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Solution Manual for Revel for Introduction to Python Programming and

Data Structures, Y. Daniel Liang,
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Liang Python Revel Assigned Quiz and Programming Project
Solution

Chapter 1

Chapter 1: Programming Project 1:

(Display three different messages)
Write a program that displays
Welcome to Python
Welcome to Computer Science

Programming is fun.
If you get a logical or runtime error, please refer
https://liangpy.pearsoncmg.com/faq.html.

# Exercise01_01
print("Welcome to Python")
print("Welcome to Computer Science")
print("Programming is fun")

Chapter 1: Programming Project 2:

(Compute expressions)
Write a program that displays the result of (9.5 * 4.5 - 2.5 * 3) / (45.5
- 3.5).

If you get a logical or runtime error, please refer

https://liangpy.pearsoncmg.com/faq.html.
©2020 Pearson Education, Inc., 330 Hudson Street, NY NY
10013. All rights reserved.

# Exercise01_05
print((9.5 * 4.5 - 2.5 * 3) / (45.5 - 3.5))

Chapter 1: Programming Project 3:

(Population projection)
The US Census Bureau projects population based on the following assumptions:
One birth every 7 seconds
One death every 13 seconds
One new immigrant every 45 seconds
Write a program to display the population for each of the next five years. Assume
the current population is 312032486 and one year has 365 days.
If you get a logical or runtime error, please refer
https://liangpy.pearsoncmg.com/faq.html.

# Exercise01_11
print(312032486 + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 7 - 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 13
+ 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 45)
print(312032486 + 2 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 7 - 2 * 365 * 24 * 60 *
60 / 13 + 2 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 45)
print(312032486 + 3 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 7 - 3 * 365 * 24 * 60 *
60 / 13 + 3 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 45)
print(312032486 + 4 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 7 - 4 * 365 * 24 * 60 *
60 / 13 + 4 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 45)
print(312032486 + 5 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 7 - 5 * 365 * 24 * 60 *
60 / 13 + 5 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 / 45)

Chapter 1: Programming Project 4:

(Simple computation)
©2020 Pearson Education, Inc., 330 Hudson Street, NY NY
10013. All rights reserved.

The formula for computing the discriminant of a quadratic equation ax^2 + bx + c =

0 is b^2 – 4ac.
Write a program that computes the discriminant for the equation 3x^2 + 4x + 5 = 0.
If you get a logical or runtime error, please refer
https://liangpy.pearsoncmg.com/faq.html.

# Exercise01_01Extra
print(4 * 4 - 4 * 3 * 5)

Chapter 1: Programming Project 5:

(Physics: acceleration)
Average acceleration is defined as the change of velocity divided by the time taken
to make the change, as shown in the following formula:
a = (v1 - v0) / t
Here, v0 is the starting velocity in meters/second, v1 is the ending velocity in
meters/second, and t is the time span in seconds.
Assume v0 is 5.6, v1 is 10.5, and t is 0.5, and write the code to display the average
acceleration.
If you get a logical or runtime error, please refer
https://liangpy.pearsoncmg.com/faq.html.

