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 Chapter

Maya Command Engine

1
and User Interface

CHAPTER OUTLINE
Interacting with Maya 4
Maya Embedded Language 5
Python 5
C++ Application Programming Interface 6
Python API 6
Executing Python in Maya 6
Command Line 6
Script Editor 8
Maya Shelf 10
Maya Commands and the Dependency Graph 11
Introduction to Python Commands 15
Flag Arguments and Python Core Object Types 19
Numbers 20
Strings 20
Lists 20
Tuples 21
Booleans 21
Flag = Object Type 21
Command Modes and Command Arguments 22
Create Mode 22
Edit Mode 23
Query Mode 23
Python Command Reference 24
Synopsis 25
Return Value 25
Related 25
Flags 25
Python Examples 26
Python Version 26
Python Online Documentation 26
Concluding Remarks 27
Maya Python for Games and Film. DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-378578-7.00001-6
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 3
4 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

BY THE END OF THIS CHAPTER, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO:

■ Compare and contrast the four Maya programming interfaces.
■ Use the Command Line and Script Editor to execute Python commands.
■ Create a button in the Maya GUI to execute custom scripts.
■ Describe how Python interacts with Maya commands.
■ Define nodes and connections.
■ Describe Maya’s command architecture.
■ Learn how to convert MEL commands into Python.
■ Locate help for Python commands.
■ Compare and contrast command arguments and flag arguments.
■ Define the set of core Python data types that work with Maya commands.
■ Compare and contrast the three modes for using commands.
■ Identify the version of Python that Maya is using.
■ Locate important Python resources online.

To fully understand what can be done with Python in Maya, we must first
discuss how Maya has been designed. There are several ways that users
can interact with or modify Maya. The standard method is to create content
using Maya’s graphical user interface (GUI). This interaction works like any
other software application: Users press buttons or select menu items that
create or modify their documents or workspaces. Despite how similar Maya
is to other software, however, its underlying design paradigm is unique in
many ways. Maya is an open product, built from the ground up to be capable
of supporting new features designed by users. Any Maya user can modify or
add new features, which can include a drastic redesign of the main interface
or one line of code that prints the name of the selected object.
In this chapter, we will explore these topics as you begin programming in
Python. First, we briefly describe Maya’s different programming options and
how they fit into Maya’s user interface. Next, we jump into Python by exploring
different means of executing Python code in Maya. Finally, we explore some
basic Maya commands, the primary means of modifying the Maya scene.

INTERACTING WITH MAYA

Although the focus of this book is on using Python to interact with Maya,
we should briefly examine all of Maya’s programming interfaces to better
understand why Python is so unique. Autodesk has created four different
 Interacting with Maya 5

Maya user interface

MEL Python C++

Maya Command Engine Maya API

Maya application core

■ FIGURE 1.1 The architecture of Maya’s programming interfaces.

programming interfaces to interact with Maya, using three different pro-

gramming languages. Anything done in Maya will use some combination
of these interfaces to create the result seen in the workspace. Figure 1.1
illustrates how these interfaces interact with Maya.

Maya Embedded Language

Maya Embedded Language (MEL) was developed for use with Maya and is
used extensively throughout the program. MEL scripts fundamentally define
and create the Maya GUI. Maya’s GUI executes MEL instructions and Maya
commands. Users can also write their own MEL scripts to perform most
common tasks. MEL is relatively easy to create, edit, and execute, but it is
also only used in Maya and has a variety of technical limitations. Namely,
MEL has no support for object-oriented programming. MEL can only com-
municate with Maya through a defined set of interfaces in the Command
Engine (or by calling Python). We will talk more about the Command
Engine later in this chapter.

Python
Python is a scripting language that was formally introduced to Maya in
version 8.5. Python can execute the same Maya commands as MEL using
Maya’s Command Engine. However, Python is also more robust than MEL
because it is an object-oriented language. Moreover, Python has existed
since 1980 and has an extensive library of built-in features as well as a
large community outside of Maya users.
6 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

C++ Application Programming Interface

The Maya C++ application programming interface (API) is the most
flexible way to add features to Maya. Users can add new Maya objects
and features that can execute substantially faster than MEL alternatives.
However, tools developed using the C++ API must be compiled for new
versions of Maya and also for each different target platform. Because of
its compilation requirements, the C++ API cannot be used interactively
with the Maya user interface, so it can be tedious to test even small bits
of code. C++ also has a much steeper learning curve than MEL or Python.

Python API
When Autodesk introduced Python into Maya, they also created wrappers
for many of the classes in the Maya C++ API. As such, developers can use
much of the API functionality from Python. The total scope of classes acces-
sible to the Python API has grown and improved with each new version of
Maya. This powerful feature allows users to manipulate Maya API objects
in ordinary scripts, as well as to create plug-ins that add new features to Maya.
In this book, we focus on the different uses of Python in Maya, including
commands, user interfaces, and the Python API. Before we begin our
investigation, we will first look at the key tools that Maya Python program-
mers have at their disposal.

EXECUTING PYTHON IN MAYA

Maya has many tools built into its GUI that allow users to execute Python
code. Before you begin programming Python code in Maya, you should
familiarize yourself with these tools so that you know not only what tool
is best for your current task, but also where to look for feedback from your
scripts.

Command Line
The first tool of interest is the Command Line. It is located along the
bottom of the Maya GUI. You can see the Command Line highlighted in
Figure 1.2.
The Command Line should appear in the Maya GUI by default. If you
cannot see the Command Line, you can enable it from the Maya main
menu by selecting Display → UI Elements → Command Line.
The far left side of the Command Line has a toggle button, which says
“MEL” by default. If you press this button it will display “Python.”
 Executing Python in Maya 7

■ FIGURE 1.2 Programming interfaces in the Maya GUI.

The language displayed on this toggle button tells Maya which scripting
language to use when executing commands entered in the text field imme-
diately to the right of the button. The right half of the Command Line, a
gray bar, displays the results of the commands that were entered in the text
field. Let’s create a polygon sphere using the Command Line.
1. Switch the Command Line button to “Python.” The button is located on
the left side of the Command Line.
2. Click on the text field in the Command Line and enter the following
line of text.
import maya.cmds;

3. Press Enter.
4. Next enter the following line of code in the text field.
maya.cmds.polySphere();

5. Press Enter. The above command will create a polygon sphere object
in the viewport and will print the following results on the right side
of the Command Line.
# Result: [u'pSphere1', u'polySphere1']
8 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

You can use the Command Line any time you need to quickly execute a
command. The Command Line will only let you enter one line of code at
a time though, which will not do you much good if you want to write a
complicated script. To perform more complex operations, you need the
Script Editor.

Script Editor
One of the most important tools for the Maya Python programmer is the Script
Editor. The Script Editor is an interface for creating short scripts to interact
with Maya. The Script Editor (shown on the right side in Figure 1.2) consists
of two panels. The top panel is called the History Panel and the bottom panel
is called the Input Panel. Let’s open the Script Editor and execute a command
to make a sphere.
1. Open a new scene by pressing Ctrl + N.
2. Open the Script Editor using either the button located near the bottom
right corner of Maya’s GUI, on the right side of the Command Line
(highlighted in Figure 1.2), or by navigating to Window → General
Editors → Script Editor in Maya’s main menu. By default the Script
Editor displays two tabs above the Input Panel. One tab says “MEL”
and the other tab says “Python.”
3. Select the Python tab in the Script Editor.
4. Click somewhere inside the Input Panel and type the following lines of
code.
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polySphere();

5. When you are finished press the Enter key on your numeric keypad. If
you do not have a numeric keypad, press Ctrl + Return.
The Enter key on the numeric keypad and the Ctrl + Return shortcut are
used only for executing code when working in the Script Editor. The reg-
ular Return key simply moves the input cursor to the next line in the Input
Panel. This convention allows you to enter scripts that contain more than
one line without executing them prematurely.
Just as in the Command Line example, the code you just executed created a
generic polygon sphere. You can see the code you executed in the History
Panel, but you do not see the same result line that you saw when using the
Command Line. In the Script Editor, you will only see a result line printed
when you execute a single line of code at a time.
6. Enter the same lines from step 4 into the Input Panel, but do not execute
them.
 Executing Python in Maya 9

7. Highlight the second line with your cursor by triple-clicking it and then
press Ctrl + Return. The results from the last command entered should
now be shown in the History Panel.
# Result: [u'pSphere2', u'polySphere2']

Apart from printing results, there are two important things worth noting
about the previous step. First, highlighting a portion of code and then press-
ing Ctrl + Return will execute only the highlighted code. Second, high-
lighting code in this way before executing it prevents the contents of the
Input Panel from emptying out.
Another useful feature of the Script Editor is that it has support for marking
menus. Marking menus are powerful, context-sensitive, gesture-based
menus that appear throughout the Maya application. If you are unfamiliar
with marking menus in general, we recommend consulting any basic Maya
user’s guide.
To access the Script Editor’s marking menu, click and hold the right mouse
button (RMB) anywhere in the Script Editor window. If you have nothing
selected inside the Script Editor, the marking menu will allow you to
quickly create new tabs (for either MEL or Python) as well as navigate
between the tabs. As you can see, clicking the RMB, quickly flicking to
the left or right, and releasing the RMB allows you to rapidly switch
between your active tabs, no matter where your cursor is in the Script Edi-
tor window. However, the marking menu can also supply you with context-
sensitive operations, as in the following brief example.

