Programming Fundamentals A Modular Structured Approach Using C++ 1st Edition by Kenneth Leroy Busbee ISBN 1616100656 9781616100650
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Programming Fundamentals - A Modular
Structured Approach using C++
Online: <http://cnx.org/content/col10621/1.20>
Table of Contents
Preface
Author Acknowledgements
Orientation and Syllabus
Why You should Create a Personal Connexions Account
Creating a Connexions Account
Rating Connexions Modules
1. 1. Introduction to Programming
2. 2. Program Planning & Design
3. 3. Data & Operators
4. 4. Often Used Data Types
5. 5. Integrated Development Environment
6. 6. Program Control Functions
7. 7. Specific Task Functions
8. 8. Standard Libraries
9. 9. Character Data, Sizeof, Typedef, Sequence
10. 10. Introduction to Structured Programming
11. 11. Two Way Selection
12. 12. Multiway Selection
13. 13. Test After Loops
14. 14. Test Before Loops
15. 15. Counting Loops
16. 16. String Class, Unary Positive and Negative
17. 17. Conditional Operator and Recursion
18. 18. Introduction to Arrays
19. 19. File I/O and Array Functions
20. 20. More Array Functions
21. 21. More on Typedef
22. 22. Pointers
23. 23. More Arrays & Compiler Directives
24. 24. OOP & HPC
25. Review Materials
26. Appendix
A. Attributions
Preface
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Author Acknowledgements
I wish to acknowledge the many people who have helped me and have
encouraged me in this project.
2. The hundreds (most likely a thousand plus) students that I have taken
programming courses that I have taught since 1984. The languages
include: COBOL, main frame IBM assembly, Intel assembly, Pascal,
"C" and "C++". They have often suggested that I write my own book
because they thought that I was explaining the subject matter better than
the author of the textbook that we were using. Little did my students
understand that directly or indirectly they aided in the improvement of
the materials from which I taught as well as improving me as a teacher.
4. My wife, Carol, who supports me in all that I do. She has tolerated the
many hours that I have spent in concentration on developing the
modules that comprise this work. Without her support, this work would
not have happened.
Orientation and Syllabus
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Table 1.
Group Title Chapters Modules
Pre-Chapter Items N/A 6
Foundation Topics 1-5 27
Modular Programming 6-9 17
Structured Programming 10-16 30
Intermediate Topics 17-21 17
Advanced Topics 22-24 11
Review Materials N/A 5
Appendix N/A 7
Total Modules N/A 120
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Learning Objectives
1. Starting Out with C++ Early Objects, by: Tony Gaddis et. al., 6th
Edition, ISBN: 0-321-51238-3
2. Starting Out with C++ Early Objects, by: Tony Gaddis et. al., 5th
Edition, ISBN: 0-321-38348-6
3. Computer Science – A structured Approach using C++, by: Behrouz A.
Forouzan et. al., 2nd Edition, ISBN: 0-534-37480-8
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Table 2.
Check Description # Modules
Pre-Chapter Items 6
Last four Appendix Items 4
Chapters 1 to 5 27
Review Materials for 1 to 5 1
Chapters 6 to 9 17
Review Materials for 6 to 9 1
Chapters 10 to 16 30
Review Materials for 10 to 16 1
Chapters 17 to 21 17
Review Materials for 17 to 21 1
Chapters 22 to 24 11
Review Materials for 22 to 24 1
First three Appendix Items 3
N/A Total Modules 120
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ORIGIN OF NERVE-FORCE.
56. After this brief account of Neurility we may pass to the
consideration of its origin. Are we to understand that this property
belongs to the nerves themselves in the sense in which Contractility
belongs to the muscles? or are we to accept the teaching which
assigns the origin of “nerve-force” to the ganglia, and regards the
nerves simply as passive conductors of a force developed in the
cells?
