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Online gambling and crime: a sure bet?

BANKS, James
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The Ethicomp Journal

ONLINE GAMBLING AND CRIME: A SURE BET?

Dr James Banks
Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Department of Law, Criminology and Community
Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK

Despite a growing body of research that is exploring the deleterious social

effects of online gambling, there has, to date, been very little empirical
research into internet gambling and crime. This paper seeks to initiate
discussion and exploration of the dimensions of crime in and around internet
gambling sites through an analysis of the current literature on gambling
online. The paper forms part of a wider study that seeks to examine online
gambling related crime and identify appropriate legal, technological and
educational frameworks through which to limit victimisation.

1. Introduction
The explosive growth of the internet as a public and commercial vehicle has
provided new opportunities for gambling based activities to take place online.
Facilitated by the development of the first gambling software, by Microgaming in
1994, and encrypted communication protocols which enable online monetary
transactions, by Cryptologic in 1995, Antiguan based company InterCasino became
the first internet gambling site to accept an online wager in January 1996 (Williams
and Wood 2007). By the end of that year, approximately 15 sites were accepting
wagers, rising to 200 by the end of 1997, 650 by the end of 1999 and 1,800 by the
end of 2002 (Schwartz 2006). Today, there are in the region of 2,347 listed
gambling sites in existence, including 768 casinos, 524 poker rooms, 430
sportsbooks, 19 betting exchanges, 377 bingo sites, 45 skill games sites, 94 lottery
sites, 13 backgammon sites and 16 mahjong and rummy sites (Casino City 2010).
These sites are spread across 661 owners who operate out of 74 jurisdictions,
including Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Costa Rica, the Dutch Antilles, the
Kahnawake Mohawk reserve in Canada, Malta and the United Kingdom (Williams
and Wood 2007, 2009; Casino City 2010).

The marked growth in online gambling sites appears to stem from a number of inter-
related factors (Griffiths and Parke 2002; Watson, Liddell, Moore and Eshee 2004).
First, online gambling offers an extremely lucrative business venture for many. The
entertainment and leisure industry has recognised the cost effectiveness of online
gambling sites, as start-up and operating costs are considerably lower than those of
their land-based counterparts. For example, operating a land-based casino could
require thousands of staff and an outlay of around £300 million, yet an internet
gambling business can be run for less than one per cent of this investment (Clarke
and Dempsey 2001). Moreover, the online gambling market represents one of the
fastest growing segments of the gambling industry (Summerfield and Loo 2010).
Despite political and legislative restrictions within certain jurisdictions, the online
gambling market recorded record revenues totalling US$21.2 billion in 2008 and
this is expected to grow by 42 per cent to US$30 billion by 2012 (H2 Gambling
Capital 2009).
The Ethicomp Journal

Second, significant sectors of the world populace have the potential to access online
gambling sites. With computers becoming less expensive, simpler to use and more
readily available, the opportunity for consumers to partake in anonymous and
effortless gambling from the comfort of their own home or workplace has increased
substantially (Keller 1999; Kish 1999). The actual number of people gambling
online is difficult to identify, but it has been estimated that over 14 million have
used internet gambling sites (American Gaming Association 2006; RSeConsulting
2006). Of this figure, 4 million are US citizens, 3.3 million are from Europe and 7
million are from the Asia-Pacific Region. And whilst the prevalence of online
gambling amongst the general population is low, it continues to grow. In 1999, the
British Gambling Prevalence Study recorded that 0.2 per cent of UK adults had
gambled online (Sproston, Erens and Orford 2000). By 2007, this figure had risen to
6 per cent, representing a 2900 per cent increase within the intervening period
(Wardle et al., 2007).

Third, internet gambling services have continued to enhance the consumer’s online
experience. The development of sophisticated gambling software that combines live
remote wagering and increasing realism with multi-lingual websites has made
gambling online an appealing alternative to land-based gambling operations
(Griffiths and Parke 2002). Furthermore, integrated, multicurrency e-cash systems
and superior customer services continue to improve the safety, legitimacy and
reputation of online gambling amongst consumers.

