Maxims: Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - Noscitur a sociis -

Ejusdem generis - Reddendo singula singulis, Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

Secondary/subsidiary rules of interpretation:

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat: refer module 1

Noscitur a Sociis:

 The doctrine of noscitur a sociis - meaning of a word should be understood by its

accompanying or associating words.
 The principle is that the meaning of the doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to
the meaning of words associated with it.
 Implication of a word is to be decided by the company it keeps -Lord Macmillan
 This rule is not applicable in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been
deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined words correspondingly wider.
 It is only applicable where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with
narrower words is doubtful or ambiguous.
 The reason for the application of this principle is because a word of wide possible meaning
may be given a limited meaning by looking at the accompanying words.
 Illustrations:
 Foster V Diphwys Casson (1887)
 law mandates that explosives be conveyed in a ‘case or canister’
 defendant had conveyed explosives in a cloth-bag
 whether using cloth bag met the statutory requirements?
 Court held that in application of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, cloth bag
cannot fall within the definition of “case”.
 Held legislature intended to refer to a container of similar strength and
durability as a canister- exclude cloth bag.
 State of Assam v Ranga Mahammad, AIR 1967 SC
 Two district and sessions judges were transferred.
 Respondent filed a petition under Art. 226 asking the notification by the
state government be quashed on the ground that only HC can make such
transfer- neither was HC consulted.
 HC held that the transfer and posting was irregular as no consultation was
made.
 State appealed on the ground that the judgement involved interpretation of
Art. 233.
 Question before the court was whether Art. 233(1) was mandatory or
directory?
ᴏ Appointment of district judges- Appointments of persons to be, and
the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be
made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High
Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State
 Whether posting includes transfer?
 Sc applied the rule of noscitur a sociis and held that the word “posting” will
take its color from the associating words “appointment” and “promotion”.
 Held “posting” would mean “the assignment of an appointee or promotee
to a position in the cadre” and not his transfer from one station to another.
  Rainbow Steels Ltd v Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR 1981
 The state of UP issued a notification which provided that "old, discarded,
unserviceable or obsolete machinery stores or vehicles including waste
products” are liable to be taxed at the point of sale at 5%.
 A thermal power plant together with its associated parts belonging to state
electricity board was sold to appellant 1 in a working condition.
 Appellant 1 discontinued the power plant and negotiated its sale with
appellant 2.
 Differences of opinion between the parties as to the payment of sales tax.
 Clarification sought to the commissioner of sales tax.
 Commissioner held the words "old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete"
had been used disjunctively and each adjective had its own meaning and
sense and that since the power plant had been used before its sale it was
“old” machinery and the sale was liable to tax under the said Entry.
 Matter reached SC.
 Appellants argue that the principle of noscitur a sociis should be invoked-
the expression “old” which is a general expression should be restricted by
the less general expression namely “discarded, unserviceable or obsolete”
and in this manner the sale could not be regarded as old falling within the
entry.
 SC held the power plant is in perfect running condition and would not fall
under this entry.
 Court applied the rule of noscitur a sociis and held that the word “old”
which has a general meaning which is vague and imprecise- hence would
take its color from other accompanying words.
 State of Rajasthan v Sripal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1323

