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Exploring the Variety of Random
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portrayed as the characteristic of the age in the pages of Machiavelli.
No previous Pope had ventured to show so reckless a determination
to use his office for the advancement of his relatives, and to employ
his relatives as a means of strengthening the temporal power of the
papacy. Three of his nephews were the sons of his brother, Raffaelle
della Rovere. The eldest, Lionardo, was made prefect of Rome, and
was married to a natural daughter of Ferrante of Naples. Giuliano
della Rovere, the most capable and vigorous of the family, was
raised by his uncle to be cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula. After
playing a prominent part as the opponent of the two succeeding
popes, he gained the tiara himself as Julius II. The third son,
Giovanni, succeeded Lionardo as prefect of Rome, and Sixtus
obtained for him the hand of Joanna, daughter of Federigo da
Montefeltro, duke of Urbino, a marriage which in the next generation
gave the duchy to a della Rovere dynasty. But the Pope’s most lavish
favours were conferred upon the two sons of a sister, Piero and
Girolamo Riario. Piero was made a cardinal at the age of twenty-five,
and received so many preferments, including the archbishopric of
Florence, that he drew a princely revenue from the Church. He only
lived three years after his uncle’s accession, but during that time he
succeeded in startling Europe by the stories of the extraordinary
pomp and debauchery on which he squandered his wealth. The
promotion of Girolamo Riario, a layman, was effected within the
papal states, and had more lasting results. The papal treasure was
employed to purchase for him the lordship of Imola; he was married
to Caterina, a natural daughter of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, and on the
extinction of the Ordelaffi in 1480 his uncle’s support gained for him
the city of Forli with the title of duke. The whole policy of the Pope
was directed for years to the aggrandisement of a youth who proved
no more worthy of his elevation than his brother had been. In 1488
the people of Forli rose and murdered him, and only the heroism of
his widow secured for a time the continuance of his dynasty.
The obvious intention of the Pope to extend his temporal power and
to abuse it for the aggrandisement of his nephew excited the
misgivings of the neighbouring states, and especially of Florence,
which was at this time under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici. In
order to remove this obstacle from their way, Sixtus and Riario
organised the famous conspiracy of the Pazzi for the overthrow of
the Medici rule. The Pope asserted his ignorance of any scheme of
assassination, but he must have known that success could hardly be
achieved without bloodshed, and his denial of complicity was a
merely formal attempt to save the credit of the holy see. The plot
very narrowly missed its aim: Giuliano de’ Medici was killed in the
cathedral of Florence, but Lorenzo escaped with a severe wound,
and the chief conspirators, including the archbishop of Pisa, fell
victims to the popular fury. Enraged at the failure of his scheme,
Sixtus excommunicated the Florentines for laying violent hands upon
a dignitary of the Church, and formed a league with Ferrante of
Naples for the overthrow of the republic. The disorder in Milan
War with Florence. following the death of Galeazzo Maria
Sforza, and the fact that Venice was still
engaged in the Turkish war, deprived Florence of her natural allies,
and in 1479 the city was exposed to serious peril. Lorenzo de’
Medici, however, not only averted the danger, but dexterously
employed it to strengthen his authority. At considerable personal
risk, he undertook a journey to Naples, and succeeded in negotiating
a peace with Ferrante. Sixtus was at first inclined to continue the
war; but the occupation of Otranto by a Turkish force in 1480
constituted such a serious menace to Italy, that the obstinate Pope
was forced to come to terms with his opponents and to withdraw the
bull of excommunication against Florence.
The Turkish invasion compelled Ferrante of Naples and his son
Alfonso to withdraw their troops from Tuscany, and to concentrate
Relations with their attention on the recovery of Otranto.
Ferrara and Venice, Fortunately for Italy, the death of
1482-84. Mohammed II. on May 3, 1481, and a
dispute as to the Turkish succession, led to the withdrawal of the
invaders, and enabled the Neapolitan rulers to claim a military
triumph which they had done little or nothing to bring about. But the
alliance between Naples and the papacy had been completely
annulled, and Sixtus, as restless as ever, did not scruple to form a
new coalition, which was destined to have momentous results to
Italy. Venice had concluded the treaty of Constantinople with the
Turks in 1479, and was eager to obtain upon Italian soil
compensation for its losses in the east. Hence arose in 1482 an
unscrupulous and unprecedented alliance between the papacy and
Venice for the spoliation of Ercole d’Este of Ferrara. The danger to
the balance of power in Italy led to the formation of a hostile
coalition between Naples, Florence, and Milan. Sixtus IV. soon
discovered that he had gained nothing by his change of allies. Venice
had seized the district of Rovigo from Ferrara, but had obviously no
intention of handing over any share of the spoils to Girolamo Riario.
At the same time, Neapolitan troops entered the papal states and
threatened Rome, and there was a risk that the misdeeds of the
papacy might result in the meeting of another general council. The
Pope, whose policy was entirely selfish, did not hesitate to avert the
danger by a sudden and complete change of front. In 1483 he made
peace with Naples and Ferrara, excommunicated the Venetians for
disturbing the peace of Italy, and prepared to seize the cities which
Venice had acquired within the papal dominions. But his restless
greed was again doomed to disappointment. Venice adroitly ended
the war by the treaty of Bagnolo, in which the only loser was the
unfortunate duke of Ferrara, and Sixtus was chagrined to find that
he had gained absolutely nothing by his ill-faith. Soon afterwards he
died on August 12, 1484, and contemporary lampoons declared that
he died of peace.

‘Nulla vis potuit sævum extinguere Sixtum:

Audito tantum nomine pacis, obit.’

