INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

A. INTRODUCTION

a. Meaning of Interpretation

“The essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the
external manifestation of the intention that underlies it” – Salmond Interpretation means the art of
finding out the true sense of an enactment by giving the words of the enactment their natural and
ordinary meaning. It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute.
The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have been certain principles
which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the Courts. These
principles are sometimes called ‘rules of interpretation’

The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed
expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by SALMOND, "by interpretation or
construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the
legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed."

Interpretation thus is a familiar process of considerable significance. In relation to statute law,

interpretation is of importance because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of law. The
process of statute making and the process of interpretation of statutes are two distinct activities. In
the process of interpretation, several aids are used. They may be statutory or non-statutory.
Statutory aids may be illustrated by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions
contained in individuals Acts whereas non-statutory aids is illustrated by common law rules of
interpretation (including certain presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-laws
relating to the interpretation of statutes.

Interpretation : The term interpretation has been derived from the Latin word ‘interpretari’ which
means to understand, expound, explain and translate. Interpretation is the procedure of explaining
or translating a text. In simple terms, interpretation of a statute means understanding the law. The
Aim of a court is to not just read law but to apply it in a manner which suits Case to case. Therefore,
it is a process used by courts to find out the actual Implication of an act or document and also its
intention. Interpretation bridges the gap between the enactment of a law and its translation.

Construction : Construction is the activity of inferring logical conclusion of a Legal text, with
legal rules. In other words, it is the drawing of conclusions from a subject which cannot be
understood truly from the text. Constructions is the process of legal explanation which makes
sense of difficult or apparent text in statutes, and gives a conclusion based on Logic and reasoning.
It is difficult to distinguish between interpretation , because they are so overlapping in
nature.

Although, we may differentiate them as follows –

1. Interpretation is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words and the Purpose
of the legislation. Whereas, Construction is the process of using the legal text to draw
conclusions that go beyond its plain language to solve Inconsistencies.
2. Interpretation may be performed when a certain term or phrase in law has an unambiguous
meaning. Whereas, Construction may occur when the language and the meaning attached
to specific phrases in the laws are unclear and ambiguous.
3. The process of interpretation identifies the methods that can be used to interpret any
statute. Whereas, Construction intends to bring it to a conclusion.
4. Interpretation is used to determine the linguistic meaning of a legal text. Whereas, The
logical and legal impact of the legislative text can be ascertained through construction.
5. A legal text can be partially interpreted. Whereas, it is necessary to complete construction
as a whole.
6. Interpretation can be seen as a broad form of construction. Whereas, Construction is almost
like an interpretation in which the words are considered.
7. Interpretation refers to the understanding of words and the true sense of a legal text.
Whereas, Construction refers to the drawing of conclusions of the legal text that lie beyond
the direct expression of the legal texts or statutes.

b. Need for Interpretation

Interpretation of something means ascertaining the meaning or significance of that thing or

ascertaining an explanation of something that is not immediately obvious. Construction and
Interpretation of a statute is an age-old process and as old as language. Interpretation of statute is
the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute. When the language of
the statute is clear, there is no need for the rules of interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than
one meaning may be derived from the same word or sentence. It is therefore necessary to interpret
the statute to find out the real intention of the statute. Interpretation of statutes has been an essential
part of English law since Heydon's Case in 1854 andalthough it can seem complex, the main rules
used in interpretation are easy to learn. Elaborate rules of interpretation were evolved even at a
very early stage of Hindu civilization and culture.

The concept of interpretation of a Statute cannot be static one. Interpretation of statutes becomes
an ongoing exercise as newer facts and conditions continue to arise. We can say, interpretation of
Statutesis required for two basic reasons viz. to ascertain:

• Legislative Language - Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and hence
mayrequire interpretation; and

• Legislative Intent - The intention of legislature or Legislative intent assimilates two aspects:

i. the concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word means; and

ii. the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading through the statute.

Necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision is
ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different
meaning defeatingthe object of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, no need of
interpretation would arise.

B. RULES OF INTERPRETATION

A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. It is that which is prescribed or laid down as
a guide for conduct or action; a governing direction for a specific purpose; an authoritative
enactment; a regulation; a prescription; a precept; for example, the rules of various societies; the
rules governing a school; a rule of etiquette or propriety etc. It should be remembered that these
Rules are Rules of Practice and not Rules of Law. Without these rules, it would soon become
impossible to not only understand the law but even just to apply it, as new situations are always
coming to light which Parliament and the courts could not have foreseen when the law was
developed.