# Exercise01_02Extra
print((10.5 - 5.6) / 0.5)

Solution Files:
©2020 Pearson Education, Inc., 330 Hudson Street, NY NY
10013. All rights reserved.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 CAUSES
Yüan's closing years might have resembled Napoleon's rise from
the position of First Consul to that of emperor, had he not been
checked at the very last moment by armed uprisings and
expressions of deep popular contempt. Even so, he retained control
of the country.1 The humiliation of his defeat lacked even dramatic
compensations, and he died in June, 1916, of disease, poison, or
chagrin. With his death the Republic had a chance to stand by itself,
but it could not.
The Age of the War Lords
Yüan had fastened the symbols of old on the scaffolding of a new
order. With his death the momentum of administrative routine
retained from the Manchu dynasty was lost; the Republican
government in Peking degenerated from impotence to comedy. The
process called government began to nauseate patriotic Chinese and
foreigners alike; few were able to take a long view, to maintain their
courage, and to keep on fighting against disgusting and
disheartening realities. With the decomposition of the central
government—except the modern bureaucracies such as posts and
customs, which were kept intact by their foreign personnel and their
special international status—the armies, though divided provincially,
stepped into positions of unprecedented authority. There was a
veritable epidemic of monarchical ambition, greed, and willfulness
among the provincial military commanders; many Chinese expected
a new Yüan to emerge from that group and become the "strong man
of China." With such a stage to strut on, it is not surprising that the
Chinese military lost constructive vision. A sober nucleus of
idealistically hard-headed, patriotic men, each a George Washington,
might have used military power to reunite the country, but order
could not be expected to emerge from the unsystematized
competition of armed forces.
Three broader factors affected the ascendancy of war lords, in
addition to obvious motives and interests. The ideological ruin was
bad enough; the consequent social disorder crippled China. But the
armies now came to provide a refuge for the unemployed and
dispossessed. A second factor, the mechanical mobilization of
military forces through the railways, made warfare more expensive
and ruinous than it would have been with the slow-moving infantry
of the past. Thirdly, the war lords gave physical embodiment to the
ideological and social disunity of China, inviting the constant
intervention of the Western powers and of Japan in Chinese affairs.
Individually the war lords warrant no special attention. There was
Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria; Tuan Chi-jui and Ts'ao Kun in North
China; Yen Hsi-shan ("The Model Governor") and, to the west of
him, Fêng Yü-hsiang ("The Christian General"); Chang Chung-chang
in Shantung, significant more for his brutality than for his political
and military position; the quaint, conservative scholar Wu P'ei-fu, in
the Yangtze valley, minor figures in the South and West. It was not
the generals who were important, but militarism.
Militarism machine-gunned the Confucian ethics out of politics; it
taxed the land into ruin; it laid China wide open to imperialistic
thrusts, and—by the same act—made her a poor market. Militarism
built roads when they were strategically required, established a few
railways and spoiled more, modernized China, but did so in the
costliest way of all. Only in the intellectual world was military
domination not outright destruction. The generals and their staffs
were surprisingly ignorant of the power of ideas, ineffectual in their
censorship, oblivious to the great leverage of undercover agitation.
Trusting arms, they failed to see that the only opposition able to
destroy them was not military but mental.
While the soldiery stirred the country with murder and oppression,
their system progressed steadily toward self-destruction. Two great
pressures forced constant further expansion of the armies. The first
is obvious: military rivalry. The second was the growing abuse of
army organization as a means of unemployment relief. Military
taxation drove the peasants off the land, whereupon they had no
recourse but to become bandits or soldiers. If they were bandits,
consolidation under a chieftain transformed them into military
irregulars and induced some ambitious general to include them in his
forces. If they were soldiers, the bandit stage remained in reach. In
either case, they added to the burden falling upon their commander,
which in turn led to still greater impoverishment of the peasants, a
further increase of dispossessed men, bandits, and soldiers. With the
widening circulation of arms, Western guns and fighting methods
became less and less a secret of small groups capable of establishing
a firm military oligarchy and more and more the property of a cross
section of the Chinese masses.

From an estimated total of 1,369,880 in 1921,2 the number of

men under arms rose to a figure estimated to be between 1,883,300
and 1,933,300 five years later.3 This increase occurred in one of the
poorest countries of the world, despite conditions of extreme misery:
Recruiting goes on incessantly in every town in North China where there is
a garrison. There are no statistics available, but it is known that the death
rate from disease is very high because, even in garrison, sanitary precautions
are crude and the medical service is inefficient and inadequate. In battle the
care of the wounded is barbarously primitive, even in the best units, and
death from infected wounds is rather the rule than the exception; while those
who cannot walk from the field to the nearest hospital more often than not
die of exposure or clumsy handling. One of a Chinese commander's major
concerns is filling the gaps in the ranks, but at the same time these conditions
have kept the proportions of the armies down to a fairly constant figure.
Chinese officers have advanced the theory that if recruiting were everywhere
abandoned, disease, desertions and losses in battle would account for ten per
cent. per annum, so that the armies would automatically cease to exist in ten
years.4

