(Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,

Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922, (21 April 1998),

352 Phil 153-206)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION

OF THE LAWS; IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRINT AND AIR
MEDIA JUSTIFY DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR FREE SPEECH
PURPOSES. — Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles
out radio and television stations to provide free airtime. They
contend that newspapers and magazines are not similarly required
as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC we upheld their
right to the payment of just compensation for the print space they
may provide under §90. The argument will not bear analysis. It rests
on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same
treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as
the print media. There are important differences in the
characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their
differential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the
physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government
must, of necessity allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing
to use them. There is no similar justification for government
allocation and regulation of the print media. In the allocation of
limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on
the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as already
noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and
regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the
case of the print media. To require the radio and television
broadcast industry to provide free airtime for the COMELEC Time is
a fair exchange for what the industry gets. From another point of
view, this Court has also held that because of the unique and
pervasive influence of the broadcast media, "[n]ecessarily . . . the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media."
Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg 881 denies them
the equal protection of the law has no basis.
9. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; POWER TO REGULATE;
DIFFERENT FROM POWER OF CONGRESS TO PROHIBIT. — It is
argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution does not include
the power to prohibit. In the first place, what the COMELEC is
authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the
Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information
of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or airtime
for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or
regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another
fallacy for petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does
not include the power to prohibit. This may have force if the object
of the power were the same.

Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale or donation

of print space or air time for political ads, except to the Commission
on Elections. Petitioners challenge the validity thereof on the
ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that
it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election. AICHaS
Radio and television broadcasting companies do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege
of using them or franchise, the exercise of the which may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service, such as providing print space or airtime
to Comelec. Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must be deemed
incorporated in R.A. No. 7252 granting GMA Network, Inc. a
franchise and does not constitute denial of due process and that
B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's
franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by
petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.
An administrative agency cannot, in the exercise of
lawmaking, amend a statute of Congress. Therefore §2 of Resolution
No. 2983-A of the Comelec providing for payment of just
compensation is invalid.
B.P. Blg. 881, §92 does not single out radio and television
stations in providing free airtime. There are important differences in
the characteristics of the broadcast media and the print media,
which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes.
The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print
media.
 What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by
Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by
media of information of their franchises or permits, while what
Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of
print space or airtime for political ads. In other words, the object of
supervision or regulation is different from the object of the
prohibition.
(ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
133486, (28 January 2000), 380 Phil 780-804)

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM

OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS; NATURE AND SCOPE THEREOF. — The
freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic
government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher
level than substantive economic or other liberties. . . . [T]his must be
so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate
that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of
nearly every other form of freedom." Our Constitution clearly
mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. COMELEC, this Court
enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist
of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
interest without prior restraint. The freedom of expression is a means
of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing
participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and
of maintaining the balance between stability and change. It represents
a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. It means more than the
right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to
lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the existing
climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And
paraphrasing the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we stress
that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the
thought we agree with. DTAaCE

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATIONS; CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST. —
This Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly
did in its earlier decisions in Primicias v. Fugoso and American Bible
Society v. City of Manila; as well as in later ones, Vera v. Arca, Navarro
v. Villegas, Imbong v. Ferrer, Blo Umpar Adiong v. COMELEC and, more
recently, in Iglesia ni Cristo v. MTRCB. In setting the standard or test for
the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of
Justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree." A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified
only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a
right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the
danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the
time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to
be inevitable. The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as
to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing
instrument.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTION. — Doctrinally, the

Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any
restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its
validity. And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption.
Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows,
so it has been said. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a
substantial government interest must be clearly shown. Thus: "A
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." Hence, even though the
government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties,
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TOTAL BAN ON EXIT POLL NOT JUSTIFIED. — The
COMELEC's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit
polls — disorder and confusion in the voting centers — does not justify
a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed COMELEC Resolution is
too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether
the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. There is no
showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters
cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been
presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an
election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit
poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and
ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to
the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored.
Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists
and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the
impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on
voters' choices. In Daily Herald Co. vs. Munro, the US Supreme Court
held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was to prevent the
broadcasting of early returns, was unconstitutional because such
purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly
tailored to advance a state interest nor the least restrictive alternative.
Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating voters from
outside influences is insufficient to justify speech regulation. Just as
curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for the
reason that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is
impermissible, so is regulating speech via an exit poll restriction. The
absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC cannot, therefore, be justified.
It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to
gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the
other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to
achieve the COMELEC end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and
confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXIT POLLS DO NOT TRANSGRESS THE SANCTITY
AND SECRECY OF THE BALLOT. — The contention of public respondent
that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the
ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to
the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at
issue here. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid
vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited
from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons,
from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks
thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out contents of
the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or
illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is
the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of
assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the
instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved
merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a
pollster of whom they have voted for. In exit polls, the contents of the
official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of
whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters
may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the COMELEC, so as to
minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls,
without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND

INFORMATION; NOT ILLIMITABLE AND IMMUNE FROM THE VALID
EXERCISE OF AN EVER DEMANDING AND PERVASIVE POLICE POWER. —
While I understand what the ponencia is saying quite laudably, I also
appreciate, upon the other hand, the concern of the Commission on
Elections, i.e., that the conduct of exit polls can have some adverse
effects on the need to preserve the sanctity of the ballot. The
Commission performs an indispensable task of ensuring free, honest,
and orderly elections and of guarding against any frustration of the
true will of the people. Expectedly, it utilizes all means available within
its power and authority to prevent the electoral process from being
manipulated and rendered an absurdity. Like my colleagues, I greatly
prize the freedom of expression but, so also, I cherish no less the right
of the people to express their will by means of the ballot. In any case, I
must accept the reality that the right to information and free speech is
not illimitable and immune from the valid exercise of an ever
demanding and pervasive police power. Whether any kind of restraint
should be upheld or declared invalid in the proper balancing of interest
is one that must be resolved at any given moment, not on perceived
circumstances, but on prevailing facts. aDIHCT

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH; IF

THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH COLLIDES WITH A NORM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL STATURE, THE RULE ON HEAVY PRESUMPTION OF
INVALIDITY DOES NOT APPLY. — The majority opinion cites the general
rule that any restrictions to freedom of expression would be burdened
with a presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with "furrowed
brows." While this has been the traditional approach, this rule does not
apply where, as in this case, the COMELEC exercised its Constitutional
functions of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballots and
ensuring the integrity of the elections. Thus, Mr. Justice Feliciano in
National Press Club (NPC) v. COMELEC wrote: The technical effect of
Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seem to be that no
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of supervisory or regulatory
authority on the part of the COMELEC for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the right of
free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the
operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such
accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time
honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that
the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of
clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. The NPC decision holds
that if the right to free speech collides with a norm of constitutional
stature, the rule on heavy presumption of invalidity does not apply.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF NO PRESUMPTION OF INVALIDITY ARISES, THERE IS

NO OCCASION FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER TEST. — Our Constitution mandates the COMELEC to enforce
and administer laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections and to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballots to
ensure orderly, honest, credible and peaceful elections. This
Constitutional provision effectively displaces the general presumption
of invalidity in favor of the presumption that COMELEC acted in the
exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. If no presumption of
invalidity arises, I see no occasion for the application of the "clear and
present danger test." As this Court, through Mr. Justice Mendoza,
succinctly observed: . . . the clear-and-present danger test is not,
however, a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. As has been
pointed out by a thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was
originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated
for free speech cases. For the criminal law is necessarily concerned
with the line at which innocent preparation ends and guilty conspiracy
or attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining
the constitutional validity of law which, like §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are
not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their
incidents. To apply the clear-and-present danger test to such regulatory
measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a
regular hammer is all that is needed.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court filed by ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation assailing the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998
approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop petitioner ABS-
CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to
issue the same. Because of the issuance of this resolution,
petitioner filed the instant case, and on May 9, 1998, the Court
issued the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner. The
lone issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the
issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other
group, its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls
during the May 11, 1998 elections.
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The Court
ruled that the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their
results through mass media constitute an essential part of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the COMELEC cannot
ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly
and credible elections. Moreover, the COMELEC's concern with the
possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls — disorder and
confusion in the voting centers — does not justify a total ban on
them. Undoubtedly, the assailed COMELEC Resolution was too
broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the
polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits disruptive behaviors around the voting centers. There was
no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview
voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither had any evidence
been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near
the election precincts tended to create disorder or confuse the
voters. Accordingly, the petition was granted and the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court was made permanent.