In Rome itself the pontificate of Sixtus IV. had been as turbulent as

his foreign relations. The great families, and especially the Colonnas,
had opposed the advancement of the Pope’s nephews, and had thus
drawn on themselves the wrath of Sixtus. A long civil war ensued, in
Disorders in Rome. which the barons allied themselves with the
foreign enemies of the Pope, at one time with Florence, at another
with Naples or with Venice. In this war Sixtus displayed all his cold-
blooded cruelty and treachery. The stronghold of his enemies was
the castle of Marino, which was surrendered by Lorenzo Colonna on
condition that he should be restored to his family. Sixtus fulfilled his
promise by sending them his corpse. The mother appeared at the
papal court, and producing her son’s head, exclaimed, ‘See how a
Pope keeps faith!’ It was a graphic picture of the terrible degradation
of Rome by the Pope’s abandonment of spiritual aims for temporal
ambition. Directly the Pope’s death was known, the Colonnas headed
a rising which sacked the palaces of the Riarios and drove their
adherents from Rome.
The character of Innocent VIII. has been painted by some historians
in blacker colours than it deserves. It is true that he was the first
Innocent VIII., Pope who recognised his own children, but
1484-92. they seem to have been born before he
took orders, and his devotion to them did not involve him in such
scandals as disgrace his predecessor and his successor. The
principality of Anguillara was purchased for his son, Franceschetto
Cibo, but the latter was more interested in gaining money than
power, and his first act after his father’s death was to sell his
territories to Virginio Orsino. Innocent himself had little capacity and
little interest in politics. He spent great part of his time in a state of
lethargy, which not infrequently gave the appearance of death.
Among those who exercised a dominant influence over the feeble
Pope was Lorenzo de’ Medici, who married his daughter Maddalena
to Franceschetto Cibo, and as a part of the bargain, obtained the
cardinal’s hat for his second son, Giovanni, at the age of fourteen. It
was under Innocent VIII. that the Medici obtained that position at the
papal court which enabled them to produce two almost successive
popes, Leo X. and Clement VII., and enabled these popes to use the
power of the Church to suppress the liberties of their native city.
By far the greatest difficulty of Innocent VIII.’s pontificate was
connected with Naples. Ever since the withdrawal of John of Calabria
in 1464, the bastard house of Aragon had enjoyed undisputed
Rising of Neapolitan possession of the Neapolitan throne. Jacopo
barons. Piccinino, the condottiere, who had been
formidable in the previous struggle, was enticed to Naples by
Ferrante with the aid of Francesco Sforza, and was treacherously put
to death in 1465. At the time of his alliance with Sixtus IV. against
Lorenzo de’ Medici, Ferrante had succeeded in reducing his tribute to
his papal suzerain to the annual gift of a white horse. The freedom
from external danger enabled the king to make the royal authority
despotic, and to annul the independence of the feudal nobles. His
son, Alfonso of Calabria, gained an undeserved military reputation by
the withdrawal of the Turks from Otranto, and from that time was
associated with his father in the government. Under his influence the
royal rule became even more tyrannical and oppressive, and in 1485
the barons determined to rebel. Innocent VIII., who desired to extort
the old tribute from Naples which his predecessor had commuted,
espoused their cause, and Venice, always hostile to the house of
Aragon, gave secret assistance. It was decided to revive the Angevin
pretensions, and Réné of Lorraine, the grandson of Réné le Bon, was
invited to come to Italy as a claimant of the crown for which his
ancestors had so long contended. But the rebellion ended in
complete failure. Neither Florence nor Milan would consent to such a
disturbance of the normal relations of Italy as would be involved in
French intervention. The military force of the Neapolitan rulers was
overwhelming, and Alfonso, for the second time, led an army against
Rome. To complete the disasters of the Pope and his allies, Réné of
Lorraine, who was engaged in prosecuting a hopeless claim upon
Provence at the French court, allowed the opportunity of gaining
Naples to slip from his hands. But the mere threat of a French
invasion was enough to induce Ferrante and Alfonso to come to
terms. The Pope was bought off by the restoration of the former
tribute, and the Neapolitan barons, deprived of all hope of
assistance, submitted on the understanding that a full amnesty
should be granted to them. The promise was broken with that
cynical disregard of good faith which marked the politics of Italy in
the fifteenth century. The nobles who returned to Naples were
imprisoned, and were never again seen alive. The sole survivors
were those who preferred to remain in exile rather than trust the
rulers whom they had endeavoured to depose. These men eagerly
watched for an opportunity which might enable them at once to
avenge the death of their associates and to regain their own
confiscated territories. In 1493 they were at last enabled to act. The
death of Lorenzo de’ Medici, and the growing alienation of Ludovico
Sforza from Naples, removed some of the chief securities for peace
in Italy. By the advice of Venice the Neapolitan exiles petitioned for
the intervention, not of the duke of Lorraine, but of the French king,
Charles VIII. Before any final decision had been come to at the
French court, Ferrante had died on January 25, 1494, and Alfonso II.
was left to face the danger of which his own violence and misrule
had been the principal cause.
Innocent VIII. had not lived to witness this new crisis in the history of
Naples. His death in 1492 had been followed by a very important
election. The most prominent candidates for the suffrages of the
conclave were Ascanio Sforza, the brother of Ludovico, and Giuliano
della Rovere, the nephew of Sixtus IV. But neither could obtain the
requisite majority, and in the end Ascanio Sforza was bribed to
support the candidature of the wealthiest of the Roman cardinals,
Rodrigo Borgia, a nephew of Calixtus III. The well-known fact that he
had several natural children, born to him not only since he was a
priest, but since he had been a cardinal, seems to have been
Election of completely disregarded. A lavish
Alexander VI. expenditure of money and promises
secured his election, and he assumed the title of Alexander VI. The
first great problem which the new Pope had to solve concerned the
approaching struggle in Naples. In spite of his obligations to Ascanio
Sforza, and his antagonism to the Orsini, who were closely
connected at this time with the house of Aragon, Alexander allowed
himself to be drawn in 1493 into an alliance with Ferrante, and on
his death he recognised the title of Alfonso II. The French invasion,
which the Pope was thus pledged to resist, threatened the papacy
for some time with serious dangers; but in the end it proved one of
the chief circumstances which enabled Alexander himself, and
afterwards Julius II., to erect the temporal power upon firmer
foundations than any of their predecessors had been able to
construct.