The use of the railways for military purposes unsettled large

groups of Chinese geographically and caused meetings of extensive
bodies of men from different areas. At first such contacts, especially
under wartime conditions, would only intensify provincial sentiment
and mistrust of strangers, but gradually this influence began to make
for a new national consciousness. In the meantime, the troops
learned the intricacies of modern transport. A coolie in a peaceful
part of Asia might see trains for years, observing the Westerners
riding in them, and remain impressed by the sight; a Chinese bandit
sitting on a freight car in a commandeered train would become
rapidly familiar with the fire vehicles.
The role of the militarists with respect to China's international
status was ambiguous. In the first place, the weakness which they
created reduced China to an international pawn. The discord into
which she had fallen allowed for semipartitions—various foreign
interests backing different war lords—although a genuine partition
may thereby have been staved off. In China proper the influence of
the Japanese seemed to be behind Chang Tso-lin and the Northern
militarists; the British were regarded as friendly to Wu P'ei-fu in the
Yangtze valley; and the French achieved something not far from
domination in the province farthest southwest, Yünnan. Fêng Yü-
hsiang was supposed to have veered picturesquely for foreign
friends between the Protestant missions and the Bolshevik agents. A
miniature replica of the European balance of power could be played
in China, with outside groups friendly to one or the other war lord.
An agreement between the chief participants in 1919 sought to
prevent the shipping of arms to unauthorized military groups in
China but proved largely ineffectual in the end.
Between 1922 and 1926 there was formed in South China a nexus
of armies which were to provide the military edge to ideological
revolution and establish the followers of Sun Yat-sen in power. These
armies were built up with the assistance of Russian and German
advisers and with American arms which had been left in Siberia and
had fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviks; the troops were led by
new-style Chinese officers under the leadership of Chiang K'ai-shek.
The Whampoa Academy was the most obvious sign of the new
school of military thought, coming forth as a consequence of the
Nationalist-Communist coalition.5 Armaments did not differ in any
substantial degree from those of the war lords, but they were more
carefully kept and more skillfully used. The military machine which
arose in the South was better organized, better disciplined, better
led, and better cared for than any army on the Chinese scene for a
decade.
From 1926 to 1927 the ensuing campaign for the Nationalist
conquest of China, as outlined in the principles of Sun Yat-sen,6]
drove forward with striking success. The Nationalist troops
everywhere pushed their enemies before them with astonishing
speed. The explanation is to be found in part in the efficiency and
military honesty of officers and men, but even more in the
nonmilitary factors which fortified the armies and the ideological
weapons which cleared the ground before it. The new armies not
only represented military might; they were also propaganda
machines. To every regiment there was attached a political staff to
keep up the morale of the troops and to win over the enemy and the
civilian population. The troops themselves were propaganda
brigades as well as military units. Literacy in the armies was made a
point of great pride, and certain divisions made novel reputations for
themselves on this ground. The Nationalists were known by many as
the soldiers who did not harm the people. Without the troops the
Nationalists would never have come to power; but without the
supporting sweep of mass propaganda the Nationalist movement
might have gone on for decades in the form of civilian conspirators
fighting against overwhelming odds or else seeking to make venal
mercenaries the prime instrument for the regeneration of Chinese
civilization.
The military revolution of 1926-1927 brought new factors to the
Chinese military scene. It indicated that a point of equilibrium had
been reached between the military and the ideological modes of
control and that it was no longer possible for sheer force and a
minimum of intelligence to hold unchallenged power in the Chinese
society. It was, furthermore, a threefold struggle: a patriotic and
progressive uprising against domestic and foreign oppression and
inefficiency; an agrarian revolt on a grand scale; and a proletarian
uprising on the part of the relatively small but strategically placed
Chinese proletariat. Only in the first of these aspects did the
revolution meet with the approval of most Chinese—the victims and
not the bearers of arms. Men of all shades of opinion were able to
agree on a policy of attacking the system of tuchüns, which offered
no planning for the future, no resurrection of the past, and little
public order. The patriotic troops were enraged by the corruption
and inadequacy all about them and by the fortresses of privilege
reared by aliens on their coasts and in their greatest inland cities.
The campaign of 1926-1927 marked the identification of the coolie
soldier with his own class and of the peasant fighter with his. The
rank and file were given to understand that they were not fighting in
some game beyond their understanding but for the security of
people like themselves. Under the influence of the propaganda put
forth by the Nationalists and the allied Communists, an incipient
agrarian revolt was fanned into flame and proletarian uprisings in
the cities were made possible for the first time. Whole sections of
the countryside fell into a condition not far from anarchy as the
revolutionary troops led the people in revolt. After 1927, however,
the military forces developed along two antagonistic lines. The
Nationalists, seizing the political instruments of the revolution but
