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Poliomyelitis
Eradication
Field Guide
Third Edition
2006
Also published in Spanish (2005) with the title: Erradicación de la poliomielitis: guía práctica.
(ISBN 92 75 31607 4)
ISBN 92 75 11607 5
NLM WC556
This guide was prepared by the Immunization Unit of the Pan American Health Organization.
The Pan American Health Organization welcomes requests for permission to reproduce or
translate its publications, in part or in full. Applications and inquiries should be addressed to the
Publications Program, Pan American Health Organization, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., which will
be glad to provide the latest information on any changes made to the text, plans for new editions,
and reprints and translations already available.
Publications of the Pan American Health Organization enjoy copyright protection in accor-
dance with the provisions of Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. All rights are
reserved.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the Pan Ameri-
can Health Organization concerning the status of any country, territory, city, or area or of its
authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers’ products does not imply that
they are endorsed or recommended by the Pan American Health Organization in preference to
others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. Errors and omissions excepted, the names of
proprietary products are distinguished by initial capital letters.
CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Epidemiology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.1 Infectious Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.2 Distribution and Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.3 Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.4 Reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.5 Incubation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.6 Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.7 Changes in Epidemiology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Clinical Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 Pathogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 Clinical Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3 Differential Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4 Complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5 Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Vaccines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1 Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Vaccination Schedule, Contraindications, and Adverse Events . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3 Dosage and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4 Cold Chain and Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5 Vaccine Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Immunization Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1 Routine Immunization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2 Mass Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
iii
iv PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
6. Epidemiologic Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1 Case Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2 Detection and Notification of Probable Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3 Case Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4 Laboratory Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.5 Monitoring and Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.6 Surveillance Indicators for Acute Flaccid Paralysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.7 Response to Outbreaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.8 Information and Data Analysis Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Annex 1. Poliomyelitis outbreak caused by vaccine-derived virus in Haiti
and the Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Annex 2. Distribution of diagnoses for discarded cases of acute flaccid
paralysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Annex 3. Description of differential diagnosis of poliomyelitis . . . . . . . . . . 46
Annex 4. Refrigerator record form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Annex 5. Immunization coverage of < 1-year-old children . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Annex 6. Coverage of 1-year-old population with at least three doses
of OPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Annex 7. Acute flaccid paralysis case investigation form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Annex 8. Line-listing of probable cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Annex 9. Polio outbreak control measures—summary form . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Annex 10. Specimen tracking form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Annex 11. Polio Weekly Bulletin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Annex 12. Laboratory line-listing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE v
Tables
Table 1. Criteria for the differential diagnosis of poliomyelitis . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Specimens for poliovirus detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 3. Rate of reported cases of acute flaccid paralysis per 100,000
population under 15 years of age, by department
(fictitious data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figures
Figure 1. OPV3 coverage and incidence of poliomyelitis in the Region
of the Americas, 1969–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Figure 2. Polio cases in the Americas, 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Figure 3. Areas in Haiti and the Dominican Republic with confirmed cases
of polio, 2000–2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Figure 4. Wild poliovirus, 2004–2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 5. Spread of wild poliovirus, 2004–2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 6. Pathogenesis and clinical course of acute poliomyelitis . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 7. Vaccine efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 8. Map displaying OPV coverage by municipality in children less
than 1 year of age. January–December 2003 (fictitious) . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 9. Investigation of a probable case of poliomyelitis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 10. Case investigation decision tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Figure 11. Packaging for virological specimens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 12. Polio reference laboratory network in the Americas . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 13. Progress of polio eradication, 1988 and 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 14. Outbreaks caused by circulating vaccine-derived
poliovirus (cVDPV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
ABOUT THE IMMUNIZATION FIELD GUIDES
vii
PREFACE
This Poliomyelitis Eradication Field Guide presents information and strategies that
health workers in the Americas should be familiar with in order to keep the hemi-
sphere polio-free. Perhaps a more appropriate title would be “Field Guide for the
Maintenance of Polio Eradication,” since the last case of this disease caused by wild
poliovirus in the Region was detected in 1991 (see Figure 1). In 1994, the Interna-
tional Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication in the Americas
(ICCPE) reviewed the evidence available in all the countries and territories of the
hemisphere and concluded that the indigenous circulation of wild poliovirus in the
Americas had been interrupted. As can be seen in Figure 2, this goal was achieved in
a continent where endemic poliomyelitis was present in most countries.
The strategies that allowed the eradi-
cation of polio in the Americas are the Figure 1. OPV3 coverage and incidence of poliomyelitis in the
Region of the Americas, 1969–2003
same as those currently being used
globally, and are essentially the same 7,000 100
90
strategies that will make it possible to 6,000
80
keep countries disease-free. They con- 5,000 70
Notified cases
Coverage (%)
sist in reaching and maintaining high 60
4,000
levels of vaccination coverage (through 50
3,000
vaccination campaigns, if necessary) 40
These are the same strategies that Type 1 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) in 2000 and 2001: 21 cases
Note: Coverage data are for children under 1 year of age.
were applied to combat the polio out- Source: PAHO, Family and Community Health, Immunization Unit.
break that occurred in the Dominican
Republic and Haiti in 2000 and 2001 (see Figure 3). This outbreak, which was caused
by a virus derived from the Sabin vaccine itself, showed that reversion of the vaccine
virus to neurovirulence is a constant threat unless countries ensure adequate vaccina-
tion coverage. It also showed that surveillance for flaccid paralysis should be main-
tained at an optimal level, not only during eradication efforts but also afterwards.