 CHAPTER XIV
FLORENCE UNDER THE MEDICI

The period of oligarchical rule in Florence—Maso and Rinaldo

degli Albizzi—Niccolo da Uzzano—The opposition and Giovanni
de’ Medici—War with Filippo Maria Visconti—The Catasto—
Unsuccessful attack upon Lucca—Expulsion of the Medici—Fall of
the Albizzi, and return of Cosimo de’ Medici—Character and
methods of Cosimo’s rule—Luca Pitti and the coup d’état of 1458
—Cosimo’s foreign policy—Piero de’ Medici and his opponents—
Victory of Piero—Accession of Lorenzo de’ Medici—Approximation
to monarchy—Alienation of Naples, and quarrel with Sixtus IV.—
Conspiracy of the Pazzi—War in 1478 and 1479—Lorenzo goes to
Naples—Conclusion of peace—Constitutional changes in 1480—
Lorenzo’s later years—Importance of his death—Reckless
conduct of the younger Piero.

The leaders of the Florentine democracy paid a heavy penalty for

Oligarchical rule in their momentary triumph in 1378. A violent
Florence. reaction in 1382 restored the oligarchy
under the leadership of the Albizzi, and for the next fifty years the
curious machinery of the civic constitution was carefully manipulated
to secure the ascendency of the dominant faction. Although it is by
no means the most famous, there can be no doubt that this is one of
the most successful periods in Florentine history. Under the resolute
guidance of a close oligarchy, Florence maintained a heroic struggle
against the encroachments of Gian Galeazzo Visconti until his death
in 1402 saved the city from almost inevitable submission. When the
Milanese dominions fell to pieces, Florence seized the opportunity to
gain a great prize; and the city of Pisa, which commanded the
mouth of the Arno, was in 1406 compelled to surrender after an
obstinate resistance (see p. 244). Then followed a long war with
Ladislas of Naples, in the course of which Florence acquired the
important town of Cortona. And in 1421 the commercial interests of
the city were strengthened by the purchase from Genoa of a second
port—Livorno.
For a long time the active leader of the victorious faction and the
most influential politician in Florence was Maso degli Albizzi, a
nephew of the Piero degli Albizzi who had been so prominent in the
party strife of the fourteenth century (see p. 164). Maso had
returned from exile in 1382, and at various times held most of the
chief offices of the state. While he was gonfalonier in 1393 harsh
measures were taken to complete the defeat of the democrats. But,
apart from the severity shown to the unfortunate Alberti and their
supporters, Maso showed himself a wise and tolerant ruler. When he
died in 1417, his place was, to some extent, taken by his eldest son,
Rinaldo, who displayed great industry and integrity, but less
prudence and insight than his father. The almost hereditary
prominence of these two men did much to accustom the Florentines
to that disguised despotism which was afterwards established by the
Medici. But the Albizzi never enjoyed such undivided ascendency as
was held by Cosimo and Lorenzo de’ Medici. At least as influential a
leader as Rinaldo was Niccolo da Uzzano, who is frequently spoken
of by contemporaries as the head of the party. He seems to have
been a sincere enthusiast for aristocratic rule, and it was greatly due
to his influence that the Albizzi were prevented from making
themselves absolute masters of the city. His reputation for wisdom
and insight was deservedly high, and his death in 1432 proved a
fatal blow to the party in whose counsels he had always been on the
side of moderation.
In spite of the services which it rendered to the state, the
oligarchical government did not succeed in averting discontent and
hostility. The strongest political sentiment among the Florentines was
the love of equality, which found practical expression in the system
of filling offices by lot. This love of equality was more outraged by
the domination of a clique of ruling families than it would have been
by the government of a single despot. The lesser guilds and the
lower classes resented their virtual exclusion from office; and many
wealthy citizens, who had incurred the displeasure of the dominant
faction, found themselves equally left in the cold. Moreover, the
militant foreign policy of the government was extremely expensive;
and the burden of taxation, as was always the case in Florence, fell
more heavily upon the opponents than upon the supporters of the
government. Gradually the cause of the opposition came to be more
and more identified with the house of Medici. The action of Salvestro
de’ Medici in 1378 had identified the name with the popular cause,
though he did not personally profit by its short-lived victory. In 1393,
when the severe measures of Maso degli Albizzi provoked a popular
rising, it was to Vieri de’ Medici, a kinsman of Salvestro, that the
mob appealed for guidance, and it was his moderate advice which
checked the rebellion. But it was a member of another branch of the
family—Giovanni de’ Medici—who, in the second decade of the
fifteenth century, came to be regarded as the leader of those who
disapproved of the conduct of affairs by the ruling party. Giovanni
was a banker and money-changer, and was so successful in his
business that he became the richest citizen in Florence, if not in
Italy. He employed his wealth in extending his popularity, though he
was extremely careful to avoid any action which might give the
government a handle against him. In 1421 he was drawn as
gonfalonier, and Niccolo da Uzzano wished to cancel the
appointment as dangerous. But Giovanni’s hold on the people, and
especially on the lesser guilds, made such a step perilous, and his
two months of office passed uneventfully. Giovanni de’ Medici died in
1429, leaving two sons—Cosimo, afterwards the ruler of Florence,
and Lorenzo, whose descendants in the sixteenth century became
grand-dukes of Tuscany.