Now question is- Do judges really use the rules of statutory interpretation? If yes, which rule do
they use first? –

Judges rarely if ever, volunteer the information that they are now applying a certain rule of
interpretation. Often, judges look to see if there can be a literal meaning to the words used in the
disputed statutory provision.

However, there is no rule that states that they must use the literal rule first. No Legal Rules exist
which state which rule of Interpretation can be used and the rules of interpretation that have been
identified, are not themselves legal rules. There are certain general principles of interpretation
which have been applied by Courts from time to time. Over time, various methods of statutory
construction have fallen in and out of favour.
Some of the better-known rules of interpretation also referred to as the Primary Rules of
Interpretation are discussed hereunder-

a. Literal Rule-

In construing Statutes the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions Literally and grammatically
giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. This rule is also known as the Plain meaning
rule. The first and foremost step in the course of interpretation is to examine the language and the
literal meaning of the statute. The words in an enactment have their own natural effect and the
construction of an act depends on its wording. There should be no additions or substitution of
words in the construction of statutes and in its interpretation. The primary rule is to interpret words
as they are. It should be taken into note that the rule can be applied only when the meanings of the
words are clear i.e. words should be simple so that the language is plain and only one meaning can
be derived out of the statute.

In Municipal Board v State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand was
changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30 days of
receipt of order of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor vehicles
Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read as
“30 days from the knowledge of the order”. The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must
be made and hence rejected the application as invalid. Lord Atkinson stated, ‘In the construction
of statutes their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be
something in the context or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances
in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary
grammatical sense.’

Meaning-

To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include "definitions" sections within a statute, which
explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But some statutes omit a definitions
section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define a particular term. The plain meaning rule
attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by
the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself. According to Viscount Haldane,
L.C., if the language used has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless,
reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so. According to the plain meaning rule,
absent a contrary definition within the statute, words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal
meaning. If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator
may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says
instead of what the law means. “Some laws are meant for all citizens (e.g., criminal statutes) and
some are meant only for specialists (e.g., some sections of the tax code). A text that means one
thing in a legal context might mean something else if it were in a technical manual or a novel. So
the plain meaning of a legal text is something like the meaning that would be understood by
competent speakers of the natural language in which the text was written who are within the
intended readership of the text and who understand that the text is a legal text of a certain type.”
(Prof. Larry Solum's Legal Theory Lexicon). A literal construction would not be denied only
because the consequences to comply with the same may lead to a penalty. The courts should not
be over zealous in searching for ambiguities or obscurities in words which are plain. (Tata
Consultancy Services V. State of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 308)

Understanding the literal rule-

The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions –

i. Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in
the interpretation section.
ii. Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified
any other.
iii. Words will not be inserted by implication.
iv. Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.
v. It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context.

When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural ordinary and popular sense,
it is meant that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they
have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they
have been used in the Statute. In the statement of the rule, the epithets ‘natural, “ordinary”,
“literal”, “grammatical” and “popular” are employed almost interchangeably to convey the
same idea.

For determination of the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, the first question is what
is the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute but when
that natural or ordinary meaning indicates such result which cannot be opposed to have been
the intention of the legislature, then to look for other meaning of the word or phrase which may
then convey the true intention of the legislature.

In the case of ‘Suthendran V. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the question related to Section
14(1) of the Immigration Act, 1971, which provides that ‘a person who has a limited leave
under this Act to enter or remain in the United Kingdom may appeal to an adjudication against
any variation of the leave or against any refusal to vary it. The word ‘a person who has a limited
leave’ were construed as person should not be included “who has had” such limited leave and
 it was held that the section applied only to a person who at the time of lodging of his complaint
was lawfully in the United Kingdom, in whose case, leave had not expired at the time of
lodgment of an appeal.

Another important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that exact meaning is
preferred to loose meaning in an Act of Parliament. In the case of Pritipal Singh V. Union of
India (AIR 1982 SC 1413, P. 1419(1982)), it was held that there is a presumption that the words
are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.

b. Golden Rule of Interpretation-

The Golden rule, or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to depart
from a word's normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result. It is a compromise between the
plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the plain meaning rule, it gives the words
of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when this may lead to an irrational result that
is unlikely to be the legislature's intention, the judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of
homographs, where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred
meaning; if the word only has one meaning, but applying this would lead to a bad decision, the
judge can apply a completely different meaning. This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied
most frequently in a narrow sense where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words
themselves.