Finally, it demonstrated that the vaccination strategies used during the eradication
campaign continue to be valid. The outbreak was controlled using live attenuated oral
poliovirus (OPV) vaccine. Given the importance of this outbreak for countries that
have already eradicated poliomyelitis, details of the outbreak are provided in Annex 1.
ix
x PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
1 point = 1 case
Source: Pan American Health Organization, Family and Community Health,
Immunization Unit.
Figure 3. Areas in Haiti and the Dominican Republic with confirmed cases of polio,
2000–2001
Gonaïves Santiago
Concepción
de la Vega San Francisco de Macorís
HAITI San Juan de la Maguana
Port-au-Prínce Santo Domingo
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Source: PAHO, Family and Community Health, Immunization Unit, PESS/HVP. Data through 30 May 2001.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
On 14 May 1985, the Director of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
announced the goal of eradicating wild poliovirus in the Americas. At the XXXI Meet-
ing of the PAHO Directing Council in September 1985, the Member Governments
unanimously approved a resolution to adopt this goal. When the ICCPE met in
1994, poliovirus had not been detected in the Americas for three years, despite
intensive surveillance by more than 21,000 health units that submitted weekly
reports and the investigation of over 3,800 probable cases, which on close study
were discarded as not being poliomyelitis. The eradication effort also dramatically
strengthened vaccination services for other preventable diseases included in the
Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI).
A number of public and private agencies joined forces with PAHO to achieve the
eradication goal, including the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), the United States Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC), the Canadian Public Health Association (CPHA), Rotary International,
and others.
2. EPIDEMIOLOGY
2.1 Infectious Agent
The poliovirus is an enterovirus, and it has three antigenic types: 1, 2, and 3.
Although all three types can lead to paralysis, type 1 is most frequently responsible,
type 3 plays a lesser role, and type 2 is only rarely involved. Most epidemics are
caused by type 1. Cases associated with the vaccine, which contains all three types,
are usually caused by types 2 or 3.
Poliovirus derived from the Sabin vaccine, which has caused outbreaks in the
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, Madagascar, and the Philippines, is a virus that
has mutated from the original Sabin strain by more than 1% and reverted to neurovir-
ulence. Two types of vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) have been recognized: iVDPV
(i stands for immunodeficient), which is isolated from immunodeficient individuals,
and cVDPV (c stands for circulating), which is isolated from outbreaks and shown to
have the same epidemiological and biological characteristics as the wild viruses.
2.2 Distribution and Frequency
Poliomyelitis existed worldwide before the eradication initiative was undertaken,
first in the Americas and then globally. At the time of writing this field guide (Sep-
1
2 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
tember 2005), three Regions of the world were certified as free from the indigenous
circulation of the wild poliovirus: the Region of the Americas in 1994, the Eastern
Pacific in 2000, and Europe in 2002. The transmission of the wild virus only persists
in 10 countries of the world, four of which (Indonesia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Yemen)
accounted for 91% of the cases reported during 2005. The annual number of cases
of polio reported was 719 in 2000 (in 23 countries), 483 in 2001 (in 15 countries),
1,918 in 2002 (in 9 countries), 784 in 2003 (in 15 countries), 1,255 in 2004 (in 18
countries), and 1,469 in 2005 (16 countries) (see Figure 4). The dramatic increase
in cases in 2004 was due to the fact that Nigeria interrupted its national vaccination
campaigns, which caused not only an increase in the number of cases in that coun-
try, but also led to the emergence of cases in countries that previously had eliminat-
ed polio but that had pockets of susceptibles, such as Botswana, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Mali, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan (see Figure 5). This experience reveals the risk of
imported cases to countries and regions of the currently polio-free world. It also
highlights the importance of maintaining high immunization coverage, conducting
national immunization days, sustaining good epidemiologic surveillance of acute
flaccid paralysis, and taking measures to contain wild poliovirus in laboratories.
2.3 Transmission
Fecal-oral transmission of the poliovirus is the predominant mode in the developing
countries where sanitation is poor, whereas oral-pharyngeal transmission is more
likely to predominate in industrialized countries and also during outbreaks. One
week after onset, little virus remains in the throat, but it continues to be shed in
stools for six to eight weeks. Cases are probably most infectious during the first few
days before and after the onset of symptoms.
2.4 Reservoir
Humans are the only reservoir of poliovirus, and infection is spread from person to
person. Given the large number of inapparent infections, it is sometimes difficult
to find the source of a case. A long-term carrier state is not known to occur, except
for rare cases in which the virus has been isolated repeatedly and over long periods
in immunodeficient individuals. Those cases have not been associated with polio
outbreaks.
2.5 Incubation
On average, the incubation period from exposure to the virus to the onset of the first
symptoms is 7 to 10 days, with an overall range of 4 to 40 days. The initial illness is
followed by a few days relatively free of symptoms before the onset of paralysis.
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 3
2.6 Immunity
All unimmunized persons are susceptible to poliomyelitis. Epidemiologic evidence
shows that infants born to mothers with antibodies are protected naturally against
paralytic disease for a few weeks. Immunity is acquired through infection with the
wild virus and through immunization. Immunity following natural infection (includ-
ing inapparent and mild infections) or administration of a complete series of live
oral polio vaccine (OPV) results in both humoral and local intestinal cellular
responses. Such immunity is thought to be lifelong and can serve to block infection
with subsequent wild viruses, thereby interrupting the chain of transmission. The
inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) confers humoral immunity but relatively less
intestinal immunity. Thus, vaccination with IPV does not provide resistance to car-
riage and spread of the wild virus in the community. There is believed to be little or
no cross-immunity between the poliovirus types.
2.7 Changes in Epidemiology
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative has significantly reduced the number of cas-
es in the world, from an estimated 350,000 in 1988 to only 1,469 reported as of
November 2005. The disease continues to follow the same epidemiologic pattern
that it had when incidence was high: it particularly affects poorer, non-immune pop-
ulations and retains the same epidemiological characteristics. On the other hand,
the emergence of outbreaks caused by vaccine-derived virus is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon that bears out the importance of achieving global eradication as soon as
possible.