As long as the oligarchical government was successful, there was
little prospect of its overthrow, but from 1421 its credit steadily
declined. The reunion of the Milanese territories under Filippo Maria
War with Filippo Visconti constituted a serious menace to
Maria Visconti. Florence, and the imperative duty of self-
defence compelled the republic to embark once more in a desperate
struggle for existence. In 1424 the Florentine army, under Pandolfo
Malatesta, was defeated with great loss in the battle of Zagonara. A
despairing appeal was made to Venice for assistance, and the
intervention of Carmagnola saved Florence from annihilation. But the
spoils of victory were monopolised by Venice, and the
aggrandisement of their ally was by no means popular with the
Florentines. The power of the oligarchy had rested upon the success
of their foreign policy, and alarming discontent was the inevitable
result of an unsuccessful war. Two important measures were
resorted to in the hope of restoring the prestige of the dominant
faction. The heavy expenses of the war had called attention to the
old grievance of arbitrary taxation, and in 1427 a reform was
The Catasto of introduced to provide a more equitable
1427. basis of assessment. According to
Machiavelli, the acceptance of the Catasto, as it was called, was due
to the influence of Giovanni de’ Medici. Every citizen was to report to
the gonfalonier of his district his whole income from every source;
and concealment was to be punished by confiscation. From fixed
capital the income was to be estimated at seven per cent. These
reports were to be collected into four books, one for each quarter of
the city; and henceforth the assessment of taxation was to be
determined by them instead of depending upon a man’s political
position and opinions. As wealth fluctuated rapidly in a mercantile
community, a new catasto was to be made every three years. It was
a notable sacrifice on the part of the ruling clique, and probably
tended to weaken their unanimity, but it helped to pacify public
opinion for a time. Rinaldo degli Albizzi now came forward with a
new scheme for restoring the credit of his party. Ever since the days
Attack upon Lucca, of Castruccio Castracani, the annexation of
1430. Lucca had been a darling object of
Florentine ambition. Lucca was, at this time, ruled by one of its own
citizens—Paolo Guinigi—who had sided with Milan in the recent war.
Rinaldo proposed to treat this as a pretext for attacking Lucca. It
was in vain that Niccolo da Uzzano pointed out the risks of the
enterprise. Giovanni de’ Medici was dead, and his son Cosimo
supported the proposal of Rinaldo. His conduct on this occasion has
exposed him to the suspicion that he foresaw the failure of the
enterprise, and was willing to ruin his opponent even at the expense
of the state. War was declared in 1430, and Rinaldo degli Albizzi was
appointed one of the commissioners to superintend the siege of
Lucca. The enterprise was as unsuccessful as it was unjust, and its
failure was ultimately fatal to the party in power. Rinaldo, unjustly
accused of peculation, threw up his command in disgust. The duke
of Milan was drawn into the war, and the two most famous
condottieri of the day—Francesco Sforza and Niccolo Piccinino—were
employed in his service. After suffering serious reverses in the field,
the Florentines were glad to accept the mediation of the emperor
Sigismund, and in 1433 peace was made, leaving things as they
were before the war.
But no treaty could restore the previous conditions within the city.
Niccolo da Uzzano had died in 1432, and his death deprived his
Expulsion of the party of their strongest support, while it
Medici, 1433. removed the moderating influence on their
conduct. Cosimo de’ Medici was at once more ambitious and less
cautious than his father, and he and Rinaldo degli Albizzi were now
avowed rivals for ascendency. The latter, conscious of his growing
weakness, determined to have recourse to violence. In September
1433, when the signoria was composed of Rinaldo’s adherents,
Cosimo de’ Medici was summoned to appear before the magistrates,
and was imprisoned while his fate was deliberated upon. For some
time it was generally expected that he would be put to death. But
the wealth which his father had collected stood him in good stead,
and his judges were not proof against corruption. The majority
decided for a milder sentence. Cosimo was banished for ten years to
Padua, and his brother Lorenzo for five years to Venice. Most of their
prominent adherents shared their exile, and the Medici were
declared incapable of holding any office in Florence.
The victory of Albizzi seemed to be assured when Cosimo went into
exile in October 1433. The ordinary machinery of a Florentine coup
d’état had been set in motion. The people had been convened in the
piazza, and had approved the appointment of a balia or
revolutionary committee. But by a strange oversight on the part of
so experienced a partisan, Rinaldo had failed to obtain for this
committee the right of refilling the bags with the names of
candidates for office. The result was that the weakness of his
position was only slightly modified. His own party was divided and
inclined to be mutinous because the catasto was not abolished. And
the alienation of public opinion by military failures could only be
removed by some conspicuous success. In 1434 Florence became
involved in a war in Romagna between Filippo Maria Visconti and the
Pope. Again her troops were defeated in the field, and her ally,
Eugenius IV., driven from Rome by the Colonnas, was forced to seek
a refuge within her walls. In this moment of depression the accident
of lot resulted in the formation of a signoria in September 1434,
Recall of the which was favourable to the Medici. Rinaldo
Medici, 1434. in his turn was summoned before a hostile
magistracy, and he came accompanied by eight hundred armed
men. But he lost the favourable opportunity for overawing his
opponents by consenting to an interview with Eugenius IV., who had
offered his mediation. This delay proved fatal. The popolo minuto
took up arms and surrounded the piazza; while the signoria called in
armed peasants from the country. The parliament created a balia in
the interests of the party, which had for the moment the upper
hand. The Medici and Alberti families were recalled and declared
eligible for office. Rinaldo degli Albizzi with his son and about
seventy partisans were banished from Florence, and few of them
ever returned to their native city. Cosimo de’ Medici, who was in
Venice when the news of this sudden revolution reached him, re-
entered Florence on October 6, 1434. For the next three centuries
the history of Florence is bound up with the history of the house of
Medici.
