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Using Industrial Standards on PLC Programming

Learning
F.J. Molina∗ , J. Barbancho∗ , C. Leon∗ , A. Molina∗ , A. Gomez∗
∗ University of Seville/Department of Electronic Technology, Seville, Spain

Abstract— In this paper, we review aspects relevant to The study of these works offers a clear perspective of the
industrial standards related to PLC programming: IEC programming methodology that the standard draws. Cur-
61131, IEC 61499 and a work about safety developed by the rently, the IEC 61131 has been successfully introduced in
PLCOpen organization based on IEC 61508. We propose to
use these standards in PLC learning to fix a common know- the industry. Many commercial tools are compliant or, at
how that allows one to reduce the gap between industry and least, include their main concepts. Nevertheless, several
education, and between different professionals. We show the studies show that the languages and the execution model,
application scope of these standards by analyzing the IEC defined in the standard, are incomplete. Because of this,
61131 limits. The IEC 61499 can be introduced in distributed frameworks usually define additional language elements
control systems and in complex centralized systems with
multiple operating modes. In critical applications, like safety or characteristic, and non-compliant program execution
functions, where functional safety is required, the IEC 61508 models [6] [7].
is a reference model. In section II, we analyze the main concepts of IEC
61131-3 standard. In certain applications, special relia-
I. I NTRODUCTION bility and availability are required for long periods of
In PLC programming, there is a gap between industry time (e.g. safety in process and machinery). Programming
and education that has been increasing, especially in the restrictions and different methodologies are necessary to
last few years. We identify two main reasons. Tradition- achieve that [8] [9] . IEC 61508 standard introduces the
ally, automation control systems have been developed main concepts on functional safety, recommendations and
by engineers or technicians. Their know-how, design methods for programmable electronic devices in safety
methodology and working procedures are compiled into applications. In the section III, we present a work done
standards. But usually, these standards are quite complex by PLCOpen organization to adapt IEC 61131-3 to IEC
to be introduced in education because they are written to 61508 recommendations.
transmit clear information to experts, not to teach to non- The application of the IEC 61131 also has limitations.
experienced students. The second reason is the increasing The study of these limitations allows us to introduce the
use and the integration, of programmable electronic sys- standard IEC 61499. This new standard is better suited
tems (PES) and computers in all the levels of the automa- to program decentralized control with highly-coupled
tion hierarchy: sensor/actuator level, supervisory level and applications distributed on several devices [14] [15] .
the company management tools (databases, information It is also adequate when the process and the controller
systems, decision tools, etc). Due to the introduction of have multiple operation modes and operating states. A
communications technologies and new programming con- comparative study of both is presented in section IV.
cepts with PES, professionals from computer science have
started working with industrial PES. Their methodology II. T HE IEC 61131-3 MAIN CONCEPTS
and their knowledge about industrial processes are quite The IEC 61131 part 3 defines a software model for
different from traditional engineers and conversely. There industrial controllers based on a clear set of definitions
is a mutual misunderstanding. about what is a program, how to construct one, and how
The IEC 61131 standard was a first attempt to give the program interacts with the host machine and with
a reference model for industrial PES. It was defined another program. The model consists of:
in 1993 and released in 2003. It unifies concepts and • High-level elements: Configurations, Resources and
proposes a common standardized programming interface Tasks. They describe the overall architecture of a
to allow people with different backgrounds to create program resident in a programmable controller.
different pieces of a program that can be joined to work
• Program Organization Units - POU’s. They are basic
together correctly. The standard also defines a set of
programming languages and includes an easy way to code containers. A program is structured in one or
apply new technologies like communication protocols and more POU’s.
fuzzy-logic [1][2][3]. The PLCOpen association is work- • Variables and Data Types.

ing to update and promote the IEC-61131 standard. Their The standard defines basic hardware-independent data
working groups have developed much material to better types. The size and the arithmetic are strictly declared.
understand and teach the standard [4] [5]. They have also Consequently, many errors, caused when a program is
been developing recommendations and solutions to many compiled in different platforms, can be avoided. From
industrial problems such as safety and motion control. basic types, programmers can define derived data types,

