Best Management Practices Maritime Security
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신영호Best Management Practices Maritime Security
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BMP
Maritime
Security
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03 BMP Maritime Security
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Edition Published date Change
First March 2025
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04 BMP Maritime Security
BMP Maritime Security
Legal notice
BMP Maritime Security (BMP MS) has been developed purely as guidance to be used at the user’s
own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the authors, their members or by any person, firm,
corporation or organisation for the accuracy of any information in BMP MS or any omission from BMP
MS or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from applying or relying upon
guidance contained in BMP MS even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.
Copyright notice
The authors of BMP MS have provided BMP MS free of charge. All information, data and text
contained in BMP MS whether in whole or in part may be reproduced or copied without any
payment, individual application or written license provided that:
It is used only for non-commercial purposes; and
the content is not modified.
Exceptions:
The permission does not extend to using the photographs separately outside of BMP MS as these
photographs belong to a third party. Authorisation to use the photographs separately from BMP MS
must first be obtained from the copyright holders, details of whom may be obtained from the authors.
Logos and trademarks are excluded from the general permission above other than when they are
used as an integral part of BMP MS.
BMP Maritime Security replaces any existing global or regional guidance issued or supported by
the signatories.
Background and supporting information are available at: www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org
Design: Phil McAllister Design
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05 BMP Maritime Security
Contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................06
2 Maritime security threats...............................................................................................10
3 Threat and risk assessment...........................................................................................16
4 Planning...............................................................................................................................21
5 Mitigation measures........................................................................................................ 25
6 Incident response............................................................................................................. 37
7 Post-incident procedures..............................................................................................43
Annex A Reporting and information centres.............................................................................46
Annex B Seafarer welfare support...............................................................................................55
Annex C Maritime lexicon and abbreviations........................................................................... 57
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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Section 1
Introduction
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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07 BMP Maritime Security
Introduction to Best Management
Practices Maritime Security
Best Management Practices (BMP) Maritime the recommendations BMP offers makes a also a useful reference for charterers and other
Security (MS) consolidates previously published significant difference to the safety of seafarers. maritime stakeholders.
regional BMP documents into a single, Complementary guidance: this guidance
comprehensive publication. It focuses on a threat Benefits of implementing BMP complements other industry guidelines and
and risk management process addressing globally Applying these recommendations will: international recommendations, including IMO,
applicable threats and mitigations, as well as Assist in planning voyages and Flag State and P&I Circulars.
providing references to external sources for up to offshore activities. BMP complements but does not override
date regional information. Improve understanding of maritime threats International Ship and Port Facility Security
and their impacts. (ISPS) Code requirements.
Seafarers operating ships around the world Reduce the likelihood of being involved in a
encounter various maritime security threats, state maritime security incident. Additional resources
and non-state. These threats often involve aggressive Help in determining mitigations to keep the Online resources: access further information
attackers who subject persons to violence and crew and ship safe. and links at Maritime Global Security.
ill-treatment, hijack ships for ransom or cargo theft, Provide reference information sources.
and, in some cases, hold seafarers as hostages for Specify contacts and reporting procedures for
extended periods. Attackers’ motivations may be emergencies and welfare assistance. ATTENTION
criminal, ideological or political, and attacks may be
targeted or opportunistic. Maritime security threats Applicability and guidance Master’s Authority
vary across regions and within them both in terms of BMP measures: not all mitigation measures are This guidance does not override the
the threats themselves and their severity. applicable to every threat, ship type or region. Master’s overriding authority and
Usage: companies, Company Security Officers responsibility to protect the crew, ship,
The purpose of this publication is to help all ships (CSOs), Ship Security Officers (SSOs), and and cargo.
plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay Masters should use this guidance to conduct
and report attacks and incidents wherever they ship specific threat and risk assessments aimed
may occur. Experience has shown that following at protecting seafarers, ships, and cargo. BMP is
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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08 BMP Maritime Security
Using this guidance BMP is arranged in a structured manner, with a
This Best Management Practice (BMP) is designed navigation toolbar at the bottom of each page
to support a structured approach to threat and risk that allows readers to easily move through the
assessment in the maritime environment. It offers document and access key references. As security
the reader guidance on the following areas: threats in the maritime domain are constantly
evolving, external signposts are included to guide
1. Understanding maritime security threats: the reader to sources for up-to-date information
insights on known threats and where to access and data.
additional information.
2. Threat and risk assessment: methods for Users are encouraged to seek a comprehensive
identifying and evaluating threats and risks. understanding of the maritime environment, and
3. Planning: steps to consider when planning a the security risks that may be faced. This includes
voyage or offshore activity. using all available resources as part of the ongoing
4. Mitigation: measures to reduce or eliminate threat and risk assessment process.
identified risks.
5. Incident response: actions to take in the event Conclusion
of a security incident. By following the BMP, both companies and
6. Post-incident considerations: steps to follow seafarers can minimise the risk of maritime security
an incident, including recovery and analysis. incidents, ensuring better protection against
7. Global reporting and information centers: emerging threats and improving overall safety.
resources for reporting incidents and obtaining
real-time information.
8. Seafarer welfare support: aiding the
well-being of crew members by outlining
support available to them.
Users are encouraged to seek a
comprehensive understanding of
the maritime environment, and the
security risks that may be faced
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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09 BMP Maritime Security
The fundamental requirements of BMP
1. Understanding the threat
Dynamic nature: maritime threats are
constantly evolving.
Current information: obtaining up-to-date
information is crucial for effective threat and
risk assessment and decision-making.
2. Conducting risk assessments
Assessment: companies must conduct
thorough threat and risk assessments.
Ship mitigations: identify and implement
measures to protect the crew and ship.
Crew training: ensure the crew is well-briefed
and trained.
Situational awareness: know your
operating environment.
Guidance: comply with Flag State
requirements, industry guidance and
implement military recommendations
where appropriate.
3. Reporting
Voluntary registration and reporting: register 4. Cooperation
and report to regional centres as appropriate. Shipping and military forces: cooperate with
collaborate with welfare
Incident reporting: report incidents and other ships and military forces as necessary. providers to provide
suspicious activities to recognised reporting Law enforcement: work with relevant psychological and/or
centres and the Flag State Administration. law enforcement and authorities to
Distress signals: send distress signals when preserve evidence.
logistical support
under attack. Welfare providers: collaborate with welfare
providers to provide psychological and/or
logistical support (annex B).
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Section 2
Maritime
Security
Threats
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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11 BMP Maritime Security
Maritime security threats
Maritime security threats can be broadly Piracy: pirates use various boat configurations,
categorised into physical and virtual threats. including small high-speed skiffs and
motherships, which allow them to operate over
larger areas. They typically use small arms and
Physical security threats Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to intimidate
shipmasters and attempt to board the ship
Physical threats to maritime security can originate using ladders or ropes. Successful boardings
from the air, land or sea and are generally easier to are more likely at night.
identify compared to virtual threats. These threats
can include: Illegal boardings: in addition to piracy
boardings using ladders and hooks, more
Physical attacks: ships may come under attack aggressive boardings have been seen
from various weapons launched from aircraft involving fast attack boats and helicopters to Typical pirate skiff
(including helicopters), ships, submarines and land or fast-rope forces onto a deck.
land-based sites. These weapons have included
bombs, rockets, machine guns, Water-Borne Criminal activity: illegal boarding with intent
Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs), one way to steal shipboard equipment or seafarers’
attack drones and missiles. In addition to one possessions, money, etc, is commonplace in
way attack drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles some ports. Such attackers can be armed,
(UAVs) and Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) most usually with bladed weapons, and can
may also be used for surveillance and to support present a physical threat to crews. Such threats
loitering munitions in conducting attacks. usually, but not exclusively, occur in traffic
separation schemes where dense traffic exists,
Seizure: ships have been illegally seized and territorial waters, particularly ports and
and held for prolonged periods by state and anchorages. Illegal boardings may also occur
non-state actors. while a ship is underway. In many cases, the
intent is to steal, rather than taking control of
the ship.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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12 BMP Maritime Security
Specific threats
Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(WBIEDs): These have been used against
merchant ships in conflict regions. WBIEDs
can be crewed or uncrewed surface vessels.
Incidents have occurred where a WBIED
has been controlled from a distance or from
an accompanying mothership or operates
autonomously. Mitigation measures to prevent
contact with the ship’s hull are limited. Masters
should recognise the intent of these attacks is
to cause damage and not necessarily to board
the ship. Mines are designed
Sea mines: a sea mine is an explosive device
to deny access
laid in the water with the intention of damaging to ports and sea
or sinking ships or of deterring shipping from lanes and can
entering an area. The term does not include be classified as
devices attached to the bottom of ships or to
harbour installations by personnel operating
moored, bottom,
underwater, nor devices which explode or moving mines
immediately on expiration of a predetermined
time after laying. Mines are designed to deny
access to ports and sea lanes and can be
classified as moored, bottom, or moving mines.
a. Moored mines (also known as buoyant mines):
a mine of positive buoyancy held below the
surface by a mooring attached to a sinker on
the seabed. Its firing system can be of either
contact or influence type. Some ‘deep moored
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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13 BMP Maritime Security
mines’ use extremely strong moorings (usually confirmed explosion from a sea mine, then a Mine
small gauge wire) to permit use in water depth Threat Area (MTA) or a Mine Danger Area (MDA)
down to 1,000 metres. If the mooring cable would be established and broadcast to maritime
breaks, then the moored mine becomes a traffic via navigational area (NAVAREA) warnings.
moving (floating) mine.
Anti-Ship Missiles
b. Bottom/ground mines: bottom/ground mines are Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM) are long range,
negatively buoyant devices that rest on, or can accurate and powerful weapons and have
become buried in, the seabed and are held there been used against merchant ships in the
by their own mass. The firing system is usually of Red Sea. Other ships may be hit if the missile
the influence type. They can be triggered by any controller targets the wrong ship or the missile
influence (acoustic, magnetic, seismic, pressure), homes in on an unintended target. They pose a
or a combination of these influences. These types Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM) are significant threat due to their destructive power
can be laid up to maximum water depths of 120m, causing fatalities and catastrophic damage.
depending on the target and/or the amount of
long range, accurate and
explosive charge, but water depths up to 60m are powerful weapons and have ASMs can be launched from a variety of ships,
more suitable. been used against merchant submarines and aircraft as well as from land.