The ascendency which the dramatic events of 1433 and 1434 gave
Character of to Cosimo de’ Medici was not only retained
Medicean Rule. during his life, but became for a time a
hereditary possession. Yet it is impossible to point to any great
apparent change in the constitution. The old magistracies and
councils continued to exist and to fulfil their former functions.
Cosimo was extremely careful to avoid any outward signs of
despotism. He continued to live in his former residence; and nothing
in his dress or his manner of life distinguished him from his fellow-
citizens. Like his defeated rival, he surrounded himself with a sort of
body-guard of allied families, whose interests he skilfully identified
with his own. To all appearance this was as much an oligarchy as the
government which it had displaced. The difference is to be found in
two points. On the one hand Cosimo was enabled, partly by his
wealth, and partly by his extensive foreign connections, to exercise a
far stronger control over his adherents and over the state than either
Maso or Rinaldo degli Albizzi had ever been able to wield. And, on
the other hand, the influential families who rose to power under
Cosimo did not represent the domination of a class as the rule of the
Albizzi had done. The Medici never forgot that they owed their
original rise to their championship of democratic equality; and they
were careful to avoid any unnecessary collision with the prejudices
of the mob. Even a disguised despotism must aim at the obliteration
of classes, and this can be clearly traced in the policy of Cosimo. He
transferred several families from the lesser to the greater guilds, and
thus obscured a distinction which had been at one time of
supereminent importance. And he even procured the repeal of the
disqualifications against the old nobility on which the foundations of
the historic municipality had been built.
It is not difficult to trace the methods by which Cosimo maintained
the power which had fallen into his hands. He had two primary
Methods of objects to attain: he must prevent the more
Cosimo’s important offices from falling into the hands
Government. of malcontents, and he must diminish their
number by bringing home to them the hardships and dangers of
opposition and the rewards that were to be gained by loyalty.
Cosimo boasted of the humanity of his rule, and he was always
careful to intrust to his followers the initiation of harsh proposals.
But his policy was really one of proscription. The Albizzi and their
allies were treated with the greatest severity. Not only were they
banished, but their place of exile was constantly changed, and they
were hunted about Italy like wild beasts. It was no wonder that their
patriotism gave way to a desire for revenge, and they joined the
duke of Milan against their native city. But the battle of Anghiari in
1440 destroyed all hope of success, while their treason gave a
pretext for more merciless treatment. The financial administration
was employed to the same ends. The catasto of 1427 was abolished,
and the system of arbitrary assessment was revived. This enabled
Cosimo to reward his adherents and to punish malcontents.
Giannozzo Mannetti, a harmless student, whose only offence was his
popularity, was called upon to pay taxes to the amount of 135,000
florins, and could only avoid ruin by going into voluntary exile. It
was a common saying that Cosimo employed the taxes, as northern
princes used the dagger, to rid himself of his opponents.
For the regulation of offices Cosimo employed the revolutionary
machinery which was in theory the ultimate enforcement of popular
sovereignty. The balia which had recalled the Medici in 1434 had
received from the parliament full power to reform the state. Every
five years this power was renewed—in 1439, 1444, 1449, and 1454.
The most important act of the balia was the appointment of ten
accoppiatori to superintend the filling of the bags with the names of
those who were eligible for office. This was in itself a fairly ample
assurance that no opposition to the Medici could be anticipated from
the magistracy; and to make it doubly sure, the names of the
gonfalonier and priors were selected every two months by the
accoppiatori. They were made, as the phrase went, not by lot, but
by hand. But as time went on, this prolonged departure from normal
procedure gave rise to grumbling; and as there were good reasons
for avoiding at the moment any appearance of disunion in the city,
Cosimo determined to yield. In 1455 the balia, which had been
renewed the year before, was abolished, and the practice of drawing
the names of the signoria was revived. The concession was more
apparent than real; for the bags had only recently been refilled, and
three years would elapse before a new squittinio would be
necessary. For that time the ascendency of the Medici party was
secure, and before it had elapsed measures might be taken to
prolong it. But that the revival of liberty was of some moment is
proved by the proposal in the signoria of January 1458 to restore the
catasto. Cosimo’s partisans urged him to employ energetic measures
to defeat a scheme which attacked their own pockets. But he was
not unwilling to teach them how dependent they were upon his
support, and he allowed the system of strict and impartial
assessment to be revived.
There was one very obvious danger to which such a government as
that of Cosimo de’ Medici was exposed. Jealousy and ill-will might
arise among his intimate associates. It was his deliberate policy to
place them in prominent positions, and they were perforce intrusted
with the secrets of his administration. One or more of them might
seek to use their experience for their own advancement and to free
themselves from the control of their patron. This danger was
partially realised in Cosimo’s later years, and serious difficulties arose
from the same source in the time of his son. In 1458 it had become
a grave question how far the revival of republican freedom should be
allowed to go. The death of Alfonso of Naples removed one great
motive for continuing the conciliatory policy of the last three years;
and the appointment to the gonfaloniership of Luca Pitti, one of the
oldest and closest of Cosimo’s adherents, gave the opportunity for
decisive action. After careful precautions had been taken to control
the avenues to the piazza and to impress the mob, a parliament was
convened by the ringing the great bell of the Palazzo Publico. A balia
Coup d’état of of 350 citizens, together with the existing
1458. signoria, was endowed with full authority.
Accoppiatori were appointed to fill the bags, and a permanent
committee, the Otto di Balia, received the control of the civic police.
By a curious irony it was announced to the people that the priors
should henceforth be called, not priori delle arti, but priori della
Liberta. The name was chosen, says Machiavelli, to designate what
had been lost.
