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Numerical
Python
Scientific Computing and Data Science
Applications with Numpy,
SciPy and Matplotlib
—
Second Edition
—
Robert Johansson
Numerical Python
Scientific Computing and Data
Science Applications with Numpy,
SciPy and Matplotlib
Second Edition
Robert Johansson
Numerical Python: Scientific Computing and Data Science Applications with
Numpy, SciPy and Matplotlib
Robert Johansson
Urayasu-shi, Chiba, Japan
Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xxi
v
Table of Contents
vi
Table of Contents
Aggregate Functions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 79
Boolean Arrays and Conditional Expressions������������������������������������������������������������������������ 82
Set Operations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 85
Operations on Arrays������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 87
Matrix and Vector Operations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 88
Summary������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 95
Further Reading�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 95
References���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 96
vii
Table of Contents
Summary���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 134
Further Reading������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 134
Reference���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 134
viii
Table of Contents
ix
Table of Contents
x
Table of Contents
xii
Table of Contents
xiii
Table of Contents
JSON����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 631
Serialization������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 636
Summary���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 639
Further Reading������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 639
Reference���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 640
Index��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 683
xiv
About the Author
Robert Johansson is an experienced Python programmer
and computational scientist, with a Ph.D. in Theoretical
Physics from Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
He has worked with scientific computing in academia and
industry for over 10 years, and he has participated in both
open source development and proprietary research projects.
His open source contributions include work on QuTiP, a
popular Python framework for simulating the dynamics of
quantum systems; and he has also contributed to several
other popular Python libraries in the scientific computing
landscape. Robert is passionate about scientific computing
and software development and about teaching and communicating best practices for
bringing these fields together with optimal outcome: novel, reproducible, and extensible
computational results. Robert’s background includes 5 years of postdoctoral research in
theoretical and computational physics, and he is now working as a data scientist in the
IT industry.
xv
Other documents randomly have
different content
The superior judge reversed the decision, on the ground that in
dealing with another person’s property one is responsible for any
injury which he could have avoided by any degree of circumspection.
“The firing ... was rash and incautious.”
Does not the whole spirit of this discussion speak for itself?
Jan. T. 1827. 4 See also the very next case in Wheeler’s
M’Cord’s Rep. 156. Law. Richardson v. Dukes, p. 202.
Trespass for killing the plaintiff’s slave. It appeared the slave was stealing potatoes
from a bank near the defendant’s house. The defendant fired upon him with a gun
loaded with buckshot, and killed him. The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for one
dollar. Motion for a new trial.
The Court. Nott J. held, there must be a new trial; that the jury ought to have
given the plaintiff the value of the slave. That if the jury were of opinion the slave
was of bad character, some deduction from the usual price ought to be made, but
the plaintiff was certainly entitled to his actual damage for killing his slave. Where
property is in question, the value of the article, as nearly as it can be ascertained,
furnishes a rule from which they are not at liberty to depart.
Wheeler’s Law of It seems that the value of this unfortunate
Slavery, 220. piece of property was somewhat reduced
from the circumstance of his “stealing potatoes.” Doubtless he had
his own best reasons for this; so, at least, we should infer from the
following remark, which occurs in one of the reasonings of Judge
Taylor, of N. Carolina.
“The act of 1786 (Iredell’s Revisal, p. 588) does, in the preamble, recognize the
fact, that many persons, by cruel treatment to their slaves, cause them to commit
crimes for which they are executed. * * The cruel treatment here alluded to must
consist in withholding from them the necessaries of life; and the crimes thus
resulting are such as are calculated to furnish them with food and raiment.”
Perhaps “stealing potatoes” in this case was one of the class of
crimes alluded to.
Witsell v. Earnest & Again we have the following case:
Parker. Wheeler, p.
The defendants went to the plantation of Mrs.
202.
Witsell for the purpose of hunting for runaway
negroes; there being many in the neighborhood, and the place in considerable
alarm. As they approached the house with loaded guns, a negro ran from the
house, or near the house, towards a swamp, when they fired and killed him.
The judge charged the jury, that such circumstances might exist, by the
excitement and alarm of the neighborhood, as to authorize the killing of a negro
without the sanction of a magistrate.
This decision was reversed in the Superior Court, in the following
language:
By the statute of 1740, any white man may apprehend and moderately correct any
slave who may be found out of the plantation at which he is employed, and if the
slave assaults the white person, he may be killed; but a slave who is merely flying
away cannot be killed. Nor can the defendants be justified by common law, IF we
consider the negro as a person; for they were not clothed with the authority of the
law to apprehend him as a felon, and without such authority he could not be
killed.
Wheeler, p. 252. If we consider the negro a person, says the
June T., 1820. judge; and, from his decision in the case,
Walker’s Rep. 83.
he evidently intimates that he has a strong
leaning to this opinion, though it has been contested by so many
eminent legal authorities that he puts forth his sentiment modestly,
and in an hypothetical form. The reader, perhaps, will need to be
informed that the question whether the slave is to be considered a
person or a human being in any respect has been extensively and
ably argued on both sides in legal courts, and it may be a comfort to
know that the balance of legal opinion inclines in favor of the slave.
Judge Clarke, of Mississippi, is quite clear on the point, and argues
very ably and earnestly, though, as he confesses, against very
respectable legal authorities, that the slave is a person,—that he is a
reasonable creature. The reasoning occurs in the case State of
Mississippi v. Jones, and is worthy of attention as a literary curiosity.
It seems that a case of murder of a slave had been clearly made out
and proved in the lower court, and that judgment was arrested and
the case appealed on the ground whether, in that state, murder
could be committed on a slave. Judge Clarke thus ably and earnestly
argues:
The question in this case is, whether murder can be committed on a slave.
Because individuals may have been deprived of many of their rights by society, it
does not follow, that they have been deprived of all their rights. In some respects,
slaves may be considered as chattels; but in others, they are regarded as men.
