Kelman: One Country / Two States

A One-Country / Two-State Solution

To the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Herbert C. Kelman

Dr. Kelman is the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics,

emeritus, at Harvard University. This article is based on a lecture
presented at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, on November
30, 2010. A previous version, “Negotiating a Historic Compromise:
New Opportunities in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” appeared
in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Perspectives on the Peace
Process, M. Salinas & H. Abu Rabi, Eds. (Cambria Press, 2009).

T
he Israeli-Palestinian peace to accepting the conditions required for
process has been stymied since a viable Palestinian state. Apart from his
the failure of the Camp David own ideological reluctance to move in that
summit in 2000, followed by the direction, the survival of his coalition de-
onset of the second intifada. The current, pends on right-wing and religious parties,
off-again/on-again, process of negotiation which limit his freedom of movement.
is not very encouraging. There are serious President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
questions whether the leadership on either Mazen), on his part, is quite clearly eager
side has the capacity to make the conces- to negotiate a two-state solution and
sions required for a final-status agreement. prepared to make many of the concessions
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that it would require — for example, on
by now seems to recognize the necessity the refugee issue, if it is carefully framed
of a two-state solution, as proclaimed in — although he does have some limits on
his Bar-Ilan speech on June 14, 2009, but such issues as the size of the Palestinian
it is not clear whether his conception of the state and sovereignty over East Jerusalem.
future Palestinian state meets the minimum He has not, however, made clear commit-
conditions of his Palestinian interlocutors ments about what he is prepared to accept,
— for example, on issues of Jerusalem, and he has been reluctant to enter into
borders and settlements. Recall that in unconditional negotiations because of his
the 1990s, he was proposing Palestinian political limitations. He does not, person-
autonomy over enclaves in the West Bank ally, have a strong political base, and he is
and added: “If the Palestinians want to call not in control of Gaza (even though a large
it a state, let them call it a state.” Today, he proportion of the Gaza budget is provided
himself seems prepared to call it a state. by the Palestinian Authority). President
But it is not clear how much closer he is Obama’s original call for a cessation of all
© 2011, The Author Journal Compilation © 2011, Middle East Policy Council

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011

Israeli settlement activity as a condition settlement project and sharing Jerusalem.

for negotiation (from which he has since But opposition to a one-state formula
pulled back) has made it hard for Abu within Israel would be much stronger and
Mazen to enter into negotiations without a virtually unanimous, since it would mean
settlement freeze. abandonment of the essence of the Zion-
ist project, which is the establishment of
NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY a Jewish-majority state. The preservation
Despite the weakness of the leader- of Israel as a Jewish-majority state is an
ships and the faltering negotiation pro- existential concern for an overwhelming
cess, I believe that a negotiated two-state majority of Israeli Jews. I might add here
solution is still possible and that we cannot that the majority of Palestinians in the
give up the effort to achieve it. My starting West Bank and Gaza prefer a solution that
point is the lack of an acceptable alterna- would allow them to establish an indepen-
tive. The failure so far to reach a negoti- dent state in the West Bank and Gaza, in
ated agreement, along with the changing which they can exercise their right to na-
realities on the ground — the growth of tional self-determination and give expres-
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the sion to their national identity.
building of separate roads, the confiscation Attractive though a one-state solu-
of land, the construction of the security tion may be (and I write as someone who
barrier, the proliferation of checkpoints, favored a binational state in the 1940s,
the development of Jewish housing in before the establishment of Israel), pursuit
East Jerusalem — have led increasing of that option at this historical juncture is
numbers of Palestinians to the conclusion a formula for continuing and escalating
that a two-state solution is no longer pos- the conflict, with predictably destructive
sible. They propose, instead, to work for a consequences for both sides. The choice,
one-state solution, whether in the form of in my view, is between a two-state solution
a unitary state (based on the principle of and a one-state non-solution. I therefore
one-person/one-vote) or a binational state. see no alternative to the vigorous pursuit
The calls for a one-state solution come pri- of a two-state solution.
marily from the Palestinian diaspora, not Despite the setbacks and frustra-
from the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, tions of the last few years and the limited
some of the people who now argue that a progress in the negotiating process, and
two-state solution has become impossible despite the realities on the ground that are
have never accepted a two-state solution creating obstacles to the establishment
in the first place or have accepted it only of a Palestinian state, I believe there is
reluctantly. room for what I call strategic optimism:
There is no question that Israeli facts an optimism that is anchored in a realistic
on the ground have made the establishment assessment of the situation, but actively
of a viable Palestinian state increasingly seeks out all the possibilities for movement
difficult; to a certain extent, they were toward peace and vigorously pursues them.
indeed designed to do so. The settlement A major source of my optimism, or
process has created increasing opposition sense of possibility if you will, is aware-
within Israeli society to a two-state solu- ness of how much has changed in the past
tion that would require abandoning the 40 years. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is,