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creating enumerations, sub-ranged types, arrays, or data

structures. MAN_SELECTED
MANUAL
POU’s are the key of the program development based AUTO_MODE EN END
on 61131-3. There are three types: Functions (FUN), EN END

Function Blocks (FB) and Programs (PROG). A Function

is defined as a program organization unit in which, when
executed, yields exactly one data element. It does not RESTORING
contain internal memory. The same arguments always EN END
MAN_SELECTED
yield the same output.
A function block can process several outputs. It con-
tains internal state information. Each function block in-
stance has a structure with internal data, the inputs or
Fig. 2. Main program structured by FB’s.
default input values, and output, last output or default
output values.
S3 RESTORING
A Program is a function or a FB with access to the I/O
End_Restoring
variables.
Fig. 1 illustrates function or function blocks elements: S1 AUTO_MODE

interface, internal variables and code.

End_Auto& /Man_Selected
Two advantages of using blocks can be stood out.
Firstly, the interface must be defined exactly and con- S3

sequently the block operation/behavior. The second is re- End_Auto&ManSelected

lated to the programmer’s skills. The code can be written S2 MAN_MODE

using any of the five languages that the standard defines.
Ladder (LD), Functions (FUN) and Sequential Function
Chart (SFC) are graphical languages. Instruction List Fig. 3. SFC structured main program.
(IL) and Structured Text (ST) are textual languages. The
selection of these languages is guessed right because it
allows the programmers with different abilities to program SFC - Sequential function chart is an evolution of IEC
easily. Ladder language is widely used. Seventy percent 648 language. But instead of a program documentation
of the programs in PLC’s are written in it. It is inspired resource, SFC is a set of execution control elements
on relay logic formalism, so it is very popular amongst for POU’s. It is designed to structure sequential and
technicians. Instruction List language is similar to the concurrent algorithms. It can be considered a special case
assembler languages. It is better suited to solve problems of a Petri Net, and it is better suited to describe Discrete
that deal with mathematical algorithms, or to process Event Systems (DES). Many researchers have developed
data intensively. It is very popular amongst program- procedures to program SFCs from DES models [10] [11]
mers accustomed to low level languages like embedded [12] [13] .
systems developers. Structured Text language is similar Function Language is a graphical language in which
to Pascal language. It is attractive to computer science POU’s can be interconnected with in a similar way to an
programmers, and it is better suited to solve math or electronic circuit. It structures the program and manages
algorithmic problems. Despite their importance, SFC and concurrency easily.
FUN languages are not very popular. In the standard, The standard also defines high level elements to de-
both languages are used to structure the main program. In scribe how the program is hosted and executed. The
fact, the main program is defined as a logical assembly elements are Tasks, Resources and Configurations.
of programming languages elements. Figures 2 and 3
A Task defines the execution mode of program or a
illustrate the aspect of a main program structured with
POU. Typically, there are three: cyclic execution, periodic,
both languages
or triggered by an event. In this context an Event is
a change in a variable. If this variable is associated
to a physical I/O the event is called Alarm. A Con-
EN ENO
figuration represents a programmable controller system
INPUTS OUTPUTS
as defined in IEC61131-1. A PLC is a configuration
0 0

0 0
example. Another is a computer running a Soft-PLC.
A soft-PLC is a specialized software able to run IEC
CODE programs. Nowadays, this technology is being applied
1 more and more frequently. A Resource is a real o virtual
1
machine where the programs are executed. Each CPU
STATIC DATA
in a PLC is a resource. A configuration can contain
one or more resources. Global user variables can be
Fig. 1. Function Block elements. defined in the resource or a configuration level, and this
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CONFIGURATION
RESOURCE RESOURCE S1