3. CLINICAL ASPECTS
3.1 Pathogenesis
The mouth is the usual site of entry, and the virus first multiplies in the lymph nodes
of the pharynx and the gastrointestinal tract. It is usually present in the pharynx and
in the stool before the onset of paralytic illness. Once the virus has entered the body,
it invades local lymphoid tissue, enters the bloodstream, and then may invade cer-
tain types of nerve cells. As it multiplies intracellularly, the virus may damage or
destroy the nerve cells completely.
3.2 Clinical Features
For reporting purposes, surveillance is chiefly concerned with identifying paralytic
cases. Many people infected with the wild poliovirus have only a mild illness that
cannot be distinguished clinically from illnesses due to a large number of other caus-
es. Symptoms associated with these minor illnesses include mild fever, muscular
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 5
pain, headache, nausea, vomiting, stiffness in the neck and back, and, less frequent-
ly, signs of aseptic (nonbacterial) meningitis. Inapparent (subclinical) infections are
common: depending on the strain of poliovirus, the ratio between subclinical and
clinical infections is estimated to range between 100:1 and 1,000:1 (see Figure 6).
Older children and adults run a greater risk of developing paralytic illness. The
case-fatality rate ranges between 2% and 20% among persons who do develop the
paralytic form of the disease. However, if there is bulbar or respiratory involvement,
the case-fatality rate may be as high as 40%. Most deaths occur within the first week
following the onset of paralysis.
3.3 Differential Diagnosis
Every case of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) in persons under 15 years old that is clear-
ly not due to severe trauma should be investigated. If there is a strong suspicion of
polio in persons over 15 years of age, such cases should also be thoroughly investigated.
CLINICAL COURSE
HEADACHE (SEVERE)
HEADACHE VOMITING
SYMPTOMS
AND SIGNS
103
102
101
100
99
98 Days after exposure
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) 0 5 10 15 20 25
Cells o ++ ++ + + o
Elevated protein o +- + ++ ++ +
Source: Horstmann DM, “Clinical aspects of acute poliomyelitis,” American Journal of Medicine, 6(5), 598; copyright 1949, with the authorization of Excerpta Medica, Inc.
6 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
3.4 Complications
The complications are essentially related to the severity of the illness. Some people
with paralytic poliomyelitis manage to recover partially or completely, but the large
majority of patients have permanent sequelae in the form of paralysis of the affect-
ed members. Those who experience muscle weakness or paralysis for over 12
months will usually have permanent residual paralysis.
During the acute phase, the most severe complication is bulbospinal paralysis,
which gives rise to paralysis of the respiratory muscles. The case-fatality rate for par-
alytic poliomyelitis is usually 2% to 5% in children and 15% to 30% in adults
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 7
Time from onset of paralysis Usually from two to three From hours to 10 days From hours to four days From hours to four days
to full progression days
Fever Fever with onset of paralysis, Not common Commonly present before, during, Rarely present
usually disappearing within and after flaccid paralysis
three to four days
Flaccid paralysis Acute, asymmetrical, Generally acute, symmetrical, and Asymmetrical, acute, usually Acute, lower limbs
principally proximal (upper distal (lower part of arms and affecting only one limb affected symmetrically
part of arms and legs) legs)
Muscle tone Reduced or absent in the Reduced or absent Reduced or absent in the Deduced in lower limbs
affected limb affected limb
Deep-tendon reflexes Decreased or absent Absent Decreased or absent Absent in lower limbs
Sensation, pain Sensation usually normal; Cramps, tingling, reduced Pain in buttocks, reduced sensation Anesthesia of lower
severe myalgia, backache sensation on palms and soles to cold and heat limbs with sensory
perception
Cranial nerve involvement Only when bulbar Often present, low and high: Absent Absent
involvement is present Miller/Fisher variant
Respiratory insufficiency Only when bulbar In severe cases, complicated by Absent Often thoracic paralysis,
involvement is present bacterial pneumonia with sensory perception
Autonomic signs & symptoms Rare Frequent blood pressure Hypothermia in affected limb Present
alterations, sweating, blushing,
body temperature fluctuations
Cerebrospinal fluid Inflammatory High protein content with Normal Normal or mild increase
relatively few cells in cells
Nerve conduction velocity at 3 Abnormal: anterior horn cell Abnormal: Abnormal: axonal damage Normal or abnormal,
weeks disease (normal during the demyelinization no diagnostic value
first 2 weeks)
Sequelae at 3 months up to 1 year Severe, asymmetrical atrophy; Symmetrical atrophy of peroneal Moderate atrophy, only in affected Atrophy, flaccid diplegia
skeletal deformities appear muscles (outer side of leg) lower limb years later
later
Source: Alcalá H, Olivé J-M, de Quadros C. “The Diagnosis of Polio and Other Acute Flaccid Paralyses: A Neurological Approach.” Document presented at the Ninth Meet-
ing of the Technical Advisory Group on Vaccine-preventable Diseases, held in Guatemala City, Guatemala, 12–15 March 1991. (Doc. EPI/TAG/91-10).
8 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
(depending on the patient’s age). This figure increases from 25% to 75% when there
is bulbar involvement.
3.5 Treatment
There is no specific treatment for poliomyelitis. During the acute phase, the only
medical care is life support to preserve vital functions. Once the acute stage has
passed, physical therapy and other measures that facilitate the recovery of move-
ment and locomotion are helpful.