For example, imagine there may be a sign saying "Do not use lifts in case of fire." Under the literal
interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire.

However, this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is
obviously to prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby. The second
use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to principles of public
policy, even where words have only one meaning. Example: The facts of a case are; a son murdered
his mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to rule on who then inherited the
estate, the mother's family, or the son's descendants. There was never a question of the son profiting
from his crime, but as the outcome would have been binding on lower courts in the future, the
court found in favour of the mother's family.

c. The Mischief Rule-

The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the legislator's
intention. Originating from a 16th century case (Heydon’s case) in the United Kingdom, its main
aim is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in question has set out to remedy, and
what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. When the material words are capable of
bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule or construction of such words
“of all statutes in general be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law
is the rule of Heydon’s case. The rules laid down in this case are also known as Purposive
Construction or Mischief Rule.

The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to
discover Parliament's intention.

It essentially asks the question: By creating an Act of Parliament what was the "mischief" that the
previous law did not cover?

Heydon’s case This was set out in Heydon's Case [1584] 3 CO REP where it was stated that there
were four points to be taken into consideration when interpreting a statute:

1. What was the common law before the making of the act?

2. What was the "mischief and defect" for which the common law did not provide?

3. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth?

4. What is the true reason of the remedy?

The office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the
mischief, and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according
to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico. The application of this rule gives the
judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on
Parliament's intent. It can be argued that this undermines Parliament's supremacy and is
undemocratic as it takes law making decisions away from the legislature. Use of this Rule This
rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning rule, in
that it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when the statute was passed
to remedy a defect in the common law. Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary
sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding statutes. This
rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied.

In the case of Thomson vs. Lord Clan Morris, Lord Lindley M.R. stated that in interpreting any
statutory enactment regard must be had not only to the words used, but also to the history of the
Act and the reasons which lead to its being passed.
The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. V. State of Bihar, (AIR 1995 SC 661) applied the
mischief rule in construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. After referring to the state
of law prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that
was brought about in inter-state trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers
by the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus, Chief Justice
S.R. Das, stated “It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of
interstate trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any
provincial barrier that the constitution maker adopted Article 286 in the constitution”.

d. Doctrine of Harmonious Construction -

According to this rule, a statute should be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be
construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment
of the whole statute. Such an interpretation is beneficial in avoiding any inconsistency or
repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute.

The five main principles of this rule are:-

1) The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they must
construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them

2) The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another unless
the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their differences.

3) When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions, the

courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both the provisions as much as
possible.

4) Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless number
or dead is not harmonious construction.

5) To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it fruitless.

The rule of harmonious construction can also be used for resolving a conflict between a provision
in the Act and a rule made under various Acts.

In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, the Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious
construction in resolving a conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it
was held that the right of every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State providing for social
welfare and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all
classes and sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)].

e. What is noscitur a sociis?

Noscitur a sociis- is a Latin legal maxim that means it is known by its associates or it is known
from its companions. In the context of legal interpretation, this principle is used to determine the
meaning of a particular word or phrase in a statute or legal document based on the words or phrases
that surround it or are associated with it.

Here’s how it works:

● Contextual Interpretation: When multiple words or phrases are used together in a legal
provision and one of those words or phrases is ambiguous or unclear in its meaning,
noscitur a sociis suggests that the meaning of that word should be determined by looking
at the context provided by the other words or phrases in the same provision.
● Restriction or Clarification: The principle helps to clarify or restrict the meaning of the
ambiguous word by considering it in the context of the surrounding words. In other words,
the meaning of the unclear word is influenced or limited by the words it is associated with.
● Avoiding Ambiguity: The goal of applying noscitur a sociis is to avoid ambiguity in legal
texts by interpreting the words in a way that makes sense within the overall context of the
statute or document.

For example, if a legal provision refers to vehicles, including cars, trucks and other vehicles, and
the term other vehicles is ambiguous, noscitur a sociis would suggest that other vehicles should be
interpreted in the context of the specific examples given (cars and trucks) and should not include,
for instance, bicycles or boats.

f. What is Ejusdem generis?

Ejusdem generis is a Latin legal principle that means of the same kind or of the same nature. In
the context of legal interpretation, this principle is used to interpret ambiguous or general words
in a statute or contract based on the specific words or phrases that precede them.