But in this revolution to confirm the previous revolution Cosimo had
carefully abstained from taking any active share. In the eyes of the
Luca Pitti. mob the victorious politician was Luca Pitti,
who seemed to himself, as to others, to
overshadow his employer. Puffed up with ambition, he began to
build the magnificent palace on the southern side of the Arno,
which, afterwards the residence of the grand-dukes of Tuscany, and
now the shrine of one of the greatest picture galleries in the world,
has done more than any political achievement to preserve to
posterity the name of its founder. Cosimo was probably convinced
that little real danger was to be dreaded from Luca Pitti, and he
made no attempt to alter or correct the popular impression. As long
as his influence was really unimpaired he cared little who had the
appearance and pomp of supremacy.
As a great banker, Cosimo de’ Medici was an important personage in
Cosimo’s Foreign many foreign courts, quite apart from his
Policy. political position in Florence. With very
notable dexterity he played his two parts so as to make each
improve the other. He employed his financial relations to strengthen
his hold upon the strings of Florentine policy, and he utilised his
political influence to increase his business and his profits. It is in
foreign affairs far more than in domestic administration that he
showed himself to be the real ruler of Florence. He inherited from
the Albizzi a struggle against Filippo Maria Visconti and an alliance
with Venice. As long as the duke of Milan threatened the
independence of Florence, and especially when he espoused the
cause of the exiled Albizzi, Cosimo could not safely depart from the
traditional policy of Florence. But the death of Filippo Maria in 1447
and the establishment of a republic in Milan gave him more scope
for originality. He had to choose between the aggrandisement of
Venice in Lombardy, which must have been the inevitable result of
the maintenance of the Milanese republic, and the erection of a
military power in Milan which should hold Venice in check. Without
any hesitation he decided for the latter alternative, and the later
history of Italy was vitally influenced by his choice. The financial and
other aid which he received from Florence was one of the most
potent factors in enabling Francesco Sforza to obtain the lordship of
Milan in 1450, and to conclude the treaty of Lodi with Venice in
1454.
Another hardly less momentous question for Italy arose after the
death of Alfonso V. of Naples, when in 1460 the Angevin claim was
revived in antagonism to Ferrante. Although Florence was closely
allied with France by her Guelf traditions and her commercial
interests, Cosimo was resolute in his support of Ferrante and in
urging Francesco Sforza to do the same. Again his attitude helped to
turn the scale in a struggle where, for a time, the balance was
undecided. He just lived to hear of the retirement of John of
Calabria, which secured the bastard house of Aragon from serious
attack for the next thirty years. By his action in these two great
crises Cosimo must be regarded as the real author of that triple
alliance between Naples, Milan, and Florence, of which his grandson
in later years made such a masterly use.
Cosimo’s death in 1464 left the headship of the family to his only
surviving son, Piero, who was already middle-aged and in feeble
Piero de’ Medici health. The five years during which he
and his opponents. survived his father are chiefly noteworthy
because they witnessed the great split in the Medicean party, which
careful observers must have seen for some time to be inevitable.
Four of the most prominent associates of Cosimo—Luca Pitti,
Diotisalvi Neroni, Angelo Acciaiuoli, and Niccolo Soderini—were
unwilling to give to the son the deference which they had shown to
the father. Luckily for the Medici, their unanimity did not go far. The
first three were actuated by motives of personal ambition, which
might easily lead them to quarrel with each other, while Niccolo
Soderini was an enthusiast for democracy, and had no desire to
humble Piero in order to exalt another in his place. Neroni was the
ablest of the leaders, but he was lacking in personal courage, and
preferred to employ intrigue and constitutional methods rather than
violence. It was only gradually that two parties were organised in
avowed opposition to each other. The anti-Medicean party received
the nickname of the Mountain, because the great palace of Luca Pitti
was rising on the hill of San Giorgio. The residence of the Medici
stood on level ground to the north of the Arno, and hence Piero’s
adherents were known as the Plain.
The first trial of strength took place in 1465, when the opposition
made a bid for popularity by proposing to abolish the balia of 1458
and to restore the constitutional method of filling offices by lot. Piero
was too cautious to oppose such a measure, and it was carried with
virtual unanimity. In November the first draw took place, and Niccolo
Soderini became gonfalonier. Disunion among the leaders prevented
any use being made of the advantage which chance had given them,
and Soderini went out of office at the end of December without
having effected any further change in the constitution. In the next
year the party strife was extended to foreign politics. Venice had
never forgotten or forgiven the part which Florence had played in
establishing the Sforzas in Milan. Now that Francesco was dead and
succeeded by the more reckless Galeazzo Maria, there was some
possibility of evicting a dynasty which was a perpetual bar to
Venetian expansion in Lombardy. But to overthrow the Sforzas it was
first necessary to overthrow the Medici. And so the leaders of the
Mountain made overtures to Venice, regardless of the consideration
that a complete reversal of foreign policy might damage the interests
of Florence. The Venetians were too cautious to commit themselves
to an alliance with a faction which might fail, and moreover they had
the Turkish war on their hands. But there was a secret
understanding that if Piero de’ Medici were got rid of, either by the
dagger or by a revolution, his opponents would be aided by troops
under Bartolommeo Coleone, a condottiere in the pay of Venice, and
Ercole d’Este, brother of the duke of Ferrara.