4. VACCINES
There are two types of polio vaccine: (1) trivalent oral (live, attenuated) polio vac-
cine (OPV) and (2) inactivated or killed polio vaccine (IPV). This guide provides
more detail on the use of the Sabin oral vaccine (OPV) because it is recommended
by the Technical Advisory Group of the PAHO Immunization Program, and it has
been and continues to be used in global campaigns to eradicate poliomyelitis.
The Sabin OPV vaccine is prepared using strains of different live viruses that have
been attenuated for oral administration. Because it is replicative, it is the vaccine
that more closely simulates the natural infection process. Also, it stimulates the pro-
duction of secretory IgA antibodies and circulating IgGs. Today the trivalent form is
used throughout the world (although it should be noted that vaccines have been
made using a single virus type, ranging in color from pale yellow to light pink). Since
the vaccine virus is live and the preparation is administered orally, imitating the nat-
ural route of infection, it also can be transmitted from a vaccinated person to close
contacts who have not been immunized. Its circulation interrupts transmission of
the wild virus by displacing it. This effect is greater if the vaccine is administered to
entire communities on national immunization days.
OPV is usually provided in vials of 10 or 20 doses using a dropper. Each dose, usu-
ally two drops, contains:
The vaccine contains small traces of streptomycin and neomycin, and it has no
preservatives. The use of a live poliovirus vaccine spreads the vaccine viruses in the
environment, resulting in transmission of the virus to other individuals, both vacci-
nated and unvaccinated.
The IPV, or Salk-type vaccine, is non-replicative. It is made with inactivated or
killed viruses and inoculated either subcutaneously or intramuscularly. The virus is
not shed in stools, and it does not colonize lymphoid tissue in the throat. The vac-
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 9
the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends the use of IPV (inactivated polio
vaccine) for patients with immunodeficiencies. It should be made clear that these
patients cannot be guaranteed an adequate immune response from the IPV.
4.3 Dosage and Administration
The basic schedule calls for three doses of OPV, given either at 6, 10, and 14 weeks
of age or at 2, 4, and 6 months. In areas where polio is still endemic, a dose for new-
borns is also recommended. OPV should be administered orally (that is, directly in
the mouth). Each dose consists of two drops of live oral poliovirus vaccine (the man-
ufacturer’s instructions should be reviewed). It is given by drops in the child’s
mouth, making sure that the dropper does not contaminate the mucosa; if the child
spits out the vaccine, he or she should be vaccinated again.
Since no vaccine is 100% effective, not all persons given polio vaccine are necessari-
ly protected against the disease. The best way to determine whether the number of
vaccine recipients who develop poliomyelitis is too high is to calculate the vaccine’s
efficacy. Low efficacy (for example, less than 80%) may indicate that there are prob-
lems with the cold chain, the manufacturing process, application techniques, or use
of vaccine lots of different origin that affect the vaccine’s protective capacity.
There are several ways to calculate vaccine efficacy, including the use of coverage
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 11
data and the investigation of outbreaks using case-control studies. These methods
are too detailed to describe here. A preliminary assessment is outlined below to
quickly determine whether the efficacy is within expected limits.
Vaccine efficacy can be estimated if the two fol-
lowing variables are known: (1) the proportion of Figure 7. Vaccine efficacy
cases occurring in vaccinated individuals (PCV) 100 100
and (2) the proportion of the at-risk population 90 90
Y
that is vaccinated (PPV). The curves in Figure 7
80 80
X
individuals receiving three or more doses of vac- Source: Orenstein WA et al., “Field evaluation of vaccine efficacy” Bull WHO 1985; 63(6):
1055–1068.
cine (PCV = 58.8%) but a higher proportion of
individuals vaccinated (PPV = 88%), the intersection of these values on the graph
(point y) is located to the right of the 80% curve, indicating vaccine efficacy that is
higher than 80%. This method does not give precise estimates of vaccine efficacy,
but it does provide a rough guide as to whether further evaluation is necessary.
The efficacy of routine immunization activities can be monitored by monthly
reviews of the vaccination records of the 1-year-old population (12 to 23 months of
age) to determine whether or not the children were fully immunized by the end of
their first year of life. Reasons for noncompliance with the vaccination schedule
should be identified and strategies should be adjusted accordingly (see Annexes 5
and 6).
5. IMMUNIZATION ACTIVITIES
5.1 Routine Immunization
Systematic or routine immunization is conducted by the permanent health services
on an ongoing basis. The objective is to ensure that all new cohorts entering the pop-
ulation are immunized as early as possible to prevent pockets of susceptibles from
developing. The success of routine immunization depends on the following:
12 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
The participation of local community leaders is key to the success of the cam-
paign. Mass media attention needs to be focused on the event. The decentralization
of financial resources for direct administration by health officials at the lowest level
of the health system is essential, so that the funds are closest to where the expendi-
tures will take place. Logistic, geographic, or demographic factors may prompt
some countries to conduct immunization days in smaller geopolitical units, such as
single provinces or regions.
Figure 8. Map displaying OPV coverage by municipality in children less than 1 year of
age. January–December 2003 (fictitious)
During “Vaccination Week in the Americas,” each country in the region carries out
promotion, vaccination, and health services delivery to groups selected in relation to
their levels of risk. This is an example of the concerted way in which countries can
carry out health interventions to reduce inequity and protect their communities.
These continent-wide campaigns were launched in 2003 and reach nearly 40 million
people annually.
5.4 Missed Vaccination Opportunities
An opportunity for immunization is considered missed when a person who is eligi-
ble for it and who has no contraindication to immunization visits a health service
and does not receive all the needed vaccines. Missed opportunities mainly occur in
two settings: during visits for preventive services, including other vaccinations, and
during visits for curative services. In both settings, eliminating missed opportunities
can raise coverage levels in a population.
