《Nuclear Power Safety》

Safety Functions and Systems

Weimin Ma
Division of Nuclear Power Safety
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)
Stockholm, Sweden

Contents

 Safety functions
o Control of reactivity
o Removal of heat from radioactive material
o Confinement of radioactive material
 Safety systems (PWRs and BWRs)
o Protection and shutdown systems
o Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS)
o Containment and its protection systems
o Severe accident mitigation systems

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 Fundamental safety functions

 The nuclear power reactor shall be designed so that the

fundamental safety functions for an NPP:
(i) control of reactivity;
(ii) removal of heat from radioactive material (protection of
the primary system integrity, emergency core cooling,
residual heat removal); and
(iii) confinement of radioactive materials, shielding against
radiation and limitation of accidental radioactive releases,
shall be secured for all plant states: from normal operation to
anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions.

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Subdivision of fundamental safety functions

1) to prevent unacceptable reactivity transients;
2) to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition after all shutdown actions;
3) to shut down the reactor as necessary to prevent anticipated operational occurrences from leading to design basis accidents and to
shut down the reactor to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents;
4) to maintain sufficient reactor coolant inventory for core cooling in and after accident conditions not involving the failure of the
reactor coolant pressure boundary;
5) to maintain sufficient reactor coolant inventory for core cooling in and after all PIEs considered in the design basis;
6) to remove heat from the core after a failure of the reactor coolant pressure boundary in order to limit fuel damage;
7) to remove residual heat in appropriate operational states and accident conditions with the reactor coolant pressure boundary intact;
8) to transfer heat from other safety systems to the ultimate heat sink;
9) to ensure necessary services (such as electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic power supplies, lubrication) as a support function for a safety
system;
10) to maintain acceptable integrity of the cladding of the fuel in the reactor core;
11) to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
12) to limit the release of radioactive material from the reactor containment in accident conditions and conditions following an
accident;
13) to limit the radiation exposure of the public and site personnel in and following design basis accidents and selected severe accidents
that release radioactive materials from sources outside the reactor containment;
14) to limit the discharge or release of radioactive waste and airborne radioactive materials to below prescribed limits in all operational
states;
15) to maintain control of environmental conditions within the plant for the operation of safety systems and for habitability for
personnel necessary to allow performance of operations important to safety;
16) to maintain control of radioactive releases from irradiated fuel transported or stored outside the reactor coolant system, but within
the site, in all operational states;
17) to remove decay heat from irradiated fuel stored outside the reactor coolant system, but within the site;
18) to maintain sufficient subcriticality of fuel stored outside the reactor coolant system but within the site;
19) to prevent the failure or limit the consequences of failure of a structure, system or component whose failure would cause the
impairment of a safety function.

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 Safety systems

 The reactor protection, shutdown and emergency cooling

systems are commonly known as safety systems.
 Normal operation
o Safety requirements are met by ordinary operating systems
of the reactor.
 Fault conditions: Measures to be put into action in order to
ensure safety during unusual events:
o To shut down operating reactors (Scram)
o To cool down nuclear fuel so as to remove decay heat
o To contain radioactive materials: Containment and its
protection systems.
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Safety systems in PWR

 Reactor protection systems
 Shutdown systems
o Control rods
o Boron injection
 Pressure relief systems
 Auxiliary feedwater system
 Emergency core cooling system
o High pressure injection system
o Accumulator system
o Low pressure injection system
 Containment and its protection systems

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 Reactor protection system

 The system initiates measures for preventing fuel overheating

and for limiting radioactive releases to the environment
o Consists of sensors, signal processing units, logic circuits, etc.
o Input signals are obtained from detectors which monitor safety-
related plant variables.
 Signals requiring the same action are grouped into safety
chains. There are three main safety chains:
o Reactor shutdown
o Reactor isolation (closure of containment isolation valves)
o Emergency core cooling

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Shutdown system in PWR

 Scram
o Control rods are fully inserted within few seconds by
gravity.
 At Scram, main circulation pumps coast down.
 The reactor can also be shut down by injection of boric acid
into the reactor, if it is impossible to insert control rods.