Here’s how it works:

● General vs. Specific Words: When a provision or clause in a legal document includes a
list of specific words or phrases followed by a more general or ambiguous term, ejusdem
generis suggests that the general term should be interpreted to be of the same kind or nature
as the specific words listed.
● Restriction or Clarification: The principle helps to restrict or clarify the meaning of the
ambiguous term by considering it in the context of the specific examples provided. In
essence, the general term takes on the characteristics of the specific terms that precede it.
 ● Avoiding Overly Broad Interpretations: The purpose of applying ejusdem generis is to
prevent overly broad interpretations of the general term that could lead to unintended
consequences or loopholes in the legal text.

For example, if a contract clause states that employees are prohibited from bringing animals,
including dogs, cats and other animals into the workplace and the term other animals is ambiguous,
ejusdem generis would suggest that other animals should be interpreted to be of the same kind as
the specific animals mentioned (i.e., pets) and it would not include, for instance, farm animals or
exotic wildlife.

Differences between Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur a Sociis in statutory interpretation:-

Aspect Ejusdem Generis Noscitur a Sociis

Of the same kind or Of the same
Meaning It is known by its associates
nature

To understand the meaning of a word in

Purpose To interpret general terms in context
context

When specific terms precede a When words are susceptible to related

Application
general term meanings

Focus Narrowing the scope of general terms Contextual interpretation to avoid ambiguity

Specific vs. Deals with specific vs. general terms

Applies to any words with related meanings
General within lists
Nature of Addresses ambiguity within specific
Addresses broader ambiguity within context
Ambiguity vs. general terms
No vehicles, including cars, trucks The employee must attend meetings,
Example
and other vehicles conferences and other related events

g. Reddendo Singula Singulis-

Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin legal principle that means "referring each to each". It is a
principle of statutory interpretation, which states that when there is a list of multiple words or
phrases followed by a clause that applies to some but not all items in the list, the clause should
only apply to the items it logically refers to.
For example, consider this statement:
“Dogs, cats, parrots, and goldfish must be kept in cages, on leashes, or in aquariums.”
Here the phrases "on leashes" and "in aquariums" logically apply only to dogs/cats and goldfish
respectively. So reddendo singula singulis suggests that those phrases should only apply to the
animals they refer to, not to the entire list.
In legal interpretation, reddendo singula singulis aids in avoiding absurd or ambiguous meanings
when interpreting statutes, contracts, wills, and other documents. It narrows the scope of
applicability of a phrase to only the appropriate items in a list that it modifies.
For example, in the 1743 British case Stradling v Morgan, the court utilized the Reddendo Singula
Singulis doctrine to interpret a statute regarding fraudulent conveyances. By matching the
qualifying phrases with the appropriate referents, the court avoided an unreasonable construction.

h. Territorial Operation of the Act is within the Country/ Statutes are territorial in
operation.

The general principle regarding acts of parliament is that they are applicable within the territories
of the country in which they are enacted unless stated otherwise. Statutes passed by parliament are
binding within the boundaries of the country and do not have extra-territorial operation.
However, Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India provides that no act made by parliament shall
be deemed invalid on the ground of having extra-territorial operation. Courts are obligated to
enforce such legislation.
There is a presumption in statutory interpretation that an interpretation of a statute that restricts or
takes away the jurisdiction of the courts should not be given effect unless the words of the statute
clearly and explicitly provide for it.
Unless the legislature clearly and expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the courts or it can be inferred
by necessary implication, the courts should be presumed to have jurisdiction. Statutes should be
construed in a manner that avoids taking away the jurisdiction of superior courts or extending
jurisdiction through the right to appeal.
Statutes that confer jurisdiction on subordinate courts, tribunals or government agencies should be
strictly construed. Unless the construction of an act clearly indicates the intention of the legislature
to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, the jurisdiction of ordinary courts of judicature is not taken
away. When jurisdiction is conferred by a statute, it is implied that the act also grants the power to
perform all acts necessary for its execution.
In the case of Bhimsi v. Dundappa, the Supreme Court held that if a revenue court is granted
exclusive jurisdiction to try certain matters and the jurisdiction of the civil court is completely
excluded, then the civil court should transfer those matters to be tried and decide by the revenue
court alone.
i. Delegatus non potest delegare
According to this maxim, if a person or entity has been delegated a specific power or authority,
they cannot further delegate that power or authority to someone else unless expressly permitted to
do so.
The principle of delegatus non potest delegare is often applied in legal and administrative
contexts, particularly in relation to delegated legislation, contractual agreements, and agency
relationships. It serves as a safeguard to ensure accountability and prevent the excessive or
unauthorized sub-delegation of powers.

