Problem set 1

MTL 763 (Introduction to Game Theory)

1. Consider the game of “Matching Pennies”. Find a saddle point equilibrium and
the value of the game. pure strategy nash equilibrium dosent exist, saddle point, mix startegy exist (1/2,1/2)

2. Player 1 holds a black Ace and a red 8. Player 2 holds a red 2 and a black 7. The
players simultaneously choose a card to play. If the chosen cards are of the same
color, player 1 wins. Player 2 wins if the cards are of the different colors. The
amount won is a number of dollars equal to the number on the winner’s card (Ace
counts as 1). Formulate this as a zero sum game by defining the payoff matrix. Find
the value and saddle point equilibrium of the game. x*=(5/6, 1/6) y*=(5/9, 4/9) value= -1/3

3. Players 1 and 2 Simultaneously call out one of the numbers 1 or 2. Player 1 wins if
the sum of the numbers is odd, and player 2 wins if the sum of the number is even.
The amount paid to the winner by the loser is always the sum of the numbers in
dollars. Find the saddle point equilibrium and value of the game. x*=y*=(7/12,5/12) value =1/12

4. Consider following matrix games

   
y*=1/4,3/4 ; x*= 3/4.1/4.. value 7/4
2 0 4 0 4 6
A = 1 2 3 , B = 5 7 4 .
4 1 2 9 6 3

Find the value and saddle point equilibrium in both the games A and B using
graphical method.

5. Consider a matrix game 

1 1 1
A = 1 2 0 how does symmetric matrix affect?
1 0 2

ˆ For a fixed strategy x = (0, 1/2, 1/2) of player 1 what is the optimal strategy
of player 2. xTA=[1,1,1] to y can be anything same val, similar for x

ˆ For a fixed strategy y = (0, 1/2, 1/2) of player 2 what is the optimal strategy
of player 1.
ˆ What can you say about the saddle point equilibrium of the game? doubt
ye x,y to hoga kyuki incentive nhi hai deviate krne ka kisi k pas bhi, koi bhi y with this x is SPE, and koi bhi x with this y is SPE, but
aur bhi combinations of x and y can exist ?
6. Consider a matrix game A given below
 
1 2 4
A = 2 1 1  ,
t 43 1

where −∞ < t < +∞.

(i) For a given strategy x∗ = 12 , 0, 12 of player 1, find the optimal strategies of

player 2 for all −∞ < t < +∞.

t>=7/3 pe 0,1,0 : t<7/3 pe y,1-y,0 .. ya saddle point wale method se nikalege y wali chiz 1/3, 2/3,0(aur agar aise hi nikalni hoti to x* ke respect me kyu hoti )

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optimal stategy, best response aur saddle point.

(ii) For a given strategy y ∗ = 31 , 23 , 0 of player 2, find the optimal strategies of

player 1 for all −∞ < t < +∞.

(iii) Using the information from (i) and (ii) can we say that (x∗ , y ∗ ) forms a saddle
point equilibrium for a certain value of t.

7. Solve the game with matrix  

0 2 copy me ans

t 1
for an arbitrary real number t. Draw the graph of v(t), the value of the game, as a
function of t.

8. Solve the following matrix games:

 
5 4 1 0    
4 3 2 −1 10 0 7 1 0 8 5  
 ,  2 6 4 7 ,  8 4 6 , 3 2 4 0

0 −1 4 3  .
−2 1 −4 5
6 3 3 5 12 −4 3
1 −2 1 2

9. Players 1 and 2 choose i and j simultaneously from the sets {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Player
1 wins 1 if |i − j| = 1, otherwise there is no payoff. Describe the payoff matrix of
the game and find the value and saddle point equilibrium of the game.

10. Construct a 3×3 matrix game A which has a pure strategy saddle point equilibrium
and each player has no dominant strategies.