1. Type the following code into the Input Panel of the Script Editor, but
do not execute it.
maya.cmds.polySphere()

2. Use the left mouse button (LMB) to highlight the word polySphere in
the Input Panel.
3. Click and hold the RMB to open the Script Editor’s marking menu. You
should see a new set of options in the bottom part of the marking menu.
4. Move your mouse over the Command Documentation option in the
bottom of the marking menu and release the RMB. Maya should
now open a web browser displaying the help documentation for the
polySphere command.

As you can see, the Script Editor is a very useful tool not only for creating
and executing Python scripts in Maya, but also for quickly pulling up infor-
mation about commands in your script. We will look at the command
documentation later in this chapter.
10 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

At this point, it is worth mentioning that it can be very tedious to continually

type common operations into the Script Editor. While the Script Editor
does allow you to save and load scripts, you may want to make your script
part of the Maya GUI. As we indicated earlier, clicking GUI controls
in Maya simply calls commands or executes scripts that call commands.
Another tool in the Maya GUI, the Shelf, allows you to quickly make a
button out of any script.

Maya Shelf
Now that you understand how to use the Command Line and the Script
Editor, it is worth examining one final tool in the Maya GUI that will be
valuable to you. Let’s say you write a few lines of code in the Script Editor
and you want to use that series of commands later. Maya has a location for
storing custom buttons at the top of the main interface, called the Shelf,
which you can see in Figure 1.3. If you do not see the Shelf in your GUI
layout, you can enable it from Maya’s main menu using the Display →
UI Elements → Shelf option.
You can highlight lines of code in the Script Editor or Command Line and
drag them onto the Shelf for later use with the middle mouse button

■ FIGURE 1.3 The Shelf.

 Maya Commands and the Dependency Graph 11

(MMB). In the following example, you will create a short script and save it
to the Shelf.
1. Type in the following code into the Script Editor, but do not execute
it (when executed, this script will create a polygon sphere and then
change the sphere’s vertex colors to red).
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polySphere(radius=5);
maya.cmds.polyColorPerVertex(
colorRGB=[1,0,0],
colorDisplayOption=True
);

2. Click the Custom tab in the Shelf. You can add buttons to any shelf, but
the Custom shelf is a convenient place for users to store their own
group of buttons.
3. Click and drag the LMB over the script you typed into the Script Editor
to highlight all of its lines.
4. With your cursor positioned over the highlighted text, click and hold
the MMB to drag the contents of your script onto the Shelf.
5. If you are using Maya 2010 or an earlier version, a dialog box will
appear. If you see this dialog box, select “Python” to tell Maya that
the script you are pasting is written using Python rather than MEL.
6. You will now see a new button appear in your Custom tab. Left-click on
your new button and you should see a red sphere appear in your viewport
as in Figure 1.3. If you are in wireframe mode, make sure you enter shaded
mode by clicking anywhere in your viewport and pressing the number 5 key.
You can edit your Shelf, including tabs and icons, by accessing the
Window → Settings/Preferences → Shelf Editor option from the main
Maya window. For more information on editing your Shelf, consult the
Maya documentation or a basic Maya user’s guide. Now that you have an
understanding of the different tools available in the Maya GUI, we can start
exploring Maya commands in greater detail.

MAYA COMMANDS AND THE DEPENDENCY GRAPH

To create a polygonal sphere with Python, the polySphere command must
be executed in some way or other. The polySphere command is part of the
Maya Command Engine. As we noted previously, the Maya Command
Engine includes a set of commands accessible to both MEL and Python.
As we briefly discussed previously, Maya is fundamentally composed of a core
and a set of interfaces for communicating with that core (see Figure 1.1).
The core contains all the data in a scene and regulates all operations on these
12 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

data—creation, destruction, editing, and so on. All of the data in the core are
represented by a set of objects called nodes and a series of connections that
establish relationships among these nodes. Taken together, this set of relation-
ships among nodes is called the Dependency Graph (DG).
For example, the polygon sphere object you created earlier returned the
names of two nodes when you created it: a node that describes the geome-
try of the sphere and a transform node that determines the configuration of
the sphere shape in space. You can see information on nodes in an object’s
network using the Attribute Editor (Window → Attribute Editor in the
main menu) or as a visual representation in the Hypergraph (Window →
Hypergraph: Connections in the main menu). Because this point is so
important, it is worth looking at a brief example.
1. If you no longer have a polygon sphere in your scene, create one.
2. With your sphere object selected, open the Hypergraph displaying
connections by using the Window → Hypergraph: Connections option
from the main menu.
3. By default, the Hypergraph should display the connections for your
currently selected sphere as in Figure 1.4. If you do not see anything,

■ FIGURE 1.4 The Hypergraph.

 Maya Commands and the Dependency Graph 13

then select the option Graph → Input and Output Connections from
the Hypergraph window’s menu.
As you can see, a default polygon sphere consists of four basic nodes
connected by a sequence of arrows that show the flow of information. The
first node in the network is a polySphere node, which contains the para-
meters and functionality for outputting spherical geometry (e.g., the radius,
the number of subdivisions, and so on). In fact, if you highlight the arrow
showing the connection to the next node, a shape node, you can see what
data are being sent. In this case, the polySphere node’s output attribute is
piped into the inMesh attribute of the shape node.
If you were to delete the construction history of this polygonal sphere
(Edit → Delete by Type → History from the main menu), the polySphere
node would disappear and the sphere’s geometry would then be statically
stored in the shape node (pSphereShape1 in Figure 1.4). In short, if the
polySphere node were destroyed, its mesh information would be copied into
the pSphereShape node, and you would no longer be able to edit the radius
or number of subdivisions parametrically; you would have to use modeling
tools to do everything by hand.
While you can also see that information is piped from the shape node into a
shadingGroup node (to actually render the shape), there is a node that
appears to be floating on its own (pSphere1 in Figure 1.4). This separate
node is a special kind of object, a transform node, which describes the posi-
tion, scale, and orientation of the polygonal sphere’s geometry in space. The
reason why this node is not connected is because it belongs to a special part
of the DG, called the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). For right now, it suf-
fices to say that the DAG essentially describes the hierarchical relationship of
objects that have transform nodes, including what nodes are their parents
and what transformations they inherit from their parents.
The Maya DG is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 11 in the context of
the Maya API, yet this principle is critical for understanding how Maya
works. We strongly recommend consulting a Maya user guide if you feel
like you need further information in the meantime.
Although Maya is, as we pointed out, an open product, the data in the core
are closed to users at all times. Autodesk engineers may make changes
to the core from one version to another, but users may only communicate
with the application core through a defined set of interfaces that Autodesk
provides.
One such interface that can communicate with the core is the Command
Engine. In the past, Maya commands have often been conflated with
14 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

Maya user interface

MEL Python C++

Maya Command Engine Maya API

Maya application core

■ FIGURE 1.5 Python’s interaction with the Maya Command Engine.

MEL. Indeed, commands in Maya may be issued using MEL in either

scripts or GUI elements like buttons. However, with the inclusion of
Python scripting in Maya, there are now two different ways to issue Maya
commands, which more clearly illustrates the distinction.
Figure 1.5 highlights how Python interacts with the Maya Command
Engine. While Python can use built-in commands to retrieve data from
the core, it can also call custom, user-made commands that use API inter-
faces to manipulate and retrieve data in the core. These data can then be
returned to a scripting interface via the Command Engine. This abstraction
allows users to invoke basic commands (which have complex underlying
interfaces to the core) via a scripting language.
MEL has access to over 1,000 commands that ship with Maya and has been
used to create almost all of Maya’s GUI. While Python has access to nearly
all the same commands (and could certainly also be used to create Maya’s
GUI) there is a subset of commands unavailable to Python. The commands
unavailable to Python include those specifically related to MEL or that deal
with the operating system. Because Python has a large library of utilities
that have grown over the years as the language has matured outside of
Maya, this disparity is not a limitation.
Maya has documentation for all Python commands so it is easy to look up
which commands are available. In addition to absent commands mentioned
previously, there are some MEL scripts that appear in MEL command doc-
umentation as though they were commands. Because these are scripts
rather than commands, they do not appear in the Python command
 Introduction to Python Commands 15

documentation and are not directly available to Python. Again, this absence
is also not a limitation, as it is possible to execute MEL scripts with Python
when needed. Likewise, MEL can call Python commands and scripts when
required.1
Another important feature of the Maya Command Engine is how easy it is to
create commands that work for MEL and Python. Maya was designed so that
any new command added will be automatically available to both MEL and
Python. New commands can be created with the Maya C++ API or the Python
API. Now that you have a firmer understanding of how Maya commands fit
into the program’s architecture, we can go back to using some commands.