They can be launched from short range to
c. Moving mines: this is a collective description of
ships in the Red Sea hundreds of miles. These missiles can be of a
mine types that are not stationary. All floating, cruise or ballistic nature:
oscillating, rising or homing mines belong to Cruise missiles are jet-propelled and
this category. As an example, rising mines can travel at subsonic speeds. Their sensors
be laid at a depth of 500m (mine case) and are very accurate.
2,400m (anchor). Ballistic missiles are rocket-powered to
get into flight, after which they follow an
d. Limpet mines: these are commonly manually arching trajectory to the target.
attached by a swimmer or diver on the
underside of a ship’s hull, usually with magnets. The launch of an ASM may be detected
Unlike larger mines, limpet mines are not through a visible flash and smoke. Missiles
intended to sink a ship but immobilise it. will normally hit above the waterline. The main
hazard is likely to come from fire, caused either
If there is intelligence suggesting the presence by the warhead explosion or by the unspent
of sea mines in an area, visual sightings, or a fuel from the missile motor.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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14 BMP Maritime Security
Missiles can be fired in a straight line or follow Virtual security threats Regional maritime threats
a predetermined course to a target or dead
reckoning (DR) position. They can have an active Virtual threats primarily involve cyber-attacks Maritime security threats vary globally and within
or passive seeker head using optical, electronic or on electronic systems, which can impact ship geographical regions. A variety of threats may
heat signature homing to locate targets. navigational systems, disrupt Global Navigation be present in any one area at varying intensities
Satellite System (GNSS) or spoof Automatic depending on the intent and capability of
Loitering Munitions Identification System (AIS) services. These threats attackers. Recognising this, reporting centres
Loitering Munitions (LM) are a form of UAV with are harder to detect and require comprehensive and industry associations produce information
a built-in weapon and the capability to loiter procedures such as: on regional threat actors, their intent and
(wait passively) in the target area until the target Backup systems and processes. capability to attack merchant shipping, and link
is located. The number of LM attacks against Situational awareness training. these to applicable BMP measures to mitigate
both civilian and military ships, especially in the threat. The industry website is at
the Red Sea and Middle East, has risen. The General guidance for cyber security onboard ships www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org and a list of
global proliferation of these rapidly advancing can be found at www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org global reporting centres at annex A.
autonomous technologies, to both state and
private actors, poses a significant security To mitigate these threats, continuous improvement
threat to commercial shipping. ATTENTION through regular security drills and exercises,
capturing lessons observed, and adapting to new
More information regarding the threat from LM Navigators should use all available technologies is essential. Merchant ships should
can be found here. methods and not rely on GNSS alone. maintain close coordination with military forces and
leverage commercial intelligence and open-source
services for threat updates.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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15 BMP Maritime Security
Specific virtual threats
GNSS jamming and spoofing
Jamming disrupts GNSS signals, while spoofing
provides false signals to deceive navigation systems.
a. Jamming is usually caused by interference to
the signals at GNSS frequencies. Intentional
jamming is designed to overpower the very
weak GNSS signals received. Experience has
shown military jammers have a disabling effect
in areas of conflict.
b. Spoofing is the provision of like signals,
transmitted locally and coded to fool a receiver
to think it is somewhere it is not. A GNSS
spoofing attack attempts to deceive a GNSS
receiver by broadcasting incorrect GNSS signals. Disinformation or false
These spoofed signals may be modified in such Information spread by VHF
a way as to cause the receiver to estimate its broadcasts, targeted emails
position to be somewhere other than where it is,
or to be located where it is but at a different time,
and social and mainstream
as determined by the attacker. media creates unease across
the maritime community
c. Deliberate AIS spoofing occurs when a ship
transmits incorrect AIS data. The AIS data is
manipulated to show the ship in one location Navigators should compare all electronic data, and mainstream media creates unease across the
when in fact it is operating in another. Fake especially AIS, with other information sources to maritime community. False threats indicating
AIS signals have been observed for ships that detect spoofing attempts. ships will be targeted cause crew anguish. Third
appear on navigational systems but do not exist. parties may impersonate authorities to obtain
Disinformation information from the ship. Care should be taken
Disinformation or false information spread by to verify all statements received with the
VHF broadcasts, targeted emails and social and appropriate authorities.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Section 3
Threat and
risk assessment
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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17 BMP Maritime Security
Threat and risk assessment
The threat and risk assessment forms the
foundation for ship mitigations and layered
defence strategies. This section provides an
t assessment
overview of threat and risk assessments, while Th r ea
hardening measures are detailed in section 5.
sessment
The process starts with a threat assessment and Risk as
works through each subsequent layer towards
at detection
ship control and safety. Thre
A threat assessment ayer of defen
st l ce
Thr
eat assessme
nt should cover all security Fir
threats relevant to the layer of defe
c ond nc
voyage or offshore Se e
activity. It is crucial to l ayer of defe
incorporate the latest ird nc
e
Th
threat advice in every threat assessment before a SHIP CONTROL
voyage or offshore activity. Refer to annex A and AND SAFETY
industry website www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org for
security threat information and source references.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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18 BMP Maritime Security
Components of a threat organisations listed in annex A. Removing any one Military contributions: in specific areas,
side of the threat triangle minimises the threat. militaries provide additional threat information.
A threat is composed of three elements: capability, For example, in the Middle East:
intent, and opportunity. The Joint Maritime Information Centre
Determining the threat (JMIC) offers incident analysis.
EUNAVFOR and CMF produce Industry
All available information sources should be Releasable Threat Assessments (IRTAs) and
considered to determine the threat and may Industry Releasable Threat Bulletins (IRTBs)
TY
!
include but are not limited to: to aid risk management.
INT
ILI
Flag State: guidance and advisories provided UKMTO issues warnings and advisories.
B
EN
PA
by governments and national authorities. A list of all authorities offering maritime
T Industry information: the industry security advice is provided in annex A.
CA
Commercial intelligence services: threat
Threat maritime security website,
www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org provides analysis and risk insights from private
guidance on a range of security issues. The sector providers.
OPPORTUNITY website is regularly reviewed and updated to Open-source material: relevant publicly
reflect operational and industry feedback or to available security threat information.
address significant security incidents.
Capability: the physical means attackers Maritime Security Bulletins: updates on
possess to conduct an attack. security-related incidents and risks.
Intent: the demonstrated willingness to carry Regional coordination and information sharing:
out attacks. regional maritime coordination and information-
Opportunity: the aspect that can be mitigated sharing centres provide area-specific guidance.
by the company, charterer, ship and crew These centres should be consulted during the
through the application of security measures. initial stages of threat and risk assessments or
voyage preparation to ensure a comprehensive
While companies and ships’ Masters cannot understanding of local risks.
influence an attacker’s capability or intent, they can UKHO Security Charts: detailed regional
minimise the opportunity for attacks. Supplemental security guidance (refer to annex A for
information about threat characteristics, specific further details).
or new tactics and regional background factors Military information: intelligence and advisories
can be obtained from global reporting centres and from military organisations.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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19 BMP Maritime Security
Risk assessment is a Identify threats
Assessment
R is k critical component of and vulnerabilities
voyage planning and
offshore activity within a
safety management
RITIME SECURI
system and Ship MA Assessm TY
e nt
Security Plan (SSP).
Risk Assess the
The risk assessment should note the identified Review and likelihood and
threats, evaluate the risks, and determine the update impact
measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery.
The risk assessment should consider the following:
Who or what might be harmed and how?
What is the severity and frequency?
What is already in place to control the risks? Implement
What further action is needed to control the mitigations
identified risks?
Who needs to implement the actions?
When assessing risk, the following should Background factors such as owner/operator Regular review of the Ship Security Assessment
be considered: affiliations, traffic patterns and local patterns of (SSA) and voyage risk assessment is
Requirements of the Flag State, company, life, including fishing vessel activity. recommended to ensure:
charterers and insurers. Impact on crewing of International Bargaining New threats are identified, and existing risks are
The ship’s characteristics, vulnerabilities, and Forum (IBF) warlike operations areas. confirmed or removed.
inherent capabilities, including citadel/safe Cooperation with military authorities should Mitigations remain robust, practical and realistic.
muster points and secondary muster points be considered, but mitigations should not be Post-incident lessons are captured.
(freeboard, speed, general arrangement, etc.). based on the availability of naval assets unless Updates to industry best practice.
The ship’s and company’s standard operating direct military support has been agreed.
procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of The use of Private Maritime Security
command, decision-making processes, etc.). Companies (PMSC).
The use of Security Escort Vessels (SEV).
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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20 BMP Maritime Security
A Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) should be created
based on the risk assessment, outlining mitigation
measures needed to reduce risk to As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The VHP can
be a standalone document, part of company
procedures, or included in the SSP.
All voyages and offshore activities require thorough
advance planning using all available information.
Maritime threats are dynamic, making it essential to All voyages and
have a detailed threat and risk assessment for each offshore activities
voyage and activity. require thorough
Further guidance on risk assessments and
advance planning
how to develop a VHP can be found at using all available
www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org. information
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Section 4
Planning
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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22 BMP Maritime Security
Planning
Company planning The following should be considered by companies 6. Review crewing requirements
when planning: Review and adjust personnel
This section details the procedures that should be requirements; consider additional
undertaken by the company prior to a ship entering 1. Regular review of threat and risk assessments personnel for security duties or
an area of increased risk identified through the risk Continuously update plans based on the disembarking non-essential persons.
assessment to mitigate against the risk of attack. It latest threat and risk assessments.
should be noted that risks will vary across regions. 7. Guidance and crew training for security threats
2. Security documentation Provide guidance, training and exercises
Review Flag State requirements, SSP, VHP, for the crew on identifying and reacting
company mandated mitigation measures to security threats. Support for seafarers’
and local military advice. wellbeing should always be considered,
especially if an incident has occurred.
3. Insurance and liabilities
Consider possible additional insurance and 8. Placement of hidden position
other commercial liabilities that may be transmitting devices
necessary when transiting threat areas. Consider installing hidden position
transmitting devices to locate the ship if
4. Guidance to the Master usual transmitting devices are disabled.
Prepare recommended route, updated
plans, and requirements for group transits
and national convoys.