In sum, the online gambling experience is likely to continue to be desirable to

consumers because it offers frequent and interactive gambling that is characterised
by accessibility, affordability and anonymity. Moreover:

As the popularity of both gambling and online entertainment continues to

grow, the online gaming market is without doubt an attractive area of
expansion for software developers, casinos and other land-based gambling
operators, related suppliers, and industry newcomers and investors alike.
(Summerfield and Loo 2010: 16)

Nevertheless, the development of such technologies has not been accepted

uncritically. The last decade has witnessed a growing body of research that has
explored the deleterious social effects of online gambling. Of particular concern is
the ease with which young people and other vulnerable populations can access
online gambling sites (Griffiths 1995; Smeaton, Poole, Chevis and Carr 2004),
increases in gambling, money spent gambling, problem gambling and gambling
addiction (Griffiths 2003), public health and public safety (Griffiths 2004). Yet, to
date, there has been very little empirical research into internet gambling and crime
(McMullan and Rege 2010). This is surprising given that the scale and density of
internet gambling sites, the voluminous number of players and the large quantities of
e-cash available as tournament prizes or held in online gambling accounts, provides
a marketplace replete with criminal potential. Nevertheless, little is known about the
frequency, types, techniques and organisational dynamics of internet gambling
related crime nor has there been any consideration of the degree to which such
The Ethicomp Journal

crimes go undetected. This paper seeks to initiate discussion and exploration of the
dimensions of crime in and around gambling sites through an analysis of the current
literature on gambling online. Although much of this work does not explicitly set out
to examine crime online, it enables an initial assessment of the forms and features of
crimes that take place in and around internet gambling sites. Moreover, the paper
identifies the opportunities and complexities in undertaking empirical research and
outlines a research agenda that will help shape this field of study.

2. Crime Online
Cyberspace has been depicted as a ‘world wild west’, with the threat of e-criminality
looming large over an increasingly globalised world (Sandywell 2010). The
significant quantities of e-cash held in online gambling sites and flowing between
them and various ancillary organisations presents a digital network ripe for criminal
exploitation. In such contested spaces, gambling site operators, employees,
customers and unwanted ‘third parties’ anonymously intermingle, creating the
opportunity for multi-various forms of criminal activity and constructing rhyzomatic
relations between perpetrators and victims.

McMullan and Rege's (2010) research suggests that online 'criminal entrepreneurs'
range from solo actors to dynamic, amorphous and loosely connected assemblages
who engage in singular, but often substantial, crimes in and around online gambling
sites. In McMullan and Rege’s typology, three distinct categories of ‘criminal
entrepreneur’ that exhibit various levels of skill and sophistication are identified.
'Cybernomads', solo criminal actors, differ in their skills, motivations and
technological acumen, but typically either purchase or manufacture 'toolkits' that
enable individuals to cheat and steal from online gambling sites and their clientele.
More advanced cybernomads, often akin to professional criminals, engage in the
production of malware, technical intelligence and personal information that can be
sold on to others through the underground economy. Alternatively, advanced
hackers may execute their own attacks on gambling sites or subcontract their
services to other criminal groups. By contrast, 'dot.con teams' may consist of small-
scale organised crime groups, players, consultants or web and gambling site owners,
managers and employees who unite to commit acts of fraud, theft or money
laundering. Online players may collude with other players to cheat opponents or
engage with gambling site insiders who provide privileged information that enables
the committal of crimes against both employers and their clientele. Moreover,
organised crime groups often utilise online gambling sites to launder money and
'clean' their proceeds from various criminal activities. Finally, 'criminal assemblages'
consist of dynamic and complex criminal networks that engage in ongoing extortion,
phishing, identity fraud and money laundering enterprises. More formal and
continuous than Dot.con teams, the scale, intensity and duration of their criminal
activity means criminal assemblages are more likely to be identified by corporate
and government agencies who become involved in 'techno wars' with criminal
groups as they seek to limit crime and victimisation visited upon online gambling
communities.