The law views them as capable of committing crimes. This can only be upon the
principle, that they are men and rational beings. The Roman law has been much
relied on by the counsel of the defendant. That law was confined to the Roman
empire, giving the power of life and death over captives in war, as slaves; but it no
more extended here, than the similar power given to parents over the lives of their
children. Much stress has also been laid by the defendant’s counsel on the case
cited from Taylor’s Reports, decided in North Carolina; yet, in that case, two
judges against one were of opinion, that killing a slave was murder. Judge Hall,
who delivered the dissenting opinion in the above case based his conclusions, as
we conceive, upon erroneous principles, by considering the laws of Rome
applicable here. His inference, also, that a person cannot be condemned capitally,
because he may be liable in a civil action, is not sustained by reason or authority,
but appears to us to be in direct opposition to both. At a very early period in
Virginia, the power of life over slaves was given by statute; but Tucker observes,
that as soon as these statutes were repealed, it was at once considered by their
courts that the killing of a slave might be murder. Commonwealth v. Dolly
Chapman: indictment for maliciously stabbing a slave, under a statute. It has been
determined in Virginia that slaves are persons. In the constitution of the United
States, slaves are expressly designated as “persons.” In this state the legislature
have considered slaves as reasonable and accountable beings; and it would be a
stigma upon the character of the state, and a reproach to the administration of
justice, if the life of a slave could be taken with impunity, or if he could be
murdered in cold blood, without subjecting the offender to the highest penalty
known to the criminal jurisprudence of the country. Has the slave no rights,
because he is deprived of his freedom? He is still a human being, and possesses
all those rights of which he is not deprived by the positive provisions of the law;
but in vain shall we look for any law passed by the enlightened and philanthropic
legislature of this state, giving even to the master, much less to a stranger, power
over the life of a slave. Such a statute would be worthy the age of Draco or
Caligula, and would be condemned by the unanimous voice of the people of this
state, where even cruelty to slaves, much [more] the taking away of life, meets
with universal reprobation. By the provisions of our law, a slave may commit
murder, and be punished with death; why, then, is it not murder to kill a slave?
Can a mere chattel commit murder, and be subject to punishment?
The right of the master exists not by force of the law of nature or nations, but by
virtue only of the positive law of the state; and although that gives to the master
the right to command the services of the slave, requiring the master to feed and
clothe the slave from infancy till death, yet it gives the master no right to take the
life of the slave; and, if the offence be not murder, it is not a crime, and subjects
the offender to no punishment.
The taking away the life of a reasonable creature, under the king’s peace, with
malice aforethought, express or implied, is murder at common law. Is not a slave
a reasonable creature?—is he not a human being? And the meaning of this phrase,
reasonable creature, is, a human being. For the killing a lunatic, an idiot, or even a
child unborn, is murder, as much as the killing a philosopher; and has not the
slave as much reason as a lunatic, an idiot, or an unborn child?
Thus triumphantly, in this nineteenth century of the Christian era
and in the State of Mississippi, has it been made to appear that the
slave is a reasonable creature,—a human being!
What sort of system, what sort of a public sentiment, was that which
made this argument necessary?
And let us look at some of the admissions of this argument with
regard to the nature of slavery. According to the judge, it is
depriving human beings of many of their rights. Thus he says:
“Because individuals may have been deprived of many of their rights
by society, it does not follow that they have been deprived of all
their rights.” Again, he says of the slave: “He is still a human being,
and possesses all those rights of which he is not deprived by the
positive provisions of the law.” Here he admits that the provisions of
law deprive the slave of natural rights. Again he says: “The right of
the master exists not by force of the law of nature or of nations, but
by virtue only of the positive law of the state.” According to the
decision of this judge, therefore, slavery exists by the same right
that robbery or oppression of any kind does,—the right of ability. A
gang of robbers associated into a society have rights over all the
neighboring property that they can acquire, of precisely the same
kind.
With the same unconscious serenity does the law apply that principle
of force and robbery which is the essence of slavery, and show how
far the master may proceed in appropriating another human being
as his property.
Wheeler, p. 28. The question arises, May a master give a
Banks, Adm’r, v. woman to one person, and her unborn
Marksbury. Spring T. children to another one? Let us hear the
1823. 3 Little’s Rep.
275. case argued. The unfortunate mother
selected as the test point of this interesting
legal principle comes to our view in the will of one Samuel
Marksbury, under the style and denomination of “my negro wench
Pen.” Said Samuel states in his will that, for the good will and love
he bears to his own children, he gives said negro wench Pen to son
Samuel, and all her future increase to daughter Rachael. When
daughter Rachael, therefore, marries, her husband sets up a claim
for this increase,—as it is stated, quite off-hand, that the “wench had
several children.” Here comes a beautifully interesting case, quite
stimulating to legal acumen. Inferior court decides that Samuel
Marksbury could not have given away unborn children on the
strength of the legal maxim, “Nemo dat quod non habet,”—i. e.,
“Nobody can give what he has not got,”—which certainly one should
think sensible and satisfactory enough. The case, however, is
appealed, and reversed in the superior court; and now let us hear
the reasoning.
The judge acknowledges the force of the maxim above quoted,—
says, as one would think any man might say, that it is quite a correct
maxim,—the only difficulty being that it does not at all apply to the
present case. Let us hear him:
He who is the absolute owner of a thing owns all its faculties for profit or increase;
and he may, no doubt, grant the profits or increase, as well as the thing itself.
Thus, it is every day’s practice to grant the future rents or profits of real estate;
and it is held that a man may grant the wool of a flock of sheep for years.
See also p. 33, Fanny v. Bryant, 4 J. J. Marshall’s Rep., 368. In this
almost precisely the same language is used. If the reader will
proceed, he will find also this principle applied with equal clearness
to the hiring, selling, mortgaging of unborn children; and the perfect
legal nonchalance of these discussions is only comparable to running
a dissecting-knife through the course of all the heart-strings of a
living subject, for the purpose of demonstrating the laws of nervous
contraction.
