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Python Penetration Testing

Essentials
Second Edition

5FDIOJRVFTGPSFUIJDBMIBDLJOHXJUI1ZUIPO

Mohit

BIRMINGHAM - MUMBAI

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||||||||||||||||||||

Python Penetration Testing Essentials

Second Edition
Copyright a 2018 Packt Publishing

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form
or by any means, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations
embedded in critical articles or reviews.

Every effort has been made in the preparation of this book to ensure the accuracy of the information presented.
However, the information contained in this book is sold without warranty, either express or implied. Neither the
author, nor Packt Publishing or its dealers and distributors, will be held liable for any damages caused or alleged to
have been caused directly or indirectly by this book.

Packt Publishing has endeavored to provide trademark information about all of the companies and products
mentioned in this book by the appropriate use of capitals. However, Packt Publishing cannot guarantee the accuracy
of this information.

Commissioning Editor: Vijin Boricha

Acquisition Editor: Noyonika Das
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First published: January 2015

Second edition: May 2018

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Contributors

About the author

Mohit is a Python programmer with a keen interest in the field of information security. He
has B.Tech (UIET, KUK, 2009) and M.E (Thapar University, 2012) degree. He is a CEH,
ECSA at EC-Council USA. He has worked in IBM and Sapient. He is currently doing PhD
from Thapar Institute of Engg & Technology under Dr. Maninder Singh. He has published
several articles in national and international magazines. He is the author of Python
Penetration Testing Essentials, Python: Penetration Testing for Developers and Learn Python in 7
Days also by Packt. His username is mohitrajcs on gmail. .

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||||||||||||||||||||

About the reviewers

Sanjeev Jaiswal is a computer graduate from CUSAT with 9 years of industrial experience.
He uses Perl, Python, AWS, and GNU/Linux for his day-to-day activities. He's currently
working on projects involving penetration testing, source code review, security design, and
implementations in AWS and Cloud security projects.

He is learning DevSecOps and security automation currently as well. Sanjeev loves

teaching engineering students and IT professionals. He has been teaching for the past 8
years in his leisure time. He founded Alien Coders and Cybercloud Guru as well.

My special thanks to my wife, Shalini Jaiswal, for her unconditional support, and my
friends Ranjan, Ritesh, Mickey, Vivek, Hari, Sujay, Shankar, and Santosh for their care
and support all the time.

Rejah Rehim is currently the Director and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) of
Appfabs. Previously holding the title of Security Architect at FAYA India, he is a long-time
preacher of open source and steady contributor to the Mozilla Foundation. He has
successfully created the world's first security testing browser bundle, PenQ, an open
source Linux-based penetration testing browser bundle preconfigured with tools
for security testing. He is also an active member of OWASP and the chapter
leader of OWASP Kerala. Additionally, Rejah also holds the title of commander at
Cyberdome, an initiative of the Kerala Police Department.

Packt is searching for authors like you

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just like you, to help them share their insight with the global tech community. You can
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||||||||||||||||||||

Table of Contents
Preface 1
Chapter 1: Python with Penetration Testing and Networking 6
Introducing the scope of pentesting 7
The need for pentesting 7
Components to be tested 8
Qualities of a good pentester 8
Defining the scope of pentesting 9
Approaches to pentesting 9
Introducing Python scripting 10
Understanding the tests and tools you'll need 11
Learning the common testing platforms with Python 11
Network sockets 11
Server socket methods 12
Client socket methods 13
General socket methods 13
Moving on to the practical 14
Socket exceptions 22
Useful socket methods 23
Summary 29
Chapter 2: Scanning Pentesting 30
How to check live systems in a network and the concept of a live
system 31
Ping sweep 31
The TCP scan concept and its implementation using a Python script 35
How to create an efficient IP scanner in Windows 37
How to create an efficient IP scanner in Linux 44
The concept of the Linux-based IP scanner 44
nmap with Python 47
What are the services running on the target machine? 51
The concept of a port scanner 51
How to create an efficient port scanner 54
Summary 59
Chapter 3: Sniffing and Penetration Testing 60
Introducing a network sniffer 61
Passive sniffing 61
Active sniffing 61
Implementing a network sniffer using Python 61

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||||||||||||||||||||

Table of Contents

Format characters 63
Learning about packet crafting 73
Introducing ARP spoofing and implementing it using Python 74
The ARP request 74
The ARP reply 75
The ARP cache 75
Testing the security system using custom packet crafting 78
A half-open scan 79
The FIN scan 82
ACK flag scanning 83
Summary 85
Chapter 4: Network Attacks and Prevention 86
Technical requirements 86
DHCP starvation attack 87
The MAC flooding attack 93
How the switch uses the CAM tables 93
The MAC flood logic 94
Gateway disassociation by RAW socket 95
Torrent detection 96
Running the program in hidden mode 104
Summary 106
Chapter 5: Wireless Pentesting 107
Introduction to 802.11 frames 108
Wireless SSID finding and wireless traffic analysis with Python 110
Detecting clients of an AP 120
Wireless hidden SSID scanner 122
Wireless attacks 125
The deauthentication (deauth) attack 125
Detecting the deauth attack 128
Summary 131
Chapter 6: Honeypot – Building Traps for Attackers 132
Technical requirements 132
Fake ARP reply 133
Fake ping reply 135
Fake port-scanning reply 142
Fake OS-signature reply to nmap 145
Fake web server reply 146
Summary 149
Chapter 7: Foot Printing a Web Server and a Web Application 150
The concept of foot printing a web server 150
Introducing information gathering 151

[ ii ]

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||||||||||||||||||||

Table of Contents

Checking the HTTP header 155

Information gathering of a website from whois.domaintools.com 157
Email address gathering from a web page 159
Banner grabbing of a website 160
Hardening of a web server 161
Summary 162
Chapter 8: Client-Side and DDoS Attacks 163
Introducing client-side validation 163
Tampering with the client-side parameter with Python 164
Effects of parameter tampering on business 169
Introducing DoS and DDoS 172
Single IP, single ports 172
Single IP, multiple port 174
Multiple IP, multiple ports 176
Detection of DDoS 178
Summary 181
Chapter 9: Pentesting SQL and XSS 182
Introducing the SQL injection attack 183
Types of SQL injections 184
Simple SQL injection 184
Blind SQL injection 184
Understanding the SQL injection attack by a Python script 184
Learning about cross-site scripting 194
Persistent or stored XSS 195
Nonpersistent or reflected XSS 195
Summary 204
Other Books You May Enjoy 205
Index 208

[ iii ]

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||||||||||||||||||||

Preface
This book is a practical guide that shows you the advantages of using Python for
pentesting, with the help of detailed code examples. This book starts by exploring the
basics of networking with Python and then proceeds to network and wireless pentesting,
including information gathering and attacking. You will learn how to build honeypot traps.
Later on, we delve into hacking the application layer, where we start by gathering
information from a website, and then eventually move on to concepts related to website
hacking, such as parameter tampering, DDOS, XSS, and SQL injection.

Who this book is for

If you are a Python programmer, a security researcher, or a network admin who has basic
knowledge of Python programming and want to learn about penetration testing with the
help of Python, this book is ideal for you. Even if you are new to the field of ethical hacking,
this book can help you find the vulnerabilities in your system so that you are ready to
tackle any kind of attack or intrusion.

What this book covers

$IBQUFS, Python with Penetration Testing and Networking, goes through the prerequisites of
the following chapters. This chapter also discusses the socket and its methods. The server
socket's method defines how to create a simple server.

$IBQUFS, Scanning Pentesting, covers how to perform network scanning to gather

information on a network, host, and the services that are running on the hosts. You will see
a very fast and efficient IP scanner.

$IBQUFS, Sniffing and Penetration Testing, teaches how to perform active sniffing and how
to create a Transport layer sniffer. You will learn special kinds of scanning.

$IBQUFS, Network Attacks and Prevention, outlines different types of network attacks, such
as DHCP starvation and switch mac flooding. You will learn how to detect a torrent on the
client side.

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||||||||||||||||||||

Preface

$IBQUFS, Wireless Pentesting, goes through wireless frames and explains how to obtain
information such as SSID, BSSID, and the channel number from a wireless frame using a
Python script. In this type of attack, you will learn how to perform pentesting attacks on the
AP.

$IBQUFS, Honeypot ` Building Traps for Attackers, focuses on how to build a trap for
attackers. You will learn how to bulid code from TCP layer 2 to TCP layer 4.

$IBQUFS, Foot Printing a Web Server and a Web Application, dives into the importance of a
web server signature, email gathering, and why knowing the server signature is the first
step in hacking.

$IBQUFS, Client-Side and DDoS Attacks, explores client-side validation and how to bypass
client-side validation. This chapter covers the implantation of four types of DDoS attacks.

$IBQUFS, Pentesting SQL and XSS, discusses two major web attacks: SQL injection and
XSS. In SQL injection, you will learn how to find the admin login page using a Python
script.

To get the most out of this book

In order to understand the book reader must have the knowledge of Networking
fundamentals, basic knowledge of Linux OS, good knowledge of information security and
core Python.

In order to perform experiments or run the codes reader can use the virtual machine
(Vmware, virtual box). For Wireless pen-testing readers can use a wireless card TP-Link TL-
WN722N. Becuase TL-WN722N wireless card supports the Kali Linux in VMware.

Download the example code files

You can download the example code files for this book from your account at
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XXXQBDLUQVCDPNTVQQPSU and register to have the files emailed directly to you.

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||||||||||||||||||||

Preface

You can download the code files by following these steps:

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1BDLU1VCMJTIJOH1ZUIPO1FOFUSBUJPO5FTUJOH&TTFOUJBMT4FDPOE&EJUJPO. In case
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at IUUQTHJUIVCDPN1BDLU1VCMJTIJOH. Check them out!

Download the color images

We also provide a PDF file that has color images of the screenshots/diagrams used in this
book. You can download it here: IUUQXXXQBDLUQVCDPNTJUFTEFGBVMUGJMFT
EPXOMPBET1ZUIPO1FOFUSBUJPO5FTUJOH&TTFOUJBMT4FDPOE&EJUJPO@$PMPS*NBHFTQEG.

