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The role of understanding in word problems

Article in Cognitive Psychology · October 1988

DOI: 10.1016/0010-0285(88)90011-4

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COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY u), 405-438 (1988)

The Role of Understanding in Solving Word Problems

DENISE DELLAROSA~UMMINS
Yale University

AND
WALTERKINTSCH,KURTREUSSER, AND RHONDA WEIMER
University of Colorado
Wordproblemsare notoriously difficult to solve. We suggest that much of the
difliculty children experience with word problems can be attributed to difficulty in
comprehending abstract or ambiguous language. We tested this hypothesis by (1)
requiring children to recall problems either before or after solving them, (2) re-
quiring them to generate final questions to incomplete word problems, and (3)
modeling performance patterns using a computer simulation. Solution perfor-
mance was found to be systematically related to recall and question generation
performance. Correct solutions were associated with accurate recall of the prob-
lem structure and with appropriate question generation. Solution “errors” were
found to be correct solutions to miscomprehended problems. Word problems that
contained abstract or ambiguous language tended to be miscomprehended more
often than those using simpler language, and there was a great deal of system-
aticity in the way these problems were miscomprehended. Solution error patterns
were successfully simulated by manipulating a computer model’s language com-
prehension strategies, as opposed to its knowledge of logical set relations. o 1st~
Academic Press, Inc.

Word problems are notoriously diffkult to solve. In the study presented

here, one type of arithmetic problem was solved by all first-grade children
when it was presented in numeric format, but by only 29% of the children
when it was presented as a word problem. Nationally, children perform 10
to 30% worse on arithmetic word problems than on comparable problems
presented in numeric format (Carpenter, Corbitt, Kepner, Linquist, &
Reys, 1980). More importantly, as students advance to more sophisti-
cated domains, they continue to find word problems in those domains
more diEcult to solve than problems presented in symbolic format (e.g.,
algebraic equations).

This work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant BNS-8309075 to Walter
Kintsch and James G. Greeno. We thank Arthur Samuel, Kurt Van Lehn, and an anony-
mous reviewer for helpful comments on this manuscript. Requests for reprints should be
sent to Denise D. Cummins, Psychology Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ
85721.
405
oolo-0285/88 $7.50
Copyright 0 1988 by Academic Press, Inc.
Au rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
406 CUMMINS ET AL.

This discrepancy in performance on verbal and numeric format prob-

lems strongly suggeststhat factors other than mathematical skill contrib-
ute to problem solving success. In this paper, we explore the contribution
of a factor we believe to be heavily involved in word problem solving: text
comprehension processes. We argue that problem texts should be taken
seriously as valid discourse entities. Like narratives, word problems re-
quire skillful mapping of text input onto the reader’s knowledge base if
proper comprehension is to be achieved. In the case of narratives, the
reader must map linguistic input onto world knowledge concerning (e.g.)
actors and their motives. In the case of word problems, the solver must
map linguistic input onto knowledge about the problem domain. Nowhere
are the ramifications of a breakdown in these mappings more strongly felt
than in the domain of children’s problem solving, where developing lin-
guistic skills can play havoc with problem solving strategies. Accordingly,
we, like many other researchers, have chosen this domain as a starting
point for understanding how the nature of problem solving is shaped and
colored by a solver’s verbal comprehension skills.
Solving Arithmetic Word Problems
Not all word problems are alike. Some problems are much easier to
solve than others. For example, even very young children rarely make
errors on Combine 1 problems (See Table l), but frequently make errors
on Compare 1 problems. This differential performance changes with age,
with performance on these problems becoming nearly equivalent over
time. Because problem difficulty patterns change with age, many re-
searchers have adopted a Piagetian view of solution performance charac-
teristics. According to this view, a problem proves troublesome for a
child only insofar as the capacities required to process the problem are
not yet possessed by the child. While this general view is fairly uncon-
troversial, researchers disagree as to which capacities develop over time
to improve solution performance. Explanations generally fall into two
camps: those that attribute improved solution performance to the devel-
opment of logico-mathematical knowledge and those that attribute such
improvement to the development of language comprehension skills. We
discuss each of these in turn.
The logico-mathematical development view. According to the logico-
mathematical explanation of solution difficulty, children fail to solve cer-
tain problems because they do not possess the conceptual knowledge
required to solve them correctly. Support for the logico-mathematical
development explanation was offered by Riley, Greeno, and Heller (1983)
and Briars and Larkin (1984).
Riley et al. argue that problem difficulty depends in part on the prob-
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 407

lem’s semantic structure. Nonetheless, they attribute developmental

trends in problem solving skill to the acquisition of knowledge concerning
logical set relations. To explicate this view, they proposed models of
good, medium, and poor problem solving using a schema type formalism.
Set knowledge is represented in these models as schemata that specify
relations among sets of objects. Their model of good problem solving
possesses elaborate schemata that specify high level set relations, such as
part-whole, or subset-superset relations. In contrast, their model of poor
problem solving ability possesses impoverished schemata that are capable
of representing the integrity of individual sets but not their part-whole
relations.
Briars and Larkin also proposed a model of problem solving ability that
simulates solution performance characteristics. Although somewhat tem-
pered with “set language” and memory resource constraints, the primary
mechanisms contributing to solution performance in this model are deti-
ciencies in conceptual knowledge. Unlike Riley et al., however, this con-
ceptual knowledge includes such things as the ability to understand subset
equivalences and the ability to understand that things can be undone in
time.
The linguistic development view. The linguistic development view
holds that certain word problems are difficult to solve because they em-
ploy linguistic forms that do not readily map onto children’s existing
conceptual knowledge structures. For example, a child may understand
par-whole set relations and yet be uncertain as to how the comparative
verbal form (e.g., How many more X’s than Y’s?) maps onto them. If this
were the case, we would say that the child had not yet acquired an
interpretation for such verbal forms.
Importantly, the linguistic development view implies that word prob-
lems that contain certain verbal forms constitute tests of verbal sophisti-
cation as well as logico-mathematical knowledge. Accordingly, solution
errors on these problems may reflect deficiencies in semantic knowledge,
logico-mathematical knowledge, or both. To test the contributions of
each, several researchers have manipulated problem wording and ob-
served its effects on solution performance.
For example, consider the following problem:
There are 5 birds and 3 worms.
How many more birds are there than worms?

This is a relatively difficult problem for children, with correct perfor-

mance ranging from 17% for nursery school children to 64% for first
graders. The logico-mathematical view holds that this problem is difficult
because it requires sophisticated understanding of part-whole relations,
408 CUMMINS ET AL.

which nursery school children presumably do not yet possess. Hudson

(1983), however, reported dramatic improvements in solution perfor-
mance on this type of problem when the final line was changed to the
following:
How many birds won’t get a worm?

Correct performance on this version of the problem ranged from 83% for
nursery school children to 100%for first graders. Importantly, even nurs-
ery school children exhibited sophisticated set knowledge when solving
this problem. They did not, for example, simply line up the birds and
worms (on an accompanying picture) and count the singletons. Instead,
they solved the problem by counting the smaller set (worms) to determine
its cardinality, counting out a subset of the larger set (birds) to the same
cardinality, and then counting the number of birds remaining and retum-
ing that number as the answer. By using this “match-separate” strategy,
even nursery school children evidenced a tacit understanding of one-
to-one correspondence among sets that possess equivalent cardinality
(subset equivalence), as well as a sophisticated grasp of part-whole set
relations. Similar results were found by DeCorte, Verschaffel, and De-
Winn (1985), who improved solution performance by manipulating lin-
guistic aspects of problem texts in such a way as to make the semantic
relations among sentencesclearer. In fact, the inlluence of problem word-
ing was apparent in the Riley et al. data. For example, mean solution
accuracy on Compare 4 (see Table 1) was 25% higher than that on Com-
pare 5 (for second graders), even though these two problems describe
identical part-whole set structures, albeit with different words. The same
discrepancy was noted for Compare 3 (80%) and Compare 6 (35%), both
of which describe the same problem structure with different wordings.
Empirical results such as these are damaging to the logico-
mathematical explanation of solution difficulties. If children fail to solve
certain problems because they do not possess the conceptual knowledge
required to solve them, one would not expect minor wording changes to
improve solution performance. Yet this is precisely what is observed.
Instead, these results are entirely consistent with the linguistic develop-
ment view of problem solving development, since they suggest that chil-
dren find certain problems difficult because they cannot interpret key
words and phrases in the problem text.
An unanswered question in this work, however, is just how children do
interpret the problems they are asked to solve, particularly those that
employ troublesome language. This is of some importance because the
errors that children make are often counter-intuitive. For example, the
most commonly committed error on the birds/worms problem is to return
the large number “5” as the answer to the problem. In fact, these “given
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 409