finding its ideological factors largely beyond their control, began to
create a professionalized army with which to stabilize their regime.
The Communists, and their agrarian allies, standing to the Left of
the newborn Nanking government, were eager to fight on in the
tested informal fashion. In the year of the establishment of the
Nanking government, 1927, the Red Army could still demonstrate its
effectiveness. Shortly afterward the precautionary arms embargo of
the foreign powers, which had prevailed since 1919, was lifted,
thereby opening up the means by which Chiang K'ai-shek could
renovate and specialize the armies under his command.
 The break with the war-lord tradition was much more obvious in
the case of the Communists than in the case of the Nationalists. The
Communists, lacking sufficient support to occupy any broad
contiguous territory, fell back on guerrilla fighting of their own. The
Nationalists, strong enough to hold a certain portion of the area,
nevertheless compromised with the existing military system to seek
mastery. For three years after the establishment of the Nanking
government, it remained doubtful whether the whole government
might not subside into inertia and neglect, leaving Chiang standing
alone, distinguished from the other war lords only by his character.
Late in 1930 and early in 1931 a menacing alliance was organized
between two of the most influential remaining Northern tuchüns and
the "liberal" wing of the Nationalists. Operating from the north, after
the proclamation of an insurgent "National Government" at Peking,
the rebels at first seemed to have the military advantage. Chiang
had learned many lessons, however, and in the most serious fighting
which China had seen in years he broke the force of the Northern
offensive. Airplanes appeared as a threat against the civilian
population of Peking, although no actual deaths were reported.
There were ugly rumors that gas was being used at the front. Small
tanks from England, though giving a rather poor performance,
symbolized a novel trend. More and better heavy artillery was used
than ever before. Trenches came up to World War standards. The
war ended with the intervention from Manchuria of Chang Hsüeh-
liang, a strangely progressive and patriotic tuchün; but the fighting
had been enough to show that of all the great armed forces in China
the Nationalist armies of Chiang K'ai-shek and the Nanking
government were the most effective.
The rehabilitation of men's thinking had not proceeded far enough
to eliminate the dangers of an overemphasized military leadership,
but the tide had turned. After 1931 the military situation in China
had become subordinate to the problems of ideology and of
government. The chief military factors were now the
governmentalized armies, the guerrilla opposition of the
Communists, and the problem of foreign war.
The Age of Air Conquest
The new military period which replaced the war-lord system was
marked by (1) technical improvement of the armies, especially in the
direction of air power; (2) supplementation of the armies by the
quasi-military power of the civil government, so that Chinese wars
ceased to be a question of armed bands drifting about the surface of
the social system; (3) organization of the Nationalist armies into
national units in fact as well as name; (4) increasing pressure of the
disbandment problem; (5) development of guerrilla tactics by the
Reds and of guerrilla-suppression tactics by the Nationalists; (6)
problems arising from Japanese conquest, which overwhelmed
Manchuria in one fierce onslaught and harassed China for six years
of military aggressions before breaking forth anew in the
catastrophic surge of 1937-1938.
Aviation was to leap to a sensational place. Aviation and national
civilian government became almost natural complements of one
another. Only by aviation could all parts of the country be brought
under the jurisdiction of Nanking and the geographical handicaps of
China be overcome, and only a national government could afford the
long-term investments in machines and men necessary to effective
air armament. The record of technical improvement in the
Nationalist armies is clearly symbolized by the advancement of
military aircraft. Military aviation in China previous to the establishing
of the Nanking government demonstrated the weakness of the
preceding regime. As early as 1909 a French aviator was giving
demonstration flights over Shanghai.7 The Ch'ing dynasty sought to
establish an airplane factory but met with no success. Yüan Shih-k'ai
purchased a few planes and set up a flying school. The first telling
use of planes in Chinese politics and war occurred, however, with the
bombardment of the imperial palace by a lone aviator in the course
of an attempted monarchical restoration in 1917. In the period of the
war lords there were many isolated efforts to build up flying
services. The most promising of these, undertaken by the Peking
Republic with British assistance after 1920, failed through neglect,
mismanagement, and corruption. As late as 1928 there was no
prospect of significant air fighting in China.
By 1931 the Nanking government had built up an air force of
about seventy serviceable planes; a contemporary commentator
observed, "Aeroplanes played a very considerable—some would even
say a decisive—part in the civil war of 1930...."8 By 1932, when an
American aviation mission arrived to help in the training of a Chinese
military air force, the estimates ran into a total of 125 to 140
commercial and training planes.9 In the ensuing five years the
Chinese national air force developed rapidly. It played the leading
role in suppressing the Fukien uprising of 1932-1933 and in driving
the Communists into the Northwest. In 1937 the head of the
American aviation mission, Colonel John Jouett, wrote, "Japan
maintains that China has a thousand planes; my guess would be
seven hundred and fifty of all types. But no one knows...."10 Other
experts would reduce the figure to one-third or less by the
elimination of planes which would not be of first-class utility in actual
