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Advanced Protocol Fuzzing

The document discusses the development and implementation of a Layer 2 fuzzer using the SPIKE framework, highlighting the need for such a tool in the free tool space. It covers the limitations of SPIKE, the additional features implemented, and examples of protocols fuzzed, such as MPLS and LLDP. The authors also mention their transition to the Sulley framework for enhanced capabilities in fuzz testing.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
22 views57 pages

Advanced Protocol Fuzzing

The document discusses the development and implementation of a Layer 2 fuzzer using the SPIKE framework, highlighting the need for such a tool in the free tool space. It covers the limitations of SPIKE, the additional features implemented, and examples of protocols fuzzed, such as MPLS and LLDP. The authors also mention their transition to the Sulley framework for enhanced capabilities in fuzz testing.

Uploaded by

vezunchik
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Advanced Protocol Fuzzing –

What We Learned when Bringing Layer2 Logic


to SPIKE Land

... and later we went on to Sulley Land ;-)

Enno Rey & Daniel Mende


{erey,dmende}@ernw.de
Notice

 Everything you are about to see,


hear, read and experience is for
educational purposes only. No
warranties or guarantees implied or
otherwise are in effect. Use of these
tools, techniques and technologies
are at your own risk.
Agenda

 The Need for a Layer2 Fuzzer


 Fuzzing Landscape & Options
 Why we Initially Chose SPIKE
 Limitations & Additional Features we Implemented
 Some Protocols and Results
 The Journey Goes on... here comes Sulley
Definition
 “Fuzz testing or Fuzzing is a Black Box software testing
technique, which basically consists in finding
implementation bugs using malformed/semi-malformed
data injection in an automated fashion
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Fuzzing

 “A highly automated testing technique that covers


numerous boundary cases using invalid data (from files,
network protocols, API calls, and other targets) as
application input to better ensure the absence of
exploitable vulnerabilities.” Peter Oehlert, “Violating
Assumptions with Fuzzing”, IEEE Security & Privacy,
March/April 2005
The Need for a Layer 2 Fuzzer

 So far nothing available in the “free tool space”.

 Quite some options in commercial space (think of


BreakingPoint, Mu, Codenomicon et.al.), but all these very
pricey.

 Multi purpose L2 packet crafter(s) out there (mainly


yersinia)… but the focus of those tools is
– regarding accuracy in fulfilling specifications –
completely different from that of a fuzzer ;-)
Why did we jump into this field?
 See above: know the feeling “it would be nice to have a
tool at hand that does...“ ?

 To gain some understanding of the way network fuzzers


(and frameworks) work.
 Gain some understanding of specific protocols.
 => so far we mostly implemented “exotic protocols“ (e.g. no STP...)
 To be able to “get an impression“ of a device‘s robustness
in a given scenario.

 Not (too much): vulnerability research. We did not try to


find the exact parser weaknesses. However... you could ;-)
Fuzzing Landscape & Options

 Quite some fuzzers/frameworks available


 Most of them: unmaintained or one-man projects
 Interesting Fuzzing Frameworks
 SPIKE
 autodafé
 Peach
 GPF – General Purpose Fuzzer
 With Evolutionary Fuzzing System (EFS)

 Sulley
Why we Initially Chose SPIKE
 Includes “proven” fuzzing strings
 Written in C
 Efficiency:
 Write a generic program once (e.g. for TCP, UDP or Layer 2)
 Add context-based payloads to this generic program via scripting
interface ( protocol descriptions )
 Very easy to use framework functions
 Can be used in the scripts or in a “common C program”
 Complete code under GPLv2

 In the meantime we prefer Sulley… wait for later part of talk…


How to run SPIKE

 Get package
 Unpack, ./configure, make

 Open shell and use one


 of the programs for specific purposes
 probably a script is also needed
 of the more generic programs
 you have the write your own script(s) per protocol

 Or write a new specific / generic program (we did)