SWS vs. COMELEC, MAY 05, 2001

Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-
stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in
various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information
including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for prohibition
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA.
No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7)
days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to
conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both
at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of
such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to
publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on
May 14,2001

Issue: WON Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constituted an unconstitutional

abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the

constitutional validity of §5.4? The United States Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A]
Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing
content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have
"become canonical in the review of such laws." is noteworthy that the
O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the
causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest
makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free
expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results
because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the
integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the
same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers Even if the
governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is
only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the
O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is
necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4
aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation
of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and
resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas."
Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be
attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when
such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts,
rather than speechbecause of apprehension that such speech creates
the danger of such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 -
batas.org | 1 Title: Re: Request of Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against Former President Joseph
E. Estrada, et al. Facts: The petition for live radio and television
coverage of the plunder trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada
emerged from both public and official requests, highlighting the
unprecedented nature of the case and the public’s interest in it. On
March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP)
initially requested the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage.
This was followed by similar requests from individuals and officials,
ultimately leading to Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filing
the petition on April 17, 2001. The petition underscored the trial’s
public concern and advocated for transparency through media
coverage, presenting this as a resonant issue dealing with the
administration of justice and public rights to information. Issues: The
Supreme Court was tasked to determine: 1. If allowing live radio and
TV coverage of the trial would serve the public interest without
compromising the principles of a fair trial and due process. 2. If the
benefits of live coverage outweigh potential risks to judicial processes.
3. The constitutional implications of live broadcast as it pertains to the
right to information and the right to a fair trial. Court’s Decision: The
Supreme Court denied the petition for live radio and TV coverage. It
prioritized the defendant’s due process rights over the potential public
benefit of live coverage. The Court referred to its previous resolution
from October 1991 in which it banned live coverage to preserve
courtroom decorum and the defendant’s rights. The Court highlighted
the potential prejudice against the accused stemming from live
coverage, including undue influence on jury members, witnesses, and
even judges due to heightened public scrutiny. It emphasized that the
right to a public trial does not equate to a right to a televised trial, and
that judicial proceedings must maintain a level of solemnity and
seriousness, free from external influences. Doctrine: The Court
reiterated the doctrine established in its 1991 resolution that live radio
and TV coverage of court proceedings is prohibited, based on the
potential harm it could do to the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the
orderly administration of justice, despite the A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June
29, 2001 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 2 constitutional
right to public information. Class Notes: – In criminal cases, the
accused’s rights to a fair trial and due process are paramount and can
supersede the public’s right to information. – A public trial means the
proceedings are open to those who wish to attend, subject to spatial
limitations, ensuring a fair trial free from undue public and media
influence. – Live media coverage of court proceedings poses risks to
the fairness and impartiality of the trial process. – Legal statutes or
provisions central to this case: Philippine Constitution’s provisions on
the right to a fair trial, due process, and the right to information on
matters of public concern. Historical Background: This case is rooted in
the complex political and legal aftermath following the ouster of former
President Joseph E. Estrada, highlighting the Philippine society’s
hunger for transparency and the justice system’s efforts to balance
such demand with fundamental principles of fairness and impartiality
in criminal proceedings. It reflects the tension between the judiciary’s
duties and the media’s role in a democratic society, underscoring the
evolving challenges of administering justice in the age of mass
information.