TASK TASK TASK TASK

S1 S2 S3
PROGRAM PROGRAM PROGRAM PROGRAM

FB FB FB FB S4 S5
S2 S3

GLOBAL AND DIRECTLY INSTANCE-SPECIFIC S4 S5 S6

REPRESENTED VARIABLES IMPLEMENTATIONS

ACCESS PATHS

COMMUNICATION FUNCTION (SEE IEC 1131-5) Fig. 5. Unsafe and impossible SFC’s

EXECUTION CONTROL PATH

OR VARIABLE ACCESS PATHS
FB
CUNTION BLOCK IEC 61131-3 languages have been well studied in sev-
VARIABLE eral papers, and they are known for their inconsistencies.
For example in SFC languages the state evolution can fall
into unsafe states or impossible conditions derived from
Fig. 4. The IEC 61131-3 software model
jumps from simultaneous divergences (fig. 5).
Moreover, dynamic problems like critical races or non-
will be its scope. Special sort of global variables are deterministic execution time have to be avoided for better
Directly Represented Variables and Access paths. Directly reliability, too. Critical races can be present in any lan-
Represented Variables are vendor-defined and represent guage if simultaneous accessing to shared variables or
physical I/O channels. Access Paths are variables that can feedbacks are used in FB’s. In these cases, the result
be accessed by other configurations. can depend on the execution order. Non-deterministic
execution time or infinite loops can be caused by clas-
The standard software model (fig. 4) describes an
sical structuring instructions like WHILE or FOR. In
overall automation structure consisting of several configu-
consequence, language and execution model restrictions
rations connected by a communication bus, with programs
must be stronger in those cases where reliability should
residing in the resources and working in a coordinated
be higher. Safety is one of these cases. Safety can be
way.
defined as the expectation that a system will not cause
anyone bodily harm or risk human life or health. Safety
III. P ROGRAMMING RESTRICTIONS AND FUNCTIONAL
functions in a process or machinery require an extra
SAFETY OF PLC’ S
reliability and availability that can only be achieved with
Reliability and functional safety are always problems special hardware devices, special PLC systems and/or
present in an industrial controller. In fact, IEC 61131 special programming methodology. Safety in machinery
defines hardware and software characteristics to achieve or industrial processes is a very important, sometimes
this goal. Although, programmers’ habits and program- complex problem that can be considered at the design
ming languages are likely sources of failures. Jointly and stage. Safety measures have to be included at the be-
with a clear methodology, to reduce program failures it ginning of the development process, so the process and
is necessary to limit the variability of the languages. Full the safety elements are well integrated. Safety functions
Variability Languages (FVL) like Pascal, Java or C++, can be managed by standalone elements, wiring safety
allow to the programmers great freedom to define the devices or specialized programmable electronic systems
program structure, the data and the program flow, so (PES). Complex safety functions are usually managed by
the failure probability is greater compared to Limited safety PLC’s, using centralized or distributed structures.
Variability Languages (LVL) that are more restricted, and Safety functions must be reliable to guarantee that safety
combine predefined and application specific functions. measures are functional or to maintain a safe state for
The IEC 61131-3 languages are good examples of LVL’s. the equipment under control. This concept is described in
But the standard also includes additional restrictions to the IEC 61508 standard as Functional Safety of a safety
increase reliability, e.g. by fixing the program structure related system. The introduction of this standard is quite
and by limiting the program access to hardware resources important to have a clear idea about how to estimate the
directly. Specifically, this late restrictions means: risks derived from the failure of a PES, and the Safety
Integrity Level (SIL) required to assure the risks are at an
• The I/O channels are updated through Directly Rep-
acceptable level. Furthermore, IEC 61508 offers a set of
resented Variables, e.g. the program never read or
measures or recommendations to enhance SIL in a PES.
write the I/O channels.
For example:
• The programs are not often compiled to a processor
native code program. Instead of that, it is translated • Using applicable programming languages and lan-
to Instruction List or to a pseudo assembler language guage subsets.
that runs in a supervised or interpreted mode. • Using validated software blocks.
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Safety App lication Safety application:

PROG or FB programmed
Safety Safety in basic level
Runt ime &
Inputs
Outputs
AND
FB programmed FB programmed
in system level in extended level

Funct iona l GE

Standa rd App lication Standa rd

FBD, LD
Inputs NOT
Runt ime Outputs Vendor FB library TOF

Any language FBD, LD

Fig. 6. PLCOpen software model for Safety applications User FB library

Validation/ Validation/
certification certification
• Using applicable programming guidelines.
• Using recognized error-reducing measures for the
lifecycle of the safety-related software. Fig. 7. Safety applications programming procedure