SPIKE, Sample Script
//netbios
s_int_variable(0x81,3); //session type //sessionon request
s_int_variable(0x00,3); //flags
s_binary_block_size_halfword_bigendian_variable("netbiosbl
ock");

s_block_start("netbiosblock");
//*SMBSERVER
s_string_variable(" CKFDENECFDEFFCFGEFFCCACACACACACA");
s_binary("00");
//LOCALHOST
s_string_variable(" EMEPEDEBEMEIEPFDFECACACACACACAAA");
s_binary("00");
s_block_end("netbiosblock");
Protocol Definitions –
The Simple Approach
 Sniff packets
 Transform structures to prot. definition
 Wireshark is your friend here ;-)

 You still need a basic understanding of


the stuff...
Simple Example: ARP
s_binary("00 01"); /* Hardware Type -> here Ethernet (1)*/
s_binary("08 00"); /* Protocol Type -> here IP (8) */
s_binary("06"); /* Hardware size -> here MAC (48Bit) */
s_binary("04"); /* Protocol Size -> here IP (32Bit) */
s_binary("00 01"); /* Opcode (1->request, 2->reply) */
s_string_variable("01 02 03 04 05 06"); /* MAC-Src */
s_string_variable("c0 a8 5f b5"); /* IP-Src */
s_string_variable("00 00 00 00 00 00"); /* MAC-Dst */
s_string_variable("c0 a8 5f b6"); /* IP-Dst */

Problem here:
s_string_variable takes any string, not just those with length of six bytes

=> We added a new function s_string_variable_sized


General Limitations
 SPIKE mostly does string / integer based fuzzing
 => addition of s_string_variable_sized()

 SPIKE is byte-oriented
 No handling of protocol information with “odd sizes” possible
 No handling of bit fields (e.g. TLVs)
 One of the reasons why we later switched to Sulley

 No fuzzing with/of predefined values possible


 Added function s_binary_selection
 Did not work from SPK scripts due to parser weaknesses
Additional Features we Implemented

 Generic L2 sender ( Ethernet II and IEEE802.3 )


 Selection of random or fixed ethernet-src

 Additional functions
 s_random_fuzz(), s_random_fuzz_repeat()
fuzz completely random data with fixed size
[based on POSIX rand()]
 s_binary_type_and_block_size_lldp()
 l2_write_data()
 s_binary_selection()
 s_string_variable_sized()
Overview ;-)
libnet.h

listener.h
tcpstuff.h udpstuff.h l2stuff.h dlrpc.h dlargs.h
-struct listener
-struct lldpTlv

spike.h
-struct spike

spike.c listener.c tcpstuff.c l2stuff.c dlrpc.c udpstuff.c generic_send_l2.c

+spike_send() +l2_write_data() +s_parse()


+spike_init_l2()
+s_binary_type_and_block_size_lldp()
+add_size_listener_lldp()
+close_a_size()
Let‘s go practical then

Some of the protocol definitions


we‘ve added so far:

 MPLS
 LLDP
 VTP
 DTP
 WLCCP (only for Sulley)
MPLS

 Not really “a protocol” but a set of technologies and


protocols.
 In the very basic technology a 32-bit header is inserted
between Layer2 and Layer3 header (here on ethernet).
 Definition and subsequent fuzzing of these 32 bit are easy.

 We did not split up the 32 bits into dynamic and static


pieces (like the EXP part) or limit ranges.
 Testbed: some Cisco 7200 routers running Service
Provider images. Processed packets without problems.
MPLS Label Header

LABEL EXP S TTL

0 1920 22 2324 31

 20-Bit Label
 Short information entity without further internal structure
 3-Bit Experimental-Bits (e.g. for CoS)
 1-Bit Bottom-of-Stack Indicator (Label Stack)
 8-Bit TTL-Field (Loop Mitigation)
MPLS (header) protocol definition

 Uses INTELENDIANWORDs (= 32 Bits)

is_int_fuzz_variable(9); /* 9 equivalent to INTELENDIANWORD */


s_binary( “PACKET CONTENT“ );
...

