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Regular Expression
Pocket Reference
 SECOND EDITION

Regular Expression
Pocket Reference

Tony Stubblebine

Beijing • Cambridge • Farnham • Köln • Paris • Sebastopol • Taipei • Tokyo

Regular Expression Pocket Reference, Second Edition
by Tony Stubblebine

Copyright © 2007, 2003 Tony Stubblebine. All rights reserved. Portions of

this book are based on Mastering Regular Expressions, by Jeffrey E. F. Friedl,
Copyright © 2006, 2002, 1997 O’Reilly Media, Inc.
Printed in Canada.
Published by O’Reilly Media, Inc., 1005 Gravenstein Highway North,
Sebastopol, CA 95472.
O’Reilly books may be purchased for educational, business, or sales
promotional use. Online editions are also available for most titles
(safari.oreilly.com). For more information, contact our corporate/
institutional sales department: (800) 998-9938 or corporate@oreilly.com.

Editor: Andy Oram Indexer: Johnna VanHoose Dinse

Production Editor: Sumita Mukherji Cover Designer: Karen Montgomery
Copyeditor: Genevieve d’Entremont Interior Designer: David Futato

Printing History:
August 2003: First Edition.
July 2007: Second Edition.

Nutshell Handbook, the Nutshell Handbook logo, and the O’Reilly logo are
registered trademarks of O’Reilly Media, Inc. The Pocket Reference series
designations, Regular Expression Pocket Reference, the image of owls, and
related trade dress are trademarks of O’Reilly Media, Inc.
Many of the designations used by manufacturers and sellers to distinguish
their products are claimed as trademarks. Where those designations appear
in this book, and O’Reilly Media, Inc. was aware of a trademark claim, the
designations have been printed in caps or initial caps.
Java™ is a trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc. Microsoft Internet Explorer
and .NET are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. Spider-Man
is a registered trademark of Marvel Enterprises, Inc.
While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this book, the
publisher and author assume no responsibility for errors or omissions, or for
damages resulting from the use of the information contained herein.

ISBN-10: 0-596-51427-1
ISBN-13: 978-0-596-51427-3
[T]
 Contents

About This Book 1

Introduction to Regexes and Pattern Matching 3
Regex Metacharacters, Modes, and Constructs 5
Unicode Support 13
Regular Expression Cookbook 13
Recipes 14
Perl 5.8 16
Supported Metacharacters 17
Regular Expression Operators 21
Unicode Support 23
Examples 24
Other Resources 25
Java (java.util.regex) 26
Supported Metacharacters 26
Regular Expression Classes and Interfaces 30
Unicode Support 35
Examples 36
Other Resources 38

v
.NET and C# 38
Supported Metacharacters 38
Regular Expression Classes and Interfaces 42
Unicode Support 47
Examples 47
Other Resources 49
PHP 50
Supported Metacharacters 50
Pattern-Matching Functions 54
Examples 56
Other Resources 58
Python 58
Supported Metacharacters 58
re Module Objects and Functions 61
Unicode Support 64
Examples 65
Other Resources 66
RUBY 66
Supported Metacharacters 67
Object-Oriented Interface 70
Unicode Support 75
Examples 75
JavaScript 77
Supported Metacharacters 77
Pattern-Matching Methods and Objects 79
Examples 82
Other Resources 83

vi | Contents
PCRE 83
Supported Metacharacters 84
PCRE API 89
Unicode Support 92
Examples 92
Other Resources 96
Apache Web Server 96
Supported Metacharacters 96
RewriteRule 99
Matching Directives 102
Examples 102
vi Editor 103
Supported Metacharacters 103
Pattern Matching 106
Examples 108
Other Resources 108
Shell Tools 109
Supported Metacharacters 109
Other Resources 114
Index 115

Contents | vii
 Regular Expression Pocket
Reference

Regular expressions are a language used for parsing and

manipulating text. They are often used to perform complex
search-and-replace operations, and to validate that text data
is well-formed.
Today, regular expressions are included in most program-
ming languages, as well as in many scripting languages,
editors, applications, databases, and command-line tools.
This book aims to give quick access to the syntax and
pattern-matching operations of the most popular of these
languages so that you can apply your regular-expression
knowledge in any environment.
The second edition of this book adds sections on Ruby and
Apache web server, common regular expressions, and also
updates existing languages.