INTRODUCTION TO PYTHON COMMANDS

Let’s return to Maya and open up the Script Editor. As discussed earlier in
this chapter, the top panel of the Script Editor is called the History Panel.
This panel can be very useful for those just learning how to script or even
for advanced users who want to figure out what commands are being
executed. By default, the History Panel will echo (print) most Maya
commands being executed. You can also make the History Panel show
all commands being executed, including commands called by the GUI
when you press a button or open a menu. To see all commands being exe-
cuted, select the History → Echo All Commands option from the Script
Editor’s menu. While this option can be helpful when learning, it is gener-
ally inadvisable to leave it enabled during normal work, as it can degrade
Maya’s performance. Right now, we will go through the process of creating
a cube and look at the results in the History Panel (Figure 1.6).
1. In the menu for the Script Editor window, select Edit → Clear History
to clear the History Panel’s contents.
2. In the main Maya window, navigate to the menu option Create →
Polygon Primitives → Cube.
3. Check the History Panel in the Script Editor and confirm that you see
something like the following results.
polyCube -w 1 -h 1 -d 1 -sx 1 -sy 1 -sz 1 -ax 0 1 0 -cuv 4 -ch 1;
// Result: pCube1 polyCube1 //

The first line shown is the polyCube MEL command, which is very similar
to the polySphere command we used earlier in this chapter. As you can see,

1
MEL can call Python code using the python command. Python can call MEL code
using the eval function in the maya.mel module. Note that using the python command
in MEL executes statements in the namespace of the __main__ module. For more infor-
mation on namespaces and modules, see Chapter 4.
16 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

■ FIGURE 1.6 The results of creating a polygon cube.

a MEL command was called when you selected the Cube option in the
Polygon Primitives menu. That MEL command was displayed in the
Script Editor’s History Panel.
Because Maya’s entire interface is written with MEL, the History Panel
always echoes MEL commands when using the default Maya interface.
Custom user interfaces could call the Python version of a command, in
which case the History Panel would display the Python command.
This problem is not terribly troublesome for Python users though. It does
not take much effort to convert a MEL command into Python syntax, so
this feature can still help you learn which commands to use. The following
example shows what the polyCube command looks like with Python.
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polyCube(
w=1, h=1, d=1, sx=1, sy=1, sz=1,
ax=(0, 1, 0), cuv=4, ch=1
);

If you execute these lines of Python code they will produce the same result as
the MEL version. However, we need to break down the Python version of the
command so we can understand what is happening. Consider the first line:
import maya.cmds;
 Introduction to Python Commands 17

This line of code imports a Python module that allows you to use any Maya
command available to Python. There is only one module that holds all
Maya commands and you only need to import it once per Maya session.
Once it is in memory you don’t need to import it again (we only have
you reimport it for each example in case you’re picking the book back
up after a break from Maya). We will discuss modules in greater depth in
Chapter 4. The next line of code is the Python command.
maya.cmds.polyCube(
w=1, h=1, d=1, sx=1, sy=1, sz=1,
ax=(0, 1, 0), cuv=4, ch=1
);

As you can see, the name of the command, polyCube, is prefixed by the
name of the module, maya.cmds. The period between them represents that
this command belongs to the Maya commands module. We then supply the
command several flag arguments inside of parentheses. A key-value pair
separated by the equals sign, such as w=1, represents the name and value
for the flag argument, and each of these pairs is separated by a comma.

Each flag may be added using a shorthand abbreviation or long version of

the flag name. Although many Maya programmers tend to use the shorthand
flag names in their code, it can make the code more difficult to read later. In
the previous example, the command is using the shorthand flags so it is hard
to understand what they mean. Here is the same version of the command
with long flag names.
maya.cmds.polyCube(
width=1,
height=1,
depth=1,
subdivisionsX=1,
subdivisionsY=1,
subdivisionsZ=1,
axis=(0, 1, 0),
createUVs=4,
constructionHistory=1
);

The long names are easier to read and so it can be good practice to use them
when scripting. Code that is easier to read can be much easier to work with—
especially if you or a coworker has to make any changes several months later!
You may now be wondering how to find the long flag names in the future.

1. Type the following lines into the Script Editor and press Ctrl + Return
to execute them.
import maya.cmds;
print(maya.cmds.help('polyCube'));
18 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

2. Look for the results in the History Panel, which should look like the
following lines.
Synopsis: polyCube [flags] [String...]
Flags:
–e –edit
–q –query
–ax –axis Length Length Length
–cch –caching on|off
–ch –constructionHistory on|off
–cuv –createUVs Int
–d –depth Length
–h –height Length
–n –name String
–nds –nodeState Int
–o –object on|off
–sd –subdivisionsDepth Int
–sh –subdivisionsHeight Int
–sw –subdivisionsWidth Int
–sx –subdivisionsX Int
–sy –subdivisionsY Int
–sz –subdivisionsZ Int
–tx –texture Int
–w –width Length

Command Type: Command

As you can see, the result first displays the command for which help was
requested—polyCube in this case. The following items in brackets, [flags]
and [String...], show MEL syntax for executing the command. In
MEL, the command is followed by any number of flag arguments and then
any number of command arguments. We’ll differentiate these two items
momentarily.
Next, the output shows the list of flags for the command, displaying the
short name on the left, followed by the long name in the middle column.
Each flag is prefixed by a minus symbol, which is required to indicate a
flag in MEL syntax, but which you can ignore in Python. To the very right
of each flag name is the data type for each argument, which tells us what
kind of value each flag requires.
We can see how flags work with the polyCube command. Consider the
following example.
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polyCube();
Executing this command causes Maya to create a polygon cube with default
properties. The parentheses at the end of the command basically indicate that
 Flag Arguments and Python Core Object Types 19

we want Maya to do something—execute a command in this case. Without

them, the command will not execute. We will discuss this topic further in
Chapter 3 when we introduce functions. For now, it suffices to say that
any command arguments we wish to specify must be typed inside of the
parentheses, as in the following alternative example.
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polyCube(name='myCube', depth=12.5, height=5);

If you execute the previous lines, Maya will create a polygon cube named
“myCube” with a depth of 12.5 units and a height of 5 units. The first flag
we set, name, is a string, as indicated in the help results. A string is a sequence
of letters and numbers inside of quotation marks, and is used to represent a
word or words. Immediately afterward is a comma before the next flag, depth.
We specify that the depth should be the decimal number 12.5. Such values are
listed as type Length in the help results. Last, we provided the height flag and
supplied a value of 5. In this case, we used the long names of the flags, but we
could also have used the short ones to do the same thing.
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polyCube(n='myCube', d=12.5, h=5);

Looking at the help results, you can see that the axis flag takes three decimal
numbers. To specify this kind of argument in Python, we use what is called
a tuple. A tuple is basically a sequence of objects inside of parentheses, sepa-
rated by commas. The following lines show an example of the same command
using a tuple to specify a different axis.
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polyCube(
name='myCube',
depth=12.5,
height=5,
axis=(1,1,0)
);

FLAG ARGUMENTS AND PYTHON CORE

OBJECT TYPES
As you have seen, most Maya Python commands have flags, which allow
you to change the default settings of the command being executed. Each flag
argument must be passed a value. A flag’s value can be one of several
different built-in Python types. Table 1.1 lists Python’s core object types
that are used by Maya commands.
Note that Table 1.1 is not a complete list of Python core object types—
there are many others that you may use for other purposes in your scripts.
20 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

Table 1.1 Python Core Object Types Used by Maya Commands

Type Examples

Numbers 1
−5
3.14159
9.67
Strings "Maya"
'ate'
"my dog's"
"""homework"""
Lists [1, "horse", 'town']
Tuples (1, "two", 'three')
Booleans True
False
1
0

However, the core object types in this list are the only ones that Maya
commands have been designed to use, so we may ignore the others for now.
Other Python data types are discussed in Chapter 2. Let’s focus for now on
the five types in this list.

Numbers
Maya commands expecting Python numbers will accept any real number.
Examples could include integer as well as decimal numbers, which corre-
spond to int/long and float/double types, respectively, in other languages.

Strings
The string type is any sequence of letters or numbers enclosed in single quota-
tion marks, double quotation marks, or a matching pair of triple quotation
marks of either type. For instance, “boat”, “house”, and “car” are equivalent
to ‘boat’, ‘house’, and ‘car’ as well as to “““boat”””, “““house”””, and
“““car”””. However, the string “3” is different from the number object 3.
Strings are typically used to name objects or parameters that are accessible
from the Maya user interface.

