IET Microwaves, Antennas & Propagation

Received: 28 June 2024

DOI: 10.1049/mia2.12541

ORIGINAL RESEARCH
- -Revised: 3 December 2024 Accepted: 4 December 2024

-
Research on methods to enhance the survivability of AWACS
with FDA against anti‐ARMs on a battlefield

Bo Wang1 | Gang Wang2 | Rengnong Yang1 | Yonglin Li1 | Yu Zhao1

Abstract
1
Air Traffic Control and Navigation School, Air
Force Engineering University, Xi'an, P.R.China
The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) are pivotal assets in aerial opera-
2
Air and Missile Defense College, Air Force tions, necessitating specialised protection measures, and serving as prime targets for
Engineering University, Xi'an, P.R.China
enemy anti‐radiation missiles (ARMs). This paper explores approaches to enhance the
Correspondence
battlefield survivability of frequency diverse array AWACS (FDA‐AWACS) by incorpo-
Bo Wang. rating airborne radar technology onto the platform. The study commences by analysing
Email: [email protected] the typical operational methods of anti‐radiation missiles. Following this, a deception
model is formulated for the frequency diverse array (FDA) against the passive radar
Funding information homing head of anti‐radiation missiles utilising the adjacent antenna single‐pulse
Shaanxi Provincial Association for Science and amplitude‐comparison direction‐finding technique. Expanding on this groundwork, the
Technology Youth Talent Support Program Pro‐ject,
Grant/Award Number: 20230137; National Natural research further assesses the deceptive impacts of FDA‐AWACS on direction finding
Science Foundation of China Youth Fund Support cross‐location techniques. Simulation results validate that FDA‐AWACS can effectively
Project, Grant/Award Number: 61503408; Shaanxi counter the threat of anti‐radiation missiles by diminishing their direction‐finding and
Provincial Natural Science Basic Research Program
General Project, Grant/Award Number: positioning systems.
2023JCYB509
KEYWORDS
radar antennas, radar detection, radiation detection

1 | INTRODUCTION attribute weight information is completely unknown. During

operations, AWACS must continuously utilise airborne
The Airborne Warning and Control System holds the capability communication equipment to transmit and receive various
for long‐range detection across entire airspaces, making it a intelligence commands while keeping their radar operational
vital strategic asset in modern air combat. Much of the current for conducting aerial early warning and command tasks. These
research on AWACS focuses on enhancing their command and characteristics make them highly vulnerable to revealing their
control capabilities. For example, Zheng et al. [1] conducted a positions in environments characterised by high‐intensity
simulation analysis on the causes and variations of relative electronic warfare, where “detect and destroy” tactics are
radial velocity blind zones, exploring methods to enhance prevalent. Consequently, they are susceptible to both soft kills
target detection efficiency in key directional surveillance mis- through active electronic jamming and hard kills from anti‐
sions using multiple AWACS. Liu Mao et al. [2] employed a radiation weapons. Derived typically from commercial or
random jitter model for targets and concluded that altering the transport planes by installing radar antennas on their dorsal
polarisation mode could improve the detection performance of sections, AWACS are large, slow‐moving, possess limited
airborne early warning radar under similar conditions. manoeuverability, and lack active attack capabilities. In situa-
Addressing the blind compensation issue within cooperative tions where escort fighters are incapacitated or the aerial
operations involving multiple AWACS was the primary focus defence system is breached, these aircraft, which serve as the
[3]. Additionally, Chen J. et al. [4] proposed a novel approach core of tactical command and control, face substantial threats
based on hybrid multi‐attribute decision‐making for multi‐ to battlefield survivability [5–7]. Therefore, methodologies for
aircraft cooperative air defence operations, even when enhancing the battlefield survivability of AWACS are essential

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
© 2025 The Author(s). IET Microwaves, Antennas & Propagation published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Institution of Engineering and Technology.

IET Microw. Antennas Propag. 2025;e12541.

