A RESEARCH PROJECT

ON
THE TOPIC
“GAME THEORY”

FOR THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN MATHEMATICS

UNEDR THE SUPERVISION OF: Submitted by :

Dr. D . S. SHARAMA DEVKINANDAN MAHURE
M.Sc. Ph.D. M.Sc. IV Semester

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS
DR. B. R. A. UNIVERSITY, AGRA -
. MAY2025

SUPERVISOR CERTIFICATE
This to certify that Devkinandan mahure has worked for the
degree Master of science in mathematics in the ST JOHNS
COLLEGE AGRA under my supervision. The work reported in
the present research report entitled “game theory” has been
done by the candidate himself, and has not been submitted
elsewhere.

Date:02/05/2025
SUPERVISOR SIGNATURE

DECLARATION

I Devkinadan mahure declare that work done in the present

research report entitled “game theory’’ has been done
thoroughly by me and not copied and taken from any other
literature related to this field. The related literature is used only
to review the advancement and benefit of the research in this
field has not been submitted for any other degree.

DATE-08/05/2024
NAME: Devkinandan Mahure
S/ O: Vinod kumar Mahure
Roll no: 2300020530003
Class : M.SC. (Final )

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
At completion of the present project entitled “game theory” I
feel great pleasure to say that that the entire work is due the
inspiration, encouragement and hearty co-operation of my
respected supervisor “Dr. D.S Sharma’’ head of department of
mathematics ST JOHNS COLLEGE AGRA and my special thanks to
Dr. SHARON MOSES for o co-operation and guide in every step
Whom I am deeply indebted for her effective guidance and un-
conditional help.
I would also pay my sincere thanks to the Principal, ST JONHS
College, Agra and my teachers for his kind co-operation and help
which I received from time to time. I would also like to pay my
sincere regards to my friends and colleagues for their
unconditional help and constant encouragement in all respects
throughout this work. Finally, I consider myself fortunate enough
to dedicate this research project to my respected father and
mother whose blessings and continuous encouragement inspired
me to under- take this research work.

Abstract
The mathematical analysis of situations with conflicts of interest is
called game theory. (G.Owen, 2012) (Roy et al., n.d.). Additionally, it
may be used to create rules such that regular game play results in a
just conclusion (for example, assigning voting weights in a
parliament where members represent constituencies of various
sizes). It is a formal theory that assumes perfect reason, but it may
also—and frequently—be utilised as a toolbox of idea techniques for
research that assumes thin rationality. This category of applications
in housing studies is presented and discussed in relation to four
different societal levels: gender and generational relations in the
household, problems with collective action in housing estates, local
governance networks in urban renewal, and nested games over
national housing regimes. A larger use of lightly rationalistic game
models should be very beneficial for research into urban
government, national housing regimes, and housing sustainability.
Games can be classified as having complete or imperfect knowledge,
as cooperative or noncooperative, as zero-sum or non-zero-sum
games, and so on. The emphasis in noncooperative games is on
finding tactics that are in equilibrium or that are, in some ways,
beneficial.(McEachern, 2017) In cooperative games, the focus is
placed on the negotiation and coalition-building process. The issue
of learning is equally significant in games with missing information.
Game theory often presupposes that the players are fully informed
about the game they are playing, i.e., they are aware of the tactics
that are accessible, the probabilities associated with random
actions, and the reward functions. In reality, this isn't always the
case. Theorists have so investigated scenarios in which players'
subjective probability for the games they are playing are present.
Aumann and Maschler have investigated the conundrum posed by a
player who wants to use secret knowledge but worries that doing so
would give it away to an adversary, as well as the conundrum faced
by a player who wants to infer information from an adversary's
movements.(GAME THEORY-NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS
APPLICATIONS, 2015a) Therefore, game theory cannot suggest an
ideal course of action for a specific player without simultaneously
supplying a means for that player to predict the choices of other
players. To put it another way, game theory is concerned with
defining the actions for all players, guaranteeing that each player's
selected actions are optimum given the actions of other players,
meaning that optimality is relative. As a result, it is frequently
challenging to determine the optimum result from all participants'
perspectives. Therefore, game theory's utility resides on its capacity
to simulate player interaction. Such a model can rule out some
options that could not otherwise be considered, as well as explain
findings involving multiperson decisionmaking settings. (Burguillo,
2018)
 Table of content