About This Book

This book starts with a general introduction to regular
expressions. The first section describes and defines the
constructs used in regular expressions, and establishes the
common principles of pattern matching. The remaining sec-
tions of the book are devoted to the syntax, features, and
usage of regular expressions in various implementations.
The implementations covered in this book are Perl, Java™,
.NET and C#, Ruby, Python, PCRE, PHP, Apache web
server, vi editor, JavaScript, and shell tools.

1
Conventions Used in This Book
The following typographical conventions are used in this
book:
Italic
Used for emphasis, new terms, program names, and
URLs
Constant width
Used for options, values, code fragments, and any text
that should be typed literally
Constant width italic
Used for text that should be replaced with user-supplied
values
Constant width bold
Used in examples for commands or other text that
should be typed literally by the user

Acknowledgments
Jeffrey E. F. Friedl’s Mastering Regular Expressions (O’Reilly)
is the definitive work on regular expressions. While writing, I
relied heavily on his book and his advice. As a convenience,
this book provides page references to Mastering Regular
Expressions, Third Edition (MRE) for expanded discussion of
regular expression syntax and concepts.
Nat Torkington and Linda Mui were excellent editors who
guided me through what turned out to be a tricky first edi-
tion. This edition was aided by the excellent editorial skills of
Andy Oram. Sarah Burcham deserves special thanks for
giving me the opportunity to write this book, and for her
contributions to the “Shell Tools” section. More thanks for
the input and technical reviews from Jeffrey Friedl, Philip
Hazel, Steve Friedl, Ola Bini, Ian Darwin, Zak Greant, Ron
Hitchens, A.M. Kuchling, Tim Allwine, Schuyler Erle, David
Lents, Rabble, Rich Bowan, Eric Eisenhart, and Brad Merrill.

2 | Regular Expression Pocket Reference

Introduction to Regexes and Pattern
Matching
A regular expression is a string containing a combination of
normal characters and special metacharacters or metase-
quences. The normal characters match themselves.
Metacharacters and metasequences are characters or sequences
of characters that represent ideas such as quantity, locations,
or types of characters. The list in “Regex Metacharacters,
Modes, and Constructs” shows the most common metachar-
acters and metasequences in the regular expression world.
Later sections list the availability of and syntax for sup-
ported metacharacters for particular implementations of
regular expressions.
Pattern matching consists of finding a section of text that is
described (matched) by a regular expression. The underlying
code that searches the text is the regular expression engine.
You can predict the results of most matches by keeping two
rules in mind:
1. The earliest (leftmost) match wins
Regular expressions are applied to the input starting at
the first character and proceeding toward the last. As
soon as the regular expression engine finds a match, it
returns. (See MRE 148–149.)
2. Standard quantifiers are greedy
Quantifiers specify how many times something can be
repeated. The standard quantifiers attempt to match as
many times as possible. They settle for less than the max-
imum only if this is necessary for the success of the
match. The process of giving up characters and trying
less-greedy matches is called backtracking. (See MRE
151–153.)
Regular expression engines have differences based on their
type. There are two classes of engines: Deterministic Finite
Automaton (DFA) and Nondeterministic Finite Automaton