https://doi.org/10.1049/mia2.12541
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- 1 of 14
2 of 14 WANG ET AL.
-
for strengthening the operational capabilities of air forces enhancing the survivability of AWACS in offshore combat
within complex electromagnetic environments. scenarios. Currently, there is a lack of research specifically
Anti‐radiation missiles possess strong manoeuverability addressing the mitigation of anti‐radiation missile attacks on
and penetration capabilities, posing a direct threat to radar AWACS from the perspective of diverse frequency array radar
emitters. He et al. [8] identified three major operational modes systems.
for long‐range anti‐radiation missiles, which greatly increase Unlike phased array radars, frequency diverse array radar
the success rate of attacks on AWACS while ensuring the safety exhibits distance‐dependent isophase planes for spatial elec-
of the launch platform. Xi et al. [9] proposed a multi‐signal tromagnetic wave propagation [20–22]. The unique properties
direction of arrival (DOA) estimation algorithm based on a of FDA offer extensive potential applications in electronic
uniform circular array, which effectively mitigated the adverse warfare [23,24]. Previous studies have simulated and confirmed
effects of multipath reflections and active decoy interference the deceptive effects of log‐FDA and sin‐ FDA on interfer-
on the DOA estimation of passive radar homing heads. Ma ometer direction determination under far‐field conditions.
et al. [10] presented an improved single‐neuron adaptive pro- Subsequently, they validated the deceptive capabilities of FDA
cess identifier (ISNAPID) strategy, which enables the anti‐ jammers against time difference of arrival (TDOA) and other
radiation missile homing head to effectively counter radar positioning systems, as well as the accuracy of these systems
shutdown tactics. Dong Zhu et al. [11] put forth an optimal [25–28]. Additionally, other researchers have conducted in‐
guidance law aimed at extending the attack range of air‐to‐air depth analyses on the deceptive effects of frequency diverse
missiles, enabling effective strikes against AWACS. Alongside arrays on MUSIC direction finding, interferometer direction
direct attacks, active electronic jamming holds the potential to finding, time‐frequency difference positioning, and frequency
reduce the detection range of airborne radar on these aircraft. difference positioning [29,30]. Expanding upon this previous
Investigating deployment strategies for airborne distributed research, this paper aims to ascertain the feasibility of
jammers, Zhao [12] explored methods for close‐range pene- enhancing the battlefield survivability of AWACS equipped
tration against AWACS from various directions. Kulhandjian with FDA radar by streamlining the spatial parameter mea-
et al. [13] leveraged a network of ground receiving stations to surement process of anti‐radiation missile passive radar
significantly improve the position tracking accuracy of AWACS seekers.
targets, offering vital data for aligning electronic jamming and
facilitating hard kills by anti‐radiation weapons. In tackling the
challenge of enhancing the battlefield survivability of AWACS, 2 | FREQUENCY DIVERSE ARRAY
Zhao Qing et al. [14] outlined the safety distance boundary MODEL
between AWACS and enemy aircraft under the protection of
escort fighters in offshore combat scenarios. Additionally, Ye The frequency diverse array radar, comprising N elements is
Haijun and Feng [15] validated the proposed survivability depicted in Figure 1.
assessment model for AWACS across four distinct combat The carrier frequency of array element n is given by the
scenarios. Li Qiang et al. [16] established a mathematical model following:
for AWACSs to deceive anti‐radiation missiles and analysed the
relationship between deception effectiveness and the relative f n ¼ f 0 þ xn Δ f ; n ¼ 0; 1; :::; N − 1 ð1Þ
speed between AWACSs and active decoys. Xinhu Li et al. [16]
presented a dual‐radar active decoy deployment scheme for where f0 represents the carrier frequency of the reference array
AWACSs to counter ARMs and compared the hit probability element, Δf denotes the frequency offset increment, and
of anti‐radiation missiles on AWACSs with and without decoys different frequency diverse array configurations can be ob-
through simulations. Zou et al. [17] developed two coherent tained by selecting the encoding coefficient xn.
active decoy models and analysed the effectiveness of inducing Assume that array element n transmits a narrowband
ARMs using the phase difference of coherent decoys. Mattila signal:
et al. [18] examined the optimal placement of decoys to protect
ground‐based radar from anti‐radiation missile attacks. How-
ever, the approaches to countering anti‐radiation missiles dis-
cussed earlier [17,18] are not suitable for AWACS platforms.
Cao and Li [19] investigated five methods to counter anti‐
radiation weapons within an air defence and missile defence
system. In offshore operations, where formations are distant
from ground‐to‐air missile protection zones, effectively inter-
cepting anti‐radiation missiles travelling at speeds exceeding
Mach 3 and showing high‐speed manoeuverability presents a
formidable challenge for AWACS escort formations. There-
fore, it is critical to explore methods capable of efficiently
neutralising the threat of anti‐radiation missiles while main-
taining the operational effectiveness of airborne radar, thereby FIGURE 1 One‐dimensional linear FDA radar structure.
WANG ET AL. 3 of 14
-
sn ðtÞ ¼ exp j2π f n t ; n ¼ 0; 1; :::; N − 1 Derived from equation (7), the FDA array factor utilising


ð2Þ
Euler's formula is presented in equation (9), while the FDA
The received signal at a far‐field observation point ðR; θÞ is phase pattern based on Euler's formula is depicted in
as follows: equation (10):
 r i
n
h
sn ðtÞ ¼ exp j2πf n t − ð3Þ !2 !2 #12
c N −1 N −1
"
AF2 ðt; R; θÞ ¼
X X
cos φn þ sin φn ð9Þ
where rn = R0‐ndsinθ, R0 represents the distance from the n¼0 n¼0

reference array element to the target point, d is the spacing 0 1

between array elements, and c denotes the speed of light. When
B PN−1 sin φ C
xn = n, the electric field intensity at the far‐field observation B n¼0
Φ2 ¼ arctan BPN−1 nC
ð10Þ
point (R,θ) is as follows: @ n¼0 cos φn A
C

 N −1
R X

E ¼ exp j2πf 0 t − expðj2πnγÞ
c n¼0
ð4Þ
sinðNπγÞ R 3 | ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL
  
¼ exp j2πf 0 t − exp½jðN − 1Þπγ�
sinðπγÞ c USE CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMS
2
where, γ ¼ nΔf t þ f 0 nd sin
c
θ
− nΔcf R þ n Δ f dc sin θ As the cornerstone of campaign‐level command and control,
The array factor AF1 ðt; R; θÞ is given by the following: AWACS must emit and receive electromagnetic waves contin-
uously, making radar shutdown impractical for avoiding anti‐
radiation missile threats. Anti‐radiation missiles, aimed at tar-
  
f0 d sin θ Δf R
sin Nπ Δ f t þ c − c
geting radar emitters and suppressing air defence systems, can
AF1 ðt; R; θÞ ¼ ð5Þ
either force radars to shut down or directly destroy radar an-
  
sin π Δf t þ f0 d csin θ − Δ fc R tennas, creating a critical window for attack formations to
penetrate defences. Evolving through four generations of
development, these missiles have seen continuous enhance-
The phase pattern is:
ments in operational effectiveness. The primary operational
patterns of anti‐radiation missiles include:
R
  