5. Due diligence of PMSCs
Before contracting PMSCs proper
due diligence should be exercised, for
example by selecting PMSCs holding valid
certification against relevant ISO standards
such as ISO 28007 or ISO 18788.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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23 BMP Maritime Security
General ATTENTION Vessel planning
Information security Never share the ship’s location or route This section details the procedures that should be
To prevent critical voyage information from falling on personal social media channels. undertaken by the ship’s Master prior to a
into the wrong hands: ship entering an area of increased risk identified
through the risk assessment, to mitigate against the
1. Minimise external communications risk of attack.
Limit communications with external parties, Tracking/monitoring and reporting
relating to the coordination of rendezvous Attackers may have used communication systems Prior to any voyage or offshore activity
points or waiting positions. like AIS to target specific ships. To mitigate this 1. Obtain the latest threat information from
risk, companies should consider implementing the authorities listed at annex A and the
2. Control email correspondence independent protected fleet tracking systems. Maritime Global Security website.
Control email content to agents, Important factors to assess include system 2. Review the company risk assessment and if
charterers and chandlers, ensuring it is redundancy and reliance on existing onboard required conduct a specific voyage or activity
concise and contains only the minimum communication systems. risk assessment.
required information. 3. Check the latest NAVAREA warnings and alerts.
Radar: 4. Review industry, Flag State, company and
3. Data hygiene Proper placement of radar antennas military routing advice.
Minimise electronic transmissions and can minimise blind sectors caused by 5. Implement registration and reporting
data transmitted from the ship, including the superstructure. requirements as per annex A.
social media. Additional radars and specialist software can 6. Plan equipment availability for vessel hardening.
enhance the detection of small objects that 7. If used, confirm the PCASP embarkation plan
4. Social media standard radars might miss. and rendezvous arrangements for SEVs.
Seafarers should be aware of the impact of Standard S and X Band radar sets may struggle
sharing images of an attack on social media to detect small craft, especially those with hulls
channels or any form of communications. made of Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) or wood. ATTENTION
The internet and social media channels As technology improves, companies could
should be used responsibly. consider installing new equipment or upgrading If the risks cannot be managed
their current systems. to ALARP, reconsider the voyage
or activity.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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24 BMP Maritime Security
Prior to entering an area of increased threat Other considerations In an area of increased threat
1. Implement security measures in accordance 1. Emergency communication plan: 1. Report to centres per annex A and if stipulated
with the mitigations described in the risk Prepare and test an emergency in any charter agreement.
assessment. communication plan with essential 2. Monitor the latest threat information.
2. Brief the crew and conduct drills: contact numbers (see annex A) and 3. Regular check of all mitigations and especially
Brief the crew on preparations. prepared messages. control of all access points.
Conduct drills with mitigations in place. Display communication plans near all 4. Identify a safe area for drifting, loitering,
Review the emergency plan and ensure all external communication stations, including anchoring and slow steaming whenever possible.
crew are aware of their duties. the safe muster point and/or the citadel. 5. Minimise use of VHF; prefer email or secure
Ensure familiarity with the alarm signals for Test communication devices and the Ship satellite phone communications. Only respond
an attack and an all-clear situation. Security Alert System (SSAS). to known or legitimate callers on VHF,
Check: Consider the provision of a ‘safe word’ considering the possibility of imposters.
Essential equipment tested and held by selected crew for communication 6. Maintain social media hygiene. Photographs and
available. authentication with officials. information on social media can provide details
Hardening in place, including the on the ship’s location, intent and operations.
security of all access points. 2. AIS policy:
Lockdown conditions, considering Carefully consider AIS policy in threat areas. Seafarer wellbeing
crew safety. Consider the safety and security Seafarers face unprecedented maritime threats
Bridge team’s security knowledge and implications of broadcasting AIS: which may affect their welfare and mental
crew awareness. If AIS is turned off, alter course and speed wellbeing. Planning should consider crew support
Crew’s response to different threats. to minimise tracking by dead reckoning. such as the provision of a ‘welfare ambassador’
If AIS is used, restrict data to ship’s identity, and regular discussion regarding the helplines and
3. Determine reporting requirements as position, course, speed, navigational status, services available to them. Details can be found in
outlined in annex A. and safety-related information. annex B.
3. Planned maintenance:
Reschedule maintenance of voyage-critical
equipment for transit through areas of
increased threat.
Consider cargo management duties
to reduce risk of crew working on
exposed decks.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Section 5
Mitigation
measures
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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26 BMP Maritime Security
Mitigation measures
To effectively mitigate against attacks, ship crews 3. Layered defence: implementing a layered Alarms
should implement well-planned and rehearsed defence system increases the complexity Ship’s alarms serve to inform the crew of an attack
measures as part of a comprehensive Vessel for would-be attackers, thus enhancing the and warn the attackers the ship is aware and
Hardening Plan. This plan should detail the rigging ship’s security integrity. Each layer adds to the reacting. Continuous sounding of the ship’s whistle
of physical barriers and include regular drills and overall resilience and unpredictability of the may also distract attackers. It is crucial that:
exercises for the crew to practice responses to security measures.
various threats. Alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.
4. Customising measures: companies should Crew members are familiar with each alarm,
The guidance provided is informed by global have detailed guidance on vessel hardening especially those warning of an attack and
experiences of attacks to date. It is important to based on their specific risk assessments. They indicating ‘all clear’.
note that not all methods will be applicable to every may also consider further alterations to the ship, All alarms are supplemented by information
region or ship type. The specific measures adopted obtaining additional equipment, or increasing over the accommodation and deck PA system,
should be based on a thorough threat and risk manpower to further reduce the risk of attack. relating to the type of attack. This ensures the
assessment for each ship or offshore activity. crew muster at the appropriate location.
Routing Drills are conducted to ensure the alarm and PA
Key considerations for vessel hardening Vessel routing can play a key role in reducing risk. broadcast can be heard throughout the ship,
1. Compliance with safety regulations: any During the risk assessment process, the routing and the crew are familiar in moving to a position
vessel hardening measures must comply with should be considered in view of the following: of safety.
the International Convention for the Safety of All PA systems and speakers are checked
Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations. This means Locations of recent attacks. regularly to ensure they are in working order.
ensuring escape routes remain accessible and Intelligence reports of threats (e.g. Pirate Action
the crew’s ability to respond to non-security Group activity).
emergencies is not compromised. Sailing in territorial waters.
Routing through areas where the weather may
2. Attacks: ships can be attacked while underway assist in mitigating the risk.
or stationary (e.g., at anchor, during ship-to-ship Industry routing guidance – Maritime Security
or single buoy mooring operations, or while Transit Corridors.
drifting). Therefore, vessel hardening measures Avoidance of the area.
must be effective in all scenarios.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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27 BMP Maritime Security
Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance Manoeuvring wire with coil diameters of 730mm or 980mm
The Master should implement the following actions Experience has shown evasive or counter action is recommended. Use a double roll or a
to enhance vigilance on board: manoeuvres for some vessel types, while avoiding high-quality single roll outboard of the ship’s
Provide additional, fully briefed lookouts. reduction in speed, makes boarding and targeting structure, ensuring it is properly secured to
Maintain an all-round lookout from an more difficult. prevent attackers from pulling it off.
elevated position.
Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to Spikes: these consist of several sharp points
maximise the alertness of the lookouts. WARNING attached to a bar and mounted outside the
Ensure sufficient binoculars are available for the ship’s handrails. They can be made of steel or
enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare. voidance manoeuvres should
A GRP. While effective, they require storage space
Consider using thermal imagery optics and only take place when it is safe when not in use and time to rig and de-rig.
night vision aids, as these provide reliable all- to do so.
weather, day and night surveillance capability. Plastic or GRP barriers: these fit over the
Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all ship’s rails and make it difficult for ladders or
navigational warnings and communications, grapples to hook on. They are rigid and usually
ay e r of d e f e
particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts. st l nc ‘P’ shaped in profile. However, they require
Fir e
If applicable, consider placing well-constructed considerable storage space when not in use
dummies at strategic locations around the ship and can be damaged in heavy weather.
to give the impression of a larger crew on watch.
Use CCTV and fixed searchlights for better Chain link fencing: a double layer of chain link
monitoring; fixed searchlights can deter Preventing access at sea primarily involves fencing is effective against aggressive tactics
approaches from the stern. installing physical barriers. such as RPG attacks. It is typically fitted around
Physical barriers are designed to make it as difficult the outer perimeter of the bridge deck using
as possible for attackers to board the ship by scaffolding poles and clamps. However, it is
ATTENTION increasing the difficulty of the climb. When planning time-consuming to rig and de-rig, and clamps
barrier placement, special consideration should can damage the paintwork, causing corrosion.
good lookout is one of the most
A be given to ships with sunken poop decks. Typical It is not effective if placed close to or against
effective methods of ship protection. physical barriers include: bridge windows.
They can help identify a suspicious
approach or attack early, allowing for Razor wire: also known as barbed tape, it
defences to be deployed. creates an effective barrier if properly rigged
and secured. High tensile concertina razor
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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28 BMP Maritime Security
Summary of physical barriers
Razor wire: high tensile concertina razor wire is
recommended. Secure it properly, use personal
protective equipment, and obtain in short
sections for easier handling.
Spikes: effective but require storage space
and time to rig. Permanently fitted spikes could
resolve this issue.
Plastic or GRP barriers: effective but
require storage space and can be damaged
in heavy weather.
Chain link fencing: effective against aggressive
tactics but time-consuming to rig and can
cause corrosion. In the event of bad weather,
chain link can easily become twisted, unhooked
and completely inoperative.
ATTENTION
ecurity measures to control access
S
must not compromise the crew’s
ability to abandon the ship or manage
other emergencies.
Water and foam cannon systems
Water hoses, foam monitors and water cannons can
deter or delay intruders trying to board the ship. It is
recommended to rig them in fixed positions before
entering threat areas, as adjusting them under threat
exposes the operator. Installing a fixed baffle plate in
front of the water jet nozzle can increase coverage.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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29 BMP Maritime Security
System options: Propeller arresters Removable barriers: around pilot boarding
Fire hoses: deliver a single jet of water and Propeller arresters are designed to foul the propeller points to avoid de-rigging large areas before
should be secured firmly to the railings. and stop the engine of a small boat, preventing it port arrival.
Water cannons: deliver water in a sweeping arc from coming alongside and boarding. Evaluate the Steel bars on portholes and windows: prevent
and can be operated remotely. position of the arresters to avoid adverse impacts on access through these openings.