Ejusdem generis

 Ejusdem Generis is a Latin expression which means “of the same kind”.
 When particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general
words, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those
specified.
 This rule reflects an attempt "to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general
words in view of the other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect
if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are
presumed to be superfluous".
 When is it applicable/permissible?
 when the statute contains an enumeration of specific words
 the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
 that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration
 the general terms follow the enumeration; and
 there is no indication of a different legislative intent
 When is it not applicable?
 not applicable when it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to
be so limited and no absurdity is likely to result if they are allowed to take their
natural meaning.
 cannot be invoked if there is no class, category or genus which can be
comprehended from the proceeding words.
  This rule can also not be invoked where the general words precede specific words.
 Hidayatullah J in Jagdish Chander Gupta v Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd, AIR 1964 SC explained
the principle of ejusdem generis by giving the following illustration:
 In the expression ‘books, pamphlets, newspapers and other documents’, private
letters may not be held included if ‘other documents’ be interpreted ejusdem
generis with what goes before. But in a provision which reads ‘newspapers or other
documents, likely to convey secrets to the enemy’, the words ‘other documents’
would include document of any kind and would not take their colour from
newspaper
 Illustrations on when applicable:
 Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Pvt Ltd v UOI, AIR 1989 SC
 The appellant manufactures cotton fabrics on power looms.
 By notification, “unprocessed” cotton fabrics was exempted from excise
duty and additional charges.
 The appellant was using the process of “calendaring”- process of pressing
the fabric between two plain rollers to improve its appearance.
 central excise authorities held cotton fabrics manufactured ceases to be
“unprocessed”
 Appellant directed to pay excise duty.
 Appellant argued that plain-calendaring process does not add anything to
the fabric- hence would not fall within the meaning of Sec. 2(f)(v):
ᴏ Defined manufacture as "in relation to goods comprised in Item No.
19-I of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, includes
bleaching, merce- rising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing,
rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing or any other
process or any one or more of these processes;"
 In construing the words “any other process” in section 2(f)(v) this rule was
applied.
 It was held by the Supreme Court that the processes enumerated
contemplate processes which import change of a lasting character to the
fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise.
 “any other process” in the section must share one or other of these
incidents which constitute manufacture in the extended sense
 Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. East India Hotels Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 419
 Respondent owns and runs “Oberoi Grand” – a five-star hotel in the city of
Calcutta.
 The hotel had 3 restaurants within its premises.
 The question before the court was whether the company is required to pay
the license fee and obtain licenses to run the said restaurants under Sec.
443 of Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951:
 Section 433 states that:
ᴏ “No person shall, without or otherwise than in conformity with the
terms of a license granted by the Commissioner in this behalf, keep
open any theatre, circus, cinema house, dancing hall or other similar
place of public resort, recreation or amusement:
 HC applied the principle of ejusdem generis and held that the general
words are intended to have a restricted meaning in the sense that the words
 “other similar places” should fall within the class enumerated in the
specific words.
 Held that a restaurant which provides items of amusement occasionally or
incidentally in its main business, to its customers is not a place of public
resort, recreation or amusement similar to a theatre, circus, cinema house,
dancing hall, which form a class by themselves, and does not fall' within the
mischief of Section.
 Appealed- question was whether the three restaurants run by the company
in the premises of the hotel are similar to any of the four instances given
under Section 443 of the Act.
 SC observed that it is not necessary for the HC to rely on the rule of
ejusdem generis because the provision under sec. 443 are on the face of it
clear and unambiguous and as such there is no occasion to call in the said
rule.
 Section 443 clearly states that a theatre, circus, cinema house, dancing hall
or “other similar place” of public resort, recreation or amusement cannot be
run without obtaining a license from the Commissioner of the Corporation.
 The SC held that the three restaurants run by the company in the premises
of the hotel are similar to any of the four instances given under Section 443
of the Act.
 The admitted facts are that there are dancing floors in the restaurants
where the residents and other guests entertain themselves. The
entertainment is further provided by music including vocal music.
 A dancing hall as understood in the ordinary parlance is a place where
dancing floor is provided and live orchestra or music in any other form is
played to entertain the guests who wish to come on the floor and dance.
We see no difference in a “dancing hall” and a restaurant where a proper
dancing floor is provided and the guests entertain themselves by using the
floor to the tune of live or recorded music. Simply because the recreation in
the shape of dancing is provided along with a posh-eating place would not
make it different than a “dancing hall” where drinks and eatables are also
invariably provided. We are, therefore, of the view that the restaurants run
by the company are places similar to the dancing halls and, as such, are
places of public amusement covered by the provisions of Section 443 of
the Act.
 Animal Welfare Board of India v. A Nagaraja , (2014) 7 SCC 547:
 This case was in regards to the Rights of animals on one hand and the
practice of Jallikattu and Bullock-cart races in the states of Tamil Nadu and
Maharashtra.
 Initiated to ban such practices owing to the cruelty on bulls- violates sec.
11(1)(a) of the Prevention of Animal Cruelty Act, 1960.
 Section 11 treating animals cruelly:
ᴏ (1)(a) if any person beats, kicks, overrides, overdrives, overloads,
tortures "or otherwise" treats any animal so as to subject it to
unnecessary pain or suffering or causes or, being the owner permits,
any animals to be so treated- he commits the offence of treating
animals cruelly.
 AWBI argued that “or otherwise” includes Jallikattu, Bullock-cart race etc.
  State of TN argued that the expression should be understood by applying
the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
 The Supreme Court held that the words "or otherwise" are not used as
words of limitation and that the Legislature intended the expression to
cover all situations where animals are subjected to unnecessary pain or
suffering which may not fall within the meaning of the preceding clause.
 Hence, jalikattu, bullock cart races and other such events were held to fall
within the ambit of section 11(1)(a) of the Act.
 R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, (1999) 2 All ER 545
 Concerns 2 married women from Pakistan who fled their homes and their
country to escape domestic violence- both were accused of adultery- a
crime which results in severe sanctioning- included flogging and stoning to
death.
 Entered UK and applied for asylum claiming that their return to Pakistan
would result in domestic violence from their home from which there was
no state protection
 They claim for refugee status under the ground of “membership of a
particular group”
 Article 1A(2) defines refugee as “a person who "owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.”
 Both applications were rejected by the Secretary of state- on the ground
that their claims for asylum did not fall within any of the enumerated
grounds of persecution that she was not a member of 'a particular social
group’.
 The court of appealed also rejected their claim but both women have been
granted exceptional permission to remain in UK.
 However, both women still want refugee status- which provides stronger
form of protection.
 The house of lords granted their refugee status by applying the reasoning
given in the case of Acosta Re Interim Decision, 1986 -decided by the United
States Board of Immigration Appeals.
 In that case the Board observed: "The other grounds of persecution listed in
association with "membership of a particular social group" are "race",
"religion", "nationality" and "political opinion".
 By applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase “membership of a
particular social group” means persecution that is directed towards an
individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a
common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an
innate one such as sex, color or kinship ties or in some circumstances it
might be a shared past.
 It was, therefore held that women could constitute "a particular social
group" if they were discriminated against in a country on account of their
membership to a group.