Studies of missed opportunities for immunization indicate a continuing need to
ensure that health personnel know about the limited contraindications for adminis-
tering vaccines and do not impose unwarranted barriers to immunization. Neces-
sary steps should be taken to ensure that vaccines are offered to all women and chil-
dren every time they have contact with the health system. Rates of missed opportu-
nities are generally highest in children under 1 year of age, who are the primary tar-
gets of vaccination programs. Opportunities for immunization are missed for the
following reasons:
patient visits, might not offer it, or might not ask their patients about their
vaccination status. Some health workers avoid offering vaccination in order to
economize on biologicals, since they are reluctant to open a multidose vial of
vaccine for a single child.
• Inadequate supply and distribution of vaccines.
• Another cause of failure to vaccinate relates to lack of organization and avail-
ability of services. Problems often cited include waiting to gather a large num-
ber of children before starting to vaccinate, providing services during limited
hours or on limited days, or scheduling only specific days of the week or
month for vaccinations.
• Develop in-service training programs for all professional and technical health per-
sonnel to ensure that they are up to date on national immunization standards
and prepared to help change attitudes about false contraindications.
• Arrange for meetings and visit operations and personnel on-site to review the
performance of the programs and to discuss with health workers alternatives
that will allow them to take advantage of every vaccination opportunity.
Communities should:
1. Increase awareness and inform parents about the need for vaccination.
2. Get private health providers involved.
3. Develop a training program for community leaders.
4. Carry out activities with the mass media to promote immunization.
5. Link the provision of other services (such as milk or food supplements) to the presentation of an up-
to-date vaccination card.
16 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
6. EPIDEMIOLOGIC SURVEILLANCE
6.1 Case Definitions
For purposes of the polio eradication program, the Technical Advisory Group on
Polio Eradication has adopted the following case definitions (see also Figure 9):
Probable case
A probable case is any case of acute flaccid paralysis in a person under 15 years of
age for any reason other than severe trauma, or paralytic illness in a person of any
age in whom polio is suspected.
Confirmed case
A confirmed case is acute flaccid paralytic illness, with or without residual paraly-
sis, associated with the isolation of wild poliovirus (or circulating vaccine-derived
poliovirus—cVDPV).
Polio-compatible case
A polio-compatible case is a case in which a stool sample was not collected within
15 days of the onset of paralysis and the patient also presents an acute paralytic ill-
ness with polio-compatible residual paralysis at 60 days, or death takes place, or the
case is lost to follow-up. If epidemiologic surveillance is adequate, the proportion
of these cases should be small.
Vaccine-associated case
A vaccine-associated case is acute paralytic illness in which the vaccine virus is
believed to be the cause of the disease. Vaccine-associated cases should be distin-
guished from those caused by wild poliovirus or circulating vaccine-derived
poliovirus. In order to classify a case as vaccine-associated, the following criteria
must be met:
Discarded case
A discarded case is a case of acute paralytic illness for which an adequate stool sam-
ple was obtained within two weeks after onset of paralysis and was negative for
poliovirus. Small amounts of the original specimen should be kept in the laborato-
ry for future reference. In the case of a patient who presents residual paralysis at 60
days, has died, or has been lost to follow-up, aliquots of the specimens should be
examined in two additional network laboratories using appropriate techniques to
ensure the accuracy of this classification. If the specimens were adequate and the
results are all negative, the case should be discarded.
6.2 Detection and Notification of Probable Cases
Detection of probable cases should be done mainly through health services that are
linked to surveillance systems. At the same time, active searches should be carried
Yes Trauma or No
tumor?
Yes Adequate No
sample?
No Yes
Sequelae?
Investigation
completed
18 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
out; the support of community leaders is essential for these activities. All health serv-
ices personnel should know the definition of a probable case of poliomyelitis and, if
such cases are found, they should immediately submit a report to the next higher lev-
el and institute control measures, including the collection of stool samples from the
patient.
Every country should have a system for reporting probable cases of acute flaccid
paralysis. Within this system, health centers report the presence or absence of cases
once a week to the next higher level. Door-to-door or community-wide searches are
an effective way to find additional cases once an initial case is found, or to investigate
districts or municipalities where the health centers have not reported a case in a long
time, particularly in areas where persons with illness are not likely to seek medical
care.
If a polio outbreak is suspected in a community, a list should be drawn up of all
churches, preschool centers, schools, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and rehabilita-
tion facilities in the affected area. A minimum of one visit should be made to each
site, but weekly contact is encouraged, depending on the extent of the outbreak and
the personnel available (volunteers can be used). During the first visit, the health
workers should be asked if any case of paralytic illness has been seen or diagnosed
within the last six months. If such cases occurred, the health worker’s immediate
superior responsible for the center or the coordinator of epidemiologic surveillance
should be notified immediately, and the patient’s medical record must be reviewed
to determine if there is any possibility that the case was polio. If there is this possi-
bility, the patient’s home should be visited next.
In health centers that serve larger populations, contacts may also include select-
ed medical professionals such as neurologists and pediatricians. Efforts to identify
additional cases should extend well beyond the neighborhood or community in
which the probable case was found. Because the Region of the Americas has been
free of wild poliovirus since 1991, every probable case of polio should trigger imme-
diate notification, the collection of stool samples from the patient, and an investi-
gation that will confirm the presence or absence of other cases in the community.
All reported cases of AFP should be investigated within 48 hours of being reported.
Outbreak control should begin as soon as one or more of these cases fit the defini-
tion of a probable case—that is, AFP is observed and no other cause of the paralysis
can be determined. The outbreak should be publicized and immunization activities
set up immediately so that transmission can be stopped. Mop-up operations should
be initiated to obtain the most effective results as quickly as possible. At the same
time, it is important to intensify surveillance in order to find additional cases.