Code in Action
Visit the following link to check out videos of the code being run:
IUUQTHPPHMT#)7/%

[3]

||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||

Preface

Conventions used
There are a number of text conventions used throughout this book.

$PEF*O5FYU: Indicates code words in text, database table names, folder names, filenames,
file extensions, pathnames, dummy URLs, user input, and Twitter handles. Here is an
example: "Mount the downloaded 8FC4UPSN ENH disk image file as another disk in
your system."

A block of code is set as follows:

JNQPSUPT
SFTQPOTFPTQPQFO QJOHO
GPSMJOFJOSFTQPOTFSFBEMJOFT 
QSJOUMJOF

When we wish to draw your attention to a particular part of a code block, the relevant lines
or items are set in bold:
s = socket.socket(socket.PF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW,TPDLFUOUPIT Y
J

Any command-line input or output is written as follows:

python setup.py install

Bold: Indicates a new term, an important word, or words that you see onscreen. For
example, words in menus or dialog boxes appear in the text like this. Here is an example:
"Select System info from the Administration panel."

Warnings or important notes appear like this.

Tips and tricks appear like this.

[4]

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||||||||||||||||||||

Preface

Get in touch
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General feedback: Email GFFECBDL!QBDLUQVCDPN and mention the book title in the
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||||||||||||||||||||

1
Python with Penetration Testing
and Networking
Penetration (pen) tester and hacker are similar terms. The difference is that penetration
testers work for an organization to prevent hacking attempts, while hackers hack for any
purpose such as fame, selling vulnerability for money, or to exploit the vulnerability of
personal enmity.

Lots of well-trained hackers have got jobs in the information security field by hacking into a
system and then informing the victim of their security bug(s) so that they might be fixed.

A hacker is called a penetration tester when they work for an organization or company to
secure its system. A pentester performs hacking attempts to break into the network after
getting legal approval from the client and then presents a report of their findings. To
become an expert in pentesting, a person should have a deep knowledge of the concepts of
their technology. In this chapter, we will cover the following topics:

The scope of pentesting

The need for pentesting
Components to be tested
Qualities of a good pentester
Approaches to pentesting
Understanding the tests and tools you'll need
Network sockets
Server socket methods
Client socket methods
General socket methods
Practical examples of sockets
Socket exceptions
Useful socket methods