1) Supervisor Certificate

2) Declaration

3) Acknowledgement

4) Abstract

5) Introduction

6) History of Game Theory

7) Representation of the Games

a) Strategic Form
b) Extensive Form
c) Coalitional For
8) Problems 1

9) Problem 2
10) RESEARCH OF METHODOLOGY
11) CONCLUSION

12) REFERENCE

8) Research Mathodology

INTRODUCTION
Game Theory (GT) is the formal study of conflict and cooperation
among several agents, denoted as players, representing individuals,
animals, computers, groups, firms, etc. The concepts of game theory
provide a mathematical framework to for mulate, structure, analyze,
and understand such game scenarios, i.e., it provides use ful
mathematical models and tools to understand the possible strategies
that agents may follow when competing or collaborating in games.
The list of games to apply game theory is almost endless:
entertaining games, political scenarios, competitions among firms,
geopolitical issues between countries, and so on. This branch of ap
plied mathematics is used nowadays in disciplines like economics,
social sciences, biology, political science, international relations,
computer science and philosophy among others. We can consider
two main parts in game theory represented by non-cooperative games
and cooperative ones. On the one hand, noncooperative (or
competitive) games assume that each participant acts independently,
without collaborating with the others, and chooses her strategy for
improving her own benefit. On the other hand, cooperative game
theory studies the behavior of players when they cooperate. Within
cooperative games, we find coalition games, in which a set of players
seek to form cooperative groups to improve their performance in a
competitive game, and to enable players to succeed in reaching
objectives that they may not accomplish independently. Coalitions
usually emerge as a natural way to achieve better conditions for de
fending its members against the outside players. Game theory
provides a natural framework to analyze the partitions that can be
formed in a multiplayer game, and the relative power or influence
they can achieve over the whole community. Unfor tunately, many
times coalition formation can become intractable since all possible
coalition combinations in a game depend exponentially on the
number of players. Therefore, finding the optimal partition by
checking the whole space may be too expensive from a
computational point of view. In this chapter, we are going to review
the basic concepts of game theory, and relate them with the use of
coalitions as a way to obtain cooperation in Complex Systems, with
self-interested agents.

HISTORY OF GAME THEORY

 The roots of game theory trace back to the twentieth century, when
in 1921 the math ematician Emile Borel suggested a formal theory of
games, which was taken further by the mathematician John von
Neumann in 1928 in a Theory of Parlor Games. But this discipline
really becomes popular since 1944, when John von Neumann and Os
kar Morgenstern publish the book Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior, where they analyze competitions in which one individual
does better at another’s expense, i.e., zero sum games [25]. From that
moment, traditional applications of game theory attempted to find
equilibria in these games, where each player adopts a strategy that is
unlikely to change. In 1950 John Nash demonstrated that finite
games have always an equilibrium point [24], where all players
choose the best actions for them given their opponents’ choices. This
result was lately denoted as the Nash equilibrium, and it made game
theory became very active along the 50s and the 60s, when it was
broadened theoret ically and applied to war and political models. The
scientific community developed new concepts such as the core, the
extensive form game, fictitious play, repeated games, and the
Shapley value. Besides, the theory became to spread to philosophi
cal, political and social sciences. Among them, the Nash equilibrium
became a cen tral concept of noncooperative game theory, and a focal
point of analysis mainly in economic theory. Another approach
which has been very popular and interesting is the interdisci plinary
combination of evolutionary models from Biology with game theory,
which gave birth to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) [23]. EGT
models the application of interaction dependent strategies in
populations along generations, and differs from classical game theory
by focusing on the dynamics of strategy change more than the
properties of strategy equilibrium. In evolutionary games participants
do not possess unfailing Bayesian rationality. Instead they play with
limited resources. The only re quirement is that players learn by trial
and error, incorporate what they learnt into their future behavior, and
disappear or somehow change if they do not. Along those years, an
interesting set of spatial and social evolutionary games, based on the
itera tive version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma [2] had been suggested
and deeply analyzed by Nowak and other authors [27, 18] trying to
understand the role of local or social interactions in the maintenance
of cooperation Since the end of the 90s game theory started to
consider mechanism design, for instance to design auction
mechanisms for efficient resource assignment concerning
electromagnetic spectrum bandwidth by the mobile
telecommunications industry.

Representation of the Games

Assume that there is a number of players, represented by agents that
take decision in a game, which will be denoted by n; which are
labelled by the integers 1 to n, and we denote the set of players by N
= 1,2,...,n. We will study mostly two person games, n =2, where the
concepts are clearer. There are also one-player games, and in this
case the theory is simply called Decision Theory. There are even
zero-person games, such as the Conway’s game of life [13], where an
automaton gets in motion without any person making decisions. In
several games, and in macroeconomic models, the number of players
can be very large; and sometimes those games are mathematically
modeled with an infinite number of players. We assume that,
depending on their game actions, players receive a certain pay off; as
a numberthat reflects the desirability that a player has about a certain
outcome, i.e., , its utility. The concept of rationality is a central
assumption in many variants of game the ory. A rational player
always plays to maximize his own payoff, assuming certain actions
that the other players will do. The goal of game-theoretic analysis,
under a rational approach, is to give advice on how to play the game
against other rational opponents. This rationality assumption can be
relaxed or limited, and the resulting models have been more recently
applied to the analysis of observed behavior. Next we introduce the
main representations used to describe a game: the exten sive form,
the strategic form and the coalitional form
a) Strategic Form

The strategic (or normal form) of a game is usually represented by a

matrix which shows the players, the strategies and the outcomes of
the game. The outcomes are represented by payoffs, which are real
numbers (also called utilities) that measure how much each player
likes an outcome. This strategic form representation is nor mally used
to describe non-cooperative games. In this chapter we will usually
refer to players as one and two along the text, and player I and II,
respectively, in figures. In Fig. 7.1 we find a two players game,
where player one can choose a strategy between its two row
strategies (A or B), and player two will choose between its two
column strategies (C or D). The payoffs are directly provided in the
matrix cells, with the first value corresponding to player one, and the
second value to player two. For example, if player one plays B and
player two plays C, then player one gets 5 units, while player two
receives 0 units. In a gameinstrategic form, a strategy is one of the
given possible alternatives of a player. Here, it is presumed that each
player acts simultaneously or, at least, without knowing the actions of
the other. We must differentiate between strategy and action

