Python The Complete Manual 2nd Edition Coll.

download

https://ebookultra.com/download/python-the-complete-manual-2nd-
edition-coll/

Explore and download more ebooks or textbooks

at ebookultra.com
Here are some recommended products for you. Click the link to
download, or explore more at ebookultra.com

Raspberry Pi The Complete Manual 7th Edition Coll.

https://ebookultra.com/download/raspberry-pi-the-complete-manual-7th-
edition-coll/

The Manual of Clinical Perfusion 2nd Edition Coll.

https://ebookultra.com/download/the-manual-of-clinical-perfusion-2nd-
edition-coll/

Publication Manual of the American Psychological

Association 6th Edition Coll.

https://ebookultra.com/download/publication-manual-of-the-american-
psychological-association-6th-edition-coll/

The Bhs Complete Manual of Horse Stable Management British

Horse Society 2nd Edition Batty-Smith Bhsi

https://ebookultra.com/download/the-bhs-complete-manual-of-horse-
stable-management-british-horse-society-2nd-edition-batty-smith-bhsi/
Lonely Planet USA s Best Trips 2nd Edition Coll.

https://ebookultra.com/download/lonely-planet-usa-s-best-trips-2nd-
edition-coll/

Flora of Taiwan Volume 1 6 2nd Edition Coll

https://ebookultra.com/download/flora-of-taiwan-volume-1-6-2nd-
edition-coll/

Dianetics 55 The Complete Manual of Human Communication L.

Ron Hubbard

https://ebookultra.com/download/dianetics-55-the-complete-manual-of-
human-communication-l-ron-hubbard/

Complete Solutions Manual General Chemistry 9th Edition D.

Bookin

https://ebookultra.com/download/complete-solutions-manual-general-
chemistry-9th-edition-d-bookin/

Progressive Complete Learn To Play Bass Manual Stephan

Richter

https://ebookultra.com/download/progressive-complete-learn-to-play-
bass-manual-stephan-richter/
Python The Complete Manual 2nd Edition Coll. Digital
Instant Download
Author(s): coll.
ISBN(s): 9781785464409, 178546440X
Edition: 2nd
File Details: PDF, 13.84 MB
Year: 2016
Language: english
 Welcome to
Python The Complete Manual
Python is a versatile language and its rise in popularity is
certainly no surprise. Its similarity to everyday language has
made it a perfect companion for the Raspberry Pi, which
is often a first step into practical programming. But don’t
be fooled by its beginner-friendly credentials – Python has
plenty of more advanced functions. In this new edition,
you will learn how to program in Python, discover amazing
projects to improve your understanding, and find ways
to use Python to enhance your experience of computing.
You’ll also create fun projects including programming a
Space Invaders clone and building your own networked
Hi-Fi with Pi. Let’s get coding!
 Python The Complete Manual
Imagine Publishing Ltd
Richmond House
33 Richmond Hill
Bournemouth
Dorset BH2 6EZ
 +44 (0) 1202 586200
Website: www.imagine-publishing.co.uk
Twitter: @Books_Imagine
Facebook: www.facebook.com/ImagineBookazines

Publishing Director
Aaron Asadi

Head of Design
Ross Andrews

Editor in Chief
Jon White

Production Editor
Ross Hamilton

Senior Art Editor

Greg Whitaker

Designer
Alexander Phoenix

Photographer
James Sheppard

Printed by
William Gibbons, 26 Planetary Road, Willenhall, West Midlands, WV13 3XT

Distributed in the UK, Eire & the Rest of the World by

Marketforce, 5 Churchill Place, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5HU
Tel 0203 787 9060 www.marketforce.co.uk

Distributed in Australia by
Gordon & Gotch Australia Pty Ltd, 26 Rodborough Road, Frenchs Forest, NSW, 2086 Australia
Tel +61 2 9972 8800 www.gordongotch.com.au

Disclaimer
The publisher cannot accept responsibility for any unsolicited material lost or damaged in the
post. All text and layout is the copyright of Imagine Publishing Ltd. Nothing in this bookazine may
be reproduced in whole or part without the written permission of the publisher. All copyrights are
recognised and used specifically for the purpose of criticism and review. Although the bookazine has
endeavoured to ensure all information is correct at time of print, prices and availability may change.
This bookazine is fully independent and not affiliated in any way with the companies mentioned herein.

Python is a trademark of Python Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.
Python © 2016 Python Inc.

Python The Complete Manual Second Edition © 2016 Imagine Publishing Ltd

ISBN 978 1785 464 409

Part of the

bookazine series
Contents
What you can find inside the bookazine

Code
& create
with
Python!

6
 Get started
with
Python 8 Masterclass
Discover the basics of Python

Introducing Python Create with Python Use Python with Pi

26 Make web apps 80 Tic-tac-toe with Kivy 104 Using Python on Pi

Master this starter project Program a simple game Optimise your code
86 Make a Pong clone 110 Send an SMS
Enhance your game skills Combine Twilio and RasPi
114 Voice synthesizer
Use the eSpeak library
116 Visualise music
32 Build an app for Android in Minecraft
Take your apps on the move Code using PianoHAT
40 50 Python tips 88 Program a Space
Invaders clone 122 Code a Twitter bot
A selection of handy tips
Have fun with Pivaders Retweet automatically

Work with Python 98 Make a visual novel 124 Networked Hi-Fi

Tell a story using Python Listen to digital radio
50 Replace your shell
Say goodbye to Bash
58 Scientific computing
Discover NumPy’s power
64 Python for system admins
How to tweak your settings
72 Scrape Wikipedia
Start using Beautiful Soup

7
 Get with
started
Python
Always wanted to have a go at programming? No more
excuses, because Python is the perfect way to get started!
Python is a great programming language for both beginners and experts. It
is designed with code readability in mind, making it an excellent choice for
beginners who are still getting used to various programming concepts.
The language is popular and has plenty of libraries available, allowing
programmers to get a lot done with relatively little code.
You can make all kinds of applications in Python: you could use the
Pygame framework to write simple 2D games, you could use the GTK
libraries to create a windowed application, or you could try something
a little more ambitious like an app such as creating one using Python’s
Bluetooth and Input libraries to capture the input from a USB keyboard and
relay the input events to an Android phone.
For this tutorial we’re going to be using Python 2.x since that is the
version that is most likely to be installed on your Linux distribution.
In the following tutorials, you’ll learn how to create popular games using
Python programming. We’ll also show you how to add sound and AI to
these games.

8
Get started with Python Getting started

9
 Hello World
Let’s get stuck in, and what better way than with the programmer’s
best friend, the ‘Hello World’ application! Start by opening a terminal.
Its current working directory will be your home directory. It’s probably
a good idea to make a directory for the files that we’ll be creating in
this tutorial, rather than having them loose in your home directory.
You can create a directory called Python using the command mkdir
Python. You’ll then want to change into that directory using the
command cd Python.
The next step is to create an empty file using the command ‘touch’
followed by the filename. Our expert used the command touch
hello_world.py. The final and most important part of setting up the
file is making it executable. This allows us to run code inside the hello_
world.py file. We do this with the command chmod +x hello_world.
py. Now that we have our file set up, we can go ahead and open it up
in nano, or alternatively any text editor of your choice. Gedit is a great
editor with syntax highlighting support that should be available on any
distribution. You’ll be able to install it using your package manager if
you don’t have it already.

