Subjective

Objectives Of Aai Safety Policy

Ensure that Air Navigation Service is delivered in a manner where risk of any aircraft
accident/incident is reduced to and maintained at or below As Low As Reasonably Practicable
irrespective of the volume of air traffic.

Ensure that all navigational, communications and surveillance aids function as per design
specifications and meet the required level of reliability and availability as defined by appropriate
authority.

Ensure that safety is maintained at appropriate level in airside operations, including cargo
operations at all aerodromes and identify & manage hazards in the operational area to keep
risks to aircraft operations at minimum acceptable level.

Ensure that all visual aids are maintained as per established standards and procedures.

Deliver accurate aeronautical data and information to all the users as and when they require.

Maintain the environment around the aerodrome to keep it free from any birds and wildlife that
may cause damage to the aircraft.

Conduct search and rescue coordination during emergency in an efficient and effective manner.

Provide an efficient Aerodrome Fire and Rescue response during emergencies.

Building Blocks Of Safety/ Processes of managing the safety

a. Senior management’s commitment to the management of safety. Managing safety, just
like any other management activity, requires allocation of resources. This allocation of resources
is, in all organizations, a function of senior management, hence the need for senior
management’s commitment to the management of safety. In plain language: no money, no
safety.
b. Effective safety reporting. It is a known aphorism that “one cannot manage what one
cannot measure”. In order to manage safety, organizations need to acquire safety data on
hazards that allow for measurement to take place. Most of such data will be acquired through
voluntary and self-reporting by operational personnel. It is essential therefore for organizations
to develop working environments where effective safety reporting by operational personnel
takes place.
c. Continuous monitoring through systems that collect safety data on hazards during
normal operations. Safety data collection is just the first step. Beyond collection, organizations
must analyse and extract safety information and safety intelligence from data, because data that
are collected and relegated to a drawer are as good as no data at all. Furthermore, it is
essential to share the safety information and intelligence gleaned with those who operate the
system daily for they are the ones who are in constant contact with the hazards, the
consequences of which effective safety reporting aims to mitigate.
d. Investigation of safety occurrences with the objective of identifying systemic safety
deficiencies rather than assigning blame. It is not as important to identify “who did it” as it is to
learn “why it happened”. System resilience can be much more effectively reinforced by
removing systemic deficiencies than by removing supposedly “unfit” individuals.
e. Sharing safety lessons learned and best practices through the active exchange of safety
information. Another well-known aphorism eloquently illustrates the need for data sharing and
exchange of safety information: “learn from the mistakes of others, you are not going to live long
enough to make them all yourself”. The aviation industry’s excellent tradition of sharing safety
data must be maintained and, if at all possible, reinforced.
f. Integration of safety training for operational personnel. Seldom do training curricula for
operational personnel include dedicated safety training. There is an assumption that since
“safety is everybody’s responsibility”, operational personnel are safety experts in their own right.
There is an urgent need to include dedicated training addressing the basics of safety
management at all levels of operational personnel training.
g. Effective implementation of standard operating procedures (SOPs), including the use of
checklists and briefings. SOPs, checklists and briefings, whether on a flight deck, in an air traffic
control room, in a maintenance shop or an aerodrome apron, are amongst the most effective
safety devices operational personnel have to discharge their daily responsibilities. They are a
powerful mandate from the organization regarding how senior management wants operations to
be conducted. The safety value of realistic, properly written and constantly adhered to SOPs,
checklists and briefings should never be underestimated.
h. Continuous improvement of the overall level of safety Managing safety is not one day
affair war for safety management is not a conventional warfare, where the front lines are well
defined, known to everybody, and one major battle will decide the outcome of the war.

Elements Of Safety Risk Management

Safety risk management is another key component of a safety management system. The term
safety risk management is meant to differentiate this function from the management of financial
risk, legal risk, economic risk and so forth. This section presents the fundamentals of safety risk
and includes the following topics:
a. a definition of safety risk;
b. safety risk probability;
c. safety risk severity;
d. safety risk tolerability; and
e. safety risk management.

