CASE STUDIES REVIEW REPORT

Marine Accidents and Navigational Incidents,

published by nautical institute (MARS)

Submitted by,

Name : JEDLIN STILIGO G

Roll no : 2463710008
Course : B.Sc Nautical Science
Semester : 2
Institute : JAMS Marine Academy
 Case :1

Marine Accident Report: The Grounding of Pride of Canterbury

* Name of the vessel : Pride of Canterbury

 Date of Accident : 31 January 2008
 Location : The Downs, off Deal, Kent
 Report Published : January 2009

Summary
On 31 January 2008, the Pride of Canterbury, a passenger ferry operated by
P&O Ferries, grounded on a submerged wreck while sheltering in The Downs
off the coast of Kent. The incident occurred after Dover Port was closed due to
severe weather, forcing the vessel to wait offshore.
The captain provided verbal instructions only, and no formal passage plan was
created. The bridge team relied heavily on an electronic navigation system
(VMS), which was not approved as a primary navigation tool. Due to incorrect
settings, the wreck was not visible on the display. Paper charts were available
but underused, and the crew faced several distractions, including fire alarms
and phone calls.
As a result, the vessel overshot its safe limits and struck the wreck of the
Mahratta, causing severe damage to its port propeller, tail shaft, and steering
systems. There were no injuries, and the ship was able to return to Dover with
assistance, later undergoing dry-dock repairs .
What Went Wrong
 No formal passage plan or marked danger zones.
 Electronic chart system (VMS) was used as the main tool, but not
approved.
 Wreck was hidden due to incorrect system settings.
 Paper chart was underused and not updated.
 Crew lacked proper ECDIS training.
 The bridge team was distracted by fire alarms and non-navigation calls.
 Confusion over command and informal watch handovers.
 Possible crew fatigue due to extended duty cycles.

Damage Sustained
 Loss of port controllable pitch propeller hub
 Around 1 meter of tail shaft destroyed
 Damage to stern tube bearings, rudder stock, and internal framing
 Misalignment affecting gearbox and main engines
 The ship returned to Dover with tug assistance and was later dry-docked
 Precautions

1. Always prepare a formal passage plan, even for short or waiting

passages.
2. Mark no-go zones and hazards clearly on both paper and electronic
charts.
3. Use only certified ECDIS or approved systems for primary navigation.
4. Ensure all bridge officers are trained in ECDIS and radar use.
5. Conduct regular navigation proficiency checks for bridge crew.
6. Plot positions regularly on paper charts, especially near hazards.
7. Avoid over-reliance on unapproved navigation tools or displays.
8. Keep engines and anchors ready in case of emergency maneuvers.
9. Use both visual and electronic means for situational awareness.

Conclusion
The Pride of Canterbury grounding was a preventable incident caused by poor
preparation, over-reliance on technology, and weak bridge
managementThough no lives were lost, the ship sustained serious damage and
operations were disrupted.
 Case : 2

Marine Accident Report: Collision Between Norwegian

Dream and Ever Decent

 Name of Vessels : Norwegian Dream (Cruise Ship) and Ever

Decent (Container Ship)
 Date of Accident : 24 August 1999
 Location : Dover Strait, 3.2 nautical miles from F3 Buoy
(Southwest TSS Lane)
 Report Published : March 2000

Summary
On 24 August 1999, the cruise ship Norwegian Dream collided with the
container ship Ever Decent in the southwest lane of the Dover Strait Traffic
Separation Scheme, near the F3 buoy. The accident occurred in clear weather
just after midnight in a heavily congested shipping area.
Norwegian Dream, as the give-way vessel, failed to take effective action to
avoid the collision. The officer on watch misinterpreted radar data by relying on
true vectors instead of relative vectors, and was distracted by non-essential
tasks. Ever Decent attempted a late VHF call but also did not take evasive
action. The ships collided at a shallow angle, causing significant structural
damage and a deck fire aboard Ever Decent.
Both vessels remained afloat and managed to reach port under their own
power. There were no injuries or pollution, but the incident revealed serious
shortcomings in bridge team management, radar interpretation, and collision
avoidance procedures.
 Ever decent