G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411. April 02, 2009 (Case Brief / Digest) ©
2024 - batas.org | 1 **Title:** **Newsounds Broadcasting Network Inc.
and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. vs. Hon. Ceasar G. Dy, et
al.** **Facts:** This case centers around the closure of two radio
stations operated by Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) in
Cauayan City, Isabela, following the local government’s refusal to
renew their mayor’s permits for the year 2002 onwards. The refusal
was based on the demand for documentation proving the land used by
the stations had been reclassified from agricultural to commercial, a
requirement not previously imposed. The stations managed to operate
intermittently through legal interventions, including securing a
temporary order from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) due to
the election period, but were ultimately closed down in June 2004. The
closure was contested by the petitioners through a series of legal
challenges leading up to the Supreme Court, arguing it infringed on
their freedom of speech and expression. **Procedural Posture:**
Petitioners initially filed for mandamus at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cauayan City to compel the issuance of the 2002 mayor’s permit,
which was dismissed. Subsequent challenges to the denial of permits
and the closure of the stations were made through appeals and
petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, all of which were ruled
against the petitioners. These rulings were then elevated to the
Supreme Court in two consolidated cases. **Issues:** 1. Whether the
refusal to issue zoning clearances and mayor’s permits, culminating in
the closure of the petitioners’ radio stations, constituted an
infringement of their freedom of speech and expression. 2. Whether
the petitioners were entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the necessary permits for their
operation. 3. Whether the petitioners are entitled to damages due to
the infringement of their constitutional rights. **Court’s Decision:** The
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling in
favor of the petitioners. It was held that the actions of the respondents
constituted a grave infringement of the petitioners’ constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and expression. The Court found no legal
basis for the respondents’ refusal to renew the mayor’s permits and
their demand for land reclassification documentation. The Court
granted the petition for mandanus, compelling the issuance of the
necessary permits, and awarded damages to the petitioners G.R. Nos.
170270 & 179411. April 02, 2009 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 -
batas.org | 2 for the infringement of their rights. **Doctrine:** The
decision reiterates the primacy of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press, highlighting the heavy
presumption against the validity of government actions constituting
prior restraint on these freedoms. It also touches on the doctrine of
estoppel against public authorities under certain conditions, affirming
that the government cannot play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing
against its citizens’ constitutional rights. **Class Notes:** – The case
underscores the “strict scrutiny” standard applied to government
actions that potentially infringe on freedom of speech and expression,
especially when these actions are content-based. – The principle that
government and its officials cannot escape liability under the guise of
performing official duties when such actions violate constitutional
rights (Article 32 of the Civil Code). – The doctrine of estoppel may be
applied against the government if its prior actions have led citizens to
form a reasonable basis for their actions, provided there was no fraud
or bad faith on the part of the citizens. **Historical Background:** This
case highlights the tensions between local government regulatory
powers and constitutional freedoms in the Philippines. It demonstrates
how local politics and governance can impact fundamental civil
liberties, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s role as the ultimate
guardian of constitutional rights against abuses by government
officials.