Fig. 7.1 Game described in a strategic (or normal) form

being the first a plan to play a set of actions along the game, and
perhaps achieve a certain goal; while the action would be the
particular choice made by a player at a concrete game iteration.
Sometimes, in simple one-shot games, like the one in Fig. 7.1, both
concepts coincide and are prone to confusion.

b) Extensive Form
The extensive form is used to formalize games as graphs (usually
trees) that describe a time sequencing of moves (see Fig. 7.2) and the
information each player has at each node. Graphs nodes represent a
point of choice for a player, and the links between nodes represent a
possible action for the player. Final payoffs are specified at the
bottom of the graph. This extensive form representation is more
detailed than the strategic form of a game, as it describes how the
game is played over time, including the order in which players take
actions, the information that players have at the time they must take
those actions, and the times at which any uncertainty in the situation
appears.

In the game depicted at Fig. 7.2 there are two players. Player one
moves first and chooses either A or B. Player two sees player one’s
move and then chooses between C or D. In the terminal node we
have the payoffs for every player, being the first value to player one
and the second to player two. For instance, if player one chooses A,
and player two chooses D, then player one gets 0 and player two gets
5. In an extensive form game, a strategy is a complete plan of
choices, one for each decision point of the player. Games where
players have information about choices of the other players are
usually presented in extensive form. Every extensive form game has
an equivalent strategic form representation, but such transformation
may result inadequate due to the exponential growth of strategies for
each player, making it computationally unfeasible.

c) Coalitional Form
In many-player games, there is a tendency for the players to form
coalitions to favor common interests. In the coalitional form of a
game the notion of a strategy disap pears, and the main elements are
coalitions, and the value or the worth a coalition has. It is assumed
that each coalition can guarantee its members a certain amount,
called the value of the coalition. The coalitional form of a game is a
part of cooperative game theory with transfer able utility. Under these
circumstances it is natural to assume that a grand coalition, consisting
of all the players, can appear in the game; and then the question is
how to share the payoff received among all its playe

TYPE OF GAMES
In this section we introduce several types of games according to their
characteristics.

1.Cooperative, Competitive and Hybrid

Games A game is considered cooperative if the players collaborate
establishing binding commitments, while in noncooperative (or
competitive) games they just compete among themselves. Often it is
assumed that communication among players is al lowed in
cooperative games. Hybrid games contain elements from cooperative
and non-cooperative games, usually creating coalitions of players that
cooperate among themselves, but play in a competitive style with the
rest of the players or coalitions. As an example, a football
championship is a pure competition among teams, i.e., coalitions with
a set of players playing cooperatively against the other teams.

2.Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Games Symmetric games model

situations where both players have the same opportunities to play and
payoffs, and therefore, the strategic form of the game is represented
by a symmetric payoff matrix. Asymmetric games usually model
different player roles that provide asymmetric payoffs. Rock-paper-
scissors is a symmetric game, as all the players may choose any of
the strategies and they have the same opportunities. Chess or
checkers are asymmet ric games, as one of the players play first.

3.Zero-sum vs. non-zero-sum games

Zero-sum games Are those ones where the global payoff is
divided among the players, therefore choices done by the players can
neither increase nor decrease the amount of available resources.
Hence, in zero-sum games a player gets a benefit at the expense of
the others. For instance, poker is a classical example of zero-sum
game. Non-zero-sum games are those ones where the gains obtained
by one player does not necessarily correspond with losses for the rest
of the players. In these type of games, usually a cooperation among
players produce higher payoffs than a pure self ish playing.

4. Simultaneous vs. Sequential Games

Simultaneous games are the ones where all the players play their
actions at the same time. Even, if the movement is not effectively
simultaneous, then the players cannot know the others movement at
the same round. Rock-paper-scissors is an example of a simultaneous
game.

5.Perfect, Imperfect and Complete Information Games

In sequential games, a game has perfect information if each player,
when making any decision, is perfectly informed about all the events
that have previously occurred, i.e., the player knows all the actions
that have been made previously by the rest of the players, and the
obtained payoffs. For instance, chess or checkers can be games with
perfect information if players have access to previous moves. As
imperfect in formation games we can refer to many card games,
where a player does not know the previous actions done by the other
players. Perfect information must not be confused with complete
information. In a game with complete information, a player knows
the strategies and payoffs available to the other players at a certain
round, but not necessarily the past events or moves performed by
them. Examples include Poker, tic-tac-toe, Battleship, etc. Games
with incomplete information are called pseudo-games. Another
typical concept used is common knowledge. A fact is considered as
com mon knowledge when all players know it, and know that the
others know it, and so on. It is often assumed that players’ rationality
is also a common knowledge. Finally, games in which players
remember all past information they once knew, and all past moves
they made are called games of perfect recall.
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games As stated at the beginning of this
chapter, John von Neumann, together with Oskar Morgenstern,
published in 1944 his book Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior; where he laid the foundations of game theory. The theory
of von Neumann and Mor genstern is most complete for the class of
games called 2-person zero-sum games. In a two-player zero-sum
game, one player’s gain is the other player’s loss, so their interests
are diametrically opposed. In general, a game is considered zero-sum
if for any game outcome, the sum of the payoffs for all players is
zero. These games are usually represented in the strategic form, with
a game matrix and two sets of strategies, one for every player. Matrix
cells represent the payoff for each player (see Fig. 7.1). We can
formally define a 2-person zero-sum game as a simultaneous game
with a triplet (S1,S2,P), where:
1. S1 is a nonempty set of strategies for Player one.
2. S2 is a nonempty set of strategies for Player two.
3. The payoff matrix P is symmetric, and the winnings of player one
are the losses of player two and viceversa.