More specific standards, derived from IEC 61508 have

been proposed in the process industry (IEC 61511), the SAFEBOOL I/Os has to be certified separately. The
machinery (IEC 62061), nuclear plants (IEC 61513), safe value of a SAFEBOOL must be false. Application
etc. In these standards the IEC 61508 philosophy is engineers must ensure that the safe behavior when set to
integrated with specific safety measures and functions, FALSE. Additional recommendations have been included
specific recommendations and specific failure estimation to process safety functions, such as: the safety application
methods. PLC Open has developed a wide work to include must runs only as a single task, or it must to have higher
the IEC 61508 and IEC 62061 strategies within the IEC priority. A safety functions should not be interrupted by
61131-3 programming languages. The work is organized the functional application program.
into four topics:
• A software model. B. Recommended reductions in the development frame-
work
• A set of recommended reductions in the Develop-
ment framework. The specifics proposed by PLCOpen for the framework
• General rules for Safety-Related Function Blocks.
differentiate between three user levels: Basic, Extended
and System level. In the Basic Level, the program consists
• A library of certified Safety Function Blocks.
of certified interconnected blocks. The Extended Level
A. The software model allows one to create custom blocks, although they have
The software model describes the functional process to be validate/certificated before being used in the basic
application and the safety application in a generic way in level. System Level is provided for suppliers of safety
order to allow that existing and upcoming safety systems controls. The blocks can be programmed in any language,
can be covered (Fig. 6). No safety control hardware so this level is not part of the specification. The figure 7
architecture should be excluded by this specification. Both illustrates these ideas.
applications can be executed on one device or there could IEC 61508 defines a reduction in the preferred pro-
be several devices which are more or less coupled. gramming languages for different SILs. Based on this,
The main objective of PLC Open is to merge the PLOpen has selected in the specification Ladder and
developer environment for the functional part and with Function Block IEC 61131-1 languages for Basic and
an integrated safety part, including reductions in language Extended levels. SFC, Instruction Lists and Structured
programming and functionality for safety section. This Text are more complex to test and validate.
way, safety is integrated with process control functions Data types, functions and function blocks from the IEC
at the beginning of the development stages. Safety I/Os 61131-3 are also reduced. The reduction is stronger in the
and safety signal processing are clearly separate from the basic level.
process I/Os and the functional application. The func- C. Safety related function blocks (SRFB’s): General rules
tional application can read safety inputs, but it can not be and certified library
connected to the safety outputs directly, it only can control
The PLCOpen safety specification defines a generic
the data flow to them. To achieve this separation, a new
SRFB (fig. 8). Specific safety related FB’s should be
data type with the designation SAFEBOOL was defined.
derived from this one. The interface and the behavior of
SAFEBOOL is not a simple new boolean variable. It can
this FB are the following:
include additional information in order to calculate the
• An Activate input to enable the safety function.
SIL with the programming tools. SAFEBOOL represents
a single input or output channel, regardless of the internal • A Reset that can be used for different purposes:

hardware structure: 1oo1 (”1 out of 1”), 1002D, 2oo2 as ”error reset”, restoring the initial state, or as a
or 2oo3. The hardware which executes the FBs with ”manual reset” of a restart interlock by the operator.
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SF_Function A - PROCESS STOPPED F - WORKING

BOOL Activate Ready BOOL
S_Output_1 SAFEBOOL
SAFEBOOL Reset A6 A1 F4
SAFEBOOL S_input_1 S_Output_n SAFEBOOL Restarting Stopped at Disordered
Initial state producing
SAFEBOOL S_input_n Error BOOL A7 A4 test
Stopped at a F2 F3
Stopping in a Starting Finishing
DiagCode WORD non-nitial state non- initial state
procedure procedure
A5 A2 A3
Preparation for Stop F5
START 0 End of Ordered
restarting after a cycle requested F1
Idle faliure Normal Production producing
request test
0000
Ready = FALSE

Activate D2
Diagnosis and D3
TRIGat Reset 0 Production
1 teatment of
with faliures F6
0 Init 1 Errors faliures Operating
8001 Bxxx Test
3
2 D1
0 NOT Activate Emergency Stop
1 1 On error D - DE FECT
0 StateX
8xxx 2 3 S_Inputx value

S_Out = FLASE
Fig. 9. The GEMMA guide.
S_Out = TRUE

0 Idle 1 GEMMA
0000
SCHEDULER
F4_EN
Fig. 8. Interface and behavior of the base SRFB. A6_EN
F4-Manual mode
EN

E128.0 ON
• S Inputs (process specific variables). E128.1 OFF PUMB1 A128.0
PUMB2 A128.1
E128.2
• A Ready output indicates if the FB is activated and /TE

the outputs are valid.