combat. The preparations for foreign hostilities up to 1937 were
accompanied by such a degree of secrecy that definite figures are
not available. For domestic purposes, however, almost every plane
would count, and the cardinal fact remains that domestically the
National Government possesses a monopoly of air power in China. It
is thereby in a better position to make its supreme will formidably
known than was any emperor of any dynasty. The future may show
that Chinese mastery of aircraft is psychologically as important as
was mastery of the steamship for the Japanese—a visible
demonstration to an Asiatic people of their own accomplishments
with Western technology.
As for other improvements of the armies, only three factors need
be mentioned. The armies were consolidated generally, and with
their better status—in literacy, pay, means of subsistence, and
regularity of control—there came a realization that the military force
was the creature of the national state. The Chinese nation was
taking form as an ideological and social entity of sufficient strength
to command the direct allegiance of fighting men. A new respect
arose for the officers and men of the armies. Under Yüan Shih-k'ai
the armies had been able to evolve a respectability of their own
making; under Chiang K'ai-shek this respectability began to be
accepted at its face value by the rest of the society, so that a pilot
was not only admired by the crowd but was recognized as an expert
among experts, even in literary and civil-minded circles. Secondly,
the armies affected the nation by road construction. In the course of
the Nationalist-Communist wars of 1927-1937 the Nationalists built
thousands of miles of highway in order to make full use of their new
mobility gained from machine power. The military roads,
supplemented by civilian roads built with an eye to military use,
constituted a network of communications upon which a new political
geography could be framed—with new strategic points and new
avenues of commerce. Thirdly, the armies began to emphasize
culture and comfort. The soldiers were given a taste of twentieth
century life and standards; their civilian kin and friends who lived
under less favorable conditions saw in the elite sections of the
armies a mass demonstration of China's modernization.
In the age of air power in China the relation between the army,
the government, and the economy was revolutionized. The new
power of a state with actual authority11 led to the creation of an
army dependent on an intricate and sensitive financial and economic
system, operating under a regular scheme of law. The strength of
the government made modern armies possible; modern armies
made corresponding political forms imperative. A resulting tendency
was for the armies to take on national form. Even in those areas
where tuchünism had left its imprint upon society, or where
provincial autonomy provided a factual check upon the national
authorities, the regional armies accepted organizational details and
long-range plans set forth by the central government. Armies which
had arisen as dumps for the unemployed or as resources for civil war
were fitted together so as to make the Chinese forces resemble the
other armies of the world—which exist for the preservation, defense,
or aggrandizement of national states. Foreign military observers,
equipped with the critical faculties of their profession, might look at
the Chinese armies and state point-blank that China had not an
army but merely armed men. They could not, however, deny that
the Chinese armed forces in their latest phase were on the way to
becoming an army nationally organized and fit to serve as the
instrument of a great nation. The lessons of nearly a thousand years
of European and American political experience may be epitomized in
great part in the word nation; the Chinese armies helped to give this
word true significance in China.
For the time being, the armies continued to serve their role of a
refuge for the economically displaced. Armed paupers are a menace
to the security and stability of any society; with the emergence of a
higher degree of Chinese unity a great proportion of the armed
forces lost their raison d'être. Nevertheless, the last great war-lord
war, that of 1930-1931, was fought largely over the issue of army
reduction. The National Government forces gradually increased in
preparation for the disbandment of others—extensive bodies of
irregulars were roughly systematized and placed under central
supervision. They were used in moderately successful but insufficient
colonization efforts in the Northwest, and as labor reserves in the
construction of highways, airports, and similar projects. Even so, the
size of the armies did not cease to interfere with their rapid
improvement. Too much had to go into pay, even with the
ridiculously low rates of compensation. As against the estimates of
nearly 1,400,000 men for 1921 and about 1,900,000 for 1926, the
size of the armies was unofficially estimated at 2,379,770 for 1936.12
This figure did not include Communists, brigands, or the Manchurian
garrisons in the service of the Japanese (the Manchoukuo army),
which would bring the total to well over 2,500,000 men. Differences
in definition of what made a coolie or peasant into a soldier caused
violent discrepancies in the estimates. If training equal to that of a
German Republican Reichswehr soldier were set as the criterion, the
Chinese army could be measured in scores. If some more or less
vague relation to a military payroll, or to the possession of arms, or
both, were taken as the requirements, the number would run into
millions. Japanese propagandists, in the light of these facts, made
injudicious statements when commenting thus on the Chinese army
of 1937:
China had 198 divisions comprising 2,250,000 officers and men. This
gigantic army has further been reinforced by 200,000 Communist soldiers
whom Nanking worked hard to set against Japan.
In comparison the Japanese Army is a puny affair, consisting of 17 divisions
of 250,000 officers and men.13