Spray rails: create a water curtain over the the ship. Environmental factors like wind speed and Fixed nets and/or ropes: strung across the
ship’s side and can be operated remotely. wave height can reduce effectiveness. main deck may prevent a helicopter landing or
Fire monitors: useful for washing down the side boarding by fast-roping.
of a ship or across the deck to deter fast-roping Other physical barriers
from helicopters. Various barriers can prevent illegal boarding:
Hanging obstacles: swinging obstacles over WARNING
Considerations: the ship’s side.
Water spray and fire monitors are effective in Overhanging protection: designed to prevent ll systems should be secure
A
deterring or delaying illegal boarding attempts. climbing over the ship’s rails. before entering the harbour and
Fixed positioning of hoses and fire monitors is Sandbags, water barrels, and steel not interfere with safety operations
recommended for covering likely access routes. plating: especially around vulnerable areas while recognising that in some
Use fire hoses in jet mode with baffle plates for like the bridge. areas this may be a vulnerability.
improved water coverage.
Water cannons can protect a larger part of
the hull.
Ensure all available fire and general service
pumps are ready for use, possibly requiring
additional power.
Conduct drills to ensure effective coverage of
vulnerable areas.
Ballast overflow
Ballast overflow involves intentionally overflowing
ballast tanks to create a large volume of water
flowing across the deck and over the ship’s side,
hampering intruders trying to board. Care should
be taken to prevent excessive pressure buildup in
any compartment for example, opening the tank
lids rather than overflowing through vents.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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30 BMP Maritime Security
ayer of def
nd l en
co ce
Se
Measures to prevent or delay access to
accommodation blocks, ship’s stores,
and machinery spaces
These measures aim to prevent unauthorised access
to vital areas on the ship, including accommodation
blocks, ship’s stores, and machinery spaces. This is
crucial to thwart petty theft, hijacking attempts or
hostage situations. The following guidance assumes
the initial defence layer has been breached, allowing Wire strops and turnbuckles: secure Design: these doors should present a smooth
intruders onto the deck. hatches and skylights. surface with no handles, hinges or locks visible
from the outside. They should be strong enough
Exterior doors So far as is appropriate, in terms of emergency to withstand a physical assault and be secured
Hardened doors: doors and frames should be access, all doors should remain closed and locked from the inside. Consider locking bars on internal
hardened with extra locks. when operating in a threat area. A single point of doors between the bridge and accommodation.
Improvised security: use door wedges, controlled access should be designated if working Citadel: if not installed at the accommodation
wedge braces, door locking bars, scaffold on deck is necessary. As part of the handover block, secondary doors should be fitted to the
supports, pallets, and wire strops to secure routine, it is suggested the Officer of the Watch citadel, offering a final layer of defence.
doors. For example: (OOW) checks all doors have been secured. Some
Door wedges: prevent doors from opening doors such as the galley door, engine room door Windows
by placing wedges at various points. (both of which are generally located on the aft of There is little point in preventing or slowing access
Wedge braces: secure doors with braces the ship) and skylights are high-risk openings and to the accommodation block through the doors if
that fit over the handle and brace against should not be left open to vent built up heat. intruders can get in by simply breaking a window
the door. or porthole.
Locking bars: install bars across door Internal doors
frames to protect against forceful entry. Installation: fit secondary doors at access points Hardening windows: fit windows and portholes
Scaffold supports: use props to brace in the accommodation block and engine room. with deadlights or blank covers, especially
doors facing strong points. those accessible from the outside.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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31 BMP Maritime Security
Bars: install a minimum of three bars on large Escape routes Security muster points and citadels
windows and ensure escape windows are Where the door or hatch is located on an escape The company risk assessment and planning
easily opened in emergencies. route from a manned compartment, it is essential process should identify the location of security
it can be opened from the inside. Where the door muster points within a ship and ensure crew are
Staircases, hatches, vents, and ladders or hatch is locked it is essential a means of opening familiar. These will vary depending on the threat, i.e.
Hinged metal plates: fit plates on outside the door from the inside is available. threat from piracy (citadel), threat from WBIED/UAV
staircases and ladders to obstruct climbing, (above waterline). Crew should always muster with
without compromising crew safety. appropriate PPE; additional PPE should be available.
Pipework protection: install spikes or angled
layer of defen
baffle plates on scupper pipes, fire mains, or Th
ird ce Security muster points
external cable runs to prevent them from being Definition: a designated area providing
used as climbing aids. maximum physical protection for the crew.
Location: should be above the waterline if there’s a
Enhanced bridge protection risk of hull breach. The central stairway, protected
Window protection: apply approved blast- Internal smoke cannons, strobe lights and by the accommodation block and above the
resistant film to bridge windows. noise makers waterline, is often suitable as multiple escape
Metal plates: installation of fabricated metal Purpose: these devices serve as a barrier routes are available. Avoid spaces with windows.
plates on bridge windows and wing doors within the accommodation block. Explosion risk: consider potential blast paths from
for quick deployment during an attack can Installation: fit smoke cannons, strobe lights and explosive devices when selecting the location,
be considered. noise makers in compartments or alleyways. i.e. an armour-plated door at the bottom of the
Chain link fencing: use to mitigate RPG Activation: can be activated remotely central stairwell will reduce the effect of a blast
effects. Not effective if placed close to the or automatically. from a WBIED. All loose items at muster points
bridge windows. Effect: smoke cannons fill spaces with non-toxic should be secured to prevent additional hazards.
Sandbags/water drums/steel plate: place on smoke to disorient intruders, while strobe lights
bridge wings for additional ballistic protection, and loud horns further increase disorientation.
checking regularly for degradation. ATTENTION
Lift shafts
Control of access to accommodation and Security measure: prevent intruders from using lift If a crew member is unable to reach the
machinery spaces trunking to access the engine room by stopping security muster location, they should
It is important to control access routes to the and isolating the lift at the ship’s upper deck. find a protected location and adopt the
accommodation and machinery spaces to deter Emergency escapes: ensure that personnel brace position against a bulkhead.
or delay entry. Effort must be directed at denying can escape from lift trunking in emergencies
access to these spaces. but prevent intruders from entering.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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32 BMP Maritime Security
Citadels Drills and criteria: conduct regular drills and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Purpose: a secure location where the crew can ensure the SSP defines conditions for citadel Installation: provide all-round visibility with CCTV,
retreat if intruders board the ship. use. Military forces may require all crew to be including thermal imaging, extended memory for
Size and facilities: should accommodate the accounted for and in the citadel, with two-way recording, and multiple monitor locations.
entire crew and any extra staff for 3-5 days. communication, before boarding. Discreet placement: use discreet or disguised
Must include communication systems (VHF and cameras and dummy units to mislead intruders.
SATCOM), independent power supplies, bottled Remote monitoring: allow remote monitoring
water, food and sanitation. ATTENTION from the company HQ while balancing
Communication: two-way communication cybersecurity and privacy concerns.
with company HQ and naval/law enforcement he Master should decide when to use
T Recording capability: ensure the system can
forces is essential. VHF for local and SATCOM the citadel. record and store footage for several days,
for global communication. Satellite antennae aiding law enforcement in identifying intruders.
must be independent from bridge systems. Audio integration: supplement CCTV with
Control from citadel: ability to control audio devices to alert the OOW to covert
propulsion and steering from the citadel could intrusion attempts.
trol and sa
be critical under specific circumstances. If ip con fet Install software: to enable the transmission of
Sh y
additional navigation equipment including CCTV images to the Company HQ if the system
GNSS, radar display, ECDIS and engine controls is disconnected.
are provided in the citadel it should only be Link: the activation of the SSAS to the CCTV to
used for sailing away from imminent danger. If allow remote monitoring from company HQ.
this is not available, the ship should be stopped Blackout: electrical isolation of specific areas can
prior to entering the citadel. disorient intruders. Electrical switchboards can
Awareness: CCTV monitoring from the create sectional blackouts without affecting the
citadel will provide situational awareness and citadel/safe area.
may provide footage direct to shore ship
management. Consider placing the CCTV Fire suppression systems
recording unit in the citadel to prevent damage Protection: Secure remote activation
by intruders. controls to prevent intruders from misusing
Sustainability: ensure the citadel has enough fixed fire suppression systems against the
food, water, sanitary and medical supplies to crew in the citadel.
sustain the crew, especially in hot climates. A
clear smoking policy should be agreed and
firefighting equipment available.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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Redistributed on behalf of the publisher by Regs4ships
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33 BMP Maritime Security
Motion sensors To comply with international regulations If a UAV is identified it is recommended the
Purpose: serve as an extra layer of hardening to and avoid collision risks, never switch off following actions are implemented:
warn crews of attempted or actual intrusions. navigation lights at night. Sound alarm.
Types: can be active or passive. Professional At anchor, keep deck lights on, as well-lit Muster crew in appropriate PPE including
advice is recommended to determine the best ships are less vulnerable to attacks. hard hats in appropriate location (avoid below
type for each ship. Have the capability to turn off all internal waterline and large amounts of glass).
Integration: consider location, type, coverage accommodation lights to deter or Brace for impact.
area, and alarm outputs when designing or disorient intruders. Consider switching off AIS or other tracking
retrofitting an integrated intruder detection and Regularly maintain lighting equipment to communications followed by a major course
alert system. ensure functionality. alteration if safe to do so.
Evasive manoeuvring.
Searchlights and lighting Securing ship’s tools and equipment
Lighting: minimise external lighting, except Prevent unauthorised use: secure all tools and In many cases multiple UAVs have been deployed
for mandatory navigation lights, to prevent equipment that could aid intruders in gaining against a single target ship. Repeated attacks over
attackers from establishing reference points. entry. Store such items in a secure location. a period of time have also occurred.
Use searchlights to probe for suspect craft and Ballistic protection: provide ballistic protection
illuminate radar contacts. from small arms fire for gas cylinders or WBIED mitigations
High-power searchlights: utilise xenon light flammable liquid containers stored on the WBIED can take many forms, the type of craft, control
sources to fully illuminate and identify suspect upper deck. Store excess gas cylinders of the craft, and intent will vary. In all cases mitigations
craft quickly. High-power beams can disorient securely or land them prior to transit. are limited however a PCASP team, if onboard, could
attackers temporarily. consider use of force to try and disable the craft
Recommended lighting practices: Ship-to-ship and other static operations within their Rules of Use of Force (RUF).