• S Outputs (process specific variables) A6 - Restarting Mode
• Error output indicates that the FB is in an error state. EN

/TE
• The DiagCode is very useful for debugging. It repre- E200.0
PUMB1
PUMB2
A200.0
sents all the states (active, not active and error states). E200.1 Temp
Heater A200.1
Following this model, PLC Open has developed a
library composed of 20 SFRB’s (e.g. emergency stop, safe Fig. 10. GEMMA implementation example.
stop category 1 and 2, mode selector, two hand control,
sequential and parallel muting, etc)
sophisticated synchronization methods than IEC 61131-
IV. T HE LIMITS OF THE IEC 61131-3 PROGRAMMING 3 defines. E.g., in contrast with the Send/Receive func-
MODEL AS AN INTRODUCTION TO IEC 61499 tions or Networked Variables, the IEC 61499 offers Pub-
STANDARD PROGRAMMING lisher/Subscriber and Client/Server services.
In complex controllers, the IEC 611313 model presents On the other hand, along its operational life, a machine
applicability problems derived from overall architecture or a process can be placed in many different operating
model misconceptions, and FB specifications. A con- modes and states. A very popular design reference to
trolled system with a high number of control points (I/O define them is GEMMA (Guide d’Etude des Modes
channel) does not carry to a complex controller necessar- de Marches et d’Arrts) (fig. 9). GEMMA is a general
ily. In this paper, we refer to controller complexity as a schedule that describes the process with up to 16 states.
functional complexity. Two aspects contribute to increase Engineers have to decide which states are present or not.
this functional complexity: Each state is a different automation problem and describes
the process in a specific situation. For example: F1- is the
• Multiple operation modes or running states of the normal production mode. F4 represents a manual mode,
process and the controllers. where some elements can be controlled by an operator’s
• The use of distributed control systems in highly- orders, A6 state signals a set of sequentially ordered
coupled applications. operations for restarting the process, etc.
The IEC 61131-3 describes a centralized, or ”multi- Following the traditional structuring methodology, and
centralized”, architecture, i.e. a control system composed IEC 61131-3 FB’s, each state will be programmed with
by several configurations running different applications a different FB. A scheduler FB will call the right FB
each one, but in a coordinated way. In the opposite, depending on the operating process state. This can be
IEC 61499 proposes applications hosted and running in done by using the EN input of FB’s (Fig 10), or using
several devices. Obviously, Function Blocks running in actions in an SFC main program.
different devices, within a distributed application, have When an FB is deactivated it is not executed and stores
to be strongly coupled, so it is required to have more the process state. When the block is activated again, the
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Ex ecution Co ntrol C hart