[liam@liam-laptop ~]$ mkdir Python

[liam@liam-laptop ~]$ cd Python/
[liam@liam-laptop Python]$ touch hello_world.py
[liam@liam-laptop Python]$ chmod +x hello_world.py
[liam@liam-laptop Python]$ nano hello_world.py

Our Hello World program is very simple, it only needs two lines.
The first line begins with a ‘shebang’ (the symbol #! – also known

10
 Get started with Python Getting started

as a hashbang) followed by the path to the Python interpreter. The

program loader uses this line to work out what the rest of the lines Tip
need to be interpreted with. If you’re running this in an IDE like IDLE, If you were using a graphical
you don’t necessarily need to do this. editor such as gedit, then you
would only have to do the
The code that is actually read by the Python interpreter is only a last step of making the file
single line. We’re passing the value Hello World to the print function by executable. You should only have
to mark the file as executable
placing it in brackets immediately after we’ve called the print function. once. You can freely edit the file
Hello World is enclosed in quotation marks to indicate that it is a literal once it is executable.
value and should not be interpreted as source code. As we would
expect, the print function in Python prints any value that gets passed
to it from the console.
You can save the changes you’ve just made to the file in nano using
the key combination Ctrl+O, followed by Enter. Use Ctrl+X to exit nano.

#!/usr/bin/env python2
print(“Hello World”)

You can run the Hello World program by prefixing

its filename with ./ – in this case you’d type:
./hello_world.py.

[liam@liam-laptop Python]$ ./hello_world.py

Hello World

Variables and data types

A variable is a name in source code that is associated with an area in
memory that you can use to store data, which is then called upon
throughout the code. The data can be one of many types, including:

Integer Stores whole numbers

Float Stores decimal numbers
Boolean Can have a value of True or False
String Stores a collection of characters. “Hello World” is a
string

“A variable is associated with an area in

memory that you can use to store data”
11
 Getting started Get started with Python

As well as these main data types, there are sequence types (technically,
Tip a string is a sequence type but is so commonly used we’ve classed it
At this point, it’s worth explaining as a main data type):
that any text in a Python file
that follows a # character will be
ignored by the interpreter. This List Contains a collection of data in a specific order
is so you can write comments in
your code. Tuple Contains a collection immutable data in a specific
order

A tuple would be used for something like a co-ordinate, containing

an x and y value stored as a single variable, whereas a list is typically
used to store larger collections. The data stored in a tuple is immutable
because you aren’t able to change values of individual elements in a
tuple. However, you can do so in a list.
It will also be useful to know about Python’s dictionary type. A
dictionary is a mapped data type. It stores data in key-value pairs.
This means that you access values stored in the dictionary using that
value’s corresponding key, which is different to how you would do it
with a list. In a list, you would access an element of the list using that
element’s index (a number representing where the element is placed
in the list).
Let’s work on a program we can use to demonstrate how to use
variables and different data types. It’s worth noting at this point that
you don’t always have to specify data types in Python. Feel free to
create this file in any editor you like. Everything will work just fine as
long as you remember to make the file executable. We’re going to call
ours variables.py.

Interpreted vs compiled languages

An interpreted language compiled language such as

such as Python is one C, where the source code is
where the source code only converted to machine
is converted to machine code once – the resulting
code and then executed machine code is then
each time the program executed each time the
runs. This is different from a program runs.

12
 Get started with Python Getting started

Full code listing

#!/usr/bin/env python2

# We create a variable by writing the name of the

The following line creates variable we want followed# by an equals sign,
an integer variable called which is followed by the value we want to store
hello_int with the # in the# variable. For example, the following line
value of 21. Notice how creates a variable called# hello_str, containing the
it doesn’t need to go in string Hello World.
quotation marks hello_str = “Hello World”

The same principal is hello_int = 21

true of Boolean values
hello_bool = True
We create a tuple in
the following way hello_tuple = (21, 32)

hello_list = [“Hello,”, “this”, “is”,

And a list in this way “a”, “list”]

# This list now contains 5 strings. Notice that

there are no spaces# between these strings so if
you were to join them up so make a sentence #
you’d have to add a space between each element.

You could
hello_list = list()
also create the
hello_list.append(“Hello,”)
same list in the
hello_list.append(“this”)
following way
hello_list.append(“is”)
hello_list.append(“a”)
hello_list.append(“list”)

# The first line creates an empty list and the

following lines use the append# function
of the list type to add elements to the
list. This way of using a# list isn’t
really very useful when working
with strings you know of in
# advance, but it can be
useful when working with
dynamic data such as
user# input. This list
will overwrite the
first list without
any warning

13
Getting started Get started with Python

We might as well as we# are using the same variable name as the
create a dictionary previous list.
while we’re at it.
Notice how we’ve hello_dict = { “first_name” : “Liam”,
aligned the colons “last_name” :
below to make the “Fraser”,
code tidy “eye_colour” : “Blue” }

# Let’s access some elements inside our

collections# We’ll start by changing the value
of the last string in our hello_list and# add an
exclamation mark to the end. The “list” string is
the 5th element # in the list. However, indexes
in Python are zero-based, which means the
# first element has an index of 0.
Notice that there
print(hello_list[4])
will now be two
hello_list[4] += “!”
exclamation marks
# The above line is the same as
present when we
hello_list[4] = hello_list[4] + “!”
print the element
print(hello_list[4])

Remember
that tuples are print(str(hello_tuple[0]))
immutable, # We can’t change the value of those elements
although we like we just did with the list
can access the # Notice the use of the str function above to
elements of them explicitly convert the integer
like so # value inside the tuple to a string before
printing it.
Let’s create a
sentence using
the data in our print(hello_dict[“first_name”] + “ “ + hello_
hello_dict dict[“last_name”] + “ has “ +
hello_dict[“eye_colour”] + “ eyes.”)
A much tidier way
of doing this would
be to use Python’s print(“{0} {1} has {2} eyes.”.format(hello_
string formatter dict[“first_name”],
hello_dict[“last_name”],
hello_dict[“eye_colour”]))

14
 Get started with Python Getting started

Indentation in detail

As previously mentioned, essential to use a consistent

the level of indentation indentation style. Four
dictates which statement a spaces are typically used to
block of code belongs to. represent a single level of
Indentation is mandatory indentation in Python. You
in Python, whereas in other can use tabs, but tabs are
languages, sets of braces not well defined, especially if
are used to organise code you open a file in more than
blocks. For this reason, it is one editor.

Control structures
In programming, a control structure is any kind of statement that can
change the path that the code execution takes. For example, a control
structure that decided to end the program if a number was less than 5
would look something like this:

#!/usr/bin/env python2
import sys # Used for the sys.exit function
int_condition = 5
if int_condition < 6:
sys.exit(“int_condition must be >= 6”)
else:
print(“int_condition was >= 6 - continuing”)

The path that the code takes will depend on the value of
the integer int_condition. The code in the ‘if’ block will only be
executed if the condition is true. The import statement is used to
load the Python system library; the latter provides the exit function,
allowing you to exit the program, printing an error message. Notice
that indentation (in this case four spaces per indent) is used to indicate
which statement a block of code belongs to. ‘If’ statements are
probably the most commonly used control structures. Other control

“The path the code takes will depend on

the value of the integer int_condition”
15
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
of her exceedingly defective system of railways and communications, and
to the fortification of the Gulf of Finland.

