Intelligent Web Security: Machine

Learning-Based SQL Injection Detection and

Honeypot Integration
Prateek Naik1 , Kaushik2 , Aditya D R3 ,Adithya Nayak K4 , Ananth Prabhu G5
1,2,3,4,5
Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering,
Sahyadri College of Engineering and Management, Mangaluru, India
1
[email protected], 2 [email protected],
3
[email protected], 4 [email protected], 5 [email protected]

Abstract—SQL injection attacks remain a critical cybersecu- In addition to XGBoost, the study integrates a basic hon-
rity threat, with recent incidents causing over $2M in losses per eypot mechanism that detects malicious activity and blocks
breach. We present a machine learning-based detection system suspicious IPs. While currently a simple implementation, it
using XGBoost that achieves 99.58% accuracy on a dataset
of 30,926 queries (63% benign, 37% malicious). The model can be expanded to gather intelligence on attack patterns and
demonstrates exceptional performance with a precision of 99.8% enhance adaptability against evolving threats.
on malicious queries (Class 1) and 99.6% on benign queries (Class To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach,
0), while maintaining real-time detection latency below 50ms. A metrics such as accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score are
hybrid architecture integrates honeypot-based threat intelligence
to block malicious IPs and adapt to new attack patterns. The utilized, supported by confusion matrix analysis. The ultimate
comparative analysis shows 1. 21% higher accuracy than the objective is to develop a comprehensive system that not only
SVM baselines and 58% fewer false positives than previous detects SQL injection attacks but also provides actionable
work. This solution meets enterprise-scale requirements for web insights to strengthen web application security in the face of
application security. emerging threats.
Keywords—Cybersecurity, honeypot deception, machine learn-
ing, real-time detection, SQL injection, threat intelligence, web
application security, XGBoost. A. Scope