Under this principle, the original delegate is responsible for carrying out the delegated task or
exercising the delegated authority. They cannot transfer or delegate that responsibility to another
person or entity unless there is a clear provision or legal authority permitting such sub-delegation.
However, it’s important to note that the principle is not absolute and can vary depending on the
jurisdiction and the specific circumstances of the case. In some cases, statutes or agreements may
expressly allow for sub-delegation, while in others, sub-delegation may be implied or permitted
by custom or necessity.

j. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius-

The maxim ‘Expressio unios exclusio alterius’ means that “to express one is to exclude others;
therefore mention of one or more specific things may be taken to exclude others of the same
type.” It is not necessary to add other words to the list in order to make sense of the
provision. When something is mentioned expressly in a statute it leads to the presumption that the
things not mentioned are excluded.
The effect of this rule means that if a list of words is not followed by general words, the act only
applies to the words used in the list. This is an aid to construction of statutes. This will not be
strictly applied in the event that the act mentions that the words listed are illustrative by the use of
the word ‘includes’ for example, as this suggests that there may be other items which may apply.
That is the words such as Etc., Others, More are used. An act only applies to the items in a list of
words, if it is not followed by general words.
The literal meaning of this maxim was discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
GVK Industries Ltd. vs. ITO [2011] 332 ITR 130 (SC) which is as follows: the express mention of
one thing implies the exclusion of another This maxim indicates that when something is expressly
mentioned in a statute, it leads to the presumption that the things which are not specified in the
statute are excluded. Accordingly, this maxim is based on the rule: Express mention and implied
exclusion.

Generalia specialibus non derogant

Generalia specialibus non derogant is a Latin maxim. It is a maxim used for statutory
interpretation.

Generalia stands from general and Specialibus stands for special. Thus, when interpreted, it means
that general laws do not prevail over special laws or, the general does not detract from specifics.

Justice Griffith said in R v Greenwood, [1992] 7 O.R. (3d) 1, “The maxim generalia specialibus
non derogant means that, for the purposes of interpretation of two statutes in apparent conflict, the
provisions of a general statute must yield to those of a special one.”

When a law is questioned before the courts, the courts assume that the legislature enacted the law
(under discussion) keeping in mind the welfare of society at heart. Thus, repealing a law is not
favoured and is done only under exceptional circumstances. In case of conflict of interpretation of
statutes, this maxim is applied.

In the following case laws this maxim was applied:

In Azad Transport Co. v. State of Bihar (2016)- Tax is a specialized field. VAT is a special
provision and rules in CrPC are considered to be of a general nature. The government made law
with respect to a particular field thus, the specific law gains superiority over general laws.

In State of Gujarat v. Patel Ranjibhai, 1979 AIR 1098- Conflict arose with respect to section 33(6)
and section 35 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. It was decided that with respect to unregistered
dealers section 33(6) will prevail over section 35 as it was considered a special provision and dealt
with their interests in a better manner.

C. Classification of Statutes-
Classification of Statutes can be done based on their duration, nature of operation, purpose and
scope.

Classification of Statutes by Duration

Temporary Statute: A temporary statute is one that specifies a fixed period of operation and
validity within the statute itself. It remains in effect until the specified time elapses unless repealed
earlier. If the legislature wishes to extend its effect, a new enactment is required. For example, the
Finance Act is a temporary statute, requiring annual reauthorisation.
Permanent Statute: A permanent statute doesn’t have a predefined expiration date. However, this
doesn’t make the statute unchangeable. It can be amended or repealed by another act.

Classification of Statutes by Method

Mandatory, Imperative or Obligatory Statute: A mandatory statute compels the performance of

certain actions or dictates that specific things must be carried out in a particular manner or form.
Non-compliance typically leads to legal consequences.

Directory or Permissive Statute: A directory statute merely provides guidance or permission for
actions without compelling their performance. In some cases, statutes prescribe conditions or
forms that are considered essential for the regulated action and their omission can render the action
invalid. In other cases, these prescriptions are seen as non-binding and failure to follow them might
result in penalties if any are stipulated by the statute.

In the case of H.V. Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, it was determined that mandatory provisions must
be strictly adhered to, while substantial compliance with directory provisions is generally sufficient
to meet legal requirements.

Classification of Statues with Reference to Object-

Codifying Statute- A codifying statute is one that aims to comprehensively outline the entire body
of law on a specific subject. It seeks to provide a thorough and authoritative statement of the key
legal rules pertaining to that subject. This includes existing provisions from various statutes on the
subject and may also incorporate common law principles.