57. It is now many years since I ventured to criticise the reigning
doctrine, and to urge the necessity Of consistently carrying out the
distinction between Property and Function. I called attention to the
positive evidence which contradicted the idea of passive conduction;
and pointed out the illusory nature of the favorite analogy, in which
ganglia were likened to batteries, and nerves to the conducting
wires. But the old image still exerts its empire; and writers are still
found speaking of the brain as a telegraphic bureau, the ganglia as
stations, and the nerves as wires. In the cells of the gray substance
they place a constantly renewing reservoir of nerve-force. There the
force is elaborated, stored up, and from thence directed along the
nerves. The sensory nerve “transmits an impression to the brain”—
as the wire transmits a message to the bureau. The motor nerve, in
turn, “transmits the mandates of the will”—and all is clear! Clear,
until we come to translate metaphors into visible facts, or try to
conjure up some mental image of the process. For myself, I can only
conceive nerve-force as the activity of the nerve, and not of
something else. This becomes still more evident when I find that the
activity is equally manifest after its imaginary source has been
removed. Transmitting impressions, or messages, implies as a
preliminary that there should be an impressible agent, or a message-
sender, at the periphery. No one supposes that simply touching one
end of a wire would send an “impression” or a “message” to the
battery; or that without the battery this touch would evolve a
current. The battery is indispensable; in it is evolved the current
which the wire transmits. Not so the ganglion, or brain. Remove the
wire from its connection with the battery, and it is a bit of wire,
nothing more. But remove a nerve from its connection with a
ganglion, and it is still active as nerve, still displays its Neurility when
excited, still moves the muscle as before. The amputated limb will
move when its nerves are stimulated, just as when a reflex from its
centre moved it. Every one knew the fact; it was staring them in the
face, yet they disregarded it. Even the old anatomist, Willis, had
recorded experiments which ought to have opened their eyes. He
tied the phrenic nerve, and found that, when he irritated it below the
ligature, the diaphragm moved; but when he irritated it above the
ligature, no movement followed. Since his days, thousands of
experiments have shown that the presence of a ganglion is not
100
necessary to the action of a nerve.
58. Of course an explanation was ready. The nerve was said to
have been “endowed with force” from its ganglion during their vital
connection; and this force, stored up in the nerve, was disposable
for some time after separation from the ganglion. We need not
pause to criticise this misty conception of one part “endowing”
another with force; the plain facts afford the best answer. There
seemed, indeed, a confirmation of the hypothesis in the fact that
although the nerve separated from its ganglion was capable of
excitation, yet after a few excitations it was exhausted, and ceased
to stimulate the muscle. It seemed like the piece of magnetized iron
which would act as a temporary magnet, though quickly losing this
borrowed power. But the whole fabric fell—or ought to have fallen—
when extended observation discovered that this exhausted nerve
would, if left in repose, recover its lost power. A nerve preserves its
excitability as long as it preserves its structural integrity, and
recovers its power in recovering that integrity. The length of time
101
varies. Gratiolet found the muscles in the leg of a tortoise, which
had been amputated a week before, contract when the nerves were
irritated; and Schiff found the divided nerve of a winter frog
excitable at the end of three weeks. Even after all excitability has
disappeared, it will reappear if arterial blood be injected; just as
muscles which have already begun to assume cadaveric rigidity
recover their contractility after transfusion. Nor is this all. The
separated nerve finally degenerates, and loses all its structural
characters and physiological properties; yet under favorable
conditions it will regenerate—recover its structures and properties;
and this even apart from a centre, as Vulpian showed. Very
noticeable is the fact that the force said to be produced in the
centre, and only “conveyed” by the nerve, vanishes gradually from
the centre to the periphery, and recovers from the periphery to the
centre—the part of the nerve which is farthest from the centre being
excitable when the part nearest the centre is still inexcitable. Again,
when a nerve is pinched, contraction in the muscle follows; but the
pinch has for a time so disturbed the structural integrity of the nerve
(at that spot) that no irritant applied to the spot, or between it and
the centre, will be followed by contraction, whereas below the spot
an irritation takes effect. This is another form of the experiment of
Willis. Even in its normal state, the nerve has different degrees of
excitability in different parts of its course,—a fact discovered by
Pflüger which is quite irreconcilable with the hypothesis of passive
102
conduction. Doubts have been thrown on Pflüger’s interpretation,
namely, that there is an avalanche-like accumulation of energy
proportionate to the length of the stimulated portion; but the fact
remains, that one and the same irritant applied successively to two
different points of a nerve does not irritate the muscle in the same
degree. Munk also finds the velocity of transmission in a motor nerve
103
increases as it approaches its termination in the muscle.