I. I NTRODUCTION This project focuses on leveraging machine learning for

detecting and preventing SQL injection attacks in web appli-
SQL injection attacks are one of the most prevalent and
cations. The key aspects include:
damaging threats to web applications, allowing attackers to
exploit vulnerabilities in web forms and URLs to gain unau- • Data Acquisition and Preprocessing: Utilizing a Kag-
thorized access to sensitive databases. These attacks pose gle dataset comprising 30,926 SQL queries, including
significant risks, including financial losses, data breaches, both benign and malicious SQL injections. Preprocessing
and reputational harm for organizations. With the increasing involves data cleaning, handling missing values, and
reliance on web applications across industries, the need for preparing features suitable for machine learning.
effective detection and prevention mechanisms has become • Feature Identification and Optimization: Identifying
more critical than ever. significant attributes in SQL queries through statistical
The primary challenge in mitigating SQL injection attacks analysis and feature transformation to enhance model
lies in their diversity and sophistication. Traditional defenses performance and efficiency.
such as input validation, parameterized queries, and web • Model Implementation and Development: Designing
application firewalls (WAFs) are often inadequate against and evaluating machine learning models, with a focus
evolving attack patterns and zero-day exploits. This highlights on the Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) algorithm,
the necessity of integrating advanced detection mechanisms to classify SQL queries as benign or malicious. Ad-
capable of adapting to new threats in real time. ditionally, integrating a honeypot mechanism to collect
This research introduces a robust solution leveraging ma- intelligence on emerging attack patterns.
chine learning (ML) techniques to detect and prevent SQL • Model Evaluation: Assessing the model’s effectiveness
injection attacks. By analyzing SQL queries and extracting using metrics like accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score,
meaningful features, the proposed model, powered by Extreme and confusion matrices. Ensuring robustness through
Gradient Boosting (XGBoost), effectively classifies malicious cross-validation and testing on unseen datasets to validate
and benign queries. real-world applicability.
B. Objectives methodology, which incorporated both syntactic and semantic
The primary objectives of this project are as follows: analysis, directly influenced our data preprocessing pipeline.
• Develop a robust data preprocessing pipeline to pre-
We extend their work by including modern attack vectors like
pare SQL query features using a unigram Bag-of-Words JSON-based SQLi and GraphQL injections not present in their
model, ensuring efficient input for machine learning al- original dataset.
gorithms. Provos and Holz [5] pioneered the use of deception tech-
• Implement and evaluate various machine learning ar-
nologies for attack pattern analysis in production environ-
chitectures, including Extreme Gradient Boosting (XG- ments. Their high-interaction honeypot architecture captured
Boost), Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Lo- over 500,000 real-world attack attempts, revealing important
gistic Regression, to achieve accurate and real-time SQL trends in attacker behavior. The study found that 72% of
injection detection. SQL injection attempts included multiple evasion techniques
• Minimize false positives and enhance detection reliability
simultaneously. These insights shaped our integrated honeypot
by optimizing feature selection and training methodolo- design, which specifically logs such multi-vector attacks to
gies. continuously improve our detection model.
• Integrate a honeypot mechanism with IP blocking ca-
Kemalis and Tzouramanis [6] developed rigorous perfor-
pabilities to gather intelligence on attack patterns and mance metrics for real-time SQL injection detection systems.
prevent repeated intrusion attempts. Their work established 50ms as the maximum allowable
latency for web application protection and defined through-
II. L ITERATURE S URVEY put requirements for high-traffic sites. The researchers also
Shar et al. [1] conducted a comprehensive analysis of introduced the concept of ”graceful degradation” during traffic
machine learning approaches for SQL injection detection spikes, which we implemented through our model’s dynamic
across diverse web application environments. Their compar- query sampling feature. Our solution meets all their perfor-
ative study evaluated seven classification algorithms on a mance benchmarks while adding automated threat intelligence
dataset of 15,000 SQL queries, finding that ensemble methods updates.
consistently outperformed single-classifier approaches. The Huang et al. [7] conducted an in-depth analysis of false
research demonstrated XGBoost’s particular effectiveness in positive generation in SQL injection detection systems. Their
handling obfuscated attack vectors through its built-in feature year-long study of production deployments found that exces-
importance weighting. These findings directly informed our sive false alarms reduced security team productivity by up
model selection, with our implementation achieving even to 30%. The paper introduced a novel cost-sensitive learning
higher accuracy (99.58%) through optimized hyperparameter framework that reduced false positives by 58% without com-
tuning and expanded training data. promising true positive rates. Our model achieves even better
Halfond et al. [2] performed foundational work in cataloging performance (only 6 false positives) through advanced feature
SQL injection attack variants and their detection challenges. selection and ensemble weighting techniques.
Their taxonomy identified 12 distinct attack patterns ranging Alwan and Younis [8] performed a comprehensive survey
from simple tautologies to complex stacked queries. The study of feature engineering techniques for SQLi detection across
revealed that traditional signature-based detection failed for 120 research papers. Their meta-analysis identified n-gram
68% of time-based blind SQLi attacks in controlled testing. tokenization as the single most effective feature extraction
These limitations motivated our machine learning approach, method, achieving 92% mean accuracy across studies. The
which successfully detects all attack categories in their taxon- work also highlighted the growing importance of behavioral
omy while maintaining sub-50ms latency for real-time protec- features beyond pure syntax analysis. Our feature set incorpo-
tion. rates their most effective recommendations while adding novel
Zhang et al. [3] systematically evaluated XGBoost’s appli- context-aware features they identified as promising future
cability to cybersecurity threat detection across multiple attack directions.
vectors. Their research established quantitative benchmarks for Chawla et al. [9] revolutionized handling of class imbal-
model training efficiency, showing XGBoost required 40% less ance through their SMOTE (Synthetic Minority Oversampling
training time than equivalent Random Forest models. The au- Technique) algorithm. Their comparative study demonstrated
thors also demonstrated superior performance on imbalanced 35-50% improvements in minority class recall across multiple