An example is the Bill of Exchange Act of 1882 in England, which codified laws regarding bills
of exchange, cheques and promissory notes. Similarly, the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 in India
is a codifying statute that addresses intestate succession among Hindus.

Consolidating Statute- A consolidating statute consolidates all statutory enactments related to a

particular subject into a single law, making it easier to access and understand. It brings together
existing statutory provisions on the subject, often with minor modifications.
For example, In India, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 is a consolidating statute
concerning criminal procedures. Such statutes not only compile earlier laws but also repeal the
earlier acts for the sake of clarity.

Declaratory Statute- A declaratory statute is one that clarifies and removes doubts or
misunderstandings about the meaning of terms or expressions within the common law or statutory
law. When courts have interpreted an expression differently from what the legislature intended, a
declaratory statute is passed to set the correct meaning of that expression. In India, the Income Tax
(Amendment) Act of 1985, which added explanation 2 to section 40 of the Income Tax Act of
1961 and the Finance Act of 1987, which amended the definition of “Owner of house property” in
section 27, are examples of declaratory acts.

It’s important to note that the mere use of the phrase “it is hereby declared” does not automatically
make a statute a declaratory statute. A declaratory statute typically contains a preamble and uses
terms like “declared” and “enacted” to signal its intent.

Remedial Statute- A remedial statute is a kind of law that offers new help or a new solution. Its
main purpose is to improve how rights are protected and address problems or errors in the old law.
Examples of remedial statutes include the Maternity Benefits Act of 1961 and the Workmen’s
Compensation Act of 1923. In these laws, you’ll often find the phrase “for remedy whereof” right
before the actual law.

Blackstone, a legal scholar, thought that remedial statutes could either expand or limit rights. They
could expand rights when they made the law more generous or they could limit rights when they
restricted existing legal rights. In a case called Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi v. Vishwanath,
the court decided that all laws in a welfare state aim to promote general well-being. Some laws are
more responsive to urgent social needs and have a more direct and noticeable impact on fixing
social problems.

Enabling Statute- An enabling statute is a law that allows something that was previously
forbidden, with or without specific rules on how to do it. It widens the scope of what’s allowed
under common law. An enabling statute makes an action lawful, even if it wouldn’t be otherwise.

In a case called Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants Association v. State of Bombay, the
court explained that an enabling act not only permits something to happen but also gives the
necessary authority to do what’s needed to achieve the law’s goal. Any conditions set by an
enabling statute for the public good must be followed because they are essential. An example is
Section 49-A(1) and 49-A(2) of the Advocates Act of 1961, as amended by Act 21 of 1964.
Disabling Statute- A disabling statute is one that limits or reduces a right granted by common
law. It’s a law that restricts a common law right.

Penal Statute- A penal statute is a law that punishes certain actions or wrongdoings. This type of
law can be in the form of a detailed criminal code with many sections that define punishments for
different wrongs. For example, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Indian Penal Code, the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954 and the Arms Act of 1959 are all examples of penal
statutes.

Penalties for breaking these laws can include fines, the loss of property, imprisonment or even the
death penalty. When the law enforces obedience not through individual lawsuits but by imposing
punishments as commanded by the law, it’s considered a penal statute. Penalties can only be
imposed when the law explicitly states so and any doubts should benefit the accused.

Taxing Statute- A taxing statute is a law that imposes taxes on income or certain types of
transactions. Examples include income tax, wealth tax, sales tax and gift tax. These taxes help the
government collect money to support public welfare. However, it’s essential that a statute clearly
states that taxes must be paid and any doubts about this should benefit the person being taxed.

Explanatory Statute- An explanatory statute is a law that explains another law. It’s created to fill
in gaps or clarify confusing parts of a previous law. An explanatory statute aims to make the
meaning of an expression used in an earlier law clearer. For instance, in Britain, the Royal Mines
Act of 1688 was passed to encourage the mining of certain base metals. The Royal Mines Act of
1963 was enacted to provide a better explanation of the earlier law.

Amending Statute- An amending statute is a law that adds to or changes the original law to
improve it or better achieve its original purpose. It doesn’t cancel out the old law; it becomes part
of it. Examples include the Direct Taxes Amendments Act of 1974 and the Land Acquisition
(Amendments) Act of 1984.