59. Nothing can be more unlike the conduction of an electric
current than this excitation of Neurility; nothing more accordant with
the idea of it as a vital property of the tissue. The notion of its being
derived from a centre is on a par with the notion first successfully
104
combated by Haller, that the muscle derived its Contractility from
the nerves; or the analogous notion that the electric organ in fishes
derived its property from the brain. Indeed, it was in support of the
hypothesis that the brain was a battery, and nerves the conductors,
that the phenomena observed in electrical fishes were frequently
cited. The electric organ was seen to be connected with the brain;
its discharges were under the control of the animal, and were
destroyed on one side when the brain on the corresponding side was
destroyed. But Charles Robin long ago suggested, what indeed
ought never to have been doubted, that the brain was not the
source of the electricity; but that the tissue of the electric organ
itself had this special property, which the nerve merely called into
activity. The suggestion has been experimentally verified by M.
Moreau, who divided all the nerves supplying the electric organ on
one side, and, having thus cut off all communication with the brain,
produced electrical discharges by irritating the nerves; precisely as
the muscles are made to contract when the divided nerves are
irritated. Had the experiment ceased here, it might have been
interpreted on the old hypothesis: the electric organ might be
supposed to have a certain amount of electric force condensed in it,
stored up there, as it is said to be in the nerves, and discharged
when the organ is irritated. But experiment has decided this point
also. Electric fishes notoriously exhaust their power by a few
discharges, and recover it after repose. When M. Moreau had
exhausted his mutilated fishes, he replaced them in the water, and
allowed them repose. On again irritating the divided nerves, the
105
discharges were again produced.
60. On all sides the idea of nerves deriving their power from
another source than their own substance is seen to be untenable. A
priori this might have been concluded. Neurility is the vital property
of nerve-tissue. “Nerve-force” is nerve-action—molecular changes in
the nerve itself, not in some remote substance. That nerve and
centre are vitally connected is true; and what their physiological
relations are will hereafter be examined; but we must dismiss the
idea of nerves having the relation to centres that electrodes have to
batteries.
61. In proposing the term Neurility, I not only wished to get rid of
the ambiguities which hovered round “nerve-force” and “nerve-
current,” but to recall the physiological principle that properties are
dependent on structures; and therefore that the special property of
nerve-tissue is conditioned by its structure. Neurility is, of course, an
abstraction; but so is the nerve an abstraction. The concrete
manifestations are the several nerve-actions. These we classify and
specify. One class we call sensory, another class motor; not because
the nerve-action itself is different, but because it is in each class in a
different functional relation to other parts. In classing men as
governors and governed, employers and employed, we do not
suppose anthropological distinctions, but only differences in their
social functions.
62. This is the modification of the Law of Bell to which reference
was made in § 26. It replaces the idea of two different kinds of
nerve, sensory and motor, by that of two different anatomical
connections. I need not reproduce here the argument with which I
formerly criticised the supposed distinction between sensory and
motor nerves; because the old idea is rapidly falling into discredit,
and physiologists so eminent as Vulpian and Wundt have explicitly
announced their adhesion to the principle of identity,—a principle
which, as Vulpian truly remarks, dominates the whole physiology of
106
the nervous system.
SENSIBILITY.
68. The principles laid down in the preceding chapter are equally
applicable to the central system. But here greater difficulties await
us. We cannot expect traditional views to be easily displaced, when
they have taken such hold on the mind, as is the case with regard to
Sensibility. To admit that all nerves have a common property, and
that their functional relations depend on the organs which they
innervate, demands small relinquishment of cherished opinions. But
to admit that all nerve-centres have a common property, and that
their functional relations depend on their anatomical connections, is
to sweep away at once a mass of theoretic interpretations which
from long familiarity have acquired an almost axiomatic force. That
the brain, and the brain only, is the source and seat of Sensibility is
the postulate of modern Physiology.