Judge Stroud, in his sketch of the slave-laws, page 99, lays down for
proof the following assertion: That the penal codes of the slave
states bear much more severely on slaves than on white persons. He
introduces his consideration of this proposition by the following
humane and sensible remarks:
A being, ignorant of letters, unenlightened by religion, and deriving but little
instruction from good example, cannot be supposed to have right conceptions as
to the nature and extent of moral or political obligations. This remark, with but a
slight qualification, is applicable to the condition of the slave. It has been just
shown that the benefits of education are not conferred upon him, while his chance
of acquiring a knowledge of the precepts of the gospel is so remote as scarcely to
be appreciated. He may be regarded, therefore as almost without the capacity to
comprehend the force of laws; and, on this account, such as are designed for his
government should be recommended by their simplicity and mildness.
His condition suggests another motive for tenderness on his behalf in these
particulars. He is unable to read, and holding little or no communication with those
who are better informed than himself; how is he to become acquainted with the
fact that a law for his observance has been made? To exact obedience to a law
which has not been promulgated,—which is unknown to the subject of it,—has
ever been deemed most unjust and tyrannical. The reign of Caligula, were it
obnoxious to no other reproach than this, would never cease to be remembered
with abhorrence.
The lawgivers of the slaveholding states seem, in the formation of their penal
codes, to have been uninfluenced by these claims of the slave upon their
compassionate consideration. The hardened convict moves their sympathy, and is
to be taught the laws before he is expected to obey them; yet the guiltless slave is
subjected to an extensive system of cruel enactments, of no part of which,
probably, has he ever heard.
Parts of this system apply to the slave exclusively, and for every infraction a large
retribution is demanded; while, with respect to offences for which whites as well
as slaves are amenable, punishments of much greater severity are inflicted upon
the latter than upon the former.
This heavy charge of Judge Stroud is sustained by twenty pages of
proof, showing the very great disproportion between the number of
offences made capital for slaves, and those that are so for whites.
Concerning this, we find the following cool remark in Wheeler’s Law
of Slavery, page 222, note.
Much has been said of the disparity of punishment between the white inhabitants
and the slaves and negroes of the same state; that slaves are punished with much
more severity, for the commission of similar crimes, by white persons, than the
latter. The charge is undoubtedly true to a considerable extent. It must be
remembered that the primary object of the enactment of penal laws, is the
protection and security of those who make them. The slave has no agency in
making them. He is indeed one cause of the apprehended evils to the other class,
which those laws are expected to remedy. That he should be held amenable for a
violation of those rules established for the security of the other, is the natural
result of the state in which he is placed. And the severity of those rules will always
bear a relation to that danger, real or ideal, of the other class.
It has been so among all nations, and will ever continue to be so, while the
disparity between bond and free remains.
The State v. Mann. A striking example of a legal decision to this
Dec. Term, 1829. 2 purport is given in Wheeler’s Law of
Devereaux’s North
Carolina Rep. 265.
Slavery, page 224. The case, apart from
legal technicalities, may be thus briefly
stated:
The defendant, Mann, had hired a slave-woman for a year. During
this time the slave committed some slight offence, for which the
defendant undertook to chastise her. While in the act of doing so the
slave ran off, whereat he shot at and wounded her. The judge in the
inferior court charged the jury that if they believed the punishment
was cruel and unwarrantable, and disproportioned to the offence, in
law the defendant was guilty, as he had only a special property in
the slave. The jury finding evidence that the punishment had been
cruel, unwarrantable and disproportioned to the offence, found
verdict against the defendant. But on what ground?—Because,
according to the law of North Carolina, cruel, unwarrantable,
disproportionate punishment of a slave from a master, is an
indictable offence? No. They decided against the defendant, not
because the punishment was cruel and unwarrantable, but because
he was not the person who had the right to inflict it, “as he had only
a SPECIAL right of property in the slave.”
The defendant appealed to a higher court, and the decision was
reversed, on the ground that the hirer has for the time being all the
rights of the master. The remarks of Judge Ruffin are so
characteristic, and so strongly express the conflict between the
feelings of the humane judge and the logical necessity of a strict
interpreter of slave-law, that we shall quote largely from it. One
cannot but admire the unflinching calmness with which a man,
evidently possessed of honorable and humane feelings, walks
through the most extreme and terrible results and conclusions, in
obedience to the laws of legal truth. Thus he says:
A judge cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are brought into
judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated,
but where institutions similar to our own exist, and are thoroughly understood.
The struggle, too, in the judge’s own breast, between the feelings of the man and
the duty of the magistrate, is a severe one, presenting strong temptation to put
aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless, however, to complain of things
inherent in our political state. And it is criminal in a court to avoid any
responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance, therefore, it is
done, the court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the
dominion of the master over the slave in North Carolina. The indictment charges a
battery on Lydia, a slave of Elizabeth Jones.... The inquiry here is, whether a cruel
and unreasonable battery on a slave by the hirer is indictable. The judge below
instructed the jury that it is. He seems to have put it on the ground, that the
defendant had but a special property. Our laws uniformly treat the master, or other
person having the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to the same
extent of authority. The object is the same, the service of the slave; and the same
powers must be confided. In a criminal proceeding, and, indeed, in reference to all
other persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of the slave, in
relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner.... But, upon
the general question, whether the owner is answerable criminaliter, for a battery
upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority of force, not forbidden by
statute, the court entertains but little doubt. That he is so liable, has never been
decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto contended. There has been no
prosecution of the sort. The established habits and uniform practice of the country,
in this respect, is the best evidence of the portion of power deemed by the whole
community requisite to the preservation of the master’s dominion. If we thought
differently, we could not set our notions in array against the judgment of
everybody else, and say that this or that authority may be safely lopped off. This
has indeed been assimilated at the bar to the other domestic relations; and
arguments drawn from the well-established principles, which confer and restrain
the authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over
the apprentice, have been pressed on us.