Introduction to Regexes and Pattern Matching | 3

(NFA). DFAs are faster, but lack many of the features of an
NFA, such as capturing, lookaround, and nongreedy quanti-
fiers. In the NFA world, there are two types: traditional and
POSIX.
DFA engines
DFAs compare each character of the input string to the
regular expression, keeping track of all matches in
progress. Since each character is examined at most once,
the DFA engine is the fastest. One additional rule to
remember with DFAs is that the alternation metase-
quence is greedy. When more than one option in an
alternation (foo|foobar) matches, the longest one is
selected. So, rule No. 1 can be amended to read “the
longest leftmost match wins.” (See MRE 155–156.)
Traditional NFA engines
Traditional NFA engines compare each element of the
regex to the input string, keeping track of positions
where it chose between two options in the regex. If an
option fails, the engine backtracks to the most recently
saved position. For standard quantifiers, the engine
chooses the greedy option of matching more text; how-
ever, if that option leads to the failure of the match, the
engine returns to a saved position and tries a less greedy
path. The traditional NFA engine uses ordered
alternation, where each option in the alternation is tried
sequentially. A longer match may be ignored if an earlier
option leads to a successful match. So, here rule #1 can
be amended to read “the first leftmost match after greedy
quantifiers have had their fill wins.” (See MRE 153–154.)
POSIX NFA engines
POSIX NFA Engines work similarly to Traditional NFAs
with one exception: a POSIX engine always picks the
longest of the leftmost matches. For example, the alter-
nation cat|category would match the full word
“category” whenever possible, even if the first alternative
(“cat”) matched and appeared earlier in the alternation.
(See MRE 153–154.)

4 | Regular Expression Pocket Reference

Regex Metacharacters, Modes, and Constructs
The metacharacters and metasequences shown here repre-
sent most available types of regular expression constructs
and their most common syntax. However, syntax and avail-
ability vary by implementation.

Character representations
Many implementations provide shortcuts to represent char-
acters that may be difficult to input. (See MRE 115–118.)
Character shorthands
Most implementations have specific shorthands for the
alert, backspace, escape character, form feed, newline,
carriage return, horizontal tab, and vertical tab
characters. For example, \n is often a shorthand for the
newline character, which is usually LF (012 octal), but
can sometimes be CR (015 octal), depending on the oper-
ating system. Confusingly, many implementations use \b
to mean both backspace and word boundary (position
between a “word” character and a nonword character).
For these implementations, \b means backspace in a char-
acter class (a set of possible characters to match in the
string), and word boundary elsewhere.
Octal escape: \num
Represents a character corresponding to a two- or three-
digit octal number. For example, \015\012 matches an
ASCII CR/LF sequence.
Hex and Unicode escapes: \xnum, \x{num}, \unum, \Unum
Represent characters corresponding to hexadecimal num-
bers. Four-digit and larger hex numbers can represent the
range of Unicode characters. For example, \x0D\x0A
matches an ASCII CR/LF sequence.
Control characters: \cchar
Corresponds to ASCII control characters encoded with
values less than 32. To be safe, always use an uppercase
char—some implementations do not handle lowercase

Introduction to Regexes and Pattern Matching | 5

 representations. For example, \cH matches Control-H, an
ASCII backspace character.

Character classes and class-like constructs

Character classes are used to specify a set of characters. A char-
acter class matches a single character in the input string that is
within the defined set of characters. (See MRE 118–128.)
Normal classes: [...] and [^...]
Character classes, [...], and negated character classes,
[^...], allow you to list the characters that you do or do
not want to match. A character class always matches one
character. The - (dash) indicates a range of characters.
For example, [a-z] matches any lowercase ASCII letter.
To include the dash in the list of characters, either list it
first, or escape it.
Almost any character: dot (.)
Usually matches any character except a newline. How-
ever, the match mode usually can be changed so that dot
also matches newlines. Inside a character class, dot
matches just a dot.
Class shorthands: \w, \d, \s, \W, \D, \S
Commonly provided shorthands for word character,
digit, and space character classes. A word character is
often all ASCII alphanumeric characters plus the under-
score. However, the list of alphanumerics can include
additional locale or Unicode alphanumerics, depending
on the implementation. A lowercase shorthand (e.g., \s)
matches a character from the class; uppercase (e.g., \S)
matches a character not from the class. For example, \d
matches a single digit character, and is usually equiva-
lent to [0-9].
POSIX character class: [:alnum:]
POSIX defines several character classes that can be used
only within regular expression character classes (see
Table 1). Take, for example, [:lower:]. When written as
[[:lower:]], it is equivalent to [a-z] in the ASCII locale.