 Demo
LLDP

 Pretty complex protocol


 Works with Type-Length-Value (TLV) structures
 Ethernet-Header (type 0x88cc), packets sent to multicast-
address 01:80:c2:00:00:0e
 Due to “SPIKE’s byte limitation” (and odd TLVs) initially it
was not possible to fuzz LLDP, with SPIKE and L2-addon
 => addition of s_binary_type_and_block_size_lldp()
 gets an integer as the TLV-type
 Plus char* as the name of the block
LLDP (2)

 When multiple packets (containing


different information) arrive from same
source MAC address the packets are
discarded

=> random source MACs needed


=> generic_send_l2 rewritten with
random_mac_option
LLDP format
LLDP format (2)
LLDP (small excerpt!)
s_binary_type_and_block_size_lldp(1, "block_chassis"); /* TLV Type: Chassis Id(1) + TLV Length:
7 */
s_block_start("block_chassis");
s_push_int(7, 3); /* Chassis Id Subtype: 1,2,3,4,5,6 or 7 */
s_string_variable_sized("000130f9ada0", 1, 255); /* Chassis Id (dependes on Chassis ID Subtype)
*/
s_block_end("block_chassis");

s_binary_type_and_block_size_lldp(2, "block_port"); /* TLV Type: Port Id (2) + TLV


Length: 4 */
s_block_start("block_port");
s_int_variable(7, 3); /* Port Id Subtype: 1,2,3,4,5,6 or 7
*/
s_string_variable_sized("312f31", 1, 255); /* Port Id: 1/1 */
s_block_end("block_port");

s_binary_type_and_block_size_lldp(3, "block_ttl"); /* TLV Type: Time to Live (3) + TLV


Length: 2 */
s_block_start("block_ttl");
s_push_int(120,5); /* Seconds: 120 */
s_block_end("block_ttl");

s_binary("00 00"); /* TLV Type: End of LLDPDU (0) + TLV Length: 0


*/
Results – LLDP
02:29:33: LLDP rx state on FastEthernet0/3 set to WAIT FOR FRAME
02:29:33: LLDP advertisement packet RX'd on intf FastEthernet0/3
02:29:33: LLDP advertisement packet RX'd on intf FastEthernet0/3
02:29:33: LLDP rx state on FastEthernet0/3 set to RX FRAME
02:29:33: LLDP unknown tlv type 127 recd - ignoring it
02:29:33: LLDP malformed optional TLV 127 found - ignored
02:29:33: LLDP entry update - new neighbor C:\ discovered
[…]
02:29:33: LLDP-MED orig state on FastEthernet0/3 is DOWN, rcvd caps 0x0000
02:29:33: LLDP rx state on FastEthernet0/3 set to WAIT FOR FRAME
02:29:33: LLDP malformed optional TLV 127 found - ignored
02:29:33: LLDP entry update - new neighbor discovered
02:29:33: LLDP-MED orig state on FastEthernet0/3 is DOWN, rcvd caps 0x0000
02:29:33: LLDP rx state on FastEthernet0/3 set to WAIT FOR FRAME
02:29:33: LLDP rx state on FastEthernet0/3 set to RX FRAME
02:29:33: LLDP unknown tlv type 127 recd - ignoring it
02:29:33: LLDP malformed optional TLV 127 found - ignored
02:29:33: LLDP entry update - new neighbor
../../../../../../../../../../../../localstart.asp%00 discovered
02:29:33: LLDP-MED orig state on FastEthernet0/3 is DOWN, rcvd caps 0x0000
02:29:33: LLDP rx state on FastEthernet0/3 set to WAIT FOR FRAME
Results (reproducible) – LLDP
c3560#more flash:crashinfo/crashinfo_1
Cisco IOS Software, C3560 Software (C3560-ADVIPSERVICESK9-M), Version
12.2(40)SE, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3)
Copyright (c) 1986-2007 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Fri 24-Aug-07 01:43 by myl

Instruction TLB Miss Exception (0x1200)!