INIT INITO
successfully introduced in the industry and there are many
RQ commercial frameworks. Vendor specific implementation
can change, but all the tools have many common elements.
Algorit hms
That is an advantage in PLC programming learning,
jointly with the efforts made by PLCOpen organization to
I nter nal va ria bles extent the standard and make it grow and understandable.
Analyzing the IEC 61131-3 limits, it is possible introduce
new standards and new programming methodology. In
START applications like safety, reliability and availability can
increase limiting the language variability. Programming
INIT & QI
methodology must be integrated with an overall design
INITIALIZE INIT INITO methodology such as it is described in IEC 61508 stan-
dard. Again, in this point, the work realized by PLCOpen
1 1 REQ & PAR AM = 1 is outstanding. IEC 61131-3 is also limited in distributed
MODE1 ALGORITHM1 control systems. In this scope, the new IEC 61499 can
be introduced. But, as we have shown, IEC 61499 is also
REQ & PAR AM = 2
better suited to be applied in centralized control systems,
ALGORITHM2
MODE1 when the process and the controller have many different
operating modes and operative stages.
Fig. 11. IEC 61499 Function Blocks: interface and ECC.
R EFERENCES
[1] International Electrotechnical Commission, “IEC 61131-3. Second
real process state will likely not match with the stored Edition” , IEC publications, 2003.
one, so the FB’s must be restarted. But FB’s in the IEC [2] R. Lewis, “Programming industrial control systems using IEC
61131-3”, IEE Control Engineering Series, 1998.
61131-3 have no special inputs to achieve that. Each [3] F. Bonfatti, “IEC 1131-3 Programming Methodology” , CJ Inter-
vendor defines specific non-standarized inputs to control national, France, 1997.
their execution. In consequence, the programs are not [4] www.plcopen.org
[5] E. van der Wal, “Introduction into IEC 1131-3 and PLCopen” , The
portable and the behavior of FB’s can differ from different Application of IEC 61131 to Industrial Control, IEE Colloquium on.
vendors. The FB’s defined in IEC 61499 standard solve 1999.
both problems. The FB interface makes a clear separation [6] I. Plaza and C. Medrano, “A specific implementation of IEC 61131-
3 software model”, IEEE World Automation Congress, 2004.
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triggered ones, called Events. These inputs control the mantics for Sequential Function Charts”,Integration of Software
functional state of the FB by means of a user defined Specification Techniques for Applications in Engineering, LNCS
3147, 2004, pag 400-418.
Execution Control Chart (Fig. 11). [8] Lewis,R., “Can IEC 61131 graphical languages be used for safety
ECC guarantee the FB behavior, managing the execu- related PLC applications?”,IEE - The Application of IEC 61131 in
tion and restarting of the algorithms written in it. When Industrial Control, 2002.
[9] K. Toon, “ IEC 61131-3 in Safety Applications”IEE - The Appli-
comparing ECC and GEMMA is clear that ECC can cation of IEC 61131 in Industrial Control, 2002.
implement the complete system operation model (e.g. [10] J. Flochova, “ A Petri net based supervisory control implementa-
GEMMA) or, at least the relevant part of it. Nowadays, tion”,Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2003.IEEE Conf., 2003.
[11] G. Music, D. Gradisar, D. Matko, “IEC 61131-3 Compliant
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many elements like ECC’s, can be implemented under Control. Mediterrean Conference on Control and Automation”,
certain restrictions with IEC 61131-3 tools [16] [17] (e.g 2005.
[12] S.Klein, G.Frey; M. Minas, “PLC Programming with Signal In-
using SFC’s). SFC language is an evolution of GRAFCET terpreted Petri Nets”,IEEE - Applications and Theory of Petri Nets
(IEC-848). It is very usual that commercial tools support 2003, ICATPN, 2003.
vendor specific implementations of GRAFCET orders do [13] D. Thapa, S. Dangol, Wang, “Transformation from Petri Nets
Model to Programmable Logic Controller using One-to-One Map-
not include in SFC standard language. E.g. non-structured ping Technique”,Computational Intelligence for Modelling, Control
hierarchy actions like SET, KILL and FREEZE. With and Automation, IEEE - CIMCA, 2005.
these orders, a master SFC can control the execution [14] G. Frey, T. Hussain, “ Modeling techniques for distributed control
systems based on the IEC 61499 standard - current approaches
of another SFCs. SET order activates states, fixing them and open problems”,Discrete Event Systems, 2006 8th International
till the order is deactivated. KILL order deactivates all Workshop on, IEEE Proc., 2006.
the states and actions of an SFC, so it can not keep [15] F. Vyatkin, S. Karras, T. Pfeiffer, “Architecture for automation
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on running. And, FREEZE pause the SFC evolution and formatics, IEEE Conf., 2005.
actions execution till the order will be deactivated. Master [16] L. Ferrarini, M. RomanoC. Veber, “ Automatic Generation of AWL
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Conf., 2006.
slaves like the algorithms. [17] Isagraf Inc.,“IEC 61499 Execution Model”www.isagraf.com.
V. C ONCLUSIONS
IEC 61131-3 is a reference standard for PLC pro-
gramming. It is designed to allow that technicians and
engineers with different skills can work together. It is