Description

This Moodle book presents a discussion of the nature of human acts and other
questions concerning it.

Table of contents
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Nature of a Human Act
o 2.1. On Acts of Man
o 2.2. The End of Human Acts

• 3. The Determinants of the Morality of Human Acts

• 4. On Direct and Indirect Voluntariness
o 4.1. Case of Double Effect
o 4.2. The Doctrine of Double Effect

• 5. Modifiers of Human Acts

• 6. References

1. Introduction
Which kinds of acts are human? Are all actions moral? These are some of the
questions addressed in the meta-ethical study of human actions. This lesson
module tackles the nature of human acts as objects of ethical study. The questions
addressed here are as follows:

• What is the nature of a human act?

o What are acts of man?
o What is the end of human acts?
• What are the determinants of the morality of human acts?
• Do human acts have degrees of voluntariness?
o What is a case of double effect?
o What morally justifies an act that produces not only a good effect but
also an evil effect?
• What are the modifiers of human acts?
 2. The Nature of a Human Act
In philosophy, the term nature has a specific meaning. Nature is that which defines
a thing as such. It constitutes the what-ness or the essence of something. For
example, the table-ness of the table (its purpose, function, form, etc.) constitutes its
nature or essence. The nature of the table is that which defines it as table.

The preliminary lesson explains that the study of philosophy entails investigating
the first and ultimate principles or causes of beings or things that exist. The nature
of a thing is the cause that explains its existence. It is its first cause. Hence, in ethics,
to study the nature of human acts entails investigating the fundamental elements
or causes that constitute them as such.

A human act is an act that comes from the deliberate will of an agent. As such, it
has a moral character, that is, it can be judged as either morally good or morally bad.
There are three essential components of a human act, namely,

1. Knowledge
2. Freedom
3. Voluntariness

No human act is done without knowledge. This means that when a human act is
done, it is done with full advertence or awareness. The agent of such act, therefore,
is fully aware of what he is doing and the consequences of doing it. Before pursuing
an action, the agent must have deliberated to act. Deliberation presupposes that
knowledge is present. Hence, knowledge is present in the resulting act.

A human act is a free act. This means that the act stems from the free will of the
agent. The agent, thus, freely exercised his will upon deciding to act in a certain
way. To exercise one's will presupposes that one was given options to freely choose
from. This implies that the agent was not coerced or compelled to do such act. There
were no external forces that compelled the will of the agent to act in a certain way.
Freedom, therefore, is present in a human act.

A human act is a voluntary act. This means that the act was voluntarily or willfully
done by the agent. To voluntarily do something entails that one should be able to
give consent to his will to do such thing. Voluntariness, hence, is present in a
human act. Voluntariness essentially follows from both knowledge and freedom. If
either one or both of them is absent, then no voluntariness follows.
Human acts are imputable to the agent, man himself, which entails his
responsibility. Imputability is the capacity to be ascribed or attributed to something
or someone. Hence human acts are ascribable or attributable to man, since he is able
to perform them with exercise of free will and deliberation. If an act is imputable to
him, then he is responsible or accountable for it. This makes him either praise-
worthy if he has done good or blame-worthy if he has done wrong. An agent's
blame-worthiness presupposes culpability, which is the state of being at fault or
guilty for a moral wrong.

For example, your act of studying this lesson is a human act. As the agent, you did
something with full knowledge of your action. You decided to study with the
exercise of your free will. You could have simply decided not to study. But you did
out of your own doing. Since you know what you are doing and you did such thing
out of free choice, your action is one which is voluntarily done. Consequently, your
act of studying is imputable to you. This makes you the author of such act and thus
are responsible for it.

In the same way, if you cheat on exams or submit a plagiarized paper then you are
accountable and culpable for such wrongdoings. You did such things out of your
deliberate will. Thus, they are imputable to you.

In ethics, we are concerned with human acts. Particularly, we deal with their
morality. Only human acts have a moral character, that is, the quality of being
judged as good or bad.

2.1. On Acts of Man

If knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness are not present in an act then it cannot
be counted as human but an act of man. An act of man is one that does not come
from a deliberate will. As such, knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness are not
present in it. It occurs as a result of purely deterministic causal factors such as
bodily instincts and sensations. For example, the beating of your heart, the blinking
of your eyes, the rumbling of your stomach, and the swaying of your hips when you
dance, are acts of man.