SRR0 = 0x2A2A2A28 SRR1 = 0x00029230 SRR2 = 0x0059574C SRR3 = 0x00021200


ESR = 0x00000000 DEAR = 0x00000000 TSR = 0x8C000000 DBSR = 0x00000000

CPU Register Context:


Vector = 0x00001200 PC = 0x2A2A2A28 MSR = 0x00029230 CR = 0x40000002
LR = 0x2A2A2A2A CTR = 0x00000000 XER = 0x0000003F
R0 = 0x2A2A2A2A R1 = 0x02F44E28 R2 = 0x00000000 R3 = 0x02F45050
R4 = 0x019CFC7D R5 = 0xFFFFFFFF R6 = 0x02F44D90 R7 = 0x00000000
R8 = 0x00000000 R9 = 0x02F450B3 R10 = 0x02F450B3 R11 = 0x02F450B2
[...]
Stack trace:
PC = 0x2A2A2A28, SP = 0x02F44E28
Frame 00: SP = 0x2A2A2A2A PC = 0x2A2A2A2A
VTP
 Good Cisco dokumentation
 http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/473/21.html
 ISL or IEEE 802.1q encapsulated
 IEEE 802.3 Ethernet Header
 Logical Link Control Header
 Subnetwork Access Protocol Header
VTP packet format

 3 types of VTP messages:


 Summary Advertisements
 Subset Advertisements
 Advertisement Requests
VTP packet format

 Summary Advertisement Packets

 (Per default) transmitted every five minutes


 Include the name of the VTP domain
 Populate the current revision number of the VLAN-
database
VTP packet format
VTP packet format

 Subset Advertisement Packet

 Transmitted in answer to an advertisement request


 Contains multiple VLAN-Info fields
 One or more Subset Advertisement packets represent the
complete VLAN-Database
VTP packet format
VTP packet format

 Advertisement request Packets

 Transmitted in three cases:


 VLAN-Database is empty (after reset)
 VTP-Domain changed
 Summary Advertisement with higher revision no. received
Spike scripts
VTP Summary Advertisement
s_binary("aa"); /* DSAP */
s_binary("aa"); /* SSAP */
s_binary("03"); /* func */
s_binary("00000c"); /* Orga-code */
s_binary("2003"); /* VTP */

s_int_variable(1,3); /* version - ONEBYTE */


s_binary("01"); /* code */
s_int_variable(0,3); /* followers - ONEBYTE */
s_binary_block_size_byte_variable("MgmtD"); /* MgmtD length */
s_block_start("MgmtD");
s_binary("66757a7a696e67"); /* Mgmt Domain = "fuzzing" */
s_block_end("MgmtD"); /* end MgmtD length */
s_binary("00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"); /* fill Domain to
32 byte */
s_int_variable(111,1); /* configuration revision number - BINARYBIGENDIAN */
s_int_variable(0,1); /* update identity - BINARYBIGENDIAN */
s_random_fuzz(12); /* update timestamp */
s_binary("0000000000000000"); /* md5 digest / password - 16 bytes length */
Spike scripts
VTP Subset Request
s_binary("aa"); /* DSAP */
s_binary("aa"); /* SSAP */
s_binary("03"); /* func */
s_binary("00000c"); /* Orga-code */
s_binary("2003"); /* VTP */

s_int_variable(1, 3); /* version - ONEBYTE */


s_binary("03"); /* code */
s_int_variable(0, 3); /* rsvd - ONEBYTE */
s_binary_block_size_byte_variable("MgmtD"); /* MgmtD length */
s_block_start("MgmtD");
s_binary("66757a7a696e67"); /* Mgmt Domain = "fuzzing" */
s_block_end("MgmtD"); /* end MgmtD length */
s_binary("00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
/* fill Domain to 32 byte */
s_random_fuzz(32); /* start value */
VTP, Results

 Tested with several Cisco switches (29xx, 35xx, 3750,


6509).

 Nearly no effect 
[albeit packets obviously processed]
Possible cause for VTP (non-)results
DTP Packet Format

 No Cisco documentation publicly available

 But there is a wireshark parser...


 Which saved us a lot of work ;-)
 Looking at the yersinia code would have been another
option...
DTP Packet format

 Same encapsulation as VTP with the Subnetwork Access


Protocol Header type of 0x2004
 Based on Type-Length-Value entries with:
 2 Bytes type
 1 Byte length
 The data
 4 known types:
 Domain – contains the DTP Domain name
 Status – contains the DTP Status
 Type – contains the DTP Type
 Neighbor – contains the MAC address of the neighbor
Changes made to Spike