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 19
• Collect all available demographic and clinical information on the case (see
Annexes 7 and 9);
• Fill out the Line-Listing of Probable Cases (AFP) (see Annex 8);
• Immediately collect a stool sample from the patient. The epidemiologist in
charge of the investigation should determine whether samples should be tak-
en from individuals who were in contact with the initial case. Samples from
contacts are not routinely collected. If it is decided to collect samples from con-
tacts, they should be taken from children under 5 years of age who did not
receive the oral polio vaccine within the last 30 days. A date and place must be
set for further follow-up in order to: (1) collect additional stool samples, if nec-
essary, and (2) determine whether residual paralysis is present after 60 days;
• Inform surveillance site coordinators in the surrounding areas that a case of
AFP has been identified;
20 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
• If the onset of paralysis occurred less than six months earlier, initiate an inves-
tigation in the community to identify additional cases and institute wide-
spread control measures regardless of coverage levels; and
• If the onset of paralysis occurred more than six months earlier, start mop-up
vaccination activities as soon as the low transmission season begins.
PROBABLE CASE
Yes Yes No
Confirmed or polio-compatible
case
No
Yes Was another cause confirmed?
Collection technique Use a clean, empty container to collect 8 g of feces Avoid contamination of nervous system tissue with intestinal
(approximately the size of two thumbs). contents. Tissues should be collected using sterilized
instruments and placed in individual, sterile containers. Use
separate instruments and containers for different tissue
types.
Storage If possible, keep specimens refrigerated from the time of Keep specimens refrigerated from the time of collection.
collection.
Labeling Label all specimens clearly with name of case or contact, case Label all specimens clearly with name of case or contact,
number, date of collection, and date of onset of paralysis. case number, date of collection, and date of onset of
paralysis.
Shipping of specimens Ship specimens wrapped in a well-sealed plastic sack in a Ship specimens wrapped in a well-sealed plastic sack in a
thermos or cooler with ice. Use dry ice if available. Include thermos or cooler with ice. Dry ice is strongly recommended.
appropriate laboratory slips, and inform laboratory when Include appropriate laboratory slips, and inform laboratory
specimen will arrive. when specimen will arrive.
Interpretation of results If poliovirus is isolated, it must be characterized as being Isolation of poliovirus from central nervous system tissue
either a “wild” or “vaccine-derived” strain. Absence of virus confirms poliovirus infection.
does not rule out the possibility of poliomyelitis.
Stool. The virus can usually be found in feces from 72 hours to six weeks after infec-
tion, with the highest probability during the first two weeks after onset of paralysis.
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). It is not likely to yield virus, and therefore its collection is
not recommended.
Throat. It is not likely to yield virus, and therefore specimen collection from this site
is not recommended.
Blood. It is not likely to yield virus, and current serologic tests cannot differentiate
between wild and vaccine-derived virus strains. Experience has shown that for
polio, interpretation of serologic data can often be misleading. Therefore, collec-
tion of blood specimens is not recommended.
Specimen collection
Probable case. One stool sample should be collected from probable cases within
two weeks of the onset of paralysis.
Probable case, patient has died. Specimens should be collected from intestinal con-
tents or nearly formed stools; tissue (medulla, spinal cord) and serum may also be
collected as soon as possible after death. These specimens will be sent to the labo-
ratory, where they should be cultured and undergo polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
and histopathologic analysis. A section of nerve from the affected limb should also
be obtained.
Contacts. When so indicated by the epidemiologist, stool specimens should be col-
lected from five or more contacts who are under 5 years of age and who have not
received oral polio vaccine within the last 30 days. The epidemiologist will usually
give instructions to collect specimens from contacts when the probable case has
clinical or epidemiological manifestations suggesting that it is a true case of
poliomyelitis (high fever, asymmetrical acute flaccid paralysis, etc.), or when there is
more than one probable case in the community.
If the probable case is seen later than 14 days after the onset of paralysis, and is
clinically compatible with polio, special studies will be needed in addition to analy-
sis of the stool specimen. Such studies may include community surveys to collect
stool specimens from 50 to 100 of the patient’s contacts and neighbors who are
under the age of 5 and who have not been vaccinated within the previous 30 days.
At least 8 g of specimen (about the size of two thumbs) should be collected direct-
ly in the container that will be sent to the laboratory. Rectal swabs are not recom-
mended, although rectal tubes may be used in special circumstances.
Storage and shipment of specimens
Stool specimens should be kept cold if they are to remain in adequate condition for
reliable testing when they arrive at the laboratory (see Figure 11). The best way to
keep them cold is with dry ice; when dry ice is unavailable, ice packs are recommend-
ed. Dry ice requires special handling, so it should be ensured that any box contain-
ing dry ice is hermetically sealed.
The person responsible for shipping should make sure that there is sufficient
quantity of the stool specimen and ice. In addition, the shipper should telephone
and send a fax to the receiver, and should ensure that the appropriate forms are
included with the shipment. Upon delivery, the receiver should inform the shipper of
the date and time the specimens were received and their condition. If possible, this
verification should take place within 48 hours, so that arrangements can be made
to collect additional specimens if necessary.
24 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
Rigid, waterproof outer container. Case investigation form and lab slip
should be placed inside this container. Use tight-fighting lid—e.g.,
screw-on or push-on type. Apply tape or metal clips over lid to secure.
• Collection date,
• Case identification number,
• Health jurisdiction,
• Hospital/clinic,
• Key clinical information, and
• Vaccination history and date of last OPV dose.
lated viruses. Sequence information is also used in the systematic design of nucleic
acid probes and in the initiation of RNA segments for PCR. This further characteri-
zation also makes it possible to know if it is a vaccine virus or one derived from the
Sabin vaccine.