G.R. NO. 164437. May 15, 2009 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 -
batas.org | 1 **Title: Hector C. Villanueva vs. Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Inc. and Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation** **Facts:** –
**Background:** Hector C. Villanueva was a mayoralty candidate in
Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992, elections. Ricardo
Nolan, another candidate, petitioned for his disqualification, citing
administrative convictions, but the COMELEC denied this petition. –
**May 9, 1992:** The Manila Daily Bulletin published a story falsely
stating that Villanueva had been disqualified from running for mayor. –
**May 10, 1992:** The Philippine Daily Inquirer published a similar
story with similar claims about Villanueva’s disqualification. –
**Elections:** On May 11, Villanueva lost the election. He attributed his
loss to the published stories affecting his credibility and support. –
**Lower Court:** Villanueva sued both newspapers and their related
officers for damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bais City. He
alleged “malicious timing” of the reports intended to undermine his
electoral success and sought damages amounting to millions for
expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and legal fees. The RTC
ruled in favor of Villanueva, awarding him significant damages. –
**Court of Appeals:** Respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC’s decision, finding no malice or improper motive by
the newspapers. **Issues:** 1. Whether proving malice was necessary
for Villanueva to claim damages. 2. If Villanueva’s action was correctly
characterized as quasi-delict by him or libel by the respondents. 3.
Whether the respondents’ publications had been created with actual
malice affecting Villanueva’s election adversely. **Court’s Decision:** –
**Nature of Action:** The Supreme Court affirmed that the nature of
Villanueva’s complaint pertained to alleged libel (malicious publication)
rather than quasi-delict. The primary relief he sought was based on
accusations of malice in the articles. – **Requirement of Malice:**
Villanueva needed to prove actual malice, which required G.R. NO.
164437. May 15, 2009 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 2
showing knowledge of the falsehood in publication or reckless
disregard for the truth. The court found no substantial proof of this, as
the news was based on sources that the journalists believed credible at
the time of publication. – **Public Figure Principle:** Villanueva, by
participating in the elections, assumed the status of a public figure.
Thus, the threshold for proving libel against him involved a higher
standard, specifically actual malice, which was not adequately
demonstrated. **Doctrine:** – **Actual Malice Standard:** Recognition
that public figures must demonstrate actual malice to prevail in
defamation cases involving matters of public interest, echoing
principles from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. – **Qualified Privilege:**
Protects media reports on matters of public interest unless there is
proof of malice. **Class Notes:** – *Libel:* Defined under Art. 353 of
the Revised Penal Code as defamatory imputations. – *Presumption of
Malice:* Not absolute but absent in privileged communications or
reports on matters of public interest unless proven otherwise. – *Public
Figure Doctrine:* Public figures have less protection from defamation
as they are subject to higher scrutiny concerning issues of malice.
**Historical Background:** The case reflects the evolving protections
for press freedom weighed against an individual’s claim to reputation
in democratic processes. It highlights the media’s role during elections
and sets a standard for how public figures engage with defamation
claims, drawing on the protective mantle of free discussion and
oversight of public affairs.

G.R. No. 180291. July 27, 2010 (Title: **Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Dinnah Villaviza et al.: The Right
to Expression within the Public Sector**

Facts: The case originated when Winston Garcia, President and General
Manager of the GSIS, filed formal charges against respondents Dinnah
Villaviza and others for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. These charges were based on an
incident on May 27, 2005, where the respondents, wearing red shirts,
ostensibly supported former union presidents by marching to or
appearing at the GSIS Investigation Unit, an act perceived as a mass
demonstration/rally. This led to a series of memos, initially demanding
written explanations from the respondents, which escalated to formal
charges when respondents failed to submit the required under-oath
responses. Upon the respondents’ failure to file under-oath responses
to the formal charges, PGM Garcia issued decisions, finding them guilty
and suspending them for one year. The respondents appealed to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), which reduced the penalty to a
reprimand, finding them guilty of a lesser offense and citing an
insufficient basis for the original charges. Garcia’s subsequent plea for
reconsideration with the CSC was denied, prompting an appeal to the
Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld the CSC’s decision.

Issues: 1. Can provisions of the Rules of Court on the effect of failure to

deny allegations in the complaint and failure to file an answer be
applied suppletorily in administrative proceedings?

2. Is administrative due process equivalent to judicial due process

regarding the consideration of evidence?
3. Is a decision valid if it is based on undocumented allegations? 4. Is
further proof required to establish disruption by a mass gathering of
employees for a case of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service?

5. Does an unruly mass gathering for a protest fall within the

constitutional guarantee to freedom of expression and peaceful
assembly?

6. Can abandoning posts for a protest be categorized merely as a

violation of reasonable office rules and regulations?

Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. It

declared that administrative rules of the GSIS already provided clear
procedures for instances where respondents fail to file an G.R. No.
180291. July 27, 2010 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 2
answer, and there was no evidential basis to consider allegations in the
complaint as admitted due to such failure. It underscored that, even in
administrative proceedings, the complainant must prove the charges
with substantial evidence. The collective actions of the respondents did
not equate to a concerted mass action as defined by CSC resolutions
since there was no intent to effect work stoppage or demand
concessions. Ultimately, the actions of the respondents were seen as
an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Doctrine: The doctrine established in this case reiterates that not all
collective activities of government employees amount to prohibited
concerted actions or mass actions, especially when such activities do
not intend to effect work stoppage or service disruption to demand
concessions. It also highlights the principle that administrative due
process is fulfilled as long as the parties are given the opportunity to
be heard and present evidence.