Fundamentals Of Sms

Difference Between Error And Violation

An error is defined as ―an action or inaction by an operational person that leads to deviations
from organizational or the operational person’s intentions or expectations. In the context of an
SMS, both the State and the product or service provider must understand and expect that
humans will commit errors regardless of the level of technology used, the level of training or the
existence of regulations, processes and procedures.
A violation is defined as “a deliberate act of willful misconduct or omission resulting in a
deviation from established regulations, procedures, norms or practices. Nonetheless,
non-compliance is not necessarily the result of a violation because deviations from regulatory
requirements or operating procedures may be the result of an error.
The fundamental difference between operational errors and violations lies in intent. While an
error is unintentional, a violation is a deliberate act. People committing operational errors are
trying to do the right thing, but for the many reasons discussed in previous paragraphs on
operational error, they fail to achieve their expectations. People committing violations, on the
other hand, know that they are engaging in behaviours that involve a deviation from established
procedures, protocols, norms or practices, yet, they persevere in the intent.

Action To Be Taken For Major Change In Scars

Where the SCARS form indicates a Major change a Safety Plan and a Safety Case must be
prepared and a HAZLOG Register for this change must be developed.

Defenses-Technology Training,Regulations
Defences are resources provided by the system to protect against the safety risks that
organizations involved in production activities generate and must control.
Typically, defences in aviation can be grouped under three large headings: technology, training
and regulations. Defences are usually the last safety net to contain latent conditions, as well as
the consequences of lapses in human performance

Error safety Strategies

Safety strategies must be put into place to control or eliminate errors. The strategies to control
errors leverage the basic defences within the aviation system. These include the following:
a. Reduction strategies provide direct intervention to reduce or eliminate the factors
contributing to the error. Examples of reduction strategies include improvement of ergonomic
factors and reduction of environmental distractions.
b. Capturing strategies assume the error will be made. The intent is to ―capture‖ the error
before any adverse consequences of the error are felt. Capturing strategies are different from
reduction strategies in that they utilize checklists and other procedural interventions rather than
directly eliminating the error.
c. Tolerance strategies refer to the ability of a system to accept that an error will be made but
without experiencing serious consequences. The incorporation of redundant systems or multiple
inspection processes are examples of measures that increase system tolerance to errors.

Error Definition And Types

An error is defined as ―an action or inaction by an operational person that leads to deviations
from organizational or the operational person’s intentions or expectations.
Errors can be divided into the following categories:
a. Slips and lapses are failures in the execution of the intended action. Slips are actions that do
not go as planned, while lapses are memory failures. For example, operating the flap lever
instead of the (intended) gear lever is a slip. Forgetting a checklist item is a lapse.
b. Mistakes are failures in the plan of action. Even if execution of the plan were correct, it would
not have been possible to achieve the intended outcome

Components Of Sms/ ICAO framework components/ SSP shall include the following
components
The framework for SMS implementation shall include four components, representing the
minimum requirements for SMS implementation. The four components of an SMS are:
a. safety policy and objectives;
b. safety risk management;
c. safety assurance; and
d. safety promotion.

Objective of SMS components

The objective of the safety risk management component is to identify hazards, assess the
related risks and develop appropriate mitigations in the context of the delivery of the
organization’s products or services.

Hazard Identification and source

Examples of the scope of factors and processes that should be looked into when engaging in
hazard identification include:
a) design factors, including equipment and task design;
b) procedures and operating practices, including their documentation and checklists, and their
validation under actual operating conditions;
c) communications, including means, terminology and language;
d) personnel factors, such as company policies for recruitment, training, remuneration and
allocation of resources;
e) organizational factors, such as the compatibility of production and safety goals, the
allocation of resources, operating pressures and the corporate safety culture;
f) work environment factors, such as ambient noise and vibration, temperature, lighting and
the availability of protective equipment and clothing;
g) regulatory oversight factors, including the applicability and enforceability of regulations; the
certification of equipment, personnel and procedures; and the adequacy of oversight;
h) defences, including such factors as the provision of adequate detection and warning
systems, the error tolerance of equipment and the extent to which the equipment is resilient
against errors and failures; and
i) human performance, including medical conditions and physical limitations
There is a variety of sources of hazard identification. Some sources are internal to the
organization while other sources are external to the organization

Examples of the internal sources of hazard identification available to an organization include:

Flight data analysis
Company voluntary reporting system
Safety surveys
Safety audits
Normal operations monitoring schemes
Trend analysis
Feedback from training
Investigation and follow-up of reported hazards and incidents

Examples of external sources of hazard identification available to an organization include:

Accident reports
State mandatory occurrence reporting system
State voluntary reporting system
State oversight audits
Information exchange systems

SMS definition
A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures,
accountabilities, policies and procedures.