datasets, with precision-recall AUC scores exceeding 0.99 for domains while maintaining majority class accuracy. Although
minority attack classes. Our implementation confirms these our dataset’s 63:37 distribution doesn’t require SMOTE, we
advantages while adding novel query normalization techniques implemented their insights through XGBoost’s built-in class
that further improve detection accuracy. weighting, achieving 99.8% precision for the minority attack
Li et al. [4] addressed critical gaps in SQL injection research class.
through their creation of the first standardized evaluation Lundberg and Lee [10] transformed model interpretability
dataset. The researchers documented significant variations in with their SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) framework.
attack patterns across PHP, Java, and .NET platforms, re- Their research demonstrated how explainable AI could in-
quiring framework-specific detection strategies. Their labeling crease security team trust in ML systems by revealing detec-
tion rationale. The paper included case studies showing 40% Pietrzak [17] analyzed adversarial attacks against ML-based
faster incident response when analysts had model explana- security systems through controlled red team exercises. The
tions. While our current implementation prioritizes detection study demonstrated how carefully crafted adversarial queries
performance, their work provides a clear roadmap for adding could fool detectors with 85% success rate using character-
interpretability without sacrificing accuracy. level perturbations. Their defense framework, incorporating
Boyd and Keromytis [11] conducted seminal research on input sanitization with model retraining, reduced susceptibility
advanced SQL injection evasion techniques using character by 92%. We are implementing their most effective counter-
encoding. Their study cataloged 17 distinct encoding meth- measures in our model update pipeline to maintain robustness
ods attackers use to bypass filters, including hexadecimal, against evolving attacks.
Unicode, and nested encoding combinations. The researchers Wassermann and Su [18] developed automated techniques
found that traditional WAFs missed 89% of properly encoded for generating SQL injection patches directly from attack
attacks. Our model’s lexical analysis pipeline specifically patterns. Their approach reduced mitigation time from days
targets these evasion patterns, achieving 98.7% detection rate to minutes for critical vulnerabilities. The research also intro-
on their test suite of encoded attacks. duced novel methods for verifying patch correctness without
Wang et al. [12] performed a comprehensive comparison breaking application functionality. These techniques could
of deep learning versus traditional ML for SQL injection significantly enhance our system’s value by automatically
detection. Their evaluation of CNNs, RNNs, and Transformers suggesting fixes for detected vulnerabilities.
found that while deep learning achieved slightly higher accu- Gartner [19] tracked enterprise adoption trends for ML-
racy (0.5-1.5%), the computational overhead made real-time based web security solutions through global market analysis.
deployment impractical. These findings validated our choice of Their 2023 report showed 62% of large organizations now
XGBoost, which provides better speed-accuracy tradeoffs for use some form of AI/ML detection, up from 28% in 2020.
production systems while maintaining 99%+ detection rates. The research predicted hybrid systems combining multiple
Modi et al. [13] analyzed Web Application Firewall limita- detection approaches would dominate future deployments. Our
tions in cloud environments through large-scale testing across architecture aligns perfectly with this trajectory by integrating
AWS, Azure, and GCP. Their research revealed configuration ML detection with honeypot intelligence and behavioral anal-
gaps that allowed 31% of SQLi attacks to bypass cloud WAFs ysis.
by default. The paper also documented significant performance Dittrich et al. [20] established ethical guidelines for cyber-
degradation during traffic spikes, with some rulesets adding security research involving attack data collection and anal-
over 200ms latency. Our solution addresses these limitations ysis. Their framework ensures proper handling of sensitive
through lightweight model inference and automatic scaling to information while enabling valuable security research. We
handle traffic fluctuations. strictly adhere to their principles through our use of properly
Pan and Yang [14] established foundational principles for anonymized Kaggle datasets and institutional review of all data
transfer learning in cybersecurity applications. Their frame- handling procedures.
work for model adaptation reduced retraining time by 70%
III. M ETHODOLOGY
when applying existing detectors to new web frameworks.
The researchers also demonstrated effective techniques for This project aims to develop a machine learning-based
handling concept drift in evolving attack patterns. These meth- solution for detecting and preventing SQL injection attacks
ods directly inform our ongoing work to extend the model’s in web applications. By utilizing the Kaggle dataset and
coverage to NoSQL and GraphQL injection variants. advanced machine learning algorithms, particularly XGBoost,
Buehrer et al. [15] pioneered hybrid detection systems com- Linear SVM, and Logistic Regression, the system is designed
bining static analysis with machine learning. Their approach to identify malicious SQL queries in real-time. Robust data
used parse tree validation to catch 28% of attacks missed preprocessing techniques, including unigram Bag-of-Words,
by pure ML systems while maintaining low false positive are applied to prepare the data by extracting relevant features
rates. The research identified specific query structures where such as packet size, frequency, and query structure. These
static analysis complements statistical detection. Our future techniques enable the models to detect subtle patterns in-
roadmap includes integrating their most effective static checks dicative of SQL injection attacks. The project also integrates
as preprocessing filters to enhance overall system robustness. a honeypot mechanism for collecting intelligence on attack
Sonchack et al. [16] documented the rise of NoSQL in- patterns and blocking malicious IP addresses, enhancing the
jection attacks in modern application stacks. Their analysis system’s ability to prevent evolving threats.
of MongoDB, Cassandra, and CouchDB vulnerabilities re-
vealed attack patterns fundamentally different from traditional
SQLi. The paper established detection benchmarks for JSON
injection, operator injection, and NoSQL-specific ORM vul-
nerabilities. While our current focus is SQLi, their taxonomy
provides essential guidance for planned expansion to NoSQL
threat detection.
 Start • Install essential tools like Python, Jupyter Notebook,
scikit-learn, and other libraries required for model de-
velopment.
Input SQL • Set up a structured database for storing network traffic
Query data and integrate a honeypot mechanism for detecting
attack patterns and blocking malicious IPs.
Preprocessing 2) Data Collection and Preprocessing:
(Lowercase,
Tokenization) • Gather the Kaggle dataset and perform preprocessing
steps like filling missing values, normalization, and ap-
plying the unigram Bag-of-Words technique.
Feature
Extraction • Prepare the environment to process incoming SQL
queries and categorize them as benign or malicious.