When we choose among the set of pure strategies for player one in
S1 (or in S2 for player two) with certain random probabilities, then
we have a mixed strategy for such set. Besides, a 2-person zero-sum
game (S1,S2,P) is a finite game if both strategy sets S1 and S2 are
finite.
 Literature review

The middle ground between ancient and modern game theory was
made to metamorphose thoroughly, if not formalised, in Gerolemo
Cardano’s infamous book ‘The Book on Games of Chance: The 16th-
Century Treatise on Probability, published in 1663. Works like
Augustin Cournot’s Researches into the Mathematical Principles of
the Theory of Wealth, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth’s Mathematical
Psychics and Emile Borel’s Algèbre et calcul des probabilités made a
huge impact on advanced studies and discussions on game theory
(Walker, 2001a). They created a strong base for mathematicians and
economists later on to systematise and approbate game theory.
(Schwalbe & Walker, 2001a)

In 1912, Ernest Zermelo gave two talks in the Fifth International

Congress of Mathematicians in Cambridge.
The second speech was on the game of chess which prompted him
to write a paper on game theory named “Über eine Anwendung der
Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels”. It was published in
1912 and was written in Dutch. This is said to be the first paper ever
written on game theory. Being a chess player, Zermelo wanted to
prove how this theory works in the game of chess. His theorem
states “either White can force a win, or Black can force a win, or
both sides can force at least a draw". He used backward induction to
prove his theory. (Schwalbe & Walker, 2001a)

A number of works on the theory of games were published in 1921

by French mathematician Emile Borel. He discussed the issue of
bluffing and second-guessing the opponent in a game with
incomplete information using poker as an example. (Theory of
Games of Strategy)
 Then came the Zeuthen bargaining model in 1938, which occupies a
prominent place among those theories of the bargaining process
that have been formulated and expounded by economists.
(Coughlin, 1992)

And then finally came the giants- Neumann and Nash. Although
many people have made contributions to the history of game
theory, it is generally agreed that John von Neumann started
modern analysis and that John Nash gave it its methodological
foundation.
This article significantly advanced the subject. Von Neumann
introduced the topic of game theory for the first time in his 1928
work, "Theory of Parlor Games," which also established the
renowned Minimax theorem. Von Neumann anticipated that game
theory would be a significant tool for economists. To establish his
hypothesis, he collaborated with Princeton University economist
Oskar Morgenstern, an Austrian (cournot)(MATHEMATICAL
PSYCHICS)(Schwalbe & Walker, 2001).
The discipline of economics was dramatically altered by their work.
The book's applicability to psychology, sociology, politics, military,
leisure activities, and many other areas quickly became clear,
despite the fact that it was originally only meant for economists.

In 1950, John Nash, an American mathematician, came up with the

Nash theory, which stated: “a situation in which a player will
continue with their chosen strategy, having no incentive to deviate
from it, after taking into consideration the opponent's strategy.”
(GAME THEORY-NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS APPLICATIONS,
2015b)Game theory booms after this. One of the greatest
developments in social science was the creation of noncooperative
game theory was done by John Nash. (PINTO)To better comprehend
how the core concepts of noncooperative game theory were
established and how they altered the history of economic theory,
Nash's work in this field is reviewed in its historical context.

In 1971, the international journal of game theory was started.

In 1972, John Maynard Smith, a British mathematician applied

game theory to animal behaviour and with
Price, he proved that game theory is also used in the evaluation of
the species. They wrote the book “ Game theory and the Evaluation
of Fighting”.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century and early 2000s, Game
theory paid special attention to the formulation of dynamic models.
In 2007, Roger Myerson, alongside Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin,
was awarded the Nobel prize in Economics “for having laid the
foundations of mechanism design theory” with game theory
structure and its design. Roger Myerson has provided a clear and
thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and
methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game
theory. Myerson introduced, clarified, and synthesised the
extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen
years, presents an overview of decision theory, and
comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental
models with games in extensive form and strategic form.(Myerson,
2025)

In 2005, game theorists Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann won

the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences.

Dynamic models, the earliest applications of evolutionary game

theory, were a focus of Schelling's work. (Pinto, n.d.)Aumann made
significant contributions to the equilibrium school, creating a
coarsening correlated equilibrium and a thorough investigation of
the presumption of general knowledge.

For "laying the basis of mechanism design theory," Leonid Hurwicz,

Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson were given the 2007 Nobel Prize in
Economics. A significant graduate text, Game Theory, Analysis of
Conflict, and the idea of appropriate equilibrium are among
Myerson's accomplishments. Hurwicz first proposed and formally
established the idea of incentive compatibility.

For "the theory of stable allocations and the practise of market

design," (MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS, n.d.)Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S.
Shapley received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012.