What Went Wrong

 Failure of collision avoidance: Norwegian Dream was the give-way

vessel but failed to take effective early action.
 Over-reliance on ARPA/radar: The officer misinterpreted radar vectors,
likely confusing true vs. relative vectors.
 Bridge distractions: The OOW was distracted by signing a garbage log
and responding to a VHF call during a critical time.
 Late VHF communication: Ever Decent only called Norwegian Dream 4–5
minutes before impact and took no evasive action.
 Traffic congestion: Heavy traffic in the TSS limited the ability of both
vessels to maneuver early.
Actions Taken

 Norwegian Dream:
o Sounded emergency alarms and mustered passengers
o Conducted internal checks for watertight integrity
o Communicated with Dover Coastguard and proceeded safely to
port
o Post-incident drug and alcohol tests for crew (all negative)

 Recommendations Issued
o Improved radar/ARPA use (only one system for collision avoidance)
o Use of relative vectors instead of true vectors for collision risk
o Clearer night orders and support during high-traffic navigation
o Crew training in radar interpretation and bridge team coordination

Norweigan dream
Damage Sustained
 Norwegian Dream:
o Bow severely damaged from direct impact
o Temporary power and propulsion issues

 Ever Decent:
o Fire in containers on deck following impact
o Structural damage on port side.

Lessons Learned
 Bridge Team Management (BTM) is critical in busy waterways.
 Radar interpretation errors can have serious consequences; crew must
understand vector types.
 VHF communication is not a substitute for proper collision avoidance
maneuvers.
 Traffic Separation Schemes must be designed to reduce—not
concentrate—risk.

Conclusion
The 1999 collision between Norwegian Dream and Ever Decent was the result
of human error, poor coordination, and situational overload on the bridge.
While no lives were lost, the incident revealed critical gaps in radar use,
decision-making under stress, and ship traffic management.
 Case : 3
Marine Accident Report: The Grounding of K-Wave

 Name of Vessel : K-Wave

 Date of Accident : 15 February 2011
 Location : 13 miles east of Malaga, Spain
 Report Published : September 2011

Summary
On 15 February 2011, the UK-flagged feeder container ship K-Wave ran
aground at full speed on the coast 13 nautical miles east of Malaga, Spain,
while en route from Algeciras to Valencia. The incident occurred at 0546
(UTC+1), and the ship was found to be unmanned on the bridge at the time of
grounding.
The investigation revealed that a group of officers had held a party on the
bridge the night before to celebrate a birthday, during which they consumed
alcohol, disabled alarms, and left the officer of the watch (OOW) unattended.
Around 0216, the ship’s autopilot was manually changed from its planned
course (081º) to a new heading (305º), likely as a prank or under the influence
of alcohol. The vessel then continued on the wrong course for nearly 4 hours,
with no one at the controls, until it ran aground on a sandy shoreline.
After the grounding, the master delayed informing the Spanish Coastguard and
even initially denied the incident. The crew eventually responded, and the
vessel was inspected and later refloated safely with the help of a salvage tug.
Though no formal recommendations were issued by the UK Marine Accident
Investigation Branch (MAIB), the ship’s managers took disciplinary action,
dismissed the officers involved, and introduced random alcohol testing across
their fleet. The case highlighted a dangerous culture of negligence, alcohol
misuse, and poor bridge discipline, prompting support for global alcohol limits
at sea under STCW regulations.
 Grounded vessel

What Went Wrong

 Officers held an alcohol-fueled party on the bridge during passage.
 The officer of the watch (OOW) was left alone, and the watch alarm and
lookout were not active.
 At 0216, the autopilot was deliberately altered from course 081º to 305º,
taking the vessel off the planned route.
 No one was on the bridge for over 4 hours as the vessel steamed toward
shore at full speed.
 The vessel grounded at 0546 with no evasive action taken.
 The master delayed informing authorities and initially denied the
grounding when contacted.
 No alcohol testing was conducted by authorities despite clear evidence
of alcohol consumption.
Damage
 Minor hull paint damage; no breach or oil spill
 The vessel was refloated safely the next day using a commercial salvage
tug
 No injuries or environmental damage reported