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 Kelman: One Country / Two States

indeed, a very longstanding and intractable brought major changes in the global and
conflict, and there is good reason to feel regional environment (including the end
discouraged by the obstacles to a peaceful of the Cold War, the aftermath of the first
resolution that arise whenever there seems Gulf War, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty,
to be a sign of progress. It is important to and the first intifada), to persuade Israeli
remember, however, that in the 1970s, the and Palestinian leaders of the necessity of
idea of negotiations between the Israeli negotiating a compromise.2 The growing
government and the PLO toward establish- number of unofficial interactions over the
ment of a course of
Palestinian Even elements of the Israeli right are these years
state in the now resigned to the establishment helped to per-
occupied suade them of
territories
of a Palestinian state, although their the possibil-
was barely on conception of the nature of that state is ity of doing
the horizon. not acceptable to Palestinians. so.3 These
Even within developments
the Israeli peace movement, only a minor- culminated in the Oslo accord of 1993,
ity endorsed this idea. On the Palestin- “which I still regard as a major break-
ian side, acceptance of a state alongside through in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Israel in 22 percent of mandatory Palestine despite its inherent flaws and despite the
was unthinkable — as reflected in a 1978 failure of the Camp David talks in the
article in Foreign Affairs by Walid Khalidi, summer of 2000, the onset of the second
embracing this formula, which was entitled intifada later that year, and the breakdown
“Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign in the ‘Oslo process’ in 2001.”4 The major
Palestinian State.” breakthrough of the Oslo accord was the
Today, the two-state solution is widely mutual recognition between the PLO and
accepted among Israelis and Palestin- the State of Israel, in effect acknowledg-
ians and around the world. Even elements ing each other’s political legitimacy, which
of the Israeli right are now resigned to still stands despite the breakdown of the
the establishment of a Palestinian state, Oslo process itself.
although their conception of the nature of I have written elsewhere5 about the
that state is not acceptable to Palestinians. ups and downs of the Oslo process, which
On the Palestinian side, even elements of ultimately led to its collapse with the
the Hamas leadership have hinted that they failure of the Camp David summit and
would go along with a two-state solution if the onset of the second intifada in 2000.
negotiated by Fatah leaders and endorsed Negotiations continued for several months
by the public, as long as they did not have after Camp David, but ended completely
to renounce their ideological principles. after an apparently productive last round in
The formula for a historic compromise Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. Despite the
in the form of a two-state solution began total breakdown of negotiations in 2001,
to take shape after the 1967 war and the the general shape of a two-state solution —
resulting Palestinianization (or re-Pales- with provisions on the key issues of bor-
tinianization) of the Arab-Israeli conflict.1
ders, Jerusalem, settlements and refugees
It took another quarter century, which — that could be acceptable to the moder-

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011

ate elements in the Israeli and Palestinian tions to Israeli and Palestinian samples,
communities and that is likely to emerge found that both sides, in mirror-image fash-
if serious final-status negotiations were ion, underestimated the extent of support
resumed is by now widely known. The ne- on the other side for a two-state solution.
gotiations in Taba came very close to such The distrust is reinforced by such events
an agreement. Similarly, the Clinton points as the continuing settlement process on
of December 2000,6 the People’s Voice the Israeli side and the electoral victories
Initiative of 2002,7 and the very ambitious and continuing strength of Hamas on the
Geneva Accord of 20038 all envisaged a Palestinian side. The publics have been un-
solution more or less along these lines. willing to support the painful concessions
on such emotional and existential issues as
PUBLIC AMBIVALENCE the right of return and Jerusalem, that the
Public-opinion polls have consistently Geneva Accord and other initiatives call
shown that majorities on both sides sup- for, at a time when they have no confidence
port a two-state solution loosely based on that the other side will reciprocate and fol-
these parameters. Moreover, majorities in a low through on its commitments.
joint poll conducted in late 2004 endorsed The widely held belief on each side
mutual recognition of the national identi- that there is no credible negotiating partner
ties of the two states after an agreement on the other side explains the anomalous
is reached: 70 percent of Israeli and 63 findings of the opinion polls. Even as
percent of Palestinian respondents ac- majorities on both sides have continued
cepted the concept of Israel as the state to endorse a two-state solution and some
of the Jewish people and Palestine as the of the compromises it requires, majorities
state of the Palestinian people.9 This find- (with fluctuating percentages) have also
ing has been replicated, with fluctuating supported anti-Israeli violence, including
majorities, in subsequent polls. And yet suicide bombings, on the Palestinian side,
the publics have not fully embraced such and violent and at times indiscriminate re-
initiatives as the Geneva Accord, espe- prisals on the Israeli side. The view on each
cially its formulas for resolving the issues side seems to be that, since the other is not
of Palestinian refugees and sovereignty responding to “our” peaceful overtures,
in Jerusalem. Nor have they given whole- they leave us no choice but to use violence,
hearted support to negotiations. “the only language they understand.” Pub-
The main reason for the publics’ am- lic ambivalence also expresses itself at the
bivalence has been the profound mutual electoral level. Palestinians gave Mahmoud
distrust that has marked the relationship Abbas a landslide victory in the presiden-
between the two communities since the tial election, which constituted a mandate
failure of the Camp David summit and the to pursue negotiations, but then empowered
onset of the second intifada. The prevailing Hamas in the legislative elections. Support
narrative on each side has held that, while for Hamas has fluctuated, but it is now in
“we” have demonstrated our readiness control of Gaza and still a force to be reck-
to make the necessary compromises for oned with in the West Bank. In Israel, the
peace, “they” have refused to do so. Opin- peace camp has increasingly lost electoral
ion data bear out this conclusion. Shamir support in the past decade, and the latest
and Shikaki,10 who posed the same ques- elections were marked by a strong shift to