Repealing Statute- A repealing statute is a law that cancels out an earlier law. It can do this
explicitly by saying so in the statute or implicitly through its language. For example, the Hyderabad
District Municipalities Act of 1956 repealed the Hyderabad Municipal and Town Committees Act
of 1951.

Types of Operation of Statutes (and its interpretation)

The operation statutes are of two types, i.e.

i. Prospective Operation

It seeks to lead current and future activities, events which are deemed to organize the regulatory
system intact. Prospective with reference to statutes shows that it is concerned with or applying
the laws in future or at least from the date of commencement of the statute

The future activities and events of the law are been decided to analyze and articulate the all the
amendments made with respect to the fundamental rights till the day of the decision in the case
would continue to remain valid and effective. All the provisions made in the purview of the future
are meant to be prospective statutes.

Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR. 1965 SC 845-In the case the 17th Amendment, which
added several legislations to the 9th Schedule making to the 9th Schedule making them immune
from attack on the ground of violation of fundamental rights, was challenged. Though this case
reiterated the opinion of Shankari Prasad's case, Justice Hidayathullah and Mudholkar J. expressed
doubts whether fundamental rights created no limitation on the power of amendment.

ii. Retrospective Operation:

It seeks to govern past acts, events as to impair an existing right or obligation. A retrospective
statute contemplates the past and gives to a previous transaction some different legal effect from
that which it had under the law when it occurred or transpired.

Retrospective generally means to take a look back at events that already have taken place. The
term is used in situations where the law (statutory, civil, or regulatory) is changed, altered or
reinterpreted, affecting acts committed before the alteration.

It is a cardinal principle construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is
expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. But the rule in general
is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or
to impair Existing obligations.
In contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely matters of
procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible.

Voffice Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.- It was observed
that the question of fairness will have to be answered in respect of a particular statute by taking
into account various factors, viz., value of the rights which the statute affects; extent to which that
value is diminished or extinguished by the suggested retrospective effect of the statute; unfairness
of adversely affecting the rights; clarity of the language used by Parliament and the circumstances
in which the legislation was created.

D. DIFFERENT PARTS OF A STATUTE (ARE ALSO KNOWN AS INTERNAL AID OF

INTERPRETATION)

Parts of Statutes also works as or called as internal aid of a statutes.

1) Short title-The short title of the Act is only its name and is given solely for the purpose of
facility of reference.

It is merely a name given for identification of the Act and not for description and generally ends
with the year of passing of the Act, such as the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Indian Penal Code,
1860, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Even though it is a part of the statute, it has no role to play while interpreting a provision of the
Act. Neither can it extend nor can it delimit the clear meaning of a particular provision.

2) Long little-A statute is headed by a long title whose purpose is to give a general description
about the object of the act. Normally, it begins with the words An Act to…

For instance, the long title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says: An Act to consolidate
and amend the law relating to criminal procedure, and that of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 says: ‘An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and
matters connected therewith’.

In the olden days the long title was not considered a part of the statute and was, therefore, not
considered an aid while interpreting it.

3) Preamble-The Preamble to the Act contains the aims and objectives sought to be achieved, and
is therefore, part of the Act. It is a key to unlock the mind of the law makers.
Therefore, in case of any ambiguity or uncertainty, the preamble can be used by the courts to
interpret any provision of that statute. But there is a caution here. The apex court has held
in Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya v. State of M.P. AIR (2013) 15 SCC 677– the
court cannot have resort to preamble when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.

Similarly it has been held that help from preamble could not be taken to distort clear intention of
the legislature– Burrakar Coal Company v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 954.

In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, it was observed that the policy and purpose of the Act can be
legitimately derived from its preamble.

Another important example is found in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC
1461– wherein the apex court strongly relied on the Preamble to the Constitution of India in
reaching a conclusion that the power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under Article 368
was not unlimited and did not enable the Parliament to alter the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

4) Headings and Title of a Chapter-

Headings are of two kinds – one prefixed to a section and other prefixed to a group or set of
sections. Heading is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation and the heading may be
treated as preambles to the provisions following them.

In Krishnaih V. State of A.P. AIR 2005 AP 10, it was held that headings prefixed to sections cannot
control the plain words of the provisions. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt, heading or
subheading may be referred to as an aid in construing provision.

In Durga Thathera v Narain Thathera, the court held that the headings are like a preamble which
helps as a key to the mind of the legislature but do not control the substantive section of the
enactment.

5) Marginal Notes-

Marginal notes are the notes which are inserted at the side of the sections in an Act and express
the effect of the sections stated. Marginal notes appended to the Articles of the Constitution have
been held to constitute part of the constitution as passed by the constituent assembly and therefore
they have been made use of in construing the articles.