6 | Regular Expression Pocket Reference

Table 1. POSIX character classes
Class Meaning
Alnum Letters and digits.
Alpha Letters.
Blank Space or tab only.
Cntrl Control characters.
Digit Decimal digits.
Graph Printing characters, excluding space.
Lower Lowercase letters.
Print Printing characters, including space.
Punct Printing characters, excluding letters and digits.
Space Whitespace.
Upper Uppercase letters.
Xdigit Hexadecimal digits.

Unicode properties, scripts, and blocks: \p{prop}, \P{prop}

The Unicode standard defines classes of characters that
have a particular property, belong to a script, or exist
within a block. Properties are the character’s defining char-
acteristics, such as being a letter or a number (see Table 2).
Scripts are systems of writing, such as Hebrew, Latin, or
Han. Blocks are ranges of characters on the Unicode char-
acter map. Some implementations require that Unicode
properties be prefixed with Is or In. For example, \p{Ll}
matches lowercase letters in any Unicode-supported lan-
guage, such as a or α.
Unicode combining character sequence: \X
Matches a Unicode base character followed by any
number of Unicode-combining characters. This is a
shorthand for \P{M}\p{M}. For example, \X matches è; as
well as the two characters e'.

Introduction to Regexes and Pattern Matching | 7

Table 2. Standard Unicode properties
Property Meaning
\p{L} Letters.
\p{Ll} Lowercase letters.
\p{Lm} Modifier letters.
\p{Lo} Letters, other. These have no case, and are not considered
modifiers.
\p{Lt} Titlecase letters.
\p{Lu} Uppercase letters.
\p{C} Control codes and characters not in other categories.
\p{Cc} ASCII and Latin-1 control characters.
\p{Cf} Nonvisible formatting characters.
\p{Cn} Unassigned code points.
\p{Co} Private use, such as company logos.
\p{Cs} Surrogates.
\p{M} Marks meant to combine with base characters, such as accent
marks.
\p{Mc} Modification characters that take up their own space. Examples
include “vowel signs.”
\p{Me} Marks that enclose other characters, such as circles, squares, and
diamonds.
\p{Mn} Characters that modify other characters, such as accents and
umlauts.
\p{N} Numeric characters.
\p{Nd} Decimal digits in various scripts.
\p{Nl} Letters that represent numbers, such as Roman numerals.
\p{No} Superscripts, symbols, or nondigit characters representing
numbers.
\p{P} Punctuation.
\p{Pc} Connecting punctuation, such as an underscore.
\p{Pd} Dashes and hyphens.
\p{Pe} Closing punctuation complementing \p{Ps}.
\p{Pi} Initial punctuation, such as opening quotes.

8 | Regular Expression Pocket Reference

Table 2. Standard Unicode properties (continued)
Property Meaning
\p{Pf} Final punctuation, such as closing quotes.
\p{Po} Other punctuation marks.
\p{Ps} Opening punctuation, such as opening parentheses.
\p{S} Symbols.
\p{Sc} Currency.
\p{Sk} Combining characters represented as individual characters.
\p{Sm} Math symbols.
\p{So} Other symbols.
\p{Z} Separating characters with no visual representation.
\p{Zl} Line separators.
\p{Zp} Paragraph separators.
\p{Zs} Space characters.

Anchors and zero-width assertions

Anchors and “zero-width assertions” match positions in the
input string. (See MRE 128–134.)
Start of line/string: ^, \A
Matches at the beginning of the text being searched. In
multiline mode, ^ matches after any newline. Some
implementations support \A, which matches only at the
beginning of the text.
End of line/string: $, \Z, \z
$ matches at the end of a string. In multiline mode, $
matches before any newline. When supported, \Z matches
the end of string or the point before a string-ending new-
line, regardless of match mode. Some implementations
also provide \z, which matches only the end of the string,
regardless of newlines.