Φ1 ¼ exp j2πf 0 t − �
c (1) Programmed attack: Known ground/sea radar target po-
ð6Þ
 
f 0 d sin θ Δf R
 sitions and radio parameters are loaded into the fire con-
exp jðN − 1Þπ Δ f t þ − trol computer before or during flight. The carrier aircraft
c c
follows a predetermined route, utilising the anti‐radiation
missile's seeker to detect and acquire electromagnetic sig-
If the encoding coefficient xn adopts a non‐linear function, nals from specified targets. Upon identifying, assessing,
achieving the sinc form array factor as shown in equation (5) and confirming the target, the missile is launched.
through series summation becomes unfeasible. This section (2) Self‐defence attack: In‐flight, if the carrier aircraft is illu-
examines the simplification of equation (4) by utilising Euler's minated by an unknown radar target, the aircraft's elec-
formula: tronic reconnaissance equipment detects and measures the
target's radio parameters. The pilot then aligns the aircraft
!2 !2 #12
N −1 N −1 with the target and activates the anti‐radiation missile
"
E¼
X X
cos φn þ sin φn seeker to detect, intercept, and capture the target's elec-
n¼0 n¼0 tromagnetic signals. Upon identifying, assessing, and
calculating the target's relative position, the missile is
2 0 13
6 B N−1 sin φ C7
P launched once the attack is confirmed.
B n¼0 n C7
exp6j arctanB PN−1 ð7Þ (3) Opportunistic attack: In certain scenarios, the missile
6
@ n¼0 cos φn A5
C7
seeker autonomously searches for and captures any target.
4
In this case, the target's attributes and characteristics are
not confirmed, but its position must be calculated. Upon
Where attack confirmation, the missile is launched. During its
flight towards the target radar, the anti‐radiation missile
R R 2π f 0 d sin θ
   
φn ¼ 2π f 0 t − þ 2πΔf n t − þ ð8Þ continuously receives and analyses the electromagnetic
c c c signals emitted by the target, determining the target's
4 of 14 WANG ET AL.
-
4.1 | FDA 3 dB beamwidth

From equation (5), the normalised directional function of the

FDA is given by:
  
sin Nπ Δ f t þ f0 d csin θ − Δ fc R
Fðt; R; θÞ ¼    ð11Þ
N sin π Δ f t þ f0 d csin θ − Δ fc R

In general, when the beam is very narrow and jθj is small,

the above equation can be simplified further to:
  
f0 d sin θ Δf R
FIGURE 2 Working principle of the passive radio seeker. sin Nπ Δf t þ c − c
Fðt; R; θÞ ≈   ð12Þ
f0 d sin θ Δf R
Nπ Δf t þ c − c
azimuth and elevation relative to the missile. This ensures
stable tracking and alignment with the target until impact.  
f0 d sin θ Δf R
When π Δ f t þ c − c ¼ � 0:443π, the 3 dB
In the operational use of an anti‐radiation missile, depicted beamwidth θ0.5‐FDA is obtained as follows:
in Figure 2, the passive radio seeker (PRS) first measures pa-
rameters such as arrival time, pulse width, frequency, and angle 50:8λ 114:5Δf λ R
 
θ0:5−FDA ¼ − t− ð°Þ ð13Þ
of intercepted radar emitter signals. Subsequently, the Nd cos θ d cos θ c
measured parameter information is utilised for target sorting
and identification. Finally, angle tracking technology de-
termines the direction and position of the targeted emitter,
with results transmitted to the guidance and control system of 4.2 | FDA‐AWACS deception against
the ARM [9]. adjacent amplitude monopulse direction
finding
4 | RESEARCH ON FDA METHODS TO In the process of AWACS countering ARMs, a Cartesian co-
COUNTER ARM ATTACKS ordinate system is established with the ARM direction‐finding
system as the origin. The X‐axis represents the horizontal di-
Ground‐based air defence radar employs various methods to rection of the ARM attack, while the Z‐axis denotes the ver-
counter ARMs, including bistatic configurations, bistatic/mul- tical downward direction. Figure 3 illustrates the positional
tistatic setups, radar networking, radar shutdown, multipoint relationship between the AWACS and the ARM in the vertical
source interference, and decoy deployment. However, due to plane.
spatial limitations and operational necessities for early warning Equation (13) provides the calculation for the 3 dB
and command tasks, AWACS cannot utilise these same coun- beamwidth of the radiation signal received by the PRS adjacent
termeasures. As a result, ARMs have become the primary threat amplitude monopulse direction‐finding system on the AWACS.
to the battlefield survivability of AWACS. During ARMs' tar-
geting of AWACS, intercepted radiation signals must be pro- 50:8λ 114:5Δf λ

RF

cessed, and parameters measured to calculate the position θ0:5 ¼ − t− ð°Þ ð14Þ
Nd cos θF d cos θF c
information of the AWACS, guiding the missile to the target.
Leveraging the distinct beam scanning characteristics of fre-
quency diverse arrays, it's feasible to safeguard AWACS by By substituting equation (14) into the adjacent amplitude
minimising the passive direction‐finding and positioning pro- monopulse direction‐finding angle of arrival estimation for-
cess of the PRS. Moreover, the time‐varying nature of beam mula, we derive:
pointing and the "dot” beam pointing control technology of
50:8λ 114:5Δ f λ RF 2 Δ
  