In short, internet gambling sites can operate as source of criminal activity, as a

vehicle for crime or support for other criminal enterprise. Criminal entrepreneurs
The Ethicomp Journal

may target gambling operations and/or their clientele or utilise gambling sites as a
conduit for crime. Moreover, in order to engage in fraudulent activities, criminal
entrepreneurs may enlist gambling organisations, their employers and clientele or
disguise themselves as legitimate online gambling operations or customers.
Similarly, legitimate gambling businesses may employ corrupt practices as profits
turn to losses and once genuine patrons may seek to engage in criminal practices in
order to reduce their deficits. Nevertheless, this dense tangle of virtual villains and
victims can be simplified to identify four distinct forms of e-crime and modus
operandi of gambling site operators and their employees, users of online gambling
sites and criminal entrepreneurs, who either utilise gambling sites as a conduit for
nefarious activities or specifically target gambling operators and their clientele. It is
to this typology that discussion now turns.

3. Typology

3.1 Fraud
Ensuring that online gambling is conducted fairly and openly is a significant
challenge for the gambling industry. Characterised by low profit margins and high
percentage payouts, which are estimated at between 88 and 98.7 per cent of turnover
(RSeconsulting 2006), online gambling sites must sustain a high turnover if they are
to be successful. In a highly competitive market, the reputation of operators may be
considered paramount as players are likely to switch to rival sites if gaming
practices are deemed questionable. Yet low levels of consumer trust in online
gambling operations and the fairness of their games does not appear to equate to a
reduction in website usage (Haried 2009). This is surprising given that the limited
regulation of online gambling, coupled with the multi-jurisdictionality of online
gambling sites, provides significant opportunities for unscrupulous gambling
operators to engage in fraudulent activities.

Unsurprisingly, there are many cases in which online sites have not paid winnings,
cheated players with unfair games or absconded with player’s deposits (Games and
Casino 2006). Sportsbookreview (2010), an independent monitoring organisation,
details a ‘black list’ of 507 online gambling sites and an ‘avoid list’ of 555 online
operators who have experienced problems ranging from bonus scams to financial
collapse. Bookmakers listed include those who are not licensed to operate a
gambling company where required, have had payout problems in the past, used
bonus confiscation and scam tactics, are illegally hosted in the US, been involved in
wager scams, unjustly cancelled bets, changed rules after a wager or are part of an
operation which has had such issues in the past.

In its simplest form, fraud often involves gambling sites who take gambler's money
but do not pay any winnings (Griffiths 2010). The lack of online gambling
regulation in many countries means that it is possible to launch a site, collect
customer data and banking details, take bets and then close the site before paying
out any winnings (McMullan and Rege 2007). These ‘deposit-only bookmakers’
regularly appear on the market and eventually disappear. Offering generous sign-up
bonuses to entice customers, such sites operate from domain registrations which are
The Ethicomp Journal

hidden behind ‘domains by proxy’, which make it unclear as to who owns the site
and whether or not they are licensed.

Such websites are often adorned with kite-marks of 'social responsibility' that
suggest the business is government licensed or has been subject to third party
accreditation. The display of logos from organisations such as the Gambling
Commission, the Independent Betting Adjudication Service, Gamcare and Gambling
Therapy help make such sites look safe, reputable and trustworthy. Criminal
enterprises also create immaculate forgeries of legitimate gambling sites by ‘lifting’
the general design, graphics and materials from such sources (Griffiths 2004;
McMullan and Rege 2007). These state of the art webpage forgeries are one of the
most common fraudulent practices that fool unsuspecting customers into depositing
their money.