||||||||||||||||||||
Other documents randomly have
different content
cover him against Victor. Davout since Orsha had been only harassed
by Cossacks. The bulk of Wittgenstein’s slowly advancing force was at
Kolopenichi, 27 miles north-east of Borisov: Platov was east of
Krupki, and Yermólov at Maliavka, near Bobr.
General Aubry, Oudinot’s chief of artillery, began to fell trees and
construct trestles for bridges immediately upon arriving at Studianka,
but unfortunately they proved too weak. As soon as it was dark
Oudinot started his artillery for the selected point of passage, and as
night drew its veil over the dreary banks of the Berezina, Generals
Eblé and Chasseloup reached Studianka with their men and their
slender equipment, and began in earnest to construct bridges. All
night they laboured to prepare the supports, and at 8 a.m. on the
26th the first trestle was fixed in position. It had been hoped to
throw three bridges, but there were scarce enough materials for two.
Chasseloup soon saw that the hopeless deficiency of equipment of
his engineers would prevent him from doing anything independently;
he therefore brought his men to help Eblé, the engineers working at
the preparation of trestles and floors while the pontonniers fixed
them.
The fate of the relics of the Grande Armée now rested, humanly
speaking, in the hands of a prematurely aged and physically broken
man of fifty-five years of age, who had never, under Napoleon,
received employment equal to his merits. The name of Jean Baptiste
Eblé is one to be uttered with all honour and reverence as that of a
man who, besides being a master of his profession, was in very truth
a hero, upright, modest, self-sacrificing, and literally faithful unto
death. One seeks not for purity or an exalted standard of duty among
the rough and greedy fighters about Napoleon. Exceptions there
were, but they were comparatively few; and so one turns with
peculiar respect towards the simple, gracious figure of Eblé.
Early on the 26th Eblé verified the width and depth of the river. The
latter had increased, owing to a freshet, since Corbineau’s crossing
from 3½ feet to 5.
Besides pushing on the preparations for the bridges, the engineers
constructed three small rafts, by which some 400 infantry were
ferried over to guard the bridge-head, accompanied by some of
Corbineau’s troopers, who forded the river with foot soldiers behind
them.
The cold was bitter; the water was already freezing; and the
pontonniers would have to work in it up to their shoulders. The
ordeal meant certain death to almost all; but the men answered the
call of their chief with a heroism as high as his own. They were
relieved every 15 minutes and were promised special rewards, but
five-sixths of them perished. There were 7 companies in all, about
400 men, of whom 100 were Dutch.
The bridges were placed 200 yards apart. Each had 23 sets of trestles
(chevalets). That on the right was intended only for troops. It was
terribly weak. Suitable wood for the roadway was lacking, but the
engineers patched up one of planks nailed one upon another, and laid
brushwood and twigs upon it to lessen the strain. The roadway was
in places nearly level with the water; there were no rails. The left-
hand bridge was intended for artillery and baggage. It was more solid
than the other; but still very weak, and as there was no time to
square them the roadway was constructed of rough logs, the passage
over which of vehicles occasioned continued joltings which impaired
the stability of the frail structure.
 GENERAL BARON EBLÉ
Commander of the Bridge Trains of the Grand Army in 1812
Napoleon himself, with his Head-quarters and Guard, reached
Studianka early on the 26th. He came to the head of the bridges and
there remained until they were completed, personally supervising the
construction. In the intervals when he could do nothing he sat on a
pile of logs on the bank, gloomily gazing upon the slowly progressing
structures on which his last hopes rested. More than once he asked
Eblé to hurry. The General pointed to his devoted pontonniers
working themselves to death in the icy stream, and the Emperor
could say no more. What he could do to relieve them he apparently
did, sometimes helping with his own hands to serve them out brandy.
The artillery of the Guard and of the 2nd Corps was massed behind
Studianka ready to open fire as soon as the Russians should show
themselves. But Chaplitz was already withdrawing through the woods
to Borisov; only a weak rear-guard with 2 light guns remained
opposite the village. Chaplitz’s worst fault was to neglect to destroy
the long wooden bridges on which the Zembin road crossed the
marshes. He was a brave and a good officer, but on this occasion
failed much in the performance of his duty.
At 1 p.m. the right-hand bridge was completed, and at once
Napoleon gave the order to Oudinot’s corps to cross. With the
addition of Dombrowski’s Poles it appears to have been nearly 11,000
strong. Some of its regiments were reduced to mere skeletons; but
others were still relatively strong. They were generally well clothed
and in good order, and their still unbroken spirit appeared in the
lately unaccustomed cheers with which they hailed Napoleon as they
defiled past him. The Swiss regiments were especially solid and
eager. Only 2 guns were taken across for fear of injuring the bridge.
The advance-guard easily cleared away Chaplitz’s feeble rear-guard,
and moved forward on the Borisov road until it found Chaplitz,
reinforced by Pahlen, in position across its path. Reconnaissances
despatched to Zembin found the Vilna road clear, and the Emperor
decided to give up any intention of reaching Minsk and to move upon
Vilna.
The heavier bridge was ready at 4 p.m., and the artillery of the Guard
and Oudinot’s corps began to pass. At 8 p.m. three sets of trestles
gave way. Half the pontonniers were called upon and, worn out with
desperate toil and sunk in sleep as they were, they answered Eblé’s
call. By 11 p.m. the breakage was repaired, and the rest of the
artillery, the remains of the reserve park, and Ney’s corps began to
cross.
At 2 a.m. on the 27th the bridge broke in the centre; three sets of
trestles were destroyed. The second half of the pontonniers were
called upon. Eblé himself chose good sound wood and superintended
the making of new ones, while the heroic pontonniers sacrificed
themselves as nobly as before. At 6 a.m. the damage was repaired
and the passage proceeded. The bridge broke again at 4 p.m., two
trestles giving way. It was repaired by 6 p.m.
The supports of the troop bridge held firm, but the weak roadway
was continually breaking, and the devoted engineers were at work
upon it with little intermission. It was so frail and swayed so badly
that it is remarkable that it did not collapse.
Napoleon, with the Head-quarters and the Guard (less Claparède),
crossed about 1 p.m. on the 27th. As yet no very great number of
the non-combatants had arrived, and they were mostly employees of
the army who crossed with their corps. The disbanded mob was
flocking into Borisov ahead of Eugène and Davout. It was amenable
to no control, and, as aforesaid, Napoleon’s order to the rear-guard
to hold back was little likely to save it from destruction.
Chichagov, on reaching Chabachevichi, sent patrols across the river
which failed to locate the enemy, and the Admiral became aware that
he had been misled. He once more turned his troops towards Borisov,
which they re-entered on the evening of the 26th. He directed
Langeron to do what he could to reinforce Chaplitz, adding that he
was coming up with all speed. Everybody, according to the bitter
Langeron, was cursing “this miserable sailor.” They, however, did not
know the circumstances, and might have cursed the high and well-
born Prince Golénischev-Kutuzov with better reason. Langeron took
forward Pahlen’s infantry to reinforce Chaplitz; he says—certainly with
exaggeration—that there were only 1200 of them. Voïnov’s and
Sabaniev’s troops, after a 30 miles march in frost and snow, were in
no condition for battle, and the Army of the Danube had to remain at
rest on the 27th. Without wishing entirely to absolve Chichagov, it
appears to the writer that the chief blame must be laid upon Kutuzov,
who lagged behind and sent misleading intelligence. Blame also
attaches to Chaplitz for his negligence at Zembin. Yet it must be
observed that he probably expected, with the rest of Chichagov’s
officers, that Napoleon would retreat upon Minsk, and therefore drew
in the detachment, which might otherwise have been cut off.
Chichagov cannot be blamed for resting during the 27th. Borisov was
full of French, who might attempt to force a passage there. They
were mostly non-combatants, but this could not of course be
ascertained with certainty. For the rest his troops were weary.
Wittgenstein was probably more blameworthy than the much abused
Admiral. His pursuit of Victor was unenergetic; despite his double
superiority of numbers, he made no attempt to press. He was in fear
that Napoleon would turn his own right flank and retreat by Lepel to
Vilna; and this was in fact one of the Emperor’s alternative plans. He
moved so cautiously that on the 25th his advance-guard did not
touch the rear-guard of Victor, who fell back unmolested towards the
high-road at Borisov. Reconnaissances made it clear that Napoleon
was not moving past the Russian right and Wittgenstein advanced to
Kostritza, only 8 miles from Borisov and about 10 east of Studianka.
Victor reached Borisov in safety; and Eugène and Davout moved on
to Studianka, where they arrived at dusk on the 27th. Victor’s move,
however, had evil effects; his troops came upon the line of march of
the unhappy fugitives from Moscow, and the awful condition of the
latter spread demoralisation in the ranks of the 9th Corps. The 2nd
Corps had already come in contact with the woeful relics of the Guard
and Ney’s corps, and their morale was affected. At Kostritza
Wittgenstein learned that the French were at Studianka, but instead
of marching thither he directed part of his troops on the 27th on
Borisov, part on Staroï Borisov, some miles above the former place.
Platov was in touch with Wittgenstein, and Yermólov was on the
march to Borisov. There were thus, of Russian troops, on the
Berezina the army of Chichagov, 32,000 strong with 180 guns, that of
Wittgenstein at least 31,000, and Yermólov’s and Platov’s columns,
say 12,000 men and 30 guns, in all 75,000.
As against this large and eager, if partly irregular, force Napoleon is
said by De Chambray to have had barely 31,000 men. This figure is
certainly too low. De Fezensac believes that he had 50,000 men; and
on the whole it is possible that the total number of combatants was
about 47,000. It was composed as follows: Guard (less Claparède)
8500, Ney about 5000, Davout 3000, Eugène 2000, Junot 1500
(including dismounted cavalry), Oudinot 11,000 (including
Dombrowski), Victor 13,500, Head-quarters 2500. The last item is
usually ignored by historians. There were between 250 and 300 guns,
and perhaps 5500 effective cavalry, of whom 1500 belonged to the
Guard and Head-quarters. But of these troops nearly a third were so
worn down by hardship as to be hardly capable of making any great
effort.
Eugène and Davout on reaching Studianka crossed in the night, the
bitter cold of which went far to achieve the destruction of their few
remaining troops. Even Oudinot’s troops, still in comparatively good
condition, suffered greatly in their wretched bivouacs in the woods of
Stakhov. Behind the 1st and 4th Corps the horde of non-combatants
came pouring down to the bridges. The road from Borisov to
Studianka was choked with their throngs. Every age and sex was
represented in the helpless mass; and there was to be seen human
misery in its most hideous aspects. Even more harrowing than the
misery and hideous aspect of the fugitives was their utter apathy and
helplessness. The crowd heaved itself sluggishly along the tracks in
whatever direction it chanced to take or was pushed by moving
troops. Most of the wretches who composed it seem to have lost
their senses no less than their appearance as more or less civilised
human beings. The instincts of comradeship and humanity were
almost extinct, and progress was constantly retarded by the brawling
and fighting for places in the column of the mass of degraded
savages which once had been Napoleon’s Grande Armée.
Snow fell heavily during the night upon the unfortunates huddled
shelterless among the woods and marshes. The non-combatants on
reaching Studianka would go no further, despite the efforts of Eblé
and Chasseloup to induce some of them to cross. Napoleon had
issued orders that the passage was to be kept up day and night, but
they probably could not be, at any rate were not, executed. The
luckless people continued to stream down towards Studianka until
the bank for miles was covered with them, and apathetically
bivouacked as best they could among their vehicles. Very few appear
to have attempted to cross; those who did probably created
blockages and disorder, being amenable to no kind of control. The
pontonniers and engineers were too few and too weary to enforce
order in such a mass. More might have been done had Napoleon
personally exerted himself to supervise the passage; unfortunately
after the 27th he did nothing.
Victor’s corps on the 26th became the rear-guard, Davout and
Eugène passing in advance with the scanty relics of their troops.
Victor left Borisov for Studianka on the 27th. The Baden brigade of
Dändel’s division marched first and crossed the bridges soon after
Napoleon. Victor himself with the rest of Dändel’s troops, Gérard’s
Poles and Saxons, and the artillery made his way out of Borisov
towards midday, while Partouneaux’s division with 4 guns and
Delaître’s cavalry brigade formed the rear-guard. It was to remain at
Borisov until dark. Platov was marching upon Borisov; behind him
came Wittgenstein with Steingell’s and Berg’s troops. Yermólov was
behind. Vlastov’s division was marching upon Staroï Borisov and
Fock’s reserve on the way to rejoin.[9]
The road from Borisov to Studianka was choked with non-
combatants, sick and wounded barely capable of dragging
themselves along, straggling soldiers, disbanded skulkers, fugitives
from Moscow, camp-followers, men, women and children, huddled in
a helpless mass, all streaming mechanically to Studianka with the last
of the organised fighting men. Vlastov’s division coming into the road
at Staroï Borisov about 3 a.m., cut the line of retreat and the
rearward portions of the mob fled back towards Borisov, whence
Partouneaux moved out to fight his way through. His division was
now only 4000 strong. Delaître had about 500 Saxon and Berg
horsemen. Two tracks led from Borisov to Studianka, dividing a short
distance west of the town. That to the left skirted the bank, but it
was full of stragglers, and Partouneaux, believing that the right-hand
one would take him directly to Studianka, struck into it. This
movement brought him right against Vlastov’s division. After a most
gallant attempt to fight their way through the French were forced to
give way. Partouneaux and Billard were taken prisoners with the poor
remains of the latter’s brigade, and the remaining three fell back
towards Borisov, to find it occupied by Wittgenstein. They passed a
fearful night in the snow, without food, fire, or shelter. Next day
almost all the wounded and weaker men were dead, and the
benumbed and starving survivors could only surrender. A single
battalion, about 160 strong, which had luckily taken the left-hand
track, reached Studianka. The French loss was over 4000 men,
including 500 cavalry and 4 guns.
In the evening of the 27th Yermólov entered Borisov. As soon as the
French left the town Chichagov repaired the bridge with pontoons,
and direct communication being thus established, a general attack
was concerted for next day. Wittgenstein was to complete the
destruction of Victor’s corps, while Chichagov, supported by Yermólov
and Platov, pressed Ney and Oudinot, and endeavoured to throw
them back upon Zembin.
The whole country was partially wooded except on the marshy banks
of the Berezina, and in places the woods became very thick. On the
western bank, about 3 miles south of Studianka and nearly half-way
between the villages of Brilova and Bolshoï Stakhov, stood Ney and
Oudinot. Their front was about a mile long, Ney’s force being on the
left, resting on the river, Oudinot on the right, supported upon a
dense wood. Guns could not be brought into action on either side
except on the road, where 8 pieces, equally divided between the two
armies and continually replaced, fought each other all day. In reserve
behind Ney and Oudinot stood the Guard.
At 8 a.m. Chaplitz and Pahlen began an attack on the 2nd Corps with
7 regiments of Chasseurs, and soon a furious conflict raged in the
woods. At first the attack made headway, and the French and Swiss
soldiers, who had passed a wretched night, began to give ground.
When the roar of firing swelled up all the disbanded men took to
flight, disordering and carrying away the reserves, while Oudinot was
disabled by a wound. Ney, always at the point of danger, rushed to
take his place, rallied the 2nd Corps and, calling up some of his own
troops in support, checked Chaplitz’s advance and began to drive him
back upon Stakhov. Some hundreds of prisoners were taken.
Sabaniev, who was moving up to support Chaplitz, stayed Ney’s
advance, but was suddenly charged in the most gallant fashion by
Doumerc’s Cuirassiers. They burst from the woods upon Cherbatov’s
division, broke through its skirmishing line, and charged its squares
with desperate courage. Some 2000 Russians were sabred and
captured. The Cuirassiers were of course nearly destroyed, but their
splendid behaviour saved the army for the moment. Chichagov sent
forward Voïnov to sustain Sabaniev, but though nearly twice as
numerous the Russians could make no headway. The French losses
were fearful. General Zayonczek, who had defended Praga against
Suvorov in 1794, had his leg shattered; Legrand, Rapp, Amey,
Dombrowski, and Kniaziewicz were also wounded. Half the survivors
of the 2nd Corps were killed or disabled; but at night their shattered
ranks still held their own, and if courage and devotion could have
saved the Grande Armée, that end would have been achieved.
Meanwhile on the left bank Victor’s corps, with equal heroism but less
success, had been contending with Wittgenstein. Most of Victor’s
artillery and the Baden brigade were already across, but Napoleon
now sent back the latter, adding to them apparently the Baden
battalion at Head-quarters. The bridges were so blocked that the
artillery could not return. Victor took up a position nearly
perpendicular to the river, just south of Studianka, on some rising
ground partially wooded. On the right, close to the river, there was a
thick clump of wood. This was defended by the Badeners. Next on
the left stood the Berg brigade when it arrived in line, then Gérard’s 3
Polish regiments, with Löw’s Saxon brigade beyond them. On the
extreme left stood General Fournier with his two remaining cavalry
regiments (Baden and Hesse). Victor had under his hand only 15
guns, and his entire strength was not more than 8000 infantry and
500 cavalry (according to his own account only 7400). The Berg
brigade had moved forward to endeavour to rescue Partouneaux.
 Passage of the BEREZINA
Positions at Midday
Nov. 28, 1812.
Wittgenstein left Steingell at Borisov to disarm the prisoners; the rest
of his army was directed upon Studianka. Vlastov drove back the
Berg troops into the main line of the 9th Corps; but was then
checked, though a battery established by Diebich made terrible havoc
among the wild crowd which was surging around the entrance to the
bridges. All the non-combatants, when the balls began to fall among
them, crowded to the river marge in utter confusion and there
remained, huddled in a mass more than 200 yards deep and
extending for three-quarters of a mile. The panic was fearful, and the
horrors that took place in the crowd will never be known. Men fought
their way ahead by any and every means, and drove their vehicles
remorselessly through the press. Men, women, and children were
murdered, trodden down, and forced helplessly into the river, while
all the while the Russian cannon-balls were falling with the snow.
Many of those who reached the bridges were thrust off them and
drowned or crushed beneath the wheels of vehicles. Many committed
suicide to avoid a worse fate: there is at least one well-authenticated
case of a mother who, herself mortally wounded, killed her child
before she died. Yet carriages of Napoleon’s staff and of the Generals
of the Guard were laden with helpless women and children whom
their protectors made every effort to save. Marshal Bessières and
General Laborde in particular earned by their humanity laurels fairer
than any which they had gained upon the field of battle.