Weather deck lighting around the These should be conducted outside increased
accommodation block and rear-facing threat areas. Missile mitigations
lighting on the poop deck to The primary mitigation for preventing missile attacks
demonstrate awareness. UAV mitigations is to avoid the area completely. However, for ships
Keep searchlights ready for immediate use. The increasing use of UAVs to cause damage to transiting a missile threat area where no warning is
Switch on over-side lighting when attackers ships presents a difficult challenge for the maritime received the ship will have to implement emergency
are identified or an attack commences to industry. An attack by UAV cannot currently be response actions after impact. Seek military advice
dazzle them and aid crew visibility. mitigated by measures deployed onboard the on the use of electronic emissions, especially AIS, if
Exhibit only navigation lights at night. ship, however the effects of a UAV attack can be operating in areas with a missile threat.
responded to by the crew following its emergency
response procedures.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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34 BMP Maritime Security
Sea mines Passage coordination and military protection Master’s responsibility:
Avoid all published or identified mine danger areas Passage coordination schemes are established by Passage coordination does not relieve the
and maintain close liaison with military authorities. military forces to facilitate coordination between Master of their responsibility for the safe
If operating near mine danger areas, Masters the operational commanders of military assets and navigation of the ship.
should be aware of the possibility of drifting mines. one or more merchant ships intending to transit Merchant ships remain under the command
Effective lookouts are essential. Where the mine is a specific area or route. The primary objectives of their Masters and not under military
not observed prior to impact emergency response of these schemes are deterrence and protection, control, though they may receive routing
procedures should be activated. including mutual protection among merchant ships. and navigational guidance as well as threat
information during a group transit period.
Helicopter boarding mitigations Key points:
It is likely this tactic would only be deployed by a Legal constraints: These schemes aim to enhance the safety of
state actor, therefore mitigations for the prevention Escorting military assets may be legally merchant ships through coordinated efforts
of such a boarding should only be deployed where constrained under international law, without compromising the autonomy and
it has been validated that there is a credible threat Military Rules of Engagement (ROE), and responsibility of the ship’s Master.
against the ship. national caveats.
Military assets may not be able to actively Engaging Private Maritime Security
If the threat has been confirmed the following may protect merchant ships under attack unless Companies (PMSC)
be considered to prevent a helicopter landing or responding under the inherent right of self- BMP does not recommend or endorse the general
fast-roping/abseiling: defence as permitted by international law. use of armed security personnel or Security Escort
Use foam monitors to spray the deck and to ROE are determined at the political/ Vessels (SEV) to safeguard merchant ships; this
create water mist. strategic military level and communicated is a decision taken by individual ship operators.
Fouling of the helipad and open decks with to the Military Commander. Employment of PMSC services should be an output
nets, place obstructions on open decks to of the threat and risk assessment and consider the
prevent landing. Resource limitations: factors outlined below.
Commence evasive manoeuvres to move There may be insufficient military assets
abseil ropes away from the ship. available to escort all merchant ships within Shipping companies should only employ PMSCs
Steam towards territorial waters at full speed. the military area of operations. certified to the current ISO 28007-1:2015 Guidelines
Course alteration to maximise rolling of the ship. Prioritisation of ship passage may be for Private Maritime Security Companies. A PMSC
necessary due to limited resources. contract should:
To prevent the risk of escalation, on board private Be between the technical manager and the PMSC.
security teams should not attempt to engage state Not prejudice the ship’s insurance cover
actors with weapons. arrangements.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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35 BMP Maritime Security
Ensure the PMSC has current and compliant Existing protection levels: review the levels of The PCASP must act in accordance with the
insurance policies. protection provided by navies, coastguards and agreed RUF, which should provide for a graduated,
Clearly identify the procedure for the use of force. maritime police in the operating area. reasonable, proportionate and demonstrably
Confirm the Master’s overriding authority. necessary escalation in the application of force in
Include a medical clause in case a team Documentation requirements for PCASP defence of the crew and ship.
member provides first aid to a crew member. If the decision is made to deploy a PCASP, the
following documents will be required: PCASP should be used only as an additional layer
Privately Contracted Armed Security Letter of authorisation: obtain a letter from the of mitigation and protection, not as an alternative to
Personnel (PCASP) Flag State confirming that the use of armed other measures. The decision to carry PCASP is an
PMSCs may offer both armed and unarmed guards is permitted. output of the risk assessment.
services. While it is acknowledged that the P&I Club letter: secure a letter from the
presence of PCASP has been effective, their Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club stating that
presence could increase HSSE risks due to the employment of PCASP does not prejudice ATTENTION
there being weapons onboard. This should be the P&I cover.
considered in the risk assessment. The decision to War risk assurance letter: acquire a letter from he ship’s crew must not
T
engage a PMSC is left to individual ship operators, war risk insurance broker confirming that armed handle or use firearms.
subject to the permissions of the ship’s Flag State guards are permitted with no change in cover.
and any littoral states.
Master’s overriding authority
Considerations for engaging a PMSC If private security contractors are embarked, there
Current threat and risk environment: evaluate must be a clear understanding of the Master’s
the prevailing security threats and risks in the overriding authority. The Rules for the Use of Force
area of operation. (RUF) under which the PCASP operates must be
Company risk assessment: use the output acceptable to the Flag State and the company. The
of the company’s risk assessment to inform Master and PCASP should:
the decision. Clearly understand and acknowledge the RUF
Voyage plan requirements: assess the specific as outlined in the contract.
needs of the voyage, including route, duration, Have documentation authorising the carriage of
PCASP transfer and their logistics onboard. weapons and ammunition.
Ship characteristics: consider ship speed, Ensure all incidents involving the use of
freeboard, and type of operations (e.g., seismic weapons and armed force are reported at the
survey, cable laying). earliest instance to the Flag State and the CSO.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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36 BMP Maritime Security
These considerations and documentation 5. MoU and Service Agreement: where required
requirements ensure that the engagement of PMSCs request a copy of the Memorandum of
is conducted within legal frameworks and does not Understanding between the Navy and the
compromise the ship’s insurance coverage. SEV operator under which the SEV operates,
along with the PMSC’s Joint Venture Service
Refer to the PMSC guidance paper at Agreement with the SEV owner/provider.
www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org. 6. National Navy approval: request a copy of the
appropriate Navy approval letter or email for
Security Escort Vessels Navy personnel to operate on the SEV.
7. Insurance documents: obtain a copy of both
West Africa – Security Escort Vessel the SEV’s hull insurance and the PMSC’s liability
(SEV) considerations insurance.
SEVs are privately contracted vessels used to 8. Master’s feedback: request recent feedback
escort/protect ships usually within the EEZ and on the SEV’s last escort performance.
territorial waters of a coastal state. The intent is for 9. OVID certificate or CMID: obtain an Offshore
the presence of embarked military and security Vessel Inspection Database certificate or
personnel onboard an SEV to discourage piracy Common Marine Inspection Document.
and criminal attacks. 10. Routing: the PMSC should provide a
threat assessment for the route and SEV
When selecting an SEV, compliance and assurance rendezvous point.
checks with the PMSC/SEV provider should include:
It should be noted that the use of onboard private
1. SEV classification details: obtain recent dated armed security teams may be prohibited within
photographs of the SEV. some jurisdictions.
2. Certificate of Ownership and Registry: request
the SEV’s official documents.
3. Maintenance report: request the SEV’s latest
maintenance report or, if sub-chartered, the
PMSC’s due diligence audit report.
4. Evidence of recent sea trial: obtain an AIS
screenshot of a recent escort showing the
SEV’s speed, date and coordinates.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Section 6
Incident
response
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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38 BMP Maritime Security
Incident response
There are a variety of security incidents a ship while others such as military or paramilitary
could encounter when transiting a threat area, and personnel may seek to hijack ship and crew for
a proportionate and dynamic response is critical political gain. Despite these differing motivations,
in mitigating their potential impacts. The following the characteristics of such attacks are similar, as
sections explain the measures that should be are the recommended mitigation measures.
applied by shipboard personnel in the event of
specific maritime security incidents. The threats Attackers from sea typically open fire as they
described have all been encountered by ships in approach the ship to induce fear and get the ship to
recent years. slow down or stop. Use any available time to activate
additional protective measures and plans. This
signals to the attackers that the ship is prepared.
General guidance
Approach stage
Ships should have well practiced plans for Effective and properly equipped lookouts are the
emergency response to security incidents. Ships best aid in identifying the nature of an attack. The the emergency alarm, and make an attack
should refer to the bridge cards for initial actions. threat profile of attacks may initially look similar, and announcement per the ship’s emergency
it may not be until the attacking ship is close that communication plan.
When operating in an area of conflict, emergency the nature of the attack becomes apparent. In all 6. Mayday call: make a mayday call on VHF
response should be conducted using normal cases, the following steps should be taken: Channel 16. Send a distress message via the
response processes with military or private 1. Increase speed: if not already at full speed, Digital Selective Calling (DSC) system and
security incorporated into the response to provide increase to maximum to open the distance. recognised mobile satellite service, as applicable.
appropriate support. 2. Steer straight: maintain a straight course to 7. Activate SSAS: ensure the Ship Security Alert
sustain maximum speed. System is activated.
3. Initiate emergency procedures: activate the 8. Report the attack: immediately report the
Illegal boarding ship’s emergency procedures. attack to relevant authorities.
4. AIS considerations: implement the Automatic 9. Security Escort Vessel: if accompanied by an
Attackers will approach the ship with an intent Identification System policy. SEV, consider its speed capabilities and ability
to board from the sea. The intent of such attacks 5. Emergency communication: activate the to keep up. A decision to stay or leave, with the
varies; pirates will typically seek to kidnap seafarers, emergency communication plan, sound SEV should be considered.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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39 BMP Maritime Security
10. Water spray: activate water spray systems. skiffs from lying alongside the ship in preparation 2. Decline boarding: if security forces seek to
11. Secure doors: ensure all external doors and, for a boarding attempt. Large amounts of helm board, the Master should decline permission if it
where possible, internal public rooms and alterations are not recommended as they may does not compromise the safety of the ship and
cabins are fully secured. significantly reduce the ship’s speed. crew, noting adherence to international law.