The fragile nature of online gambling businesses also means a decrease in turnover
can result in once legitimate companies engaging in corrupt practices. For example,
BetOnSports, based in Costa Rica, formerly one of the largest online gambling firms
with an annual turnover of US$1.8 billion, was closed down with executives charged
with racketeering, conspiracy and fraud (McCarthy 2006; Salter 2009). The
company misled gamblers into believing its operations were legal and that their
money was safe and accessible when instead the money was being used to expand
operations and purchase a rival firm. When BetOnSports ceased trading in 2006,
customers lost over US$16million in unpaid deposits and winnings (Salter 2009).
More recently, the managing director of Maltese based sportsbook Strykke was
arrested after failing to pay over US$70,000 to customers and operating without an
appropriate licence (Sportsbookreview 2010).

Other ‘legitimate’ operators employ more sophisticated forms of entrapment which

provide an air of legitimacy to their techniques to defraud customers. Complex
terms of agreement and wager requirements prevent customers withdrawing their
money and many find their winnings and deposit locked inside an account until all
funds are exhausted. For example, one bookmaker offers to match customer’s
deposits to the tune of £200. However, customer's money may only be withdrawn
after the deposit and bonus have each been wagered six times at odds of 2.0 or more.
The difficulty for customers is that their bonus can only be bet once all other funds
have been wagered. This requires a customer who wins with his first bet to wager
both his original stake and any winnings on a second bet before he can bet with his
bonus. The greater the winnings the more money a customer must bet through
before he can bet with his bonus. Requiring a minimum of twelve bets – wagering
the full deposit (and any winnings) followed by the bonus – before a withdrawal
may be sanctioned it is highly unlikely that the player will escape with any money.

There are also a number of cases in which legitimate customers have been defrauded
by other online gamblers who operate alone or in partnership with other players or
employees of online gambling operators. Online poker appears to be particularly
susceptible to deceptive player practices. This may involve the collusion between
poker players at the same table (i.e. several players are actually in the same room
using different computers) or the use of computer programs using optimal play
The Ethicomp Journal

(poker bots) against other players (Brunker 2004). Many of those who are victims of
such practices remain completely unaware of any wrongdoing considering their loss
to be the result of meeting a more skilled (or more fortunate) opponent.

3.2 Theft
The theft of customer's money is at heart of many of the fraudulent activities
undertaken by both criminal entrepreneurs and once legitimate gambling operations.
However, there have been several cases of hackers altering online gambling sites to
pay wins and enable the theft of funds from gambling site owners (Reuters 2001;
RSeconsulting 2006). For example, in 2001, hackers enabled 140 gamblers to win
over $1.9 million in only a few hours by altering the casino games of Cryptologic's
operating licensees so that users could not lose.

The internet also offers a valuable opportunity for criminal entrepreneurs to disguise
themselves and their identities through multiple aliases or the theft of an
unsuspecting person's identity. Identity theft through a technique known as 'black-
holing' has been targeted at users of online gambling web sites. Criminal
entrepreneurs 'hijack' an online web site, surreptitiously redirecting customers to an
identical looking site operated by the thieves. When the customer logs in, the
criminals are able to collect their IDs and passwords. Passing the visitors straight
through to the real website the thieves are then able to access the customers
gambling account. Exploiting weaknesses in the DNS, which is at the core of the
internet itself, gambling sites are vulnerable to such attacks irrespective of the
internal defences the web site employs. Thus, as security analysts are quick to point
out, there is no such thing as secure gambling software as skilled people in the
hacking underground will always be able to exploit vulnerabilities in systems and
steal money and information from gambling organisations (Gray 2005).