number errors” constitute a significant proportion of errors committed on

word problems (Riley et al., 1983; DeCorte et al., 1985). It is not clear
why children believe that the solution to a problem could consist of a
number already given in the problem.
In the work to be described here, we attempted to obtain evidence
concerning the interpretations that children apply to standard word prob-
lems. By doing so, we also tested the two opposing viewpoints concerning
solution errors. We accomplished these goals in the following way. In
Experiment 1, we required children to recall problem texts either before
or after solving them, thereby providing us with information concerning
their problem representations. We then compared these recall protocols
to solution errors. We predicted that recall errors and solution errors
would vary systematically in that solution “errors” would constitute cor-
rect solutions to miscomprehended problems. Second, we compared ob-
served error patterns with error patterns obtained when manipulating a
computer simulation program’s linguistic and logico-mathematical knowl-
edge. We predicted that the best match between the two sets of patterns
would be obtained when linguistic knowledge was altered rather than
when logico-mathematical knowledge was altered.
In Experiment 2, we tested children’s interpretations of word problems
by requiring them to generate final questions to incomplete word prob-
lems. We reasoned that in order to complete a problem with an appro-
priate question, it is necessary to understand it properly. We therefore
predicted that solution accuracy would vary systematically with question
generation performance.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment I, fast grade children were required to recall word prob-
lems either before or after solving them. The word problems that were
used in this study were the same ones used by Riley et al. (1983). In
addition, these children were required to solve the same problems in
numeric format. Our hypotheses were as follows: We predicted that so-
lution performance would vary systematically with recall performance,
that is, that most of the variance in solution performance would be at-
tributable to comprehension success. Moreover, we predicted that solu-
tion errors would in fact be correct solutions to miscomprehended prob-
lems, and that miscomprehensions would be primarily in the direction of
transformations of difficult problems to easier ones. That is, we expected
that when faced with particularly difBcult linguistic forms, children would
try to simplify them to bring them more in line with linguistic forms with
which they were more familiar. Finally, we predicted that the most com-
monly committed solution errors could be simulated by manipulating ver-
bal comprehension.
410 CUMMINS ET AL.

Method
Subjects. Thirty-eight first grade children from the Boulder Valley School District served
as participants in the study. The children were tested late in the school year (during May).
Apparatus and materials. The 18 story problems used by Riley et al. (1983) served as
stimulus materials in the current study. These 18 problems are presented in Table 1. They
consist of six instances within each of three major problem types. The problem types are as
follows: Combine problems, in which a subset or superset must be computed given infor-

TABLE 1
Problems Used in Experiment 1 (Adapted from Riley, Greeno, & Heller, 1983)
Combine problems
1. Mary has 3 marbles. John has 5 marbles. How many marbles do they have
altogether?
2. Mary and John have some marbles altogether. Mary has 2 marbles. John has 4
marbles. How many marbles do they have altogether?
3. Mary has 4 marbles. John has some marbles. They have 7 marbles altogether. How
many marbles does John have?
4. Mary has some marbles. John has 6 marbles. They have 9 marbles altogether. How
many marbles does Mary have?
5. Mary and John have 8 marbles altogether. Mary has 7 marbles. How many marbles
does John have?
6. Mary and John have 4 marbles altogether. Mary has some marbles. John has 3
marbles. How many does Mary have?
Change problems
1. Mary had 3 marbles. Then John gave her 5 marbles. How many marbles does Mary
have now?
2. Mary had 6 marbles. Then she gave 4 marbles to John. How many marbles does
Mary have now?
3. Mary had 2 marbles. Then John gave her some marbles. Now Mary has 9 marbles.
How many marbles did John give to her?
4. Mary had 8 marbles. Then she gave some marbles to John. Now Mary has 3
marbles. How many marbles did she give to John?
5. Mary had some marbles. Then John gave her 3 marbles. Now Mary has 5 marbles.
How many marbles did Mary have in the beginning?
6. Mary had some marbles. Then she gave 2 marbles to John. Now Mary has 6
marbles. How many marbles did she have in the beginning?
Compare problems
1. Mary has 5 marbles. John has 8 marbles. How many marbles does John have more
than Mary?
2. Mary has 6 marbles. John has 2 marbles. How many marbles does John have less
than Mary?
3. Mary has 3 marbles. John has 4 marbles more than Mary. How many marbles does
John have?
4. Mary has 5 marbles. John has 3 marbles less than Mary. How many marbles does
John have?
5. Mary has 9 marbles. She has 4 marbles more than John. How many marbles does
John have?
6. Mary has 4 marbles. She has 3 marbles less than John. How many marbles does
John have?
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 411

mation about two other sets; Change problems, in which a starting set undergoes a transfer-
in or transfer-out of items, and the cardinality of the start set, transfer set, or result set must
be computed given information about two of the sets; Compare problems, in which the
cardinality of one set must be computed by comparing the information given about the
relative sizes of the other set sizes. The instances within each problem type differ in terms
of which set cardinality must be computed and the wording of the problems. The story
problems used in the present study all contained “Mary and John” as actors and “marbles”
as objects. This was done to reduce the memory load required to comprehend the problem.
The child needed only to attend to the relationships among the sets and to remember the
numbers stated in the problems.
Each child solved 18 problems. Half of the 18 problems were first solved and then re-
called; the remaining half were first recalled and then solved. Two versions of problem
presentation were used to ensure that all 18 problems were tested in each solve-recall
condition. In the fust version, one half of the problems in each problem type was assigned
to the Solve-Recall condition, and the remaining halves were assigned to the RecallSolve
condition. In the second version, these assignments were reversed so that version 1 Solve-
Recall problems became RecallSolve problems, and version 2 RecallSolve problems be-
came Solve-Recall problems. The presentation version served as a between-subjects factor.
The number triples used in the story problems included only the numbers 1 through 9 and
were chosen such that correct answers were (a) less than 10 and (b) not the same as a
number used in the story. Nine triples that satisfied these constraints were chosen for use
in the problems: 3-2-5, 4-2-6, S-2-7, 6-2-8,7-2-9,4-3-7, 5-3-8, 6-3-9, and 5-4-9. Half of these
triples were tested as addition problems and half as subtraction. Across subjects, these
triples were assigned to problems such that each triple was tested in each of the eighteen
problems.
In addition to the story problems, these number triples were tested as numeric format
problems. Each child received the same number assignment condition for both the story
problem and numeric format tests. For example, a given child received 3 + 2 = ? as both
a story problem (Combine 1) and as a numeric format problem. The child’s performance on
that equation could therefore be observed under both the story and numeric formats. The
numeric formats mirrored the story problem structures to which they corresponded. Note
that in certain cases (e.g., Change 5) this meant that the equation to be solved contained an
unknown on the left side of the equation (e.g., ? + 2 = 5). All numeric format problems
were presented in vertical sentence form; equations such as ? + 2 = 5 were written as an
open box with “ + 2” underneath it, a line underneath “ + 2,” and “5” underneath the line.
Procedure. Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their schools during
school hours. In keeping with the methodology of Riley et al. (and others), all problems were
presented orally, and the child was required to solve them without benetit of paper and
pencil. The sessions were recorded on a small, unobtrusive tape recorder. The child was
informed of the presence of the tape recorder, but was assured that only the experimenter
would hear the tape (i.e., parents and teachers would not). No child seemed uncomfortable
having the session taped.
Problem presentation was randomized for each child. The session began with instructions,
followed by practice problems. The practice problems consisted of two solve-recall and two
recall-solve problems. Children were assisted in solving and recalling these if required.
Once the experimenter was satisfied that the child understood the procedure, the experi-
mental session was begun. Children were not assisted in solving or recalling experimental
problems. They also were not told whether a problem was to be solved first or recalled first
until after the problem had been read. This was done to ensure that the strategies used to
solve and recall the problems would be the same in both conditions. Following the oral story
problem session, the child was given a sheet with the numeric problems on it and was
required to solve these.
 CUMMINS ET AL.

-N
-W

123456123456123456
Combine Change Compare

Problem Type
FIG. 1. Proportion of correct solutions for the problems shown in Table 1 when presented
as word problems (W) and when presented in numerical form (N).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Protocols were scored for the following: (a) solution accuracy on verbal
format problems, (b) solution accuracy on numeric format problems, and
(c) structural recall of each problem. The data are pooled over the recall-
before and recall-after conditions since initial analyses showed this factor
to be nonsignificant. Unless otherwise stated, rejection probability was
.05. Significant interactions from ANOVAs were followed by simple ef-
fects tests (Keppel, 1973). Significant main effects involving more than
one mean were tested using Tukey’s test of pairwise comparisons.
Recall and Solution Accuracy
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of subjects who correctly solved each of
the 18word- and numeric-format problems. These results are quite similar
to the results of Riley (1981) and Riley et al. (1983), with the possible
exception that our students performed slightly higher on the more difficult
Change and Compare problems. As expected, performance on numeric
problems was consistently higher than that on verbal problems. Some
problems were solved correctly more than three times as often in numeric
format than in verbal form. Some numeric formats, however, also proved
troublesome for the children. These were the number sentences that con-
tained variables, as in “? -t- 5 = 8” (i.e., Change 3, 4, 5, and 6). First
grade children in the Boulder Valley School District are not routinely
exposed to number sentences of these forms. Given this fact, it is not
surprising that children performed less well on these than on the more
typical “3 + 2 = ?.” What is surprising is that these number sentences
were solved correctly nearly two-thirds of the time, despite their relative
novelty.
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 413