In contrast to human acts, acts of man do not have a moral quality. We could say
that they are amoral. It follows, then, that such acts are not morally imputable to an
agent.
 2.2. The End of Human Acts

Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, states that "every action as well as choice, is
held to aim at some good. Hence ... the good is that at which all things aim." (I.1
1094a). Centuries later, St. Thomas Aquinas develops this claim and explains that,
regarding human acts, "the object of the will is the end and the good" ( Summa
Theologica IaIIae 1.1). It is part of the nature of human acts, therefore, that they
essentially move towards the good as their proper end.

Aquinas explains that in every action we do, the intellect always guides the will to
what it perceives as good. And since human acts are those acts that stem from the
deliberate will of man, it follows that human acts have as their proper end the good.
This entails that the good is the goal that we want to achieve through the actions
that we pursue. Whether it be the college diploma you desire to obtain, a future
stable job, a family of your own to raise, the money you want to earn for your life-
plans, all these things are the good in so far as they are the ends or goals of the
actions you are pursuing.

While Aristotle posits happiness as the ultimate end of actions, Aquinas deems that
it is God which is the ultimate end since He is goodness himself in that in Him alone
can humans find true happiness and satisfaction.

3. The Determinants of the Morality of Human Acts

It is said that human acts have a moral character, meaning they have the quality of
being either morally good or morally bad. The moral teachings of St. Thomas
Aquinas provide a meta-ethical analysis of the morality of human acts. What
accounts for the morality of human acts is the end to which they are inclined.
Human acts have their proper end, which is the good. Acts are morally good if they
are inclined towards man's natural goods as judged by reason (see St. Thomas
Aquinas' theory of natural law). These natural goods are things that contribute to
man's wellness. Ultimately, the measure of the morality of human acts is God, that
is, whether or not actions are ordered towards bringing man closer to God who alone
is the good.

According to St. Thomas, there are three determinants of the morality of human
acts. They are:
 1. the object of the act itself
2. the motive or intention (of the agent)
3. the circumstances of the act

The object is a fundamental or essential aspect of the act itself. It is the object which
the will chooses to do or not to do, that is, the thing done (or not done) and directs
the act to its natural end. In essence, acts have their own termination or end, e.g.
knowledge of truth is the end of learning, production of offspring is the end of the
sexual act, etc. The object of the act determines whether the act is intrinsically good,
intrinsically evil, or extrinsically good or evil. An intrinsically good act is one that
is directed toward man's natural good as judged by reason, e.g. learning, loving,
caring, etc. An intrinsically evil act is one that is contrary to reason and thus not
inclined to man's natural good, e.g. causing other humans harm, stealing, etc. An
extrinsically good or evil act is morally indifferent in its object, that is, it is only
either good or evil depending on the circumstances surrounding the act. For
example, talking is a natural tendency but if one talks to spread false rumors about
someone then it becomes evil.

The motive or intention of the agent is the purpose of the agent in doing the act.
Without a motive, an act is simply involuntary and not human. The motive,
although relative to the agent, is an essential aspect in evaluating the morality of
actions. The fundamental moral principle is the end does not justify the means.
Thus, a good intention does not make an intrinsically evil act morally good as, for
example, one steals money and goods to help the poor. On the other hand, a bad
intention makes an act, which in and of itself may be intrinsically good, entirely
evil.

The circumstances of the act are secondary elements, and thus not intrinsic, of the
human act itself. They are elements or conditions that surround the action in its
commission, and hence are outside the essence of the human act. They contribute
to the increased moral goodness or badness of an act. The circumstances of an act
may be known by asking: who? where? when? how? how much? by what means?
why? In principle, circumstances only add to the moral goodness or moral badness
of an action so that no evil act is made good by circumstances. A good action,
however, may become evil depending on the circumstances. Circumstances may
make a good action better, e.g. giving food to a person who is dying of starvation.
They may also make good an action which is otherwise morally indifferent, e.g.
sitting down with someone who grieves the loss of a loved one. But they may also
worsen an action that is evil in its object, e.g. robbing a beggar of his only meal of
the day. In cases where circumstances are so great the moral quality of an action
may be completely altered. Every action occurs in a specific context. This is why
the circumstances of actions are important in evaluating the morality of acts.