Austria did not remain stationary in military preparations any more than
her neighbours. Her intake of recruits was 181,000 in 1912. It was decided
to raise it to 206,000 in 1913, and again to 216,000 in 1914.

In the British Army, during this critical period, there had of course been
no increases, but the reverse.

The Regular Forces, which had been, reduced in 1906 by nine battalions,
[3] were in 1914 some eight thousand men under their nominal strength.
The Territorials, which had never yet reached the figure postulated by their
originator, were at this date about 47,000 short. The Army Reserve was
doomed in the near future to an automatic shrinkage on a considerable
scale, owing to the reductions which had been effected in the Regular
Forces, from which the reservists were drawn at the expiry of their terms of
service.

Actually, therefore, the weakness of our own military position had

become more marked since 1911. Relatively it had undergone an even
greater change for the worse, owing to the stupendous German programme,
to the fact that we had lagged behind in the matter of aircraft, and that our
naval preponderance was not so great as it had been three years earlier.

EFFECT OF The events which occurred in the Turkish peninsula

BALKAN between October 1912, when the first Balkan war broke out,
WARS and August 1913, when the second was ended by the Treaty
of Bucharest, were not without their bearing upon the
general balance of power in Europe. Turkey had collapsed before the onset
of the allied states of Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and this
was a serious injury to German interests. The Ottoman Empire had been
warmly suitored, over a long period of years, by the diplomacy of Berlin,
with a view to co-operation in certain contingencies. On the other hand, the
result of the second war—fomented by the intrigues of Vienna—in which
Bulgaria was finally overpowered by the other three states, destroyed for
the time being Slav solidarity, and thereby considerably relieved the
apprehensions of Austria with regard to her southern frontier and recently
annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.... Profit-and-loss accounts
of this sort are impossible to work out upon an arithmetical basis, and
perhaps the chief importance of such occurrences as these lies in the effect
which they produce upon the nerves of the onlookers. On the whole—
judging by the tone of diplomacy at the time—the Balkan series of events
appeared to have raised greater anxieties in the Chancelleries of Germany
and Austria than in any other quarter; though why this should have been so,
it is difficult to understand.

Looking back at the Balkan struggle in the light of subsequent events, it

appears to us now a great deal less remarkable for what it actually produced
than for what it failed to produce. It failed to set Europe in a blaze, and yet
it afforded far better opportunities for doing this than the Serajevo murders
in June 1914.

The full inner history of the negotiations between the Great Powers, for
six months prior to the Treaty of Bucharest, will be interesting reading, if it
ever sees the light. If even one of them had chosen to work for war during
this period, nothing could have kept the peace. If one or two of them had
been apathetic, war must inevitably have come of itself. But even France—
who at that time was showing signs of superficial excitement, and on that
account was credited, not only in the German press, but in a section of our
own, with chauvinistic designs—worked hard for peace. It is certain that
Germany desired peace; many well-informed people indeed believed that at
this time she desired peace more ardently than any other state. It is true that
a few days before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, Italy had been
secretly sounded by Austria as to whether she would join with her two allies
in making an attack on Servia; but the Italian reply being of a kind that took
away all hope of securing the military assistance of that country in the
proposed adventure, the Concert of Europe continued to perform the pacific
symphony apparently in perfect accord.

GERMANY'S The policy of Germany, in 1912 and 1913, to preserve

TWO DATES peace, and her efforts—equally successful—in the following
year to provoke war, were probably due to one and the same
cause. Two dates from Germany's point of view were of supreme
importance—the summer of 1914, when her new military preparations
would be complete, and when the Kiel Canal—having been widened and
deepened[4]—would be available for the passage of Dreadnoughts; the
summer of 1916, by which date the French Army increases were due to take
effect, and the Russian scheme of military reorganisation would have been
carried through. From the point of view of Berlin and Vienna war could be
waged to greatest advantage so soon as the first of these two dates had been
reached. If, however, Italy, always a doubtful participator, could have been
tempted by self-interest to make common cause with her allies in the
summer of 1913, the certainty of her adherence would have turned the
scales in favour of the earlier date. For Italy could put an army of 700,000
men into the field; and this no doubt would have more than compensated
for the benefits which might have been lost by anticipating the ideal
moment by a year.

[1] Germany took time by the forelock, and began to carry through the
contemplated programme before disclosing the terms of the Army Bill to
the legislature. Consequently her intentions were known in a general
way to every Intelligence department in Europe, long before they were
actually announced.

[2] In going through the memoranda upon which this chapter is based, I
came across a paper written at the end of July 1913 by a retired soldier
friend, in answer to a request on my part for certain technical
information as to French and German preparations. On the margin of the
document, which gives a very full and able analysis, he had added the
following postscript as an expression of his personal opinion. "N.B.—
Most Important: The German Bill takes immediate effect. The French
only takes effect in 1916 because (1) the French are not going to retain
the class which finishes its service this year with the colours; (2)
comparatively few are fit for enrolment at twenty; (3) there has been
great delay in Parliament ... A year from now will be the critical time.
Germany will have had the full benefit from her Bill, whereas France
will have a mass of young recruits still under instruction. The strain on
officers will be tremendous in order to knock this mass of raw men into
shape." It is rarely that a prophecy is fulfilled practically to a day.
[3] Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, in justifying this
reduction explained that 'his infantry was in excess, the artillery was
deficient.' He would rather not have cut off these nine battalions, "but he
could not use them. He had four more than he could mobilise"
(Auchterarder, December 29, 1906). In his view "the first step to doing
anything for developing the national basis of the Army was to cut
something off the Regular Forces" (Newcastle, September 15, 1906).
"He did not think Compulsory Training would be adopted in this country
until after England had been invaded once or twice" (London, December
1, 1911). The British, however, had the best reasons for feeling secure:
they "were always a nation of splendid fighters. They were never ready,
but they fought the better the less ready they were..." (Glasgow, January
6, 1912).

[4] On June 23, 1914, the Emperor William opened the new lock at the
North Sea end of the Kiel Canal. On the following day he performed the
same function at the Baltic end. The Times correspondent remarks that
the Emperor's passage through the Canal on this occasion was of
symbolical rather than practical significance, as on the one hand German
Dreadnoughts had already used the widened passage experimentally,
while on the other hand it would be a long time before the whole work
was finished. He continues: "The extension works, which were begun in
1907, are, however, of vast importance, especially to the Navy. The
Canal has been made two metres deeper, and has been doubled in
breadth. The places at which large ships can pass one another have been
increased in number, and at four of them Dreadnoughts can be turned.
There are now four, instead of two, at each end, which means a great
saving of time in getting a fleet through. Above all, the distance between
Kiel and Wilhelmshaven for battleship purposes is reduced from more
than 500 to only 80 nautical miles. The new locks at Brunsbüttel and
Holtenau are the largest in the world."—The Times, June 25, 1914.

CHAPTER VII
A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS
 It may be said—up to the very outbreak of war it was said very
frequently—that the mere power and opportunity to make an outrageous
attack are nothing without the will to do so. And this is true enough. Every
barber who holds his client by the nose could cut his throat as easily as
shave his chin. Every horse could kick the groom, who rubs him down, into
the next world if he chose to do so. What sense, then, could there be in
allowing our minds to be disturbed by base suspicions of our enterprising
and cultured neighbour? What iota of proof was there that Germany
nourished evil thoughts, or was brooding on visions of conquest and rapine?