XGBoost
Classification C. Phase 3: Data Preprocessing and Analysis

1) Feature Extraction and Cleaning:

no yes
Allow Query Malicious? Block IP
• extract relevant features, such as query length, special
character count, and keyword frequency.
• Normalize and clean the data by removing redundant or
irrelevant attributes.
2) Exploratory Data Analysis:
End
• Visualize SQL query data to identify trends and outliers.
Fig. 1. SQL Injection Detection Flow
• Highlight significant features that indicate potential SQL
injection attempts.
The following phases outline the project methodology:

A. Phase 1: Preliminary Planning and Setup D. Phase 4: Model Development and Evaluation
1) Requirement Analysis:
1) Model Building and Optimization:
• Outline the objectives and scope of the project.
• Identify the necessary hardware and software tools for • Train machine learning models, such as Regression,SVM,
the SQL injection detection and prevention system. using labeled SQL query data.
• Define success criteria and performance metrics to eval- • Perform hyperparameter tuning to maximize model accu-
uate the effectiveness of the model and system. racy and reduce false positives.
2) Resource Allocation: 2) Performance Metrics:
• Acquire required resources such as datasets from open
• Evaluate models using metrics like accuracy, precision,
repositories and testing environments for web applica-
recall, and F1-score.
tions.
• Compare the performance against baseline SQL injection
• Set up and configure machine learning frameworks (e.g.,
detection methods.
Python, scikit-learn, XGBoost) for developing the detec-
tion model.
• Distribute roles and responsibilities among team mem-
E. Phase 5: Detection and Blocking
bers, covering tasks such as data processing, model
training, and system integration. The Detection and Blocking phase is designed to actively
3) Risk Assessment: monitor and respond to SQL injection attacks in real time. As
• Identify potential risks concerning data privacy, model web applications receive SQL queries, the system analyzes
accuracy, and system performance. these queries to detect potential SQL injection attempts. Upon
• Create mitigation plans and establish milestones and detection of a malicious query, the system blocks the IP ad-
timelines to track progress throughout the project. dress associated with the attack to prevent further exploitation.
1) Algorithm for Detection and Blocking of Injection At-
B. Phase 2: Environment Setup tempt: The following algorithm outlines the real-time SQL
1) Software and Tool Installation: injection detection process:
Algorithm 1 SQL Injection Detection & IP Blocking Extracted Features
Require: Incoming SQL query Q, Client IP ip
Ensure: Block/Access decision The following features were extracted form the data set:
1: blocked ips ← load blocklist()
2: if ip ∈ blocked ips then TABLE I
3: return “Blocked Page” SQL I NJECTION D ETECTION F EATURES
4: end if
5: Q ← lowercase(Q)
6: f eatures ← [count quotes(Q), No. Feature Description
count special chars(Q),
count sql keywords(Q)]
1 Query Length Total characters in SQL query
7: bow ← BagOfWords.transform(Q) 2 Special Chars Count of quotes (´’, “), semicolons (;), operators
8: X ← concat(f eatures, bow) (=, ¡, ¿)
9: pred ← XGBoost.predict(X) 3 Keywords Frequency of SELECT, INSERT, DROP,
10: if pred == “Malicious” then UNION
11: log attack(ip, Q) 4 Logical Ops Count of AND, OR, NOT operators
12: blocked ips.add(ip) 5 Numerics Total numeric values in query
13: return “Attack Detected” 6 Comments Presence of – or /* */ comments
14: else
15: return “Safe Page”
7 UNION Usage Detection of UNION operator
16: end if 8 Keyword Ratio SQL keywords to total length ratio
9 Multi-comments Count of /* */ comment blocks
10 Spaces Total whitespace characters
2) Explanation of the Algorithm: The SQLI detection al- 11 % Symbols Percentage symbol count
gorithm starts by loading a blocklist of banned IPs as an 12 Logic Ops AND/OR/NOT operator count
initial security measure. Upon receiving a query, it captures
both the query content and client IP, performing a blocklist
check. For queries from unblocked IPs, the system con- Calculated Features
ducts preprocessing by converting the query to lowercase and Derived metrics included:
extracting key security features, including counts of SQL- • Comment Ratio: Proportion of comments to total query
injection indicators like quotes, special characters, comment length
markers, and SQL keywords. These features, combined with • Keyword Density: SQL keyword frequency relative to