69. The question is one of extreme complexity, but may be
greatly simplified, if we can manage to reduce it to purely
physiological terms, and consider the phenomena in their objective
aspect. In dealing with nerves and their actions this was
comparatively easy; we had for the most part only physiological
processes to unravel. It is otherwise in dealing with nerve-centres—
the subjective or psychological aspect of the phenomena inevitably
thrusts itself on our attention; and all the mysteries of Feeling and
Thought cloud our vision of the neural process. Do what we will, we
cannot altogether divest Sensibility of its psychological connotations,
cannot help interpreting it in terms of Consciousness; so that even
when treating of sensitive phenomena observed in molluscs and
insects, we always imagine these more or less suffused with Feeling,
as this is known in our own conscious states.
70. Feeling is recognized as in some way or other bound up with
neural processes; but Physiology proper has only to concern itself
with the processes; and the question whether these can, and do, go
on unaccompanied by Feeling, is, strictly speaking, one which
belongs to Psychology. It demands as a preliminary that the term
Feeling be defined; and the answer will depend upon that definition,
namely, whether Feeling be interpreted as synonymous with
Consciousness in the restricted sense, or synonymous with the more
general term Sentience. If the former, then since there are
unquestionably neural processes of which we are not conscious, we
must specify the particular groups which subserve Feeling; as we
specify the particular groups which subserve the sensations of Sight,
Hearing, Taste, etc.; and localize the separate functions in separate
organs. If the latter, then, since all neural processes have a common
character, we have only to localize the particular variations of its
manifestation, and distinguish sensitive phenomena as we
distinguish motor phenomena.
71. It is absolutely certain that the Feeling we attribute to a
mollusc is different from that which we attribute to a man; if only
because the organisms of the two are so widely different, and have
been under such different conditions of excitation. If every feeling is
the functional result of special organic activities, varying with the co-
operant elements, we can have no more warrant for assuming the
existence of the same particular forms of Feeling in organisms that
are unlike, than for assuming the 47th proposition of Euclid to be
presented by any three straight lines. The lines are the necessary
basis for the construction, but they are not the triangle, except when
in a special configuration. This is not denying that animals feel (in
the general sense of that term), it is only asserting that their feelings
must be very unlike our own. Even in our own race we see marked
differences—some modes of feeling being absolutely denied to
individuals only slightly differing from their fellows. If, however, we
admit that different animals must have different modes of Feeling,
we must also admit that the neuro-muscular activities are generically
alike in all, because of the fundamental similarity in the structures.
Whether we shall assign Feeling to the mollusc or not will depend on
the meaning of the term; but, at all events, we require some term
general enough to include the phenomena manifested by the
mollusc, and those manifested by all other animals. Sensibility is the
least objectionable term. Unless we adopt some such general
designation, physiological and psychological interpretations become
contradictory and obscure. The current doctrine which assigns
Sensibility to the brain, denying it to all other centres, is seriously
defective, inasmuch as it implies that tissues similar in kind have
utterly diverse properties; in other words, that the same nerve-tissue
which manifests Sensibility in the brain has no such property in the
spinal cord.
72. How is this tenable? No one acquainted at first hand with the
facts denies that the objective phenomena exhibited by the brainless
animal have the same general character as those of the animal
possessing a brain: the actions of the two are identical in all cases
which admit of comparison. That is to say, the objective appearances
are the same; differing only in so far as the mechanisms are made
different by the presence or absence of certain parts. The brain not
being a necessary part of the mechanical adjustments in swimming,
or pushing aside an irritating object, the brainless frog swims and
defends itself in the same way as the normal frog. But no sooner do
we pass from the objective interpretation, and introduce the
subjective element of Feeling among the series of factors necessary
to the product—no sooner do we ask whether the brainless frog
feels the irritation against which it struggles, or wills the movements
by which it swims—than the question has shifted its ground, and has
passed from Physiology to Psychology. The appeal is no longer made
to Observation, but to Interpretation. Observation tells us here
nothing directly of Feeling. What it does tell us, however, is the
identity of the objective phenomena; and Physiology demands that a
common term be employed to designate the character common to
the varied phenomena. Sensibility is such a term. But most modern
physiologists, under the bias of tradition, refuse to extend Sensibility
to the spinal cord, in spite of the evidences of the spinal cord
possessing that property in common with the brain. They prefer to
invoke a new property; they assign spinal action to a Reflex
Mechanism which has nothing of the character of Sensibility,
because they have identified Sensibility with Consciousness, and
have restricted Consciousness to a special group of sensitive
phenomena.