Action Taken
 Company response
o Conducted internal investigation
o Dismissed the officers involved
o Introduced random alcohol testing
o Reviewed SMS to ensure safety duties (e.g., lookout) are not
sacrificed for maintenance
 No formal recommendations issued by MAIB

Lessons Learned

 Alcohol consumption on duty poses serious risks to navigation and safety

 Unmanned bridges, especially on autopilot, are extremely dangerous
 Bridge team management and watchkeeping discipline are essential
 Authorities must be honestly and promptly informed in an emergency
 STCW amendments (effective 2012) emphasize alcohol limits for
seafarers to avoid such incidents globally
* Masters must report accidents truthfully and promptly to authorities.
 Deviated course

Conclusion

The grounding of K-Wave was a result of severe professional misconduct,

including alcohol consumption, failure to maintain watch, and dishonest
communication with authorities. The ship ran aground simply because no one
was monitoring its course. Though the vessel was undamaged and no one was
hurt, the incident exposed a complete breakdown of safety protocols. It
highlights the importance of discipline, accountability, and strict enforcement
of alcohol policies at sea

Case : 4

Marine Accident Report: Dragging Anchor Leads to Collision

 Name of Vessels:
o Vessel A: Blue Bosporus
o Vessel B: Alpine Penelope
 Date of Accident: 25 March 2022
 Time: 02 30 hours
 Location: Anchorage off Prince Rupert, British Columbia,
Canada
Summary
On 25 March 2022, two bulk carriers in ballast, referred to as Vessel A
and Vessel B, were anchored about 910 meters apart while awaiting
berthing instructions. Vessel A had its main engine on 20 minutes’
notice, but the crew was unaware of an approaching gale forecasted to
bring winds of 25–35 knots.
As the wind intensified to 28–33 knots, Vessel A began to yaw and
eventually dragged anchor. The anchor drag alarm sounded, and the
vessel started drifting toward Vessel B at 1.4 knots, pushed by wind and
tidal flow. The crew attempted to deploy more anchor chain and a
second anchor, but the port anchor was initially stuck. Meanwhile,
Vessel B tried to avoid collision by paying out 11 shackles of chain to
increase distance.
 Despite both vessels’ efforts, Vessel A’s port midsection collided with
Vessel B’s starboard bow. There were no injuries or pollution, but the
event revealed clear shortcomings in weather monitoring and
emergency preparedness.
The investigation found that Vessel A's crew had not checked weather
forecasts via available methods (VHF, MF broadcasts, weather fax), and
thus were unprepared for the sudden wind increase. The crew’s
delayed response and lack of situational awareness contributed
significantly to the collision.

What Went Wrong

 Vessel A did not receive or review the weather forecast.
o Weather warnings were available via VHF, MF radio, weather fax
— but none were accessed.
 No preventive actions were taken in advance, even as wind increased to
33 knots.
 Dragging anchor alarm activated, indicating movement — but the port
anchor could not be deployed immediately.
 Delayed engine readiness: Main engine was on 20-min notice, not
immediate.
 Anchorage spacing was insufficient under storm-force conditions.

 Vessel A drifted uncontrollably at 1.4 knots toward Vessel B.

Damage Sustained
 Vessel A: No specific damage described, but was the striking vessel.
 Vessel B: Starboard bow area impacted by Vessel A’s port mid-section.
 No injuries or pollution reported in the incident.
 Actions Taken
 Vessel A deployed additional shackles on both anchors after drag was
detected.
 Main engine was eventually brought online and used for maneuvering.
 Vessel B’s crew paid out 11 shackles in an attempt to avoid impact.
 Despite efforts, collision occurred due to wind strength, late reaction,
and limited sea room.
Lessons Learned
1. Weather awareness is critical at anchor. OOWs and Masters must
actively monitor weather via all available means — including VHF,
weather fax, and official alerts.
2. Do not assume anchorage is safe during approaching storms — in severe
weather, vessels are often safer at sea.
3. Anchor dragging alarms must be respected and acted on promptly.
4. Anchor readiness and engine readiness should be adjusted based on
environmental risk.
5. Timely preventive action, including weighing anchor and putting to sea
when appropriate, may prevent escalation.

