University of Sargodha

Course : Advance Database Management System

MSIT Spring ( 1st Semester )

Title : “A Survey of Security Mechanisms and Threats in

NoSQL Databases”
1. Abstract

The increasing adoption of NoSQL databases has revolutionized the way large-scale, high-velocity, and
diverse data types are stored and managed. Unlike traditional relational databases, NoSQL systems
prioritize scalability and flexibility, often at the expense of comprehensive built-in security features. This
survey explores the security mechanisms implemented in six popular NoSQL databases: MongoDB,
Neo4j, Redis, Cassandra, Amazon DynamoDB, and Couchbase. We investigate the authentication
protocols, access control models, encryption strategies, auditing capabilities, and known vulnerabilities.
Our comparative analysis reveals significant variations in security practices and highlights the need for
stronger standardization. The findings aim to assist developers, administrators, and researchers in
deploying more secure NoSQL systems.

2. Introduction

As data continues to grow rapidly across industries, the need for databases that can handle large
volumes, high speed, and diverse formats has increased. Traditional relational databases, like MySQL
and Oracle, use structured tables and are based on a fixed schema. While they offer strong security and
reliability, they are often not suitable for modern applications that need flexibility and horizontal
scalability. This has led to the rise of NoSQL databases, which stand for "Not Only SQL". These databases
are designed to store, process, and retrieve unstructured or semi-structured data quickly and efficiently
across distributed systems.

NoSQL databases are widely used in areas such as cloud computing, big data analytics, real-time
applications, and IoT systems. They are divided into different types based on their data models:
document-based, key-value stores, column-family, and graph databases. Each type is optimized for
different use cases and provides its own way of storing and accessing data. While NoSQL databases bring
great benefits in terms of performance and scalability, their design often lacks consistent and
standardized security features, making them more vulnerable to attacks.

The explosion of big data applications in areas like IoT, social media, and e-commerce has led to
widespread use of NoSQL databases. Unlike RDBMS, which enforce rigid schemas and ACID properties,
NoSQL databases offer schema-less data storage, horizontal scalability, and distributed architecture
[Stonebraker, 2015].

However, this shift introduces unique security challenges. Traditional databases have matured over
decades with extensive security models, while many NoSQL databases were initially designed without
considering strong security [Okman et al., 2011].

This paper focuses on understanding the security landscape of NoSQL databases, identifying both
protections and vulnerabilities. Specifically, we:

 Survey the security features across six major NoSQL databases.

 Analyze common vulnerabilities and security lapses.
 Provide a comparative framework for evaluating NoSQL database security.
 Suggest future research directions.

3. Overview of NoSQL Databases

MongoDB: A document-oriented database storing data in JSON-like documents with dynamic schemas,
designed for high performance and easy scalability [MongoDB Docs, 2024].

Neo4j: A graph database optimized for querying and storing interconnected data, using the Cypher
query language and the Bolt protocol [Neo4j Documentation, 2024].

Redis: An in-memory key-value store known for low-latency access, often used for caching, messaging,
and real-time analytics [Redis Labs, 2023].

Cassandra: A distributed wide-column store originally developed by Facebook, offering high availability
without a single point of failure [Apache Cassandra Docs, 2024].

Amazon DynamoDB: A fully managed proprietary NoSQL database service by AWS that offers automatic
scaling, encryption, and integration with IAM [AWS DynamoDB Documentation, 2024].

Couchbase: A hybrid document and key-value store that combines caching and persistent storage,
offering SQL-like querying capabilities through N1QL [Couchbase Server Docs, 2024].

4. Security Requirements in NoSQL Systems

Authentication:
Verifying the identity of users or services accessing the database. Weak or absent authentication is a
major vulnerability [Okman et al., 2011].
Authorization and Access Control:
Ensuring users can only access data and operations permitted by their roles; critical for preventing
privilege escalation attacks [Sharma and Kadam, 2019].

Encryption (at rest and in transit):

Protecting data confidentiality during storage and transmission. Encryption must be strong and properly
managed to resist attacks [MongoDB Security Manual, 2024].

Auditing and Monitoring:

Recording access and operational activities for forensic and compliance purposes [Neo4j Security
Whitepaper, 2023].

Backup and Recovery:

Securing backup copies against unauthorized access and ensuring recovery procedures are resilient
against tampering [AWS Backup Best Practices, 2024].

Secure Deployment and Configuration:

Reducing attack surface by securing network settings, disabling unused services, and following least
privilege principles [Redis Security Guidelines, 2023].