73. Nor is it to be denied that on this ground they have a firm
basis. Every one could testify to the fact that many processes
normally go on without being accompanied by consciousness, in the
special meaning of the term. Reflex actions,—such as winking,
breathing, swallowing,—notoriously produced by stimulation of
sensitive surfaces, take place without our “feeling” them, or being
“conscious” of them. Hence it is concluded that the Reflex
mechanism suffices without the intervention of Sensibility. I
altogether dispute the conclusion; and in a future Problem will
endeavor to show that Sensibility is necessary to Reflex Action. But
without awaiting that exposition we may at once confront the
evidence, by adducing the familiar fact that “unconscious” processes
go on in the brain as well as in the spinal cord; and this not simply in
110
the sphere of Volition, but also in the sphere of Thought. We act
and think “automatically” at times, and are quite “unconscious” of
what we are doing, or of the data we are logically grouping. We
often think as unconsciously as we breathe; although from time to
time we become conscious of both processes. Yet who will assert
that these unconscious processes were independent of Sensibility?
Who will maintain that because cerebral processes are sometimes
unaccompanied by that peculiar state named Consciousness,
therefore all its processes are unaccompanied by Feeling? And if
here we admit that the Reflex mechanism in the brain is a sensitive
mechanism, surely we must equally admit that the similar Reflex
mechanism in the spinal cord is sensitive?
74. Let it be understood that Sensibility is the common property
of nerve-centres, and physiological interpretations will become clear
and consistent. Consciousness, as understood by psychologists, is
not a property of tissue, it is a function of the organism, dependent
indeed on Sensibility, but not convertible with it. There is a greater
distinction between the two than between Sensation, the reaction of
a sensory organ, and Perception, the combined result of sensory and
cerebral reactions; or than that between Contractility, the property of
the muscles, and Flying, the function of a particular group of
muscles. It is not possible to have Consciousness without Sensibility;
but perfectly possible to have Sensations without Consciousness.
This will perhaps seem as inconceivable to the reader as it seemed
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to Schröder van der Kolk.
75. Let us illustrate it by the analogy of Pain. There is a vast
amount of sensation normally excited which is totally
unaccompanied by the feelings classed as painful. The action of the
special senses may be exaggerated to an intolerable degree, but the
exaggeration never passes into pain: the retina may be blinded with
excess of light, and the ear stunned with sound—the optic nerve
may be pricked or cut—but no pain results. The systemic sensations
also are habitually painless, though they pass into pain in abnormal
states. Clearly, then, Pain is not the necessary consequence of
Sensibility; and this is true not only of certain sensitive parts, but of
all; as is proved in the well-known facts of Analgesia, in which
complete insensibility of the skin as regards Pain co-exists with vivid
sensibility as regards Touch and Temperature. Hence the majority of
physiologists refuse to acknowledge that the struggles and cries of
an animal, after removal of the brain, are evidences of pain;
maintaining that they are “simply reflex actions.” This is probable;
the more so as we know the struggles and cries which tickling will
produce, yet no pain accompanies tickling. But if the struggles and
cries are not evidence of pain, they are surely evidence of Sensibility.
