Durán, I. S. (2017). Autocratisation, authoritarian progressions and fragmented states.

In I. Szmolka, Political Change in the Middle East and North Africa: After the Arab
Spring (pp. 403-423). United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press. Price; 2518/-INR.

This seventeenth chapter and the final one of the book titled as ‘Political Change in the
Middle East and North Africa: After the Arab Spring’, Inmaculada Szmolka and Marien Dura
has highlighted the negative political changes in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA)
countries following the Arab Spring of 2011. They have placed them within the broader
notion of "democratic involution" as described by Francis Fukuyama. This chapter has
highlighted the way Arab Spring fostered negative trends eroding the very nature of
democratization from the MENA. For instance, Turkey's transition from a failed democratic
governance in 2011 to a more restrictive and authoritarian regime, worsened by the 2016
coup. Followed by, the authoritarian progression in Bahrain and Kuwait as well as the
fragmentation and failure of Iraq and Syria.

This chapter has begun with the brief explanation of the process of autocratisation in Turkey,
that is a notable example of democratic regression. Initially, Turkey has been regarded as a
model for democratic development in the Middle East, particularly post- Arab Spring, Turkey
has evolved into a more authoritarian state, due to several by internal uprisings and regional
imbalances. However, this transition started with the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his
Justice and Development Party (AKP), who initially implemented economic and political
changes aimed at strengthening Turkey's relationship with Europe, including reducing the
military's political power, prioritizing human rights, and integrating the Kurdish population
into political life. However, Erdogan's push for a hyper-presidential system, the repression of
protests like those in Gezi Park (2013), corruption scandals, and fractures on freedoms,
especially post the failed 2016 coup emphasized the transition towards autocratic rule. As a
result, Turkey has been by the authors as downgraded from a "defective democracy" to a
"quasi-competitive, restrictive pluralist authoritarianism." However, the factors involved for
such a transformation as mentioned in the chapter are- Turkey’s rigid electoral system that
has been characterized by certain undemocratic elements, such as the 10% national threshold
for parliamentary representation, which limits pluralism and undermines political
accountability, particularly impacting Kurdish parties and minority groups. The elections of
2011, 2014, 2015, and the changes in the parliament and presidential elections highlighted the
growing imbalance, with Erdogan consolidating his power through legal and electoral
advantages. Despite the lack of a formal constitutional change to establish a presidential

1|Page
system, Erdogan's de facto control over state institutions, particularly after becoming
president in 2014, led to the erosion of checks and balance system. Also, major corruption
and lack in transparency among governance involving government ministers in 2013 and
concerns over government influence in judicial proceedings and public expenditures have
tarnished Turkey’s political environment. Lastly, the hurdles in execution of tights liberty and
freedom especially since the Gezi Park protests, marks a significant shift towards
authoritarianism.

In the third portion of the chapter, Inmaculada Szmolka and Marien Dura has presented a
case study of two major nations such as Bahrain and Kuwait, which has paved the path
towards authoritarianism. Bahrain experienced severe intensification of political turmoil in
2011, with protests mainly led by the Shiite community asking for constitutional reforms and
better rights, rather than the removal of the monarchy. However, the government has
restrained these protests with military support from Gulf states, and political pluralism has
since declined. Opposition groups, such as the Shiite al-Wefaq, boycotted the elections,
protesting it as an unfair system. Despite some constitutional changes in 2012, the king
retains absolute control, and the government is still dominated by the royal patronage.
However, political freedoms have more worsened, with strict limits on protests, media
censorship, and heavy penalties for dissidents. Although some attempts were made to
investigate the human rights abuses, but the regime continues to suppress, making Bahrain’s
political environment more authoritarian and repressive.

On the other hand, Kuwait has faced severe persistent protests since 2011, rooted
by opposition to the government corruption and growing authoritarianism, but unlike other
countries in the region, it did not initiate any substantial political reforms. The ‘Kuwaiti
Spring’ has led to significant governmental and parliamentary instability, including three
elections in two and a half years and attempts by the emir to control parliament. This
instability weakened pluralism and political competition, as opposition parties boycotted
elections, and new restrictive laws limited political freedoms. Kuwait’s political system
evolved from a quasi-competitive authoritarianism to a more hegemonic and restrictive
pluralist authoritarianism, marked by government instability, weakened checks and balances,
and diminishing public liberties. Despite political movements, including secular, leftist,
Shiite, Salafi, and Islamist groups, demanding reforms like the legalization of political
parties, the government refused to respond. However, election changes in 2012 and 2013
further co-opted candidates by the ruling family, pushing the opposition to boycott or

2|Page
participate with limited influence. Moreover, protests against government corruption led to
the resignation of the prime minister, but royal intra-family conflicts determined the course of
governmental changes. While Kuwait had traditionally enjoyed greater freedoms compared to
other Gulf monarchies, the Arab Spring led to hurdles on rights and liberties, including ban
on gatherings, limited freedom of association, and strict controls on media and the Internet,
thereby signalling a regression toward authoritarianism.