As stated earlier, subjects’ verbal recall protocols were scored for ac-
curacy of structural recd. A correct structural recall was any recall that
preserved the logical relations among sets in the original problem. For
example, consider Compare problems 4 and 5. These two problems de-
scribe the sameproblem structure using different wording. In both cases,
the small set must be derived given information about the large and dif-
ference sets. “Recalling” Compare 5 as Compare 4, therefore, constitutes
accurate structural recall because the original problem’s logical structure
is preserved. Structure-preserving recall transformations such as these
were observed on 12% of the trials; along with veridical reproductions
(45%), they constitute our measure of correct structural recall. Together,
they constituted 57% of all recall instances.
Figure 2 illustrates proportion correct structural recall. Like the solu-
tion results, the recall data are also in agreement with those of Riley
(1981), although the greater sensitivity of our recall measureprovides a bit
more information than the repetition measure used in the Riley study. As
predicted, the overall pattern of recall accuracy closely resembled that of
word problem solution accuracy, suggesting a strong relationship be-
tween the two.
We predicted that word problem performance would vary systemati-
cally with recall performance but not with numeric format performance.
To test this hypothesis, each subject’s protocol was scored for proportion
of correct word problem solutions, numeric format solutions, and struc-
tural recall across the 18 problems. A regression model was then con-
structed to predict each subject’s overall word problem solution perfor-
mance as a function of his or her overall performance on the structural
recall and numeric format tasks. A forward selection procedure was used

123456123456123456
Combine Change Compare

Problem Type
FIG. 2. Proportion correct structural recall for the problems shown in Table 1.
414 CUMMINS ET AL.

to select candidates for entry in the model. ’ Only one variable met the 5%
significance level for entry into the model, that of structural recall. This
simple model accounted for 72% of the variance in solution accuracy
(F(1,36) = 93.62, MS, = .Ol, p < .OOOl),supporting our prediction that
performance on word problems depends primarily on successful compre-
hension.
Finally, to ensure that our observed relationship was not simply re-
flecting subject variation (i.e., talented subjects performing well on all
tasks, less-talented subjects performing poorly on all tasks), we calcu-
lated a 2 x 2 contingency table for each subject indicating the number of
times problem recall and solution were equivalent in accuracy (i.e., both
right or both wrong) or were different in accuracy (i.e., one right, the
other wrong). The expected frequency was then computed for the right-
right case, and the deviation between observed and expected frequency in
that case calculated. These deviations were found to be significantly
greater than zero, t(37) = 6.75, p < .OOl, indicating that a dependency
between solutions and structural recall existed for individual subjects,
regardless of talent.
Miscomprehensions and Error Types
While the quantitative relationship between recall and solution perfor-
mance strongly suggests that solution difficulties are driven by break
downs in story comprehension, we can offer more direct evidence by way
of qualitative error analyses. We assumethat when a child recalls a prob-
lem, he or she describes the problem representation he or she constructed
during a solution attempt. The nature of a miscomprehension therefore
should be related to the type of solution error made. In the following
discussion, we will describe the relationships we noted between compre-
hension and solution errors.
Types of miscomprehensions. Aside from verbatim recall, subjects’
recall protocols could be classified into six categories. The first, termed
structure-preserving transformations (SP), was mentioned in the struc-
tural recall analysis and comprised 12% of all recall trials. These were
occasions on which the wording of the problem was changed during re-
call, but the all-important mathematical relations among sets was main-
tained (e.g., a subtraction Compare 5 problem became a subtraction Com-
t Separate regressions were also performed on the three problem types. The results were
not appreciably different than the overall regression, with the exception that the regression
coefficient for numeric accuracy was marginally significant for Change problems (b, = .22,
p < .ll). This was not surprising since, as noted earlier, four out of these six problems
contain unknowns in their number sentences, and first grade children are not familiar with
such forms.
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 415

pare 4 problem). One interpretation of these transformations is that chil-

dren are reconstructing the text base from their internal representation of
the problem structure, that is, given their comprehension of the logical set
relations. If diftlcult problems are difftcult because their text bases are
unnecessarily complex, then we would expect children to show evidence
of simplifying the text base during recall, that is, transforming a complex
subtraction story such as Change 5 into a simpler subtraction story such
as Change 2. To test this prediction, we divided each of the three problem
types into easy and hard problems based on solution accuracy levels
reported by Riley et al. Easy problems included Combine 1, 2 and 3,
Change 1,2 and 3, and Compare 1,3, and 4. The remaining problems were
classified as hard problems. As predicted, more transformations of hard
problems into easy problems were observed than vice versa. Of the 25
subjects who produced these recall transformations, 4 exhibited tied
scores and 18 exhibited the predicted bias, p < .Ol via the sign test.
Moreover, when transforming a problem during recall, children seemedto
be sensitive to problem type. On 77% of these misrecall occasions, the
problem was transformed into simpler problems of rhe same type, e.g.,
difficult Compare problems were transformed into easier Compare prob-
lems, difficult Change into easier Change. The only exception was a slight
tendency to transform difficult problems of all types into Combine 1, the
problem that occurs most often in arithmetic textbooks (Stigler, Fuson,
Ham, & Kim, 1986). Combine 1 seems to be a “default” problem, and
when all else fails children resort to what is most familiar to them.
The second type of misrecall category involved structure-violating
trunsformations (SV). This category comprised 12% of all recall trials. It
included occasions in which problems were transformed into other legit-
imate problems, but the transformation violated the important mathemat-
ical relations of the original problem (e.g., a subtraction Compare 5 be-
came an addition Compare 3). In these cases, both wording and structure
changed. As in SP transformations, these misrecalls showed a bias toward
oversimplification: Of the 21 subjects who produced these transforma-
tions, 1 exhibited a tied score and 20 exhibited the predicted bias, p < .OOl
via the sign test.
The third type of misrecall (NP) comprised 8% of all trials and involved
recalling the problem as the following nonsense problem:
(a) Mary has 5 marbles.
John has 4 marbles.
How many does (Mary, John) have?
OR
Mary had some marbles.
John gave her 3 more.
416 CUMMINS ET AL.

Now Mary has 7 marbles.

How many does Mary have now?

These are nonsense problems since they require no computation and

instead simply ask for one of the numbers given in the problem.
The fourth category (2s) included recall instances such as the follow-
ing:
(b) Mary and John have 5 marbles altogether.
Mary has 3 marbles.
How many do they have altogether?

This misrecall contains two references to the superset in the problem,

once in the body of the problem, and once as a request for the superset
cardinality. This is similar to problem category NP in that the question
requests a number already given in the problem. Misrecalls such as these
were observed on 4% of all trials.
The fifth category (OS),contrasts sharply with category 2s. Instances in
this category were observed on 6% of all trials. They consisted (e.g.) of
the following:
(c) Mary had some marbles.
John gave her 3 more.
How many did Mary have in the beginning?

Here, the superset specification line (i.e., “Now Mary has 7 marbles.“) is
simply left out of the problem altogether. In contrast to the other trans-
formations, this category does not seem to be a “transformation” at all,
but rather a legitimate “misrecall,” or memory error. A line from the
problem was simply left out or forgotten. Compare this to category 2S,
which seemsto suggest a true misconceptualization of the problem struc-
ture .
The sixth and final category simply included all misrecall instances that
did not fit into the above categories either because the child could re-
member nothing of the problem, or recall was so confused it could not be
classified. This category comprised 13% of all trials.
In summary, subjects’ miscomprehensions appeared to be systematic
in that they could be classified into five meaningful categories. It is also
interesting to note the distributions of problem types across these cate-
gories. When Compare problems were miscomprehended in a classifiable
way, they tended to fall into two categories, SV (38%) and NP (31%).
Change problems also tended to fall into the SV category (40%) and the
NP category (20%). Combine problems, on the other hand, tended to be
miscomprehended as double-superset problems (33%). Clearly, some as-
pect of these problems tends to invite certain interpretations from chil-
dren. We return to this question below; here, we turn to the more impor-
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 417

tant question of how these recall miscomprehensions affected solution

performance.
Miscomprehensions and solution performance. Aside from correct so-
lutions (55%), subjects in this study produced wrong operation errors
(8%), given number errors (18%), arithmetic errors (ll%), and unclassi-
fiable errors (8%). Wrong operation errors are errors in which the child
used an incorrect arithmetic operation in an attempt to solve the problem,
i.e., added when subtraction was required or subtracted when addition
was required. Given number errors are errors in which the child returned
one of the numbers in the problem as the answer to the problem. These
types of errors are particularly important to our analysis because they
betray faulty comprehension of the problem structure. Moreover, they
are frequently reported in the literature (Riley et al., 1983;Decorte et al.,
1985)and comprised the majority of errors committed in this study (58%).
We predicted that there would be a systematic relationship between
story miscomprehension and solution errors. In particular, we predicted
that “errors” would often be “correct answers” to miscomprehended
stories. Such relationships were observed; they are presented in Table 2.
We discuss this table in some detail below.
Beginning at the top of the table, notice that structure-preserving trans-
formations (SP) were most often associated with corrects answers (64%)
and arithmetic errors (25%). Structure-violating transformations (SV), on
the other hand, were most often associated with wrong operation errors
(42%). In fact, only 14% of these SV transformations were solved cor-
rectly. Looked at from the other side, 64% of ALL wrong operation
errors tended to be associated with this type of transformation. Intu-