Introduction to Regexes and Pattern Matching | 9

Start of match: \G
In iterative matching, \G matches the position where the
previous match ended. Often, this spot is reset to the
beginning of a string on a failed match.
Word boundary: \b, \B, \<, \>
Word boundary metacharacters match a location where a
word character is next to a nonword character. \b often
specifies a word boundary location, and \B often specifies a
not-word-boundary location. Some implementations pro-
vide separate metasequences for start- and end-of-word
boundaries, often \< and \>.
Lookahead: (?=...), (?!...)
Lookbehind: (?<=...), (?<!...)
Lookaround constructs match a location in the text where
the subpattern would match (lookahead), would not
match (negative lookahead), would have finished match-
ing (lookbehind), or would not have finished matching
(negative lookbehind). For example, foo(?=bar) matches
foo in foobar, but not food. Implementations often limit
lookbehind constructs to subpatterns with a predeter-
mined length.

Comments and mode modifiers

Mode modifiers change how the regular expression engine
interprets a regular expression. (See MRE 110–113, 135–136.)
Multiline mode: m
Changes the behavior of ^ and $ to match next to new-
lines within the input string.
Single-line mode: s
Changes the behavior of . (dot) to match all characters,
including newlines, within the input string.
Case-insensitive mode: i
Treat letters that differ only in case as identical.

10 | Regular Expression Pocket Reference

Free-spacing mode: x
Allows for whitespace and comments within a regular
expression. The whitespace and comments (starting with
# and extending to the end of the line) are ignored by the
regular expression engine.
Mode modifiers: (?i), (?-i), (?mod:...)
Usually, mode modifiers may be set within a regular
expression with (?mod) to turn modes on for the rest of
the current subexpression; (?-mod) to turn modes off for
the rest of the current subexpression; and (?mod: ...) to
turn modes on or off between the colon and the closing
parentheses. For example, use (?i:perl) matches use
perl, use Perl, use PeRl, etc.
Comments: (?#...) and #
In free-spacing mode, # indicates that the rest of the line is
a comment. When supported, the comment span (?#...)
can be embedded anywhere in a regular expression,
regardless of mode. For example, .{0,80}(?#Field limit
is 80 chars) allows you to make notes about why you
wrote .{0,80}.
Literal-text span: \Q...\E
Escapes metacharacters between \Q and \E. For example,
\Q(.*)\E is the same as \(\.\*\).

Grouping, capturing, conditionals, and control

This section covers syntax for grouping subpatterns, captur-
ing submatches, conditional submatches, and quantifying the
number of times a subpattern matches. (See MRE 137–142.)
Capturing and grouping parentheses: (...) and \1, \2, etc.
Parentheses perform two functions: grouping and captur-
ing. Text matched by the subpattern within parentheses is
captured for later use. Capturing parentheses are num-
bered by counting their opening parentheses from the left.
If backreferences are available, the submatch can be
referred to later in the same match with \1, \2, etc. The