76. Now for the term Pain in the foregoing paragraph substitute
the term Consciousness, and you will perhaps allow that while it may
be justifiable to interpret the actions of a brainless animal as due to
a mechanism which is unaccompanied by the specially conditioned
forms of Sensibility classed under Consciousness—just as it is
unaccompanied by the specially conditioned forms of Perception and
Emotion—there is no justification for assuming the mechanism not to
have been a sensitive mechanism. The wingless bird cannot manifest
any Of the phenomena of flight; but we do not therefore deny that
its other movements depend on Contractility.
77. Difficult as it must be to keep the physiological question apart
from the psychological when treating of Sensibility, we shall never
succeed in our analysis unless the two questions are separately
treated. The physiologist considers organisms and their actions from
their objective side, and tries to detect the mechanism of the
observed phenomena. These he has to interpret in terms of Matter
and Motion. The psychologist interprets them in terms of Feeling.
The actions which we see in others we cannot feel, except as visual
sensations; the changes which we feel in ourselves we cannot see in
others, except as bodily movements. The reaction of a sensory
organ is by the physiologist called a sensation,—borrowing the term
from the psychologist; he explains it as due to the stimulus which
changes the molecular condition of the organ; and this changed
condition, besides being seen to be followed by a muscular
movement, is inferred to be accompanied by a change of Feeling.
The psychologist has direct knowledge only of the change of Feeling
which follows on some other change; he infers that it is originated
by the action of some external cause, and infers that a neural
process precedes, or accompanies, the feeling. Obviously there are
two distinct questions here, involving distinct methods. The
physiologist is compelled to complete his objective observations by
subjective suggestions; compelled to add Feeling to the terms of
Matter and Motion, in spite of the radical diversity of their aspects.
The psychologist also is compelled to complete his subjective
observations by objective interpretations, linking the internal
changes to the external changes. A complete theory must harmonize
the two procedures.
78. In a subsequent Problem we shall have to examine the nature
of Sensation in its psychological aspect; here we have first to
describe its physiological aspect. To the psychologist, a sensation is
simply a fact of Consciousness; he has nothing whatever to do with
the neural process, which the physiologist considers to be the
physical basis of this fact; and he therefore regards the physiologists
as talking nonsense when they talk of “unconscious sensations,” the
phrase being to him equivalent to “unfelt feelings,” or “invisible
light.” It is quite otherwise with the physiologist, who viewing a
sensation solely as a neural process, the reaction of a sensory organ,
can lawfully speak of unconscious sensations, as the physicist can
speak of invisible rays of light,—meaning those rays which are of a
different order of undulation from the visible rays, and which may
become visible when the susceptibility of the retina is exalted. He
knows that there are different modes, and different complexities of
neural process; to one class he assigns consciousness, to the other
unconsciousness. If he would be severely precise, he would never
speak of sensation at all, but only of sensory reaction. But such
precision would be pedantic and idle. He wants the connotations of
the term sensation, and therefore uses it.
79. The functional activity of a gland is stimulated by a neural
process reflected from a centre; by a similar process a muscle is
called into action. No one supposes that the neural process is, in the
one case secretory, in the other motory: in both it is the same
process in the nerve; and our investigation of it would be greatly
hampered if we did not disengage it from all the suggestions
hovering around the ideas of secretion and muscular action. In like
manner we must disengage the neural process of a sensory reaction
from all the suggestions hovering around the idea of Consciousness,
when that term designates a complex of many reactions. In Problem
III. we shall enter more particularly into the distinction between
Sensibility and Consciousness; for the present it must suffice to say
that great ambiguity exists in the current usage of these terms.
Sometimes Consciousness stands as the equivalent of Sensibility;
sometimes as a particular mode of Sensibility known as Reflection,
Attention, and Thought. The former meaning is an extension of the
term similar to that given to the word Rose, which originally
meaning Red came to be restricted to a particular red flower; and
after other flowers of the same kind were discovered which had
yellow and white petals, instead of red, the term rose still adhered
even to these. “Yellow Rose” is therefore as great a verbal solecism
as unconscious sensation. We have separated the redness from the
rose, and can then say that the color is one thing, the flower
another. By a similar process of abstraction we separate
Consciousness from Sensation, and we can then say that there are
sensations without consciousness. In consequence of this,
psychologists often maintain that to have a sensation and be
conscious of it are two different states. We are said to hear a sound,
and yet not to be conscious of hearing it. The sound excites a
movement, but it does not excite our consciousness. Now although it
is true that there are roses which are not red, it is not true that
there are roses which have no color at all. Although it is true that
there are sensations which are not of the particular mode of
Sensibility which psychologists specially designate as Consciousness,
it is not true that there are sensations which are not modes of
Sensibility.