For an action to be morally good, it must be good in its object, intention, and
circumstances. Otherwise, the action is morally bad.

4. On Direct and Indirect Voluntariness

The degree of voluntariness of human acts may vary. One of the distinctions
regarding the degree of voluntariness of human acts is between direct and indirect
voluntariness.

Direct voluntariness is present in an act willed in itself. For example, the

voluntariness present in your act of studying this lesson is direct since the act is
willed in itself. Indirect voluntariness is present in an act which is the foreseen
result of another act directly willed. For example, the death of a soldier who throws
himself on a grenade in order to save his companions from the blast has indirect
voluntariness since it (his death) is the foreseen result of another act (throwing
himself on the grenade) directly willed.

4.1. Case of Double Effect

It is possible that a human act produces two effects: a good effect that is directly
willed; and an evil effect that is indirectly voluntary. Situations in which an action
produces two effects are called cases of double effect.

Now, two questions may arise from a case of double effect, especially when relating
it to imputability. First, when is the agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause
or act directly willed? There are parameters that account for the agent's
responsibility in such a case. They are:

1. the agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way;
2. the agent must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil
effect;
3. the agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the evil
effect.

Let us consider the following example. When a soldier throws himself on a grenade
to die so as to save his comrades from the blast, his death is imputable to him and
he is thus responsible for it since: 1) he was able to foresee the evil effect (in this
case his death) of his act; 2) he had the freedom to refrain from throwing himself on
the grenade and could have thus avoided death; 3) and morality forbids anyone
including the soldier to pursue actions that could lead to their death. Nevertheless,
the soldier's action is worthy of praise. After all, he did such thing in a radical act of
self-sacrifice so that others may be saved. The fact that he is praised for it
presupposes that he had full responsibility over his action and it was imputable to
him alone. The same holds true in a different scenario, say, a soldier pushes one of
his comrades to cover the blast from the grenade to save himself. The same
conditions are met although this time the circumstances are totally different; thus
making the soldier worthy of blame for such a deed.

The second question arising from a case of double effect is regarding the
permissibility of such acts. This will be answered with a discussion on the doctrine
of double effect on the next page.

4.2. The Doctrine of Double Effect

It was the medieval Christian philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas who formulated the
doctrine or principle of double effect in his discussion of the permissibility of self-
defense in the Summa Theologica (II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7). He writes, "an act of self-
defense may have two effects: one, the saving of one's life; the other, the slaying of
the aggressor." Aquinas argues that self-defense is justified in that it serves as
means to a goal: “Therefore, this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life,
is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in being as far
as possible.” He further argues, however, that there is a limiting condition to the
permissibility of self-defense: “And yet, though proceeding from a good intention,
an act may be rendered unlawful if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore, if a
man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful,
whereas, if he repel force with moderation, his defense will be lawful.”

For Aquinas, then, self-defense is permissible provided that the agent's intention is
to save himself and not to kill his aggressor. It may become unlawful and thus
impermissible if the means employed in saving oneself is gravely violent in
proportion to the intended goal.

The principle propounded by Aquinas is widely discussed and applied in various

contexts. Later versions of the principle stipulate four conditions for its application,
which can be summed up as follows:
 1. The object of the act must be intrinsically good or at least morally indifferent.
2. The agent must directly will the good effect and only allow or will the evil effect
indirectly.
3. The good effect must be the direct result of the action and not of the evil effect.
4. There must be a proportionately grave reason to allow the evil effect in view of
the intended good effect.

5. Modifiers of Human Acts

The modifiers of human acts are the things that may affect the human act's
essential qualities or components, and thus lessen the moral character of the
human act and consequently diminish the agent's responsibility. There are five
modifiers of human acts, namely, ignorance, concupiscence, fear, violence, and
habit. We will discuss each of them and the ethical principles governing them in
relation to moral responsibility.

Ignorance is the absence of intellectual knowledge in man. It is a negation of

knowledge; hence, a negative thing and has no essence of its own. The most
significant types of ignorance in relation to moral responsibility are invincible and
vincible ignorance. Invincible ignorance is one that no ordinary and proper
diligence can dispel because there is no way for the agent to dispel such no matter
how much he tries to rid himself of it. For example, a child who is ignorant of human
sexuality has invincible ignorance provided no external influence instills in him
the concept of sexuality. Vincible ignorance is one that can be dispelled by the use
of ordinary diligence. It is the result of the agent's lack of proper diligence to dispel
such ignorance. For example, a student who is ignorant of a given lesson in class
has vincible ignorance. If some insufficient diligence was pursued in dispelling
ignorance, it is called simply vincible. Ignorance which practically no effort is made
to dispel is called crass or supine. When ignorance is aimed at and fostered by the
agent, it is said to be affected, not because it is pretended, but because positive effort
is exerted to maintain it.