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 Kelman: One Country / Two States

the right — not, in my view, because of mitments, and concessions from the other
rejection of a two-state solution, but be- only by offering such acknowledgments,
cause of the sense that it is not possible to commitments and concessions to the other.
achieve it. Importantly, support for violent Paradoxically perhaps, this will require a
tactics or hard-line leaders has not neces- step toward reconciliation, which is gener-
sarily coincided with opposition to peace ally viewed as a post-negotiation process, in
negotiations or a two-state solution. order to move negotiation forward.
In sum, we find ourselves in a situation
in which majorities of both publics em- STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
brace a two-state solution and yet are not What I am proposing, in essence,
ready to give wholehearted support to ne- is that the pragmatic terms of a negoti-
gotiations because of profound distrust of ated agreement be complemented and
the ultimate intentions of the other side. I framed by a joint vision of a principled
propose that, to energize public opinion to- peace, based on a historic compromise
ward final-status negotiations at this point, that meets the fundamental needs of both
it is necessary to go beyond the pragmatic peoples, validates their national identities,
approach exemplified by the Oslo agree- and allows them to declare an end to the
ment, the Geneva Accord or the People’s conflict consistent with the requirements
Voice Initiative. Pragmatism was essential of fairness and attainable justice. If such a
to the considerable progress that has been framework is constructed through a joint
made and continues to be essential to shap- Israeli-Palestinian process, it can reassure
ing the terms of a final agreement, but it the two publics that the agreement is not
is insufficient to the task of overcoming jeopardizing their national existence and
the current level of mutual distrust. It is promises mutual benefits that far outweigh
unrealistic to expect the publics to accept the risks it entails. This framework, as I
painful concessions — especially on such see it, would take the form of a joint state-
existential issues as the right of return and ment of principles, containing four main
Jerusalem — on the grounds that there is components:
no other option, at a time when they are
not persuaded that the other side can be • Mutual recognition of the other’s nation-
trusted to live up to its commitments. To al identity and attachment to the land,
overcome the mutual distrust, the publics and commitment to a historic compro-
must be assured that it is possible to nego- mise that allows each people to express
tiate a solution that is fair, safe and condu- this identity in its own state within the
cive to a better future. land they both claim
To this end, the leaderships will have • Spelling out what the logic of a historic
to adopt a visionary approach, transcending compromise implies for the key final-
the balance of power and the calculus of status issues
bargaining concessions. They will have to • Highlighting the meaning of a historic
come to recognize that, in a profound con- compromise in terms of the nature of the
flict over national identity and national exis- peace that it brings into being
tence, only an integrative, win-win strategy • Offering a positive vision of a common
can provide a solution — that each can future for the two peoples in the shared
achieve the needed acknowledgments, com- land.