Shapley is generally considered one of the most important

contributors to the development of game theory. Shapley won the
2012 Nobel Memorial Prize for “The theory of stable allocations and
the practice of Market design” along with Alvin E. Roth.
He elaborated on how some market participants cannot be divided
a priori between a buyer and a seller. When the price of a product
fluctuates, in some cases, one participant can be the seller and the
buyer. Stocks are a clear example of commodities exchanged in such
markets. However, in a market without this property: participants
are either buyers or sellers, regardless of the price of the goods.
Physical or the legal characteristics of the participants also make
them be on the unique sides of the market
(ddd.uab.cat/record/174208) (Jordi Massó Dept. d’Economia i
d’Història Econòmica Facultat d’Economia i Empresa Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona 08193 Bellaterra, n.d.).
Shapley also collaborated closely with his friend mathematician and
game theorist Robert Aumann. Together, the two defined the
Aumann-Shapley value. It was built upon Shapley’s most famous
work, the Shapley value, which is a way of evaluating a game
situation before the game gets played.
Jean Tirole, a game theorist, received the Nobel Prize in 2014.
A total of 15 game theorists have won the Economics Nobel prize.
Problem 1: Prisoner's Dilemma
Two criminals, A and B, are arrested and interrogated separately.
The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict them on the
principal charge but can convict both on a lesser charge. They offer
the same deal to both prisoners:

If both remain silent, they each get 1 year in prison.

If one betrays the other (defects) and the other remains silent, the
defector goes free, and the silent one gets 3 years.

If both betray, they each get 2 years.

Construct the payoff matrix and determine the Nash equilibrium.

Solution:
Let’s construct the payoff matrix.
Each cell shows the (A’s years, B’s years).

B: Silent B: Betray
A: Silent (-1, -1) (-3, 0)
A: Betray (0, -3) (-2, -2)
Note: The negative sign indicates "years in prison" — a smaller
(more negative) value is worse.

Let’s re-write it as a payoff matrix in terms of utility (less prison

time = higher utility):

B: Silent B: Betray
A: Silent (–1, –1) (–3, 0)
A: Betray (0, –3) (–2, –2)
Now analyze the strategies:

A's decision:

If B stays silent: A chooses between –1 (silent) and 0 (betray) →

betraying is better.

If B betrays: A chooses between –3 (silent) and –2 (betray) → again,

betraying is better.

So A will betray, no matter what B does.

B's decision:

Similarly, B finds that betraying always leads to a better outcome.

Thus, the dominant strategy for both players is to betray.

Nash Equilibrium:
The only Nash equilibrium is (Betray, Betray) → (–2, –2), since no
player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally.

Interpretation:
Even though mutual cooperation (–1, –1) would give a better joint
outcome, rational self-interest leads both to betray, resulting in a
worse outcome for both — a key insight in Game Theory about non-
cooperative behavior.
Problem2: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Two-Player Game
Two competing firms, Alpha and Beta, are deciding whether to
launch Product X or Product Y. The success of each depends on what
the other company does.

The payoffs (in millions of dollars) are as follows:

Beta: Product X Beta: Product Y

Alpha: X (3, 3) (1, 4)
Alpha: Y (4, 1) (2, 2)
Each cell is (Alpha’s payoff, Beta’s payoff).

We are to find all Nash Equilibria, both in pure and mixed

strategies.

Step 1: Pure Strategy Analysis

Let’s first look for any pure strategy Nash equilibria.

Check each strategy profile:

 (X, X): Alpha’s payoff is 3. If Alpha switches to Y → gets 4 → prefers
to switch. So not NE.

(X, Y): Alpha gets 1. If Alpha switches to Y → gets 2 → prefers to

switch. So not NE.

(Y, X): Alpha gets 4. If Alpha switches to X → gets 3 → prefers to

stay.
Beta gets 1. If Beta switches to Y → gets 2 → prefers to switch. Not
NE.

(Y, Y): Alpha gets 2. If Alpha switches to X → gets 1 → prefers to

stay.
Beta gets 2. If Beta switches to X → gets 1 → prefers to stay.

→ (Y, Y) is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.

Step 2: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Let:

Alpha plays X with probability p, Y with (1–p)

Beta plays X with probability q, Y with (1–q)

Alpha’s Expected Payoff:

If Alpha plays X:

Expected payoff = 3q + 1(1–q) = 3q + 1 – q = 2q + 1

If Alpha plays Y:
Expected payoff = 4q + 2(1–q) = 4q + 2 – 2q = 2q + 2

For Alpha to be indifferent between X and Y (necessary in mixed

strategy NE):

yaml
Copy code
2q + 1 = 2q + 2 → No solution
This is impossible, meaning Alpha never mixes; prefers Y always.
Let’s test Beta now.

Beta’s Expected Payoff:

If Beta plays X:

Payoff = 3p + 1(1–p) = 3p + 1 – p = 2p + 1

If Beta plays Y:

Payoff = 4p + 2(1–p) = 4p + 2 – 2p = 2p + 2

To make Beta indifferent: Copy code

2p + 1 = 2p + 2 → No solution
Also impossible. Beta prefers Y always.