3.3 Money Laundering

It has been suggested by some (Mills 2001) that the potential for criminals to
launder their ill-gotten gains through remote gambling sites is the greatest threat
posed by the virtual gambling industry. Laundered funds can be the end product of
successful criminal enterprise, but can also be employed to fund organised crime,
terrorism, smuggling and counterfeiting, and this has led to significant attention
from law enforcement agencies and their governments (Government Accountability
Office 2002; RSeconsulting 2006). Yet whilst it is estimated that between US$300
billion and US$500 billion are laundered annually (Magliveras 1992; Barbot 1995;
Sultzer 1995), the degree to which online gambling sites facilitate such activities is
unclear. It is possible that the low limits on gambling, coupled with the close
monitoring and recording of electronic financial transactions, effectively limit the
opportunity for money laundering. Conversely, the high speed, high volume and
international reach of online gambling operators and their clientele, alongside the
anonymity afforded by the internet and encrypted payment processes, can make it
difficult to trace payments. Moreover, gambling sites are frequently located in areas
with weak or non-existent supervisory regimes, which may make them particularly
susceptible to money laundering.
The Ethicomp Journal

There are three principal ways in which gambling sites can theoretically be used to
launder money: First, illegal funds may be transferred to a source inside the
gambling organisation by gambling until all money is lost; second, illegal funds may
be transferred from a casino insider to a gambler through the use of rigged games;
third, casino gambling software may be programmed to respond to a specific
password or sign-in command by removing a percentage of the money deposited and
recording it as a gambling loss. Alternatively, legitimate gambling sites may be used
by money launderers who operate a legitimate account under a false name.
Individuals may ‘clean’ their illicit funds by wagering a small amount before
withdrawing the remaining money or transferring it to an offshore account. Betting
exchanges have also provided significant opportunity for the laundering of money,
as all sides of an event may be bet on. Irrespective of the outcome and minus only
the house ‘vigorish’, visible and declarable profits and losses can be generated.

As ‘traditional’ laundering requires the movement of illicit funds through financial

institutions that are highly regulated, avoiding built-in detection processes is
extremely challenging for the criminal entrepreneur. Yet the instantaneous and
anonymous nature of the internet, augmented by the rapid development of both e-
banking and the online gambling industry, has revolutionised the money laundering
process and provided significant opportunity for launderers to deposit, cleanse and
withdraw money, all at the click of a button. With no traditional financial
institutions in place to alert authorities to potential criminal activity, ill gotten gains
can be easily filtered into the stream of international commerce. So whilst the
magnitude of this problem is, to date, unknown, the potential for money laundering
is significant, given the laissez-faire approach to regulation in many of the
jurisdictions in which online gambling occurs (Williams and Wood 2007).

3.4 Extortion
Cyberextortion presents a 'severe' threat to gambling organisations who seek to
operate online (RSeconsulting 2006). The 'denial of service' (DoS) attack is a typical
technique used in electronic extortion activities by crime syndicates who target
internet gambling sites. DoS attacks occur when a network or server is inundated
with thousands of requests that consume all available disk space, central processing
unit time, bandwidth capability, or physical network components. Similarly,
'distributed denial of service' (DDoS) attacks originate from a group of compromised
‘zombie’ computers that flood systems with requests, overwhelming servers,
crashing networks and shutting down sites. Attackers install software on zombie
systems enabling them to be controlled by a master computer that directs a specific
bandwidth assault against a chosen target. The infected zombie slaves form a
‘botnet’ that is herded into a single DDoS attack, which disrupts online gambling by
denying access to the computer system for legitimate customers.

The business model for cyberextortion closely resembles that of the ‘real world’
racket, with criminal groups demanding payment from online organisations in order
not to launch DoS attacks that will cripple their system and cost them many times
more money in lost revenue (Lovet 2006). Threats are delivered via email to
companies demanding the wiring of ‘protection’ money to a specific drop. If the
company fails to make payment they are likely to be subject to an attack which
The Ethicomp Journal

prevents or severely limits business operations. The success of online extortion is

premised upon the extorted funds being clearly less than the potential loss caused by
the down-time.