Introduction to Regexes and Pattern Matching | 11

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ideation which I have distinguished are so constantly and so
intimately blended together, that analysis of the adult mind
corroborates the fact already yielded by analysis of the infantile
mind, namely, that the distinctions (which I have been obliged to
draw in order to examine the allegations of my opponents) are all
essentially or intrinsically artificial. My position is that Mind is
everywhere continuous, and if for purposes of analysis or
classification we require to draw lines of demarcation between the
lower and the higher faculties thereof, I contend that we should only
do so as an evolutionist classifies his animal or vegetable species:
higher or lower do not betoken differences of origin, but differences
of development. And just as the naturalist finds a general
corroboration of this view in the fact that structural and functional
characters are carried upwards from lower to higher forms of life,
thus knitting them all together in the bonds of organic evolution; so
may the psychologist find that even the highest forms of human
intelligence unmistakably share the more essential characters met
with in the lower, thus bearing testimony to their own lineage in a
continuous system of mental evolution.
Let us, then, briefly contemplate the relations that obtain in the
adult human mind between the boasted faculties of conceptual
judgment, and the lower faculties of non-conceptual. Although I
agree with my opponents in holding that predication (in the strict
sense of the term) is dependent on introspection, I further hold that
not every statement made by adult man is a predication in this
sense: the vast majority of our verbal propositions are made for the
practical purposes of communication, or without the mind pausing to
contemplate the propositions as such in the light of self-
consciousness. When I say “A negro is black,” I do not require to
think all the formidable array of things that Mr. Mivart says I
affirm[139]; and, on the other hand, when I perform an act of
conscious introspection, I do not always require to perform an act of
mental predication. No doubt in many cases, or in those where
highly abstract ideation is concerned, this independence of the two
faculties arises from each having undergone so much elaboration by
the assistance which it has derived from the other, that both are
now, so to speak, in possession of a large body of organized material
on which to operate, without requiring, whensoever they are
exercised, to build up the structure of this material ab initio. Thus, to
take an example, when I say “Heat is a mode of motion,” I am using
what is now to me a merely verbal sign which expresses an external
fact: I do not require to examine my own ideas upon the abstract
terms in the abstract relation which the proposition sets forth. But
for the original attainment of these ideas I had to exercise many and
complex efforts of conceptual thought, without the previous
occurrence of which I should not now have been able to use, with
full understanding of its import, this verbal sign. Thus all such
predications, however habitual and mechanical they may become,
must at some time have required the mind to examine the ideas
which they announce. And, similarly, all acts of such mental
examination—i.e. all acts of introspection,—however superfluous
they may now appear when their known product is used for further
acts of mental examination, must originally have required the mind
to pause before them and make to itself a definite statement or
predication of their meaning.[140]
But although I hold this to be the true explanation of the
apparent independence of predication and introspection in all cases
of highly abstract thought, I am firmly convinced that in all cases
where those lower orders of ideation to which I have so often
referred as receptual and pre-conceptual are concerned, the
independence is not only apparent, but real. This, indeed, I have
already proved must be the case with the pre-conceptual
propositions of a young child, inasmuch as such propositions are
then made in the absence of self-consciousness, or of the necessary
condition to their being in any degree introspective. But the point
now is, that even in the adult human mind non-conceptual
predication is habitual, and that, in cases where only receptual
ideation is concerned, predication of this kind need never have been
conceptual. For, as Mill very truly says, “it will be admitted that, by
asserting the proposition, we wish to communicate information of
that physical fact (namely, that the summit of Chimborazo is white),
and are not thinking of the names, except as the necessary means
of making that communication. The meaning of the proposition,
therefore, is that the individual thing denoted by the subject has the
attributes connoted by the predicate.”[141]
Now, if it is thus true that even in ordinary predication we may
not require to take conceptual cognizance of the matter predicated—
having to do only with the apposition of names immediately
suggested by association,—the ideation concerned becomes so
closely affiliated with that which is expressed in the lower levels of
sign-making, that even if the connecting links were not supplied by
the growing child, no one would be justified, on psychological
grounds alone, in alleging any difference of kind between one level
and another. The object of all sign-making is primarily that of
communication, and from our study of the lower animals we know
that communication first has to do exclusively with recepts, while
from our study of the growing child we know that it is the signs used
in the communication of recepts which first lead to the formation of
concepts. For concepts are first of all named recepts, known as
such; and we have seen in previous chapters that this kind of
knowledge (i.e. of names as names) is rendered possible by
introspection, which, in turn is reached by the naming of self as an
agent. But even after the power of conceptual introspection has
been fully reached, demand is not always made upon it for the
communication of merely receptual knowledge; and therefore it is
that not every proposition requires to be introspectively
contemplated as such before it can be made. Given the power of
denotative nomination on the one hand, and the power of even the
lowest degree of connotative nomination on the other, and all the
conditions are furnished to the formation of non-conceptual
statements, which differ from true propositions only in that they do
not themselves become objects of thought. And the only difference
between such a statement when made by a young child, and the
same statement when similarly made by a grown man, is that in the
former case it is not even potentially capable of itself becoming an
object of thought.