The well-informed expert on Chinese famine relief, Walter H.

Mallory, set the total for 1937 at 1,650,000, of which 150,000 were
Communist and 350,000 the crack troops of Chiang K'ai-shek; arms
would be available for less than 1,000,000.14 All factors considered,
the figure of 2,000,000 armed men with nonproductive occupations
seems to be in rough accord with the facts. Two salient conclusions
emerge from these figures: Firstly, the armies constituted an
enormous burden, which could only be reduced by partial
disbandment; this in turn would not be achieved until greater
national prosperity had become a fact. Secondly, and in China's
favor, the armed forces have spread some elementary notions of
modern fighting throughout the rest of the population and have
enhanced not merely the willingness of the Chinese masses to fight
but also their capacity to do so.
Disbandment programs had not made enough progress by 1937 to
alter the general position of the armies in Chinese society.
Nevertheless, the counterpart of disbandment—selective recruiting—
produced a central force which became the vocation, avocation, and
passion of Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek. Though not marked in
any recognizable way as apart from the rest of the armed forces, the
central units were given special arms, special equipment, regular
pay, mass education, and training in the patriotic and reform
doctrines of the New Life movement. "Chiang's own" were to
distinguish themselves; they seem to have profited by new matériel,
modern military instruction (chiefly from Germans), and the excellent
opportunities for practice which arose from the Communist wars of
1928-1937. They were a testimonial to the fact that, had the
disbandment program fully materialized, a more effective and much
smaller Chinese army might have appeared. Despite the failure of
disbandment, alliance with the quondam enemies, the Chinese Red
Army, gave the national forces of 1937 a great diversity and wealth
of actual experience in all types of fighting. Although the Chinese
have never had adequate training for aggressive, coordinated
warfare, they possess a marvelous background in guerrilla methods.
The Communist forces have been hunted for a decade; technical
superiority they have learned to meet by tactics which force the
enemy to meet them on their own terms. Ultimately they were
driven by the Nationalists across China, but at most disproportionate
cost. The Nationalists, on the other hand, learned to master the
terrain of inland war and thus acquired the very knowledge which a
foreign enemy would need most.
In time, the Chinese armies became increasingly less the free
agencies of domestic tyrants and, after the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria, more and more the protective force for the whole nation.
The enemy began to force Chinese society into national form more
sharply than could any pressure from within. Even the efforts of the
National Government at Nanking to make a truce with the Japanese
in order to continue the drive against the Communists failed to still
the widespread clamor for unification. Whether or not Chiang, as a
soldier, thought successful war with Japan conceivable, he found
that destiny had cast him in the role of the defender—he had only
the choice of accepting or rejecting the challenge.
Governmental and Political Role of the Armies
Broadly, the political role of the armies was that of giving a day-to-
day index for the influence of ideological control, and of providing
the framework to which government had to accommodate itself. The
Republic was born with Sun Yat-sen as its father but with Yüan Shih-
k'ai as its midwife. Yüan and his armies established the order in
which the parliamentary Republic had its illusory success; with his
death the military order broke into military anarchy, and the political
order disappeared almost completely from the arena of actual power.
The armies and the tuchüns expressed a certain provincial autonomy
and a desire for a crude stability. They ruled the chaos but kept the
society stirred by war until the Nationalist-Communist revolution in
1926-1927 brought ideology back to a conspicuous place in the play
of events. The armies developed under Yüan into separate entities
exercising the power derived from the monopoly of force. In time
this monopoly of force was broken. The problem was one not of
tyranny but of anarchy. Force was too broadly distributed, order too
insufficiently achieved. The Chinese, said Sun Yat-sen, did not need
liberty; they needed wealth, in the form of food for those starving
and the necessities of life for impoverished millions.15 When even
soldiers were treacherous and tumultuous, order could not come
from bayonets. It had to arise within men's minds, including the
minds of the soldiers. This happened; the ideological revolution
absorbed the military forces, but only to disgorge them, as it were,
into opposing camps—the one identifying military power and the
masses, the other seeking to build up a new military elite with which
to impose government and law on the society. Each of the two
incompatible ideals reached a considerable measure of fulfillment,
and they were reconciled only by the very presence of alien
invaders. From being the de facto rulers, the armies found
themselves called upon to act as de facto defenders. Hitherto the
forces unsettling ideological control, they became the instruments of
ideologies reconciled on the minimal terms of national defense for
national existence.
The armies had supplied the power necessary to government but
not the order. The Peking Republic lost its claim to authority when it
was made the tool of Yüan Shih-k'ai. The years after his death were
a pitiful period wherein the civilian authorities in the central
government constituted either the puppets of the war lords or their
sycophants. The Peking Republic fell into the expedient of giving de
jure status to every shift in the interplay of power. Military leaders of
provincial importance easily captured the functions of tuchüns;
regional leaders obtained correspondingly higher titles. The Peking
Republic tried to govern on the Western pattern when the country
was not ready for it, and it governed poorly. Soon it passed from
nominal control into nonexistence.