The court does not recognize their application. There is no likeness between the
cases. They are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf
between them. The difference is that which exists between freedom and slavery;
and a greater cannot be imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness of
the youth born to equal rights with that governor on whom the duty devolves of
training the young to usefulness, in a station which he is afterwards to assume
among freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral and intellectual
instruction seem the natural means; and, for the most part, they are found to
suffice. Moderate force is superadded only to make the others effectual. If that
fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and the ultimate
correction of the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a private
person. With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his
security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed, in his own person and his
posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make anything
his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits. What moral considerations
shall be addressed to such a being, to convince him what it is impossible but that
the most stupid must feel and know can never be true,—that he is thus to labor
upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal happiness?
Such services can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who
surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the
consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else
which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute,
to render the submission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of the
harshness of this proposition. I feel it as deeply as any man can. And, as a
principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it. But, in
the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline
belongs to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited without abrogating at
once the rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his subjection. It
constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and the free portions of our
population. But it is inherent in the relation of master and slave. That there may
be particular instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity, where in conscience the
law might properly interfere, is most probable. The difficulty is to determine where
a court may properly begin. Merely in the abstract, it may well be asked which
power of the master accords with right. The answer will probably sweep away all
of them. But we cannot look at the matter in that light. The truth is that we are
forbidden to enter upon a train of general reasoning on the subject. We cannot
allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice.
The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is no appeal from
his master; that his power is, in no instance, usurped, but is conferred by the laws
of man, at least, if not by the law of God. The danger would be great, indeed, if
the tribunals of justice should be called on to graduate the punishment
appropriate to every temper and every dereliction of menial duty.
No man can anticipate the many and aggravated provocations of the master which
the slave would be constantly stimulated by his own passions, or the instigation of
others, to give; or the consequent wrath of the master, prompting him to bloody
vengeance upon the turbulent traitor; a vengeance generally practised with
impunity, by reason of its privacy. The court, therefore, disclaims the power of
changing the relation in which these parts of our people stand to each other.
I repeat, that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful question. But, being
brought to it, the court is compelled to declare that while slavery exists amongst
us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the legislature to interpose
express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of the judges to
recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise
of it is forbidden by statute.
And this we do upon the ground that this dominion is essential to the value of
slaves as property, to the security of the master and the public tranquility, greatly
dependent upon their subordination; and, in fine, as most effectually securing the
general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves. Judgment below
reversed; and judgment entered for the defendant.
No one can read this decision, so fine and clear in expression, so
dignified and solemn in its earnestness, and so dreadful in its
results, without feeling at once deep respect for the man and horror
for the system. The man, judging him from this short specimen,
which is all the author knows,[5] has one of that high order of minds,
which looks straight through all verbiage and sophistry to the heart
of every subject which it encounters. He has, too, that noble scorn
of dissimulation, that straight-forward determination not to call a bad
thing by a good name, even when most popular and reputable and
legal, which it is to be wished could be more frequently seen, both in
our Northern and Southern States. There is but one sole regret; and
that is that such a man, with such a mind, should have been merely
an expositor, and not a reformer of law.
The killing of a slave by his master and owner, by wilful and excessive
whipping, is murder in the first degree: though it may not have been the
purpose and intention of the master and owner to kill the slave.
Simeon Souther was indicted at the October Term, 1850, of the Circuit Court for
the County of Hanover, for the murder of his own slave. The indictment contained
fifteen counts, in which the various modes of punishment and torture by which the
homicide was charged to have been committed were stated singly, and in various
combinations. The fifteenth count unites them all: and, as the court certifies that
the indictment was sustained by the evidence, the giving the facts stated in that
count will show what was the charge against the prisoner, and what was the proof
to sustain it.
The count charged that on the 1st day of September, 1849, the prisoner tied his
negro slave, Sam, with ropes about his wrists, neck, body, legs and ankles, to a
tree. That whilst so tied, the prisoner first whipped the slave with switches. That
he next beat and cobbed the slave with a shingle, and compelled two of his slaves,
a man and a woman, also to cob the deceased with the shingle. That whilst the
deceased was so tied to the tree, the prisoner did strike, knock, kick, stamp and
beat him upon various parts of his head, face and body; that he applied fire to his
body; * * * * that he then washed his body with warm water, in which pods of red
pepper had been put and steeped; and he compelled his two slaves aforesaid also
to wash him with this same preparation of warm water and red pepper. That after
the tying, whipping, cobbing, striking, beating, knocking, kicking, stamping,
wounding, bruising, lacerating, burning, washing and torturing, as aforesaid, the
prisoner untied the deceased from the tree in such way as to throw him with
violence to the ground; and he then and there did knock, kick, stamp and beat the
deceased upon his head, temples, and various parts of his body. That the prisoner
then had the deceased carried into a shed-room of his house, and there he
compelled one of his slaves, in his presence, to confine the deceased’s feet in
stocks, by making his legs fast to a piece of timber, and to tie a rope about the
neck of the deceased, and fasten it to a bed-post in the room, thereby strangling,
choking and suffocating the deceased. And that whilst the deceased was thus
made fast in stocks as aforesaid, the prisoner did kick, knock, stamp and beat him
upon his head, face, breast, belly, sides, back and body; and he again compelled
his two slaves to apply fire to the body of the deceased, whilst he was so made
fast as aforesaid. And the count charged that from these various modes of
punishment and torture the slave Sam then and there died. It appeared that the
prisoner commenced the punishment of the deceased in the morning, and that it
was continued throughout the day: and that the deceased died in the presence of
the prisoner, and one of his slaves, and one of the witnesses, whilst the
punishment was still progressing.