Here, then, the psychological examination of my opponents’

position comes to an end. And, in the result, I claim to have shown
that in whatever way we regard the distinctively human faculty of
conceptual predication, it is proved to be but a higher development
of that faculty of receptual communication, the ascending degrees of
which admit of being traced through the brute creation up to the
level which they attain in a child during the first part of its second
year,—after which they continue to advance uninterruptedly through
the still higher receptual life of the child, until by further though not
less imperceptible growth they pass into the incipiently conceptual
life of a human mind—which, nevertheless, is not even then nearly
so far removed from the intelligence of the lower animals, as it is
from that which in the course of its own subsequent evolution it is
eventually destined to become.
 CHAPTER XII.

COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY.

We have now repeatedly seen that there is only one argument in

favour of the view that the elsewhere continuous and universal
process of evolution—mental as well as organic—was interrupted at
its terminal phase, and that this argument stands on the ground of
psychology. But we have also seen that even upon this its own
ground the argument admits of abundant refutation. In order the
more clearly to show that such is the case, I have hitherto
designedly kept my discussion within the limits of psychological
science. The time, however, has now come when I can afford to take
a new point of departure. It is to Language that my opponents
appeal: to Language they shall go.
In previous chapters I have more than once remarked that the
science of historical psychology is destitute of fossils: unlike pre-
historic structures, pre-historic ideas leave behind them no record of
their existence. But now a partial exception must be taken to this
general statement. For the new science of Comparative Philology has
revealed the important fact that, if on the one hand speech gives
expression to ideas, on the other hand it receives impression from
them, and that the impressions thus stamped are surprisingly
persistent. The consequence is that in philology we possess the
same kind of unconscious record of the growth and decay of ideas,
as is furnished by palæontology of the growth and decay of species.
Thus viewed, language may be regarded as the stratified deposit of
thoughts, wherein they lie embedded ready to be unearthed by the
labours of the man of science.
In now turning to this important branch of my subject, I may
remark in limine that, like all the sciences, philology can be
cultivated only by those who devote themselves specially to the
purpose. My function, therefore, will here be that of merely putting
together the main results of philological research, so far as this has
hitherto proceeded, and so far as these results appear to me to have
any bearing upon the “origin of human faculty.” Being thus myself
obliged to rely upon authority, where I find that authorities are in
conflict—which, I need hardly say, is often the case—I will either
avoid the points of disagreement, or else state what has to be said
on both sides of the question. But where I find that all competent
authorities are in substantial agreement, I will not burden my
exposition by tautological quotations.
Among the earlier students of language it was a moot question
whether the faculty had its origin in Divine inspiration or in human
invention. So long as the question touching the origin of language
was supposed to be restricted to one or other of these alternatives,
the special creationists in this department of thought may be
regarded as having had the best of the argument. And this for the
following reasons. Their opponents, for the most part, were unfairly
handicapped by a general assumption of special creation as regards
the origin of man, and also by a general belief in the confusion of
tongues at the Tower of Babel. The theory of evolution having been
as yet unformulated, there was an antecedent presumption in favour
of the Divine origin of speech, since it appeared in the last degree
improbable that Adam and Eve should have been created “with full-
summed powers” of intellect, without the means of communicating
their ideas to one another. And even where scientific investigators
were not expressly dominated by acceptance of the biblical
cosmology, many of them were nevertheless implicitly influenced by
it, to the extent of supposing that if language were not the result of
direct inspiration, it can only have been the result of deliberate
invention. But against this supposition of language having been
deliberately invented, it was easy for orthodox opponents to answer
—“Daily experience informs us, that men who have not learned to
articulate in their childhood, never afterwards acquire the faculty of
speech but by such helps as savages cannot obtain; and therefore, if
speech were invented at all, it must have been either by children
who were incapable of invention, or by men who were incapable of
speech. A thousand, nay, a million, of children could not think of
inventing a language. While the organs are pliable, there is not
understanding enough to frame the conception of a language; and
by the time that there is understanding, the organs are become too
stiff for the task, and therefore, say the advocates for the Divine