Lists
A list is a sequence of any number of Python objects contained within the
bracket characters [ and ]. A comma separates each object in the list. Any
Python object may be in a list, including another list!
 Flag Arguments and Python Core Object Types 21

Tuples
The Python tuple is very similar to the list type except that it is not muta-
ble, which means it cannot be changed. We discuss mutability in greater
detail in Chapter 2. Tuples are contained inside of ordinary parentheses,
( and ).

Booleans
A Boolean value in Python can be the word True or False (which must
have the first letter capitalized), or the numbers 1 and 0 (which correspond
to the values True and False, respectively). These values are typically used
to represent states or toggle certain command modes or flags.

Flag = Object Type

To find out what type of object a command flag requires, you can use the
help command. As you saw earlier in this chapter it will give you a list of
the command flags and what type of value they require. The argument type
is not an option—you must pass a value of the required type or you will get
an error. Using the polyCube command as an example, let’s look at its
width flag and pass it correct and incorrect argument types.

1. Create a new scene by pressing Ctrl + N.

2. Execute the Maya help command for the polyCube command in the
Script Editor:
import maya.cmds;
print(maya.cmds.help('polyCube'));

3. Look for the width flag in the results displayed in the History Panel
and find its argument type on the right side:
–w –width Length

As you can see, the width flag requires a Length type argument, as shown
to the right of the flag name. This is technically not a Python type but we
can deduce that Length means a number, so we should pass this flag some
sort of number. If the number needed to be a whole number, the flag would
specify Int to the right of the flag instead of Length. We can therefore also
deduce that the flag may be passed a decimal number in this case. Let’s
first pass a correct argument.
4. Type the following command into the Script Editor and press Ctrl +
Return to execute it.
maya.cmds.polyCube(width=10);
22 CHAPTER 1 Maya Command Engine and User Interface

You should see the following result in the Script Editor’s History Panel.
# Result: [u'pCube1', u'polyCube1'] #

The result lets us know that the command succeeded and also shows that the
command returned a Python list containing the names of two new nodes that
have been created to make our cube object: “pCube1” (a transform node)
and “polyCube1” (a shape node). Now, let’s see what happens when we inten-
tionally supply the width flag with the wrong data type.
5. Type the following command into the Script Editor and press Ctrl +
Return to execute it.
maya.cmds.polyCube(width='ten');

This time the command returns an error.

# Error: TypeError: file <maya console> line 1: Invalid
arguments for flag 'width'. Expected distance, got str #

The error tells you that the argument for the width flag was incorrect and it
expected a distance value. Even though the help command showed the
width flag needed a Length type, Maya is now calling it a distance type.
This can be confusing at first but most of the time it is very clear what
the flag argument requires simply by looking at the flag in context. The
help command does not describe what each flag does, but you can get
more detailed descriptions using the Python Command Reference, which
we will examine shortly.

COMMAND MODES AND COMMAND ARGUMENTS

Maya commands often have more than one mode in which they can work.
Some commands may be available to use in create mode, edit mode, and/or
query mode, while certain flags may only be available in certain modes.

Create Mode
Most commands at least have a create mode. This mode allows users to
create new objects in the scene and specify any optional parameters. By
default, the polyCube command operates in create mode.
1. Create a new Maya scene.
2. Execute the following lines in the Script Editor to create a new cube.
import maya.cmds;
maya.cmds.polyCube();

Note that you do not have to do anything special to execute commands in

create mode. Leave the cube in your scene for the next steps.
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 therefore in all probability inhabited as well as the earth. The
analogy is not one whit better than that previously mentioned.
That the earth is inhabited does not depend on its being a
celestial body, but in other conditions, such as the presence of an
atmosphere, and of water in connexion with the atmosphere, &c.:
and these are precisely the conditions which the moon, so far as
we know, does not possess. What has in modern times been
called the Philosophy of Nature consists principally in a frivolous
play with empty and external analogies, which, however, claim to
be considered profound results. The natural consequence has
been to discredit the philosophical study of nature.
(γ) Syllogism of Necessity.
191.] The Syllogism of Necessity, if we look to its purely abstract
characteristics or terms, has for its mean the Universal in the same
way as the Syllogism of Reflection has the Individual, the latter
being in the second, and the former in the third figure (§ 187). The
Universal is expressly put as in its very nature intrinsically
determinate. In the first place (1) the Particular, meaning by the
particular the specific genus or species, is the term for mediating the
extremes—as is done in the Categorical syllogism. (2) The same
office is performed by the Individual, taking the individual as
immediate being, so that it is as much mediating as mediated:—as
happens in the Hypothetical syllogism. (3) We have also the
mediating Universal explicitly put as a totality of its particular
members, and as a single particular, or exclusive individuality:—
which happens in the Disjunctive syllogism. It is one and the same
universal which is in these terms of the Disjunctive syllogism; they
are only different forms for expressing it.
192.] The syllogism has been taken conformably to the distinctions
which it contains; and the general result of the course of their
evolution has been to show that these differences work out their
own abolition and destroy the notion's outwardness to its own self.
And, as we see, in the first place, (1) each of the dynamic elements
has proved itself the systematic whole of these elements, in short a
whole syllogism,—they are consequently implicitly identical. In the
second place, (2) the negation of their distinctions and of the
mediation of one through another constitutes independency; so that
it is one and the same universal which is in these forms, and which
is in this way also explicitly put as their identity. In this ideality of its
dynamic elements, the syllogistic process may be described as
essentially involving the negation of the characters through which its
course runs, as being a mediative process through the suspension of
mediation,—as coupling the subject not with another, but with a
suspended other, in one word, with itself.
In the common logic, the doctrine of syllogism is supposed to
conclude the first part, or what is called the 'elementary' theory. It
is followed by the second part, the doctrine of Method, which
proposes to show how a body of scientific knowledge is created
by applying to existing objects the forms of thought discussed in
the elementary part. Whence these objects originate, and what
the thought of objectivity generally speaking implies, are
questions to which the Logic of Understanding vouchsafes no
further answer. It believes thought to be a mere subjective and
formal activity, and the objective fact, which confronts thought, to
have a separate and permanent being. But this dualism is a half-
truth: and there is a want of intelligence in the procedure which
at once accepts, without inquiring into their origin, the categories
of subjectivity and objectivity. Both of them, subjectivity as well
as objectivity, are certainly thoughts—even specific thoughts:
which must show themselves founded on the universal and self-
determining thought. This has here been done—at least for
subjectivity. We have recognised it, or the notion subjective
(which includes the notion proper, the judgment, and the
syllogism) as the dialectical result of the first two main stages of
the Logical Idea, Being and Essence. To say that the notion is
subjective and subjective only, is so far quite correct: for the
notion certainly is subjectivity itself. Not less subjective than the
notion are also the judgment and syllogism: and these forms,
together with the so-called Laws of Thought (the Laws of Identity,
 Difference, and Sufficient Ground), make up the contents of what
is called the 'Elements' in the common logic. But we may go a
step further. This subjectivity, with its functions of notion,
judgment, and syllogism, is not like a set of empty compartments
which has to get filled from without by separately-existing
objects. It would be truer to say that it is subjectivity itself which,
as dialectical, breaks through its own barriers and opens out into
objectivity by means of the syllogism.
193.] This 'realisation' of the notion,—a realisation in which the
universal is this one totality withdrawn back into itself (of which the
different members are no less the whole, and) which has given itself
a character of 'immediate' unity by merging the mediation:—this
realisation of the notion is the Object.
I his transition from the Subject, the notion in general, and
especially the syllogism, to the Object, may, at the first glance,
appear strange, particularly if we look only at the Syllogism of
Understanding, and suppose syllogising to be only an act of
consciousness. But that strangeness imposes on us no obligation to
seek to make the transition plausible to the image-loving conception.
The only question which can be considered is, whether our usual
conception of what is called an 'object' approximately corresponds to
the object as here described. By 'object' is commonly understood not
an abstract being, or an existing thing merely, or any sort of
actuality, but something independent, concrete, and self-complete,
this completeness being the totality of the notion. That the object
(Objekt) is also an object to us (Gegenstand) and is external to
something else, will be more precisely seen, when it puts itself in
contrast with the subjective. At present, as that into which the
notion has passed from its mediation, it is only immediate object and
nothing more, just as the notion is not describable as subjective,
previous to the subsequent contrast with objectivity.
Further, the Object in general is the one total, in itself still
unspecified, the Objective World as a whole, God, the Absolute
Object. The object, however, has also difference attaching to it: it
falls into pieces, indefinite in their multiplicity (making an objective
world); and each of these individualised parts is also an object, an
intrinsically concrete, complete, and independent existence.
Objectivity has been compared with being, existence, and actuality;
and so too the transition to existence and actuality (not to being, for
it is the primary and quite abstract immediate) maybe compared
with the transition to objectivity. The ground from which existence
proceeds, and the reflective correlation which is merged in actuality,
are nothing but the as yet imperfectly realised notion. They are only
abstract aspects of it,—the ground being its merely essence-bred
unity, and the correlation only the connexion of real sides which are
supposed to have only self-reflected being. The notion is the unity of
the two; and the object is not a merely essence-like, but inherently
universal unity, not only containing real distinctions, but containing
them as totalities in itself.
It is evident that in all these transitions there is a further purpose
than merely to show the indissoluble connexion between the notion
or thought and being. It has been more than once remarked that
being is nothing more than simple self-relation, and this meagre
category is certainly implied in the notion, or even in thought. But
the meaning of these transitions is not to accept characteristics or
categories, as only implied;—a fault which mars even the Ontological
argument for God's existence, when it is stated that being is one
among realities. What such a transition does, is to take the notion,
as it ought to be primarily characterised per se as a notion, with
which this remote abstraction of being, or eve of objectivity, has as
yet nothing to do, and looking at its specific character as a notional
character alone, to see when and whether it passes over into a form
which is different from the character as it belongs to the notion and
appears in it.
If the Object, the product of this transition, be brought into relation
with the notion, which, so far as its special form is concerned, has
vanished in it, we may give a correct expression to the result, by
saying that notion or, if it be preferred, subjectivity and object are
implicitly the same. But it is equally correct to say that they are
different. In short, the two modes of expression are equally correct
and incorrect. The true state of the case can be presented in no
expressions of this kind. The 'implicit' is an abstraction, still more
partial and inadequate than the notion itself, of which the
inadequacy is upon the whole suspended, by suspending itself to the
object with its opposite inadequacy. Hence that implicitness also
must, by its negation, give itself the character of explicitness. As in
every case, speculative identity is not the above-mentioned triviality
of an implicit identity of subject and object. This has been said often
enough. Yet it could not be too often repeated, if the intention were
really to put an end to the stale and purely malicious misconception
in regard to this identity:—of which however there can be no
reasonable expectation.
Looking at that unity in a quite general way, and raising no objection
to the one-sided form of its implicitness, we find it as the well-known
pre-supposition of the ontological proof for the existence of God.
There, it appears as supreme perfection. Anselm, in whom the
notable suggestion of this proof first occurs, no doubt originally
restricted himself to the question whether a certain content was in
our thinking only. His words are briefly these: 'Certe id quo majus
cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo
intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod majus est. Si ergo
id quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu; id ipsum quo
majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest. Sed certe
hoc esse non potest.' (Certainly that, than which nothing greater can
be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone. For even if it is in the
intellect alone, it can also be thought to exist in fact: and that is
greater. If then that, than which nothing greater can be thought, is
in the intellect alone; then the very thing, which is greater than
anything which can be thought, can be exceeded in thought. But
certainly this is impossible.) The same unity received a more
objective expression in Descartes, Spinoza and others: while the
theory of immediate certitude or faith presents it, on the contrary, in
somewhat the same subjective aspect as Anselm. These
Intuitionalists hold that in our consciousness the attribute of being is
indissolubly associated with the conception of God. The theory of
faith brings even the conception of external finite things under the
same inseparable nexus between the consciousness and the being of
them, on the ground that perception presents them conjoined with
the attribute of existence: and in so saying, it is no doubt correct. It
would be utterly absurd, however, to suppose that the association in
consciousness between existence and our conception of finite things
is of the same description as the association between existence and
the conception of God. To do so would be to forget that finite things
are changeable and transient, i.e. that existence is associated with
them for a season, but that the association is neither eternal nor
inseparable. Speaking in the phraseology of the categories before
us, we may say that, to call a thing finite, means that its objective
existence is not in harmony with the thought of it, with its universal
calling, its kind and its end. Anselm, consequently, neglecting any
such conjunction as occurs in finite things, has with good reason
pronounced that only to be the Perfect which exists not merely in a
subjective, but also in an objective mode. It does no good to put on
airs against the Ontological proof, as it is called, and against Anselm
thus denning the Perfect. The argument is one latent in every
unsophisticated mind, and it recurs in every philosophy, even against
its wish and without its knowledge—as may be seen in the theory of
immediate belief.
The real fault in the argumentation of Anselm is one which is
chargeable on Descartes and Spinoza, as well as on the theory of
immediate knowledge. It is this. This unity which is enunciated as
the supreme perfection or, it may be, subjectively, as the true
knowledge, is pre-supposed, i.e. it is assumed only as potential. This
identity, abstract as it thus appears, between the two categories may
be at once met and opposed by their diversity; and this was the very
answer given to Anselm long ago. In short, the conception and
existence of the finite is set in antagonism to the infinite; for, as
previously remarked, the finite possesses objectivity of such a kind
as is at once incongruous with and different from the end or aim, its
essence and notion. Or, the finite is such a conception and in such a
way subjective, that it does not involve existence. This objection and
this antithesis are got over, only by showing the finite to be untrue
and these categories in their separation to be inadequate and null.
Their identity is thus seen to be one into which they spontaneously
pass over, and in which they are reconciled.