TABLE 2
Miscomprehensions and Conceptual Solution Errors
Response type
Recall type co wo SPN SBN AR OTH Total
Structure Preserving (SP) 51 1 5 2 20 1 80
Structure Violating (SV) 11 34 16 4 12 3 80
Nonsense Problem (NP) 10 2 14 24 4 1 55
Double Superset (2s) 4 5 13 0 5 3 30
Partial Recall (OS) 25 1 2 4 5 4 41
Correct (CO) 2.51 3 11 13 20 13 311
OTH (Other) 25 7 12 5 6 32 87
Total 377 53 73 52 72 57 684

Note. Frequencies are based on 18 observations from each of 38 subjects. WO, Wrong
operation errors; SPN, superset given number errors; SBN, subset given number errors;
AR, arithmetic error; OTH, unclassifiable error; CO, correct solution. See the text for an
explanation of recall types.
418 CUMMINS ET AL.

itively, these results make sense. Transforming a problem in a structure-

violating way meant turning an addition problem into a subtraction prob-
lem, and vice versa. It follows, then, that a wrong operation error would
occur on these trials.
Nonsense-problem transformations were associated overwhelmingly
with given number errors (69%), and in virtually all cases, the number
returned was the cardinality of the set specified in the final line of the
transformed problem. Correct solutions were observed on only 18% of
these trials. Again, these results make sense intuitively. If a problem were
transformed into the nonsense problems described above, the transfor-
mation would produce a “problem” that requests a given number. Ac-
cordingly, a given number is returned as the answer.
Double-superset transformations (2s) were associated with given num-
ber errors (43%) and wrong operation errors (16%). All but one of the
given number errors involved returning the superset quantity as the an-
swer. Virtually all of the wrong operation errors consisted of incorrectly
adding rather than subtracting the numbers in the problem. Correct so-
lutions occurred on 17% of these trials, and the majority of these were on
trials in which the original problem was an addition problem as well. The
addition of a superset line to the transformed problem therefore seems to
be interpreted by children in one of two ways, namely: (1) Add the num-
bers or (2) return the large number (i.e., return how many there are
altogether).
Interestingly, partial-recall (OS) transformations were associated most
often with correct solutions. On 61% of the trials in which this misrecall
occurred, the problem was solved correctly anyway. This type of trans-
formation therefore seems to be a genuine “misrecall,” or memory error,
as suggested earlier.
In summary, structural recall, both correct and erroneous, provided
clear evidence that children’s problem solving strategies are determined
by their comprehension of the problem stories. Moreover, frequently
observed conceptual errors were related to story miscomprehension in
systematic ways. These conceptual errors were found to be correct an-
swers to m&comprehended stories. Subtraction tended to be used to
solve addition problems that were miscomprehended as subtraction prob-
lems, and vice versa. Given number errors tended to occur on trials where
problems were miscomprehended as nonsense problems or double-
superset problems, that is, as problems that simply request one of the
numbers in the problems. Children, therefore, correctly perform opera-
tions that they believe are requested by the problem statements.
The more important question, however, is why children tend to mis-
comprehend problems in the ways that they do. As is apparent in our
data, these miscomprehensions were not idiosyncratic; recall protocols
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 419

could be classified in meaningful ways. This suggeststhat certain aspects

of these problems tend to invite interpretations that are similar across
subjects. The alternative views we contrast here to explain these misin-
terpretations are (1) that comprehension failures reflect deficiencies in
conceptual knowledge, and (2) that comprehension failures reflect inad-
equate mappings from English phrases onto existing conceptual knowl-
edge. To test these two views, we employed a computer simulation
model.
Model Predictions of Solution Performance
In order to evaluate the relative contributions of logico-mathematical
knowledge and linguistic knowledge to solution accuracy, we required a
computer simulation model to solve these word problems under four
knowledge conditions: full knowledge, impaired logico-mathematical
knowledge, and two versions of impaired linguistic knowledge. The sim-
ulation is based on a model of children’s problem solving proposed by
Kintsch and Green0 (1985). A full description of the computer model is
given by Dellarosa (1986) and Fletcher (1985). We offer here a rather
detailed summary of the model due to its importance in interpreting our
results.
The most fundamental aspect of the model is that it solves problems
through an interaction of text-comprehension processes and arithmetic
problem solving strategies. Its ability to solve them correctly, therefore,
depends on the integrity of both types of knowledge.
In solving problems, the computer model first comprehends the story
by building proposition frames which represent the story’s text base (van
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Numeric information, however, is given special
treatment. Such information is used to build representations of sets,
called set frames. In a sense, the simulation “understands” numbers as
sets of objects. The local relations among these sets are captured in su-
perschemata, which are larger set frames that have whole sets as their
components. A superschemain this model is essentially a blended repre-
sentation of story and problem structure.
There are three basic types of superschemata in the model, SUPER-
SET, TRANSFER, and COMPARE. They represent text-driven map-
pings between part-whole set relations and the story situations described
in COMBINE, CHANGE, and COMPARE problems, respectively. For
example, SUPERSET is a superschema that contains three sets, two of
which are parts of the third (e.g., 3 dolls and 2 teddy bears = 5 toys). This
is the most transparent mapping. TRANSFER-IN/OUT are supersche-
mata that identify an original set, a set of objects transferred into or out
of that set, and a set representing the results of the transfer (e.g., Mary’s
5 toys, John’s gift to Mary of 2 toys, Mary’s resulting 7 toys). This is
420 CUMMINS ET AL.

essentially a part-part-whole structure that has been contextualized to

map smoothly onto CHANGE type problems. COMPARE is a super-
schema that identities two sets and the set representing the difference
between their cardinalities (e.g., John’s 5 toys, Mary’s 2 toys, and the 3
toys Mary has more than John). Again, this is essentially a whole-
par-part structure that has been contextualized to map smoothly onto
COMPARE type problems.
Sets are assignedto the slots in these contextualized schemata based on
the relations among ,propositions in the text base and the sets already
existing in short-term memory. For example, if the current line of the text
base contains a transfer proposition (i.e., GAVE MARY JOHN (5
MARBLES)), and a set belonging to MARY already exists, then the set
already in existence is assigned to the role of the STARTSET and the set
referred to in the proposition (i.e., 5 MARBLES) is created and assigned
the role of TRANSFERSET. The existence of these two sets and the
transfer proposition then triggers the creation of a global TRANSFER-IN
superschema.
It is important to note that these schemata are constrained to direct
mappings of propositional structures onto logical structures. Essentially,
that means that they are constrained to directly mirroring the actions or
descriptions in the text base. Certain problems, however, do not lend
themselves readily to this proposition-schema mapping; instead, they re-
quire that inferences be made concerning abstract part-whole relations.
Take, for example, Changes 5 and 6. These problems start out with an
unknown quantity. Transfers cannot be made into or out of an unknown
quantity. As a result, the simulation (and presumably children) must infer
super-set and result-set role assignments given the complete story situa-
tion. The simulation does this by way of conversion rules. These rules are
simply mappings from complete TRANSFER-IN/OUT superschemata (in
which the start set is unknown) onto abstract part-whole schemata. Sim-
ilar conversions are done for Compares 3 through 6 since these problems
do not specify direct comparisons between two set quantities but instead
require inferences about which set among the three is the superset.
Consequently, the simulation also contains other decontextualized
knowledge concerning part-whole relations, in addition to these contex-
tualized schemata. The most important is a decontextualized part-whole
superschema. Assignment of sets to this schema is done either through
the contextualized conversion rules mentioned above or through decon-
textualized reasoning strategies. For example, the model assumesthat the
least specified of three sets of like objects can be assigned the role of
WHOLE in a part-whole schema (e.g., windows = big windows and
small windows). It can also make assignmentsbased on class membership
(e.g., 5 toys = 3 dolls and 2 teddy bears) and on conjunction information
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 421