FDA can enhance the signal‐to‐noise ratio (SNR) received by the φF ¼ − t− ð15Þ
direction‐finding and positioning system, consequently reducing Nd cos θF d cos θF c 12θs
positioning error. The amplitude comparison monopulse
direction‐finding system, being simple, reliable, compact, and The spatial angle of the FDA AWACS obtained by the
lightweight, is suitable for ARM bodies, which have restricted amplitude comparison direction‐finding system is expressed as
diameters and cannot accommodate large aperture antennas. follows:
WANG ET AL. 5 of 14
-

θ1 ¼ φF þ
θs
ð16Þ
4.3 | FDA‐AWACS deception against
2 bistatic direction finding cross location
Moreover, the disparity between the estimated value and
When confronted with threats from anti‐radiation missiles,
the actual value of the amplitude comparison direction is as
radars often resort to shutdown measures as a defensive
follows:
tactic. However, to avoid losing targets, anti‐radiation mis-
siles can persist in their attack using previously stored radar
Δθ1 ¼ θF − θ1 ð17Þ
location information even if the radar is shut down. This
requires the calculation of position coordinates of the radi-
Assuming the slant range to the radiation source measured ation source based on direction‐finding data. In this section,
by the direction‐finding system is R, the Euclidean distance D we investigate the impact of FDA‐AWACS deception on
between the virtual position and the true position of the identifying the cross‐location of the bistatic direction. A
AWACS, as determined by the amplitude comparison bistatic configuration can be formed by two attack aircraft,
direction‐finding system in the XOZ plane depicted in two anti‐radiation missiles, or a combination of a carrier
Figure 3, is given by the following: aircraft and an anti‐radiation missile. By utilising angle
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi measurements from two observation stations, triangulation
D¼ 2R2 ½1 − cosðjΔθ1 jÞ� ð18Þ can be employed to determine the cross‐location direction
of the AWACS's radar emitter. The bistatic structure formed
In equation (15), θs represents the flare angle of the antennas, by the carrier aircraft and the anti‐radiation missile is illus-
and Δ represents the logarithmic voltage ratio determined by trated in Figure 4.
subtracting the logarithmic envelope signals of the pulses In Figure 4, the carrier aircraft acts as the reference point
received by antennas 1 and 2. for establishing the X–Z coordinate system, with Station 1
situated at coordinates (0,0) and Station 2 at (x2, z2). The

Q1 Fðθs =2 − φ
^ ÞUðtÞ
 AWACS is positioned at (xt, zt). Through adjacent antenna
Δ ¼ 10½S1 ðtÞ − S2 ðtÞ� ¼ 10 lg ð19Þ amplitude comparison direction finding, Stations 1 and 2
Q2 Fðθs =2 þ φ
^ ÞUðtÞ
determine the direction angles, β1 and β2, of the electromag-
netic waves originating from the radiation source. Ideally, the
In the equations, Qk denotes the amplitude response of the
intersection of these two lines signifies the jammer's location.
receiving channel of antenna k, and U(t) represents the
The variables r1 and r2 denote the distances from each
amplitude modulation of the signal. Assuming that the PRS
observation station to the presumed position of the radiation
measures the slant range
 to  the radiation
 source as R0, 
the
source.
position coordinates R0 cos θs
2 − φF ; R0 sin θs
2 − φF From the geometric relationships illustrated in Figure 4, we
can deduce the following:
of the AWACS in the XOZ coordinate system depicted in
Figure 3 can be determined. 
zt tan β1 ¼ xt
The overall differential of the adjacent amplitude monopulse ðzt − z2 Þtan β2 ¼ xt − x2
ð21Þ
direction‐finding principle formula leads to the system error dϕ:
Rewritten in matrix form:
θ0:5 θ2 θ2
dϕ ¼ Δdθ0:5 − 0:5 Δdθs þ 0:5 dΔ ð20Þ
6θs 12θs 12θs AX ¼ Z ð22Þ

F I G U R E 3 The relationship between the position of the FDA and the

direction finding system. FIGURE 4 Schematic diagram of direction‐finding cross‐positioning.
6 of 14 WANG ET AL.
-
1 − tan β1 xt −z2 tan β1 tan β2 þ x2 tan β1
    8
where, A ¼ , X ¼ Z¼ , < xt ¼
> ʹ
1 − tan β2 zt tan β1 − tan β2
>
>
ð25Þ
0
 
. > ʹ −z2 tan β2 þ x2
: yt ¼
>
z2 tan β2 − x2 tan β1 − tan β2
>
The analytical determination of the AWACS's position is:
The Euclidean distance between the genuine position of
X ¼ A−1 Z ð23Þ the FDA‐AWACS and its virtual position can be expressed as
follows:
Expanding the matrix, we can derive the calculated co- qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ffiffiffiffi
ordinates of the AWACS's position: 2 2
ΔD ¼ xt − xtʹ þ yt − ytʹ ð26Þ

−z2 tan β1 tan β2 þ x2 tan β1

8
< xt ¼ To quantitatively evaluate the deceptive influence of the
>
tan β1 − tan β2
>
>
ð24Þ FDA‐AWACS on the intersection coordinates obtained via the
−z2 tan β2 þ x2 direction finding cross‐location method, we conduct additional
: yt ¼
>
>
tan β1 − tan β2
>
analysis to assess the positioning accuracy.