So the only Nash Equilibrium is in pure strategies:

Final Answer: Nash Equilibrium is (Alpha: Y, Beta: Y) with payoff (2,

2)
 Interpretation:
Although both firms might have been tempted to go for high
payoffs by mismatching (e.g., Alpha chooses Y, Beta chooses X gives
Alpha 4), these are not stable due to incentive to deviate. The only
stable outcome is where both go for Product Y.
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The major keywords used in the methodology research, which we

shall discuss further are-

1. Crisis: To analyse the relation of game theory with ‘crisis’, we

shall briefly talk about the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A Soviet
attempt to place medium- and intermediate-range nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles in Cuba that could strike a significant portion of
the United States in October 1962 served as the catalyst for the
Cuban missile crisis. The United States sought the prompt removal
of Soviet missiles, and American policymakers gave two
approaches substantial consideration. The approaches were –

A naval blockade (B), or "quarantine" as it was

euphemistically called, to prevent shipment of more missiles,
possibly followed by stronger action to induce the Soviet Union
to withdraw the missiles already installed.

OR

A "surgical" air strike (A) to wipe out the missiles already

installed, insofar as possible, perhaps followed by an invasion
of the island.

The alternatives open to Soviet policy makers were:

1. Withdrawal (W) of their missiles.

2. Maintenance (M)of their missiles.

 These strategies may be thought of as many routes that the two
parties, or "players" in game theory speak, could pursue. The four
outcomes are to be ranked by the participants as follows: 4 = best, 3
= next best, 2 = next worst, and l = worst. As a result, as the number
rises, so does the reward. The payoffs, however, are only ordinal,
which means that they don't reflect how much a player favours one
occurrence over another but rather the ranking of events from best
to worst. The first number in each set of ordered pairs represents
the payout for the row player (the United States), while the second
number represents the payout for the column player (Soviet Union).
It goes without saying that the strategy decisions, likely outcomes,
and related payoffs depicted in Figure 1 only give a basic overview of
the crisis's thirteen-day evolution. Both parties thought about
various modifications on each of the two mentioned options in
addition to the other options. For instance, the Soviets asked that
the United States remove its missiles from Turkey in exchange for
them removing their own missiles from Cuba. The United States
publicly disregarded this demand. (docplayer.net/52603373-Game-
theory-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html)
Although one book detailing this nuclear conflict had "collision
path" in the title, most observers of this crisis believe that the two
superpowers were on it. President Kennedy was pressured by the
Union to vow not to invade Cuba at the same time, which seems to
suggest that a compromise of sorts was reached in the end.
However, since the strategies connected to compromise do not
make up a Nash equilibrium, this is not what game theory predicts
for Chicken. (docplayer.net/52603373-Game-theory-and-the-cuban-
missile-crisis.html)
 To see this, pretend that play is at the compromise position (3, 3),
which is when Cuba and the S.U. are both under American blockade.
pulls back its missiles. Due to the motivation for both players to
switch to their more combative tactic, this strategy is not reliable.
Play would shift to (4,2) if the U.S. defected by switching to an
airstrike strategy, enhancing the reward for the U.S.; if the S.U. play
would shift to (2,4) if the S.U. deviated by switching to maintenance,
offering the S.U. a 4. payout. Last but not least, if the players were
facing nuclear war, which is the mutually worst consequence of
(1,1), they would both undoubtedly want to flee from it, rendering
the strategies related to it unstable, just like those with (3,3).
(plus.maths.org/issue13/features/brams/feat.pdf, n.d.)
3. Cheap Talk- "Cheap talk" is the term used in game theory to
describe activities that are visible to players but have no direct
impact on their payoffs (Dixit, Jan 2011). These are referred to as
"messages." (These messages should be separated from those
that are sent within the context of a contract and do have
immediate outcomes and payoffs, such as a bid in an action, as
well as from those that transmit verifiable information, such as
submitting a college transcript, with the possibility of significant
penalties for falsification (Jamison, Aug 2020) . Since "cheap talk"
messages have no immediate reward effects, any equilibrium in
the game that existed before the addition of cheap talk continues
to exist merely by allowing senders to transmit useless messages
and allowing recipients to ignore them (clearly, those strategies
are best responses to each other). They are referred to as
"babbling" equilibria. As long as the sender randomises so that
every potential message is sent with a positive probability, these
equilibria are not eliminated by the standard refinements.
(However, several unique improvements have been proposed for
games involving cheap talk; see, for instance, Farrell's
"neologism-proofess").
While doing so, cheap conversation can create intriguing new
equilibria. Games of shared interest are the most straightforward
example, where complete communication achieves equilibrium
and results in a better payout than if cheap talk is prohibited
(Sidartha Gordon, March, 2021). At the other extreme, it is
simple to see that idle discussion cannot add equilibrium results
in a two-player game of competing interests (often known as a
zero-sum game). Of course, the scenarios that involve partial but
not total interest congruence between participants are the most
interesting. For instance, the divergence of interests between the
sender and the receiver is parameterized using a "bias" in the
renowned Crawford-Sobel model (Crawford & Sobel, Nov 1982).
Applications of cheap talk include asking informed but biassed
experts for advice, politicians communicating with their
constituents and with one another, businesses dividing the
market through communication, news media stories, and
international communications, among others. A "long-run" player
would aim to establish a reputation for a message approach, it
should be added. For instance, you want to build a reputation for
not crying wolf too frequently so that when you do, the people
would believe you when you do and come to your aid. According
to Kamenica and Gentzkow, communication involving this level of
commitment from the sender is known as "Bayesian Persuasion"
and typically results in significantly more communication than
conventional small talk.(Amadae, 2018)