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 Pressure relief systems in a PWR

 PWR pressure relief systems on

o The primary side (pressurizer)
o The secondary side (steam lines)

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Auxiliary feedwater system in a PWR

 Auxiliary feedwater system in a PWR
o One 100% capacity steam-driven pump, and two 50 % capacity
electric-motor-driven pumps.

Feedwater

Aux. Feedwater

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 Emergency core cooling systems in a PWR

 Diagram of emergency
core cooling systems
(ECCS)

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ECCS in a PWR (cont’d)

 High-head injection system

(HPSI): for small and
medium size breaks
 Low-head injection system
(LPSI): for large pipe
Accumulators
breaks)
 Accumulator system
 RWST=Refueling Water
Storage Tank (contains HPSI
borated water)

LPSI

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 LOCA and ECCS actions in PWR

 Stages in LOCA in PWR

(‘Guillotine’ break in one
of the cold legs):
(a) normal operation,
(b) blowdown phase,
(c) refill phase, and
(d) reflood phase.

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LOCA and ECCS actions in PWR (cont’d)

 Pressure and temperature during LOCA in PWR

《Nuclear Power Safety》 15

 Passive safety systems of AP1000

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Safety systems in BWR

 Reactor protection systems
o Similar to PWR
 Shutdown systems
 Pressure relief systems
 Auxiliary feedwater system
o High-pressure emergency core cooling system
 Low-pressure injection system
o Low-pressure emergency core cooling system)
 Containment and its protection systems

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 Shutdown system in a Nordic BWR
 Scram
o Control rods are fully inserted within few seconds.
 Fine-motion control rod insertion (screwed into the core
using electrically driven motors)
o Inserted into the core within few minutes from a fully
withdrawn position.
 At Scram, the speed of the main circulation pumps is
automatically reduced to a minimum value, which contributes
to safe reactor shutdown.
 The reactor can also be shut down by the injection of boric
acid solution into the reactor, if it is impossible to insert
control rods.

《Nuclear Power Safety》 19

Shutdown system in a Nordic BWR

 Sufficient conditions for reactor shutdown

《Nuclear Power Safety》 20

 Pressure relief system in a BWR
 Protects reactor from overpressure.
 Reduces reactor pressure (from 7.0 MPa in) to a low level so that
the low-pressure coolant injection system can be used.
 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

《Nuclear Power Safety》 21

Coolant circulation systems in BWRs

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 LOCA and ECCS actions in BWR
 Large LOCA in BWR with jet pumps
 Guillotine break in one of recirculation pump intake lines
 Flooding of the vessel is possible due to limited break flow

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ECCS in a Nordic BWR

327: High pressure injection systems

323: Low pressure injection systems

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 Isolation condenser (IC)
 GE BWR-3 (e.g. Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1)

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Schematic of a typical IC system

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 Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)
 GE BWR-4,5 and 6 (e.g. Fukushima Daiichi Units 2 – 6)

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Schematic of a typical RCIC system

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 Passive safety systems of ESBWR

Note: Water!

《Nuclear Power Safety》 29

Reactor containment
 Most of operating reactors are entirely enclosed by a strong and leaktight
containment structure (requirement in most countries).
 Design pressure for reactor containments is about 0.5 - 0.6 MPa.
 The primary purpose of the containment is to remove and retain
radioactive substances in accident situations.
 Most present-day containments are made of reinforced, pre-stressed
concrete with a steel liner.
 Containments of BWR’s are filled with nitrogen during operation to
eliminate the risk of hydrogen explosion in accident situations
(containments are inerted).
 Containments of many PWR’s are equipped with Passive Autocatalytic
Recombiners (PAR) to mitigate the hydrogen threat in case of a severe
accident by continuous catalytic reaction of hydrogen and oxygen to
water vapor.

《Nuclear Power Safety》 30

 PWR containment

 Reinforced concrete containment

 Large dry containment
 Volume (air) ~ 55 000 m3

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Igniters and PARs in PWR containment

 Igniters are intended to prevent high local concentrations of hydrogen,

avoiding hydrogen explosion
 Passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) are envisaged for converting
hydrogen to water and thus lower the risk for hydrogen explosion.