Field J. delivered the opinion of the court.
The prisoner was indicted and convicted of murder in the second degree, in the
Circuit Court of Hanover, at its April term last past, and was sentenced to the
penitentiary for five years, the period of time ascertained by the jury. The murder
consisted in the killing of a negro man-slave by the name of Sam, the property of
the prisoner, by cruel and excessive whipping and torture, inflicted by Souther,
aided by two of his other slaves, on the 1st day of September, 1849. The prisoner
moved for a new trial, upon the ground that the offence, if any, amounted only to
manslaughter. The motion for a new trial was overruled, and a bill of exceptions
taken to the opinion of the court, setting forth the facts proved, or as many of
them as were deemed material for the consideration of the application for a new
trial. The bill of exception states: That the slave Sam, in the indictment mentioned,
was the slave and property of the prisoner. That for the purpose of chastising the
slave for the offence of getting drunk, and dealing as the slave confessed and
alleged with Henry and Stone, two of the witnesses for the Commonwealth, he
caused him to be tied and punished in the presence of the said witnesses, with the
exception of slight whipping with peach or apple-tree switches, before the said
witnesses arrived at the scene after they were sent for by the prisoner (who were
present by request from the defendant), and of several slaves of the prisoner, in
the manner and by the means charged in the indictment; and the said slave died
under and from the infliction of the said punishment, in the presence of the
prisoner, one of his slaves, and of one of the witnesses for the Commonwealth.
But it did not appear that it was the design of the prisoner to kill the said slave,
unless such design be properly inferable from the manner, means and duration of
the punishment. And, on the contrary, it did appear that the prisoner frequently
declared, while the said slave was undergoing the punishment, that he believed
the said slave was feigning, and pretending to be suffering and injured when he
was not. The judge certifies that the slave was punished in the manner and by the
means charged in the indictment. The indictment contains fifteen counts, and sets
forth a case of the most cruel and excessive whipping and torture.[6]
The bill evidently seems to have a leaning to the idea that twelve
hours spent in beating, stamping, scalding, burning and mutilating a
human being, might possibly be considered as presumption of
something beyond the limits of lawful chastisement. So startling an
opinion, however, is expressed cautiously, and with a becoming
diffidence, and is balanced by the very striking fact, which is also
quoted in this remarkable paper, that the prisoner frequently
declared, while the slave was undergoing the punishment, that he
believed the slave was feigning and pretending to be suffering, when
he was not. This view appears to have struck the court as eminently
probable,—as going a long way to prove the propriety of Souther’s
intentions, making it at least extremely probable that only correction
was intended.
It seems, also, that Souther, so far from being crushed by the united
opinion of the community, found those to back him who considered
five years in the penitentiary an unjust severity for his crime, and
hence the bill of exceptions from which we have quoted, and the
appeal to the Superior Court; and hence the form in which the case
stands in law-books, “Souther v. the Commonwealth.” Souther
evidently considers himself an ill-used man, and it is in this character
that he appears before the Superior Court.
As yet there has been no particular overflow of humanity in the
treatment of the case. The manner in which it has been discussed so
far reminds one of nothing so much as of some discussions which
the reader may have seen quoted from the records of the
Inquisition, with regard to the propriety of roasting the feet of
children who have not arrived at the age of thirteen years, with a
view to eliciting evidence.
Let us now come to the decision of the Superior Court, which the
editor of the Courier & Enquirer thinks so particularly enlightened
and humane. Judge Field thinks that the case is a very atrocious
one, and in this respect he seems to differ materially from judge,
jury and lawyers, of the court below. Furthermore, he doubts
whether the annals of jurisprudence furnish a case of equal atrocity,
wherein certainly he appears to be not far wrong; and he also states
unequivocally the principle that killing a slave by torture under the
name of correction is murder in the first degree; and here too,
certainly, everybody will think that he is also right: the only wonder
being that any man could ever have been called to express such an
opinion, judicially. But he states, quite as unequivocally as Judge
Ruffin, that awful principle of slave-laws, that the law cannot
interfere with the master for any amount of torture inflicted on his
slave which does not result in death. The decision, if it establishes
anything, establishes this principle quite as strongly as it does the
other. Let us hear the words of the decision:
It has been decided by this court, in Turner’s case, that the owner of a slave, for
the malicious, cruel and excessive beating of his own slave, cannot be indicted.
* * * * * * It is the policy of the law, in respect to the relation of master and
slave, and for the sake of securing proper subordination and obedience on the part
of the slave, to protect the master from prosecution in all such cases, even if the
whipping and punishment be malicious, cruel and excessive.
What follows as a corollary from this remarkable declaration is this,
—that if the victim of this twelve hours’ torture had only possessed a
little stronger constitution, and had not actually died under it, there
is no law in Virginia by which Souther could even have been indicted
for misdemeanor.
If this is not filling out the measure of the language of St. Clare, that
“he who goes the furthest and does the worst only uses within limits
the power which the law gives him,” how could this language be
verified? Which is “the worst,” death outright, or torture indefinitely
prolonged? This decision, in so many words, gives every master the
power of indefinite torture, and takes from him only the power of
terminating the agony by merciful death. And this is the judicial
decision which the Courier & Enquirer cites as a perfectly convincing
specimen of legal humanity. It must be hoped that the editor never
read the decision, else he never would have cited it. Of all who
knock at the charnel-house of legal precedents, with the hope of
disinterring any evidence of humanity in the slave system, it may be
said, in the awful words of the Hebrew poet:
“He knoweth not that the dead are there,
And that her guests are in the depths of hell.”