6) Definitional Sections/ Interpretation Clauses-

The object of a definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing the subject
matter to which the word or expression defined is intended to apply. A definition contained in the
definition clause of a particular statute should be used for the purpose of that Act. Definition from
any other statute cannot be borrowed and used ignoring the definition contained in the statute itself.

7) Illustrations-

Illustrations in enactment provided by the legislature are valuable aids in the understanding the
real scope. In Mahesh Chandra Sharma V.Raj Kumari Sharma, (AIR 1996 27 SC 869), it was held
that illustrations are parts of the Section and help to elucidate the principles of the section.

8) Proviso-

The normal function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall
within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. There
may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a proviso may be construed
as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso is construed as restricting the main provision or as
a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it stands as a proviso. It
must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.” [CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. (1964) 55
ITR 741 (SC)]

9) Explanations

An Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the words
appearing in the section. An Explanation to a statutory provision has to be read with the main
provision to which it is added as an Explanation. An Explanation appended to a section or a
subsection becomes an integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it.

The purpose of an Explanation is not to limit the scope of the main section. An Explanation is
quite different in nature from a proviso; the latter excludes, excepts and restricts while the former
explains, clarifies or subtracts or includes something by introducing a legal fiction.

10) Schedules

Schedules form part of a statute. They are at the end and contain minute details for working out
the provisions of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule cannot override the
provisions of the express enactment.

11) Punctuation
Punctuation is a minor element in the construction of a statute. Only when a statute is carefully
punctuated and there is no doubt about its meaning can weight be given to punctuation. It cannot,
however, be regarded as a controlling element for determining the meaning of a statute.

E. EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to external aids. The external aids
are very useful tools for the interpretation or construction of statutory provisions. As opposed to
internal aids to construction there are certain aids which are external to the statute. Such aids will
include parliamentary history of the legislation, historical facts and surrounding circumstances in
which the statute came to be enacted, reference to other statutes, use of dictionaries, use of foreign
decisions, etc.

Some of the external aids used in the interpretation of statutes are as follows:

a. Parliamentary History, Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances Historical setting

cannot be used as an aid if the words are plain and clear.

If the wordings are ambiguous, the historical setting may be considered in order to arrive at the
proper construction. Historical setting covers parliamentary history, historical facts, statement of
objects and reasons, report of expert committees. Parliamentary history means the process by
which an act is enacted. This includes conception of an idea, drafting of the bill, the debates made,
the amendments proposed etc.

b. Social, Political and Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions.

A Statute must be interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were unknown or did
not exist at the time of enactment of the statute. Any relevant changes in the social conditions and
technology should be given due weightage. Courts should take into account all these developments
while construing statutory provisions. In S.P. Gupta v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, it was
stated - “The interpretation of every statutory provision must keep pace with changing concepts
and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit,
suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation so as to accord with the requirement of the fast
changing society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation …

c. Reference to Other Statutes

In case where two Acts have to be read together, then each part of every act has to be construed
as if contained in one composite Act. However, if there is some clear discrepancy then the latter
Act would modify the earlier. Where a single provision of one Act has to be read or added in
another, then it has to be read in the sense in which it was originally construed in the first Act. In
this way the whole of the first Act can be mentioned or referred in the second Act even though
only a provision of the first one was adopted. In case where an old Act has been repealed, it loses
its operative force.

d. Dictionaries:

When a word is not defined in the statute itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out
the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. However, in the selection
of one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the scheme, context
and legislative history.

e. Judicial Decisions:

When judicial pronouncements are been taken as reference it should be taken into note that the
decisions referred are Indian, if they are foreign it should be ensured that such a foreign country
follows the same system of jurisprudence as ours and that these decisions have been taken in the
ground of the same law as ours. These foreign decisions have persuasive value only and are not
binding on Indian courts and where guidance is available from binding Indian decisions; reference
to foreign decisions is of no use.

f. Other materials

Similarly, Supreme Court used information available on internet for the purpose of interpretation
of statutory provision in Ramlal v State of Rajasthan, (2001) 1 SCC 175. Courts also refer passages
and materials from text books and articles and papers published in the journals. These external
aids are very useful tools not only for the proper and correct interpretation or construction of
statutory provision, but also for understanding the object of the statute, the mischief sought to be
remedied by it, circumstances in which it was enacted and many other relevant matters.