The National Government established at Nanking in 192716 gained

actual effectiveness partly because the armies under its command
were in need of essentials not obtainable by merely military
measures. The modernized Nationalist armies under Chiang K'ai-
shek were dependent upon a complementing state which would
provide support behind the lines. Furthermore, the cry from the
educated classes for civilian government was loud, and practical
considerations prompted the acquiescence of the Nationalist
generals in the development of civilian government. Although by
1938 a government primarily civilian was not yet in evidence, the
auspices were favorable to the regularization and demilitarization of
government.
Finally, the most significant role of the armies may be found in
their destructive powers. Modern weapons coming into China
pressed on her the mold of a modern state. By preventing any
tranquil change from the Ch'ing dynasty to another form of
government preserving the older controls of village and family,
Western armament brought China into a condition of military
anarchy in which a strong modern government became imperative.
The armies and their irresponsible leaders goaded the masses into
the revolution of 1926-1927, and the necessity of establishing
military superiority for the sake of stability led the victorious
Nationalists to create a modern defensive force, a working
government, and the outline of operative statehood—to be partly
Chinese, but modified by Western influences, according to the
teachings of Sun Yat-sen. From 1931 on, the army and the
government became more and more the integral parts of a single
machine.
War and the Agrarian Economy
 There is a close correlation between militarism and agricultural
conditions in China. Distress among the Chinese farming masses is
both a cause and an effect of war. Misery creates unrest, unrest
brings war, war brings misery—until government stops the vicious
circle. On the whole, the economic system of old China was probably
more stable, and ensured greater distributive justice, than did the
Western systems during the same centuries; but periods of famine,
flood, and—worst of all—oppression were far from rare.17
At its best, the old economy rested on a vast body of farmers,
associated in villages (hui) and families but tilling their own land in
fairly small units. The farming class provided the nourishment for the
bulk of society but did not hold a low status, since the
compensations of interclass kinship and of free play in the hierarchy
of politics and intellect made families (if not individuals)
approximately equal. There were no families in old China to compare
with the aristocracy which Europe inherited from the Middle Ages,
nor castes to compare with those of India. When functioning well,
the Chinese economic system resembled some Western ideals of
freehold farming governed by a hierarchy of scholars.
But at its worst, when the government became sterile and
unimaginative, or corrupt and demoralized, the taxes rose sharply,
and usurers added to the burden. Lack of resources caused the loss
of the land, and the peasant proprietor found himself a tenant
farmer. When economic and political exploitation overreached itself,
social upheaval followed, and peasant rebellions tore down the
government and the economy together. Most Chinese dynasties met
their end as a consequence of the land problem.18
Moreover, the Chinese farmer maintained very slight reserves of
foodstuffs, so that flood or drought resulted in appalling famines,
sometimes costing the lives of millions in one year. Governments
established large granaries which, under good management, were
filled in time of plenty and dispersed in time of need. R. H. Tawney
says of drought and flood:
 Those directly affected by them cannot meet the blow, for they have no
reserves. The individual cannot be rescued by his neighbors, since whole
districts together are in the same position. The district cannot be rescued by
the nation, because means of communication do not permit of food being
moved in sufficient quantities. Famine is, in short, the last stage of a disease
which, though not always conspicuous, is always present.19