4.Game Theory- A game theory concept known as Nash

equilibrium finds the best course of action in a noncooperative
game in which each participant has no incentive to alter their
starting strategy. Assuming that the other players maintain their
 initial plans, a player does not benefit from changing their
approach under the Nash equilibrium. There could be several
Nash equilibria in a game, or none at all.
Sam and John are signing up for the upcoming semester. Both of
them have the choice of either a psychology or finance course. They
don't have time to talk to one another because there are only 30
seconds left before the registration deadline. (Myerson, March
1999)
Sam and John will gain from the chance to prepare for the tests
together if they enrol in the same course. They will both lose out if
they select different classes, though.
There are several Nash equilibria in the example. Sam and John will
benefit from studying together for the exams if they sign up for the
same course. Therefore, in this situation, the outcomes
finance/finance and psychology/psychology are Nash equilibria.
Competition- A and B, two computer companies, intend to market
network systems for offices. handling of information. Each business can
either create a quick, effective system (H) or a sluggish, subpar system
(L).

According to market studies, the resulting revenues will. The

following payoff matrix is provided for each business in relation to
the possible tactics. If both firms make their decisions at the same
time and follow maximin (low-risk) strategies, what will the
outcome be? With a maximin strategy, a firm determines the worst
outcome for each option, then chooses the option that maximizes
the payoff among the worst outcomes. If Firm A chooses H, the
worst payoff would occur if Firm B chooses H: A’s payoff would be
30. If Firm A chooses L, the worst payoff would occur if Firm B
chooses L: A’s payoff would be 20. With a maximin strategy, A
therefore chooses H. If Firm B chooses L, the worst payoff would
occur if Firm A chooses L: the payoff would be 20. If Firm B chooses
H, the worst payoff, 30, would occur if Firm A chooses L. With a
maximin strategy, B therefore chooses H. So under maximin, both A
and B produce a high-quality system.
(www.coursehero.com/file/119362850/Team-4-Game-
Theorypptm/, n.d.)
 The definition of a density graph is “Density plots are used to study
the distribution of one or a few variables. Checking the distribution
of your variables one by one is probably the first task you should do
when you get a new dataset. It delivers a good quantity of
information.”
In the density graph obtained in our game theory research, we will
explore the 2 most recurring words
(variables)-
1. Demand Response- Demand response (DR) is widely
acknowledged as an efficient way to lessen the strain placed on
power systems (Khaled Alshehri, 2020). The decision-making
procedures in grid operations become much more difficult as new
concepts develop since DR causes a variety of interactions among
numerous emergent entities. Due to its capacity to deal with
challenging decision-making issues, game theory (GT) has recently
attracted a lot of attention in the field of disaster risk
management. For tackling various DR concerns, a number of
theoretical GT-based techniques have been put forth, however it
is still unclear whether these theoretical approaches can actually
be implemented in practise. We first give detailed instructions on
how to build a DR-oriented facility, and then we investigate the
efficacy of applying a Stackelberg game theory-based DR
algorithm to manage the energy consumption of the facility,
where the energy management centre (EMC) serves as the leader
and numerous devices act as the followers. This approach aims to
close the gap between theoretical studies and practical
implementations. The experimental assessment results
demonstrate that the GT-based DR algorithm performed
 admirably in real-world DR management, including peak load
reduction with a peak-to-average ratio (PAR) of 1.59 and optimal
load control in response to real-time price (RTP).(Tang et al.,
2019)

2. Conflict- In society, there will always be conflict between those

who have different demands and values. Although there are
many different definitions of conflict, it is clear that every
researcher agrees on the significance of reason and pattern in
conflict. Relationship and task conflict were categorised by Jehn,
and Pondy came to the conclusion that conflict processes
included latent, perceived, felt, manifested, and aftermath
conflicts. The disparity of goals and limited resources contributes
to a latent conflict. Drives for autonomy can occasionally lead to
conflict in organisations; this process is known as perceived
conflict and occurs when one or more parties become aware of
the possibility of conflict. In the end, reactive interactions
between contending parties have an impact on the aftermath of
the conflict. Conflict management is the style of handling conflict
and the control of conflict. Administrators should manage
interpersonal disputes as well as organisational ones; various
people may manage conflicts in different ways. According to the
two aspects of assertiveness and cooperativeness, there are five
alternative techniques to managing disputes (Blake and Mouton,
1964).

3. Construction Management- In the construction industry,

researchers have applied various game theory models to explain
and predict outcomes. Ho (2001) used game theory to analyse the
procurement process of project construction, operation, and
delivery in the presence of asymmetric information and its impact
on project funding and government policy. Drew and Skitmore
(2006) used auction theory, a subfield of game theory, to analyse
the bidding process in the construction industry. Ho and Liu (2004)
used a game theory model to analyse the dynamics between
contractors and owners in building claims. Karl (2014) developed his
approach to modular-oriented modelling that can be used to
simulate multi-causal and dynamic relationships at various levels in
the construction industry.(Ahmed et al., 2016).
The circumstance when the bidder with the most optimistic (low)
project cost estimate wins the project contract based on a
submitted bid less than the actual project construction cost is known
as the "winner's curse," especially in the construction sector. Such a
bidder, who disregards the winner's curse issue, is likely to generate
negative or at the very least, below-average earnings. (2016) Ahmed
et al. Additionally, game theory has been used to examine
subcontractor selection methods and to examine the effects of bid
compensation on competitive bidding procedures (Unsal and
Taylor , 2011), (Ho, 2005).Therefore, it is believed that game theory
is a crucial instrument for studying various issues in the building
sector. (2016) Ahmed et al.
 DISCUSSION