5. Common Threats and Vulnerabilities in NoSQL Databases

Lack of default security settings:

Many NoSQL databases prioritize ease of use over security defaults, leading to exposed instances (e.g.,
open MongoDB servers being hijacked) [Shodan Report, 2023].

Insecure authentication mechanisms:

Use of weak passwords or unauthenticated modes can allow attackers full control over databases [Redis
Security Analysis, 2022].

Insufficient role-based access control:

Some NoSQL systems have basic or non-existent RBAC, leading to broad user privileges [Okman et al.,
2011].

Injection attacks:
Poor input validation can enable NoSQL injection, compromising data integrity [OWASP NoSQL Injection
Guide, 2024].

Data breaches through misconfiguration:

Misconfigured instances often expose data publicly on the Internet [Elastic Security Report, 2023].
Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities:
Systems can be overwhelmed by resource exhaustion or logical flaws [Apache Cassandra CVE-2023-
2976].

Insider threats:
Authorized users misusing access, particularly dangerous if logging and auditing are weak [CSO Insider
Threat Report, 2023].

Insecure APIs and third-party integrations:

APIs or libraries without proper security checks can become a point of exploitation [AWS Security Best
Practices, 2023].

6. Security Mechanisms in Individual NoSQL Databases

6.1 MongoDB

 Supports SCRAM authentication, LDAP integration, and x.509 certificates [MongoDB Security
Docs, 2024].
 Fine-grained Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
 TLS/SSL for data-in-transit; Encrypted storage engines for data-at-rest.
 Built-in auditing framework configurable by action type.
 Notable attacks: Ransom attacks on unsecured MongoDB instances (2016).

6.2 Neo4j

 Native authentication and LDAP/Active Directory support [Neo4j Admin Manual, 2024].
 RBAC system for database and graph operations.
 Secure Bolt protocol communications with TLS.
 Backup systems offer consistency validation.
 Risks: Earlier versions vulnerable to authentication bypass (CVE-2017-11467).

6.3 Redis

 Basic password authentication (AUTH command); no user accounts [Redis Security Guidelines,
2023].
 TLS introduced in Redis 6.0 for encrypted communication.
 Recommended use with stunnel or VPN when TLS unavailable.
 Common issues: Exposed unauthenticated instances being hijacked.

6.4 Cassandra

 Internal authentication with passwords; can integrate Kerberos [Cassandra Docs, 2024].
 TLS for client-node and node-node communication.
 Fine-grained audit logging available.
  Data encryption features: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE).
 Example threat: Misconfigured Cassandra clusters publicly exposed (2021).

6.5 Amazon DynamoDB

 Authentication and authorization managed through AWS IAM [AWS DynamoDB Docs, 2024].
 VPC Endpoints for private network access.
 Encryption at rest using AWS KMS; TLS for all network traffic.
 Security monitoring using AWS services like CloudTrail, GuardDuty.
 Risks: Compromise through weak IAM policies.

6.6 Couchbase

 Supports RBAC and LDAP authentication [Couchbase Docs, 2024].

 TLS for client-server and inter-node communication.
 Data encryption both at rest and in memory.
 Eventing and audit logging features.
 Threat examples: Exploitable misconfigurations in admin UI access.

7. Comparative Analysis

Security Feature Matrix: Table showing which databases support encryption, RBAC, auditing, backup
security, etc.

Amazon
Feature MongoDB Neo4j Redis Cassandra Couchbase
DynamoDB
SCRAM, Basic Auth, Password Internal IAM-based LDAP, Certs,
Authentication
x.509 Certs LDAP (optional) authentication (AWS) Internal
Authorization / Fine-grained Basic No native Role-based IAM Fine-grained
RBAC RBAC RBAC RBAC auth Policies RBAC
Bolt
Encryption In- TLS/SSL Optional SSL/TLS Always via
protocol + TLS enforced
Transit supported TLS supported TLS
TLS
Transparent
Native, External
Encryption At- Manual Data Always Native
WiredTiger tools
Rest setup Encryption enabled encryption
Encryption needed
(TDE)
Native
No native Audit logs CloudTrail
Auditing auditing Basic logs Full audit logs
auditing plugin integration
available
Ops Manual or Manual Snapshots, Backup
Backup & Automated
Manager, Enterprise dump & incremental Service,
Recovery backups
Snapshots features restore backup XDCR
Default Partially Moderate Weak Moderate Strong Good (post
 Amazon
Feature MongoDB Neo4j Redis Cassandra Couchbase
DynamoDB
secure
Security (recent (Enterprise (trust- (cloud
(needs config) configuration)
Posture versions better) based) managed)
better)
Yes (notable Frequent Fewer direct Moderate,
Vulnerability Some Some auth
ransomware exposure breaches, admin panel
History CVEs bypass CVEs
issues) cases user errors exposures

Strengths and Weaknesses: MongoDB strong in RBAC, Redis weak in authentication.