Whether or not natural calamities struck in conjunction with

specific extortions sanctioned by social injustice, the Chinese farmer
has been faced with threefold oppression whenever times were bad.
The tax collector, the usurer, and the landlord were able to lay their
hands on the harvest, reduce the peasant to subsistence level or
beneath it, and place him under a system of exploitation which was
as severe as Western feudalism. The check which provided a stop to
any indefinite decline into greater and greater horror was the
fighting power of the peasants. Peasant revolts periodically followed
agrarian oppression, and swept the land free for the time. The Han
dynasty, in some ways the greatest in all Chinese history, went down
in an uproar of peasant rebellions. Peasant bandits have provided
the ancestry of many imperial houses. Politics or war might ease the
economy, until the government again became weak and exploitation
common.
It is one of the tragic coincidences of history that the Europeans
should have appeared in China at a time when the Chinese were
entering upon one of their most acute periods of agrarian decline
and class exploitation. Roughly, from the middle of the eighteenth
century down to the present day the lot of the Chinese farmers has
become worse and worse. At periods the country as a whole seemed
fairly prosperous, but the broad agricultural recession remained
constant. The nineteenth century was one long record of rebellions,
and the twentieth amplified the disturbances.
Government in modern China has fallen heir to a depression
centuries old, arising from inequitable land distribution, overtaxation,
insufficient public works for drainage and communications, and—in
more recent generations—the evils attendant upon sharp economic
change. Most economic writers agree that some of the difficulties of
Chinese agriculture are caused by the smallness of individual
holdings and by population pressure. Such factors are not subject to
immediate remedy; the peasants have attributed their misfortune
primarily to landlordism and political oppression. The Chinese
Communists, on their economic front, may perform a valuable
service if they are able to devise new methods of social organization
which will provide relief for the organic difficulties of Chinese
agriculture. Of all the important problems of China, the land problem
shows government ineffectiveness at its worst.
Behind the T'ai-p'ing rebellion which flared up in unparalleled
fanaticism in the 1850's and 1860's, there was the long provocation
of a land system which made farming unprofitable and a
government supine in the face of unreversed decline. The Boxer
rebellion burst forth from the unrest of the peasants, although it
could be deflected by the demagoguery of the Manchu officials and
changed into wild xenophobia. When the fiercely discordant
economics of imperialism and international industrialism intruded
upon the old and already corrupted economy, farm existence
became even less tolerable than it might have been if left to its
native miseries. Dynastic decomposition was hastened by the
collapse of handicraft economy and the fiscal disorganization caused
by Western commercial activity.
In the earliest days of the Republican-Nationalist movement led by
Sun Yat-sen, emphasis was on land reform. Sun Yat-sen's family had
suffered from overtaxation when he was a boy.20 Nationalization and
equalization of the land were slogans used at the founding of the
Tung Mêng Hui; the program seems at that time to have been
derived from old Chinese distributism and from Henry George.21
With the coming of the Republic, two years went by, however, before
any agrarian legislation was passed, and the new laws had no
perceptible consequence.22 The problem of land reform had to be
fought out on the ideological front and placed above the military
before it could become a fit subject for competent government
action.
The epoch of the tuchüns added to agricultural misfortune.
Militarism had a direct effect on the deterioration of the land
economy, and an indirect one in that it led to the cultivation of
opium as the one money-making crop which could meet the
excessive tax demands of the militarists. A Chinese writer has
described the years which marked the ending of the tuchün system
as follows:
The ... misery among the farming population in the decennial period 1920-
1930 [must be] attributed to (1) internal warfare; (2) neglect of agriculture;
(3) low stage of art; and (4) over-population. The civil wars during the last
eighteen years have increased the cost of production, have added to the
farmers' ... burden of taxation, have raised the rate of interest on loan, and
have caused endless suffering to [those] who form the basis of our social and
economic life. Great many people have often wondered as to why a country
like China with 75 per cent of her total population engaged in farming and
with such a vast territory should suffer from the high cost of living; but to the
student of social problems the question is comparatively simple, for the
recurrence of civil war since the establishment of the Republic has [changed]
conditions of supply and has driven millions of farmers out of cultivated areas,
and this alone suffices to explain an unprecedented rise of prices of food and
other necessities of life during the last few years, especially since 1926.23

These conditions led to farmers' movements, which became

effective, however, only as they merged with the broader ideological
tendencies in China.
The Farmers' Movement ... may ... be divided into four periods: (1) the
period of reaction to bad conditions ... (1921-1925); (2) the period of
communistic activities and violence (1925-1927); (3) the period of
retrenchment and preparation for reconstruction (from the spring of 1927-
1928); and (4) the period of reconstruction (since 1928).24

The Kuomintang-Communist alliance struck severely at the tuchün

armies by giving their own forces a sense of doctrine and by tying
together the causes of patriotism and agricultural reform. The joint
agrarian program was a failure in that it accentuated precisely those
issues on which neither of the parties could compromise. When the
Communists and the Nationalists parted, the Nationalists took one
portion of Sun Yat-sen's economic program (industrialization and
communications) for emphasis, and the Communists another (land
reform). The agrarian issue was a source of strength to the Chinese
Red Army, intent upon winning the peasantry. It was a military
weakness to the new-style Nationalist armies officered largely by the
relatives of landlords; they had little sympathy for the economic
troubles of the farmers whose lands they occupied. The Nationalist
Reconstruction aimed in great part at removing both the acute and
the latent causes of peasant rebellion, thereby cutting the ground
from under the feet of the Communists. Although it met with more
success than any other project of its type in modern China, Western
observers agree in regarding it as inadequate.25
Imperialism and Chinese Wars
A great part of the military disturbances in modern China can be
regarded as both the cause and the effect of agrarian evils, and
some of the struggles as peasant rebellions in modern guise,
carrying on the immemorial farmer-infantry tradition. Another part is
traceable to the impact of the Western economy on China. It was
Western economic activity that gave most compelling proof of the
fact that the Westerners had encircled China and were compressing
it from a world in its own right into a nation. The military
intervention of Western powers in China not only caused much of
the ideological reaction and forced a reorganization of the
government, but also provided deadly evidence of the superiority of
Western fighting. Western economy helped to bring the confusion
which meant war in China; and Western economy itself waged war.
Sun Yat-sen saw China's unfortunate position as a whole, and in
his programs there may be discerned three separate demands, for
(1) a national economic revolution, (2) an industrial revolution, and
(3) a social revolution.26 Since the Chinese could no longer function
as a self-contained world economically, and scorn foreign trade as a
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