 Modified the layer2stuff to support IEEE 802.3 headers


 Modified the creation of fuzz-integers to cover the whole
WORD range

 And of course: created a Spike script for DTP


Spike scripts – DTP
s_binary("aa"); /* DSAP */
s_binary("aa"); /* SSAP */
s_binary("03"); /* func */
s_binary("00000c"); /* Orga-code */
s_binary("2004"); /* DTP */

s_block_start("Domain");
s_binary("0001"); /* Type: Domain */
s_binary_block_size_byte("Domain"); /* Domain length */
s_binary("00"); /* Domain: none */
s_block_end("Domain");

s_block_start("Status");
s_binary("0002"); /* Type: Status */
s_binary_block_size_byte("Status"); /* Status length */
s_int_variable(0, 3); /* Status - ONEBYTE */
s_block_end("Status");

s_block_start("DTPtype");
s_binary("0003"); /* Type: DTPtype */
s_binary_block_size_byte("DTPtype"); /* DTPtype length */
s_int_variable(1, 3); /* DTPtype - ONEBYTE */
s_block_end("DTPtype");

s_block_start("Neighbor");
s_binary("0004"); /* Type: Neighbor */
s_binary_block_size_byte("DTPtype"); /* Neighbor length */
s_int_variable(0, 1); /* Neighbor byte 0,1 - BINARYBIGENDIAN */
s_int_variable(0, 1); /* Neighbor byte 2,3 - BINARYBIGENDIAN */
s_int_variable(0, 1); /* Neighbor byte 4,5 - BINARYBIGENDIAN */
s_block_end("Neighbor");
Results – DTP

 Tested against same testbed.

 On some devices/images while fuzzing (on one switchport)


strange things happen:

 Trunk on other (!!) ports goes down and up and down up …


 Some ports set to mode blocking
 The device blinks like a Christmas tree
 …
This does _not_ look good ;-)
00:57:55: FEC: get-fechannel: port (Fa0/2) not part of fechannel line
= 2311 func = strata_dma_done_desc_rx: Received packet for unit 0,
swport 0
Inst base port = 0, dcb port = 0
[0000]: {01000CCCCCCC} {000102030405} 002E AAAA
00:57:55: 00100300 000C 2004 0001 0400 0002 0400 0003
00:57:55: 00200401 0004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
00:57:55: 00300000 0000 000B 6C61 6C61 6C61
00:57:55: line = 746 func = process_rx_packet iport = 0x0
linkType = 114 line = 879 func = process_rx_packet
line = 2207 function= strata_dma_done_desc_rx
[ … SNIP … ]
pm_vlan_rem_port: vlan 4093, port 1
pm_vlan_rem_port: vlan 4094, port 1
cled_vp_list_fwdchange: state 0(fwd 1)
cled_vp_list_fwdchange: [1] blocked 1

hmat_handle_pm_vp_fwdchange Interface Fa0/2, Vlan 1 changed state to


blocking
mat_enable_disable_addrs: type:2, port:Fa0/2
“Blinking like a Christmas tree“
A new kid in town: Sulley

 We decided to switch from SPIKE to the Sulley fuzzing


framework
 It can use SPIKE-Scripts without major changes
 No more crappy SPIKE Parser ;)
 Real python instead

 NO MORE BYTE LIMITATION, because Sulley brings the s_bit_field


which is really useful for layer2 fuzzing
Bring Sulley to layer2

 Very easy to implement


 Sulley code is easy to modify
 The patch only has some 100 lines

 We found (and fixed) a bug in the


s_bit_field function, too.

 Additionally we added a flag to the


s_size function to avoid the byte
limitation.
First Sulley scripts

 After bringing L2 logic to Sulley we tested the new


capability with some of the SPIKE scripts
 ARP was very easy
 Only adjust the syntax (from SPIKE to python)
 Add some Sulley session handling stuff