In Section 3.2, we explored how the presence of FDA‐AWACS

can lead to inaccuracies in adjacent amplitude monopulse di- 5.1 | Positioning ambiguity region
rection finding. As a result, the intersection point determined
by the bistatic direction cross‐positioning method may deviate In practical scenarios, random noise errors within the
from the true position of the AWACS. direction‐finding system introduce positioning inaccuracies in
the cross‐direction finding process. Consequently, the actual
intersection points from the two observation stations scatter
5 | ACCURACY ANALYSIS OF randomly around the anticipated position, forming an ambi-
DIRECTION FINDING CROSS LOCATION guity zone. This zone, depicted as the shaded “kite‐shaped”
area in Figure 6, represents the uncertain region of the direc-
To simplify computations, both the AWACS and the two tion finding cross‐location. To determine this area, let's assume
observation stations are situated on the same X–Z plane. In angular errors at Station O1 (Observation Station 1) and Sta-
Figure 5, Observation Station 1 acts as the coordinate origin, tion O2 (Observation Station 2) are Δβʹ1 and Δβʹ2 respectively.
with the direction vertically downward towards sea level By defining r1 ¼ O1 T2 and r2 ¼ O2 T2 accordingly, we can
designated as the Z‐axis. T1 indicates the actual position of the calculate the area using the law of sines.
jammer, while T2 represents the virtual position of the
AWACS, influenced by the deceptive capabilities of the FDA‐ x2 − tan βʹ2 z2
8
> r1 ¼
AWACS. β1 and β2 denote the angles between the actual po- sin βʹ1 − tan βʹ2 cos βʹ1
>
>
>
>
sition of the AWACS and normal direction from each obser-
>
>
cos βʹ1 x2 − sin βʹ1 z2
>
>
vation station, with βʹ1 and βʹ2 indicating the predicted direction r2 ¼
<
sin βʹ1 − tan βʹ2 cos βʹ1 ð27Þ
of arrival of the AWACS as calculated by the two stations. >
>
From equation (24), we can determine the coordinates of Δd 1 ¼ r1 tanΔβʹ1 ¼ r1 Δβʹ1
>
>
>
>
the virtual jammer position T2:
>
>
>
Δd 2 ¼ r2 tanΔβʹ2 ¼ r2 Δβʹ2
:

F I G U R E 5 Relationship between the actual position of the FDA

jammer and the virtual position. FIGURE 6 Fuzzy area for determining the direction of cross‐location.
WANG ET AL. 7 of 14
-
The approximate area is as follows: ∂βʹ1 ʹ ∂βʹ1 ʹ cos βʹ1 ʹ sin βʹ1 ʹ
8
> dβ ʹ
¼ dx þ dz ¼ ʹ dxt − ʹ dzt
1
∂xʹt t ∂yʹt t r1 r1
>
>
<
4Δd1 Δd 2 ð30Þ
S¼ ð28Þ ∂βʹ ∂βʹ cos βʹ sin βʹ
: dβʹ2 ¼ 2ʹ dxʹt þ 2ʹ dzʹt ¼ ʹ 2 dxʹt − ʹ 2 dzʹt
>
sin βʹ1 − βʹ2

>
r2 r2
>
∂xt ∂yt

Consequently,

1
5.2 | Circle probability error
8
dxʹt ¼
r1 sin βʹ2 dβʹ1 − r2 sin βʹ1 dβʹ2
>

sin β2 − β1
>
> ʹ ʹ
<
ð31Þ
In Figure 6, significant errors in the direction‐finding posi- 1
: dyt ¼
r1 cos βʹ2 dβʹ1 − r2 cos βʹ1 dβʹ2
> ʹ


tioning system can lead to the actual jammer position falling
>
sin β2 − β1
>
ʹ ʹ
within the error distribution area. Equation (28) relates the
area of this error region to the distance between the two
observation stations and the angle of arrival of the signals The variance of the equation is:
measured by the direction‐finding system. However, this
1
8
approximation is somewhat coarse. To determine the likeli- σ 2xʹ t ¼ 2 ʹ
r21 sin2 βʹ2 dβ1ʹ2 þ r22 sin2 βʹ dβ2ʹ2
>

sin β2 − β1
> ʹ
hood that the randomly distributed positioning intersections
>
<
are near the actual jammer location, further analysis of the 1
2
r21 cos2 βʹ2 dβ1ʹ2 þ r22 cos2 βʹ1 dβ2ʹ2
>

positioning error is needed based on the radius r0.5 of circular : σ yʹ t ¼
>
2
sin β2 − β1
>
ʹ ʹ
error probable (CEP). Generally, it can be approximated that
the direction‐finding error follows a zero‐mean Gaussian ð32Þ
distribution. As illustrated in Figure 7, the intersection points
of the direction‐finding cross‐location are randomly scattered If we assume that the direction‐finding errors at both
within a skewed ellipse centred on point T2. In practice, the observation stations adhere to independent, zero‐mean
CEP radius r0.5 is commonly used as an approximation, rep- Gaussian distributions, we can define their probability den-
resenting the radius of the error distribution circle at a 50% sity functions as follows:
probability of error.
1 ðx − xʹ t Þ2
" (
From equation (28), it is known that: 1
f ðx; yÞ ¼ exp −
2πσ2βʹ 1 σ 2βʹ 2 2 σ 2βʹ 1
xʹt − x1
8
ð33Þ
> β1 ¼ arctan ʹ ðy − zʹ t Þ2
> ʹ #)
zt − z1
>
þ
<
ð29Þ σ 2βʹ 2
xʹ − x2
: βʹ2 ¼ arctan ʹt
>
>
zt − z2
>
To compute the circular error probable (CEP) radius r0.5,
Taking the total differential of the above equation yields this formula can be numerically integrated to approximate the
result:
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
r0:5 ¼ 0:8 σ 2xʹ t þ σ 2zʹ t ð34Þ