11. Consider a diagonal game described by matrix

y1+y3=4, y2=1/4, y6=1/4, y5+y7=1/4, y4=0;
 
5 0 0 0
x* 12/77, 20/77, 15/77, 30/77.. y* same, value=60/77 value 1/4
0 3 0 0
A=
0 0 4
. y*= (y,1/4, 1/4-y,0 , y2, 1/4, 1/4-y2)
0
0 0 0 2

Find the value and saddle point equilibrium of the game.

12. Consider a rack-paper-scissors game described by the following payoff matrix

 
x*=(1/3,1/3,1/3)= y* . value =1/3
0 −1 1
A= 1 0 −1 .
−1 1 0

Find the value and saddle point equilibrium of the game.

13. Colonel Blotto has 4 regiments with which to occupy two posts. The famous Lieu-
tenant Kije has 3 regiments with which to occupy the same posts. The army sending
the most units to either post captures it and all the regiments sent by the other
side, scoring one point for the captured post and one for each captured regiment. If
the players send the same number of regiments to a post, both forces withdraw and
there is no payoff. Formulate this game as a zero-sum game. Find the saddle point
equilibrium and value of the game.

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14. Solve the above Blotto and Kije game under following situations:

ˆ Suppose Blotto has 2 units and Kije has just 1 unit, with 2 posts to capture.
ˆ Suppose Blotto has 3 units and Kije has 2 units, with 2 posts to capture.
ˆ Suppose Blotto has 4 units and Kije has 3 units, with 3 posts to capture.
ˆ Suppose Blotto has 4 units and Kije has 3 units, with 4 posts to capture.

15. Player 2 chooses a number j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and player 1 tries to guess what number
player 2 has chosen. If he guesses correctly and the number was j, he wins 2j dollars
from player 2. Otherwise there is no payoff. Set up the matrix of this game and
solve. 2,0,0,0
0,4,0,0 payoff = 16/15 x*=y*= 8/15, 4/15, 2/15, 1/15
0,0,8,0
0,0,0,16
16. Player 2 chooses a number j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and player 1 tries to guess what it is. If
he guesses correctly, he wins 1 from player 2. If he overestimates he wins 21 from
player 2. If he underestimates, there is no payoff. Set up the matrix of this game
and solve. x*= 1/15, 2/15, 3/15, 4/15 y*= 8/15, 4/15, 2/15, 1/15 .. value= 8/15

17. Solve the games with the following matrices.

   
  2 1 1 1 2 0 0 2
1 −1 −1 1 3 1 1  0
2
3 0 0
(a) 0 2 1  , (b) 1 1 4 1  , (c) 0
  .
3
0 4 3
0 0 3
1 1 1 54 1 1 0 1

18. (a) Consider a matrix game A, where

 
5 8 3 1 6 Ay is
4 2 6 3 5 (121/37, 121/37,120/37, 121/37)
A=
2
.
4 6 4 1
1 3 2 5 3
6 20 11 14 4
, , 0, 19



Show that (x, y), where x = 37 , 37 , 0, 37 and y = 37 37 37
,0 , is a saddle
point equilibrium. What is the value of game? 121/37

(b) Consider a matrix game  

1 2 α
A = α 2 3  .
2 −1 3
Find value of the game and at least one saddle point equilibria for all values
of α, where α ∈ (1, ∞).

19. Find a saddle point equilibrium and value of the following matrix game A
 
2 −1 0 1
A = −2 3 1 2 .
3 1
0 4 2
3
x* 3/5,0, 2/5

y*= 1/5,0, 4/5 value=2/5

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20. Player 2 chooses a number j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and player 1 tries to guess what number
player 2 has chosen. If he guesses correctly and the number was j, he wins 2j dollars
from player 2. Otherwise there is no payoff.

ˆ Set up the matrix A of this game.

ˆ Find the value of the game and saddle point equilibrium.
ˆ What will be the new saddle point equilibrium of A if we add a number 1 in
all diagonal entries of A? same as min max still same and diagonal pe hi non zero values the

ˆ What will be the saddle point equilibrium of A if we add a number 1 in all the
entries of A? ab bhi same kt=yuki min max same ab bhi