So ran the argument of almost the whole Liberal press; and a

considerable portion of the Unionist press echoed it. Warnings were not
heeded. They came only from unofficial quarters, and therefore lacked
authority. Only the Government could have spoken with authority; and the
main concern of members of the Government, when addressing
parliamentary or popular audiences, appeared to be to prove that there was
no need for anxiety. They went further in many instances, and denounced
those persons who ventured to express a different opinion from this, as
either madmen or malefactors. Nevertheless a good deal of proof had
already been published to the world—a good deal more was known
privately to the British Government—all of which went to show that
Germany had both the will and intention to provoke war, if a favourable
opportunity for doing so should present itself.

For many years past—in a multitude of books, pamphlets, leading

articles, speeches, and university lectures—the Germans had been scolding
us, and threatening us with attack at their own chosen moment. When Mr.
Churchill stated bluntly, in 1912, that the German fleet was intended as a
challenge to the British Empire, he was only repeating, in shorter form and
more sober language, the boasts which had been uttered with yearly
increasing emphasis and fury, by hundreds of German patriots and
professors.

With an engaging candour and in every fount of type, unofficial

Germany had made it abundantly clear how she intended to carry her
designs into execution—how, first of all, France was to be crushed by a
swift and overwhelming attack—how Russia was then to be punished at
leisure—how after that, some of the nations of Europe were to be forced
into an alliance against the British Empire, and the rest into a neutrality
favourable to Germany—how finally the great war, which aimed at making
an end of our existence, was to begin. And though, from time to time, there
were bland official utterances which disavowed or ignored these
outpourings, the outpourings continued all the same. And each year they
became more copious, and achieved a readier sale.

Those, however, who were responsible for British policy appear to have
given more credit to the assurances of German diplomacy than to this mass
of popular incitement. The British nation has always chosen to plume itself
upon the fact that the hearts of British statesmen are stronger than their
heads; and possibly their amiable credulity, in the present instance, might
have been forgiven, had their means of ascertaining truth been confined to
the statements of incontinent publicists and responsible statesmen. But there
were other proofs available besides words of either sort.

THE FIRST The Liberal Government came into office in the autumn
WARNING of 1905. Ministers can hardly have had time to master the
contents of their various portfolios, before German
aggression burst rudely in upon them. Conceivably the too carefully
calculating diplomatists of Berlin had concluded, that the principles of the
new Cabinet would tend to keep England neutral under any provocation,
and that a heaven-sent opportunity had therefore arrived for proceeding
with the first item in their programme by crushing France. It is a highly
significant fact that early in 1906, only a few months after Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman's advent to power, he found himself faced with the
prospect of a European war, which was only averted when our Foreign
Minister made it clear to Germany, that in such an event this country would
range herself upon the side of France.[1]

This was the first warning.

THE SECOND The British answer to it was to utter renewed
WARNING protestations Of friendly confidence. As an earnest of our
good intentions, the shipbuilding programme[2] of the
previous Government was immediately reduced. The burden of armaments
became the burden of innumerable speeches. In well-chosen words
Germany was coaxed and cajoled to acquiesce in our continued command
of the sea; but finding in our action or inaction an opportunity for
challenging it, she turned a polite ear—but a deaf one—and pushed forward
her preparations with redoubled speed. In vain did we on our part slow
down work at our new naval base in the Firth of Forth. In vain did we
reduce our slender army to even smaller dimensions.[3] In vain did we
plead disinterestedly with Germany, for a reduction in the pace of
competition in naval armaments, on the terms that we should be allowed to
possess a fleet nearly twice as strong as her own. For the most part, during
this period, official Germany remained discreetly silent, for the reason that
silence served her purpose best; but when the persistency of our entreaties
made some sort of answer necessary, we were given to understand by
unofficial Germany—rather roughly and gruffly—that a certain class of
requests was inadmissible as between gentlemen.

Then suddenly, having up to that time lulled ourselves into the belief that
our fine words had actually succeeded in buttering parsnips, we awoke—in
the late autumn of 1908—to the truth, and fell immediately into a fit of
panic. Panic increased during the winter and following spring, and
culminated during the summer, in an Imperial Defence Conference with the
Dominions.

We had curtailed our shipbuilding programme and slowed down our

preparations. Thereby we had hoped to induce Germany to follow suit. But
the effect had been precisely the opposite: she had increased her programme
and speeded up her preparations. At last our Government became alive to
what was going on, and in tones of reverberant anxiety informed an
astonished nation that the naval estimates called for large additions.

Ministers, indeed, were between the devil and the deep sea. The
supremacy of the British Fleet was menaced; the conscience of the Radical
party was shocked—shocked not so much at the existence of the menace as
at official recognition of it, and at the cost of insuring against it. It was so
much shocked, indeed, that it took refuge in incredulity; and—upon the
strength of assurances which were of course abundantly forthcoming from
the German Admiralty, who averred upon their honour that there had been
neither addition nor acceleration—roundly accused its own anointed
ministers of bearing false witness against an innocent neighbour.

None the less, large sums were voted, and the Dominions came forward
with generous contributions.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, indeed, who had been nourished and brought up on a
diet of dried phrases, was sceptical. To this far-sighted statesman there
appeared to be no German menace either then or subsequently. The whole
thing was a mere nightmare, disturbing the innocent sleep of Liberalism and
democracy.[4]

This was the second warning.

THE THIRD The third warning came in the form of subterranean

WARNING rumblings, inaudible to the general public, but clearly heard
by ministerial ears.

In July 1909, while the Imperial Conference on Defence was in session,

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded Prince Bülow as German
Chancellor. Up to that time there had been the menace of the mailed fist, the
rattling sabre, and the shining armour. Henceforward there was the
additional menace of a diplomacy playing for time, with a careless and
unconcealed contempt for the intelligence, the courage, and the honour of
the British people and their statesmen.[5] The German Government had
clearly formed the opinion that our ministers were growing more and more
afraid of asking their party to support increased naval estimates, and that it
was only necessary to go on, alternately dangling and withdrawing illusory
proposals for a naval understanding and a general agreement, in order to
steal ahead of us in the race. Here, as in many other instances, the Germans
had observed not altogether incorrectly; but they had drawn the wrong
inference from the facts.
 During the summer and autumn of 1910 was held the famous but futile
Constitutional Conference, the primary object of which was to settle the
quarrel between the two Houses of Parliament. With steadily increasing
clumsiness, German diplomacy, through all this anxious time, was engaged
in holding out its hand and withdrawing it again; until even men whose
minds were worried with more immediate cares, could no longer ignore the
gravity of the situation.

The Conference adjourned for the holiday season, but resumed its
sessions in October. The public assurances of those who took part in it on
both sides agree in this, that nothing except the special subject for which it
had been called into existence was ever discussed at its meetings. But many
other things were certainly discussed outside its meetings—on the doorstep
and the staircase, and in the anterooms. Among these topics the dangers of
the international situation, and the peril of imperial security were the chief.

In October and November 1910 there was a great secret of Polichinelle.

Conceivably we may learn from some future historian even more about it
than we knew at the time. All that need be said here with reference to the
matter is, that many persons on both sides found themselves faced with a
position of affairs, where the security of the country plainly required
measures for its defence, of a character and upon a scale, which neither
political party could hope to carry through Parliament and commend to the
country, unless it were supported by the more responsible section of its
opponents.