Reddendo Singula Singulis:

  Where there are general words of description, following an enumeration of particular
things, such general words are to be construed distributively- reddendo singula singulis; and
if the general words will apply to some things and not to others, the general words are to
be applied to those things to which they will, and not to those to which they will not apply.
 Example-
 “If any one shall draw or load any sword or gun”- the word “draw” is applied to
“sword” only and the word “load” to “gun” only, because it is impossible to load a
sword or draw a gun
 “I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A” will be construed
reddendo singula singulis by applying “devise” to “real” property and “bequeath” to
personal property”
 The different portions of a sentence, or different sentences, are to be referred respectively
to the other portion or sentences, to which we can see they respectively relate.
 Bishop v Deakin, (1936) 1 All ER 255:
 construction of section 59(1) of the Local Government Act, 1933:
 A person shall be disqualified for being elected or being a member of a local
authority if he has within five years before the day of election or since his
election been convicted of any offence and ordered to be imprisoned for a
period of not less than three months without the option of fine
 Clauson J construing the section said:
 The section provides for two disqualifications: first, conviction within five
years before the day of election; and secondly, conviction since election. It
is obvious that the second disqualification mentioned does not fit the first
case mentioned namely that of election, but does fit the second case, and
the second case only. It is also obvious that the first disqualification
mentioned fits the first case, and it does not seem at all apt to fit the
second case.
 All difficulty can be avoided by applying the well-known method of
construction commonly known as reddendo singula singulis; and applying
the first disqualification mentioned to first case dealt with, and the second
disqualification to the second case dealt with
 It was, therefore, held that a conviction prior to election although a disqualification
for the election was not a disqualification for continuing to be a member and if the
election was not challenged by election petition within the time limited therefor,
the member did not vacate his seat.
 In Koteshwar Vittal Kamath v K Rangapa Baliga & Co, AIR 1969 SC 504 : (1969) 1 SCC 255:
 This rule has been applied in the construction of the Proviso to Article 304 of the
Constitution which reads: “Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of
clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the legislature of a State without the
previous sanction of the President.” It was held by the Supreme Court that the word
“introduced” referred to “Bill” and the word “moved” to “Amendment”