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011

To concretize what I have in mind, I Therefore, instead of pursuing a military

composed a hypothetical draft of a Joint solution to the conflict, the parties have de-
Statement of Principles that Israeli and cided to end it with a historic compromise,
Palestinian leaders might present to their whereby the two peoples agree to share the
publics as the framework for final-status land to which both are so deeply attached
negotiations.11 I did this with some mis- in a way that allows each to exercise its
givings, because I feel very strongly that right to national self-determination, fulfill
any such statement must be produced by its national aspirations, and express its
the parties themselves in order to reflect national identity in a state of its own within
their concerns and engender their commit- the shared land, in peaceful coexistence
ment. I offer this hypothetical draft only as with the neighboring state of the other.
a way of stimulating thought about reviv- Second, while details of the final
ing a meaningful Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement that reflects this historic com-
process in the current political atmosphere. promise remain to be negotiated, the state-
The text of this hypothetical draft may be ment would affirm certain basic principles,
found in the Appendix. Let me discuss dictated by the logic of the historic com-
its four components, which I consider the promise. These principles must be fol-
essential elements of a framework for a lowed in resolving the core issues, which
principled peace. engage each people’s national narrative, in
First, the statement must be based on order to enable each people to maintain its
mutual recognition of the other’s national national existence and express its national
identity and acknowledgment of both identity in its own state. In particular, the
peoples’ historic roots in the land and statement might address the issues of bor-
authentic links to it. Ideally, from my point ders, Jerusalem, settlements and refugees
of view, it would start with the proposition along the following lines:
that the land — the entire land — belongs
to both peoples. If the framers are not • The borders between the two states
prepared to endorse such a strong depar- would be drawn in a way that con-
ture from ideological positions, they could forms with international legitimacy (as
negotiate a softer formulation, e.g., that expressed in appropriate UN resolu-
the land is claimed, with some legitimacy, tions) and establishes a Palestinian state
by both peoples and that both are deeply (consisting of the West Bank and Gaza)
attached to it. that meets the criteria of independence,
The statement would then proceed to viability, governability and contiguity
acknowledge that the pursuit of the two within the West Bank. To this end, the
peoples’ national aspirations on the basis of borders would follow the 1967 armistice
their conflicting claims has led to decades lines, with minor, mutually agreed-upon
of violent, destructive conflict and express adjustments, based on an exchange of
regret for the suffering that each people has West Bank territories that contain most
caused the other in the course of this strug- of the Israeli settlers for Israeli territories
gle. It would assert that neither people can of equal size and value, and with a secure
prevail by military means at an acceptable link between the West Bank and Gaza.
cost and that continuation of the present • In recognition of the central importance
course may well lead to mutual destruction. of Jerusalem to the national identities of

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 Kelman: One Country / Two States

both peoples, the city would be shared in terms of the nature of the peace that the
by the two states and contain the capital final negotiated agreement is designed to
of each. The city’s Jewish neighborhoods put in place — a principled peace, charac-
would be under Israeli sovereignty and terized by the following conditions:
its Arab neighborhoods under Palestin-
ian sovereignty, with joint administration • Mutual recognition of the national
of arrangements for security, freedom of identity of the other people and of each
movement, municipal services for the people’s right to express this identity in
entire city, and governance of the Old an independent state within the shared
City. A plan of shared or joint sovereign- land
ty would be negotiated for the holy sites, • A sense that the agreement is not merely
allowing each side control over its own a product of the balance of power but is
sites and assuring free access to them consistent with the principle of attainable
from both parts of the city. justice and with international law and the
• To ensure the independence, viability, international consensus
governability and contiguity of the Pal- • An end to the occupation and the conflict
estinian state, Israeli settlements with ex- • Integration of both states in the region
traterritorial rights and status (including and the international community.
separate roads and protection by Israeli
Finally, the joint statement of prin-
troops) would be removed from the West
ciples that I am proposing for framing
Bank. The right of individual settlers to
a negotiated agreement would offer a
stay in place as Palestinian citizens or
positive vision of a common future for
as resident aliens, subject to Palestinian
the two peoples in the land to which both
law, would be negotiated.
are attached and which they have agreed
• Israel would recognize that the refugee
to share — and of the future of the shared
problem and the right of return are cen-
land itself. This vision would contemplate
tral to the Palestinian national identity
a secure and prosperous existence for
and national narrative and acknowledge
each society, mutually beneficial coopera-
its share of responsibility for the plight
tion between the two societies in various
of the refugees. Concretely, the refugee
spheres (e.g., economic relations, public
problem would be addressed in all its di-
health, environmental protection, telecom-
mensions, with comprehensive plans for
munications, cultural and educational
financial compensation, regularization
programs, tourism), regional development,
of the status of refugees in host coun-
and stable peace with ultimate reconcili-
tries, and resettlement when needed or
ation. Positive expectations for the future
desired. Refugees would be granted citi-
would begin to compensate the two popu-
zenship in, and the right of return to, the
lations for the losses inevitably entailed
Palestinian state. Only a limited number,
by a historic compromise. In this vision
however, would return to Israel proper,
of a common future, the extent and speed
in order to allow Israel to maintain its
of the institutionalization of cooperative
character as a Jewish-majority state.
activities and the possibility that they may
culminate in an economic union or even
Third, the statement would highlight
a confederation, conceivably including
the meaning of the historic compromise