Neither party, however, was willing to pay the price necessary for the
support of the other, and as a consequence imperial interests suffered. It is
not necessary, however, to conclude from this lamentable failure that a
sordid spirit of faction was the explanation. In the constitutional sphere
certain principles were in conflict, which the parties concerned had the
honesty to hold by, but lacked the sympathy, and possibly the intelligence,
to adjust. The acrimony of an immediate controversy distorted the vision of
those engaged in it; so that the proportions of domestic and foreign dangers
were misjudged.

The failure of this constitutional conference was welcomed at the time

by exultant shoutings among many, perhaps the majority, of the rank and
file of politicians upon both sides. It was not so regarded, however, by the
country, which in a remarkable degree refused to respond to the incitements
of violence and hatred with which it was plied during the ensuing election.
There was at this time, for no very definite reason, a widespread popular
uneasiness, and something approaching a general disgust with politicians.

Among more considerate men on both sides, the breakdown was frankly
spoken of as one of the great calamities in our political history. It was more
than that. It was in reality one of the greatest which have ever befallen
Europe.

THE FOURTH During the following July (1911), while in this country
WARNING we were deeply engaged in the bitter climax of the
constitutional struggle, there sounded a fourth strident
warning from the gong of the German Chancellery.

The Agadir incident is one of the strangest which have occurred in

British history during recent years. Its full gravity was not realised outside a
very narrow circle at the time of its occurrence; and when subsequently it
became more widely understood there was a curious conspiracy to hush it
up—or, perhaps, not so much a conspiracy, as a general instinct of
concealment—a spontaneous gesture of modesty—as if the British nation
had been surprised bathing.

At the beginning of July the German cruiser Panther appeared at Agadir

in Morocco. This visit was intended and understood as a direct challenge to
France. Diplomacy was immediately in a stir.

Three weeks later Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the Mansion House,
making it clear that England would not tolerate this encroachment. Even
amid the anger and excitement which attended the last stages of the
Parliament Bill, this statement created a deep impression throughout the
country, and a still deeper impression in other countries.

Then the crisis appeared to fade away. Germany was supposed to have
become amenable. We returned to our internecine avocations. The holiday
season claimed its votaries, and a great railway strike upset many of their
best-laid plans. The inhabitants of the United Kingdom are accustomed to
think only on certain topics during August and September, and it is hard to
break them of their habits. To reconsider a crisis which had arisen and
passed away some two and a half months earlier, was more than could be
expected of us when we returned to work in the autumn.

But Mr. Lloyd George's speech was capable of only one interpretation,—
if Germany had persisted in her encroachment, this country would have
gone to war in August or September 1911 in support of France. His words
had no other meaning, and every highly placed soldier and sailor was fully
aware of this fact, and made such preparations in his own sphere as the case
required. But from what has transpired subsequently, it does not seem at all
clear that more than two or three of the Cabinet in the least realised what
was happening. Parliament did not understand the situation any more than
the country did.

Later on, when people had time to concentrate their minds on such
matters, there was a thrill of post-dated anxiety—a perturbation and
disapproval; criticism upon various points; a transference of Mr. McKenna
from the Admiralty to the Home Office, and of Mr. Churchill from the
Home Office to the Admiralty. Indignant anti-militarists, supporters for the
most part of the Government, allowed themselves to be mysteriously
reduced to silence. Business men, who had been shocked when they learned
the truth, suffered themselves to be persuaded that even the truth must be
taken with a pinch of salt. There was, in fact, a sort of general agreement
that it was better to leave the summer embers undisturbed, lest a greater
conflagration might ensue. The attitude of the orthodox politician was that
of a nervous person who, hearing, as he imagines, a burglar in his bedroom,
feels happier and safer when he shuts his eyes and pulls the blankets over
his head.

THE FIFTH A few months later, at the beginning of the following

WARNING year (1912), the fifth warning of the series was delivered.
 It differed from its predecessors inasmuch as it was addressed to the ears
of the British Government alone. Neither the Opposition nor the country
heard anything of it until more than two years later—until the battles of
Alsace, of Charleroi, and of Mons had been lost—until the battle of the
Marne had been won—until the British Army was moving north to take up
a position in Flanders. Then we learned that, when Lord Haldane had
visited Berlin in the month of February 1912, he had done so at the special
request of the Kaiser, in order to consider how Anglo-German
misunderstandings might be removed.

Lord Haldane would have acted more wisely had he stopped his journey
en route, and never entered Berlin at all. For, two days before the date
appointed for his visit, proposals for large increases of the German Army
and Navy were laid before the Reichstag. His mission was to abate
competition in armaments, and here was an encouraging beginning! Was it
contempt, or insolence, or a design to overawe the supposed timidity of the
emissary; or was it merely a blundering effort to steal a march in the
negotiations by facing the ambassador on his arrival with a fait accompli?
Possibly it was a combination of all these; but at any rate it was exceedingly
clumsy, and no less significant than clumsy.
 As to the mission—Germany was willing in a vague way to 'retard'—
whatever that may mean—though not to abandon, or reduce, her naval
programme, providing the British Government would agree to remain
neutral in any war which Germany might choose to wage. France might be
crushed and Belgium annexed; but in either event England must stand aside
and wait her turn. On no other terms would the Kaiser consent to a
rapprochement with this country, or allow the blessed words 'retardation of
the naval programme' to be uttered by official lips.

An undertaking of this tenor went beyond those assurances of non-

aggressive intent which Lord Haldane, on behalf of his own Government,
was fully prepared to give. We would not be a party to any unprovoked
attack on Germany—was not that sufficient? It was plainly insufficient. It
was made clear that Germany desired a free hand to establish herself in a
position of supremacy astride of Europe. So Lord Haldane returned
profitless from his wayfaring, and the British Government was at its wits'
end how to placate the implacable.

The way they chose was well-doing, in which they wearied themselves
perhaps overmuch, especially during the Balkan negotiations. For Germany
did not want war at that time, for the reasons which have been given
already. And so, rather surlily, and with the air of one who was humouring a
crank—a pusillanimous people whose fixed idea was pacifism—she
consented that we should put ourselves to vast trouble to keep the peace for
her benefit. If war had to come in the end, it had much better have come
then—so far as we were concerned—seeing that the combined balance of
naval and military power was less unfavourable to the Triple Entente at the
beginning of 1913 than it was some fifteen months later.... This was all the
notice we took of the fifth warning. We earned no gratitude by our
activities, nor added in any way thereby to our own safety.

THE The Haldane mission is a puzzle from first to last. The

HALDANE Kaiser had asked that he should be sent.... For what
MISSION purpose? ... Apparently in order to discuss the foreign policy
of England and Germany. But surely the Kaiser should have
been told that we kept an Ambassador at Berlin for this very purpose; an
able man, habituated to stand in the strong sunlight of the imperial presence
without losing his head; but, above all, qualified to converse on such
matters (seeing that they lay within his own province) far better than the
most profound jurist in Christendom. Or if our Ambassador at Berlin could
not say what was required, the German Ambassador in London might easily
have paid a visit to Downing Street; or the Foreign Ministers of the two
countries might have arranged a meeting; or even the British Premier and
the German Chancellor might have contrived to come together. Any of
these ways would have been more natural, more proper, more likely (one
would think) to lead to business, than the way which was followed.