80. And what is Sensibility which, on its subjective side, is
Sentience? In one sense it may be answered that we do not know.
In another sense it is that which we know most clearly and
positively: Sentience forms the substance of all knowledge. Being
the ultimate of knowledge, every effort must be vain which attempts
to explain it by reduction to simpler elements. The human mind,
impatient of ultimates, is always striving to pierce beyond the
fundamental mysteries; and this impatience leads to the attempts so
often made to explain Sensibility by reducing it to terms of Matter
and Motion. But inasmuch as a clear analysis of Matter and Motion
displays that our knowledge of these is simply a knowledge of
modes of Feeling, the reduction of Sentience or Sensibility to Matter
and Motion is simply the reduction of Sensibility to some of its
modes. This point gained, a clear conception of the advantages of
introducing the ideas of Matter and Motion will result. It will then be
the familiar and indispensable method of explaining the little known
by the better known. The objective aspect of things is commonly
represented in the visible and palpable; because what we can see
we can also generally touch, and what we can touch we can taste
and smell; but we cannot touch an odor nor a sound; we cannot see
them; we can only connect the odorous and sonorous objects with
visible or palpable conditions. Everywhere we find sensations
referred to visible or palpable causes; and hence the desire to find
this objective basis for every change in Sensibility. The sensation, or
state of consciousness, is the ultimate fact; we can only explain it by
describing its objective conditions.
81. Thus much on the philosophical side. Returning to our
physiological point, we must say that a sensation is, objectively, the
reaction of a sensory organ, or organism; subjectively, a change of
feeling. Objectively it is a phenomenon of movement, but
distinguishable from other phenomena by the speciality of its
conditions. It is a vital phenomenon, not a purely mechanical
phenomenon. Although the molecular movement conforms, of
course, to mechanical principles, and may be viewed abstractly as a
purely mechanical result, yet, because it takes place under
conditions never found in machines, it has characters which
markedly separate it from the movements of machines. Among
these differential characters may be cited that of selective
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adaptation, which is most conspicuous in volition.
82. In the early stages of animal evolution there is no
differentiation into muscle and nerve. The whole organism is equally
sensitive (or irritable) in every part. Muscles appear, and then they
are the most sensitive parts. Nerves appear, and the seat of
Sensibility has been transferred to them; not that the muscles have
lost theirs, but their irritability is now represented by their dominant
character of Contractility, and the nerves have taken on the special
office of Sensibility. That is to say, while both muscle and nerve form
integral elements of the sensitive reaction, the process itself is
analytically conceived as a combination of two distinct properties,
resident in two distinct tissues.
83. Carrying further this analytical artifice, I propose to
distinguish the central organs as the seat of Sensibility, confining
Neurility to the peripheral nerves. In physiological reality both
systems, central and peripheral, are one; the separation is artificial.
Strictly speaking, therefore, Neurility—or nerve-action—is the
general property of nerve-tissue, central and peripheral. But since
Neurility may be manifested by nerves apart from centres, whereas
Sensibility demands the co-operation of both, and since we have
often to consider the central process in itself, without attending to
the process in the nerves, it is well to have two characteristic terms.
I shall therefore always use the term Sensibility for the reactions of
the nervous centres,—Sentience being its psychological equivalent;
although the reader will understand that in point of fact there is no
break, nor transformation, as the wave of change passes from
sensory nerve to centre, and from centre to motor nerve: there is
one continuous process of change. But just as we analytically
distinguish the sensory from the motor element of this indissoluble
process, so we may distinguish the ingoing and outgoing stages
from the combining stage. Sensibility, then, represents the property
of combining and grouping stimulations.
