NS Unit 5
NS Unit 5
DATE
OATE
Compae
2
Contdentiaihyin
by PGP
PGP i Another basic senvic pIovide:!
pep is centdenfalfly. iquue shaes the cantdenfialh
hih can be descibed as tollaw.
E[RUL,kl
POb
C DA
EP) M
DATE
oit
The sessien key is encryphed sing eAST RSA,uSing
receipt's public key and is prelended to the meságe.
The receve uses RSA nithih private key to denyet
and ecoven the sessien key.
The sessin key is used to deaypt the inessage.
Contidentialiy and Autenticaian : As shaon in Bause
both senvíces may be used for the same messaqe
Compae
: Cenidentially &authenticaen
fox te plaintext
First a sl¡nahure is qeherated Bor
meSSage ani prepended to the nessage.
Then plainte mAsagt plun sigoahä i\encyplehusty
RSA: Tats seyionee sefenble
using
Then plaintext message plus sinatue it encryphedencxypYed
0 IDEA
CAST - 12!o7 es 3DES cnd sessin key is
signs the
ohen bth seavices ane used, sender first
the
pivate key then enciptsessicn
Lmessaye he
messaqe oih sessian keyand hen encryels
key wit the reipitnks publt. key
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H= hash funcion
Ks= Session key used in symmebi entiyphon scheme
pka: private key of wen Aused în publfc key encayphon
pla =puble key of use A, uIed fn puble-key enCyphie
EP > public-key enoypo
DP= publrc -key decryphen
EL = Symmehic encTypien
DC =Symmehie decryphon
IL Concatenalion
z = Compression using zrp algoihm.
DATE
DATE
pivat key
(RNG
publiC key
messar seasinkey
Message
slanghue ’Output
mesag?
DATE
priate
pbti
Key PVa
Yeeives
key I D Dp
Eneryped Sender's
sesrion ket Key ID
session key Encypke
-diqkst DP
Encaphd
message
Sgnatue Compre
mesaye
H
|.
Decypbng the message i
a. pGP tehives tle xeceñveas piivake key on
he pivate key sng, using he key z Aeld in the
sienahune key component of he mes sage as an index.
b:PGP zecoveis he \bansmiffel message digest.
c PGP conpudes messag digest fox thexeceived
messaga and compaues i to the tynsmited mesape
diest to auhenttcàt e
. Decyphng message
a. PGP zeives the
pivate key zing usingxereîveispsivate key tsom the
the key ID feld fo the sesicn
key tompMent ot the message as an index
b PGP prOTmpts he usen fox the
he encayped pivate key passphrase to vecoveL
(. PGP hen gecovens the
te message session key and decry pts
2. Autenbcating the
a: PGp etdves the melsage i
key zíng uaing Be key sendent publîc key rem the publi
zp Meld in the sieoatue key
component ofCF the messape. as an fndex.
b-GP recovexs e tronsmited message digest.
c. PGP computes the message digest for he
message and companes if to he Teceived
diyesE toauttentate. hrausmitted meisage
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TP secuily
IP Secuny i te capabiliy hat can becad!o
present veisen oi Loteset Protocol (IPVhTv
means of addilion heades fy seCAe communiafuo
laCross LAN, WAN and Iotenel
TPsec isa set of prctocol and mechanisn tf
provide conidentialiy, auttenbiastienmesage integxiy
and.zeplay detecion at Ip layen
DATE
Architecture
ESP AH
|Protocol Protoco)
Encoypho Authentca
Alqovihm algov+thm
Domcin o
inteupelatio
Key
Management
ig : TPSec DoCument
2-IPSec Senvices i-
at the
IPSec povides secuity seruies
TP layeby enabling a system to selet
reguied secuity pyotocols, détermine the
to usefox the services
Too pyotocols ane used to provide secwihy:
algorithy
An authentcation pzotocol destpnated by He heade
of the pzotocol, authentcaton headea (AH):
Combined
by the fomatenczyphían lautbentzatien_proBoco desizoatel
of packek foy that pyotcol ESP.