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011

Jordan as a third partner, would be left to rate national identities, such that sharing
future developments and depend on how the land would not be seen as equivalent to
the relationship evolves over time. 12
losing the land.
A bold statement of the positive vision
of a common future might call for a united PUBLIC IMPACT
country with divided sovereignty.13 I have I have proposed that a joint statement
come to describe this vision as a one-coun- of principles along the lines I have out-
try/two-state lined can cut
solution to through the
The concept of a principled peace based
the Israeli- ambivalence
Palestinian on a historic compromise . . . promises of public
conflict. This the two peoples that the injustices done to opinion and
concept dif- them are finally being addressed and, to mobilize
ferentiates wholehearted
between state
the extent possible, rectified. support for
and country negotiations
and allows both Israelis and Palestinians toward a two-state solution. Let me now
to maintain their attachment to the land as summarize why I believe this to be the
a whole while claiming “ownership,” in case.
the form of independent statehood, over Let us keep in mind that opinion polls
only their part of the land. It builds on the have consistently shown public readiness
two peoples’ attachment to the land as a for a solution based on two states for two
unifying rather than a divisive force, as peoples. The publics are ambivalent about
a source of common purpose rather than negotiations to this end because they are
deadly competition. To lend reality to this not convinced that there is a credible nego-
concept, the vision requires a range of tiating partner on the other side. The most
cooperative activities that treat the shared important contribution of a joint statement
land as a unit and are designed to benefit of principles would be to reassure each
each state and its population, as well as the public about the intentions of the other side
country as a whole. It would also require and reestablish trust in the availability of
free movement across state borders so that a negotiating partner. The fact that cred-
citizens of the Palestinian state could visit ible leaders on the other side have explic-
Jaffa and appreciate or even write poems itly acknowledged your identity and tied
about it, and Israeli Jews could come to achievement of their own national rights
worship at Abraham’s tomb in Hebron. to achievement of your national rights
Such cross-border attachments would not provides the best reassurance that you are
be threatening to the other side in a context not jeopardizing your national existence by
in which both sides acknowledge that each signing a peace agreement.
is attached to the entire land but relin- The mutual recognition of the other’s
quishes claims to ownership of the part national identity is not only reassuring to
of the land that constitutes the state of the each people; it also provides important
other people. This vision might enable the affirmation of its national self-image. The
two communities to build toward a new, conflict has been marked over the de-
transcendent identity alongside their sepa- cades by each side’s systematic denial of

34
 Kelman: One Country / Two States

the other’s national identity and national tion between them is capable of generating
rights, indeed its national existence. To at enthusiasm and energizing the two publics,
last have your identity recognized and the both of which are exhausted by the unend-
legitimacy of your claims acknowledged ing conflict. A visionary approach has the
— to be told by the adversary that you potential of eliciting wholehearted public
have authentic roots in the land, that you support in a way that strictly pragmatic
belong in it and that it belongs to you — is formulations of the terms of a compromise
an immensely liberating experience for agreement have been unable to do.
each group. It is the long-sought confirma- The acknowledgment that each people
tion by the other of what you have always is attached to the entire land even though
known and the other has heretofore refused it claims only part of it for its own inde-
to acknowledge. pendent state may well strike a responsive
Moreover, the concept of a principled chord in both publics. It makes it easier for
peace based on a historic compromise people to accept the compromises entailed
speaks to an inherent sense of justice. It by an agreement by conveying the mes-
promises the two peoples that the injustic- sage that they are not losing the land by
es done to them are finally being addressed agreeing to share it.
and, to the extent possible, rectified. Be-
yond that, it also enables them to feel that ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
they are fair and just in their dealings with The development of a framework for a
the erstwhile adversary. negotiated agreement and the construction
The historic compromise embraced by of a joint statement of principles embody-
the proposed statement of principles also ing this framework would be greatly
provides a rationale for the painful con- facilitated by visionary leadership on one
cessions that each side is asked to make. or both sides, as exemplified by Nelson
These concessions can be seen as not just Mandela or Anwar Sadat. Such leader-
losses that you have to sustain because it ship has not yet emerged on either side,
is the best you can achieve in a bargaining but it may be waiting in the wings, ready
process governed by the balance of power. to emerge when the need for it becomes
They become the necessary elements of a clear. Outside powers like the United
historic compromise in which both sides States could help in this regard by stress-
make concessions to achieve a solution ing the need for a visionary approach at
that conforms to the principles of fairness this historical juncture. They could also
and attainable justice and meets the basic contribute by encouraging the parties to
needs and interests of both. think seriously about a statement of basic
A key component of the proposed principles and identifying the issues that it
framework is the positive vision of a com- must address, keeping in mind that, in the
mon future for the two peoples in the shared end, the document must be crafted by the
land. As indicated earlier, such a vision parties themselves in order to reflect their
would begin to compensate the two popula- concerns and engender their commitment.
tions for the inevitable costs that an agree- Until visionary leadership emerges
ment would entail. An agreement commit- in the two societies, the primary initia-
ted to the future welfare and security of tive for constructing and disseminating a
both societies and to peace and reconcilia- framework for a principled peace based on