CROSSING THE BEREZINA

The Baden Brigade crossing the upper bridge during the night of the 28-29th of
November, 1812
From the painting by J.A. Nikutowski at Carlsruhe
General Berg’s first division quickly supported Vlastov. The Badeners
on the right were driven back; but Napoleon at once took the
Russians in flank by establishing a battery on the other side of the
river. The Badeners reoccupied their position and held it all day
against incessant assaults—at grievous cost to themselves. Further to
the left Victor’s Polish troops executed a fierce counter-attack, and
were on the point of piercing the Russian centre when Fock arrived
with his division and restored the conflict. Victor’s men were now
hopelessly outnumbered, but they fought on with magnificent
tenacity until nightfall. An attempt to turn the left was checked by a
gallant charge of Fournier’s troopers and repulsed by the Saxons and
a Polish regiment. Berg’s second division, owing to some
misunderstanding, did not arrive until the action was over. Victor’s left
was thrown back, but he still covered the bridges.
At 9 p.m. Victor received orders to cross, and began to withdraw. All
round the bridges huddled the living mass of human beings and
animals, heaving sluggishly with convulsive movements to escape,
but practically inert. The eastern outlets were blocked by a hideous
heap of broken vehicles and dead or dying human beings and horses
piled one upon another in the trampled and blood-stained snow,
through which it was impossible to make way. Eblé and his engineers
literally had to make a cutting through the horrible heap and pile up
the corpses on each side to keep back the unhappy mob. Through
this ghastly passage, and along others like it made for them by the
pioneers, the weary remains of the German and Polish regiments
defiled, but even so they often had to fight their way. It was not until
1 a.m. on the 29th that they were at last across. Victor and Eblé
vainly endeavoured to persuade some of the mob to follow, but most
of them were torpid with misery and hopelessness and would not
move. At dawn on the 29th a small detachment of the 9th Corps
which had remained to the last was withdrawn. Eblé’s orders were to
fire the bridges at 8 a.m., but he waited until 8.30, hoping to save
some more lives. A few of the non-combatants followed Victor’s rear-
guard, but the passages were soon blocked. At 8.30 Eblé fired the
bridges, and there was a last scene of horror. Many of the unhappy
wretches, at last alive to the situation, strove to dash through the
flames, others endeavoured to cross on the thin ice between the
bridges, many threw themselves into the icy stream to wade or swim.
It is useless as well as painful to dwell longer upon the tragedy, the
details of which may be gathered from countless works. Perhaps no
event in history has ever so completely united in itself every element
of misery.
The loss of life at the passage of the Berezina will never be exactly
known. The Grand Armée lost 1200 officers killed and wounded,
which may perhaps indicate a total of all ranks of 12,000 to 15,000.
The 2nd and 9th Corps lost half their effective strength. Including
prisoners and deaths from cold and misery during the three days the
army was probably diminished by from 20,000 to 25,000 men.
Enormous quantities of baggage were lost, but few guns—the
Russians claimed 23. The loss of life among the non-combatants
must have been enormous; almost all who were captured died of
hunger or cold; their captors had little to spare them, and if the
Russian regular soldiers often behaved with kindliness, the wilder
Cossacks stripped their captives of everything. Perhaps the most
awful incident was the fate of 500 women who were huddled in a
barn at Borisov, without food for several days, and almost without
fires. Only some 20 survived.
There is reason to believe that the Russian armies lost at the
Berezina not less than 10,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners.
Langeron says that Chichagov alone lost 7000. Of the 1500 prisoners
many died of want before the survivors were retaken by the
Russians.
It cannot be said that Napoleon showed to any advantage at the
Berezina. The selection of the point of passage was due to the skill
and energy of Oudinot; the credit for the splendid resistance on the
28th is to be attributed to Ney and Victor; while the true heroes of
the episode were General Eblé and his pontonniers. Eblé died of his
hardships a month later, and of his devoted 400 not 40 ever saw their
homes again.
 FOOTNOTES:
[8] Langeron.
[9] Iachvil’s advance-guard was apparently distributed.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN. LOSSES AND RESULTS

THE passage of the Berezina practically put an end to the existence as an organised body of the
remains of the Grande Armée. Of the 45,000 or 47,000 combatants whom Napoleon had near Studianka
on the 26th, there probably remained on the 29th little more than 25,000, a total which rapidly
diminished through slaughter, fatigue, famine, despair and, above all, the steadily increasing cold. The
2nd and 9th Corps had sacrificed themselves heroically to cover the passage, but the double ordeal of
battle and hasty retreat was too heavy for them to bear, and they began to disband like the rest of the
army. They had already been reduced to a mere handful. In a report on the evening of the 30th Victor
stated that he had only 60 mounted horsemen left. He believed that he still had 4000 infantry—the
surviving half, as he explained, of the 2 divisions which had fought so gallantly on the 28th—but on
calling the roll he found that they had already dwindled to 3300.
While the battles of the 28th were raging the corps of Davout and Eugène had defiled on Zembin. The
effects of the neglect of Chaplitz to break down the long wooden bridges over the marshes were now
apparent; the marshes were hardly as yet solid enough to bear vehicles, and had the bridges been
destroyed nothing could have passed. Before daylight on the 29th Napoleon started with the Guard,
followed by Victor and Ney, but the passage over the long narrow bridges was so slow that at 10 p.m.
Ney was only at Zembin, 7 or 8 miles from Studianka. With him were Eblé and the remnant of his
pontonniers, and when the last troops had passed they fired and blew up sections of the bridges to
check the pursuit of the Russians.
On November 26th Kutuzov, who was then at Staroselie, 12 miles west of Kopis, seems to have
awakened to the probability that Napoleon would escape. At any rate, he suddenly acted with
convulsive energy, and during the next 2 days the Corps de Bataille marched 42 miles. The effort, of
course, exhausted it, and on the 29th it could only cover 11. In any case it was too late. Napoleon
himself was already safe, and, though only followed by a remnant of his once mighty host, was able
and willing to give endless trouble to Europe.
Miloradovich reached Borisov on the 28th, too late to take part in the battles. Wittgenstein was retarded
by the necessity of bridging the Berezina at Studianka, for which purpose he had to avail himself of
Chichagov’s pontoons from Borisov. He directed Kutuzov II, who had just joined him, to pursue Wrede
towards Vilna, and Orlov-Denisov, reinforced by some cavalry and mounted infantry, to follow Napoleon.
Chichagov pushed forward Chaplitz, and prepared himself to follow with the bulk of his army.
For the relics of the Grande Armée there was now, as De Chambray says, no resource but in hasty
flight. Wrede, after reoccupying Glubokoië, had moved southward to Dokchitsi, and was directed to
cover the right flank of the retreating army; but his force, at first about 10,000 strong, rapidly dwindled
from the ravages of cold and hardships, and the steady harassing of Kutuzov II. To expect that he could
check Wittgenstein, who crossed the Berezina on the 31st, and began to pursue by roads roughly
parallel to the main highway, was hopeless.
The country between the Berezina and Vilna had not been completely wasted; the towns still existed;
there were small garrisons and magazines in some of them. But the increasing cold rapidly shattered
every semblance of organisation. It rapidly became so fearful that all energy was absorbed in fighting it
and endeavouring to preserve existence. The number of men actually with the colours dwindled fast. On
December 1st Ney sent the eagles of the 3rd Corps with their guards and the regimental officers to take
refuge with the head-quarters and the few thousand troops who still marched with it. When he had sent
them off there remained to escort him only a company of 100 fighting men! The others, under General
Ledru, tramped doggedly on for two days and three nights, only halting for necessary rest, and joined
the head-quarters at Molodechno.