The serwices
prevfded by
" Access Conlo the prabacels oie
" Connechienless integiy
Data eoifo_ authenhcaht
Reieckin ot aeplayed packek
cinttdeotalth
UogiBed tratt Aoo centidenhalily.
3. Seculy Asseciatins:
A key concept that ppeas in both the authentitio
and contdertialiiy
associatoy (SA). mechanismfoy IPthe secuiy
¢n assocîafen is ne way
and eceive.fox too selaticnsbip betoeen sende
associatiens ane eguired. Oay secwity exchange,tsseo.
Asecuwaihy associan is wniguely Tdentied by thse
paramekeis.
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End to en
aultherticateon
Inteena N/
Route Extena
End toend
-uuthentiatn
End to ineumediale
authentcaen
hien primanly
Transport mode pxovlaes pxcteasexking' kox upper
ayei protocel payloads by the authenicaten
aten oiainal T header and before IP payload.
Typically transport mode i used foy end' to endl
communîcalien behween teoc hosts.
TunnelMode provide prote ctino the inteemttite
entre Ip atter'the AH oy ESP Hields cne added to
packek plus secuy payloed
the IR packek. The entivepayload
Hlds is treated as the of neo ouden IP packet.
Tunnel Mode is used when one oY botth encds o as SA
stcuihy gaBeuway such a tirewal oT TOuter that
implement ISe
Encapsulating Secuaky Payloads
Encap sdlaing selusty Payload proide,
contidentialy sewtces inchued'ng confaenialiy
and imited tratk Pbo contidenbalry
content authentcdion sevie
ESP can_ also provde an
wih te same MAG.
|6 24
Secunihy Pavamehe index ser)
Sequence Numbel
Payload Data
(vaiable
Padding o-55 byBes
Pad lengt | Next Headey
Authenicahey Data CVau able)
ta: Espfomak
Eiyune chees Pormat o ESP packets. It conting
klleuwng Aelds
SeLuuity Paameten Index (seE): 32bits - Tdentihey a
seuth asocialin
Sequene Number (32 bits): A menotonically focreasing.
Lcounter value ; this
hi pQvide, an anbreplay hunctan.
Poylaad Data (vaiable) This is tansport levelsëgment
Ltranspezt modo ox TP packel ctunel mode) that is
proledked by encyphien
Padding (ó-255 bytes)
Pad Magh.
Iengh (3 bits) : Dndicates the mumber ot pad bta
imnediately prtceding this feld.
Next Headei ii Ldenlities the type of daty contoinedn
Be pay bad data ield by ldentifina the Ast header in
Hat póylocd
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Combining SecuihyAssociatin
Secuaihy Assocíakiun
An todivtdual´sA can fnplement ethen the
authentication ox ESP protocol but not bot,.
Sometimes aa pantcular tatt Aloo oill call Poro
he senvtces provided by both AH AH and
nd ESP. A
ta ic tlo may require TPSec services behueeD pasiaub
and x sameflow sepozate sevices bthoeen hot
4akecays.
secuwih
i all theae cases, mulkple SAs mustbe emplcyed for
He same cases tratic flo to acheve thedesired
PSec sewice
secunihy associabons may becombined foto bundles to
too
) Traxpirt adiacency moxe thun me
an same IPIp packel wihout fovoking secwity pretuce
Iterated Tunneltngi aplicaien oY tuonelting.
secuthy proBocels eected thxugh IPmulkiple layeis od
tunnelirg.
SA can implement either AH oT ESP
both Tzah lo may pxotocol but not
bchseen hosts Secuity yequire sepasate TPSec senices.
associakien 'bundle veten to a
sequene oi SAS.
Basic Combinaons:
be supponted aachitechee
IPSec Ish tou examples that muat
în on
AH oY ESP.Host to împlementaen. Each'SA can be he
host SAs ane eftey transparto
tunnelotherwise it must be tumel
Case I: AI Secuihy s provided mode.
tat fmplement IPsec behoeen end system
AH in transport mode 2.possible
ESP in combincltiens oarei
3 AH followed by Esp in transpot modetransport made
4 Any one of a, b or C nside and AH oy eSP in tungel mod e
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