One guesses that the desire of the Kaiser that Lord Haldane should be
sent, was met half-way by the desire of Lord Haldane to go forth; that there
was some temperamental affinity between these two pre-eminent characters
—some attraction of opposites, like that of the python and the rabbit.

Whatever the reasons may have been for this visit, the results of it were
bad, and indeed disastrous. To have accepted the invitation was to fall into a
German trap; a trap which had been so often set that one might have
supposed it was familiar to every Foreign Office in Europe! Berlin has long
delighted in these extra-official enterprises, undertaken behind the backs of
accredited representatives. Confidences are exchanged; explanations are
offered 'in the frankest spirit'; sometimes understandings of a kind are
arrived at. But so far as Germany is concerned, nothing of all this is
binding, unless her subsequent interests make it desirable that it should be.
The names of the irregular emissaries, German, British, and cosmopolitan,
whom the Kaiser has sent to London and received at Berlin—unbeknown to
his own Foreign Office—since the beginning of his reign, would fill a large
and very interesting visitors' book. One would have imagined that even so
early as February 1912 this favourite device had been found out and
discredited even in Downing Street.

Lord Haldane was perhaps even less well fitted for such an embassy by
temperament and habit of mind, than he was by position and experience.
Lawyer-statesmanship, of the modern democratic sort, is of all forms of
human agency the one least likely to achieve anything at Potsdam. The
British emissary was tireless, industrious, and equable. His colleagues, on
the other hand, were overworked, indolent, or flustered. Ready on the
shortest notice to mind everybody else's business, he was allowed to mind
far too much of it; and he appears to have minded most of it rather ill than
well. He was no more suited to act for the Foreign Office than King Alfred
was to watch the housewife's cakes.

THE The man whose heart swells with pride in his own
HALDANE ingenuity usually walks all his life in blinkers. It is not
MISSION surprising that Lord Haldane's visit to the Kaiser was a
failure, that it awoke distrust at the time, or that it opened
the way to endless misrepresentation in the future. What surprises is his
stoicism; that he should subsequently have shown so few signs of
disappointment, distress, or mortification; that he should have continued up
to the present moment to hold himself out as an expert on German
psychology;[6] that he should be still upheld by his journalistic admirers, to
such an extent that they even write pamphlets setting out to his credit 'what
he did to thwart Germany.'[7]

We have been told by Mr. Asquith,[8] what was thought by the British
Government of the outcome of Lord Haldane's embassy. We have also been
informed by Germany, what was thought of it by high officials at Berlin;
what inferences they drew from these conversations; what hopes they
founded upon them. We do not know, however, what was thought of the
incident by the other two members of the Entente; how it impressed the
statesmen of Paris and Petrograd; for they must have known of the
occurrence—the English representative not being one whose comings and
goings would easily escape notice. The British people were told nothing;
they knew nothing; and therefore, naturally enough, they thought nothing
about the matter.

The British Cabinet—if Mr. Asquith's memory is to be relied on—saw

through the devilish designs of Germany so soon as Lord Haldane, upon his
return, unbosomed himself to the conclave in quaking whispers. We know
from the Prime Minister, that when he heard how the Kaiser demanded a
free hand for European conquests, as the price of a friendly understanding
with England, the scales dropped from his eyes, and he realised at once that
this merely meant the eating of us up later. But one cannot help wondering,
since Mr. Asquith was apparently so clear-sighted about the whole matter,
that he made no preparations whatsoever—military, financial, industrial, or
even naval (beyond the ordinary routine)—against an explosion which—the
mood and intentions of Germany being what they were now recognised to
be—might occur at any moment.

COST OF As to what Germany thought of the incident we know of

AMATEUR course only what the high personages at Berlin have been
DIPLOMACY pleased to tell the world about their 'sincere impressions.'
They have been very busy doing this—hand upon heart as
their wont is—in America and elsewhere. According to their own account
they gathered from Lord Haldane's mission that the British Government and
people were very much averse from being drawn into European conflicts;
that we now regretted having gone quite so far as we had done in the past,
in the way of entanglements and understandings; that while we could not
stand by, if any other country was being threatened directly on account of
arrangements it had come to with England, England certainly was by no
means disposed to seek officiously for opportunities of knight-errantry. In
simple words the cases of Tangier and Agadir were coloured by a special
obligation, and were to be distinguished clearly from anything in the nature
of a general obligation or alliance with France and Russia.

It is quite incredible that Lord Haldane ever said anything of this kind;
for he would have been four times over a traitor if he had—to France; to
Belgium; to his own country; also to Germany whom he would thus have
misled. It is also all but incredible that a single high official at Berlin ever
understood him to have spoken in this sense. But this is what the high
officials have assured their own countrymen and the whole of the neutral
world that they did understand; and they have called piteously on mankind
to witness, how false the British Government was to an honourable
understanding, so soon as trouble arose in July last with regard to Servia.
Such are some of the penalties we have paid for the luxury of indulging in
amateur diplomacy.

The German bureaucracy, however, always presses things too far. It is

not a little like Fag in The Rivals—"whenever it draws on its invention for a
good current lie, it always forges the endorsements as well as the bill." As a
proof that the relations of the two countries from this time forward were of
the best, inferences have been drawn industriously by the high officials at
Berlin as to the meaning and extent of Anglo-German co-operation during
the Balkan wars; as to agreements with regard to Africa already signed, but
not published, in which Downing Street had shown itself 'surprisingly
accommodating'; as to other agreements with regard to the Baghdad
Railway, the Mesopotamian oil-fields, the navigation of the Tigris, and
access through Basra to the Persian Gulf. These agreements, the earnest of a
new entente between the Teuton nations—the United States subsequently to
be welcomed in—are alleged to have been already concluded, signed and
awaiting publication when war broke out.[9] Then trouble arises in Servia; a
mere police business—nothing more—which might have been settled in a
few days or at any rate weeks, if perfidious Albion had not seized the
opportunity to work upon Muscovite suspicions, in order to provoke a
world-war for which she had been scheming all the time!

THE SIXTH The sixth warning was the enormous German Army Bill
WARNING and the accompanying war loan of 1913. By comparison,
the five previous warnings were but ambiguous whispers.
And yet this last reverberation had apparently no more effect upon the
British Government than any of the rest.

With all these numerous premonitions the puzzle is, how any
government could have remained in doubt as to the will of Germany to
wage war whenever her power seemed adequate and the opportunity
favourable for winning it. The favourite plea that the hearts of Mr. Asquith
and his colleagues were stronger than their heads does not earn much
respect. Knowing what we do of them in domestic politics, this excuse
would seem to put the quality of their heads unduly low. The true
explanation of their omissions must be sought elsewhere than in their
intellects and affections.

It is important to remember that none of the considerations which have

been set out in this chapter can possibly have been hidden from the Foreign
Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Prime Minister, the Committee of
Imperial Defence, or the inner or outer circles of the Cabinet. Important
papers upon matters of this kind go the round of the chief ministers. Unless
British public offices have lately fallen into a state of more than Turkish
indolence, of more than German miscalculation, it is inconceivable that the
true features of the situation were not laid before ministers, dinned into
ministers, proved and expounded to ministers, by faithful officials, alive to
the dangers which were growing steadily but rapidly with each succeeding
year. And although we may only surmise the vigilant activity of these
subordinates, we do actually know, that Mr. Asquith's Government was
warned of them, time and again, by other persons unconcerned in party
politics and well qualified to speak.