MARSHAL NEY SUPPORTING THE REAR-GUARD DURING THE RETREAT FROM MOSCOW
From the painting by Yvon
The flight to Vilna contains little of military interest. It was a mere rout of the most pitifully helpless
condition, the mass of fugitives trailing mechanically along the road, followed, surrounded, and
massacred by the Cossacks, while Chichagov’s army and Yermólov’s division marched steadily in the
rear, ready to overwhelm any solid resistance that might be made. But, in truth, little could be offered.
On November 29th Lanskoi’s cavalry detachment seized Plechenitzi on the French line of retreat, nearly
capturing the wounded Marshal Oudinot, whose staff heroically defended the house in which he lay.
Chaplitz crossed the Zembin marshes by strengthening the ice with planks and brushwood, followed up
the French rear-guard, and captured 7 guns and hundreds of stragglers. On the next four days there
were further rear-guard actions, all much alike and all resulting in loss of guns and prisoners to the
unhappy French, whose misery and demoralisation prevented them from responding to the splendid
example still set them by their heroic leader. The hopeless condition of affairs may be gauged by the
fact that on December 2nd there remained hardly 13,000 men with the colours (De Chambray says only
8800). With the head-quarters there were still perhaps 6000 or 7000; Ney had about 2500[10]; Victor
perhaps as many; while the 1st, 4th, and 8th Army Corps and the cavalry could not muster 1000 armed
men between them. There was still a considerable number of armed officers, but they fell sick or broke
down daily. Disorganisation was complete. Disbanded men who had hitherto kept their weapons now
threw them away. Forage could be procured; and food in quantity sufficient to support life was not
lacking. But rest was now more necessary even than food, and it was impossible to obtain it. The bulk
of the men were already broken by misery and fatigue, and were forced to continue their weary march
amid a cold which grew ever more severe. On December 3rd it became intense; on the 5th the
thermometer fell to 20° below zero (Réaumur); on the 6th to 24°; on the 7th to 26°; and it is said to
have fallen still lower later on. Its severity struck even men like Löwenstern, accustomed to the winters
of the Baltic provinces.
At Vilna Napoleon might expect his last powerful reinforcement—Loison’s division of the 11th Corps,
which reached the Lithuanian capital in the last week of November with two cavalry regiments of
D’Estrée’s Neapolitan division in Danzig. There were besides in Vilna 6000 or 7000 troops of all kinds—
régiments de marche and Polish and Lithuanian levies. Maret, with the best intentions but disastrous
results, ordered Loison’s division forward to Ochmiana to take position and cover the retreat of the relics
of the army into Vilna. It was composed of young French and German recruits, and three or four days of
the cruel weather nearly destroyed it. How many men actually died and how many disbanded cannot be
ascertained; it is only certain that on December 7th there remained in the ranks less than 3000 men!
At Molodechno on the 3rd, just as the cold was becoming deadly, Napoleon, who already contemplated
leaving the army, issued practically his last direct orders. The remains of the Polish divisions were sent
off south-west towards Warsaw, which they eventually reached in safety with such guns as they had
preserved. Here Napoleon received the first posts which had reached him for several days, the others
having presumably been intercepted by the Cossacks. Here also he composed and sent off the 29th
Bulletin. It is so well known that little reference to it is necessary. It is, however, to be observed that it is
as grossly mendacious as any of the Napoleonic series; and the Emperor’s total lack of appreciation of
the often heroic conduct of his troops throws a very disagreeable light upon his character. Certainly no
one, reading its paragraphs, would conclude that the campaign had been an annihilating catastrophe.
Every post brought shoals of letters to Maret, enquiring about the food supplies at Vilna, furiously
attacking the Poles for not supporting him, and his own agents for not having urged them to do so! One
most remarkable question is as to whether Vilna and Kovno are fortified. Surely Napoleon should have
given orders on this point. The fact seems to be that at first he had been over-confident of success, and
later had overlooked the necessity of protecting his bases—witness the case of Minsk. On the 29th of
November he had ordered the minister to clear all the diplomatic body away from Vilna, lest they should
be witnesses of the awful state of the army.
On December 3rd, Victor—much against his will—relieved Ney of rear-guard duty. He was weary of the
war, and desired chiefly to save the relics of his corps. The result was a quarrel between the two
marshals. The survivors of the 9th Corps succeeded in holding off Chaplitz in an engagement on the
4th, but next day Victor reported that it was completely used up, and could not receive the lightest
attack. He hurried on to Smorgoni with the few hundred frost-bitten men who remained to him.
Napoleon himself reached Smorgoni at 8 a.m. on the 5th. There he called to his presence Murat,
Eugène, Berthier, Davout, Ney, Lefebvre, Mortier and Bessières, and announced to them his intention of
proceeding forthwith to Paris. There can be no doubt that this was his wisest course of action. His
presence at the capital was imperatively necessary to direct new levies, and to sustain public spirit. The
army practically existed no longer, and could gain nothing by his remaining with it; finally, any longer
delay might render it impossible for him to reach his own frontier across Germany.
Murat, by virtue of his rank, succeeded to a command which was merely nominal. It was no doubt wise
to leave all the corps commanders with the army, since the circumstance might impose upon the
Russians; but otherwise it was a measure of doubtful utility. Ney, the hardest fighter of them all, and
apparently the only one who persistently held firm to his duty, was on bad terms with Davout and
Victor, and Davout and Murat quarrelled whenever they met. As it was, there being hardly anything to
command, their squabbles counted for less than they might otherwise have done.
Napoleon left in his carriage at 7 p.m., accompanied by Caulaincourt. Duroc and Lobau followed in a
sledge; and on the box of the carriage were the Mameluke Rustan and Captain Wasowicz of the Polish
Lancers of the Guard, who acted as interpreter. Believing the road to be clear, he was escorted only by a
small detachment of Neapolitan cavalry—and thus the mighty conqueror stole away from the scene of
his ruin, leaving the survivors of his gigantic host to the climate and the arms of Russia.
As a fact, he had a very narrow escape from capture, since Seslavin that day made a dash at Ochmiana.
Loison’s division, however, or what remained of it, had reached the town just before; Seslavin was
driven out, and bivouacked for the night a little way to the south, so that the Emperor arrived in safety.
At Medniki, the next stage, he met Maret, who had come out to meet him. The minister informed him of
the enormous magazines which had gradually collected in Vilna. Presumably, as De Chambray suggests,
Maret’s returns under this heading had failed to reach the Emperor, for he expressed his great relief,
and directed Maret to tell Murat to halt for eight days in the city, in order to restore the physique and
morale of the army. He arrived at Vilna on the 6th, leaving again, after a brief halt, for Warsaw. There,
on the 10th he had the interview with De Pradt which the latter has so graphically described. He started
again in a few hours via Dresden for Paris, which he reached on the 18th.
At Vilna, indeed, there were 4,000,000 rations of biscuit and flour and 3,600,000 of meat, besides an
immense quantity of grain; 27,000 spare muskets, 30,000 pairs of boots, and great stores of clothing
and equipment. But little of this was destined to be of use to the unhappy victims of Napoleon’s
overweening ambition. The scenes on the road between Vilna and the Berezina would pass all belief
were there not trustworthy witnesses, both French and Russian, to bear testimony to them. The road
and its borders were strewn with dead men and horses and abandoned guns and vehicles, often broken
and half-burned, the fugitives having endeavoured to utilise them as fuel. Along this way of sorrow
trailed an endless stream of human beings of both sexes, falling at every step to mingle with the
corpses upon which they trampled. Those who fell were quickly stripped of their wretched rags by the
passers-by—themselves doomed to the same fate before long. To dwell upon the horrors which marked
every mile of the flight is useless. They may be gathered from countless works composed by
eyewitnesses. The sense of humanity had been in many cases extinguished, and there are well-attested
incidents of cannibalism. Langeron vouches for having seen bodies from which the flesh had been
hacked. The intense cold produced insanity; men took refuge in heated ovens and were roasted to
death, or sprang into the fires. To be taken prisoner brought no alleviation of the lot of the hapless
fugitives. The Cossacks usually stripped them; often, too, the Russians, exasperated at the destruction
of Moscow and the ravages of the invaders, gave no quarter even to those who surrendered. Besides,
they could do nothing to provide for them even had they the will. Prisoners died, as before, by the
roadside, stripped, famished, frozen; at Vilna they were packed into buildings where pestilence raged
amid cold, filth, and lack of proper food.
On towards Vilna, to which they looked forward as a haven of rest, the wretched horde streamed. The
Cossacks hung about the route, dashed at will into the huddled mass, mixed with the crowd, and killed
and plundered with deadly dexterity. Around the head-quarters still moved a considerable but steadily
diminishing body of fighting men, but discipline had vanished, and even the Guard marched in
confusion, and paid little heed to orders. Here and there among the piteous crowd that followed were to
be found groups of armed officers and men, often sick and worn out, but retaining spirit to sell their
lives dearly when attacked, but these were few. Even the rear-guard was not an organised body—
merely a band of desperate warriors held together, usually, by the personal influence of the one Marshal
of France who returned from Russia with added renown.
On the heels of the French rear-guard marched Chaplitz’s division, attacking at every opportunity,
picking up abandoned guns and vehicles mile by mile and disarming prisoners, who were then left to
live or die as they might. After Chaplitz, always between a piteous double stream of “prisoners” whom it
could neither care for nor guard, tramped the Army of the Danube, everyone from the Admiral
downwards marching on foot to escape frost-bite, and carefully taking every precaution against it.
Sometimes the road was so choked with dead that the dismounted cavalry in the advance had to clear it
before the guns and trains could be got forward. Langeron says that, despite the weather, fatal cases of
frost-bite were almost unknown among these veterans of the Turkish War.
It is distressing, amid the stories of the universal misery and destitution, to read of the waggon-loads of
luxuries belonging to Napoleon, Murat and other generals which were taken by the Russians. There is a
grim humour in learning that the uncouth captors often took perfumes for spirits and liqueurs, and ate
pomade in mistake for butter!
Victor on reaching Ochmiana found, instead of Loison’s strong division, 3000 or 4000 half-frozen recruits
who would waste away entirely in a couple of days. He continued his retreat in all haste, followed and
harassed by Chaplitz and Platov, who picked up prisoners by thousands and cannon by scores. On the
9th, a little way short of Vilna, Wrede arrived. His force had dwindled from cold, dispersion, and losses
in skirmishing to a remnant of less than 3000 men, but he still possessed several guns. Murat and the
head-quarters had reached Vilna on the 8th; but as early as the 6th bands of ragged and destitute
fugitives had begun to enter the city to the consternation of the inhabitants. Even in Murat’s column
there was panic and disorder, which was only checked for a while by the Chasseurs of the Old Guard,
who held together in the mob and prevented a mad rush. But when they had entered the crush became
terrible, and order impossible. The gates were choked and, amongst others, Davout and his staff could
only enter by a gap in a wall. The fugitives poured through the streets seeking for food and shelter—
often vainly, for the horrified inhabitants barricaded themselves in their houses—and when they could
not obtain it, dropped down to die. The Jewish tradesmen sold food to the helpless wretches literally for
its weight in gold; but when the city was evacuated, unless all accounts lie, they murdered and robbed
them wholesale.
To stay in Vilna, even for a few days, was impossible. Seslavin and his Cossacks actually entered the city
on the 9th, but were, of course, obliged to retreat almost immediately. But the action showed the
absolute recklessness of the Russians, and the French army was destitute of power to resist. So many
of the men dispersed in the city that on the 10th only 6000 or 7000 at most were under arms. A large
part of the fugitives never left Vilna again. Many were worn out by sickness and fatigue, and having
once lain down to rest had not power to rise. Many died through drinking spirits, in the hope of resisting
the cold. Many more were frost-bitten, and sudden warmth added to neglect produced gangrene. Nearly
20,000 helpless creatures were left, mostly to perish, in the city when the remainder pursued their way
to the Niemen. No news as to the actual state of affairs had been allowed to reach Vilna, and the
consequence was that no preparations had been made for the reception of the army. Murat simply lost
his head; at the first sound of the cannon at the advance posts he left the palace in which he had
established himself and hurried to the Kovno gate to be ready to escape. Berthier issued hasty orders to
destroy the arms and ammunition in the arsenal. Eblé, whose noble life was almost spent, and who had
set the crown upon his reputation by his unfailing heroism and self-sacrifice during the last stages of the
retreat, was charged with this melancholy duty, Lariboissière being even nearer his end. Directions were
given to issue food and clothes to everybody abundantly and without attention to forms. Orders were
sent to Schwarzenberg to withdraw to Bielostok, while Macdonald was instructed to retreat to Tilsit. The
hopeless task of holding back the Russians was thrown upon the shoulders of Ney.
Wrede with his frozen and disorganised remnant was driven in upon Vilna by Platov on the 9th. The
Cossacks were already all round the town skirmishing with the defenders. Apart from the destruction
wrought by the cold the latter suffered considerable loss. The Lithuanian Tartar Squadrons, destined to
form part of the Guard, were completely annihilated. In the night Murat evacuated Vilna, and next day
Ney abandoned it, the Cossacks following him through the streets.
A few miles from Vilna the road to Kovno leads over a steep hill. The remains of the army trains and
those from Vilna, which were following the army, found themselves blocked at the foot of the icebound
slope, up which the horses were utterly unable to drag them. The last remaining guns and most of the
waggons had to be abandoned. The army pay-chests, containing 10,000,000 francs, were abandoned
and partly pillaged by the soldiers. Only Napoleon’s private treasure and carriages, and a very small
proportion of the trains, were by desperate exertions preserved, 20 horses being necessary to drag a
single vehicle up the hill. In the midst of the disorder and pillage the Cossacks arrived. Platov opened on
the crowd with his light guns, but his wild horsemen for the most part fell upon the spoil and apparently
disdained to take prisoners. The disaster was due to sheer lack of management, since the Novi Troki
road, which was level and little longer, turned the hill to the south, and might easily have been used for
the retreat.