In the last section of the chapter the authors considered Syria and Iraq as the failed and
fragmented states. Syria has been considered such due to prolonged civil war that began in
2011 when mass protests against President Bashar al-Assad were met with violent repression.
The conflict intensified into multiple angles involving various rebel groups, terrorist
organizations like ISIS, Kurdish forces, and external factors such as Russia, Iran, and
Hezbollah supporting the Assad regime. Although Assad still holds some power and has made
superficial political changes like allowing new parties and holding elections, these reforms
are largely symbolic. Real opposition is banned or suppressed, and elections are neither free
nor fair. Assad still controls key powers like appointing the government, vetoing laws, and
ruling the parliament. Further, the nation is divided among rival forces, with the government
only controlling about 40% of the land and basic amenities failed to serve the common
people due to high corruption and millions of people have been killed, displaced, or forced to
flee. Moreover, human rights are widely violated by all sides, and freedoms of expression,
association, and media are strictly under the jurisprudence by the regime. Hence, Syria stands
as an authoritarian force largely experienced war-torn situation and a broken state where the
basic rights, governance structure and unity has totally washed down.

On the other hand, Iraq's political scenario since 2011 has showed the features of
a weakened and fragmented state struggling with regime erosion, sectarian division, and
limited state capacity. Mass protests have been driven by unemployment, corruption,
insecurity, and poor governance, particularly under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose
centralization of power alienated Sunni and Kurdish communities and vaporised sectarian
tensions. Despite periodic elections that have been largely free and fair, Iraq’s democracy
remains fragile due to the dominance of ethno-sectarian party politics, weak institutional
framework, and ineffective governance. Al-Maliki’s tenure witnessed constitutional
hegemonization and repression, contributing to political polarization and the rise of extremist
movements like ISIS, which captured large parts of territory and further weakened the state’s
authority. Further, his successor, Haider al-Abadi, initiated reforms and a more inclusive

3|Page
approach, but efforts were undermined by entrenched corruption, resistance from political
factions, and continued public discontent. The Iraqi state continues to lack a monopoly on the
use of force, as seen in the autonomy of Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the existence of
armed groups. Furthermore, rights and liberties have deteriorated, particularly for Sunni
protesters, amid vague legal restrictions and ongoing violence. Thus, while formal democratic
structures persist, Iraq exemplifies a highly fragile and polarized state with deeply flawed in
governance structure and that resulted as a barrier in democratic consolidation.

In ‘Autocratisation, authoritarian progressions and fragmented states’, Inmaculada Szmolka

and Marien Dura concluded their analysis that the Arab Spring of 2011 did not lead to a new
wave of democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Instead, since the
early 2000s, most MENA countries have transitioned towards a more authoritarian rule.
Governments in the region often viewed protests as threats to national security rather than as
chances to become more democratic nation. As a result, many protests were met with
violence, which in some countries resulted into civil wars. Apart from Tunisia, which
successfully transitioned to democracy, no other nation in the region saw real democratic
progress or regime change. Further, authoritarian rule and weak institutions remained
common challenge in the MENA region. For example, Turkey, once a flawed democracy, has
become more authoritarian, while Bahrain and Kuwait have also transformed backwards
politically. While, Syria has collapsed into war and is now considered a failed state, and Iraq
is close to the same path. Overall, the region is following a global trend of democratic
decline, with more restrictions on human rights, less political freedom, and increasing
concentration of power in the hands of few rulers is creating a strong opposition towards the
aspiration of freedom, democracy, and human rights.

Reference
Durán, I. S. (2017). Autocratisation, authoritarian progressions and fragmented states. In I.
Szmolka, Political Change in the Middle East and North Africa: After the Arab
Spring (pp. 403-423). United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press .

4|Page
5|Page