 DTP was easy, too. But we did not see the same results… why?
 Other fuzz strings
 We didn’t fuzz the whole variable range, as we did in SPIKE
The Sulley ARP script
from sulley import *

s_initialize("arp")

s_binary("0xff ff ff ff ff ff")
s_binary("0x01 02 03 04 05 06")
s_binary("0x08 06")

s_binary("0x00 01") #/* Hardware Type -> here Ethernet (1)*/


s_binary("0x08 00") #/* Protocol Type -> here IP (8) */
s_binary("0x06") #/* Hardware size -> here MAC (48Bit /6Byte) */
s_binary("0x04") #/* Protocol Size -> here IP (32Bit /4Byte) */
s_binary("0x00 01") #/* Opcode (1->request, 2->reply) */
s_binary("0x01 02 03 04 05 06") #/* MAC-Src */
s_binary("0xc0 a8 5f b5") #/* IP-Src */
s_binary("0x00 00 00 00 00 00") #/* MAC-Dst */
s_binary("0xc0 a8 5f b6") #/* IP-Dst */
s_random(0x0000, 1, 5)

sess = sessions.session(proto="layer2", iface="eth0")


sess.connect(s_get("arp"))

target = sessions.target("layer2", 1234)


sess.add_target(target)

sess.fuzz()
Another protocol definition: WLCCP

 The next protocol on our list was


Cisco’s proprietary
Wireless Lan Context Control Protocol

 Serves for some special (wire based)


Inter-AP communication in Cisco networks

 We think protocol is flawed


(architecture wise) anyway.
Might be topic for another talk ;-)

 No documentation available
 Wireshark gives a starting point, but as the implementation seems
incomplete and flawed (at least at layer2) there was (and is) a lot
more work to do.
The WLCCP Sulley script (excerpt ;-)
from sulley import *

s_initialize("WLCCPoUDP")

s_block_start("Payload")
s_byte(0x1c) #Version
s_bit_field(1, 2) #SAP Version
s_bit_field(0, 6) #SAP ID
s_word(0x0008) #Dest Node type
s_size("Payload", length=2, endian=">") #Length
s_bit_field(0, 2) #Subtype
s_bit_field(11, 6) #Base MsgType
s_byte(0x00) #Hops
s_byte(0x0001) #MsgID
s_bit_field(8192, 16) #Flags
s_word(0x0001) #Originator Node type
s_bit_field(0x000cce333225, 48) #Orginator MAC
s_word(0x0008) #Responder Node type
Results – WLCCP

 Not too many (reliable) results, probably because WLCCP


requires quite ”some state”

 However every now and then APs crash and need hard
resets afterwards. So far we are not able to reproduce this
behavior in a controlled manner.

 Next steps:
 Reverse engineer the protocol
 Understand the WLCCP state machine and build different scripts for all
the states
The Code
 Will this stuff be available?

 Yes! On our website:


 http://www.ernw.de/download/l2spike.tar.bz2
 http://www.ernw.de/download/l2sulley.tar.bz2

 Given these are stress testing tools ;-), no problems to


expect with §202c...

 We will continue developing this stuff and will add new


protocol definitions (there are so many interesting L2
protocols out there...)
Talking about code… some old stuff
updated: snmpattack.pl
usage: snmpattck.pl [-hIrv] [-A type] [-c comm1,comm2] [-C tftp] [-f target] [-s type]
[-l delimiter] {ip/range | input file}

-A type : Do APC specific attacks (type: 1 = allON, 3 = allOFF, 4 = allREBOOT)


-c comm : Add communities to check for (comma separated)
-C tftp : Do Cisco specific attacks and specify a tftp server for config upload
-f target : Switch to flood-mode
-h : Print this help
-I : Do InnoMedia specific attacks
-l : Parse IPs from file, separated with the given delimiter
-p port : The port for tcp syn scan (default = 80)
-r : Test for RO / RW community
-s type : Scans the given ip/range (type: snmp, icmp, syn | default = snmp)
-t num : Count of parallel scans (default = 10)
-v : Be verbose

scan and attack all found devices:


# $0 -I 10.0.0.0/24

scan and use all founds as relay hosts:


# $0 -s syn -p 21 -v -f 1.2.3.4 10.0.0.0/24

 http://www.ernw.de/download/snmpattack.pl
Summary

 SPIKE did a good job, Sulley will do even better.

 We learned a lot about fuzzing frameworks and protocols


during that project.
 Hopefully you find some of the project‘s outcome helpful...

 And, btw: some network devices from $SOME_BIG_VENDOR


might have parser problems...

 See you @ Saturday Night Party ;-)


Questions?
Thanks for your attention!
www.troopers08.org

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