B.—THE OBJECT.

194.] The Object is immediate being, because insensible to

difference, which in it has suspended itself. It is, further, a totality in
itself, whilst at the same time (as this identity is only the implicit
identity of its dynamic elements) it is equally indifferent to its
immediate unity. It thus breaks up into distinct parts, each of which
is itself the totality. Hence the object is the absolute contradiction
between a complete independence of the multiplicity, and the
equally complete non-independence of the different pieces.
The definition, which states that the Absolute is the Object, is most
definitely implied in the Leibnizian Monad. The Monads are each an
object, but an object implicitly 'representative,' indeed the total
representation of the world. In the simple unity of the Monad, all
difference is merely ideal, not independent or real. Nothing from
without comes into the monad: It is the whole notion in itself, only
distinguished by its own greater or less development. None the less,
this simple totality parts into the absolute multeity of differences,
each becoming an independent monad. In the monad of monads,
and the Pre-established Harmony of their inward developments,
these substances are in like manner again reduced to 'ideality' and
unsubstantiality. The philosophy of Leibnitz, therefore, represents
contradiction in its complete development.
As Fichte in modern times has especially and with justice insisted,
the theory which regards the Absolute or God as the Object and
there stops, expresses the point of view taken by superstition and
slavish fear. No doubt God is the Object, and, indeed, the Object
out and out, confronted with which our particular or subjective
opinions and desires have no truth and no validity. As absolute
object however, God does not therefore take up the position of a
dark and hostile power over against subjectivity. He rather
involves it as a vital element in Himself. Such also is the meaning
of the Christian doctrine, according to which God has willed that
all men should be saved and all attain blessedness. The salvation
and the blessedness of men are attained when they come to feel
themselves at one with God, so that God, on the other hand,
ceases to be for them mere object, and, in that way, an object of
fear and terror, as was especially the case with the religious
consciousness of the Romans. But God in the Christian religion is
also known as Love, because in His Son, who is one with Him, He
has revealed Himself to men as a man amongst men, and thereby
redeemed them. All which is only another way of saying that the
antithesis of subjective and objective is implicitly overcome, and
that it is our affair to participate in this redemption by laying aside
our immediate subjectivity (putting off the old Adam), and
learning to know God as our true and essential self.
Just as religion and religious worship consist in overcoming the
antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity, so science too and
philosophy have no other task than to overcome this antithesis by
the medium of thought. The aim of knowledge is to divest the
objective world that stands opposed to us of its strangeness, and,
as the phrase is, to find ourselves at home in it: which means no
more than to trace the objective world back to the notion,—to our
innermost self. We may learn from the present discussion the
mistake of regarding the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity
as an abstract and permanent one. The two are wholly dialectical.
The notion is at first only subjective: but without the assistance of
any foreign material or stuff it proceeds, in obedience to its own
action, to objectify itself. So, too, the object is not rigid and
processless. Its process is to show itself as what is at the same
time subjective, and thus form the step onwards to the idea. Any
one who, from want of familiarity with the categories of
 subjectivity and objectivity, seeks to retain them in their
abstraction, will find that the isolated categories slip through his
fingers before he is aware, and that he says the exact contrary of
what he wanted to say.
(2) Objectivity contains the three forms of Mechanism, Chemism,
and Teleology. The object of mechanical type is the immediate
and undifferentiated object. No doubt it contains difference, but
the different pieces stand, as it were, without affinity to each
other, and their connexion is only extraneous. In chemism, on the
contrary, the object exhibits an essential tendency to
differentiation, in such a way that the objects are what they are
only by their relation to each other: this tendency to difference
constitutes their quality. The third type of objectivity, the
teleological relation, is the unity of mechanism and chemism.
Design, like the mechanical object, is a self-contained totality,
enriched however by the principle of differentiation which came to
the fore in chemism, and thus referring itself to the object that
stands over against it. Finally, it is the realisation of design which
forms the transition to the Idea.
(a) Mechanism.
196.] The object (1) in its immediacy is the notion only potentially;
the notion as subjective is primarily outside it; and all its specific
character is imposed from without. As a unity of differents,
therefore, it is a composite, an aggregate; and its capacity of acting
on anything else continues to be an external relation. This is Formal
Mechanism.—Notwithstanding, and in this connexion and non-
independence, the objects remain independent and offer resistance,
external to each other.
Pressure and impact are examples of mechanical relations. Our
knowledge is said to be mechanical or by rote, when the words have
no meaning for us, but continue external to sense, conception,
thought; and when, being similarly external to each other, they form
a meaningless sequence. Conduct, piety, &c. are in the same way
mechanical, when a man's behaviour is settled for him by ceremonial
laws, by a spiritual adviser, &c.; in short, when his own mind and will
are not in his actions, which in this way are extraneous to himself.
Mechanism, the first form of objectivity, is also the category which
primarily offers itself to reflection, as it examines the objective
world. It is also the category beyond which reflection seldom
goes. It is, however, a shallow and superficial mode of
observation, one that cannot carry us through in connexion with
Nature and still less in connexion with the world of Mind. In
Nature it is only the veriest abstract relations of matter in its inert
masses which obey the law of mechanism. On the contrary the
phenomena and operations of the province to which the term
'physical' in its narrower sense is applied, such as the phenomena
of light, heat, magnetism, and electricity, cannot be explained by
any mere mechanical processes, such as pressure, impact,
displacement of parts, and the like. Still less satisfactory is it to
transfer these categories and apply them in the field of organic
nature; at least if it be our aim to understand the specific features
of that field, such as the growth and nourishment of plants, or, it
may be, even animal sensation. It is at any rate a very deep-
seated, and perhaps the main, defect of modern researches into
nature, that, even where other and higher categories than those
of mere mechanism are in operation, they still stick obstinately to
the mechanical laws; although they thus conflict with the
testimony of unbiassed perception, and foreclose the gate to an-
adequate knowledge of nature. But even in considering the
formations in the world of Mind, the mechanical theory has been
repeatedly invested with an authority which it has no right to.
Take as an instance the remark that man consists of soul and
body. In this language, the two things stand each self-subsistent,
and associated only from without. Similarly we find the soul
regarded as a mere group of forces and faculties, subsisting
independently side by side.
Thus decidedly must we reject the mechanical mode of inquiry
when it comes forward and arrogates to itself the place of rational
cognition in general, and seeks to get mechanism accepted as an
absolute category. But we must not on that account forget
expressly to vindicate for mechanism the right and import of a
general logical category. It would be, therefore, a mistake to
restrict it to the special physical department from which it derives
its name. There is no harm done, for example, in directing
attention to mechanical actions, such as that of gravity, the lever,
&c., even in departments, notably in physics and in physiology,
beyond the range of mechanics proper. It must however be
remembered, that within these spheres the laws of mechanism
cease to be final or decisive, and sink, as it were, to a subservient
position. To which may be added, that, in Nature, when the
higher or organic functions are in any way checked or disturbed in
their normal efficiency, the otherwise subordinate category of
mechanism is immediately seen to take the upper hand. Thus a
sufferer from indigestion feels pressure on the stomach, after
partaking of certain food in slight quantity; whereas those whose
digestive organs are sound remain free from the sensation,
although they have eaten as much. The same phenomenon
occurs in the general feeling of heaviness in the limbs,
experienced in bodily indisposition. Even in the world of Mind,
mechanism has its place; though there, too, it is a subordinate
one. We are right in speaking of mechanical memory, and all sorts
of mechanical operations, such as reading, writing, playing on
musical instruments, &c. In memory, indeed, the mechanical
quality of the action is essential: a circumstance, the neglect of
which has not unfrequently caused great harm in the training of
the young, from the misapplied zeal of modern educationalists for
the freedom of intelligence. It would betray bad psychology,
however, to have recourse to mechanism for an explanation of the
nature of memory, and to apply mechanical laws straight off to
the soul. The mechanical feature in memory lies merely in the fact
that certain signs, tones, &c. are apprehended in their purely
external association, and then reproduced in this association,
without attention being expressly directed to their meaning and
inward association. To become acquainted with these conditions
of mechanical memory requires no further study of mechanics,
 nor would that study tend at all to advance the special inquiry of
psychology.
196.] The want of stability in itself which allows the object to suffer
violence, is possessed by it (see preceding §) only in so far as it has
a certain stability. Now as the object is implicitly invested with the
character of notion, the one of these characteristics is not merged
into its other; but the object, through the negation of itself (its lack
of independence), closes with itself, and not till it so closes, is it
independent. Thus at the same time in distinction from the
outwardness, and negativing that outwardness in its independence,
does this independence form a negative unity with self,—Centrality
(subjectivity). So conceived, the object itself has direction and
reference towards the external. But this external object is similarly
central in itself, and being so, is no less only referred towards the
other centre; so that it no less has its centrality in the other. This is
(2) Mechanism with Affinity (with bias, or 'difference'), and may
be illustrated by gravitation, appetite, social instinct, &c.
197.] This relationship, when fully carried out, forms a syllogism. In
that syllogism the immanent negativity, as the central individuality of
an object, (abstract centre,) relates itself to non-independent
objects, as the other extreme, by a mean which unites the centrality
with the non-independence of the objects, (relative centre.) This is
(3) Absolute Mechanism.
198.] The syllogism thus indicated (I—P—U) is a triad of syllogisms.
The wrong individuality of non-independent objects, in which formal