Database Strengths Weaknesses

Strong authentication and RBAC, Past history of unsecured defaults, targeted
MongoDB
encryption support by ransomware
Secure communication with Bolt Limited auditing, manual encryption setup
Neo4j
protocol, basic RBAC for free version
Minimal security model; assumes trusted
Redis High performance, simple setup
network; requires external hardening
Complexity in managing secure clusters,
Cassandra Good encryption, flexible RBAC
auditing is add-on
Complexity in policy management;
Amazon Built-in security, encryption
security depends on AWS user
DynamoDB enforced, IAM tightly integrated
configuration
Enterprise-grade security (TLS, Past incidents of admin interface exposure;
Couchbase
RBAC, auditing) initial setup must be hardened

Gaps: Inconsistent auditing and default settings among NoSQL platforms.

  Redis and earlier versions of other NoSQL databases lack mature RBAC and
auditing.
  Default installations (especially in Redis, MongoDB) are often insecure out-of-the-
box unless properly configured.
  No uniform compliance standards (e.g., GDPR-readiness, HIPAA-readiness) across
NoSQL types.
  Insufficient protection against sophisticated insider threats and advanced persistent
threats (APTs).
Trends: Movement towards better encryption (e.g., Redis introducing native TLS), IAM integrations,
cloud-native security practices.

 Cloud-native NoSQL services (like DynamoDB) generally have stronger security postures
due to forced best practices (IAM, TLS, automated backups).

 Self-managed NoSQL databases (MongoDB, Redis, Cassandra, Couchbase) often require

manual hardening and are prone to misconfiguration risks.

 RBAC and auditing are becoming standard across newer versions, but earlier versions
lacked them.

 Encryption at rest and in transit is now a default expectation, but Redis and Neo4j free
editions lag behind.

 Misconfiguration, not inherent database flaws, remains the biggest real-world risk.

8. Open Challenges and Future Directions

 Standardization: No standard for NoSQL security; adoption of best practices varies greatly.
 Evolving Threats: Ransomware targeting misconfigured databases, AI-assisted attacks, etc.
 Advanced Defense Mechanisms: Need for AI/ML-based anomaly detection within NoSQL
systems.
 Privacy Compliance: GDPR and CCPA compliance strategies are still evolving for NoSQL data
handling [GDPR Compliance Guide, 2024].
 Future Research: Homomorphic encryption for NoSQL, secure multi-tenant database-as-a-
service platforms.

9. Conclusion

The rapid growth of NoSQL databases necessitates a stronger focus on security. While progress has been
made in areas such as encryption and RBAC, significant vulnerabilities remain due to misconfiguration,
weak defaults, and evolving threat vectors. Developers and administrators must prioritize secure
deployment practices and continuous monitoring. Future research should aim at standardizing security
features across NoSQL platforms and developing proactive security mechanisms.
10. References

 [MongoDB Documentation, 2024]

 [Neo4j Security Whitepaper, 2023]
 [Redis Labs Official Docs, 2023]
 [AWS DynamoDB Best Practices, 2024]
 [Cassandra Documentation, 2024]
 [Couchbase Server Security Whitepaper, 2023]
 [Okman et al., "Security Issues in NoSQL Databases," 2011]
 [Sharma and Kadam, "Survey on NoSQL Security," 2019]
 [OWASP NoSQL Injection Guide, 2024]

In general, NoSQL databases do not follow a unified security model. Many of them trade security
features for performance and ease of deployment. This makes them attractive to developers but leaves
them open to various types of attacks such as unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, injection
attacks, insecure configuration, and data leaks. Moreover, their distributed nature adds complexity
when it comes to enforcing consistent security practices across nodes and data centers.

This paper surveys the current state of security in NoSQL databases, focusing on MongoDB, Cassandra,
and Neo4j. It explores the common and unique threats faced by each system, the mechanisms currently
in place to defend against those threats, and the gaps that still exist. The goal is to provide a clear
understanding of where NoSQL databases stand in terms of security and what future improvements can
be made to protect sensitive data in modern, high-performance applications