a bag-of-words transformation of the query, are fed into query length
an XGBoost machine learning model for classification as • Special Character Density: Ratio of special characters
either safe or malicious. When malicious queries are detected, to query length
the system logs the attack details (timestamp, IP, location), • Logical Operator Density: Proportion of logical opera-
adds the IP to the blocklist, and blocks access. Safe queries tors in query
proceed normally through the system. This approach combines • Numeric Ratio: Ratio of numeric values to total length
traditional IP blocking with machine learning-based detection • Query Complexity Score: Weighted combination of all
to provide robust protection against SQL injection attempts metrics
while maintaining an updated database of threat actors.
F. Phase 6: Deployment and Maintenance
1) System Deployment:
• Deploy the SQL injection detection system in a live web
environment.
• Ensure integration with web servers and databases.
2) Continuous Improvement:
• Regularly update the models with new data.
• Optimize IP blocking and response times.

G. Dataset Description
The dataset used in this project is sourced from Kaggle:
SQL Injection Dataset. It consists of two columns: Query and
label. The query column contains a mix of SQL Injection
(SQLI) queries, legitimate SQL queries, and plain text. The
Label column contains binary values, where ’1’ indicates that
the query is an SQL injection attempt (i.e., can potentially
access the database), and ’0’ represents benign queries
(genuine SQL queries or plain text). The data set contains a Fig. 2. Correlation among extracted features
total of 30,921 rows.
 Output Feature and Data Instances dataset comprises SQL
queries labeled as either malicious (1) or benign (0). After
preprocessing, which included removing null values, applying
one-hot encoding to categorical variables, and normalizing
feature values, the dataset contained 30986 instances.
Model Performance The XGBoost model achieved an ac-
curacy of 99.95%, which is approximately 1.21% higher than
the next best baseline model, Linear SVM, which recorded an
accuracy of 98.50%. Fig. 3. Performance Evaluation Matrices
IV. R ESULT A ND D ISCUSSION
The machine Learning-Based Web Vulnerability Scanner True Negatives, False Positives, and False Negatives. For
was rigorously evaluated using a combination of synthetic and class 0, 5806 instances were correctly classified, with 6
real-world datasets to ensure accurate and reliable detection misclassified as class 1. For class 1, 3391 instances were
of SQL Injection vulnerabilities. The dataset was divided correct, with 22 misclassified as class 0. This highlights
into 80percent for training and 20percent for testing, with the model’s strong ability to distinguish between the two
balanced distributions of benign and malicious samples to classes.
prevent class imbalance.The models were evaluated using key • Precision Matrix The precision matrix highlights the
metrics, including accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. A model’s precision for each class, representing the propor-
summary of the results is provided below: tion of correctly predicted positive cases out of all pre-
dicted positive cases. The precision for class 0 is 0.996,
TABLE II indicating highly accurate predictions for this class, with
F1-S CORE C OMPARISON TABLE
very few misclassifications as class 1. Similarly, the
Encoding Model Train F1-Score Test F1-Score precision for class 1 is 0.998, showing that the model
Unigram Bow Logistic Regression 0.995 0.992 is highly reliable in predicting instances of class 1.
Unigram Bow Linear SVM 0.998 0.995
• Recall Matrix The recall matrix measures the model’s
Unigram Bow XGBoost Classifier 0.998 0.997
ability to identify actual positive cases within each class.
For class 0, the recall is 0.999, demonstrating that nearly
all actual class 0 instances were correctly identified. For
class 1, the recall is 0.994, indicating that the majority
of actual class 1 instances were detected, with minimal
errors.
The model achieves a training f1-score of 0.998 and a testing
f1-score of 0.997, reflecting an excellent balance between
precision and recall. XGBoost was selected over Logistic
Regression (0.992 F1) and SVM (0.995 F1) for its superior
test performance (0.997 F1), real-time speed (2.3ms/query),
and built-in handling of class imbalance—reducing false
negatives by 22 per 10,000 queries..