Class Notes: 1. **Administrative Due Process**: Administrative due

process requires that the accused be given the opportunity to be heard
and defend themselves, it does not equate to judicial due process in
terms of procedural requisites and evidential weight. 2.
**Constitutional Right to Freedom of Expression**: Government
employees do not lose their constitutional rights to freedom of
expression and peaceful assembly by virtue of their employment. Such
rights can be regulated but not denied. 3. **Prohibited Concerted
Activity**: Defined in CSC Resolution No. 02-1316, an act by
government employees is only considered a prohibited concerted
activity if it is intended to effect work stoppage or service disruption to
force concessions, economic or otherwise, from the government. 4.
**Evidence in Administrative Proceedings**: The burden of proof lies
with the complainant to prove the charges with substantial evidence,
even when the respondent fails to file an answer. ### Historical
Background: This case highlights the tension between the exercise of
constitutional rights by government employees and the government’s
interest in maintaining discipline and order within public service. It
reaffirms that administrative bodies must duly consider constitutional
freedoms when adjudicating cases of discipline involving expressive
activities.

G.R. No. 164785. March 15, 2010 Eliseo F. Soriano vs. Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board et al.: A Case on Broadcast
Censorship and Freedom of Speech*

Facts: The case arose from an incident on August 10, 2004, during a
televised segment of “Ang Dating Daan,” a program hosted by
petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano. In this segment, Soriano made
controversial remarks against Michael Sandoval, a minister of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), which were deemed offensive and obscene by
the latter and other INC members. This led to the filing of a complaint
by Sandoval and others with the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB). Following the complaint, the MTRCB
issued a preventive suspension against the airing of “Ang Dating Daan”
for 20 days, pursuant to its mandate under Presidential Decree No.
1986. Soriano challenged this preventive suspension before the
Supreme Court, arguing that it constituted prior restraint and thus
infringed on his exercise of freedom of speech and religion. The
Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of MTRCB’s actions, which led
Soriano to file a motion for reconsideration.

Issues:

1. Whether the suspension of the program constitutes prior restraint.

2. Whether Soriano’s utterances constituted an exercise of religion.

3. Whether the language used by Soriano was offensive and obscene.

4. Whether the policy of non-interference in conflicts between religious
groups should be applied.

5. Whether penalizing the television program for Soriano’s acts was

erroneous.

Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court, in resolving the motion for

reconsideration, upheld its original decision, reinforcing the MTRCB’s
authority to regulate and classify television content. The Court
reasoned that: 1. The suspension did not constitute prior restraint but
served as punishment for past breaches of the program’s “G” rating.
Soriano’s complaints had been duly considered and found to merit no
change in their original decision. 2. Soriano’s comments were not
protected under religious exercise, as they were made in a public
broadcast accessible to children and did not prominently reflect any
religious conviction. 3. The language used by Soriano was adjudged as
offensive and unfit for a program rated suitable for all ages. It was
inappropriate particularly for children, thus justifying regulatory action.
4. The Court declined Soriano’s call for a hands-off approach regarding
the conflict between religious groups, citing precedents that the state
could regulate religious expression in the public interest, particularly
when it might affect children. 5. The disciplinary action was correctly
vested on the program and not on Soriano personally, aligning with the
nature of the violation relating to the program’s content and rating.
Doctrine: The essential holding is that television broadcasts, due to
their accessible nature, are subject to regulatory oversight, especially
to protect children. Freedom of speech and expression in broadcast
media is less protected compared to other forms of expression due to
potential impacts on more vulnerable audiences.

Class Notes: The balance between freedom of expression and the

state’s responsibility to protect the public, especially children, from
inappropriate content. – The concept of subsequent punishment versus
prior restraint in the context of regulating speech. – The importance of
considering the medium of expression (e.g., television) in assessing the
scope of freedom of speech protections. – The court’s power to
evaluate the appropriateness of speech under the guise of regulatory
mandates of government bodies like the MTRCB.