NAPOLEON’S TRAVELLING KITCHEN

It was taken to Moscow and afterwards captured on the field of Waterloo
Photographed for this work at the Royal Artillery Museum, Woolwich
It was as hopeless to attempt to hold firm at Kovno as at Vilna. There were 42 guns in the town, partly
those of Loison’s division, which had been left there, great magazines of food and clothing, and about
2,500,000 francs in cash. There was a feeble tête du pont, but the Niemen was frozen and could be
crossed anywhere on the ice. On the 12th the main body poured into the town— about 20,000 men,
mostly in the last stage of misery and despair and nearly all disarmed. The Guard mustered 1600
bayonets and sabres. Ney, who had been fighting with Platov all the way from Vilna, reached the town
in the evening; with the garrison troops added to the relics of the rear-guard he had not 2000 men.
Efforts were made to distribute the stores and re-arm the disbanded troops, but the men threw away
the muskets. The magazines were pillaged, the miserable wretches naturally fastening upon the spirit
stores. Men drunken and dying lay in heaps in the snow-covered streets. Most of the benumbed
fugitives lacked even the sense to avail themselves of the ice on the river; they crowded mechanically
over the bridge, fighting for precedence, stifling and trampling each other down, as at the Berezina and
Vilna. Murat placed some guns in battery on the left bank of the Niemen, and left for Königsberg on the
13th, while Ney and the rear-guard occupied the town, which they held until dark. Platov sent across a
detachment on the ice, which captured the guns on the left bank and barred Ney’s retreat. His men
were largely huddling in the houses; he had only a few hundred armed soldiers. He turned down the
left bank of the river and then diverged to the left across the Pelwiski forest, eventually making his way
by Gumbinnen to Königsberg. He abandoned in the forest Loison’s 16 guns, almost the last artillery that
the army retained.
The Russians did not immediately cross the political frontier, and bitterly as the Prussian peasantry
hated the French they did not actively ill-treat them. Many isolated fugitives were disarmed, but their
misery was such as to melt even hearts steeled by hatred and the memory of recent oppression. De
Fezensac says that the happiness of being fed and lodged prevented them from noticing the hostility of
the people. The bulk of the mob of fugitives reached Königsberg by the 20th, and thence cantonments
were spread along the Vistula. On that day the infantry of the Guard counted about 2500 officers and
men, of whom 1000 were sick. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps mustered between them on January
10th, 1813, some 13,000 men sound and sick, of whom 2500 were officers. As to the condition of the
army, nearly all the troops were disarmed and had to be furnished with new muskets from the vast
magazines at Danzig. On December 23rd Eblé, now in chief command of the artillery, reported that of
all the vast train which had entered Russia with the Central Army there remained but 9 guns and
howitzers, and 5 caissons!
Two days before Lariboissière had died, and on December 30th Eblé also passed away. Colonel Pion des
Loches, a man who rarely has a good word to say for his superiors, expresses himself thus concerning
them: “Both were victims of their zeal and devotion. Our army lost in them its pillars and supports ...
and what are all our other generals worth beside them?” As his comrades in arms laid Eblé to rest in the
Roman Catholic cemetery at Königsberg, Napoleon was signing the decree which created him First
Inspector-General of Artillery. Eblé’s grave has vanished, for the cemetery has been destroyed, but his
glory far outshines that of thousands of better known men.
Marshal Kutuzov reached Vilna on December 12th to control the hitherto independent movements of
Chichagov and Wittgenstein. His own troops were following under Tormazov, but they were so shattered
by the long march from Moscow that their offensive power was for the time at an end, and they were
cantoned about Vilna. Chichagov was to follow to the Niemen to support Platov and the advance-guards
which hung on the heels of the retreating French. Wittgenstein was ordered to intercept Macdonald on
his expected retreat to the Niemen, while Paulucci was to press him in rear. Sacken’s army, supported
by the Mozyr force, now under Tuchkov II, and a detachment from Bobruisk, was to deal with
Schwarzenberg. The Emperor Alexander reached Vilna on December 22nd, and at once devoted himself
to the task of endeavouring to save the lives of his captured enemies. The hospitals were choked with
the Russian sick, and the French prisoners, almost all ill and helpless, were perishing wholesale. Biscuit
and bread they received, but there was no other help for them. Gangrened wounds, frost-bite, and
typhus produced by filth, hunger, and putrefaction, swept them away. In three weeks 15,000 are said to
have died. Alexander and Constantine made magnificent efforts to cope with the awful mass of human
misery. Reckless of personal danger, they personally superintended the relief operations; the Grand
Duke nearly died of the fever which he caught in the midst of his labour of humanity. St. Priest was
transferred from the work of collecting the Russian stragglers to that of superintending the hospitals of
the prisoners, for which his French origin especially fitted him.
Macdonald, before Riga, received his orders to retreat on December 18th, and started next day in two
main columns, he himself leading the way with Grandjean’s division, a Prussian infantry brigade, and
Massenbach’s cavalry; while Yorck followed a day’s march behind the rest of the Prussians. Wittgenstein
himself could hardly intercept him; but the flying detachments of Kutuzov II and Diebich, thrown far
forward, might hope to impede Macdonald’s march. The Marshal on reaching Koltiniani divided his own
column, taking advantage of two roads thence to Tilsit, and intending to reunite his whole corps at
Tauroggen. Kutuzov II was too weak to intercept him; but Diebich, with his 1500 cavalry and a few
sledge-guns, got between Macdonald and Yorck on the 25th, and boldly proposed to the latter a
conference in order to prevent useless bloodshed. After some hesitation Yorck at last made up his mind,
and on the 30th concluded the famous convention of Tauroggen, by which the Prussians were declared
neutral. The results were incalculably important, but belong rather to the history of the German War of
Liberation. The immediate consequence was that the wreck of the Grande Armée was weakened by
16,000 or 17,000 excellent soldiers and 60 guns.
Macdonald, meanwhile, was pursuing his retreat, and on the 27th repulsed Vlastov’s divisions, which
had come up to support Kutuzov II, capturing some prisoners and a gun. But at Tilsit, on the 31st, he
was deserted by Massenbach and was forced to fall back on Königsberg. He marched rapidly and
steadily, and reached the Prussian capital in safety. On January 3rd, 1813, his rear-guard, under
Bachelu, was driven through Labiau, after a hard fight, by Wittgenstein’s advance-guard under
Chepelev. At Königsberg Macdonald was joined by Heudelet’s division, but Yorck’s defection ended all
hope of being able to make a stand on the Pregel, and the retreat was continued to Danzig. When the
blockade of Riga was raised, Paulucci sent Lewis with 8000 men to pursue Macdonald, and himself with
3000 made a dash for Memel, which he reached on December 15th, after an amazing march of 200
miles in 8 days. The place immediately surrendered.
While Schwarzenberg had been contending with Sacken, General Kosinski with his Poles had once more
invaded Volhynia, but was repulsed after a little skirmishing by Musin-Pushkin.
Schwarzenberg, turning from his pursuit of Sacken, reached Slonim again on December 7th; but on
learning of the catastrophe of the Grande Armée he retreated on the 14th to Bielostok, arriving there on
the 18th. Reynier drew back behind the Bug. On the advance of Sacken and Tuchkov, to assist whom
Kutuzov also directed a column under Miloradovich, Schwarzenberg steadily withdrew, there being
nothing but the most insignificant fighting. The Austrians eventually fell back into their own territory,
while Reynier retreated towards Saxony. The Polish troops remained in the Vistula fortresses, and were
mostly captured in the following year. The little field army which Poniatowski was able to collect was
allowed to join Napoleon in Saxony, since its blockade employed too many troops.
Thus in the last days of December the Russian territory had been freed from the vast host which had
threatened to overwhelm it. The immediate result of the campaign was the all but complete destruction
of an army nearly 700,000 men strong and its immense material. In all it would appear that, exclusive
of Polish stationary troops and local levies other than those already mentioned, some 674,000
combatants crossed the Vistula against Russia, of whom about 640,000 actually took part in military
operations. Of these 640,000 there remained as organised troops at the end of the campaign only the
forces of Schwarzenberg and Macdonald, perhaps 68,000 combatants in all. All the other corps and
divisions were represented by about 25,000 disorganised and generally disarmed men—largely officers
—without cavalry and with scarcely any artillery. The number of guns which actually entered Russia is
somewhat doubtful, but appears to have been over 1300, exclusive of the Riga siege train. Of these
some 250 can be accounted for as having returned. The Russians claimed 929 as captured; the rest
were no doubt abandoned and never recovered. More than 200,000 trained horses were lost; and it was
the want of them which, even more than the deficiency of trained men, ruined Napoleon’s chances in
1813. The total chasm in the Napoleonic ranks was over 550,000 fighting men. As prisoners the
Russians claimed 48 generals, 3000 officers, and 190,000 men, but it is to be feared that half of them
were captured only to die. Even without making allowance for this, more than 350,000 soldiers must
have perished, besides the tens of thousands of camp-followers, refugees, and other non-combatants.
The Russian losses are extremely difficult to compute. It is impossible to work upon the number of men
successfully put into the field, and those remaining active at the close of the campaign, since the
deficiency does not, as in the case of the Napoleonic army, represent absolute loss. There are reasons
for believing that the actual loss of fighting men was nearly 150,000. The number of non-combatants—
largely peaceful inhabitants of the country—who perished must have been enormous.
The ultimate results of the Russian victory were the general uprising of northern Germany against
Napoleon, the adhesion of Austria—after considerable hesitation—to the anti-Napoleonic coalition, and
the complete overthrow within little more than a year of the empire of force which he had built in
Europe. Britain had long since destroyed Napoleon’s efforts at gaining power on the sea, and had struck
heavy blows at his prestige on land. As the Russian army lay at Tarutino it was gladdened by the news
of Wellington’s victories. And the prestige of Napoleon, shaken in Spain, was now shattered in Russia,
and his material military power so broken that he was never really able again to face his antagonists on
equal terms. It is perhaps true to say that the enthusiastic uprising of Germany was the chief factor in
Napoleon’s downfall in 1813, but it was Russia who gave the impulse and cleared the way; and her
military aid was of vital importance.