6. Close proximity at anchorage is risky during high winds — even well-

prepared ships may have limited options.

Conclusion

This accident highlights a common and preventable issue in maritime

operations — failing to maintain situational awareness of weather
conditions while at anchor. Vessel A’s crew failed to monitor local forecasts
and weather warnings, leaving the ship vulnerable to dragging under strong
winds. The result was a low-speed but avoidable collision with a nearby
anchored vessel.
Even with engines and anchors available, space limitations and delay in
decision-making can quickly render those tools ineffective in high winds.
Vigilance, preparedness, and early action remain the best defenses against
anchor-related incidents.
 Case 5

Marine Accident Summary: Capsizing of Keoyoung Sun

 Name of Vessel: Keoyoung Sun

 Date of Accident: 20 March 2024
 Time: Early morning hours (exact time not officially stated)
 Location: Off Mutsure Island, near Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture,
Japan

Summary

On March 18, 2024, the Keoyoung Sun, a South Korean-flagged chemical

tanker, departed from Hyogo Prefecture, Japan, en route to Ulsan, South Korea.
The vessel encountered severe weather conditions, including high waves and
strong winds, which forced it to anchor near Mutsure Island off the coast of
Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture.
In the early hours of March 20, the crew reported that the vessel was tilting
and requested immediate assistance. Despite the distress call, the tanker
capsized before rescue operations could stabilize the situation. Out of the 11
crew members onboard—comprising two South Koreans, eight Indonesians,
and one Chinese national—nine were confirmed dead, one was rescued with
non-life-threatening injuries, and one remained missing as of the latest reports.
What Went Wrong
 Adverse Weather Conditions: The vessel faced severe weather, including
high waves and strong winds, which contributed to its instability.
 Anchoring in Rough Seas: Anchoring in such conditions may have
increased the vessel's vulnerability to capsizing.
 Potential Cargo Shift: The movement of acrylic acid cargo in turbulent
conditions could have affected the vessel's center of gravity.
 Delayed Rescue: Despite the distress call, the rapid progression of the
incident limited the effectiveness of rescue operations.

Actions Taken
 Search and Rescue Operations: The Japan Coast Guard initiated
immediate search and rescue efforts, deploying vessels and helicopters
to the scene.
  Casualty Management: Ten crew members were recovered; nine were
confirmed deceased, and one was hospitalized with non-life-threatening
injuries.
 Environmental Monitoring: Authorities monitored for potential leaks of
acrylic acid, although no leaks were reported.

Damage Sustained
 Total loss of vessel: Keoyoung Sun sank after capsizing
 Cargo loss: ~980 tons of acrylic acid submerged
 Fatalities: 9 confirmed dead, 1 missing, 1 rescued
 Environmental risk: High, due to chemical cargo .

Lessons Learned
1. Weather Assessment: Vessels should thoroughly assess weather
forecasts and consider delaying departure in the face of severe weather
warnings.
2. Anchoring Decisions: Anchoring in open seas during adverse conditions
can increase risks; alternative strategies should be evaluated.
3. Cargo Securing: Proper securing of cargo is critical to maintaining
stability, especially in rough seas.
4. Emergency Preparedness: Rapid response protocols and crew training
are essential for effective action during emergencies.
Conclusion
The tragic capsizing of the Keoyoung Sun underscores the critical importance of
weather assessment, decision-making regarding anchoring in adverse
conditions, cargo securing practices, and emergency preparedness. This
incident serves as a somber reminder of the perils faced at sea and the
necessity for stringent safety measures and protocols.