Historical Background: This case is situated in the broader discourse on

the limits of freedom of expression in media, set against the backdrop
of ongoing friction between religious groups in the Philippines. It
underscores the legal and ethical tensions between upholding free
speech and safeguarding public morals and the welfare of minors,
illustrating the complex interplay between religious fervor, media
regulation, and constitutional rights.

G.R. No. 178552. October 05, 2010 Title: **Southern

Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism
Council et al.**

Facts: The case pertains to six consolidated petitions filed before the
Philippine Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9372, known as the Human Security Act of 2007. The
petitioners are various organizations and individuals who claim that the
law infringes on constitutional rights including freedom of speech, due
process, and equal protection of the laws. The petitioners include
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., represented by Atty.
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., and various labor organizations, human rights
groups, and individuals who alleged that RA 9372 is vague and
overbroad, which could lead to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The procedural posture began following the effectivity of
RA 9372 when the petitioners filed separate petitions for certiorari and
prohibition with the Supreme Court. The Anti-Terrorism Council and
several government officials, including the Executive Secretary and the
heads of various departments, were impleaded as respondents. The
petitioners argued that the lack of clear standards in the definition of
“terrorism” under the law would lead to a chilling effect on protected
speech and activities, thereby infringing on their constitutional rights.

Issues:

1. The petitioners had the legal standing (locus standi) to file the
petitions.
2. There was an actual controversy warranting the invocation of the
Court’s judicial power. 3. RA 9372’s definition of terrorism is
intrinsically vague and overbroad, thereby violating the freedom of
speech and due process clauses of the Constitution.

Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions on the

grounds that the petitioners failed to establish locus standi and that
there was no actual case or controversy before the Court. The Court
held that the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness are applicable
only to free speech cases and not to penal laws. Furthermore, since
none of the petitioners had been charged under the law, they could not
claim that their rights had been violated. G.R. No. 178552. October 05,
2010 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 2 The Court found that
the petitioners did not have a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy and that their concerns were hypothetical and anticipatory
in nature, as none of them faced charges under RA 9372. Doctrine: The
Court reiterated the doctrine that overbreadth and vagueness
challenges are appropriate only for free speech cases and that penal
laws cannot be challenged on their face using these doctrines. It
emphasized that judicial review requires an actual case or controversy,
concrete adverseness, and that petitioners possess locus standi. The
Court did not establish a new doctrine but reinforced existing principles
regarding constitutional challenges to penal legislation. Class Notes: 1.
Actual Case or Controversy: Courts require an existing case or
controversy involving rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable before they can exercise judicial review. 2. Locus Standi: A
legal standing to sue, requiring a direct and personal interest in the
case. 3. Facial Challenges: Generally, only allowed in free speech cases
where there is a potential “chilling effect” on protected speech. 4.
Doctrine of Vagueness: A law is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
understand what conduct it prohibits or it authorizes or encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 5. Doctrine of Overbreadth:
Applicable only to cases involving the First Amendment (free speech),
where a law is overly broad and impacts protected activities beyond its
legitimate scope. Historical Background: The Human Security Act of
2007 was enacted in the Philippines as an anti-terrorism measure
aimed at preventing and penalizing acts of terrorism. However, it
raised concerns among various sectors regarding its possible abuse
and infringement on constitutional rights, leading to multiple petitions
filed before the Supreme Court challenging its constitutionality. The
consolidated cases reflect the ongoing tension between national
security interests and individual freedoms within the Philippine legal
context.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, v. COMELEC || G.R. No. 205728,

January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size, for public viewing
within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the
tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay”
with an “X” mark.The electoral candidates were classified according to
their vote on the adoption of the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay.

When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a

letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as
the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by
three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election
offense against the latter.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise

of free speech, Bishop Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare
the questioned orders of Comelec as unconstitutional, and
permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice
and hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda

which the Comelec has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition
shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.

RULING:

It is not election propaganda.

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in
return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.

Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the

second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining
“political advertisement” or “election propaganda.”
The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of
life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of legislation at
that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the
candidates and party- list organizations. Not all may agree to the way
their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic
dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an

enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that
prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their
conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in
judgment of the acts of others.