But supposing that no one had told them, they had their own wits and
senses, and these were surely enough. A body of men whose first duty is the
preservation of national security—who are trusted to attend to that task,
paid for performing it, honoured under the belief that they do attend to it
and perform it—cannot plead, in excuse for their failure, that no one had
jogged their elbows, roused them from their slumbers or their diversions,
and reminded them of their duty.

INACTION Mr. Asquith and his chief colleagues must have realised
OF THE the interdependence of policy and armaments; and they must
GOVERNME have known, from the year 1906 onwards, that on the
NT military side our armaments were utterly inadequate to
maintain our policy. They must have known that each year,
force of circumstances was tending more and more to consolidate the Triple
Entente into an alliance, as the only means of maintaining the balance of
power, which was a condition both of the freedom of Europe and of British
security. They knew—there can be no doubt on this point—what an
immense numerical superiority of armed forces Germany and Austria
together could bring, first against France at the onset of war, and
subsequently, at their leisure, against Russia during the grip of war. They
knew that a British Expeditionary Army of 160,000 men would not make
good the difference—would come nowhere near making good the
difference. They must have known that from the point of view of France
and Belgium, the special danger of modern warfare was the crushing
rapidity of its opening phase. They must have been kept fully informed of
all the changes which were taking place in the military situation upon the
continent to the detriment of the Triple Entente. They had watched the
Balkan war and measured its effects. They knew the meanings of the
critical dates—1914-1916—better, we may be sure, than any section of
their fellow-countrymen. And even although they might choose to
disregard, as mere jingoism, all the boasts and denunciations of German
journalists and professors, they must surely have remembered the events
which preceded the conference at Algeciras, and those others which led up
to the Defence Conference of 1909. They can hardly have forgotten the
anxieties which had burdened their hearts during the autumn of 1910.
Agadir cannot have been forgotten; the memory of Lord Haldane's rebuff
was still green; and the spectre of the latest German Army Bill must have
haunted them in their dreams.

There is here no question of being wise after the event. The meaning of
each of these things in turn was brought home to the Prime Minister and his
chief colleagues as it occurred—firstly, we may be sure, by their own
intelligence—secondly, we may be equally sure, by the reports of their
responsible subordinates—thirdly, by persons of knowledge and experience,
who had no axe to grind or interest to serve.

It is therefore absurd to suppose that ministers could have failed to

realise the extent of the danger, or of our unpreparedness to meet it, unless
they had purposely buried their heads in the sand. They knew that they had
not a big enough army, and that this fact might ruin their whole policy. Why
did they never say so? Why, when Lord Roberts said so, did they treat him
with contumely, and make every effort to discredit him? Why was nothing
done by them during their whole period of office to increase the Army and
thereby diminish the numerical superiority of their adversaries. On the
contrary, they actually reduced the Army, assuring the country that they had
no use for so many trained soldiers. Moreover, the timidity or secretiveness
of the Government prevented England from having, what is worth several
army corps, and what proved the salvation of France—a National Policy,
fully agreed and appealing to the hearts and consciences of the whole
people.
 The answers to these questions must be sought in another sphere. The
political situation was one of great perplexity at home as well as abroad,
and its inherent difficulties were immeasurably increased by the character
and temperament of Mr. Asquith, by the nature no less of his talents than of
his defects. The policy of wait-and-see is not necessarily despicable. There
are periods in which it has been the surest wisdom and the truest courage;
but this was not one of those periods, nor was there safety in dealing either
with Ireland or with Germany upon this principle. When a country is fully
prepared it can afford to wait and see if there will be a war; but not
otherwise.

Sir Edward Grey is a statesman whose integrity and disinterestedness

have never been impugned by friend or foe; but from the very beginning of
his tenure of office he has appeared to lack that supreme quality of belief in
himself which stamps the greatest foreign ministers. He has seemed at times
to hesitate, as if in doubt whether the dangers which he foresaw with his
mind's eye were realities, or only nightmares produced by his own over-
anxiety. We have a feeling also that in the conduct of his office he had
played too lonely a part, and that such advice and sympathy as he had
received were for the most part of the wrong sort. What he needed in the
way of counsel and companionship was simplicity and resolution. What he
had to rely on was the very reverse of this.

Lord Haldane, as we have learned recently, shared largely in the work of

the Foreign Office; a man of prodigious industry, but over-ingenious, and of
a self-complacency which too readily beguiled him into the belief that there
was no opponent who could not be satisfied, no obstacle which could not be
made to vanish—by argument.

SIR EDWARD Moreover, Sir Edward Grey had to contend against

GREY'S enemies within his own household. In the Liberal party there
DIFFICULTIE was a tradition, which has never been entirely shaken off,
S that all increase of armaments is provocative, and that all
foreign engagements are contrary to the public interest.
After the Agadir crisis he was made the object of a special attack by a large
and influential section of his own party and press, and was roundly declared
to be no longer possible as Foreign Minister.[10] There can be no doubt that
the attempt to force Sir Edward Grey's resignation in the winter 1911-1912
was fomented by German misrepresentation and intrigue, skilfully acting
upon the peculiar susceptibilities of radical fanaticism. Nor is there any
doubt that the attacks which were made upon the policy of Mr. Churchill,
from the autumn of 1912 onwards, were fostered by the same agency, using
the same tools, and aiming at the same objects.

The orthodoxy of Mr. Churchill was suspect on account of his Tory

ancestry and recent conversion; that of Sir Edward Grey on the ground that
he was a country gentleman, bred in aristocratic traditions, trained in
Foreign Affairs under the dangerous influences of Lord Rosebery, and
therefore incapable of understanding the democratic dogma that loving-
kindness will conquer everything, including Prussian ambitions.

Surely no very vivid imagination is needed to penetrate the mystery of

Cabinet discussions on defence for several years before war broke out.
Behind the Cabinet, as the Cabinet well knew, was a party, one half of
which was honestly oblivious of all danger, while the other half feared the
danger much less than it hated the only remedy. Clearly the bulk of the
Cabinet was in cordial sympathy either with one or other of these two
sections of their party. Sir Edward Grey accordingly had to defend his
policy against an immense preponderance of settled convictions, political
prejudices, and personal interests. And at the same time he seems to have
been haunted by the doubt lest, after all, his fears were only nightmares. Mr.
Churchill, there is no difficulty in seeing, must have fought very gallantly;
but always, for the reason already given, with one hand tied behind his
back. He had all his work cut out to maintain the Navy, which was under his
charge, in a state of efficiency; and this upon the whole he succeeded in
doing pretty efficiently.[11]

If we may argue back from public utterances to Cabinet discussions, it

would appear that the only assistance—if indeed it deserved such a name—
which was forthcoming to these two, proceeded from Mr. Asquith and Lord
Haldane. The former was by temperament opposed to clear decisions and
vigorous action. The latter—to whom the mind of Germany was as an open
book—bemused himself, and seems to have succeeded in bemusing his
colleagues to almost as great an extent.
 In fancy, we can conjure up a scene which must have been enacted, and
re-enacted, very often at Number 10 Downing Street in recent years. We
can hear the warnings of the Foreign Minister, the urgent pleas of the First
Lord of the Admiralty, the scepticism, indifference, or hostility expressed
by the preponderant, though leaderless, majority in the Cabinet. Simple
said, I see no danger; Sloth said, Yet a little more sleep; and Presumption
said, Every Vat must stand upon his own bottom.... We can almost
distinguish the tones of their Right Honourable voices.