Occurring since 1999, the 21st century has seen a surge in DoS attacks against
critical infrastructures and private businesses (Rege 2010). In the UK, the online
gambling industry has been particularly susceptible to DoS attacks and extortion
demands of between US$10,000 and US$50,000 from criminal gangs, particularly
during big money-making events or games (Nuttall 2004). Betdaq, Totalbet,
UKBetting and William Hill all recorded receiving extortion demands and being
subject to attacks prior to the Cheltenham festival in 2004. Similarly, Irish
bookmaker Paddy Power had its site paralysed for several hours during Super Bowl
XXXVIII after failing to pay a ransom, whilst Canbet refused to meet a US$12,500
demand during the Breeders' Cup and was subject to a DDoS attack that made its
servers inaccessible at a cost US$250,000 a day (Hess and Wrobleski 1996). Other
companies have paid out thousands to cyberextortionists. In 2003, BoDog
Sportsbook and Casino, who operate out of Costa Rica, met a ransom of US$20,000
after its website was shut down, whilst Antiguan based company BetWWWTS.com
paid $30,000 to hackers after a DoS attack prevented thousands of customers
placing wagers worth an estimated US$5 million (Rothman 2005; Paulson and
Weber 2006).

The exact number and total cost of DoS attacks on online gambling sites is difficult
to measure, particularly as gambling companies are likely to under-report such
offences as they seek to maintain the integrity of their security systems and preserve
the confidence of their clientele. However, security group Symantec detected an
average of 1,402 DoS attacks per day suggesting they pose a significant threat to
commercial businesses that operate online (Richards 2007). More specifically,
server monitoring firm Netcraft examined the UK’s top twenty betting sites and
recorded 33 outages, across 15 sites, within a 14 day period (Ward 2004). Whilst
half of the outages occurred late at night and are likely to be the result of routine
maintenance, half of those logged occurred during the day and exhibited
characteristics of a DoS attack, with servers struggling to deal with requests.

Clearly electronic extortion is a critical problem for the online gambling community
as the cost of DoS attacks is likely to be significant for those failing to pay ransom
demands. It is estimated that cyberextortionists cost British bookmakers alone $70
million in 2004 (Nuttall 2004). Thus, it appears that keeping gambling sites up and
running is one of the biggest challenges facing online gambling operators.

4. Summary
Online gambling offers many opportunities for criminal entrepreneurs to engage in
fraud, theft, extortion and money laundering in and around gambling sites. The large
amounts of e-cash that circuit online gambling sites provide significant rewards for
the dishonest. Yet, whilst this paper has highlighted some of the types, techniques
and organisational dynamics of online gambling related crime, a number of
significant gaps in knowledge remain.
The Ethicomp Journal

In particular, little is known about the degree to which online gambling

organisations and their clientele are victims of crime. An understanding of the extent
to which online gamblers are victims of fraud and theft committed by gambling
organisations is important if we are to develop appropriate safeguards and introduce
effective regulatory regimes. Constructing suitable protection for consumers is
surely a must if online gambling sites are to operate lawfully.

The societal effects of widespread access to online gambling have also yet to be
explored. The links between gambling, problem gambling and pathological
gambling have been subject to significant research (Griffiths and Parke 2002;
Griffiths 2006; Hayer, Mayer and Griffiths 2009), but there has, to date, been little
investigation into the degree to which public exposure to online gambling generates
crime beyond the confines of the virtual world. In particular, online gambling
amongst the young and vulnerable populations, the degree to which online gamblers
commit crime to fund their habits, and the level of gambling associated violence
(particularly domestic violence) need to be examined.

Ongoing assessment of anti-criminality measures is essential in order to mitigate the

risk posed by the rapid (and largely uncontrolled) expansion of online gambling.
There is, at present, very little cooperation and coordination between countries on
remote gambling, coupled with a lack of symmetry in regulatory regimes. This lack
of continuity will see online gambling organisations work out of ‘regulation-light’
jurisdictions and push customers towards unregulated sites. It is, therefore, essential
that regulatory and policing frameworks are subject to rigorous assessment and
appraisal.

Ultimately, the development of empirical research that explores online gambling,

crime, policing and regulation is essential in order to help develop appropriate
mechanisms to facilitate good governance and limit the effects of crime on online
gambling organisations, their clientele and wider society.

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