Piero knew enough of these schemes to induce him to draw closer
Crisis of 1466. the alliance with Milan and Naples which his
father had bequeathed to him. His elder
son, Lorenzo, received his first experience of diplomacy by being
sent on an embassy to Ferrante. The news that Ercole d’Este had
advanced in the direction of Pistoia brought matters to a crisis. Piero
hurried to Florence from his villa at Careggi, and is said to have
escaped an ambush on the way through the vigilance and acuteness
of Lorenzo. Galeazzo Maria Sforza was invited to send troops to the
assistance of Florence, and the peasants from the Medici estates
were armed and brought into the city. On the other side Niccolo
Soderini collected two hundred men who were kept in arms in the
Pitti palace. Civil war seemed inevitable, but by a tacit agreement
active violence was postponed till the new signoria was drawn at the
end of August. Fortune or skill favoured the Medici, and a
gonfalonier and priors devoted to their interests took up office on
September 1. On the next day the great bell called the people to a
parliament in the piazza. The armed adherents of Piero commanded
every entrance, and the dissentients who obtained admission were
too few or too timid to make themselves heard. A numerous balia
was proposed by the signoria and approved by acclamation. For the
next ten years the priors were to be made by hand. Neroni,
Acciaiuolo, and Niccolo Soderini were banished. Luca Pitti, who had
been bribed or persuaded to desert his associates, was allowed to
remain, but his ostentation had made him unpopular, and he spent
the rest of his life in harmless insignificance. His gigantic palace
remained unfinished till it was completed by the Medici in the next
century.
There still remained the danger of foreign intervention. Neroni, who
had been banished to Sicily, defied the decree and repaired to
Failure of the anti- Venice. It was decided to carry out the
Mediceans. scheme which had been arranged in the
previous year. Bartolommeo Coleone was to conduct in the interest
of the exiles what was ostensibly a private enterprise. He was joined
in the spring of 1467 by Ercole d’Este and several of the smaller
princes of Romagna. Neapolitan and Milanese auxiliaries were sent
to the aid of Florence, whose forces were under the supreme
command of Federigo da Montefeltro, duke of Urbino. Italy watched
with eager interest the progress of the campaign, which was
conducted with the punctilious precision so dear to the professional
soldier of Italy. There was a great deal of marching, but very little
fighting and very little execution. The armies never came anywhere
near Florence, whose fate was supposed to be at stake, and no
decisive advantage was gained by either side. But this was in itself
decisive enough. It was sufficient for the Medici to avoid defeat; the
exiles could hope for nothing unless they gained a great victory. In
1468 peace was negotiated by Pope Paul II., leaving matters in statu
quo. The exiles lost all hope of returning to Florence. Niccolo
Soderini died in Germany in 1474; Neroni lived in Rome till 1482;
Angelo Acciaiuoli entered a Carthusian monastery in Naples.
The struggle of 1466 and 1467 removed any possible doubt as to
the position of the Medici. The whole aim of the opposition and their
supporters had been to effect their overthrow, and the attempt had
failed. They were undistinguished by any title, but they were as
obviously the rulers of Florence as if they called themselves dukes or
counts. This was made clear after the death of Piero de’ Medici on
December 3, 1469. Tommaso Soderini, Niccolo’s brother, who had
remained faithful during the recent crisis, convened a pratica or
Accession of informal meeting of the principal citizens.
Lorenzo. He proposed that Lorenzo de’ Medici, who
was only twenty-one, and therefore below the legal age for holding
any magistracy in the republic, should be invited to exercise the
power that had been wielded by Cosimo and Piero. A deputation was
chosen to carry the offer, which Lorenzo accepted after a becoming
show of hesitation.
Lorenzo’s conduct shows that he was fully conscious of the altered
position which events had enabled him to assume. Hitherto the
Medici had been content to intermarry with Florentine families, and
thus to recognise their equality of rank. But Lorenzo, as a prince,
must seek a foreign bride, and he married Clarice Orsini, a daughter
of the famous family of Roman nobles. Though his own tastes led
him to show an interest in art and literature, and to encourage the
amusements of the people, he was also inspired by the wish to
Constitutional establish a court on the lines which had
changes. become familiar in the principalities of Italy.
In their intercourse with Lorenzo the Florentines showed a deference
and even a servility which would have been deemed wholly out of
place in the days of Cosimo and Piero. This growth of a monarchical
element within the republic is probably the explanation of the
numerous and obscure constitutional changes which were made or
attempted in the early years of Lorenzo’s administration. Their
essential object was to secure absolute control of appointments to
the signory. In 1470 it was proposed that the accoppiatori should be
chosen every year by a new college of forty-five, consisting of men
who had discharged this function since the return of the Medici in
1434. The scheme was denounced as an attempt to subject the city
to forty-five tyrants, and failed to pass the council of a hundred. In
the next year, however, the same object was attained in a different
way. The existing accoppiatori were associated with the sitting
members of the signoria as a permanent committee, and the names
which they proposed were to be carried in the Hundred by a bare
majority, instead of by the usual majority of two-thirds. In the same
year the legislative functions of the old councils of the people and of
the commune were suspended for ten years. It is difficult to
estimate the precise significance of these and other changes, but
their general effect was to narrow the circle of families among
whose members the more important offices circulated. This was
certain to excite dissatisfaction; and among the malcontents we find
the Pazzi, an old noble family which had devoted itself to commerce,
and now became rivals of the Medici in business as well as in
politics.
Events proved that discontent within Florence was not very
Foreign policy. formidable, unless it was reinforced by
difficulties in foreign relations. Lorenzo had
been brought up by his grandfather to regard Milan and Naples as
the normal allies of Florence, Venice as a dangerous rival of Florence
and a resolute opponent of the Medici ascendency, and the papacy
as a variable force depending on the idiosyncracies of rapidly
changing popes, and requiring to be very carefully watched. Lorenzo
had learned the lesson, but with the egotism and self-sufficiency of
youth he was not disinclined to attempt a few experiments on his
own account. If he could establish friendly relations with the papacy
and with Venice, he might make his own position stronger than ever,
and might pose as mediator and almost as arbiter in the relations of
the Italian states. On the election of Sixtus IV. in 1471, Lorenzo went
in person as Florentine envoy to carry the usual congratulations. He
returned not only with a confirmation of his banking privileges in
Rome, but with the lucrative appointment of receiver of the papal
revenues. At the same time he opened negotiations with Venice,
which led in 1474 to the embassy of Tommaso Soderini and the
conclusion of an alliance between Venice, Milan, and Florence.