Mechanism is at home, is, by reason of that non-independence, no
less universality, though it be only external. Hence these objects also
form the mean between the absolute and the relative centre (the
form of syllogism being U—I—P): for it is by this want of
independence that those two are kept asunder and made extremes,
as well as related to one another. Similarly absolute centrality, as the
permanently-underlying universal substance (illustrated by the
gravity which continues identical), which as pure negativity equally
includes individuality in it, is what mediates between the relative
centre and the non-independent objects (the form of syllogism being
P—U—I). It does so no less essentially as a disintegrating force, in
its character of immanent individuality, than in virtue of universality,
acting as an identical bond of union and tranquil self-containedness.
Like the solar system, so for example in the practical sphere the
state is a system of three syllogisms. (1) The Individual or person,
through his particularity or physical or mental needs (which when
carried out to their full development give civil society), is coupled
with the universal, i.e. with society, law, right, government. (2) The
will or action of the individuals is the intermediating force which
procures for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, &c., and
which gives to society, law, &c. their fulfilment and actualisation. (3)
But the universal, that is to say the state, government, and law, is
the permanent underlying mean in which the individuals and their
satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, inter-mediation,
and persistence. Each of the functions of the notion, as it is brought
by intermediation to coalesce with the other extreme, is brought into
union with itself and produces itself: which production is self-
preservation.—It is only by the nature of this triple coupling, by this
triad of syllogisms with the name termini, that a whole is thoroughly
understood in its organisation.
199.] The immediacy of existence, which the objects have in
Absolute Mechanism, is implicitly negatived by the fact that their
independence is derived from, and due to, their connexions with
each other, and therefore to their own want of stability. Thus the
object must be explicitly stated as in its existence having an Affinity
(or a bias) towards its other,—as not-indifferent.
(b) Chemism.
200.] The not-indifferent (biassed) object has an immanent mode
which constitutes its nature, and in which it has existence. But as it
is invested with the character of total notion, it is the contradiction
between this totality and the special mode of its existence.
Consequently it is the constant endeavour to cancel this
contradiction and to make its definite being equal to the notion.
 Chemism is a category of objectivity which, as a rule, is not
particularly emphasised, and is generally put under the head of
mechanism. The common name of mechanical relationship is
applied to both, in contra-distinction to the teleological. There is a
reason for this in the common feature which belongs to
mechanism and chemism. In them the notion exists, but only
implicit and latent, and they are thus both marked off from
teleology where the notion has real independent existence. This is
true: and yet chemism and mechanism are very decidedly distinct.
The object, in the form of mechanism, is primarily only an
indifferent reference to self, while the chemical object is seen to
be completely in reference to something else. No doubt even in
mechanism, as it develops itself, there spring up references to
something else: but the nexus of mechanical objects with one
another is at first only an external nexus, so that the objects in
connexion with one another still retain the semblance of
independence. In nature, for example; the several celestial
bodies, which form our solar system, compose a kinetic system,
and thereby show that they are related to one another. Motion,
however, as the unity of time and space, is a connexion which is
purely abstract and external. And it seems therefore as if these
celestial bodies, which are thus externally connected with each
other, would continue to be what they are, even apart from this
reciprocal relation. The case is quite different with chemism.
Objects chemically biassed are what they are expressly by that
bias alone. Hence they are the absolute impulse towards
integration by and in one another.
201.] The product of the chemical process consequently is the
Neutral object, latent in the two extremes, each on the alert. The
notion or concrete universal, by means of the bias of the objects
(the particularity), coalesces with the individuality (in the shape of
the product), and in that only with itself. In this process too the
other syllogisms are equally involved. The place of mean is taken
both by individuality as activity, and by the concrete universal, the
essence of the strained extremes; which essence reaches definite
being in the product.
202.] Chemism, as it is a reflectional nexus of objectivity, has pre-
supposed, not merely the bias or non-indifferent nature of the
objects, but also their immediate independence. The process of
chemism consists in passing to and fro from one form to another;
which forms continue to be as external as before.—In the neutral
product the specific properties, which the extremes bore towards
each other, are merged. But although the product is conformable to
the notion, the inspiring principle of active differentiation does not
exist in it; for it has sunk back to immediacy. The neutral body is
therefore capable of disintegration. But the discerning principle,
which breaks up the neutral body into biassed and strained
extremes, and which gives to the indifferent object in general its
affinity and animation towards another;—that principle, and the
process as a separation with tension, falls outside of that first
process.
The chemical process does not rise above a conditioned and finite
process. The notion as notion is only the heart and core of the
process, and does not in this stage come to an existence of its
own. In the neutral product the process is extinct, and the
existing cause falls outside it.
203.] Each of these two processes, the reduction of the biassed
(not-indifferent) to the neutral, and the differentiation of the
indifferent or neutral, goes its own way without hindrance from the
other. But that want of inner connexion shows that they are finite,
by their passage into products in which they are merged and lost.
Conversely the process exhibits the nonentity of the pre-supposed
immediacy of the not-indifferent objects.—By this negation of
immediacy and of externalism in which the notion as object was
sunk, it is liberated and invested with independent being in face of
that externalism and immediacy. In these circumstances it is the End
(Final Cause).
 The passage from chemism to the teleological relation is implied
in the mutual cancelling of both of the forms of the chemical
process. The result thus attained is the liberation of the notion,
which in chemism and mechanism was present only in the germ,
and not yet evolved. The notion in the shape of the aim or end
thus comes into independent existence.
(c) Teleology.
204.] In the End the notion has entered on free existence and has a
being of its own, by means of the negation of immediate objectivity.
It is characterised as subjective, seeing that this negation is, in the
first place, abstract, and hence at first the relation between it and
objectivity still one of contrast. This character of subjectivity,
however, compared with the totality of the notion, is one-sided, and
that, be it added, for the End itself, in which all specific characters
have been put as subordinated and merged. For it therefore even
the object, which it pre-supposes, has only hypothetical (ideal)
reality,—essentially no-reality. The End in short is a contradiction of
its self-identity against the negation stated in it, i.e. its antithesis to
objectivity, and being so, contains the eliminative or destructive
activity which negates the antithesis and renders it identical with
itself. This is the realisation of the End: in which, while it turns itself
into the other of its subjectivity and objectifies itself, thus cancelling
the distinction between the two, it has only closed with itself, and
retained itself.
The notion of Design or End, while on one hand called redundant, is
on another justly described as the rational notion, and contrasted
with the abstract universal of understanding. The latter only
subsumes the particular, and so connects it with itself: but has it not
in its own nature.—The distinction between the End or final cause,
and the mere efficient cause (which is the cause ordinarily so
called), is of supreme importance. Causes, properly so called, belong
to the sphere of necessity, blind, and not yet laid bare. The cause
therefore appears as passing into its correlative, and losing its
primordiality there by sinking into dependency. It is only by
implication, or for us, that the cause is in the effect made for the
first time a cause, and that it there returns into itself. The End, on
the other hand, is expressly stated as containing the specific
character in its own self,—the effect, namely, which in the purely
causal relation is never free from otherness. The End therefore in its
efficiency does not pass over, but retains itself, i.e. it carries into
effect itself only, and is at the end what it was in the beginning or
primordial state. Until it thus retains itself, it is not genuinely
primordial.—The End then requires to be speculatively apprehended
as the notion, which itself in the proper unity and ideality of its
characteristics contains the judgment or negation,—the antithesis of
subjective and objective,—and which to an equal extent suspends
that antithesis.
By End however we must not at once, nor must we ever merely,
think of the form which it has in consciousness as a mode of mere
mental representation. By means of the notion of Inner Design
Kant has resuscitated the Idea in general and particularly the idea of
life. Aristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner design, and is
thus far in advance of the notion of design in modern Teleology,
which had in view finite and outward design only.
Animal wants and appetites are some of the readiest instances of
the End. They are the felt contradiction, which exists within the
living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this negation
which mere subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the want or
appetite restores the peace between subject and object. The
objective thing which, so long as the contradiction exists, i.e. so long
as the want is felt, stands on the other side, loses this quasi-
independence, by its union with the subject. Those who talk of the
permanence and immutability of the finite, as well subjective as
objective, may see the reverse illustrated in the operations of every
appetite. Appetite is, so to speak, the conviction that the subjective
is only a half-truth, no more adequate than the objective. But
appetite in the second place carries out its conviction. It brings
about the supersession of these finites: it cancels the antithesis
between the objective which would be and stay an objective only,
and the subjective which in like manner would be and stay a
subjective only.
As regards the action of the End, attention may be called to the fact,
that in the syllogism, which represents that action, and shows the
end closing with itself by the means of realisation, the radical feature
is the negation of the termini. That negation is the one just
mentioned both of the immediate subjectivity appearing in the End
as such, and of the immediate objectivity as seen in the means and
the objects pre-supposed. This is the same negation, as is in
operation when the mind leaves the contingent things of the world
as well as its own subjectivity and rises to God. It is the 'moment' or