The discussion revolving around Game Theory is certainly an

Interpreting research. In this research we solve two problems and
research on methodology of game theory. all the way from
Gerolemo Cardano’s ‘The Book on Games of Chance’ of 17 th century
to breakthroughs made in mid 20 th century to latest findings.
(Schwalbe & Walker, 2001b) A subclass of optimality modelling,
game theory is useful when interactions are frequency dependent.
The strategy consists of two crucial components. First, it is expected
that specific behavioural patterns will endure in a community as
long as mutants incapable of adopting different behaviours cannot
infiltrate(Camerer, 1997). Evolutionarily stable techniques are
known as such stable combinations. The maximum of fitness
measures in optimality models are all ESSs within the environment
in which they are acceptable, hence the idea of the ESS is not
exclusive to game theory. Second, each kind must have a certain
gain or loss in fitness while interacting with another person. We
calculate the predicted payoff for each activity using this payoff
matrix. (Ray & Zhou, 2001)
 CONCLUSION
This chapter provides an introduction to game theory, as a researchfield
for studying the mathematical models of conflict and cooperation
among self-interested agents. First, we introduced three basic
game representations: strategic, extensive and coali -tional forms. Then
we have described several types of games, and also presented some
relevant concepts to analyze the conditions to find solutions in a
particular game
Strategic management must incorporate ideas from several
scientific disciplines in order to advance our understanding of the
interactions between organisations and the complexity of the world
managers must navigate. In this essay, we prioritise game theory as
one of the axes most likely to enhance the dominant strategic
management methodology. The manager's interest in game theory
hinges on how practical the tools are and how much they can be
applied to difficult, real-world circumstances.
Our opinion is that game theory may be especially effective at
elucidating the decision-making process and, in some instances, it
can help with decision-making in complex situations where various
actors (people, businesses, and governments) interact in a setting
that is marked by a high level of strategic interdependence. We have
demonstrated how corporations can better comprehend the
behaviour of their competitors and adjust their strategy by looking
at a variety of game circumstances (one-shot games, recurrent
games in a finite or an infinite setting, coalition formation). (wang c,
2019)
Game theory is not a replacement for managers' actual business
experience, though. They frequently make more "qualitative" and
"intuitive" decisions. Above all, game theory aids managers in fusing
their aptitude and capacity for "real-world" perception with a
variety of more analytical approaches. The phrase "to establish and
lead a plan, the spirit of geometry and the spirit of finesse must play
a duet" is taken from [CHA 02]. Decision-making in situations with
two or more protagonists, who are frequently driven by different or
even opposing goals, can be rationalised with the aid of game
theory. Other opportunities for "cooperation" or "coordination" may
also emerge and, in fact, constitute legitimate options that lead to
collectively better solutions, even in settings where interests may
seem incompatible and "conflict" seems to be the norm. We have
seen how decisions taken in the setting of noncooperative games
can lead to the creation of strategic coordination, which does not
always require the establishment of an explicit agreement between
the players. These various cooperative and noncooperative
approaches to cooperation, as we have seen in a chapter of this
book, present a very broad range of opportunities for the
advancement of managerial strategic thinking. Contrarily, while
game theory has been used in many disciplinary subjects (such as
biology, law, politics, international relations, sociology, and
economics), it has only just begun to make inroads into the field of
strategic management, one of the management sciences. However,
there has been an upsurge recently in papers demonstrating the
connections between game theory and strategy as it is currently
taught in university courses. This book makes an effort to capitalise
on this fresh zeal by carrying on the process started in the first book.
We have attempted to demonstrate that game theory principles
may be quite helpful in offering an innovative analysis grid for the
result of various specific events, whose lessons can be very
educational for managers, using case studies indicative of current
strategic management concerns. Through a few instances, we have
also demonstrated how economic issues can serve as study cases in
strategic thinking for managers as well as for private or public
decision-makers even when they are addressed using a theoretical
toolkit that is a priori difficult to access by the general public. To
achieve this, the logical framework and the findings must be
translated in a way that allows them to fit into the traditional
strategic management analysis grid. From this vantage point, the
spirit of this strategy should be more frequently applied to the most
current advancements in economic research. Future robots will
need to collaborate in order to complete jobs. Game theory is one
method to offer coordination, which is necessary for the robots to
function well as a team. The fundamentals of game theory are
covered in this level. Robot teams may now cooperate to perform
tasks because to developments in automation and control. When
robots cooperate in this fashion, each robot's activities have an
impact on the team's overall performance. Therefore, a coordinating
mechanism amongst the robots is required if they are to function
autonomously. Such a mechanism is provided by game theory. Each
robot is viewed as a player in a game in game theory, and it receives
prizes based on its performance .According to game theory, each
robot will benefit from cooperative effort if it completes the task at
hand. In order to maximise the incentives for each robot and the
team as a whole, the team must work together to discover a
coordinated solution. (htt)
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