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011

a historic compromise rests with civil so- in 2009 of an Israeli-Palestinian working

ciety in the two communities. Civil society group that has been meeting periodically
has already prepared the ground for such for several years. In the course of this
a project. There has been a wide variety session, we came back to the question
of Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people with which this group had started: how to
projects, particularly in the last 20 years, rebuild trust in the availability of a nego-
promoting communication, cooperation tiating partner on the other side and thus
and reconciliation. More directly relevant energize public support for the negotiation
are the Geneva initiative14 and the People’s process. Each party pointed out that there
Voice Initiative15 mentioned earlier: very are certain things their population needs to
ambitious civil-society enterprises that hear from the leadership of the other side
have, each in its own way, developed in order to be reassured that the other is
specific ideas for the terms of a final seriously committed to concluding a peace
agreement, disseminated them widely, and agreement, and each party expressed its
actively sought public support for them in frustration about the absence of such state-
the two societies. ments. In light of that discussion, we de-
The need now is for civil-society ef- cided to undertake a small exercise, which
forts that build on these two important ini- took less than an afternoon to complete.
tiatives by constructing and disseminating a Each party prepared a brief statement that
framework for the agreement whose terms it would like to hear presented by the lead-
these initiatives have spelled out. Framing ership from the other side, declaring their
the agreement as a principled peace based commitment to a genuine two-state solu-
on a historic compromise, I have argued, tion in a way that would generate hope and
would reassure the publics and mobilize trust in the other side’s population and thus
their wholehearted support. A track-two elicit public support for negotiating a final
approach like interactive problem solving, agreement. The assumption was that the
which my colleagues and I have applied in two statements would be pre-negotiated
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for nearly and issued simultaneously or in a prear-
four decades now,16 can contribute to such ranged order. After each statement was
efforts by providing a joint process of presented, the other party proposed some
“negotiating identity.” In this process, each minor changes, and both groups agreed on
side can acknowledge and accommodate the final wording of the two statements.
the other’s identity, at least to the extent of The statement drafted by the Palestin-
eliminating negation of the other and the ian participants for the Israeli leadership
claim of exclusivity from its own identity, and agreed upon by the Israelis after some
in a context in which the core of its own minor editing reads as follows:
identity and its associated narrative are
affirmed by the other.17 Ideas that emerge The State of Israel recognizes the
right of the Palestinian people to self-
from such an interactive process can then
determination and to live in a free,
be injected into the political debate and the sovereign state. To achieve this, the
political culture of each society. State of Israel is committed to ending
Let me offer a very modest illustra- its occupation of the territories it oc-
tion of how an approach like ours might cupied in 1967 in the context of a ne-
contribute to the enterprise from a session gotiated agreement. The State of Israel

36
 Kelman: One Country / Two States

accepts its share of responsibility for of the Jewish people as a precondition for
the plight of the Palestinian refugees negotiations. This action has been widely
that resulted from the war of 1948 and criticized. I share some of this criticism,
states its willingness to mitigate the not because of an objection to the concept
suffering through all available means.
itself, but because of the timing and man-
The States of Israel and Palestine will
live side by side in peace and security
ner of Netanyahu’s introduction of this
and will enjoy neighborly and full issue and its potential for undermining the
diplomatic relations on the basis of negotiations.
mutual respect and equal standing. As far as the concept itself is con-
cerned, there is nothing new about it. It
The statement drafted by the Israeli goes back to the original UN resolution
participants for the Palestinian leadership of 1947, which called for the partition of
and agreed upon by the Palestinians after Palestine into two states — one for the
some minor editing reads as follows: Jewish people and one for the Palestinian
people — and which served as the basis
The Palestinian people reaffirms its
commitment to a durable peace based
for the establishment of the State of Israel.
on the principle of two independent Proponents of a two-state solution, on both
states for two peoples, each with the sides and in the international community,
sovereign right to determine its own usually describe this vision as “two states
national character. We pledge to work for two peoples.” This view is also consis-
for a comprehensive peace treaty that tent with public-opinion data on both sides,
will satisfy the essential needs of both particularly the polls I cited above, show-
parties, end the occupation, ensure ing that sizable majorities in both commu-
an agreed and just solution to the nities endorsed mutual recognition of the
problem of the Palestinian refugees,
national identities of the two states after an
guarantee security for all, mark the
end of the conflict, and usher in an
agreement is reached — i.e., accepting the
era of coexistence and cooperation concept of Israel as the state of the Jew-
between Israel and Palestine. ish people and Palestine as the state of the
Palestinian people.
These two statements are a long way Indeed, the essence of a historic com-
removed from the extensive joint statement promise based on a two-state solution is
of principles that I have been advocating. that the two peoples agree to share the land
They do suggest, however, that it is possible to which both are deeply attached and that
for politically influential mainstream Israe- both claim as their homeland in a way that
lis and Palestinians to develop a narrative allows each to exercise its right of national
and a language of reconciliation that can self-determination, fulfill its national aspi-
help to advance the process of negotiation. rations, and express its national identity in
a state of its own within the shared land, in
CONCLUSION peaceful coexistence with the neighboring
I would like to comment on an issue state of the other.
that is related to my formulation of the The problem with Netanyahu’s
historic compromise. I refer to Prime Min- demand, then, as I see it, is not with the
ister Netanyahu’s recent insistence that the concept itself, but with the fact that he is
Palestinians recognize Israel as the state demanding recognition of Israel as the