The upshot of this case was, that Souther, instead of getting off from
his five years’ imprisonment, got simply a judicial opinion from the
Superior Court that he ought to be hung; but he could not be tried
over again, and, as we may infer from all the facts in the case that
he was a man of tolerably resolute nerves and not very exquisite
sensibility, it is not likely that the opinion gave him any very serious
uneasiness. He has probably made up his mind to get over his five
years with what grace he may. When he comes out, there is no law
in Virginia to prevent his buying as many more negroes as he
chooses, and going over the same scene with any one of them at a
future time, if only he profit by the information which has been so
explicitly conveyed to him in this decision, that he must take care
and stop his tortures short of the point of death,—a matter about
which, as the history of the Inquisition shows, men, by careful
practice, can be able to judge with considerable precision. Probably,
also, the next time, he will not be so foolish as to send out and
request the attendance of two white witnesses, even though they
may be so complacently interested in the proceedings as to spend
the whole day in witnessing them without effort at prevention.
Slavery, as defined in American law, is no more capable of being
regulated in its administration by principles of humanity, than the
torture system of the Inquisition. Every act of humanity of every
individual owner is an illogical result from the legal definition; and
the reason why the slave-code of America is more atrocious than
any ever before exhibited under the sun, is that the Anglo-Saxon
race are a more coldly and strictly logical race, and have an
unflinching courage to meet the consequences of every premise
which they lay down, and to work out an accursed principle, with
mathematical accuracy, to its most accursed results. The decisions in
American law-books show nothing so much as this severe,
unflinching accuracy of logic. It is often and evidently, not because
judges are inhuman or partial, but because they are logical and
truthful, that they announce from the bench, in the calmest manner,
decisions which one would think might make the earth shudder, and
the sun turn pale.
The French and the Spanish nations are, by constitution, more
impulsive, passionate and poetic, than logical; hence it will be found
that while there may be more instances of individual barbarity, as
might be expected among impulsive and passionate people, there is
in their slave-code more exhibition of humanity. The code of the
State of Louisiana contains more really humane provisions, were
there any means of enforcing them, than that of any other state in
the Union.
It is believed that there is no code of laws in the world which
contains such a perfect cabinet crystallization of every tear and
every drop of blood which can be wrung from humanity, so
accurately, elegantly and scientifically arranged, as the slave-code of
America. It is a case of elegant surgical instruments for the work of
dissecting the living human heart;—every instrument wrought with
exactest temper and polish, and adapted with exquisite care, and
labelled with the name of the nerve or artery or muscle which it is
designed to sever. The instruments of the anatomist are instruments
of earthly steel and wood, designed to operate at most on perishable
and corruptible matter; but these are instruments of keener temper,
and more ethereal workmanship, designed in the most precise and
scientific manner to DESTROY THE IMMORTAL SOUL, and carefully and
gradually to reduce man from the high position of a free agent, a
social, religious, accountable being, down to the condition of the
brute, or of inanimate matter.
6. The following is Judge Field’s statement of the punishment:
The negro was tied to a tree and whipped with switches. When
Souther became fatigued with the labor of whipping, he called
upon a negro man of his, and made him cob Sam with a
shingle. He also made a negro woman of his help to cob him.
And, after cobbing and whipping, he applied fire to the body of
the slave. * * * * He then caused him to be washed down with
hot water, in which pods of red pepper had been steeped. The
negro was also tied to a log and to the bed-post with ropes,
which choked him, and he was kicked and stamped by Souther.
This sort of punishment was continued and repeated until the
negro died under its infliction.
CHAPTER IV.
PROTECTIVE STATUTES.
Apprentices protected.—Outlawry.—Melodrama of Prue in the
Swamp.—Harry the Carpenter, a Romance of Real Life.
But the question now occurs, Are there not protective statutes, the
avowed object of which is the protection of the life and limb of the
slave? We answer, there are; and these protective statutes are some
of the most remarkable pieces of legislation extant.
That they were dictated by a spirit of humanity, charity, which
hopeth all things, would lead us to hope; but no newspaper stories
of bloody murders and shocking outrages convey to the mind so
dreadful a picture of the numbness of public sentiment caused by
slavery as these so-called protective statutes. The author copies the
following from the statutes of North Carolina. Section 3d of the act
passed in 1798 runs thus:
Whereas by another Act of the Assembly, passed in 1774, the killing of a slave,
however wanton, cruel and deliberate, is only punishable in the first instance by
imprisonment and paying the value thereof to the owner, which distinction of
criminality between the murder of a white person and one who is equally a human
creature, but merely of a different complexion, is disgraceful to humanity, and
degrading in the highest degree to the laws and principles of a free, Christian and
enlightened country, Be it enacted, &c., That if any person shall hereafter be guilty
of wilfully and maliciously killing a slave, such offender shall, upon the first
conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of murder, and shall suffer the same
punishment as if he had killed a free man: “Provided always, this act shall not
extend to the person killing a slave outlawed by virtue of any Act of Assembly of this
state, or to any slave in the act of resistance to his lawful owner or master, or to
any slave dying under moderate correction.”
A law with a like proviso, except the outlawry clause, exists in
Tennessee. See Caruthers and Nicholson’s Compilation, 1836, p. 676.
The language of the constitution of Georgia, art. iv., sec. 12, is as
follows:
Any person who shall maliciously dismember or deprive a slave of life shall suffer
such punishment as would be inflicted in case the like offence had been
committed on a free white person, and on the like proof, except in case of
insurrection by such slave, and unless such death should happen by accident in
giving such slave moderate correction.—Cobb’s Dig. 1851, p. 1125.
Let now any Englishman or New Englander imagine that such laws
with regard to apprentices had ever been proposed in Parliament or
State Legislature under the head of protective acts;—laws which in
so many words permit the killing of the subject in three cases, and
those comprising all the acts which would generally occur under the
law; namely, if the slave resist, if he be outlawed, or if he die under
moderate correction.
What rule in the world will ever prove correction immoderate, if the
fact that the subject dies under it is not held as proof? How many
such “accidents” would have to happen in Old England or New
England, before Parliament or Legislature would hear from such a
protective law.