Technical Hazard
Technical hazards are a result of energy sources (electricity, fuel, hydraulic pressure, pneumatic
pressure and so on) or safety-critical functions (potential for hardware failures, software glitches,
warnings and so on) necessary for operations related to the delivery of services. Examples of
technical hazards include deficiencies regarding:
aircraft and aircraft components, systems, subsystems and related equipment;
an organization’s facilities, tools, and related equipment; and/or
facilities, systems, sub-systems and related equipment that are external to the organization

Hazlog
HAZLOG – an electronic application or a paper-based system for the storage of hazard, their
consequences and safety risk assessment material. In AAI, it is HAZID form of AAI-SAF-105.

operational person, front line person

Front-line operational personnel inherit latent conditions in the system, such as those created by
poor equipment or task design; conflicting goals (e.g. service that is on time versus safety);
defective organizations (e.g. poor internal communications); or management decisions (e.g.
deferral of a maintenance item).
Active failures by operational personnel take place in an operational context which includes
latent conditions. Latent conditions are conditions present in the system well before a damaging
outcome is experienced, and made evident by local triggering factors

SCAR form - Major / Minor change

Where the SCARS form indicates a Minor change a Safety Statement must be recorded in the
SCARS form.

Where the SCARS form indicates a Moderate change, a Safety Statement must be recorded in
the SCARS form and a HAZLOG Register must be developed. Guidance material is available in
C-SMS manual on:
o hazard identification processes;
o hazard analysis processes; and
o HAZLOG application

Where the SCARS form indicates a Major change a Safety Plan and a Safety Case must be
prepared and a HAZLOG Register for this change must be developed. Guidance material is
available in C-SMS manual on:
o Safety Plans
o Safety Cases; and
o Review of Safety Plans and Safety Cases by Aviation Safety Directorate

Safe assurance
Safety assurance is accomplished through ongoing processes that monitor compliance with
international standards and national regulations.
Furthermore, the safety assurance process provides confidence that the SMS is operating as
designed and is effective. Safety promotion provides the necessary awareness and training.

Safety promotion
Safety promotion provides the necessary awareness and training.

Risk acceptance authority

Swiss cheese model diagram

HAzard, different type of Hazards

A hazard is defined as a condition or an object with the potential of causing injuries to
personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform
a prescribed function.
Hazards can be grouped in three generic families: natural hazards, technical hazards and
economic hazards.

ALARP
Safety risks must be managed to a level “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP);

Change management
Change management. A formal process to manage changes within an organization in a
systematic manner, so that changes which may impact identified hazards and risk mitigation
strategies are accounted for, before the implementation of such changes.

Safety plan
A written plan of all the safety management activities that are planned to occur prior to
introducing the change

safety case
A structured document that provides an argument supported by evidence that a major change
will be safe to implement
Safety Definition As Per Icao
The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to or in direct support of the
operation of aircraft are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.

Full form
TOR Tolerability of Risk
USOAP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
LOSA Line Operations Safety Audit
NOSS Normal Operations Safety Survey
ALoS Acceptable Level of Safety

Fill in the blanks

-HAZLOG
-In the concept advanced by the Reason Model, all accidents include a combination of both
active and latent conditions.
-The Reason model recognizes that there are many error–producing and violation–producing
conditions in any operational context that may affect individual or team behaviour.
-The notion of the organizational accident underlying the Reason Model can be best
understood through a building block approach, consisting of five blocks.
-All Safety Plans and Safety Cases must be sent to and reviewed by Aviation Safety
Directorate, CHQ prior to implementation of any change.
-Technical hazards are a result of energy sources (electricity, fuel, hydraulic pressure,
pneumatic pressure and so on) or safety-critical functions
-Active failures are generally associated with front-line personnel (pilots, air traffic controllers,
aircraft mechanical engineers, etc.) and may result in a damaging outcome.

MCQ
Defense parts - Regulations
ICAO SMS framework components - 4

Match the following