But these new connections were dearly purchased by the alienation
of Naples. Ferrante regarded Venice as the inveterate enemy of his
kingdom and his family. As long as the Medici had identified their
interests with his own he had been eager to uphold their power in
Alienation of Naples Florence. But a good understanding of
and quarrel with Milan and Florence with Venice threatened
Sixtus IV. Naples with isolation, and Ferrante must
seek support elsewhere. Sixtus had already allowed the Neapolitan
tribute to be commuted for a formal gift; and as the ties between
Naples and the papacy were drawn closer, a coolness grew up
between Sixtus and Lorenzo. The origin of the quarrel is to be found
in the opposition of Florence to the aggrandisement of Girolamo
Riario (see p. 282). Lorenzo refused to find the money for the
purchase of Imola, and the Pope transferred the post of receiver-
general from the Medici to the Pazzi. The dispute was speedily
embittered. Sixtus appointed Francesco Salviati to the archbishopric
of Pisa without consulting Lorenzo, and in defiance of his wishes.
The Florentines, on their side, refused to admit the archbishop to his
see; they supported the Vitelli in Citta di Castello, and in many ways
showed an inclination to thwart the Pope’s schemes in Romagna. For
some time, however, the dispute did not seem likely to lead to
serious results. But the death of Galeazzo Maria Sforza in 1476, and
the obvious weakness of the government of the regent, Bona of
Savoy, encouraged the opponents of the Medici to bolder acts than
they would have contemplated when Milan could give efficient
support to Florence. In 1477 Girolamo Riario and Francesco Pazzi
Conspiracy of the began to discuss in Rome how to overthrow
Pazzi. a family which stood in the way of both of
them. By the beginning of 1478 the main outlines of the conspiracy
had been agreed to. Francesco Salviati and Jacopo Pazzi, the head
of the family in Florence, had agreed to take part in the plot. It was
understood that the Pope and the king of Naples would give active
support, but they took no responsibilities for the actual means by
which the desired end was to be attained. Assassination was a
recognised weapon in Italian politics, and it was obviously difficult to
effect a revolution in Florence without it. Sixtus IV. might plead that
he was ignorant of this part of the design, but morally the plea is
worthless. If the Medici government had been unpopular in Florence,
it might have been possible to organise a rebellion and to overthrow
them by means of a parliament. But there was no widespread
discontent in the city, and the Pazzi had no strong following among
either the lower or the wealthy classes. It was decided, therefore, to
kill Lorenzo and his brother Giuliano, and to trust to the resultant
confusion and foreign intervention. A number of hired mercenaries,
headed by Giovanni Battista da Montesecco, were engaged to carry
out the two immediate objects—the murder of the brothers and the
seizure of the magistrates. It says much for the fidelity of the
plotters that no one was found to betray the design, in spite of the
discouragement caused by unavoidable delays. The great practical
difficulty arose from the necessity of assassinating Lorenzo and
Giuliano at the same moment, for fear that one might receive
warning from the fate of the other. And unless both were removed,
the plot would end in failure. At last the desired opportunity was
offered by a banquet which the Medici gave in honour of Cardinal
Raffaelle Riario, a great-nephew of the Pope. But Giuliano was too
unwell to attend, and the time and place had to be altered. On
Sunday, April 26, 1478, the two brothers were to be present at
divine service in the cathedral, and the elevation of the host was to
be the signal to the assassins. This gave rise to an unexpected
difficulty. Montesecco, who had undertaken to slay Lorenzo, refused
to commit sacrilege by shedding blood in a church, and two priests
were chosen to take his place. But the priests, though they did not
share the scruples, also lacked the strength and skill of the soldier.
As the little altar bell tinkled, Giuliano was struck down, and
Francesco Pazzi dealt the final deathblow. But Lorenzo was only
wounded in the shoulder, and in the confused scuffle which followed
he succeeded in escaping to the sacristy, where his friends closed
the bronze doors in the face of the murderers. Elsewhere the
conspirators were equally unsuccessful. Archbishop Salviati, who had
gone to the Palazzo to superintend the seizure of the gonfalonier
and priors, excited suspicion by his obvious agitation, and was
seized with several of his followers. Jacopo Pazzi headed a
procession through the streets with shouts of ‘Liberty,’ but the
people raised the counter-cry of ‘Palle! Palle!’ in favour of the Medici,
and the leaders of the demonstration were carried by the mob to the
Palazzo. On the arrival of the news that Giuliano de’ Medici was
dead, Francesco Pazzi, the archbishop of Pisa, and several other
prisoners were promptly hanged from the windows. Vindictive
severity was shown to the Pazzi and their allies. Guglielmo Pazzi,
who had married Lorenzo’s sister, was the only member of the family
who escaped. The two priests who had taken refuge in a monastery
were dragged from their sanctuary by the mob and barbarously
murdered. Montesecco had left Florence, but he was captured, and
after giving evidence which implicated the Pope in the conspiracy,
was executed. One of the murderers succeeded in reaching
Constantinople, but even there the vengeance of the Medici was
able to reach him. He was handed over by Mohammed II., and
brought back to Florence, where in 1479 he shared the fate of his
accomplices.
Within Florence all danger was at an end. The cowardly nature of
the attack rallied public opinion to the Medici; and the death of a
War with Naples brother, who had hitherto enjoyed the
and the Papacy. larger share of popular favour, served to