(e.g., John & Mary’s 7 marbles = John’s 5 marbles and Mary’s 2 mar-
bles.) In each case a part-whole (or SUPERSET) superschemais created
to capture the logical relations among the sets specified in the problems.
Finally, the presence of superschemata triggers arithmetic counting
procedures which produce answers to the problems. Failure to produce
an adequate superschema(i.e., misunderstanding the problem) causes the
program to use default strategies to produce a “best-guess” answer. An
example of such a default strategy is to search memory to determine
whether the answer is already known, that is, if a set that matches the
requested specifications has already been created. Another default strat-
egy is to mine the text base for key words (e.g., altogether, “in the
beginning”) that might cue a solution procedure. The effect of these de-
fault strategies will become apparent shortly.
When given the 18 problems to solve, the Dellarosa (1986) simulation
model solved all 18 without error, indicating that it and the Kintsch and
Green0 (1985) model upon which it is based are sufficient models of
children’s problem solving. More germane to our discussion here, how-
ever, is its usefulness in explaining children’s errors. Specifically, we
required the model to attempt these same problems under conditions of
impaired knowledge and compared its performance to that of children.
Presented in Table 3 are the answers produced by the simulation under
each of three knowledge impairment conditions, along with children’s
errors observed in this study.
Deficient conceptual knowledge. To test the contribution of conceptual
knowledge, we removed the simulation’s decontextualized knowledge
concerning par-whole relations and required it to solve the 18 problems.
The first thing to notice is that without conceptual knowledge, the
simulation’s performance matches that of children on four problems. Its
solution protocols can be described as attempts to model the actions in
the story, relying on linguistic knowledge and default strategies to obtain
answers. Relying on its “altogether means add” key word strategy, it
solves the addition Combine problems correctly (Combines 1 and 2), but
produces wrong operation errors on the subtraction Combine problems
(Combines 3 through 6). Children, however, produced given number er-
rors most frequently on these problems, with the exception of Combine 5.
On this problem, both simulation and children produced wrong operations
errors. Also, like children, the simulation had little difficulty solving
Change 1 and 2 problems because these two describe only simple transfer
operations. It cannot solve Changes 3 through 6, however, because the
story actions describe transfers involving unknown quantities, and it has
no way of mapping these onto part-whole structures. It cannot resort to
its default strategy of simply returning the quantity of the set specified in
the last line of the problem because that quantity is “SOME,” and that is
422 CUMMINS ET AL.

TABLE 3
Characteristic Errors: Observed and Simulated-Experiment 1
Simulation error
Children’s errors
Problem (most frequent) (IC)SL c(-S)L cs-L
-
Combine 1 - -* -* -*
Combine 2 - -* -* -*
Combine 3 SPN wo -wo SPN*
Combine 4 SPN wo -wo SPN*
Combine 5 wo wo* -wo* SPN
Combine 6 SPN wo -wo SPN*
Change 1 - -* U -*
Change 2 - -* U -*
Change 3 SPN U - -
Change 4 SPN U - -
Change 5 SPN-SBN U - SPN-SBN*
Change 6 SPN-SBN U - SPN-SBN*
Compare 1 SPN-WO - wo* SPN*
Compare 2 SBN-WO - wo* SBN*
Compare 3 SBN-WO U wo* SBN*
Compare 4 SBN U - SBN*
Compare 5 SBN U - SBN*
Compare 6 wo U wo* SBN
Total matches (*) 5 7 14

Note. Children’s errors constitute the most frequently observed error based on 38 sub-
jects’ observations per problem. Simulation conditions: YSL, no conceptual knowledge;
C-SL, no problem situation knowledge; CS-L, degraded linguistic knowledge concerning
key words and phrases. Error types: WO, wrong operation errors; SPN, superset given
number errors; SBN, subset given number errors; -, no error; U, unable to derive any
solution.
* Problems for which the simulation matched children’s error patterns.

not an acceptable answer. As a result, it produces no answer at all, unlike

children who tended to produce given number errors on these problems.
Finally, it has no difficulty with Compares 1 and 2 because it can perform
the simple comparison of quantities required by those problems. Note,
however, that these are two of the most difficult problems for children to
solve. It cannot solve Compares 4 through 6 because they require map-
pings onto abstract part-whole structures in order to determine whether
addition or subtraction is in order.
Deficient story-situation knowledge. To test the contribution of story-
comprehension components, we removed the schemata that correspond
to Combine, Change, and Compare problems and restored its decontex-
tualized conceptual knowledge. In other words, we removed the contex-
tualized mappings from story situations to part-whole structures. This
means that the simulation could not understand whole story situations,
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 423

but instead could only search for key words and the like in order to trigger
its conceptual knowledge concerning part-whole relations. Under these
conditions, the simulation matched children’s response patterns on 7 out
of 18 problems. Its solution protocols revealed the following:
Using its “altogether” default key word strategy, the simulation suc-
cessfully solved Combine 1 and 2 problems. Its performance on the other
Combine problems, however, depended on the ordering of rules/
strategies. If the rules were ordered such that the simulation accessed its
default rules rather than its thinking rules, then it committed wrong op-
eration errors on Combines 3 through 6. If the rules were ordered such
that the simulation “thought” before “defaulting,” then it used its con-
junction-superset strategy to assign the role of SUPERSET to the set
owned by both Mary and John. As a result it solved these problems
correctly. Giving priority to defaulting produced a pattern that matched
children’s performance on three out of six Combine problems; giving
priority to thinking produced a pattern that matched children’s on two out
of six.
In contrast, without its Change schemata, the simulation could not
solve any of the Change problems because it could not understand the
transfers described in them. In other words, it had no way to map these
transfers onto its conceptual knowledge concerning part-whole relations.
This is because Change problems describe story situations, not simple
comparisons or combining of set quantities. Without its story-situation
knowledge, it could process the text base but not produce a coherent
representation of the story.
Turning finally to Compare problems, the simulation was found to pro-
duce wrong operation errors on Compares 1 through 3 and on Compare 6,
while correctly solving Compares 4 and 5-all using the same strategy.
This strategy is one that assigns the role of SUPERSET to the set that is
least specified in the problem. The reason it did this is rather interesting.
Since it no longer understood comparison scenarios, i.e., had no direct
mappings from comparisons to part-whole structures, it ignored the
phrases containing the comparative form. The remaining parts of these
lines therefore specified sets owned by no one and were hence considered
specifications of the superset. For Compares 1 and 2, this translates into
“Mary has 5 marbles. John has 3 marbles. How many marbles (are there
altogether)?” Under these circumstances, the simulation assigned the
role of superset to the unknown quantity referenced in the last line of its
representation and added the other two set quantities. Most importantly,
when children performed wrong operation errors on these problems, they
misrecalled the problem in just this way 77% of the time. For Compares
3 and 6, ignoring the comparative phrase in the last line translated into,
e.g., “Mary has 3 marbles. (There are) 5 marbles (altogether). How many
424 CUMMINS ET AL.

does John have?” Here, it subtracted 3 from 5, instead of adding them as

it should have. Children were also observed to make wrong operation
errors on these problems, but there was no evidence of this type of mis-
recall in their protocols. Finally, on Compares 4 and 5, ignoring the com-
parative form produced a representation whose interpretation was “Mary
has 8 marbles. (There are) 5 marbles (altogether). How many does John
have?” In this case, the simulation assigned the role of superset to the
quantity “5” and produced a negative number as its solution. Children
were not observed to do this. On Compare problems, then, the simulation
matched children’s errors on only 4 problems. Across all 18 problems,
altering its story understanding knowledge produced a match with chil-
dren’s performance on only 7 problems.
Deficient linguistic knowledge. To test the contribution of knowledge
concerning words and word phrases to solution success, we restored the
simulation’s story schemata and altered instead its understanding of cer-
tain key words and phrases. The alterations were of three types: First, we
altered its understanding of the word “SOME.” As noted by Riley et al.,
among others, children often seem confused about the interpretation of
this term, choosing often to completely ignore it when modeling solution
performance with blocks. Accordingly, we removed the word “SOME”
from the simulation’s quantity word category and placed it instead in its
modifier category. Essentially, this means that, to the simulation,
“SOME” was no longer a word that specified an unknown quantity, but
was instead an adjective. Second, as noted by DeCorte and Verschaffel
(1986), children tend to ignore comparative linguistic forms when reading.
This tendency was also noted in our recall data. Accordingly, the simu-
lation was made to misinterpret “HAVE-MORE-THAN” simply as
“HAVE”. For example, Compare 3 was misparsed’ as follows:
Mary has X marbles.
John has Y marbles.
X marbles are more than Y marbles.
How many marbles does John have?
Essentially this means that the comparative form is interpreted as a state-
ment primarily about set ownership and tangentially about the relative
sizes of two cardinals; nowhere is there an understanding that the original
statement refers to a difTerence set. The third line in this misparsing was
z The simulation does not parse natural language, but uses a propositionalized text base
as its input. In an earlier version (Dellarosa, 1986), the misparsings described here were
simply used as input. In the current version, production rules produce the misparsing effect
by constructing different types of proposition frames based on the expertise level of the
simulation run. The examples in the text constitute transcriptions of the proposition frames
constructed during a low expertise run.
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 425

not recalled by children, but it was included in our simulation to allow the
MORE-THAN proposition to enter short-term memory-as it presum-
ably does when children hear it-and hence affect the processing load.
Note the difference between this treatment of the comparative and the
treatment received when the story schemata are missing. Here, the com-
parative form is completely misunderstood as a statement of ownership;
in the former case, it was ignored entirely because it was not taken as a
statement of ownership nor could it be understood as a comparison sce-
nario since no knowledge of such a scenario was present in the simula-
tion’s knowledge base.
Finally, there was some indication in our data that children have difli-
culty interpreting the term “ALTOGETHER,” as in “Mary and John
have X marbles altogether.” There was some suggestion that children
interpret this as meaning that Mary and John EACH have X marbles.
Accordingly, the simulation’s proposition processing rules were made to
interpret these linguistic forms as follows: “Mary has X marbles and John
has X marbles.”
To summarize, in its present state, the simulation interpreted SOME as
an adjective, HAVE-MORE-THAN as simply HAVE, and ALTO-
GETHER as EACH. With these changes in its linguistic structures, the
simulation was again required to solve the 18 problems.
When the simulation’s linguistic knowledge was impaired as described,
it produced a response pattern that matched that of children on 15 out of
18 problems. These results indicate that the characteristic errors reported
here and elsewhere in the literature primarily reflect difficulties children
have in assigning interpretations to certain words and phrases used in
standard word problems.
Let us begin with the Compare type problems, since these are the most
straightforward cases. Recall that these problems are misinterpreted as
follows:
John has 4 marbles.
Mary has 3 marbles.
How many does (John, Mary) have?