factor which (as noticed in the Introduction and § 192) was
overlooked and neglected in the analytic form of syllogisms, under
which the so-called proofs of the Being of a God presented this
elevation.
205.] In its primary and immediate aspect the Teleological relation is
external design, and the notion confronts a pre-supposed object.
The End is consequently finite, and that partly in its content, partly
in the circumstance that it has an external condition in the object,
which has to be found existing, and which is taken as material for its
realisation. Its self-determining is to that extent in form only. The
un-mediatedness of the End has the further result that its
particularity or content—which as form-characteristic is the
subjectivity of the End—is reflected into self, and so different from
the totality of the form, subjectivity in general, the notion. This
variety constitutes the finitude of Design within its own nature. The
content of the End. in this way, is quite as limited, contingent, and
given, as the object is particular and found ready to hand.
Generally speaking, the final cause is taken to mean nothing more
than external design. In accordance with this view of it, things are
supposed not to carry their vocation in themselves, but merely to
be means employed and spent in realising a purpose which lies
outside of them. That may be said to be the point of view taken
by Utility, which once played a great part even in the sciences,
 but of late has fallen into merited disrepute, now that people have
begun to see that it failed to give a genuine insight into the
nature of things. It is true that finite things as finite ought in
justice to be viewed as non-ultimate, and as pointing beyond
themselves. This negativity of finite things however is their own
dialectic, and in order to ascertain it we must pay attention to
their positive content.
Teleological observations on things often proceed from a well-
meant wish to display the wisdom of God as it is especially
revealed in nature. Now in thus trying to discover final causes for
which the things serve as means, we must remember that we are
stopping short at the finite, and are liable to fall into trifling
reflections: as, for instance, if we not merely studied the vine in
respect of its well-known use for man, but proceeded to consider
the cork-tree in connexion with the corks which are cut from its
bark to put into the wine-bottles. Whole books used to be written
in this spirit. It is easy to see that they promoted the genuine
interest neither of religion nor of science. External design stands
immediately in front of the idea: but what thus stands on the
threshold often for that reason is least adequate.
206.] The teleological relation is a syllogism in which the subjective
end coalesces with the objectivity external to it, through a middle
term which is the unity of both. This unity is on one hand the
purposive action, on the other the Means, i.e. objectivity made
directly subservient to purpose.
The development from End to Idea ensues by three stages, first,
Subjective End; second, End in process of accomplishment; and
third, End accomplished. First of all we have the Subjective End;
and that, as the notion in independent being, is itself the totality
of the elementary functions of the notion. The first of these
functions is that of self-identical universality, as it were the neutral
first water, in which everything is involved, but nothing as yet
discriminated. The second of these elements is the particularising
of this universal, by which it acquires a specific content. As this
 specific content again is realised by the agency of the universal,
the latter returns by its means back to itself, and coalesces with
itself. Hence too when we set some end before us, we say that
we 'conclude' to do something: a phrase which implies that we
were, so to speak, open and accessible to this or that
determination. Similarly we also at a further step speak of a man
'resolving' to do something, meaning that the agent steps forward
out of his self-regarding inwardness and enters into dealings with
the environing objectivity. This supplies the step from the merely
Subjective End to the purposive action which tends outwards.
207.] (1) The first syllogism of the final cause represents the
Subjective End. The universal notion is brought to unite with
individuality by means of particularity, so that the individual as self-
determination acts as judge. That is to say, it not only particularises
or makes into a determinate content the still indeterminate
universal, but also explicitly puts an antithesis of subjectivity and
objectivity, and at the same time is in its own self a return to itself;
for it stamps the subjectivity of the notion, pre-supposed as against
objectivity, with the mark of defect, in comparison with the complete
and rounded totality, and thereby at the same time turns outwards.
208.] (2) This action which is directed outwards is the individuality,
which in the Subjective End is identical with the particularity under
which, along with the content, is also comprised the external
objectivity. It throws itself in the first place immediately upon the
object, which it appropriates to itself as a Means. The notion is this
immediate power; for the notion is the self-identical negativity, in
which the being of the object is characterised as wholly and merely
ideal.—The whole Means then is this inward power of the notion, in
the shape of an agency, with which the object as Means is
'immediately' united and in obedience to which it stands.
In finite teleology the Means is thus broken up into two elements
external to each other, (a) the action and (b) the object which serves
as Means. The relation of the final cause as power to this object,
and the subjugation of the object to it, is immediate (it forms the
first premiss in the syllogism) to this extent, that in the teleological
notion as the self-existent ideality the object is put as potentially
null. This relation, as represented in the first premiss, itself becomes
the Means, which at the same time involves the syllogism, that
through this relation—in which the action of the End is contained
and dominant—the End is coupled with objectivity.
The execution of the End is the mediated mode of realising the
End; but the immediate realisation is not less needful. The End
lays hold of the object immediately, because it is the power over
the object, because in the End particularity, and in particularity
objectivity also, is involved.—A living being has a body; the soul
takes possession of it and without intermediary has objectified
itself in it. The human soul has much to do, before it makes its
corporeal nature into a means. Man must, as it were, take
possession of his body, so that it may be the instrument of his
soul.
209.] (3) Purposive action, with its Means, is still directed outwards,
because the End is also not identical with the object, and must
consequently first be mediated with it. The Means in its capacity of
object stands, in this second premiss, in direct relation to the other
extreme of the syllogism, namely, the material or objectivity which is
pre-supposed. This relation is the sphere of chemism and
mechanism, which have now become the servants of the Final
Cause, where lies their truth and free notion. Thus the Subjective
End, which is the power ruling these processes, in which the
objective things wear themselves out on one another, contrives to
keep itself free from them, and to preserve itself in them. Doing so,
it appears as the Cunning of reason.
Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie
in the inter-mediative action which, while it permits the objects to
follow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste
away, and does not itself directly interfere in the process, is
nevertheless only working out its own aims. With this explanation,
Divine Providence may be said to stand to the world and its
 process in the capacity of absolute cunning. God lets men do as
they please with their particular passions and interests; but the
result is the accomplishment of—not their plans, but His, and
these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those
whom He employs.
210.] The realised End is thus the overt unity of subjective and
objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this unity, that
the subjective and objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the
point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and
made conformable to the End, as the free notion, and thereby to the
power above it. The End maintains itself against and in the objective
for it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is also the
concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. This universal, as
simply reflected in itself, is the content which remains unchanged
through all the three termini of the syllogism and their movement.
211.] In finite design, however, even the executed End has the same
radical rift or flaw as had the Means and the initial End. We have got
therefore only a form extraneously impressed on a pre-existing
material: and this form, by reason of the limited content of the End,
is also a contingent characteristic. The End achieved consequently is
only an object, which again becomes a Means or material for other
Ends, and so on for ever.
212.] But what virtually happens in the realising of the End is that
the one-sided subjectivity and the show of objective independence
confronting it are both cancelled. In laying hold of the means, the
notion constitutes itself the very implicit essence of the object. In
the mechanical and chemical processes the independence of the
object has been already dissipated implicitly, and in the course of
their movement under the dominion of the End, the show of that
independence, the negative which confronts the notion, is got rid of.
But in the fact that the End achieved is characterised only as a
Means and a material, this object, viz. the teleological, is there and
then put as implicitly null, and only 'ideal.' This being so, the
antithesis between form and content has also vanished. While the
End by the removal and absorption of all form-characteristics
coalesces with itself, the form as self-identical is thereby put as the
content, so that the notion, which is the action of form, has only
itself for content. Through this process, therefore, there is made
explicitly manifest what was the notion of design: viz. the implicit
unity of subjective and objective is now realised. And this is the
Idea.
This finitude of the End consists in the circumstance, that, in the
process of realising it, the material, which is employed as a
means, is only externally subsumed under it and made
conformable to it. But, as a matter of fact, the object is the notion
implicitly: and thus when the notion, in the shape of End, is
realised in the object, we have but the manifestation of the inner
nature of the object itself. Objectivity is thus, as it were, only a
covering under which the notion lies concealed. Within the range
of the finite we can never see or experience that the End has
been really secured. The consummation of the infinite End,
therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it
seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is
eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it
needs not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as
in full actuality, accomplished. This is the illusion under which we
live. It alone supplies at the same time the actualising force on
which the interest in the world reposes. In the course of its
process the Idea creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to
confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion
which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise. In
this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error
or other-being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic
element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its
own result.