If we consider equal direction‐finding precision for both

stations, that is, σ βʹ 1 ¼ σ βʹ 2 ¼ σ β , by substituting equation (29)
into equation (34), we can deduce:

0:8 qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
r0:5 ¼ r21 σ 2βʹ 1 þ r22 σ 2βʹ 2
sin βʹ2 − βʹ1


ð35Þ
0:8σ β
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
¼ r21 þ r22
sin βʹ2 − βʹ1

This equation illustrates that the CEP radius r0.5 is influ-

enced by the distance separating the two observation stations,
their angular precision σ β , and the angles of signal arrival βʹ1 、
FIGURE 7 CEP of directional cross‐positioning. βʹ2 from the stations.
8 of 14 WANG ET AL.
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6 | SIMULATION ANALYSIS AWACS to the coordinate origin. The simulation examines
how the total number N of FDA array elements, frequency
6.1 | Simulation 1: comparative analysis of increment Δf, and power ratio Δ impact the angular deception
the beampattern characteristics of two‐ effect of the adjacent amplitude comparison monopulse
dimensional FDA and phased array direction‐finding system. With Δf = 2 kHz, the outcome
shown in Figure 9 is obtained; with Δf = 3 kHz, the outcome
In a two‐dimensional planar array with 9 � 9 element, the shown in Figure 10 is obtained. Table 1 provides the calculated
element spacing in the X‐axis direction can be given as dx, and in Euclidean distance D between the true position and the virtual
the Y‐axis direction as dy, with dx = dy = c/2f0, the array carrier position of the AWACS when RF = 20 km.
frequency f0 = 10 GHz, and both signal‐to‐noise ratio and Upon comparing Figures 9 and 10, it becomes evident that
jammer‐to‐noise ratio are taken at 10 dB. Assuming the target is with an increase in the frequency increment Δf, a decrease in
at (50 km, 50 km, 50 km), Figure 8a depicts the 10‐dB beam- the number of array elements N, and an increase in the power
pattern of the area array phased array, Figure 8b shows the 10‐dB ratio Δ, the angular deception effect of the AWACS on the
beampattern of the two‐dimensional FDA at Δfx = Δfy = 6 kHz, adjacent amplitude comparison monopulse direction‐finding
and Figure 8c illustrates the 10‐dB beampattern of the two‐ system improves. This enhancement is particularly notable
dimensional FDA at Δfx = 1 kHz, Δfy = 3 kHz. Figure 8d por- when the anti‐radiation missile is launched off‐axis. Table 1
trays the 10‐dB beampattern of the two‐dimensional FDA at illustrates that when the frequency offset increment remains
Δfx = 1 kHz and Δfy = 10 kHz. Comparative beampattern constant, the deception effect weakens with an increase in the
simulations reveal that the instantaneous beam direction of the power ratio Δ. Specifically, with a power ratio Δ of 1 dB, the
FDA exhibits a “curved” feature in space. Considering these deception effect decreases as the frequency offset increases.
observations alongside literature on the phase direction patterns However, since the absolute value of Δθ1 is used in the cal-
of both systems, it suggests that the FDA can deceive passive culations for D, the value of D increases at Δf = 3 kHz when
radar homing heads through passive direction finding. the power ratio Δ equals to 2 dB or 3 dB.

6.2 | Simulation 2: impact of power ratio Δ, 6.3 | Simulation 3: influence of the angular
number N of elements in the FDA array, and coordinates of the AWACS on the direction
frequency offset increment Δf on the adjacent finding difference Δθ1
amplitude comparison monopulse direction‐
finding the difference Δθ1 In this example, f0 = 1 GHz, d = 0.15 m, t = 0 s, RF = 35 km,
Δf = 3 kHz, N = 10. Figure 11 illustrates how the real angular
In this example, f0 = 3 GHz, d = 0.05 m, t = 0 s, θF = 60°, θF values of the AWACS affect deception in adjacent‐amplitude
with RF representing the distance from the true position of the monopulse direction identification. Table 2 outlines the

F I G U R E 8 Transmit beampattern based on a

two‐dimensional array structure.
WANG ET AL. 9 of 14
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F I G U R E 9 Schematic diagram of the impact of
Δ on Δθ when 2 kHz, N = 5, 10.

F I G U R E 1 0 Schematic diagram of the impact

of Δ on Δθ, while Δf = 3 kHz, N = 5, 10.

T A B L E 1 Dvalues under different power ratios Δ, numbers of FDA

array elements N, and frequency offset increments Δf (RF = 20 km).