In such a case, the simulation simply builds three unrelated sets, one
corresponding to John’s marbles, one corresponding to Mary’s, and one
corresponding to the set whose cardinality is requested. No superschema
is built since there is no information about how these sets are logically
related. As a result, none of the standard arithmetic operation rules apply,
and the simulation resorts to its default rules to produce an answer. In this
case, it searches memory to see if it already created a set that matches the
specifications of the requested set. Finding that it does, it returns the
426 CUMMINS ET AL.

cardinality of the requested set, i.e., John’s or Mary’s marbles, as appro-

priate. As a result, it matched children’s performance on five of the six
Compare problems.
A similar situation arises when the term “ALTOGETHER” is mapped
onto EACH. In this case problems that contain sentences such as “John
and Mary have 12 altogether” end up being represented as follows:
John as 12 marbles.
Mary has 12 marbles.
Mary has 6 marbles.
How many does John have?

Again, the simulation ends up with four unrelated sets in memory, and no
information about how they are logically related. As a result, it performs
a search for a set corresponding to John’s marbles, and returns “12,” or
the superset cardinal. Accordingly, it matched children’s performance on
five out of six Combine problems, the exception being Combine 5, on
which our subjects committed wrong operation errors instead of given
number errors .3
The case of Change problems is a bit more complex. In order for the
simulation to solve a Change problem, it must build a coherent TRANS-
FER-IN or TRANSFER-OUT schema. A TRANSFER-IN schema is
built if the problem describes a starting set into which objects are trans-
ferred. A TRANSFER-OUT schema is built if objects are transferred out
of the starting set. A difficulty arises when the simulation does not un-
derstand “SOME” to be a quantity word. In such a case, it does not
create a set when it encounters a proposition containing “Some.” In
Change 5 and Change 6 problems this is particularly disastrous, because
“Some” describes the starting set. Without this all important set, there is
not enough information to determine whether the problem describes a
TRANSFER-IN situation or a TRANSFER-OUT situation. As a result
the simulation again ends up with three unrelated sets (corresponding to
lines 2,3, and 4 in the problems) instead of a coherent superschemaunder
which these sets are subsumed. In order to solve the problem, it resorts
to its default rules. In this case, it can either (1) return the cardinality of
the set specified in the final line of the problem (e.g., Mary’s marbles) or
it can (2) use the term “BEGINNING” as a cue to return the cardinal of
the first set it created (i.e., the cardinal of the transfer set, line 2 of the
problem). Accordingly, the simulation matched the children’s perfor-
mance on four of the six Change problems.
To summarize, the best match between the children’s performance and
3 It should be noted that although our subjects committed wrong operation errors on
Combine 5, DeCorte, Verschtiel, and DeWinn (1985) reported that their subjects commit-
ted superset-given number errors on this problem, just as our simulation did.
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 427

the simulation’s was obtained when the latter’s language processing was
altered, as opposed to its logico-mathematical knowledge. Two discrep-
ancies did occur, however. The first was the fact that children were
observed to make an abundance of wrong operation errors on Compare
problems in addition to given number errors; our linguistically deficient
model produced solely given number errors. Note, however, that the
simulation did produce wrong operation errors on these problems when
its story-understanding knowledge was deficient. These results suggest
that children have two strategies for dealing with the difficult comparative
linguistic form. The first is to simply treat it as a statement about posses-
sion (as our linguistically deficient model did) and the second is to ignore
it completely (as our schema-deficient model did). In the former case, a
given number error occurs; in the latter, a wrong operation error occurs.
The same can be said of the term ALTOGETHER which can be inter-
preted either as EACH or as a command to add the numbers in the
problem.
The other discrepancy occurred on Change 3 and Change 4. Here, the
simulation could solve the problem (even without knowing that SOME is
a quantity word). Children sometimes had difficulty with these problems,
as evidenced by the given number errors observed on this problem. It is
not clear why this discrepancy occurred, although it should be noted that
even children do not find Changes 3 and 4 as difficult as Combines 3
through 6 or most of the Compare problems (see Figure 1).
Most important to our endeavor is the fact that the patterns of solution
difficulty reported here and elsewhere in the literature could be accounted
for simply by manipulating linguistic aspects of the simulation program.
The major determinant of its solution characteristics was whether the
nature of its linguistic processing afforded access to its conceptual knowl-
edge. Certain wordings allow direct mapping onto part-whole structures
(e.g., Changes 1 and 2); others instead require inferences about these
mappings (e.g., Compares 3 through 6, Changes 5 and 6) or instruction
concerning special interpretations/mappings of certain words in mathe-
matical settings (e.g., “altogether,” “ some”); these problems are there-
fore more likely to be misunderstood.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 supported our claim that language com-
prehension strategies play a central role in word problem solving. In
Experiment 2, we tested our claim further in two ways. First, we em-
ployed a new set of problems that better deserve to be called story prob-
lems than the impoverished versions used in Experiment 1. The problems
were designed to be little vignettes, showing plausible, realistic situations
and setting up a motivation for the final arithmetic question that com-
428 CUMMINS ET AL.

pleted the story. In addition to using structural recall as a measure of

comprehension, however, we also used question generation: For half of
the problems, children were required to generate a plausible question to
end the story; for the other half, the question was presented along with
the rest of the story. In order to generate a plausible question, it was
necessary to understand the story, that is, understand the world as de-
scribed by the story text. Question generation, therefore, should serve as
converging evidence of story comprehension.

Method
Subjects. The participants were 36 second and 36 third grade children from the Jefferson
County School system. The majority were white, middle class children of average intelli-
gence. The schools were paid $5.00 for each student’s participation.
Murerials. Four &cult problem types from those used on Experiment 1 were chosen on
which to base the stories. These included Combine 5, Change 5, Change 6, and Compare 5.
These problem types were then embedded in rich story contexts. The stories were all five
lines long, and their propositional content varied from 18 to 31 propositions, with a mean of
23.9 and a standard deviation of 3.9. There were 20 story problems in all, five from each of
the four problem types. One of each of these were used as practice problems; the remaining
16 served as the stimulus materials. The numbers embedded in the problems were double
digit numbers. Examples of the problems are presented in Table 4.
Procedure. Subjects were tested in a small, quiet room in their schools during school
hours. The sessions, which lasted approximately 1 h, were recorded on tape. The child was
informed of the tape recorder, but was assured that no one but the experimenter would hear
the tape (i.e., parents and teachers would not). The tape recorder was unobtrusive, and no
child seemed uncomfortable with its presence. Problems were presented by placing a card
in front of the child on which a problem was typed and reading it out loud. The reading rate
was kept slow enough to ensure that the child co&d follow along.
There were two experimental factors. The fust was recall order: Recall before or after
solving a problem. The second was the question task: Generate or listen to the fmal line of
the problem story (Generation vs Standard question condition). These two factors were
crossed to form 2 x 2 within-subject design. Each subject received one problem from each
problem type under each of these conditions.
The sessions began with verbal instructions concerning the problem solving and recall
tasks. The standard question condition always preceded the generation condition, and sep-
arate instructions were given prior to beginning the generation task. Following instructions,
the child was given two practice problems. One problem was fast solved and then recalled,
and the other was fmt recalled and then solved. Recall was initiated by asking the subject
to tell the story back. In order to ensure a reasonable amount of recall, a set of recall
prompts was used whenever the child failed to respond. A subset of words from the stories
was reserved for this purpose. These words consisted primarily of character names and time
sequence words such as “then she.” All subjects were prompted using the same words. The
question generation task was initiated by asking the subject to think up a good question to
complete the story. Once a question was generated, the child was asked to answer the
question, that is, solve the problem.
During practice, subjects were assisted in solving the problems and clarifying the task.
Once the experimental session began, no help was given other than recall prompting. The
card on which the problem was typed was turned over immediately following reading. Typed
on the back of the card were the numbers required to solve the problem, including the word
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 429

TABLE 4
Examples of Each Problem Type Used in Experiment 2

CBS Jane and Susan are having a slumber party on Saturday.