FIRST BATTLE OF POLOTSK (August 17th and 18th, 1812)

APPENDIX A
FORCES SUCCESSIVELY EMPLOYED BY NAPOLEON AGAINST RUSSIA IN 1812
 Infantry Cavalry
Date of
and and
Muster Battalions. Squadrons. Total. Guns.
Foot Horse
Roll.
Artillery. Artillery.
Grand Head-
June 24 (?)
quarters 3,075 908 3,983
1st Corps d Armée ” ” 88 16 68,627 3,424 72,051 150
2nd ” ” ” ” 48 16 34,299 2,840 37,139 92
3rd ” ” “ ”@ 45 24 35,755 3,587 39,342 86
4th ” ” “ 30 54 20 42,430 3,368 45,798 116
5th ” ” ” 24 33 20 32,159 4,152 36,311 70
6th ” ” July 1 28 16 23,228 1,906 25,134 58
7th ” ” June 24 18 16 15,003 2,186 17,189 50
8th ” ” ” ” 18 12 15,885 2,050 17,935 34
9th ” ” Sept 3 43 12 31,663 1,904 33,567 80
10th ” ” June 24 36 16 30,023 2,474 32,497 84
Austrian Corps ” ” 26 44 26,830 7,318 34,148 60
Imperial Guard Estimated
(except
Cavalry) 38 28 25,000 6,279 31,279 112
1st Cavalry Corps June 24 — 54 — 12,077 12,077 30
2nd ” ” ” ” — 52 — 10,436 10,436 30
3rd ” ” ” ” — 50 — 9,676 9,676 30
4th ” ” ” ” — 40 — 7,964 7,994 24
32nd Division Nov 2 18 — 13,592 — 13,592 20
34th ” Nov 18 19 6 13,290 700 13,299 16
Engineers,Artillery
Reserves, etc. 10,000(?) 230
410,849 83,279 504,128 1,372
Absentees who rejoined — — — 37,100 —
Lagrange’s Division (Drafts) — — — 13,408 —
Foreign Guard Battalions}
Kosinski’s Polish Brigade}
Austrian Reserve Brigade} circa — — 70,000 18
2 German Regiments }
Drafts of all kinds }
624,636
In Duchy of Warsaw and on Vistula
}
5 Foreign Guard
Battalions }
Heudelet’s Division (20
Battalions) }
Destrée’s Division (Neapolitans) at
32
Danzig} — — — 50,000
New Levies, Drafts,
etc. }
Garrisons on
Vistula }
674,636 1,422
====== ======
It is extremely difficult to compute the numbers of reinforcements, etc., since a proportion of them
consisted of convalescents and rejoining stragglers.
No allowance is made for the large number of transport drivers and other non-combatants.

APPENDIX B
COMPOSITION OF THE NAPOLEONIC GRAND ARMY BY NATIONALITIES
Imp. Guard, Head-quarters, Army Corps 1-10, Austrians, 4 Cavalry Corps, 32nd and 34th Divisions.
Battalions. Squadrons.
French and New French 239 214
Poles 51 69
Italians 22 14
Croats and Dalmatians 7 —
Spaniards 4 —
Portuguese 6 3
Swiss 12 —
Bavarians 30 24
Saxons 22 32
Westphalians 22 20
Württembergers 12 16
Badeners 7 2
Berg Troops 8 4
Mecklenburg Troops 3 —
Hesse-Darmstadt 6 2
Small Rheinbund States 11 —
Austrians 26 44
Prussians 20 24
Various (Mamelukes) 1

APPENDIX C
FORCES SUCCESSIVELY EMPLOYED BY RUSSIA AGAINST NAPOLEON IN 1812
FIRST ARMY OF WEST. APPROXIMATE STRENGTH
Force. Battalions. Squadrons. Cossack Batteries. Infantry Cavalry. Cossacks. Artillery. Total. Guns
Regiments. and
Engineers.
1st
Army
Corps 28 16 1 8 17,100 2,250 880 1,620 21,850 96
2nd ”
” 24 8 — 7 14,400 1,120 — 1,340 16,860 84
3rd ”
” 26 4 1 7 15,360 600 550 1,340 17,850 84
4th ”
” 22 8 — 6 12,960 1,120 — 1,120 15,200 72
5th ”
” 26 20 — 6 15,840 2,880 — 1,400 20,120 80
6th ”
” 24 8 — 7 14,400 1,120 — 1,340 16,860 84
1st
Cavalry
Corps — 24 — 1 — 3,480 — 220 3,700 12
2nd
” ” — 24 — 1 — 3,360 — 220 3,580 12
3rd ”
” — 20 — 1 — 2,800 — 220 3,020 12
Cossack
Corps — — — 1 — — 6,160 220 6,380 12
Artillery
Reserve — — — 3 — — — 720 720 36
95,060 18,730 7,590 9,760 126,140 584
SECOND ARMY OF WEST
Force. Battalions. Squadrons. Cossack Batteries. Infantry Cavalry. Cossacks. Artillery. Total. Guns
Regiments. and
Engineers.
7th
Army
Corps 24 8 — 7 14,650 1,120 — 1,340 17,110 84
8th ”
” 22 20 — 5 12,000 2,800 — 1,040 15,840 60
4th
Cavalry
Corps — 24 — 1 — 3,360 — 220 3,580 12
Cossack
Division — — 9 — — — 3960 220 4180 12
27th
Infantry
Division 12 — — — 7,200 — — — 7,200 —
33,850 7,280 3,960 2,820 47,910 168
THIRD ARMY OF WEST
Force. Battalions. Squadrons. Cossack Batteries. Infantry Cavalry. Cossacks. Artillery. Total.
Regiments. and
Engineers.
Kamenski’s
Corps 17 8 — 4 9,970 1,120 — 780 1
Markov’s ” 24 8 — 7 14,400 1,120 — 1,340 1
Sacken’s
Reserve 12 24 — 2 4,000 2,500 — 440
Lambert’s
Corps — 36 — — — 5040 — —
Irregulars — — 9 — — — 3,960 —
Reserve
Artillery — — — 1 — — — 240
28,370 9,780 3,960 2,800 4
ARMY OF THE DANUBE
Force. Battalions. Squadrons. Cossack Batteries. Infantry Cavalry. Cossacks. Artillery. Total.
Regiments. and
Engineers.
Langeron’s
Division 12 8 3 4 6,000 1,000 1,000 700
Essen III’s
Division 12 8 3 4 6,000 1,000 1,000 700
Voïnov’s
Division 11 12 3 4 5,500 1,500 1,000 700
Bulatov’s
Division 6 20 1 4 3,000 2,500 300 700
Sabaniev’s
Division 9 8 1 1 4,500 1,000 300 200
Lüders’
Division 9 8 2 1 4,500 1,000 600 150
29,500 8,000 4,200 3,150 4
ARMY OF FINLAND
Force. Battalions. Squadrons. Cossack Batteries. Infantry Cavalry. Cossacks. Artillery. Total.
Regiments. and
Engineers.
Steingell’s
Corps and
Field
Detachments 22 6 1 4½ — — — — 1
Garrison
Detachments 4 — 1 — — — — —
1
RESERVES AND GARRISONS IN JUNE
Depôt,
Troops, etc. 87 54 — ? — — — — 3
CRIMEAN GARRISON
Detachments 8 — — 2 — — — —
Militia, Marines, Recruits, Cossacks, etc. 9
Total 41
=====

APPENDIX D
STAFF OF NAPOLEON’S GRAND ARMY OF RUSSIA, 1812
Commander-in-Chief:
H.I.M. the Emperor and King Napoleon I.
Chief of Staff Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neuchatel
” Cavalry H.M. the King of Naples (Marshal Murat)
 ” Artillery Général de Division Comte Lariboissière
” Engineers ” ” Comte Chasseloup
” Bridge Trains ” “ Baron Eblé
Intendant General ” ” Comte Mathieu Dumas

CHIEF MINISTERS, COURT OFFICIALS, ETC., ACCOMPANYING THE EMPEROR

Maret, Duke of Bassano Minister of Foreign Affairs
Comte Daru Secretary of State
General Duroc, Duke of Friuli Grand Marshal of the Palace
” Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza Grand Equerry
Baron Ménéval Secretary of the Portfolio
” Fain ” ” Archives
” Mounier ” ” Cabinet
Colonel Baron de Ponton ” ” ”
State-Council Auditor Lelorgne
Chief Interpreter
d’Ideville
Director of Topographical
Baron Bacler d’Albe
Cabinet

THE GENERAL STAFF

Department or
General Officer.
Command.
Général de Division Junot, Duc
First Aide-de-Camp
d’Abrantes
” ” Lebrun, Duc de Placentia Aide-de-Camp
” ” Mouton, Comte Lobau ”
” ” Comte Rapp ”
” ” Comte de Narbonne ”
” ” Comte Durosnel ”
” ” Comte Sokolniki Polish Officer Attached
” ” Comte Sanson Topography and History
” ” Baron de Caulaincourt Grand Head-quarters
” Brigade Comte Bailly de
Chief of Berthier’s Staff
Monthion
” ” Baron Guilleminot Small Head-quarters
” ” Baron Jomini History
“ ” Comte Lauer Gendarmerie
There were in Napoleon’s train a large number of General Officers “disposable.” Most of these were
appointed to commands later, and mostly appear in the list of Commandants of districts.