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011

state of the Jewish people as a precondi- mass return of refugees and their descen-
tion for negotiations — without offering a dants to their original homes inside Israel.
reciprocal recognition of Palestine as the But they are not prepared to yield on this
state of the Palestinian people, without principle in advance, without assurance
acknowledging the Palestinian narrative, that the final agreement will adequately ad-
and without providing reassurances about dress the refugee problem in all its dimen-
the implications of the concept of Israel sions, practical as well as symbolic.
as the state for the Jewish people for the Third, recognizing Israel as the state
Palestinian refugees and the Palestinian of the Jewish people raises questions about
citizens of Israel. the status of the million and a half Pales-
Accepting this precondition is ex- tinian citizens of Israel. The Palestinian
tremely difficult for Abu Mazen and the leadership cannot recognize Israel as the
Palestinian leadership for several reasons. state of the Jewish people without assur-
First, recognizing Israel as the state of the ance that the Palestinian citizens of Israel
Jewish people is a direct contradiction will be equal citizens of that state and that
of the Palestinian narrative, according to their individual and collective rights will
which the entire land between the river and be fully protected.
the sea is the homeland of the Palestinian I have argued that recognition of Israel
people, 78 percent of which was violently as a state for the Jewish people — and its
and illegitimately appropriated by the Palestinian-Arab minority — is highly
Zionist project for the establishment of desirable, as part of a joint declaration of
the State of Israel in 1948. The Palestin- principles guiding the negotiations and
ian movement, according to this narrative, certainly as part of the final agreement. It
has given up its claim to this land, in the must come, however, in a context of full
resolution of the 1988 Palestinian National reciprocity, with the understanding that the
Council and in the Oslo accord of 1993, problem of Palestinian refugees is being
by recognizing Israel within its pre-1967 addressed in a meaningful way (albeit
borders. Such recognition is the basis on without a mass return to Israel) and a com-
which Israel signed peace treaties with mitment to the full and equal rights of the
Egypt and Jordan. Palestinians, however, Palestinians inside Israel. Mutual recogni-
according to this narrative, are now being tion of the concept of two states for two
asked to go beyond that and, in effect, peoples should ideally become part of a
embrace Zionist ideology by recognizing new and transcendent narrative of recon-
Israel as the state of the Jewish people. ciliation, jointly constructed by the two
Second, recognizing Israel as the state communities without abandoning the core
of the Jewish people would mean giving of their own national narratives. Such a
up on the principle of the right of return of narrative, however, cannot be imposed uni-
Palestinian refugees. The PLO leadership laterally as a precondition for negotiations.
knows that in a final peace agreement the To do so can only serve to undermine the
right of return will not be implemented in negotiation process.
more than a symbolic way; there will be no

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 Kelman: One Country / Two States

APPENDIX
Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement of Principles
1. The parties agree that the land that has been in dispute between the Jewish and the
Palestinian peoples — the land that includes the State of Israel and the occupied ter-
ritories (the West Bank and Gaza) — belongs to both peoples: both have historic roots
in it, both are deeply attached to it, and both claim it as their national homeland. We are
convinced that there is no military solution to the conflict resulting from these compet-
ing claims.
The attempt to impose a solution by violence has caused pain and suffering to both
peoples for generations, which we deeply regret. The continuing conflict threatens to
destroy the future of both peoples and of the land itself. We are therefore committed to
ending the conflict by negotiating a principled peace, based on a historic compromise
in the form of a two-state solution. We agree to share the land in a way that allows each
people to exercise its right to national self-determination, to express its national iden-
tity, and to fulfill its national aspirations in its own independent, viable state within the
shared land.

2. The details of a peace agreement that concretizes this historic compromise have to be
negotiated, but we are committed to certain basic principles, dictated by the logic of the
historic compromise, that must be followed in resolving the key issues in the negotia-
tions. Specifically:

a. The borders between the two states will follow the 1967 armistice lines, with minor,
mutually agreed-upon adjustments, based on an exchange of West Bank territories
that contain most of the Israeli settlers for Israeli territories of equal size and value,
and with a secure link between the West Bank and Gaza. These borders are neces-
sary in order to enable the Palestinian state to meet the criteria of true independence,
viability, governability, and contiguity within the West Bank. Palestinians can accept
the fairness of these borders because they conform with international legitimacy, as
expressed in appropriate UN resolutions.