They will have to collect pillows for everyone before then.
So far, they have collected 16 pillows altogether.
Susan brought 7 from home.
Jane borrowed the rest from her cousin.
Q: How many pillows did Jane borrow from her cousin?
Equation: 16 - 7 = ?
CHS Jim and Michael both have toy car collections.
Yesterday, they played in the attic and found 4 cars.
They belonged to Jim’s grandfather when he was young.
He gave them to Jim as a present.
Now Jim has 9 cars in his collection.
Q: How many cars did Jim have in the beginning?
Equation: ? + 4 = 9
CH6 BiJl carries a lot of things in his pockets.
He also tends to lose things ah the time.
Today on his way home he dropped 3 shells.
When he emptied his pockets he found only 6 shells.
Bill was sad because his father had given him those shells.
Q: How many shells did Bill have in the beginning?
Equation: ? - 3 = 6
CP5 Jane and Mimi play tennis together twice a week.
They both always try hard to beat each other.
Both of them decided to buy new tennis rackets.
So far Jane has saved 13 dollars for her racket.
She has saved 5 dollars more than Mimi.
Q: How many dollars has Mimi saved?
Equation: 13 - 5 = ?

“SOME.” Subjects were asked to write down the numbers on their work sheet and to
indicate whether they intended to add or subtract (i.e., they had to write an equation). When
they solved the problem, they also indicated their answers on the sheet.
To summarize, the sessions consisted of two practice problems, four standard problems,
two of which were solved first and two recalled first, another two practice problems, and
four question-generation problems of which two were solved first and two were recalled
fmt. Order of recall task presentation was counterbalanced across subjects, as was problem
presentation.

RESULTS
Protocols were scored for the following: (a) solution accuracy, (b) ques-
tion accuracy, both recalled and generated, (c) equation accuracy, (d)
solution error type, (e) propositional recall, and (f) structural recall. The
following analyses were conducted on these data. Unless otherwise
stated, rejection probability was .05. One third-grader’s data was lost due
to a faulty tape. In all subsequent analyses, the appropriate group mean
was substituted for that subject’s data.
430 CUMMINS ET AL.

Answers. The proportion of correct answers produced by subjects as a

function of question and recall condition were computed and are pre-
sented in Table 5. An analysis of variance was conducted on these data
using as factors grade (Second or Third), question task (Generation and
Standard), and recall condition (Solve Before Recall and Solve After
Recall), with repeated measures on the latter two variables.
The analysis returned two significant results. The first was the main
effect of grade, F( 1,70) = 7.07, MS, = .27, p < .OOl, indicating that third
graders solved more problems correctly than did second graders. The
second was the main effect of recall condition, F(1,70) = .39, MS, = .08,
p < .05, indicating that the subjects solved more problems correctly when
solutions preceded recall than when they followed recall. The question
task did not significantly influence the subjects’ solution performance.
It should be noted, however, that overall solution performance of sec-
ond graders under the standard condition (39%) was not appreciably dif-
ferent than that observed in Experiment 1 (43%). Our enriched story
contexts, therefore, did not boost performance on these difftcult prob-
lems, contrary to our expectations.
To test our prediction concerning the contribution of comprehension
factors to solution performance, we again employed a multiple regression
procedure. We constructed a regression model to predict subjects’ solu-
tion performance as a function of their structural recall and question task
performance. Question task performance under the standard condition
meant how many questions a given subject remembered correctly; ques-
tion task performance in the generation condition meant how many times
a subject generated an appropriate question to complete the problem
stories. Four models were required to explore the relationships among
these variables: One for second graders under the standard condition, one
for the second graders under the generation condition, one for third grad-

TABLE 5
Proportion Correct Solutions to Word Problems in Experiment 2
Standard condition Generation condition Mean
Third grade
Solve First .67 .71 .69
Recall First .63 .63 .63
Second grade
Solve First A4 .33 .39
Recall First .33 .28 .30
Mean .52 .49 SO

Note. Cell means are based on 72 observations (two problems from each of 36 subjects
under each cell condition).
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 431

ers under the standard condition, and one for third graders under the
generation condition.4
For both second and third graders, only one variable met the p = .05
entry level condition for predicting solution performance in the standard
condition, that of structural recall, F(1,34) = 22.45, MS, = .09, p < .OOl,
and F(1,35) = 6.51 MS, = .07, p < .02, respectively. Thus, a subject’s
ability to solve a problem depended on his or her ability to comprehend
the story properly. The ability to simply remember the final line to the
problem did not correlate significantly with solution performance. It
should be noted, however, that while this variable accounted for 40% of
the variance among third graders’ solution performance, it accounted for
only 16% of the variance among second graders’ solution performance.
The models for the generation condition presented a different picture.
Here third graders’ solution performance was determined by both their
ability to complete the problem story with an appropriate question (6, =
.61, SE, = .12, p < .OOOl)and their ability to recall the problem structure
properly, (6, = .35, SE, = .16, p < .04). This two-variable model ac-
counted for 67% of the variance in solution performance. Second graders’
solution performance, however, was significantly influenced by only one
factor, the ability to complete the problem story with an appropriate
question (b, = .33, SE, = .13, p < .02). Despite its statistical signifi-
cance, however, it should be noted that this model accounted for only
16% of the variance in second graders’ solution performance in this con-
dition. (Moreover, the regression coefficient for structural recall was sig-
nificant at the .15 level, suggesting a difficulty of statistical power.)
Clearly, second graders’ performance was far more idiosyncratic and
variable than was third graders’ performance. One interpretation is that
the rather taxing task demands exceeded their processing resources.
Finally, to ensure that the relationship between structural recall and
solution performance was not simply reflecting subject variability, the
deviation from expected frequencies in the correct-recall/correct-answer
case was computed for each subject as is described in Experiment 1.
These deviations were found to be significantly greater than zero, t(72) =
4.10, p < .OOOl, indicating that, on the average, structural recall and
solution performance correlated for each subject regardless of overall
performance level. The same result was observed for the relationship

4 Equation generation was not included in the regression models because it correlated
nearly perfectly with solution performance. That is, subjects had no diffkulty carrying out
the computations in their equations. If they wrote an appropriate equation, they got the
problem right; if they wrote the wrong equation, they got the problem wrong. The more
important question is what determined the subject’s ability to generate the right equation.
Since equation-writing and solution performance were nearly perfectly correlated, it follows
that the same variables that influenced the latter would also influence the former.
432 CUMMINS ET AL.

between question performance and solution performance for individual

subjects, t(72) = 6.05, SE = .07, p < .OOOl.
Qualitative aspects of question generation and solution pe$ormance.
The questions children generated were sensible. Only 2 out of the 288
questions children produced were “off the wall.” The remainder were
sensible questions, such as “How many altogether?“, or “How many did
Mary have left?“, which sometimesdid not fit the problem structure they
were supposed to have comprehended.
The types of questions that children generated to complete the stories
were directly related to the types of solution strategies adopted, as evi-
denced by the numbers in Table 6. When subjects completed a story with
a correct question, they tended to produce correct answers (71%). In
similar fashion, wrong operation errors tended to be preceded by wrong
operation questions (71%). (A wrong operation question is one that cues
the wrong arithmetic question, such as completing the subtraction Com-
pare problem in Table 4 with “How many altogether”). Given number
errors also tended to be preceded by given number questions (37%). (A
given number question is one that simply requests a number stated in the
problem, such as completing the Compare problem in Table 4 with “How
many has Jane saved?“). This tendency is probably underestimated in our
data because subjects were required to write equations to solve problems.
In order to produce a given number error under these circumstances, the
child had to ignore the equation he or she had written or fail to write one
at all. Finally, arithmetic errors really seemed to be “accidents” in that
85% of them were accompanied by the right question.
Model Predictions of Solution Performance
As in Experiment 1, we required the computer simulation model to
solve the problems used here under conditions of full knowledge, defi-

TABLE 6
Questions Generated and Solutions in Experiment 2
Response type
Question type co wo GN AR OTH Total
co 106 17 7 17 2 149
wo 10 35 4 0 0 49
GN 13 17 18 1 0 49
OTH 12 12 7 2 4 37
Total 141 81 36 20 6 284