C.—THE IDEA.
213.] The Idea is truth in itself and for itself,—the absolute unity of
the notion and objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing but the notion
in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the exhibition which the
notion gives itself in the form of external existence, whilst yet, by
enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and so
keeps itself in it.
The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself
absolute. All former definitions come back to this. The Idea is the
Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion:
—not of course the correspondence of external things with my
conceptions,—for these are only correct conceptions held by me, the
individual person. In the idea we have nothing to do with the
individual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things.
And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea,
and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual
being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore, yet other
actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have a self-
subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their
relation that the notion is realised. The individual by itself does not
correspond to its notion. It is this limitation of its existence which
constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual.
The Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other,
any more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion.
The Absolute is the universal and one idea, which, by an act of
'judgment,' particularises itself to the system of specific ideas; which
after all are constrained by their nature to come back to the one
idea where their truth lies. As issued out of this 'judgment' the Idea
is in the first place only the one universal substance: but its
developed and genuine actuality is to be as a subject and in that
way as mind.
Because it has no existence for starting-point and point d'appui, the
Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form. Such a view must
be abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and
genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories
which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. It is no less false
to imagine the Idea to be mere abstraction. It is abstract certainly, in
so far as everything untrue is consumed in it: but in its own self it is
essentially concrete, because it is the free notion giving character to
itself, and that character, reality. It would be an abstract form, only if
the notion, which is its principle, were taken as an abstract unity,
and not as the negative return of it into self and as the subjectivity
which it really is.
Truth is at first taken to mean that I know how something is. This
is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness; it is formal
truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the
identity between objectivity and the notion. It is in this deeper
sense of truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of
art. These objects are true, if they are as they ought to be, i.e. if
their reality corresponds to their notion. When thus viewed, to be
untrue means much the same as to be bad. A bad man is an
untrue man, a man who does not behave as his notion or his
vocation requires. Nothing however can subsist, if it be wholly
devoid of identity between the notion and reality. Even bad and
untrue things have being, in so far as their reality still, somehow,
conforms to their notion. Whatever is thoroughly bad or contrary
to the notion, is for that very reason on the way to ruin. It is by
the notion alone that the things in the world have their
subsistence; or, as it is expressed in the language of religious
conception, things are what they are, only in virtue of the divine
and thereby creative thought which dwells within them.
When we hear the Idea spoken of, we need not imagine
something far away beyond this mortal sphere. The idea is rather
what is completely present: and it is found, however confused
and degenerated, in every consciousness. We conceive the world
to ourselves as a great totality which is created by God, and so
created that in it God has manifested Himself to us. We regard
the world also as ruled by Divine Providence: implying that the
scattered and divided parts of the world are continually brought
back, and made conformable, to the unity from which they have
 issued. The purpose of philosophy has always been the
intellectual ascertainment of the Idea; and everything deserving
the name of philosophy has constantly been based on the
consciousness of an absolute unity where the understanding sees
and accepts only separation.—It is too late now to ask for proof
that the Idea is the truth. The proof of that is contained in the
whole deduction and development of thought up to this point.
The idea is the result of this course of dialectic. Not that it is to be
supposed that the idea is mediate only, i.e. mediated through
something else than itself. It is rather its own result, and being
so, is no less immediate than mediate. The stages hitherto
considered, viz. those of Being and Essence, as well as those of
Notion and of Objectivity, are not, when so distinguished,
something permanent, resting upon themselves. They have
proved to be dialectical; and their only truth is that they are
dynamic elements of the idea.
214.] The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called
reason (and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason);
subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and
the infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality in
its own self; that of which the nature can be thought only as
existent, &c. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains
all the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite
self-return and self-identity.
It is easy work for the understanding to show that everything said of
the Idea is self-contradictory. But that can quite as well be retaliated,
or rather in the Idea the retaliation is actually made. And this work,
which is the work of reason, is certainly not so easy as that of the
understanding. Understanding may demonstrate that the Idea is
self-contradictory: because the subjective is subjective only and is
always confronted by the objective,—because being is different from
notion and therefore cannot be picked out of it,—because the finite
is finite only, the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore not
identical with it; and so on with every term of the description. The
reverse of all this however is the doctrine of Logic. Logic shows that
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