D (km) (distance between the true and

virtual positions of the AWACS)
N Δ (dB) power ratio Δf = 1 kHz Δf = 2 kHz Δf = 3 kHz
5 1 dB 3.59 1.89 0.42

2 dB 1.96 1.45 6.04

3 dB 0.32 4.78 11.55

10 1 dB 4.39 3.09 1.19

2 dB 3.56 0.95 2.86

3 dB 2.73 1.17 6.88 F I G U R E 1 1 Schematic diagram of the impact of θF on Δθ when

Δf = 3 kHz and N = 10.

Euclidean distances D between the real and virtual positions of decreases. As indicated by Table 2, when Δ = 1 dB, D de-
the AWACS for various θF values. creases as θF values increase. For Δ values of 1 and 2 dB,
As depicted in Figure 11, when there's a positive angle fluctuations are observed in the values of D.
measurement error, the deviation increases with a higher po-
wer ratio Δ. Conversely, for a negative angle measurement
error, the deviation decreases as Δ rises. The shift from 6.4 | Simulation 4: impact of time t, FDA
negative to positive angle measurement errors suggests a carrier frequency, and element spacing on the
gradual repositioning of the AWACS, detected by the direction direction finding difference Δθ1
finding system, from aligning with the Z‐axis towards the X‐
axis along the equal signal axis between two antennas. Addi- In this example, the settings are RF = 20 km, θF = 60°,
tionally, with different power ratios, the value of θF at which Δf = 3 kHz, N = 10. The simulation explores the impact of
the direction finding error reaches zero progressively varying the time t and FDA carrier frequency on the difference
10 of 14 WANG ET AL.
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TABLE 2 Values of D for different power ratios Δ and θF values. TABLE 3 Values of D for different times t.

D (km) (distance between the actual and virtual D (km) (Euclidean distance between the actual and
positions of the aircraft) virtual positions of the AWACS)
θF (°) 0 10 20 30 t (s) 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Δ = 1 dB 24.21 37.28 26.11 3.34 Δ = 1 dB 1.19 4.62 5.01 2.37 3.33

Δ = 2 dB 21.59 69.91 25.43 20.51 Δ = 2 dB 2.86 4.02 4.8 0.49 11.74

Δ = 3 dB 18.94 43.26 24.74 41.94 Δ = 3 dB 6.88 3.42 4.59 3.36 19.60

T A B L E 4 Values of D for different power ratios δ and carrier

frequencies f0.

D (km) (Euclidean distance between the actual and

virtual positions of the AWACS)
f0 (GHz) 3 4 5 6 7 8
Δ = 1 dB 8.21 6.83 13.78 17.56 19.83 21.30

Δ = 2 dB 42.29 12.51 1.41 8.98 13.53 16.49

Δ = 3 dB 75.12 31.73 10.96 0.38 7.22 11.66

F I G U R E 1 2 Schematic diagram of the impact of t on Δθ when

f0 = 1 GHz and T = 0.2 ms.

in direction. Initially, the influence of the time parameter t on

the effect of deception on direction finding was investigated
via simulation. With f0 = 1 GHz, the influence of time t during
a 0.2 ms radar pulse on deception in adjacent amplitude
monopulse direction is examined, as shown in Figure 12.
Table 3 provides the Euclidean distance D between the actual
and virtual positions of the AWACS as t varies. Figure 12 il-
lustrates that at a fixed moment t, with an increasing power F I G U R E 1 3 Schematic diagram of the impact of f0 on Δθ when
ratio Δ, the measured virtual angle coordinates of the AWACS Δf = 3 kHz and N = 10.
tend to shift more towards the Y‐axis. Conversely, with a fixed
power ratio Δ, as time t increases, the direction finding error
Δθ initially decreases, then increases, followed by another distance error occurs at f0 = 3.6 GHz. At Δ = 2 dB, the smallest
decrease and increase. Table 3 shows that when the parameters distance error occurs at f0 = 5 GHz. At Δ = 3 dB, the smallest
are constant, the Euclidean distance D between the actual and distance error occurs at f0 = 6 GHz.
virtual positions of the AWACS generally shows an increasing
trend as the value of t increases. Moreover, a larger power ratio
Δ leads to a more pronounced change in D. 6.5 | Simulation 5: amplitude comparison
Additionally, we analyse the impact of the FDA carrier fre- monopulse direction finding system error
quency f0 on the direction finding results. The settings are as analysis
follows: d = 0.15 m, t = 0 s, RF = 20 km, θF = 60°, Δf = 3 kHz,
N = 10. Figure 10 illustrates the angle deception effect of the In this example, f0 = 3 GHz, t = 0s, Δf = 3 kHz, N = 10. The
array carrier frequency on the adjacent amplitude monopulse angle between adjacent antenna elements is θs = 90°. The error
direction finding system. Table 4 presents the Euclidean distance in beam width dθ0.5 due to frequency variations is 4.0°, while
D between the actual and virtual positions of the AWACS as f0 the change in antenna beam angle dθs is −2.5°. The errors
varies. As seen in Figure 13, as the carrier frequency f0 increases induced by changes in beam width dθ0.5 and antenna beam
while other parameters are constant, the angle θ1 measured by angle dθs are illustrated in Figures 14 and 15, respectively.
the adjacent amplitude monopulse direction finding system Additionally, Figure 16 illustrates the direction‐finding error
gradually decreases. Concurrently, the measured virtual position induced by channel imbalance. When Δ = 1 dB, at varying
of the AWACS shifts from aligning with the Z‐axis towards the signal‐to‐noise ratios, Figure 17 depicts the random errors in
Y‐axis along the equal signal axis between the two antennas. the amplitude comparison direction‐finding system.
Table 4, when the power ratio Δ is held constant, the values of D An in‐depth analysis of Figure 14 to 16 indicates that er-
initially decrease and then increase. At Δ = 1 dB, the smallest rors in system direction‐finding, arising from variations in
WANG ET AL. 11 of 14
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FIGURE 17 Direction finding error caused by the SNR.