Nore. Frequencies are based on four observations from each of 71 subjects. CO, Correct
answer; WO, wrong operation error; GN, given number error; AR, arithmetic error; OTH,
unclassifiable error.
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 433

cient conceptual knowledge, deficient story situation knowledge, and de-

ficient linguistic knowledge. It should be noted that the problems in Ex-
periment 2 are verbally complex, and no changeswere made to the model
to accommodate the complexities other than adding the necessary words
to its lexicon. As a result there was some question as to whether it could
handle these problems at all.
When required to solve the problems with full access to the three types
of knowledge, the simulation correctly solved 13 out of the 16 problems.
The three that it could not handle proved troublesome because they re-
quired verbal inferences in order to comprehend them. For example, one
problem stated that seven people each purchased one book. The simula-
tion created separate sets of “seven people” and “one book.” It could
not infer that in such a case, seven books would have been purchased.
Another problem stated that a boy gave his sister “some pencils” and
then later referred back to “the five pencils that he gave her.” The sim-
ulation again could not infer that these two phrases referred to the same
set. The last problem stated that two girls “traded” their doll collections.
The simulation could not infer that this meant a transfer of ownership.
The remaining problems were solved correctly, but with longer run times
and heavier processing loads than the problems in the first experiment.
The results of the simulations under conditions of degraded knowledge
are presented in Table 7. Once again, the simulation performed most like
children when its linguistic knowledge was impaired (11 out of 16 possible
matches). The next best match occurred when its story situation knowl-
edge was impaired (9 out of 16); the worst match was obtained when its
par-whole conceptual knowledge was degraded (6 out of 16).
The most striking thing about Table 7 is the predominance of wrong
operation errors among children and simulation alike. When solving the
standard word problems used in Experiment 1, children and our linguis-
tically degraded model tended to commit given number errors. While it is
not clear why children evidenced this switch in error type, examination of
the simulation’s protocols revealed the following: When solving the
sparsely worded problems in Experiment 1, the simulation often ended up
with unrelated sets in short-term memory and hence produced given num-
ber errors. Here, it seldom ended up with unrelated sets because the
specification of sets were complex, inviting more comparisons to be made
among them to determine which set could possibly serve as a superset.
This produced a tendency toward injudicious use of the least-specified
rule. Consider, for example, the Compare problem in Table 4. When
trying to solve this problem, the linguistically deficient model at first
ended up with three unrelated sets, just as in Experiment 1. However,
these sets contained elaborate specifications. As a result, its “least-
specified” rule caused it to falsely identify the last set created (How
434 CUMMINS ET AL.

TABLE 7
Characteristic Errors: Observed and Simulated-Experiment 2
Simulation error
Children’s errors
Problem (most frequent) (C)SL C(--S)L cs-L
Combine 5
A wo wo* SBN SBN
B wo wo* wo* wo*
C WO-SPN wo* wo* wo*
D WO-SPN wo* wo* wo*
Change 5
A wo U - SPN
B wo wo* - wo*
C wo wo* wo* wo*
D wo U - -
Change 6
A wo U wo* wo*
B WO-SPN U wo* wo*
C wo U - -
D WO-SBN U wo* wo*
Compare 5
A wo U wo* wo*
B wo U - wo*
C wo U wo* wo*
D wo U U U
Total matches (*) 6 9 11

Note. Conceptual errors constitute the most frequently observed conceptual errors based
on 36 subject observations per problem. Error types: WO, wrong operation errors; SPN,
superset given number errors; SBN, subset given number errors; -, no error; U, unable to
derive any solution. Simulation conditions: CSL, no conceptual knowledge; C-SL, no
problem situation knowledge; CS-L, degraded linguistic knowledge concerning key words
and phrases.
* Problems for which the simulation matched children’s error patterns.

many. . .) as a superset. Recall that this rule compares the specifications

of a group of sets and identifies the one that shares many features with
other sets but is feast specified as the superset. In our Compare problem
example, the specifications of the last set (i.e., dollars saved by Mimi)
overlaps with the other two (i.e., dollars saved by Jane for her racket;
dollars saved by Jane that are more than Mimi’s), but it contains fewer
specifications. Moreover, the latter two sets are disjoint. Therefore, the
simulation erroneously identified the dollars owned by Mimi to be the
superset whose cardinal had to be computed. As a result, it added the two
numbers.
To summarize, with intact knowledge, the simulation solved all the
problems that did not require world knowledge or sophisticated verbal
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 435

inferences. The best match with children’s error patterns was obtained
when its knowledge concerning key words and phrases were impaired.
More importantly, when its verbal knowledge was impaired but the prob-
lem texts were rich, its problem solving strategies changed. Rather than
simply terminating the problem solving episode with unrelated sets, it
attempted to use information from the problems’ rich text bases in order
to build par-whole schemas. It is possible that children attempted the
same strategies, causing a switch from given number to wrong operation
errors in their protocols.
DISCUSSION
Why are word problems so difficult? The results reported here suggest
that text comprehension factors figure heavily in word problem difficulty.
In Experiment 1, solution performance was found to mirror structural
recall, indicating that solution strategies are dictated by the quality of
comprehension achieved. Comprehension, in turn, appeared to be influ-
enced by the nature of the language used in the problem text. Problem
texts that contain certain linguistic forms are particularly difficult for
children to solve. These include forms such as “SOME,” “How many
more X’s than Y’s?“, and certain uses of “altogether.” Our structural
recall results show that these forms are often misinterpreted by children
and, moreover, misinterpreted in certain ways. Our simulation results
suggest that common solution error patterns are directly related to the
linguistic sophistication possessed by the solver. The empirical and sim-
ulation results of Experiment 2 indicated that solution strategies can be
directly influenced by the nature of the problem text.
More importantly, the simulation results of the two experiments clearly
show the interaction of text characteristics and knowledge in determining
solution strategies. Robust linguistic knowledge produced successful so-
lution attempts regardless of text characteristics, but the attempts were
more time and resource-demanding. Poor linguistic knowledge, however,
produced poor solution performance, but the nature of the errors com-
mitted depended on text characteristics. Sparse texts were associated
with given number errors; rich texts were associated with wrong opera-
tion errors and a preference for a more global super-set/subset conceptu-
alization of the problem situations. More important, the primary benefit
of proper linguistic knowledge in this domain appears to be in facilitating
access to conceptual knowledge concerning part-whole relations. Such
access allows the problem solver to construct large, cohesive problem
representations in which the relations among individual sets are clearly
specified.
This description of successful arithmetic problem solving as the build-
ing of large, cohesive structures is consistent with descriptions of problem
436 CUMMINS ET AL.

solving in other “adult” domains, such as physics (e.g., Chi, Feltovich, &
Glaser, 1981) and chess (Newell & Simon, 1972). In these domains, ex-
pertise development is typically considered a matter of constructing prob-
lem type schemata and using such structures to guide comprehension.
Indeed, the models of arithmetic problem solving expertise proposed by
Briars and Larkin and Riley et al. are based on this very notion. From this
view, then, the reason “How many more X’s are there than Y’s” is
difficult for children because it depends on the possession of a part-whole
superschema in memory to guide comprehension. This view, however,
does not explain adequately why a simple change in wording, such as that
used in Compare 4 as opposed to Compare 5, should improve perfor-
mance dramatically, as do other language manipulations (e.g., Hudson,
1983; DeCorte et al., 1985). Instead, it appears that certain verbal formats
allow contact to be made with superschema knowledge while others do
not. Results such as these suggest that word problem difficulties may be
akin to reasoning fallacies. For example, dramatic differences in reason-
ing about the logical conditional (if p, then q) have been produced by
manipulating problem format (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, Holyoak,
Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986; Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1977; Reich & Ruth,
1982). Typically, adults exhibit better performance when reasoning tasks
are presented in concrete formats (e.g., envelopes and postage require-
ments) rather than abstract, formal formats (e.g., letters and numbers).
Moreover, the strategies adults employ change as a function of the stim-
ulus format. For example, Reich and Ruth (1982) reported that adults tend
to match the terms mentioned in abstractly stated rules, but to verify
concretely stated rules-the latter being the more appropriate strategy for
the task. The tendency to produce given number errors in Experiment 1
may also be instances of this “matching” strategy: When faced with
problems whose text bases are sparse and incomprehensible due to am-
biguous linguistic terms, children may choose to ignore those terms and,
having no other useful information available, simply match actor’s names
with numbers stated in the problem. (Our simulation was found to employ
this strategy under these conditions.) If this were the case, then children
could be described as using the same strategies adults use to solve prob-
lems under conditions of uncertainty in unfamiliar domains.
Linguistic and resource factors, however, are not the whole story. How
well children perform on word problems depends, of course, on their
formal knowledge of the rules and operations in the problem domain and
on their level of conceptual development. These factors have been ex-
tensively studied both in the developmental and problem solving litera-
ture (Piaget, 1970; Greeno, 1978). The well-demonstrated significance of
such format factors, however, need not obscure the role played by com-
prehension factors. The experiments reported here provide rich evidence
 UNDERSTANDING WORD PROBLEMS 437

for their importance and help us derive a fuller understanding of the

processes involved in problem solving and reasoning. While Experiment
1 pointed to the contribution of linguistic factors, Experiment 2 demon-
strated the importance of situational understanding to solution success. If
a child understood the problem story well enough to generate an appro-
priate final question, he or she was very likely to derive the correct
solution to the problem. Investigations into the role of situational under-
standing are currently underway. Reusser (1985) is developing a model in
which a representation of the story situation is constructed prior to con-
struction of the arithmetic problem representation. Kintsch (1988) has
tried a different approach wherein arithmetic rules as well as general
situational constraints are integrated from the very beginning of the prob-
lem solving attempt. The details of these approaches, however, are be-
yond the scope of the present report.
The implications of the present paper go far beyond the domain of
children’s arithmetic. The various determinants of problem difficulty that
were explored here are likely to be important in any domain where prob-
lems are described in verbal formats. On the basis of the present findings,
it would seem worthwhile to investigate the role of text comprehension
factors in such domains. Moreover, the theory of arithmetic word prob-
lem solving investigated here may serve as a model for theorizing about
problem solving.

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(Accepted January 21, 1988)

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