“But,” some one may ask, “what is the outlawry spoken of in this
act?” The question is pertinent, and must be answered. The author
has copied the following from the Revised Statutes of North Carolina,
chap. cxi, sec. 22. It may be remarked in passing that the preamble
to this law presents rather a new view of slavery to those who have
formed their ideas from certain pictures of blissful contentment and
Arcadian repose, which have been much in vogue of late.
Whereas, MANY TIMES slaves run away and be out, hid and lurking in swamps,
woods, and other obscure places, killing cattle and hogs, and committing other
injuries to the inhabitants of this state; in all such cases, upon intelligence of any
slave or slaves lying out as aforesaid, any two justices of the peace for the county
wherein such slave or slaves is or are supposed to lurk or do mischief, shall, and
they are hereby empowered and required to issue proclamation against such slave
or slaves (reciting his or their names, and the name or names of the owner or
owners, if known), thereby requiring him or them, and every of them, forthwith to
surrender him or themselves; and also to empower and require the sheriff of the
said county to take such power with him as he shall think fit and necessary for
going in search and pursuit of, and effectually apprehending, such outlying slave
or slaves; which proclamation shall be published at the door of the court-house,
and at such other places as said justices shall direct. And if any slave or slaves
against whom proclamation hath been thus issued stay out, and do not
immediately return home, it shall be lawful for any person or persons whatsoever
to kill and destroy such slave or slaves by such ways and means as he shall think
fit, without accusation or impeachment of any crime for the same.
What ways and means have been thought fit, in actual experience,
for the destruction of the slave? What was done with the negro
McIntosh, in the streets of St. Louis in open daylight, and endorsed
at the next sitting of the Supreme Court of the state, as
transcending the sphere of law, because it was “an act of the
majority of her most respectable citizens”?[7] If these things are done
in the green tree, what will be done in the dry? If these things have
once been done in the open streets of St. Louis, by “a majority of
her most respectable citizens,” what will be done in the lonely
swamps of North Carolina, by men of the stamp of Souther and
Legree?
This passage of the Revised Statutes of North Carolina is more
terribly suggestive to the imagination than any particulars into which
the author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin has thought fit to enter. Let us
suppose a little melodrama quite possible to have occurred under
this act of the legislature. Suppose some luckless Prue or Peg, as in
the case we have just quoted, in State v. Mann, getting tired of the
discipline of whipping, breaks from the overseer, clears the dogs,
and gets into the swamp, and there “lies out,” as the act above
graphically says. The act which we are considering says that many
slaves do this, and doubtless they have their own best reasons for it.
We all know what fascinating places to “lie out” in these Southern
swamps are. What with alligators and moccasin snakes, mud and
water, and poisonous vines, one would be apt to think the situation
not particularly eligible; but still, Prue “lies out” there. Perhaps in the
night some husband or brother goes to see her, taking a hog, or
some animal of the plantation stock, which he has ventured his life
in killing, that she may not perish with hunger. Master overseer
walks up to master proprietor, and reports the accident; master
proprietor mounts his horse, and assembles to his aid two justices of
the peace.
In the intervals between drinking brandy and smoking cigars a
proclamation is duly drawn up, summoning the contumacious Prue
to surrender, and requiring sheriff of said county to take such power
as he shall think fit to go in search and pursuit of said slave; which
proclamation, for Prue’s further enlightenment, is solemnly published
at the door of the court-house, and “at such other places as said
justices shall direct.”[8] Let us suppose, now, that Prue, given over to
hardness of heart and blindness of mind, pays no attention to all
these means of grace, put forth to draw her to the protective
shadow of the patriarchal roof. Suppose, further, as a final effort of
long-suffering, and to leave her utterly without excuse, the worthy
magistrate rides forth in full force,—man, horse, dog and gun,—to
the very verge of the swamp, and there proclaims aloud the merciful
mandate. Suppose that, hearing the yelping of the dogs and the
proclamation of the sheriff mingled together, and the shouts of
Loker, Marks, Sambo and Quimbo, and other such posse, black and
white, as a sheriff can generally summon on such a hunt, this very
ignorant and contumacious Prue only runs deeper into the swamp,
and continues obstinately “lying out,” as aforesaid;—now she is by
act of the assembly outlawed, and, in the astounding words of the
act, “it shall be lawful for any person or persons whatsoever to kill
and destroy her, by such ways and means as he shall think fit,
without accusation or impeachment of any crime for the same.”
What awful possibilities rise to the imagination under the fearfully
suggestive clause “by such ways and means as he shall think fit!”
Such ways and means as ANY man shall think fit, of any character, of
any degree of fiendish barbarity!! Such a permission to kill even a
dog, by “any ways and means which anybody should think fit,” never
ought to stand on the law-books of a Christian nation; and yet this
stands against one bearing that same humanity which Jesus Christ
bore,—against one, perhaps, who, though blinded, darkened and
ignorant, he will not be ashamed to own, when he shall come in the
glory of his Father, and all his holy angels with him!
That this law has not been a dead letter there is sufficient proof. In
1836 the following proclamation and advertisement appeared in the
“Newbern (N. C.) Spectator:”
State of North Carolina, Lenoir County.—Whereas complaint hath been this day
made to us, two of the justices of the peace for the said county, by William D.
Cobb, of Jones County, that two negro-slaves belonging to him, named Ben
(commonly known by the name of Ben Fox) and Rigdon, have absented
themselves from their said master’s service, and are lurking about in the Counties
of Lenoir and Jones, committing acts of felony; these are, in the name of the
state, to command the said slaves forthwith to surrender themselves, and turn
home to their said master. And we do hereby also require the sheriff of said
County of Lenoir to make diligent search and pursuit after the above-mentioned
slaves.... And we do hereby, by virtue of an act of assembly of this state
concerning servants and slaves, intimate and declare, if the said slaves do not
surrender themselves and return home to their master immediately after the
publication of these presents, that any person may kill or destroy said slaves by
such means as he or they think fit, without accusation or impeachment of any
crime or offence for so doing, or without incurring any penalty or forfeiture
thereby.