b. Jerusalem will be shared by the two states and contain the national capital of each
state, in recognition of the central importance of the city to the national identities of
both peoples. Jerusalem’s Jewish neighborhoods will be under Israeli sovereignty
and its Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty, with jointly administered
arrangements for security, freedom of movement, and municipal services for the
entire city and for governance of the Old City. A plan of shared or joint sovereignty
will be negotiated for the holy sites, allowing each side control over its own sites
and assuring free access to them from both parts of the city.

c. Israeli settlements with extraterritorial rights and status (including separate roads and
protection by Israeli troops) will be removed from the Palestinian state in order to

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011

insure the state’s independence, viability, governability, and contiguity. The right of
individual settlers to stay in place as Palestinian citizens or as resident aliens, subject
to Palestinian law, will be negotiated.

d. In negotiating solutions to the problem of Palestinian refugees, Israel recognizes that

the refugee problem and the right of return are central to the Palestinian national
identity and national narrative, and acknowledges its share of responsibility for the
plight of the refugees. Concretely, the refugee problem will be addressed in all its
dimensions, with comprehensive plans for financial compensation, regularization
of the status of refugees in host countries, and resettlement when needed or desired.
Refugees will be granted citizenship in and the right of return to the Palestinian
state. Only a limited number, however, will return to Israel proper, in order to allow
Israel to maintain its character as a Jewish-majority state.

3. The final negotiated agreement, based on a historic compromise as reflected in the

above principles, is designed to yield a principled peace, characterized by the following
conditions:
• Mutual recognition of the national identity of the other people and of each people’s
right to express this identity in an independent state within the shared land
• A sense that the agreement is not merely a product of the balance of power, but is
consistent with the principles of attainable justice and with international law and the
international consensus
• An end to the occupation and to the conflict
• Integration of both states in the region and the international community.

4. As we commit ourselves to negotiating a final agreement based on the concept of a

historic compromise and meeting the conditions of a principled peace, we are enabled
to develop and to communicate to our publics a positive vision of a common future for
the two peoples in the land they are agreeing to share. Our vision contemplates:
• A secure and prosperous existence for each society
• Mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states and societies in various
fields, including economic relations, public health, environmental protection, tele-
communications, cultural and educational programs, and tourism
• Regional development
• Stable peace with ultimate reconciliation.

Our positive vision extends not only to the future of the two peoples in their indepen-
dent states within the land they are agreeing to share, but to the future of the shared land
itself: a land to which both peoples are attached, even though each agrees to claim only
part of it for its independent state. In this spirit, our vision of a common future includes
freedom of movement across state borders, as well as a range of cooperative activities
that treat the shared land as a unit and are designed to benefit it in its entirety.

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 Kelman: One Country / Two States

1
H.C. Kelman, “The Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 46, 1988, pp.
3-15.
2
H.C. Kelman, “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough,” International Negotiations, Vol. 2, 1997, pp.
183-94.
3
H.C. Kelman, “Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Break-
through,” Negotiation Journal, Vol. 11, 1995, pp. 19-27.
4
H.C. Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinain Case: Past Contributions and Present
Challenges.” In R.J. Fisher, ed., Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peace-
making (Lexington Books, 2005), pp. 41-42.
5
H.C. Kelman, “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes: Insights from Attitude Theory,”
American Psychologist, Vol. 62, 2007, pp. 287-303.
6
W.J. Clinton, The Clinton Peace Plan (2002), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/clinton_
plan.html.
7
“Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles,” Israel Horizons, Fall/Winter 2003, p. 9. http://meretzusa.org/
horizons/ih200312.pdf.
8
“Geneva Accord,” Tikkun, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2004, pp. 34-45.
9
Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll, press release, issued January 18, 2005, Ramallah, Palestinian
Center for Policy and Survey Research; Jerusalem, Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement
of Peace, Hebrew University.
10
J. Shamir & K. Shikaki, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Two-Level Game,” Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 42, 2005, pp. 311-28.
11
H.C. Kelman, “A ‘Declaration of Principles’ for the Mideast,” The Boston Globe, March 8, 2008, p. K9.
12
M. Ma’oz, G. Khatib, et al., “The Future Israeli-Palestinian Relationship: A Concept Paper by the Joint
Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2000, pp. 90-112.
13
H.C. Kelman, “Israeli-Palestinian Peace: Inching Toward and Looking Beyond Negotiations,” Middle East
Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2007, pp. 29-40.
14
Geneva Accord, Tikkun, op. cit.
15
“Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles,” Israel Horizons, op. cit.
16
H.C. Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinain Case: Past Contributions and Present
Challenges,” op. cit., pp. 41-63.
17
H.C. Kelman, “The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution: Experiences from Israeli-Palestinian
Problem-Solving Workships,” in R.D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder, eds., Social Identity, Intergroup
Conflict, and Conflict Reduction (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 187-212.

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