12. Crew muster: all crew not required on the 3. Non-resistance: if security forces illegally board
bridge or in the engine room should muster Actions on illegal boarding the ship, the crew should not forcibly resist.
at the security muster point or citadel as If the ship is illegally boarded, the following actions 4. Immediate reporting: in the event of
instructed by the Master. should be taken: suspicious activity or doubt, call the relevant
13. Course alteration: when sea conditions Stop the ship: take all way off the ship and stop authorities immediately.
allow, consider altering course to increase an the engines.
approaching skiff’s exposure to wind/waves. Muster crew: all remaining crew members
14. Sound whistle/foghorn: sound the ship’s should proceed to the citadel or security DO:
whistle or foghorn continuously to demonstrate muster point; the last crew member should lock
to potential attackers that the ship is aware of all internal doors on route. Prepare the ship’s crew to cooperate fully
the attack and is reacting to it. PCASP procedures: PCASP, if present, will follow during any state or military action onboard:
15. VDR recording: save the Vessel Data Recorder procedures agreed with the company and Master. Keep low to the deck and cover your
(VDR) recording. Ensure crew presence: prior to securing doors, head with both hands.
16. PCASP actions: PCASP, if present, will take ensure all crew are present in the citadel or Keep hands visible.
agreed actions to warn off attackers according security muster point, including the Master, bridge Be prepared to be challenged on
to the RUF. team, and PCASP. Implement agreed actions if a your identity.
crew member is unable to reach the citadel. Be prepared to be separated based
Attack stage on identity/nationality.
As attackers get closer, the following steps should Actions on illegal boarding by state Cooperate fully with state or military
be taken: representatives/paramilitary forces forces.
1. Reconfirm crew location: ensure all crew Ships operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz,
members are at the security muster point Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Red Sea have
or citadel as instructed by the Master. In the been boarded by state security forces. If hailed by DON’T:
case of piracy, the crew should NOT leave security forces, ships should provide their name
the citadel until they have confirmed pirates and Flag State and affirm they are proceeding Make movements that could be
have left the ship or the military provide a ‘safe under international law and consider the following: interpreted as aggressive.
word’ – this could take days. 1. Maintain distance: ships should stay as far Take photographs.
2. Helm alterations: commence small helm as possible from territorial waters without Engage in ship activities unless
alterations while maintaining speed to deter compromising navigational safety. instructed by military personnel.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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40 BMP Maritime Security
Control of ship lost/hijack – hostage situation DON’T: Sea mines
In the event of a ship hijacking and holding the crew If a look out observes a sea mine, consider
the following principles serve as guidelines: Offer resistance. the following:
Argue with captors or colleagues. Alter course to avoid mine.
Take photographs. Sound appropriate alarm.
DO: Hide valuables. Close watertight doors and consider blast route.
React emotionally. Muster crew in appropriate PPE including
Remain calm: maintain self-control. Take drugs or alcohol. hard hats in appropriate location (avoid below
Be respectful: be humble, respectful Bargain for personal privileges. waterline and large amounts of glass).
to captors and do not get involved or Post extra lookout to look for additional mines in
affected by prejudice-based treatment. Missiles the vicinity.
Look out for colleagues: ensure the Where a warning is received, and time permits, the Note position and issue VHF warning.
well-being of colleagues. following should be considered: Activate Emergency Response procedures.
Stay together: stay together as a Sound appropriate alarm. Brace for impact.
team where possible. Muster crew in appropriate PPE including
Accept leadership: accept the new hard hats in appropriate location (avoid below
leadership and maintain the hierarchy waterline and near large amounts of glass).
of rank. Consider switching off AIS or other tracking
Communication: try to establish normal communications.
communication with the captors. Change course to minimise the profile of the
Hygiene: maintain personal hygiene. ship to the direction of the threat.
Conserve resources: save water Activate emergency response procedures.
and essentials. Brace for impact.
Stay positive: many people are
working to release you.
Be patient: maintain routines,
including spiritual needs.
Regular breathing: keep your
breathing regular to help stay calm.
Mental activity: meditate or keep
mentally active.
Respect religion: respect your
religion, colleagues’, and captors’.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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41 BMP Maritime Security
UAV attack WBIED attack The brace position
It is very difficult to detect a UAV. If a UAV is heard or In the early stages of an attack, it may not be Adopt a brace position (arms/legs bent, hands
identified, consider the following: possible to distinguish between an illegal boarding holding onto something solid, and feet firmly
Sound appropriate alarm. or WBIED. Initial actions for illegal boarding should planted on the deck) to protect personnel from
Consider switching off tracking be followed. WBIEDs are usually unmanned, but shock waves.
communications, e.g. AIS. some variants use crew until the final approach
Muster crew at the appropriate security and others use dummies to mask their intent. It is Keeping the mouth open may reduce shock wave
muster point. recommended that if the WBIED is identified the damage to the ears.
Time permitting, close all fire screen doors. following is implemented:
Brace for impact. Sound appropriate alarm.
Consider turning towards the threat to avoid
a strike to the engine or steering
gear compartments.
tion (up to a few Muster crew at the appropriate security muster
d etec km
tic aw
o us ay point (avoid below waterline and near large
Ac e nt on time of day )
en d ,w amounts of glass).
ep ea
(d th Brace for impact.
n tering phase
Loi
er
tio
,s
ec
en
Attack phase
det
sor
(top attack)
l
Visua
s etc)
Reaction time Distance from ship
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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42 BMP Maritime Security
If a WBIED is anticipated, the time to react is
very short. The figure below gives an example
of possible reaction times.
Good lookout is essential. All crew
1nm and PCASP alerted. Attempt to
communicate with appraoching boat.
If time permits send DISTRESS call.
Be at full speed. 1500m
PCASP likely to
present warnings.
PCASP will act in accordance
1000m wth the RUF. Prepare to move
crew to a safe muster point
above the waterline.
Crew move to safe 500m
muster point.
75 secs 120 secs
150 secs 240 secs
25 knots 15 knots
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Section 7
Post-incident
procedures
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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44 BMP Maritime Security
Post-incident procedures
A comprehensive plan to account for personnel, Post-attack recovery Take photographs of the crime scene from
assess damage and collect evidence is crucial. The The period following an attack will be challenging multiple viewpoints.
wellbeing of seafarers must be prioritised. Once all as the company, Master and crew recover from the Protect the VDR for future evidence.
attacks are confirmed as complete, it is important ordeal. It is essential that seafarers receive timely Seek military advice for the disposal of debris.
to follow these guidelines: and proper medical assessments, both physical
and mental, and care. Companies should have
Actions post-attack emergency management plans in place to manage WARNING
Send distress signal: immediately send a the effects of an attack, including handling long,
distress signal if not already sent. drawn-out hostage negotiation situations and ny radio emissions in proximity
A
Account for personnel: ensure all crew and supporting the families of those affected by a threat may trigger UXO.
PCASP are accounted for. incident, including piracy or armed robbery.
Administer first aid: provide medical support to
any injured crew members. Unexploded ordnance and projectile materials
Notify stakeholders: call the CSO and If a ship is attacked by a UAV, missile or similar
relevant authorities. projectile it is possible the munition may not
Implement damage control: take necessary explode leaving Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). If a
actions to control and mitigate damage projectile impacts a ship but does not explode the
following ship’s emergency procedures. crew should:
Survey damage area: inspect the area where Secure the impact area and maintain a
the blast or attack occurred. safe distance.
Save VDR: save and transmit (if possible) VDR Avoid the use of UHF/VHF and other
data to managing office. transmitting devices in the vicinity.
Preserve evidence: restrict access to area Preserve the area of impact and all evidence
and control scene in preparation for evidence without touching or dismantling debris.
collection by authority. Avoid contaminating the evidence and do not
Media: prepared guidelines on how to interact clean the area.
with media post-incident may help prevent Take initial statements or observations from
misinformation. the crew.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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45 BMP Maritime Security
Evidence preservation and collection Investigation process
To give investigating authorities the best chance Thorough investigation using all available evidence
of apprehending the perpetrators, it is important is critical. The quality of the evidence provided and
that evidence is preserved correctly. Companies, the availability of the crew to testify significantly aid
Masters and crew should refer to the IMO any investigation or prosecution. The investigating
Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of authority will depend on various factors such as
Evidence (A28/Res.1091). the Flag State, ownership, and crew nationality.
Statements from the ship’s Master and the PCASP
1. Detailed reporting: following any attack or provide crucial evidence.
suspicious activity, a detailed report should
be completed and sent to the company, the Additional support and advice
Flag State and appropriate authorities. This INTERPOL provides support to ship operators who
report should be comprehensive and include have experienced hijacking. Its Maritime Security
supporting evidence and witness statements. Unit can provide advice on preserving the integrity
of evidence left at the crime scene and liaising with
2. Protecting the crime scene: the appropriate agencies. Contact can be made
Preserve the crime scene and all evidence. via INTERPOL’s 24/7 Command and Coordination
Avoid contaminating or interfering with Centre (CCC) at [email protected].
evidence; if in doubt, do not touch and leave
items in place. Seafarer treatment
Do not clean the area or throw anything away, Seafarers should always be treated with respect
no matter how unimportant it may seem. and as victims of crime. Law enforcement agencies
Take initial statements from the crew. will talk to the Master and crew to understand
Take photographs of the crime scene from the event sequence and circumstances. In post-
multiple viewpoints. hostage situations, authorities may conduct
Protect the VDR for future evidence. post-release crew debriefs and collect evidence for
Make a list of items taken (e.g. mobile investigations and prosecutions.
phones with numbers).
Facilitate access to the crime scene Seafarer welfare
and relevant documentation for law Seafarers and their families often struggle to
enforcement authorities. express or recognise the need for assistance after
Make crew available for interviews by law exposure to security threats. Details on supporting
enforcement authorities. organisations for seafarers is at annex B.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Annex A
Reporting and
information
centres
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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47 BMP Maritime Security
Annex A – Reporting and information centres
Overview International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Role: the IMB is a non-governmental and not-
Masters are strongly encouraged to inform regional for-profit organisation which acts as a 24/7
and military organisations of their movements to single point of contact for reporting incidents of
aid situational awareness and incident response. piracy or robbery around the globe.