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING IN THE DISTRICTS OF THE ARMY (11TH AUGUST)

Government of
Comte
General of Division Lithuania
Hogendorp
” ” Baron Durutte Berlin
 ” ” Comte Dutaillis Warsaw
Comte
” ” Vitebsk
Charpentier
” ” Gomès Freyre Glubokoië
” ” Marquis d’Alorna Mohilev
” ” Baillet-de-la-Tour Elbing
General of Brigade Castella Königsberg
” ” Corsin Pillau
” ” Plauzonne Plock
” ” Ferrière Bielostok
” ” Tarayre Kovno
” ” Voyezinski Thorn
” ” Wedel Wilkowiski
” ” Brun Grodno
” ” Bronikowski Minsk

Corps. Division. Division General.

1st Corps 1st Infantry Morand
(Maréchal Davout, 2nd ” Friant
Prince d’Eckmühl) 3rd ” Gudin
4th ” Dessaix
5th ” Compans
Cavalry Girardin (Sept.)
Artillery Baron Pernety

2nd Corps 6th Infantry Legrand

(Maréchal Oudinot 8th ” Verdier
Duc de Reggio) 9th ” Merle
Artillery Dulauloy

3rd Corps 10th Infantry Ledru

(Maréchal Ney, Duc 11th ” Razout
Prince Royal of
d’Elchingen) 25th ”
Württemberg
Artillery Foucher

4th Corps 13th Infantry Delzons

(His Imperial 14th ” Broussier
Highness 15th ” Pino
Prince Eugène) Artillery Danthouard

5th Corps 16th Infantry Zayonczek

(General Prince 17th ” Dombrowski
Poniatowski) 18th ” Kamienicki
Artillery Pelletier
6th Corps 19th Infantry Deroy
(General Gouvion 20th ” Wrede
Saint-Cyr)

7th Corps 21st Infantry Lecoq

(General Reynier) 22nd ” De Funck

8th Corps 23rd Infantry Tharreau

(General
24th ” Ochs
Vandamne)
(later General
Junot)

9th Corps 12th Infantry Partouneaux

(Maréchal Victor, 26th ” Dändels
Duc de Belluno) 28th ” Gérard

10th Corps 7th ” Grandjean

(Maréchal
Prussians (1) Grawert
Macdonald,
Duc de Taranto) (2) Yorck
Cavalry Massenbach

11th Corps 30th Infantry D’Heudelet

(Maréchal
31st ” Lagrange
Augereau,
Duc de Castiglione) 32nd ” Durutte
33rd ” Destrées
34th ” Morand

CAVALRY RESERVE

Commander-in-Chief:
The King of Naples.

Chief of the Staff:

General Belliard.

Corps. Division. Division General.

1st Corps 1st Light Cavalry Bruyère
1st Heavy
(Nansouty) Saint-Germain
Cavalry
5th ” Valence

2nd Light
2nd Corps Sebastiani
Cavalry
 2nd Heavy
(Montbrun) Wathier
Cavalry
4th ” Defrance

5th Heavy
3rd Corps Doumerc
Cavalry
(Grouchy) 6th ” Lahoussaye
3rd Light Cavalry Chastel

4th Corps 4th Light Cavalry Rozniecki

(Latour-Maubourg) 7th Heavy ” Lorge

APPENDIX E
STAFF OF RUSSIAN ARMIES OPPOSED TO NAPOLEON, JULY, 1812
FIRST ARMY OF THE WEST
General of Infantry Baron Barclay de
Commander-in-Chief
Tolly
Chief of Staff Major-General Yermólov (July)
Quartermaster-
Colonel Baron Toll (July)
General
General “of Service” Colonel Kikin
Chief of Artillery Major-General Count Kutaïsov
Chief of Engineers Major-General Trusson
Army
Corps Commander. Division. Divisional Commander.
Corps.
I Lieut.-General Count Wittgenstein 5th Infantry Major-Gen. Berg
14th ” Major-Gen. Sazonov
1st Cavalry Major-Gen. Khakovski
Major-Gen. Prince Eugen of
II Lieut.-General Baggohufwudt 4th Infantry
Württemberg
17th ” Major-Gen. Olsuviev
III Lieut.-General Tuchkov I 3rd ” Lieut.-Gen. Konovnitzin
1st Grenadier Lieut.-Gen. Strogonov
Lieut.-General Count Ostermann-
IV 11th Infantry Major-Gen. Choglokov
Tolstoï
23rd ” Major-Gen. Bakhmetiev
General H.I.H. Grand Duke
V Imperial Guard
Constantine
(Infantry) Lieut.-Gen. Lavrov (July)
Combined
Grenadiers
1st Cuirassier Major-Gen. Depreradovich
VI General of Infantry Dokhturov 7th Infantry Major-Gen. Kapsevich
24th ” Major-Gen. Likbachev
1st Cavalry Corps Lieut.-Gen. Uvarov
2nd Cavalry Corps Lieut.-Gen. Baron Korff
 3rd Cavalry Corps Major-Gen. Count Pahlen II
Cossacks General of Cavalry Platov

SECOND ARMY OF THE WEST

Commander-in-Chief General of Infantry Prince Bagration
Chief of Staff Major-General Count de St. Priest
Quartermaster-General ” ” Vistitski II
General of Service Colonel Marin
Chief of Artillery Major-General Baron Löwenstern
Chief of Engineers ” ” Förster
Army Corps. Corps Commander. Division. Divisional Commander.
VII Lieut.-General Raievski 12th Infantry Major-General Kolubakin
26th ” ” ” Paskievich
VIII Lieut.-General Borozdin I 2nd Grenadier ” ” Prince Karl of Mecklenburg
Combined Grenadiers ” ” Count Voronzov
2nd Cuirassier ” ” Knorring
4th Cavalry Corps ” ” Count Sievers
27th Infantry ” ” Neverovski
Cossacks ” ” Ilovaïski V
THIRD ARMY OF THE WEST
Commander-in-Chief General of Cavalry Tormazov
Chief of Staff Major-General Inzov
Quartermaster-General ” ” Renne
Chief of Artillery ” ” Sievers
Army Corps. Corps Commander. Division. Divisional Commander.
Lieut.-General Count Kamenski 18th Infantry Major-General Cherbatov
Combined Grenadiers ?
Lieut.-General Markov 9th Infantry ?
15th ” Major-General Nazimov
Reserve Lieut.-General Sacken Reserve Battalion & ” ” Sorokin
Squadrons (Skeleton)
Cavalry Corps Major-General Count Lambert 4 Brigades ?
Irregulars ?

ARMY OF THE DANUBE (JULY 31)

Commander-in-Chief Admiral Chichagov
Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Sabaniev
Quartermaster-
Major-General Berg
General
General of Service ” ” Tuchkov II
“Corps” Divisional Commanders
General of Infantry Count de
I
Langeron
II Lieutenant-General Essen III
 III ” ” Voïnov
IV Major-General Bulatov
Reserve Lieutenant-General Sabaniev
Detachment Major-General Lüders

ARMY OF FINLAND
Commander-in-Chief: Lieutenant-General Count Steingell
3 Divisions (about half brought to front in September)

STAFF OF THE MAIN RUSSIAN ARMY, OCTOBER 18, 1812

Commander-in-Chief Marshal Prince Golénischev-Kutuzov
(Commander—in—Chief of all Russian
Armies)
Chief of Staff General of Cavalry Baron Bennigsen
General of Service Lieutenant-General Konovnitzin
Intendant-General Privy-Councillor Lanskoï
Chief of Artillery Major-General Baron Löwenstern
Quartermaster-General Colonel Baron Toll
Commander of Corps de
General of Cavalry Count Tormazov
Bataille
Commander of Advance-
General of Infantry Miloradovich
Guard

FOOTNOTES:
[10] 2nd Corps 500 infantry; Claparède 200; Dombrowski 800; 5th Corps 323. Cavalry about 500.
Artillery perhaps 200.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
FRENCH AND GERMAN
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Maringoné, L.J. Vionnet de. Fragments de Mémoires.
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There are innumerable volumes of memoirs which deal in part with the campaign. Some need using
with caution—e.g. Marbot’s.
RUSSIAN, ETC.
Archives. (1) Published by P.J. Schukin.
(2) Published by Russian War Office.
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ENGLISH
Cathcart, Lt.-Gen. Sir George. Commentaries.
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Note.—The number of works in the French language dealing with the campaign of 1812 is so enormous
that no attempt has been made to give more than a selection.

THE ADVANCE TO MOSCOW

Napoleonic forces indicated by shaded blocks.
Russian ” ” solid ”
Arabic numerals indicate Napoleonic Corps d’Armée.
Roman numerals indicate Russian Corps d’Armée.
Napoleonic lines of march indicated by solid lines.
Russian ” ” ” broken lines.

The dates are those of the various stages of the French advance or on which they occupied important points. Each larger
block, whether solid or shaded, indicates approximately 20,000 men.
 THE RETREAT FROM MOSCOW
Napoleonic forces indicated by shaded blocks.
Russian ” ” solid ”
Napoleonic lines of march indicated by solid lines.
Russian ” ” ” broken lines.

The dates are those of the various stages of the French retreat or on which they abandoned or lost important places. Each
larger block, solid or shaded, indicates approximately 20,000 men.

INDEX