Laboratory network
Poliomyelitis is not clinically distinctive and may be confused with other causes of
flaccid paralysis. Surveillance systems, therefore, need laboratory support in order
to confirm or rule out poliovirus as the cause of a case of acute flaccid paralysis.
Techniques for analyzing stool specimens, isolating poliovirus, and differentiating
between vaccine-derived virus and wild poliovirus must be standardized, and the
quality of procedures must be monitored.
PAHO has sponsored the formation of a laboratory network (see Figure 12) to ana-
lyze stool specimens for poliovirus. Several of the more sophisticated (level 3) labs per-
form intratypic differentiation tests for
Figure 12. Polio reference laboratory network in the Americas poliovirus, and the results are published in
the Polio Weekly Bulletin of the Pan American
Health Organization (see Annex 11). It is
important for the laboratories to provide
regular updates of their findings so that the
epidemiologic surveillance system can
monitor the status of all stool specimens
collected from AFP patients.
CDC The network serves to enhance labora-
(United States) Virus isolation and characterization
Intratypic differentiation
tory performance by developing new tech-
nologies and analytic approaches, by pro-
INDRE
(Mexico) viding training, and by maintaining strong
INCAP collaboration among laboratories. Net-
CAREC (English-speaking Caribbean)
(Guatemala)
INS
INH (Venezuela) work representatives should be encour-
(Colombia) CHAGAS (Brazil) aged to meet regularly to discuss the eval-
uation of testing methods, interpretation
LACEN (Brazil)
of findings, implementation of new tech-
nologies, network resource and training
FIOCRUZ (Brazil)
needs, and ways to improve network per-
formance, particularly in the area of
MALBRAN (Argentina) research. The laboratories need to com-
municate their requirements regarding
timely collection, storage, and appropri-
ate means of shipping clinical specimens.
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 27
the country should prepare in order to determine the rate of AFP in its respec-
tive territorial jurisdictions.
3. Interval between case onset and notification: At least 80% of all cases should be
detected and reported within 14 days of the onset of paralysis.
Investigation
1. Interval between notification of a probable case and investigation: 100% of the cases
should have been investigated within 48 hours of notification.
2. Stool specimen from probable cases: For at least 80% of the AFP cases, a stool
specimen should have been obtained within 14 days of the onset of paralysis.
3. Interval between specimen collection
and receipt in the laboratory: 100%
Table 3. Rate of reported cases of acute flaccid paralysis
per 100,000 population under 15 years of age, of the specimens should be
by department (fictitious data) received by the laboratory within
YEAR 3 days.
DEPARTMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 4. Case follow-up: At least 80% of all
Akron 4.10 7.50 2.00 0.70 probable cases should be fol-
Antigua 0.30 1.50 1.00 1.50 lowed up within 60 days of
Cárdenas 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
paralysis onset to determine
Chattanooga 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.00
whether or not there is residual
Coronado 5.70 0.90 1.80 0.90
paralysis.
Evansville 1.90 1.90 0.70 0.60
Huila 2.30 0.00 1.10 1.10 5. Case investigation form: 100% of the
Jacksonville 3.20 1.70 0.70 0.70 cases should have a completed
La Unión 0.00 0.60 1.21 0.60 investigation form with demo-
Lowell 0.40 0.80 0.40 0.00 graphic, clinical, and laboratory
Mangas 4.10 2.10 2.10 1.00 information.
Ogden 0.20 1.60 3.30 1.40 6. Critical clinical variables: The med-
Providence 1.10 1.10 0.40 1.50
ical records for 100% of the cas-
San Juan 4.70 2.20 2.20 0.70
es should contain the following
San Marco 2.40 1.50 1.50 1.00
variables: date of paralysis
Savannah 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.00
onset; time or period of progres-
Shreveport 10.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
sion of paralysis; presence of
Somerville 10.90 0.00 4.40 0.00
Spokane 1.60 1.60 0.00 0.00
fever at onset of paralysis; resid-
Tampa 1.80 0.40 1.10 0.40 ual paralysis 60 days after onset;
Toledo 0.70 0.50 0.70 0.50 atrophy at 60 days; location of
Waterbury 1.10 0.00 1.60 0.00 paralysis (proximal or distal,
Yonkers 1.80 1.80 0.00 0.00 symmetrical or asymmetrical);
Youngstown 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 and final diagnosis.
AVERAGE 1.77 1.15 1.11 1.06
POLIOMYELITIS ERADICATION FIELD GUIDE 29
Laboratory
1. Condition of specimens: 100% of the specimens received should have proper epi-
demiological data, be correctly packaged, and be surrounded by ice.
2. Interval between receipt of specimen and report of results: 100% of the findings should
be communicated to the sender within 28 days of receipt of the specimen.
3. Recovery of virus: Enterovirus should be recovered in at least 10% of the stools
processed.
Control
1. Control measures must be instituted for 90% of all cases classified.
The following factors, among others, need to be taken into account when man-
aging an outbreak:
• Population data: Obtain the most recent data on population size and distribu-
tion.
• What’s been done: List any measures already taken.
• Case review: List cases reported in the area in the last six months. Construct an
epidemic curve.
• Coverage rates: Obtain existing coverage data, including official estimates.
30 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
• Spot map: On a map, use pins or a pen to mark the location of cases and areas
targeted for vaccination.
• Resources: Determine what resources are available at all levels (transportation,
vaccine, cold chain materials, etc.). Field personnel to assist in outbreak con-
trol should include teams from other programs, district staff, medical and
nursing students, interpreters, and drivers. Arrange for transportation and pay-
ment of travel advances.