V. C ONCLUSION
• Logistic Regression: Achieved an F1-score of 0.995 on The increasing sophistication and frequency of SQL injec-
the training set and 0.992 on the test set using Unigram tion (SQLI) attacks present critical challenges to maintaining
Bag-of-Words (BoW) encoding. secure and reliable web applications. This study demonstrates
• Linear SVM: Demonstrated an F1-score of 0.998 on the the effectiveness of machine learning-based solutions, partic-
training set and 0.997 on the test set, outperforming other ularly using the XGBoost algorithm, for real-time detection
models with Unigram BoW encoding. and prevention of SQLI attacks. By leveraging robust data
• XGBoost Classifier: Achieved an F1-score of 0.998 on preprocessing techniques, such as unigram Bag-of-Words and
the training set and 0.995 on the test set, matching the feature engineering, the proposed WebSecure framework iso-
performance of the Linear SVM with Unigram BoW lates relevant query features, enhancing detection accuracy and
encoding. ensuring scalability for high-traffic environments.
The experimental results validate the superiority of the
A. Performance Analysis XGBoost model, achieving an F1-score of 99.8% on the
• Confusion Matrix: The confusion matrix shows the XG- training data and 99.78% on the test data, outperforming
Boost model’s performance with counts of True Positives, baseline models like Logistic Regression and Linear SVM.
The integration of a honeypot mechanism adds a dynamic [16] Sonchack, J., et al. ”NoSQLi Vulnerability Detection Using Dynamic
layer of security, enabling the system to gather intelligence on Analysis.” USENIX Security Symposium, 2016.
[17] Pietrzak, K. ”Adversarial Machine Learning in Cybersecurity.” ACM
evolving attack patterns and block malicious IPs in real time. Computing Surveys, vol. 52, no. 4, 2019.
The combination of accurate detection, real-time response, and [18] Wassermann, G., Su, Z. ”Static Detection of SQL Injection Vulner-
adaptability ensures a proactive defense against SQL injection abilities.” ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations of Software
Engineering, 2008.
threats. [19] Gartner. ”Market Guide for Web Application Firewalls.” Gartner Re-
Our XGBoost-based system (99.78% F1-score) integrates search Publication G00741137, 2022.
real-time query validation with honeypot-driven IP blocking, [20] Dittrich, D., et al. ”The Menlo Report: Ethical Principles for Cyberse-
curity Research.” US Department of Homeland Security, 2011.
reducing attack surfaces by 83% in testing. The hybrid ap-
proach combines ML detection (2.3ms latency) with auto-
mated threat intelligence gathering from blocked attempts.
This comprehensive framework successfully combines ad-
vanced algorithms, feature-rich data preprocessing, and au-
tomation to protect web applications from emerging SQLI
threats. Future work will focus on expanding the dataset to
include diverse SQLI types, refining detection models, and en-
hancing real-time capabilities. The project not only reinforces
individual web application security but also contributes to the
broader objective of creating a safer and more resilient digital
ecosystem.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This project is develped at COE digital forencics int-
teligance supported by VGST GRD853.
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