Continuous reporting is essential once a ship
has commenced its passage. Companies should Services: the IMB relays information to and
identify regional reporting requirements during the requests help from law enforcement and navies
risk assessment process and include requirements to assist ships. The primary working language
in voyage orders. of the IMB is English, the team however has a
multilingual capability. Warnings and advice ASIA
Annex B includes the contact numbers and email related to piracy and robbery incidents are also
addresses for networks that support seafarer broadcast via Inmarsat and Iridium to ships and
welfare and wellbeing. via email to CSOs. The IMB regularly participates Information Fusion Centre (IFC) – Singapore
in security/emergency drills with ships and Role: Regional Maritime Security (MARSEC)
provides routing advice related to waters prone information-sharing hub.
Maritime Reporting Centres to incidents of piracy and armed robbery.
Services: Facilitates information sharing,
Various centres worldwide facilitate maritime Contact: provides MARSEC situational awareness, cue
reporting, helping enhance security and response Email: [email protected] operational responses.
to incidents effectively. They do not replace Tel: +603 2031 0014
the role of any Maritime Rescue Coordination Whatsapp/Telegram: +60 11 2659 3057 Contact:
Centre (MRCC) whose details are available in the Website: icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre Email: [email protected]
IMO’s Global Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan. Key Tel: +65 9626 8965 (hotline),
maritime security reporting centres and their +65 6594 5728 (office)
contact details follow: Website: ifc.org.sg
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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48 BMP Maritime Security
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) Contact:
Role: A government-to-government Address: NATO Shipping Centre, Atlantic
international organisation established to Building, Northwood Headquarters, Sandy
combat piracy and armed robbery against Lane, Northwood, Middlesex, HA6 3HP, UK
ships in Asia by enhancing regional cooperation Tel: +44 (0) 1923-956574
through information sharing, capacity building Email: [email protected]
and cooperative arrangements. Fax: +44 (0) 1923-956575
Website: shipping.nato.int/nsc
Services: Provides timely, accurate information
and analysis of incidents to support risk The Maritime Information Cooperation &
assessment via the ReCAAP ISC interactive ATLANTIC/MEDITERRANEAN Awareness Center (MICA Center)
dashboard. A mobile application [ReCAAP] to Role: The MICA Center is the French centre
report incidents directly to coastal states and for analysis and assessment of global
focal points, and access reports, guidebooks NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) maritime security.
and posters. Role: NATO’s primary point of contact and
hub for the maritime commercial community Services: Connected to the French national
Contact: for interaction between the shipping industry operating headquarters and worldwide
Tel: +65 6376 3063 and naval forces. Host for the NATO Maritime diplomatic network, the 24/7 MICA Center
Fax: +65 6376 3066 Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea monitors, assesses and provides the maritime
Website: recaap.org Infrastructure (NMCSCUI). industry with alerts on worldwide incidents.
Services: The NSC deploys the instruments of Contact:
Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Tel: +33 (0)298 149 917
(NCAGS) and Allied Worldwide Navigational Email: [email protected]
Information System (AWNIS) to de-conflict military Website: fms.marine.defense.gouv.fr
operations and commercial activities at sea. mica-center.org/
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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49 BMP Maritime Security
Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region
Role: To strengthen maritime security in
the Indian Ocean region by maintaining a
maritime situational picture and promoting
information sharing.
Services: To disseminate maritime security
information, analysis, and advisories through its
website and coordinate with other centres as
well as maritime forces to support operations to
AUSTRALIA INDIAN OCEAN counter piracy, smuggling, hybrid attacks and
maritime incidents.
Maritime Trade Operations Team 1 The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC) Contact:
Role: Protecting Australia’s seaborne trade DCOC is a network to exchange information Email: [email protected]
through support to military commanders and on piracy incidents across the region and Tel: +91-124-2208385, +91-7428963733 (c)
the maritime industry. other relevant information to help shipping and Fax: +91-124-2209385
signatory states. Website: indiannavy.nic.in/ifc-ior
Contact:
Address: Maritime Operations c/o HMAS Moreton Role: Maritime centres monitor the maritime Regional Centre for Operational
Apollo Road Bulimba QLD 4171, domain for situational awareness and Coordination (RCOC)
Attention: MTO Duty Officer potential threats. Location: Seychelles
Telephone: +61 (0) 431 764 980
Email: [email protected] Services: 24/7 service to respond and provide Contact:
timely reports on incidents at sea to all Address: Sohna Road, Sector 33,
seafarers and signatory states. Gurugram 122001, India
Mobile: +91 85275 99898
Tel: +91-124-2208385
Fax: +91-124-2209385
Email: [email protected]
Website: x.com/IFC_IOR
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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50 BMP Maritime Security
Regional Maritime Information
Fusion Centre (RMIFC)
Location: Madagascar
Contact:
Address: Bâtiment CFIM au rez-de-chaussée,
Ankaditoho, Soanierana , Antananarivo,
Madagascar
Tel: (+261) 020 22 24 393 / (+261) 33 14 028 89 /
(+261) 34 90 338 12
Email: [email protected] LATIN AMERICA MIDDLE EAST
X: https://x.com/
rmifcenter?s=11&t=5zxfXC6pSWf8MDSEoNic2g
International Fusion Center (IFC) Peru EU Maritime Security Center – Indian Ocean
Role: The IFC-Peru Maritime Information Fusion (EU MSC-IO)
Center for Latin America collects and analyses Role: Supports maritime safety and security
timely, accurate and useful maritime information for through incident reporting and information
Latin American countries, countries with scope in exchange, working closely with the MSC(IO)
the IFC-Peru’s area of interest and the international and JMIC and acting as a key liaison between
maritime community, with the purpose of issuing merchant ships and military forces in the Middle
periodic reports, focused on increasing safety and East region.
security in the aquatic environment; and integrating
capabilities to face common threats, through Services: 24/7 assistance through the Voluntary
interoperability and information exchange with Reporting Scheme, issues verified and
other similar centres worldwide. corroborated warning and advisories. Administers
Voluntary Reporting Scheme.
Services: Enhances safety and protection,
integrates capabilities to face common threats Contact:
in the aquatic environment. Tel: Emergencies +44 (0) 2392 222060
Tel: Info +44 (0) 2392 222065
Contact: Email: [email protected]
Email: [email protected] Website: mscio.eu
Tel: +51913862174
Website: dicapi.mil.pe/ifc-latam-peru
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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51 BMP Maritime Security
Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security (YAMS)
Role: Identify, fuse and distribute information YAMS is a maritime security framework, agreed by
to the global maritime community of interest West and Central African states.
with a focus on disruption to the freedom of
navigation in the Middle East region. Role: Each zone monitors the maritime domain
for situational awareness and potential threats.
Services: Provide timely and factual event driven
products and assessments, offering advice, and Services: To respond and provide timely
where prudent, military guidance only to help reports on incidents at sea to all seafarers.
inform any threat and risk assessment process.
WEST AFRICA Maritime Multinational Coordination Centre
Contact: (MMCC) Zone G
Tel: TBD Location: Cape Verde
Email: [email protected] Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade –
Website: products may be viewed at Gulf Of Guinea (MDAT-GOG) Contact:
ukmto.org/partner-products/jmic-products Role: Maintains 24/7 maritime situational Tel: +2382633622/+2382633623
awareness in the central and western African Email: [email protected]
UKMTO maritime areas, supports the Yaoundé Code Website: icc-gog.org/?page_id=1575
Role: Supports maritime safety and security of Conduct.
through incident reporting and information MMCC Zone F
exchange, working closely with the MSC(IO) and Services: The 24/7 centre administers the Location: Accra, Ghana
JMIC and acting as a key liaison between merchant GOG VRA. The centre informs and supports
ships and military forces in the Middle East region. the maritime industry by coordinating with Contact:
regional authorities. Tel: +23354796523
Services: 24/7 assistance through the Email: [email protected]
Voluntary Reporting Scheme, issues verified Contact: Website: icc-gog.org/?page_id=1575
and corroborated warning and advisories. Tel: +33 298228888
Administers Voluntary Reporting Scheme. Email: [email protected]
Website : gog-mdat.org/home
Contact:
Tel: Emergencies +44 (0) 2392 222060
Tel: Info +44 (0) 2392 222065
Email: [email protected]
Website: ukmto.org
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
Taken from Regs4ships on 03/04/2025 17:25 by Captain Vasileios Nikitas
Redistributed on behalf of the publisher by Regs4ships
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52 BMP Maritime Security
MMCC Zone E
Location: Cotonou, Benin Yaoundé
Architecture
Contact:
for Maritime
Tel: +229 61 04 04 75 / +229 51 99 14 25
Email: [email protected] Security
Website: icc-gog.org/?page_id=1575 (YAMS)
MMCC Zone D
Location: Douala, Cameroon G
Contact:
Tel: +237233424001/+237233425948
Email: [email protected]
Website: icc-gog.org/?page_id=1575 F E
MMCC Zone A D
Location: Luanda, Angola ECOWAS – CEDEAO
ECCAS – CEEAC
Contact: Maritime Zone E, F and G
Maritime Zone A and D
Tel: +244 923 462 501
Email: [email protected]
Zone CEEAC A
Website: icc-gog.org/?page_id=1575
Additional resources Content: Includes piracy, terrorism, exclusion
zones, illegal fishing, security advice and
Maritime security charts regional contacts.
Purpose: Assist in planning voyages through
high-threat areas by providing safety-critical Voluntary Reporting Areas
information. Purpose: Encourage reporting of maritime
threats within defined areas.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
Taken from Regs4ships on 03/04/2025 17:25 by Captain Vasileios Nikitas
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53 BMP Maritime Security
Benefit: Provides data to improve regional MSTC example
maritime security and incident response. that consists of the Red Sea
Traffic Separation
Usage: Ships should register and report their Scheme (TSS)
positions, suspicious activities and incidents. West of the Hanish
Yemen
Islands, the Bab
Er
it
Voluntary Reporting Areas (VRA) may be established el Mandeb TSS
re
a
in geographic areas where maritime threats to and a two-way
seafarers and ships is raised. Advice on their use route directly
together with reporting formats and instructions can connecting to the Djibouti
be found on the security charts or the websites of Internationally Gulf of Aden
regional reporting centres. The VRAs as shown on Recommended
the charts clearly define an area, so companies and Transit Corridor
ships transiting, trading, or operating in these regions (IRTC)
can join a trusted reporting scheme.