84. Fully aware of the misleading connotations of the term, and of
the difficulty which will be felt in disengaging it from these,
especially in reference to Consciousness, I have long hesitated
before adopting it. But the advantages greatly outweigh the
disadvantages. Sensibility has long been admitted to express the
peculiar modes of reaction in plants and animals low down in the
scale. No one hesitates to speak of a sensitive plant, or a sensitive
surface. The tentacles of a polype are said to be sensitive; though
probably no one thereby means that the polype has what
psychologists mean by Consciousness. By employing the general
term Sensibility to designate the whole range of reactions peculiar to
the nerve-centres, when these special organs exist, it will be
possible to interpret all the physiological and psychological
phenomena observed in animals and men on one uniform method.
The observed variations will then be referable to varieties in
organisms.
85. Suppose, for illustration, an organism like the human except
that it is wholly deficient in Sight, Hearing, Taste, and Smell. It has
no sense but Touch—or the general reaction under contact with
external objects. It will move on being stimulated, and will combine
its movements differently under different stimulations. It will feel,
and logically combine its feelings. But its mass of feeling will be
made of far simpler elements than ours; its combinations fewer; and
the contents of its Consciousness so very different from ours that we
are unable to conceive what it will be like; we can only be sure that
it will not be very like our own. This truncated Organism will have its
Sensibility; and we must assign this property to its central nerve-
tissue, as we assign our own. If now we descend lower, and suppose
an organism with no centres whatever, but which nevertheless
displays evidence of Sensibility—feelings and combinations of
movements—we must then conclude that the property specialized in
a particular tissue of the highly differentiated organism is here
diffused throughout.
It is obvious that the sensations or feelings of these supposed
organisms will have a common character with the feelings of more
highly differentiated organisms, although the modes of manifestation
are so various. If we recognize a common character in muscular
movements so various as the rhythmic pulsation of the heart, the
larger rhythm of inspiration and expiration, the restless movements
of the eye and tongue, the complexities of manipulation, the
consensus of movements in flying, swimming, walking, speaking,
singing, etc., so may we recognize a common character in all the
varieties of sensation. The special character of a movement depends
on the moving organ. The special character of a sensation depends
on the sensory organ. Contractility is the abstract term which
expresses all possible varieties of contraction. Sensibility—or
Sentience—is the abstract term which expresses all possible varieties
of sensation.
86. The view here propounded may find a more ready acceptance
when its application to all physiological questions has been tested,
and it is seen to give coherence to many scattered and hitherto
irreconcilable facts. Meanwhile let a glance be taken at the
inconsistencies of the current doctrine. That doctrine declares one
half of the gray substance of the spinal cord to be capable only of
receiving a sensitive stimulation, the other half capable only of
originating a motor stimulation. We might with equal propriety
declare that one half of a muscle is capable only of receiving a
contractile stimulation, and the other half of contracting. The ingoing
nerve, passing from the surface to the posterior part of the spinal
cord, excites the activity of the gray substance into which it
penetrates; with the anterior part of this gray substance an outgoing
nerve is connected, and through it the excitation is propagated to a
muscle: contraction results. Such are the facts. In our analysis we
separate the sensory from the motor aspect, and we then imagine
that this ideal distinction represents a real separation. We suppose a
phenomenon of Sensibility independent of a phenomenon of
Contractility—suppose the one to be “transformed” into the other—
and we then marvel “how during this passage the excitation changes
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its nature.”
87. Before exerting ingenuity in explaining a fact, it is always well
to make sure that the fact itself is correctly stated. Does the neural
excitation change its nature in passing from the posterior to the
anterior gray substance? I can see no evidence of it. Indeed the
statement seems to confound a neural process with a muscular
process. The neural process is one continuous excitation along the
whole line of ingoing nerve, centre, and outgoing nerve, which
nowhere ceases or changes into another process, until the excitation
of the muscle introduces a new factor. So long as the excitation
keeps within the nerve-tissue, it is one and the same process of
change; its issue in a contraction, a secretion, or a change in the
conditions of consciousness, depends on the organs it stimulates.
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