(Sehgal et al., 2012)

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 Containment spray system
 The PWR containment spray system uses borated water. The system also provides,
during recirculation phase (when the water storage tank, RWST, is empty)
redundancy for low pressure injection system for emergency core cooling. In the
containment sump there is a chemical to enhance spray removal of iodine from the
containment atmosphere.

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Konvoi PWR containment

 German four loop PWR

 Inner steel containment
 Reinforced concrete reactor
building

《Nuclear Power Safety》 34

 AP1000 containment

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EPR containment
 Double-wall containment
o E.g. Olkiluoto 3

《Nuclear Power Safety》 36

 VVER containment
 VVER-440 with ice-condenser containment (Loviisa 1 & 2 in Finland)

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Nordic BWR containments

 Nitrogen inerted
 llustration of containment
spray and reactor pressure
relief system.
 Approx. volumes (applies
to BWRs in general):
 Drywell: ~ 5000 m3
 Wetwell (gas): ~ 3000 m3
 Wetwell (pool): ~ 3000 m3

《Nuclear Power Safety》 38

 Design criteria for containment

 Design and failure pressure for Swedish reactor containments

《Nuclear Power Safety》 39

Pressure suppression system in a BWR

1. Pipe break and steam discharge
2. Steam flow into the condensation pool
3. Gases transfered to pool
4. Spray cooling
5&6. vent when the pressure in drywell is less than that in wetwell

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Filtered containment venting system (FCVS)

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Two types of FCVS

Venturi scrubber Sand-bed filter

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 GE BWR containment designs
 Three generations of GE BWR containment designs: Mark I,
Mark II and Mark III

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Mark I containment
 E.g. Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 through 5

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 BWR Mark II containment
 E.g. Fukushima Daiichi Unit 6

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German BWR-69 containment

 Inerted steel containment with pressure suppression system

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 Prestressing system

From: P. Andersson, “Structural Integrity of Prestressed Nuclear Reactor

Containment”, Lund University of Technology, October 2007.
《Nuclear Power Safety》 47

Containment leakage test requirements

 The maximum allowable leakage rate at the calculated peak

containment pressure related to the design basis loss-of-coolant
accident is
 about 1 % for BWR and about 0.1 % for PWR of gas content in
the containment during 24 hours.
 Type A test
 Measurement of the primary containment overall integrated
leakage after it has been completed and is ready for operation
 Type B test
 Detection of local leaks and measurement of leakage across each
pressure-containing boundary
 Type C test
 Measurement of containment isolation valve leakage rates

《Nuclear Power Safety》 48

 Severe accident mitigation systems

In-Vessel Retention (IVR): To

stabilize the molten corium in
the lower head for days and
weeks, relieving the threat to
containment integrity.

LoviisaVVER-440
AP600, AP1000
CAP1400, HPR1000
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Severe accident mitigation systems (contd.)

 Ex-Vessel Retention (EVR): To stabilize

the corium in a wet cavity, relieving the
threat to containment integrity.
 Need to address:
o Debris coolability
o Risk of steam explosion

Gen III/III+ designs with EVR:

EPR, VVER-1200, ESBWR

A Nordic BWR
《Nuclear Power Safety》
 Activity in Class (1015 minutes)

 In group of 45
 Identify the common and different features of safety systems in
PWRs and BWRs
 Write down the points and present them

VS.

《Nuclear Power Safety》 51

Summary

 Fundamental safety functions:

(i) control of reactivity;
(ii) removal of heat from radioactive material ; and
(iii) confinement of radioactive materials.

 In order to ensure safety under fault conditions (during unusual

events), safety systems are put into action to :
• shut down operating reactors (Scram),
• cool down nuclear fuel so as to remove decay heat, and
• contain radioactive materials
 Safety systems for: Reactor protection, shutdown, pressure relief,
pressure suppression, auxiliary feedwater, high-pressure injection, low-
pressure injection, containment spray, etc.

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《Nuclear Power Safety》
 Reading assignment

 Read Chapter 8: Safety Systems, Light Water Reactor Safety, by

Pershagen

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《Nuclear Power Safety》