FIGURE 14 Direction finding error caused by bandwidth variation.

FIGURE 18 Schematic diagram of the impact of f0 on CEP.

T A B L E 5 S values for different direction‐finding accuracies and

carrier frequencies f0.

FIGURE 15 Direction finding error caused by antenna angle S (km2) positioning ambiguity region area
variation. f0 (GHz) 2 3 4 5 7 8
1° 0.03 0.05 0.36 1.49 11.75 26.48

3° 0.07 0.15 0.99 1.02 31.73 71.48

10° 0.08 0.17 1.11 4.47 35.26 79.42

process of obtaining angle information from a frequency‐

scanning array AWACS via a direction‐finding system is
prone to significant systematic and random errors.

6.6 | Simulation 6: impact of carrier

frequency f0 on CEP of frequency controlled
array AWACS

FIGURE 16 Direction finding error caused by channel imbalance In this scenario, with RF = 70 km, θF = 60°, Δf = 3 kHz,
variation. N = 10, d = 0.15 m, we observe the influence of the carrier
frequency f0 on the circular error probable (CEP) radius of the
direction‐finding cross‐location system in Figure 18. Simulta-
beam width, antenna beam angle, and channel balance, amplify neously, Table 5 presents the area S of the positioning ambi-
with the RF distance of the AWACS, and escalate further with guity region for different values of f0. Upon a comprehensive
higher power ratio Δ. Conversely, Figure 17 reveals that sto- review of both Figure 18 and Table 5, it's apparent that under
chastic directional errors in the system decrease with increasing far‐field conditions, increasing the carrier frequency f0 leads to
signal‐to‐noise ratio (SNR) but rise with greater distance from a gradual rise in both the CEP and the area of the positioning
the AWACS (RF). In summary, in far‐field conditions, the ambiguity region. Furthermore, when f0 remains constant, the
12 of 14 WANG ET AL.
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impact of direction‐finding accuracy errors on the CEP be- stations, Observation Station 1 is positioned at coordinates
comes more pronounced. Therefore, if the direction‐finding (0 km, 0 km) in the X‐Z coordinate system depicted in
accuracy error is significant, the true position of the AWACS Figure 6, while Observation Station 2 is positioned at co-
may lie within the circular error probable radius r0.5, affecting ordinates (10 km, 10 km). The true position of the AWACS
the performance of anti‐radiation missiles. equipped with the FDA forms a 60° angle with the positive
direction of the Z‐axis. There are 10 arrays, with an array
carrier frequency of 1 GHz, and d = 0.15 m. Figure 19 illus-
6.7 | Simulation 7: impact of FDA‐AWACS trates the circular error probable (CEP) radius for direction‐
position, direction‐finding accuracy, and finding accuracies of 1°, 3°, and 10° at the observation sta-
frequency offset increment on positioning tions. The red curve shows the distance ΔD between the true
results position and the virtual position of the FDA‐AWACS. Taking
Δf = 1 kHz results in Figure 19a, Δf = 3 kHz results in
In this instance, an investigation was carried out on how the Figure 19b, and Δf = 4.5 kHz results in Figure 19c, the
genuine coordinate position of the AWACS, the precision of computed areas of the cross‐location ambiguity regions are
direction‐finding at the observation station, and the increment presented in Table 6. A thorough examination of Figure 19 and
in frequency offset of the FDA affect the positioning out- Table 6 indicates that the positioning ambiguity region de-
comes. Utilising the aircraft launching anti‐radiation missiles creases as the slant range of the AWACS increases and rises
and the anti‐radiation missiles themselves as two observation with higher array frequency offset. Furthermore, a lower

F I G U R E 1 9 The influence of the frequency

offset increment and direction determination
accuracy on the positioning results.

T A B L E 6 S values for different

S (km2) positioning ambiguity region area
direction‐finding accuracies and frequency
RF(km) Accuracy error σ β (°) Δf = 1 kHz Δf = 3 kHz Δf = 4.5 kHz offset Δf values.

50 1° 0.16 0.23 0.39

3° 4.29 6.37 10.58

10° 15.89 23.58 39.16

70 1° 0.28 0.31 0.65

3° 7.43 8.28 17.55

10° 27.54 30.65 64.99

WANG ET AL. 13 of 14
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direction‐finding accuracy corresponds to a larger probable DA TA AVA I L A B I L I T Y S TA T E M E N T
radius of circular error r0.5. When the direction‐finding accu- The simulation data such as array carrier frequency, number of
racy is 10°, the true position of the AWACS falls within the elements, and frequency offset increment in the article are all
circular error probable radius r0.5. derived from commonly used assumptions in public literature.
The calculation in this article is based on amplitude compari-
son single pulse direction finding technology combined with
7 | CONCLUSION FDA radar characteristics.

The evolution of mission planning technology is intricately tied O R CI D

to shifts in aerial combat strategies. Presently, operational Bo Wang https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1434-0391
planning for AWACS primarily focuses on adjusting tactical
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