• Coordination: Inform appropriate health and community authorities when and
where the team will be arriving and ask that specific health system staff and com-
munity representatives be present.
• Supplies: Organize necessary supplies to take to the outbreak area:
— Adequate supply of OPV vaccine for estimated target population;
— Cold chain materials: ice packs, portable refrigerators/cold boxes, vac-
cine shipping containers, vaccine control cards, thermometers. Deter-
mine whether refrigerators for the ice packs are locally available or need
to be brought (e.g., a kerosene refrigerator);
— Adequate supply of forms: line-listings for probable cases and laborato-
ry information, AFP case investigation forms (Annex 7), summary of out-
break control measures (Annex 9), and mop-up work tally sheets (Annex-
es 14 and 15).
• Outbreak monitoring: Information on cases, immunization activities, and villages
visited needs to be updated continuously and monitored during an outbreak.
This information on control measures should be kept on a form that can be
quickly summarized, such as the one shown in Annex 9. Outbreak contain-
ment will have been successful if no additional cases are reported one month
after the second round of immunizations. At that time, special reviews and
checks should be made to ensure that no new cases have occurred.
Data collection
The system, whether it is manual or computerized, consists of two main elements:
Case tracking and data collection
At the national and regional levels of a country, there should be a system that is
capable of tracking reported AFP cases until they are either confirmed or discard-
ed. Such a system should incorporate the following:
Reporting units
At the national and the regional levels of a country there should be a system to
keep track of reporting units. These units may be a geographic jurisdiction (such
as a county, district, or municipality), or a health facility such as a hospital or pri-
vate clinic. The critical data to be monitored for each of these units are prompt-
ness of reporting (on-time or late) and frequency of reporting.
Computerization
In the Americas, a computer-based system known as the Polio Eradication Surveil-
lance System (PESS) has been used to process the above-mentioned information for
all countries in the Region. The database is menu-driven, which allows users who
have limited computer ability to operate the program. This system has helped to cre-
ate a standard set of variables that allows comparisons over time within countries
and between countries. The standardization of surveillance data is fundamental.
Work is under way on a new system that will handle this information more expedi-
tiously and in real time.
Analysis
Initially, analysis should focus on data related to vaccination coverage and the
degree of compliance with epidemiologic surveillance indicators. Once this part is
done, more attention can be given to the time, place, and characteristics of AFP
cases; the search for information pointing to the existence of cases that are clus-
tered either geographically or in time periods; the presence of characteristics that
might more closely meet the definition of clinical poliomyelitis; the predominance
of AFP cases in immunized or unimmunized children; the ages of any such children;
32 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
the presence of sequelae in these cases; etc. Polio-compatible cases should also be
studied.
The structure of the case investigation forms and line-listings should be analyzed
in order to gain an overview of the cases and to determine whether the standards for
reporting and investigation are being met (see Annexes 16, 17, and 18). The follow-
ing information should be analyzed:
Clinical data. It is equally critical to determine the presence of clinical risk factors for
poliomyelitis, such as fever at onset of paralysis, rapid progression of paralysis, and
residual paralysis after 60 days.
Age. The age distribution of cases is useful for establishing which age groups to tar-
get in the vaccination campaign. In the Americas, the great majority of cases have
been seen in children under 6 years of age.
Geographic location. Cases should be plotted on a map and this information
should be compared with coverage data and surveillance reporting sites. These
maps can be useful for coordinating activities (for example, locations for adminis-
tering vaccinations).
Source of notification. This information will help determine whether improvements
are needed in the notification process for surveillance. For example, if cases are
being reported only from rehabilitation centers, then additional sources from clinics
and hospitals may be required.
Rate of acute flaccid paralysis. The effectiveness of the surveillance program can be
judged by the rate of AFP cases. The surveillance program should find at least 1 case
in every 100,000 children under 15 years of age.
Vaccination history of cases. Accurate information on the vaccination history of per-
sons with poliomyelitis is essential for evaluating vaccine efficacy and possible cold
chain problems.
Virus typing. Ultimately, the results of genomic sequencing will be useful in deter-
mining whether an outbreak was caused by the circulation of indigenous poliovirus
or by a vaccine-derived or imported strain. Urgent control measures should be tak-
en in the area that is the source of the identified virus.
As already mentioned, in 1994 the ICCPE concluded that the Region of the Amer-
icas was free from indigenous circulation of wild poliovirus. However, the fact that
polio eradication in the Americas has been certified does not mean that the children
of this hemisphere are not at risk of contracting the disease. At the time this Guide
was prepared, poliomyelitis continued to be endemic in many countries of the
world, and imported cases constitute a threat for those that have already eliminat-
ed the disease. There is also the possibility that the vaccine-derived virus can be rein-
troduced in municipalities, departments, provinces, or countries with low vaccina-
tion coverage, as occurred in Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 2000 and 2001.
In order to detect an outbreak in a timely manner, and guarantee that the children
of the Americas will remain protected, the countries of the Region should maintain
vaccination coverage levels of 95% or higher in all their municipalities, and continue
to comply with the surveillance indicators for acute flaccid paralysis.
34 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
“The accursed tea sent to this port by the East India company has arrived.
The hour of destruction, or of vigorous resistance to the machinations of tyranny
has struck. All those who love their country, who are jealous of their own
happiness and who wish to deserve well of posterity, are invited to assemble at
Faneuil Hall, to day at 9 o’clock (the bells will then ring) to concert a determined
resistance to this destructive and infamous measure of the administration.
Boston 29th. Nov. 1773.”
Camp of Savin Hill. Visit to John Adams: review of the regulations of the
Massachusetts militia.
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