The following ethical principles can be said of ignorance. Invincible ignorance, on

the one hand, is inculpable. Thus, an act resulting from it is involuntary and not
imputable to the agent. Vincible ignorance, on the other hand, is culpable. It does
not remove, but lessens, the voluntariness of an act. As such an act resulting from
it is indirectly voluntary and is imputable to the agent. Invincible ignorance frees
us of responsibility, while vincible ignorance does not. Affected ignorance in one
way lessens voluntariness and in another way increases it. It lessens voluntariness
in the sense that, despite the bad will it implies, it is a lack of knowledge
nonetheless. It increases voluntariness in the sense that it is deliberately fostered
to serve as an excuse for sin against the law.

Concupiscence refers to the bodily appetites or tendencies that are called the
passions, namely, love, hatred, joy, grief, desire, aversion or horror, hope, despair,
courage, fear, and anger. The passions can either be antecedent or consequent to the
act. They are called antecedent when they spring into action unstimulated by the
will-act, e.g. getting angry at a criminal convicted of rape. They are called
consequent when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs them up or fosters them, e.g.
exerting effort to punch the same rapist on the face.

The following ethical principles can be said of concupiscence. First, antecedent

concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act. It disturbs the mind and thwarts
its calm judgment upon the moral qualities of an act, thus, impairing knowledge
needed for perfect voluntariness. It is a strong and sudden urge to action, and thus
it lessens the full and prompt control which the will must exercise perfectly, hence,
it impairs freedom. Thus, on both knowledge and freedom, it lessens the
voluntariness of an act, and in consequence, diminishes the responsibility of the
agent. Second, antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an
act. Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by it, they are not destroyed; and
the agent’s responsibility, while diminished, is not cancelled. If the antecedent
passion is so great as to make control of the agent’s acts impossible, then the agent
is temporarily insane, and his acts are not human acts but acts of
man. Third, consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the
voluntariness of an act. Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or indirectly.
Thus, the acts that proceed from it have their proper voluntariness.

Fear is the shrinking back of the mind from danger. It is the agitation of mind, from
slight disturbance to actual panic, brought about by the apprehension of impending
evil. Actions may proceed from fear as their cause as when a student withdraws a
subject from fear of the tough instructor, or may be done with fear as an
accompanying circumstance as when a student cheats on exams with fear. The
ethical principle on fear states that an act done with fear is voluntary, while an act
done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also
conditionally involuntary. Fear does not excuse an evil act which springs from
it. Acts done from intense fear or panic, however, are involuntary. Panic completely
obscures the mind's capacity to make full deliberation and affects the will's
capacity for free choice.
Violence is the external force applied by a free cause for the purpose of compelling
a person to perform an act that is against his will. The ethical principle on violence
states that acts elicited by the will such as a wish, intention, or consent, are not
subject to violence, while external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance
is offered, like being forced steal money while held at gunpoint, are not imputable
to the agent.

Habit refers to operative habit, which is a lasting readiness and facility, born of
frequently repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner. The ethical principle on
habit states that it does not destroy voluntariness; acts from habit are always
voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure. An example
would be a first-hand smoker's habitual act of smoking is voluntary as he allows
the habit of smoking to endure.

In summary, there are modifiers that absolve the agent of culpability, while there
are others that increase voluntariness, making the agent more culpable, while still
others only lessen voluntariness and consequently diminish the agent's
responsibility.

6. References
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics

Floyd, Shawn. "Thomas Aquinas: Moral Philosophy." Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. Available from https://iep.utm.edu/thomasaquinas-moral-
philosophy/#H2

McIntyre, Alison. "Doctrine of Double Effect." The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/>.

Ming, John. "Human Acts." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. New York: Robert
Appleton Company, 1907. 27 Aug.
2021 <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01115a.htm>.

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Available

from https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3064.htm#article7.