Given under our hands and seals, this 12th of November, 1836.
B. Coleman, J. P. [Seal.]
Jas. Jones, J. P. [Seal.]
$200 Reward.—Ran away from the subscriber, about three years ago, a certain
negro-man, named Ben, commonly known by the name of Ben Fox; also one other
negro, by the name of Rigdon, who ran away on the 8th of this month.
I will give the reward of $100 for each of the above negroes, to be delivered to
me, or confined in the jail of Lenoir or Jones County, or for the killing of them, so
that I can see them.
Nov. 12, 1836.
W. D. Cobb.
That this act was not a dead letter, also, was plainly implied in the
protective act first quoted. If slaves were not, as a matter of fact,
ever outlawed, why does the act formally recognize such a class?
—“provided that this act shall not extend to the killing of any slave
outlawed by any act of the assembly.” This language sufficiently
indicates the existence of the custom.
Further than this, the statute-book of 1821 contained two acts: the
first of which provides that all masters in certain counties, who have
had slaves killed in consequence of outlawry, shall have a claim on
the treasury of the state for their value, unless cruel treatment of
the slave be proved on the part of the master: the second act
extends the benefits of the latter provision to all the counties in the
state.[9]
Finally, there is evidence that this act of outlawry was executed so
recently as the year 1850,—the year in which “Uncle Tom’s Cabin”
was written. See the following from the Wilmington Journal of
December 13, 1850:
State of North Carolina, New Hanover County.—Whereas complaint upon oath hath
this day been made to us, two of the justices of the peace for the said state and
county aforesaid, by Guilford Horn, of Edgecombe County, that a certain male
slave belonging to him, named Harry, a carpenter by trade, about forty years old,
five feet five inches high, or thereabouts; yellow complexion; stout built; with a
scar on his left leg (from the cut of an axe); has very thick lips; eyes deep sunk in
his head; forehead very square; tolerably loud voice; has lost one or two of his
upper teeth; and has a very dark spot on his jaw, supposed to be a mark,—hath
absented himself from his master’s service, and is supposed to be lurking about in
this county, committing acts of felony or other misdeeds; these are, therefore, in
the name of the state aforesaid, to command the said slave forthwith to surrender
himself and return home to his said master; and we do hereby, by virtue of the act
of assembly in such cases made and provided, intimate and declare that if the said
slave Harry doth not surrender himself and return home immediately after the
publication of these presents, that any person or persons may KILL and DESTROY the
said slave by such means as he or they may think fit, without accusation or
impeachment of any crime or offence for so doing, and without incurring any
penalty or forfeiture thereby.
Given under our hands and seals, this 29th day of June, 1850.
James T. Miller, J. P. [Seal.]
W. C. Bettencourt, J. P. [Seal.]
One Hundred and Twenty-five Dollars Reward will be paid for the delivery of the said
Harry to me at Tosnott Depot, Edgecombe County, or for his confinement in any
jail in the state, so that I can get him; or One Hundred and Fifty Dollars will be
given for his head.
He was lately heard from in Newbern, where he called himself Henry Barnes (or
Burns), and will be likely to continue the same name, or assume that of Copage or
Farmer. He has a free mulatto woman for a wife, by the name of Sally Bozeman,
who has lately removed to Wilmington, and lives in that part of the town called
Texas, where he will likely be lurking.
Masters of vessels are particularly cautioned against harboring or concealing the
said negro on board their vessels, as the full penalty of the law will be rigorously
enforced.
June 29th, 1850.
Guilford Horn.
The civilized world may and will ask, in what state this law has been
drawn, and passed, and revised, and allowed to appear at the
present day on the revised statute-book, and to be executed in the
year of our Lord 1850, as the above-cited extracts from its most
respectable journals show. Is it some heathen, Kurdish tribe, some
nest of pirates, some horde of barbarians, where destructive gods
are worshipped, and libations to their honor poured from human
skulls? The civilized world will not believe it,—but it is actually a fact,
that this law has been made, and is still kept in force, by men in
every other respect than what relates to their slave-code as high-
minded, as enlightened, as humane, as any men in Christendom;—
by citizens of a state which glories in the blood and hereditary
Christian institutions of Scotland. Curiosity to know what sort of men
the legislators of North Carolina might be, led the writer to examine
with some attention the proceedings and debates of the convention
of that state, called to amend its constitution, which assembled at
Raleigh, June 4th, 1835. It is but justice to say that in these
proceedings, in which all the different and perhaps conflicting
interests of the various parts of the state were discussed, there was
an exhibition of candor, fairness and moderation, of gentlemanly
honor and courtesy in the treatment of opposing claims, and of an
overruling sense of the obligations of law and religion, which
certainly have not always been equally conspicuous in the
proceedings of deliberative bodies in such cases. It simply goes to
show that one can judge nothing of the religion or of the humanity
of individuals from what seems to us objectionable practice, where
they have been educated under a system entirely incompatible with
both. Such is the very equivocal character of what we call virtue.
It could not be for a moment supposed that such men as Judge
Ruffin, or many of the gentlemen who figure in the debates alluded
to, would ever think of availing themselves of the savage
permissions of such a law. But what then? It follows that the law is a
direct permission, letting loose upon the defenceless slave that class
of men who exist in every community, who have no conscience, no
honor, no shame,—who are too far below public opinion to be
restrained by that, and from whom accordingly this provision of the
law takes away the only available restraint of their fiendish natures.
Such men are not peculiar to the South. It is unhappily too notorious
that they exist everywhere,—in England, in New England, and the
world over; but they can only arrive at full maturity in wickedness