Expressio unius est exclusio alterius:

 Means - The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
 Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes:
  "By the rule usually known in the form of this Latin Maxim, mention of one or
more things of a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding all other
members of the class; expressum facit cessare tacitum".
 This may be employed to denote the intention of the legislature, but it would not be safe to
regard it as an obligatory rule of law
 Considered as “a valuable servant, but a dangerous master”. Why?
 The failure to make the “expression” complete may arise by accident.
 “exclusio” may also result because it never occurred to the legislatures that the
thing supposed to be excluded requires specific mention.
 Khemka & Co v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC:
 In this case, the question was on the scope of sec. 9(2) Central Sales Act, 1956.
 The first part of the sub-section empowers the state authorities to assess, reassess
and enforce payment of tax on behalf of the central government including any
penalty payable by the dealer under the central act.
 The second part of the subsection provides that this will be as if the penalty payable
by such a dealer under the central act is a tax or penalty under the general sales
tax law pf the state.
 Section 16 of Bombay sales tax Act provides for payment or recovery of tax.
 Sub-section 4 states that if the tax is not paid by any dealer within the
prescribed time, the dealer shall pay a penalty in addition to assessed sales
tax.
 under the central act, the central government has power to levy tax and penalty for
non-payment of tax but not for delay in payment.
 Under the state act, the state government has power to levy tax, penalty for non-
payment of tac and penalty for delay in payment of tax.
 The assessee argued that penalty under sec. 16(4) for delay or default in payment
of central sales tax is without jurisdiction as it is not warranted by sec. 9(2) of
central sales-tax act- hence the penalty is illegal.
 State argued that the provision is not merely to collection of taxes by imposition of
penalties by reference into the provision of the central act.
 the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius was applied here.
 only confined to penalties mention in concluding part of sec. 9(2).
 The Parbhani Transport co-operative society Ltd. V the regional transport authority,
Aurangabad and others.

Non-Obstante Clause:

 The expression non-obstante means “notwithstanding”.

 A clause beginning with “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act” or in some
particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in
force is a clause- sometimes added to a section in the beginning with a view to give the
enacting part of the section, in case of conflict, an overriding effect over the provision or
Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause
 It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante
clause, the enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provision
indicated in the non-obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the
enactment.
  The phrase "notwithstanding anything in" is used in contradistinction to the phrase "subject
to", the latter conveying the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other
provisions to which it is made subject.
 Illustration:
 Maktool Singh v State of Punjab, JT 1999 (2) SC 176
 Section 32A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1958
reads:
ᴏ "Notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC, 1973 or any other
law for the time being in force—no sentence awarded under this
Act—shall be suspended or remitted or commuted.”
 Section 36 provides for appeals and revision to the High Court and says that
it "may exercise, so far as may be applicable, all the powers conferred by
Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
 The question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court could
exercise its power of suspending the sentence under Section 389 which
occurs in Chapter XXIX of the CrPC.
 SC held that the High Court has no such power and cannot suspend the
sentence awarded under the NDPS Act.

Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

 Means general provisions do not derogate from special provisions

 This maxim is used where there is a conflict between special and general provisions of an
act or different act.
 It facilitates the interpretation of statutes when there is conflict in regards to which law will
govern the subject matter in issue.
 Thus, as per this maxim, when there is conflict between two laws, provisions of General
law must yield to the provisions of special one
 In JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co Ltd v State of UP, 229 the Supreme Court observed
that
 “the rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an
arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges, but springs from the common
understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two
directions, one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only
some of them, his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards
these while as regards all the rest earlier directions should have effect.”
 Illustrations:
 Suresh Nanda v CBI (2008) 3 SCC 674
 The petitioner was a NRI whose passport as well as other documents were
seized when he was on a visit to India.
 Authorities conducted search and seizure in pursuance of an FIR.
 CBI retained the passport seized during the search.
 This action was challenged by petitioner.
 In this case, Supreme Court observed that there was conflict between two
acts i.e. sec 104 of CrPC and sec 10 of the Passport Act, 1967.
 Sec 104 of CrPC is a general provision dealing with impounding of
documents whereas sec 10 of the Passport Act is special provision which
provides for impounding of passport.
  Supreme Court stated that, “power under sec 104 is limited to seize any
document or thing other than a passport. This is because impounding a
passport is provided for in sec 10 (3) of the Passports Act. The Passports
Act is a special law while the CrPC is a general law”
 Thus, Supreme Court applied this maxim and concluded that since
impounding of passports are governed by special legislation namely the
passports act, normal CrPC provisions concerning impounding shall not be
attracted.
 SC held that the CBI nor court can impound a passport under Sec.104- only
Passport authority can impound passport under Sec. 10 0f passport act.
 Subramanian Swamy v Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64
 Issue was regarding sec 19(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which
deals with the requirement of previous sanction from Competent Authority
before prosecution of Public Servants and sec 190 of CrPC, 1973 which
deals with cognizance of offence by magistrate.
 Supreme Court by applying given maxim stated that since the Prevention of
Corruption Act is special statute relating to prevention of corruption, sec 19
will have overriding effect over the general provisions contained in sec 190
of CrPC.
 Thus, it is clear that the Special law will have primacy over General law when the subject
matter is covered by both the laws.

What will be the impact of particular law on general law? whether special law will repeal general
law?

What will be the impact of Special Law on General Law?

 When any subject matter is governed by both Special law and General law, then, generally,
the Special Act will partially repeal the General Act, or curtail its operation, or add
conditions to its operation.
 Illustration:
 Ratan Lal Akudia v Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 104.
 In this case, there was conflict between sec 80 of the Railways Act, 1890,
substituted in 1961, and sec 20 of CPC, 1908.
 Prior to its amendment, sec. 80 of the Railways Act- the choice of forum for
filing suits for compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or
non-delivery of goods etc. carried by the Railways was regulated by Section
20 of the Code of Civil Procedure
 However, a new section (14) was added which specifically provided where
such suits may be instituted.
 The appellant filed suits for recovery of certain amounts from Railways for
short delivery of consignments booked by them.
 Responded contended that section 20 of CPC will apply.
 SC stated that, “the doctrine of implied repeal is based on the assumption
that the legislature is presumed to know the existing state of the law and
did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions.
Courts in applying this doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect to the
legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two
enactments. Where it is not possible to reconcile two provisions/laws and
 one of provision is by itself a complete code with respect to the same
matter, then, in such a case, the actual detailed comparison of the two sets
of provisions may not be necessary. It is a matter of legislative intent that
the two sets of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneously.
 Thus, by applying this concept SC held that, the section 80 was a special law
and a complete code on subject matter in issue. It impliedly repealed the
general provision of the CPC, in respect of subjects covered by it.
 Municipal Board Bareilly v Bharat Oil Co., AIR 1990 SC 548:
 In this case, the State Government drafted rules for regulating the levy of
Octroi (local tax) for all Municipalities.
 The State Government separately drafted rules for levy of Octroi by the
Bareilly Municipality.
 They expressly provided that the new rules will have primacy over existing
rules.
 Hon’ble SC, by applying doctrine of implied repel, held that there was
deemed repeal of the earlier rules by new rules drafted for Bareilly
Municipality
 What happens when the Act contains Non-obstante clause?
 A Special law can curtail the operation of a General law even if the General law
contains a non obstante clause.
 Illustration:
 Damji Valji Shah v LIC, AIR 1966 SC 135:
ᴏ In this case, there was conflict between Companies Act, 1956 and
LIC Act.
ᴏ As per sec 446 (2) of the Companies Act, “the company court,
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force is given jurisdiction to entertain any suit, proceeding
or claim by or against the company and decide any question of
priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact,
which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up”.
ᴏ The LIC Act, 1956 also provided for constitution of a Tribunal and
sec 15 and sec 41 provides exclusive power to the LIC to initiate
proceedings for recovery of amounts from the former insurance
companies before the tribunal.
ᴏ Hon’ble SC, after analysing the provisions of these Acts, held that
the provisions of LIC Act, which provides for exclusive jurisdiction,
being provisions of the special Act will prevail over the Companies
Act
 Thus, even if General Act contains non-obstante clause, the Special/particular law
will have primacy over General act.