EXCESSIVE The situation was governed by an excessive timidity—by

TIMIDITY fear of colleagues, of the caucus, of the party, and of public
opinion—by fear also of Germany. Mr. Asquith, and the
Cabinet of which he was the head, refused to look their policy between the
eyes, and realise what it was, and what were its inevitable consequences.
They would not admit that the Balance of Power was an English interest, or
that they were in any way concerned in maintaining it. They would not
admit that our Entente with France and Russia was in fact an alliance. They
thought they could send British officers to arrange plans of campaign with
the French General Staff—could learn from this source all the secret hopes
and anxieties of France—could also withdraw the greater part of their fleet
from the Mediterranean, under arrangement for naval co-operation with our
present ally[12]—all without committing this country to any form of
understanding! They boasted that they had no engagements with France,
which puzzled the French and the Russians, and convinced nobody; save
possibly themselves, and a section of their own followers. They had in fact
bound the country to a course of action—in certain events which were not
at all improbable—just as surely by drifting into a committal, as if they had
signed and sealed a parchment. Yet they would not face the imperative
condition. They would not place their armaments on a footing to correspond
with their policy.

Much of this is now admitted more or less frankly, but justification is

pleaded, in that it was essential to lead the country cautiously, and that the
Government could do nothing unless it had the people behind it. In these
sayings there is a measure of truth. But as a matter of fact the country was
not led at all. It was trapped. Never was there the slightest effort made by
any member of the Government to educate the people with regard to the
national dangers, responsibilities, and duties. When the crisis occurred the
hand of the whole British Empire was forced. There was no other way; but
it was a bad way. And what was infinitely worse, was the fact that, when
war was declared—that war which had been discussed at so many Cabinet
meetings since 1906—military preparations were found to be utterly
inadequate in numbers; and in many things other than numbers. The
politician is right in thinking that, as a rule, it is to his advantage if the
people are behind him; but there are times when we can imagine him
praying that they may not be too close.

We have been given to understand that it was impossible for the

Government to acknowledge their policy frankly, to face the consequences,
and to insist upon the necessary preparations in men and material being
granted. It was impossible, because to have done so would have broken the
Liberal party—that great instrument for good—in twain. The Cabinet would
have fallen in ruin. The careers of its most distinguished members would
have been cut short. Consider what sacrifices would have been contained in
this catalogue of disasters.

That is really what we are now beginning to consider, and are likely to
consider more and more as time goes on.

VALUE OF A great act of self-sacrifice—a man's, or a party's—may

SELF- sometimes make heedless people realise the presence of
SACRIFICE danger when nothing else will. Suppose Mr. Asquith had
said, "I will only continue to hold office on one condition,"
and had named the condition—'that armaments should correspond to
policy'—the only means of safety. He might thereupon have disappeared
into the chasm; but like Curtius he might have saved the City. It would have
made a great impression, Mr. Asquith falling from office for his principles.
Those passages of Periclean spoken after war broke out, about the crime of
Germany against humanity—about sacrificing our own ease—about duty,
honour, freedom, and the like—were wonderfully moving. Would there,
however, have been occasion for them, if in the orator's own case, the
sacrifice had been made before the event instead of after it, or if he had
faithfully performed the simplest and chief of all the duties attaching to his
great position?
 The present war, as many of us thought, and still think, was not
inevitable. None have maintained this opinion in the past with greater
vehemence than the Liberal party. But the conditions on which it could have
been avoided were, that England should have been prepared, which she was
not; and that she should have spoken her intentions clearly, which she did
not.

THE PRICE When the war is ended, or when the tide of it has turned
PAID and begun to sweep eastward, there will be much coming
and going of the older people, and of women, both young
and old, between England and France. They have waited, and what is it that
they will then be setting forth to see? ... From Mons to the Marne, and back
again to Ypres, heaps of earth, big and little, shapeless, nameless,
numberless—the graves of men who did not hesitate to sacrifice either their
careers or their lives when duty called them. Desolation is the heaviest
sacrifice of all; and those who will, by and by, go on this pilgrimage have
suffered it, ungrudgingly and with pride, because their country needed it. If
this war was indeed inevitable there is no more to be said. But what if it was
not inevitable? What if there would have been no war at all—or a less
lingering and murderous war—supposing that those, who from the trust
reposed in them by their fellow-countrymen should have been the first to
sacrifice their careers to duty, had not chosen instead to sacrifice duty to
their careers? It was no doubt a service to humanity to save the careers of
politicians from extinction, to keep ministers in office from year to year, to
preserve the Liberal party—that great instrument for good—unfractured.
These benefits were worth a great price; but were they worth quite so great
a price as has been paid?

[1] The Editor of the Westminster Gazette should be an unimpeachable

witness: "The (German) Emperor's visit to Tangier (March 1905) was
followed by a highly perilous passage of diplomacy, in which the
German Government appeared to be taking risks out of all proportion to
any interest they could have had in Morocco. The French sacrificed their
Foreign Minister (M. Delcasse) in order to keep the peace, but the
Germans were not appeased, and the pressure continued. It was the
general belief at this time, that nothing but the support which the British
government gave to the French averted a catastrophe in the early part of
1906, or induced the Germans to accept the Algeciras conference as the
way out of a dangerous situation."—The Foundations of British Policy
(p. 15), by J. A. Spender.

[2] The Cawdor Programme.

[3] Mr. Haldane reduced the Army by nine battalions (i.e. 9000 men) in
1906. He stated that he had no use for them. This meant a great deal
more, when the reserve-making power is taken into consideration....
"The Regular Army ... has been reduced by over 30,000 men; not only a
present, but a serious prospective loss."—Lord Roberts in the House of
Lords, April 3, 1913.

[4] Even four years later we find Sir Wilfrid Laurier wedded to the belief
that the German Emperor was one of the great men of the present age;
wonderfully endowed by intellect, character, and moral fibre; his potent
influence was always directed towards peace.—Canadian House of
Commons Debates, February 27, 1913, 4364. The whole of this speech
(4357-4364) in opposition to Mr. Borden's Naval Forces Bill is
interesting reading, as is also a later speech, April 7, 1913, on the same
theme (7398-7411).

[5] How Britain Strove for Peace, by Sir Edward Cook: especially pp.
18-35; also Why Britain is at War, by the same author. These two
pamphlets are understood to be a semi-official statement authorised by
the British Government.

[6] Lord Haldane has explained German conduct in the present war by a
sudden change of spirit, such as once befell a collie dog which owned
him as master, and which after a blameless early career, was possessed
by a fit of depravity in middle life and took to worrying sheep. Thus in a
single metaphor he extenuates the German offence and excuses his own
blindness!

[7] "Lord Haldane: What he did to thwart Germany." Pamphlet published

by the Daily Chronicle.

[8] At Cardiff, October 2, 1914.

[9] If this were really so, it is remarkable that Germany has not published
these opiate documents, which lulled her vigilance and were the cause of
her undoing. In the New York Evening Post (February 15, 1915) there is
a letter signed 'Historicus' in which the German version of the facts is not
seriously questioned, although a wholly different inference is drawn:
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

ebookultra.com