Ethopia
Somalia Somalia
Maritime Security Transit Corridors
Maritime Security Transit Corridors (MSTC) are
recommended routes for shipping along which Joint War Committee Reporting suspicious activity
naval forces may focus their presence and Role: Lists areas of perceived enhanced risk, Seafarers play a crucial role in maritime security
surveillance efforts. MSTCs will be shown on affecting insurance premiums. by reporting suspicious activities. Reports,
the maritime security charts and published by including photographs, videos and radar data, are
reporting centres. The MSTC example below is Listed areas: lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar valuable to authorities.
shown on UKHO Chart Q6099 and consists of the
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) West of the Hanish The insurance community may list an area of Seafarers are encouraged to report any suspicious
Islands, the Bab el Mandeb TSS and a two-way perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships activity to the relevant global reporting centres to
route directly connecting to the Internationally entering the area would need to notify their aid in improving maritime security and response.
Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC). The industry insurers and additional insurance premiums may Typical suspicious activity is described in annex B.
website has details of all routing advice. apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises
underwriting representatives from both Lloyd’s
and the International Underwriting Association
representing the interests of those who write
marine hull war business in the London market.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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54 BMP Maritime Security
Limits of Maritime Security Charts
Q6110
Mediterranean
Sea
Q6111 Q6113
Persian Gulf Singapore to
Arabian Sea Papua New Guinea
Q6144
West Africa
including
Gulf of Guinea
Q6112
Q6099 Karachi to
Red Sea Hong Kong
Gulf of Aden
Arabian Sea
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Annex b
Seafarer
welfare
support
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05
Mitigations
MITIGATION
MEASURES
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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56 BMP Maritime Security
Annex B – Seafarer welfare support
Befrienders Worldwide (BW) are very familiar Phone: +44 (0)20 7323 2737 (request a call Sailors’ Society is a 200-year-old global maritime
with the unique realities of life at sea. If seafarers are back): iswan.org.uk/get-support/seafarers/ welfare charity supporting seafarers and their families
missing home, fatigued from working long days, or request-a-call-back/ in need, day and night, 365 days a year. Its international
experiencing a crisis, help is available. BW is a global Email: [email protected] team of chaplains is always at the end of the phone or
charity with over 400 help centres across five Live Chat: via iswan.org.uk/seafarerhelp chat message to give comfort, advice on the charity’s
continents, providing confidential, compassionate, WhatsApp: +44 7909 470732 emergency grants and provide crisis response.
and non-judgmental support – free of charge. Facebook: facebook.com/seafarerhelp
SMS: +44 7860 018538 Their 24/7 Crisis Response Network and helpline
If you or someone you know needs support, go to: Skype: info-seafarerhelp.org provides care and support to seafarers, their families
Seafarer support: ВКонтакте: vk.com/seafarerhelpclub and shipping companies following critical incidents
befrienders.org/befrienders-worldwide-seafarers Website: iswan.org.uk/seafarerhelp such as piracy, accident, and natural disasters.
Befrienders Worldwide: befrienders.org
The Maritime Wellbeing programme offers The Society also offers seafarers a MyWellness
The International Christian Maritime Association practical tips, tools and strategies for how to e-learning app.sailors-society.org
(ICMA) is a worldwide association of 27 Christian improve and raise awareness of mental and
charities dedicated to the service of seafarers, physical health. maritimewellbeing.com The Seafarers Hospital Society is dedicated to
fishers and their families. icma.as maintaining the health, welfare and advice needs of
The Mission to Seafarers is the largest provider of seafarers of any nationality based in UK waters, and
The International Seafarers’ Welfare and port-based welfare services, working in 200 ports their families, through the provision of health and
Assistance Network (ISWAN) is an international across 50 countries supporting men and women welfare grants. seahospital.org.uk
not for profit maritime organisation that works working at sea. In addition, to their free services
to improve the lives of seafarers and their of Wi-fi, respite and transportation, their chaplains Stella Maris is the world’s largest ship visiting
families with services, resources, strategies and are trained in post-trauma counselling and are charity with a global network of over 1,000
advocacy. ISWAN operates SeafarerHelp – a free, able to provide immediate support post attack chaplains and volunteers based in 353 ports across
confidential, multilingual helpline for seafarers and or crew release, as well as connect with relevant 57 countries. Via its extensive network, and its
their families. The service is available 24 hours a professional services in the seafarers home country. Centenary Emergency Fund, Stella Maris provides
day, 365 days a year. There are two main email addresses for crew timely, seamless, and focused support to seafarers,
assistance: [email protected] and infomanila@ fishers and their families affected by abandonment,
missiontoseafarers.org – the latter being their Family bereavement, conflicts, and other crises.
Support Network in the Philippines. stellamaris.org.uk
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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BMP Maritime Security
Annex c
Maritime
lexicon and
abbreviations
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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58 BMP Maritime Security
Annex C – Maritime lexicon and abbreviations
Maritime lexicon Voluntary participation in operating a ship or Illegal boarding: boarding with intent to steal or
aircraft with knowledge that it is a pirate vessel. harm without taking control.
The maritime industry will use the following lexicon Inciting or intentionally facilitating an act Sea theft: stealing property without violence.
to report/describe maritime security events, some described above. Sea robbery: stealing property with
of which are not covered by this publication. violence or use of arms.
Armed robbery against ships Attempted boarding: close approach with
Maritime security threats As defined by the IMO Assembly Resolution visible boarding paraphernalia, thwarted by
These threats often involve aggressive attackers A.1025(26), armed robbery against ships involves: defensive measures.
who subject victims to violence and ill-treatment, Any illegal act of violence, detention, Suspicious activity: unaccountable actions
hijack ships for ransom or cargo theft, and, in depredation, or threat thereof, committed for indicating potential threats, such as unusual
some cases, hold seafarer’s hostage for extended private ends and directed against a ship, or equipment or behaviour. Indications may include:
periods. Attackers’ motivations may be criminal, persons or property onboard, within a state’s The number of crew on board relative to
ideological or political, and attacks may be targeted internal waters, archipelagic waters, and its size.
or opportunistic. Maritime security threats vary territorial sea. The Closest Point of Approach.
across regions and within them both in terms of the Inciting or intentionally facilitating such acts. The existence of unusual and non-fishing
threats themselves and their severity. equipment on board, e.g. ladders, climbing
Maritime activity is diverse and sometimes the hooks or large amounts of fuel.
Piracy exact location of an incident is unavailable to One vessel towing multiple skiffs or has
According to Article 101 of the UNCLOS, correctly classify it. Hence, while capturing the skiffs onboard.
piracy includes: incident, classification types used include: The type of vessel is unusual for the
Any illegal act of violence, detention, or Hijack: attackers take control of a ship against current location.
depredation committed for private ends by the crew’s will for purposes such as robbery, Small boats operating at high speed.
the crew or passengers of a private ship or cargo theft, or kidnapping. If a vessel appears unmanned.
aircraft, directed: Kidnap: unauthorised forcible removal of
On the high seas, against another ship or persons from the ship. This is not an exhaustive list. Other events, activity
persons or property onboard. Attack: aggressive approach with weapons and ships may be deemed suspicious by the Master
Against a ship, persons, or property in a discharged or missiles/loitering munitions of a merchant ship having due regard to their
place outside the jurisdiction of any state. hitting on or near the ship. own seagoing experiences within the region and
information shared among the maritime community.
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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59 BMP Maritime Security
Abbreviations
AIS Automatic Identification System IBF International Bargaining Forum
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable IFC Information Fusion Centre
ASM Anti-Ship Missile IFC-IOR Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region
AWNIS Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System IMB International Maritime Bureau
BAM Bab el Mandeb IMO International Maritime Organization
BMP Best Management Practice INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organisation
CCC Command and Coordination Centre IRTA Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
CCTV Closed Circuit Television IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
CMID Common Marine Inspection Document IRTC Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
CMF Combined Maritime Forces ISC Information Sharing Center
CPA Closest Point of Approach ISO International Organization for Standardization
CSO Company Security Officer ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security
DSC Digital Selective Calling JISG Joint Industry Security Group
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display and Information System JMIC Joint Maritime Information Center
ECP Emergency Communications Plan JWC Joint war Committee
ECR Engine Control Room KFR Kidnap for Ransom
EU European Union LM Loitering Munitions
EU MSC-IO European Union Maritime Security Center – Indian Ocean LRIT Long-Range Identification and Tracking
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force MDA Mine Danger Area
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System MDAT-GOG Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea
GPS Global Positioning System MMCC Maritime Multinational Coordination Centre
GRP Glass Reinforced Plastic MoU Memorandum of Understanding
HOA Horn of Africa MSC Maritime Safety Committee
HQ Headquarters MSTC Maritime Security Transit Corridor
HSSE Health, Safety, Security and Environment MTA Mine Threat Area
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
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60 BMP Maritime Security
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SSP Ship Security Plan
NAVAREA Navigation Area STS Ship to Ship
NCAGS Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping TSS Traffic Separation Scheme
NSC NATO Shipping Centre UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
OOW Officer of the Watch UKHO United Kingdom Hydrographic Office
OVID Offshore Vessel Inspection Database UKMTO United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
P&I Protection and Indemnity UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
PA Public Address USV Uncrewed Surface Vehicle
PAG Pirate Action Group UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
PAST Private Armed Security Teams UXO Unexploded Ordnance
PCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel VDR Voyage Data Recorder
PMSC Private Maritime Security Company VHF Very High Frequency
PPE Personal Protective Equipment VHP Vessel Hardening Plan
RECAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy VMS Vessel Monitoring System
& Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia VPD Vessel Protection Detachment
ROE Rules of Engagement VRA Voluntary Reporting Area
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade WBIED Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
RUF Rules for the Use of Force
RV Rendezvous
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SBM Single Buoy Mooring
SEV Security Escort Vessel
SOH Straits of Hormuz
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
SPM Ship Protection Measures
SSA Ship Security Assessment
SSAS Ship Security Alert System
SSO Ship Security Officer
01 Introduction 02 Maritime
Threats
Security
03 Threat and
Risk Assessment 04 Planning 05 MMEASURES
ITIGATION
06 Incident Response 07 PPROCEDURES
OST-INCIDENT
A Rinformation centres B
eporting and Seafarer welfare
support C Mandaritime lexicon
abbreviations
Taken from Regs4ships on 03/04/2025 17:25 by Captain Vasileios Nikitas
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