origin of language, reason as well as history intimates that mankind
in all ages must have been speaking animals—the young having
constantly acquired this art by imitating those who are older; and we
may warrantably conclude that our first parents received it by
immediate inspiration.”[142]
There remained, however, the alternative that language might
have been the result neither of Divine inspiration nor of human
invention; but of natural growth. And although this alternative was
clearly perceived by some of the earlier philologists, its full
significance could not be appreciated before the advent of the
general theory of evolution.[143] Nevertheless, it is here of interest
to observe that the theory of evolution was clearly educed from, and
applied to, the study of languages by some of the more scientific
philologists, before it had been clearly enunciated by naturalists.
Thus, for instance, Dr. Latham, while criticizing the passage above
quoted, wrote in 1857:—“In the actual field of language, the lines of
demarcation are less definitely marked than in the preceding sketch.
The phenomena of growth, however, are, upon the whole, what it
suggests.... In order to account for the existing lines of demarcation,
which are broad and definite, we must bear in mind a fresh
phenomenon, viz. the spread of one dialect at the expense of
others, a fact which obliterates intermediate forms, and brings
extreme ones into geographical juxtaposition.”[144]
Now, at the present day—owing partly to the establishment of
the doctrine of evolution in the science of biology, but much more to
direct evidence furnished by the science of philology itself—students
of language are unanimous in their adoption of the developmental
theory. Even Professor Max Müller insists that “no student of the
science of language can be anything but an evolutionist, for,
wherever he looks, he sees nothing but evolution going on all
around him;”[145] while Schleicher goes so far as to say that “the
development of new forms from preceding forms can be much more
easily traced, and this on even a larger scale, in the province of
words, than in that of plants and animals.”[146]
Here, however, it is needful to distinguish between language and
languages. A philologist may be firmly convinced that all languages
have developed by way of natural growth from those simplest
elements, or “roots,” which we shall presently have to consider. But
he may nevertheless hesitate to conclude, with anything like equal
certainty, that these simplest elements were themselves developed
from still lower ingredients of the sign-making faculty; and hence
that not only all languages in particular, but the faculty of language
in general, has been the result of a natural evolution.
Here then, let it be noted, we are in the presence of exactly the
same distinction with regard to the origin of language, as we were at
the beginning of this treatise with regard to the origin of man. For
we there saw that while we have the most cogent historical evidence
in proof of the principles of evolution having governed the progress
of civilization, we have no such direct evidence of the descent of
man from a brutal ancestry. And here also we find that, so long as
the light of history is able to guide us, there can be no doubt that
the principles of evolution have determined the gradual development
of languages, in a manner strictly analogous to that in which they
have determined the ever-increasing refinement and complexity of
social organization. Now, in the latter case we saw that such direct
evidence of evolution from lower to higher levels of culture renders it
well-nigh certain that the method must have extended backwards
beyond the historical period; and hence, that such direct evidence of
evolution uniformly pervading the historical period, in itself furnishes
a strong primâ facie presumption that this period was itself reached
by means of a similarly gradual development of human faculty. And
thus, also, it is in the case of language. If philology is able to prove
the fact of evolution in all known languages as far back as the
primitive roots out of which they have severally grown, the
presumption becomes exceedingly strong that these earliest and
simplest elements, like their later and more complex products, were
the result of a natural growth.
Nevertheless, as I have said, it is important to distinguish
between demonstrated fact and speculative inference, however
strong; and, therefore, I will begin by briefly stating the stages of
evolution through which languages are now generally recognized by
philologists to have passed, without at present considering the more
difficult question as to the origin of roots.
Supposing we take such a word as “uncostliness.” Obviously here
the “un” the “li” and the “ness” are derivative appendages,
demonstrative elements, suffixes and affixes, or whatever else we
care to call modifying constants which the speakers of a language
are in the habit of adding to their root-words, for the sake of ringing
upon those words whatever changes of meaning occasion may
require. These modifying constants, of course, have all had a history,
which often admits of being traced. Thus, for instance, in the above
illustration, we know that the “li” is an abbreviation of what used to
be pronounced as “like;” the “ness,” however, being older than the
English language; while the “un” dates back still further. The word
“cost,” then, is here the root, as far as English is concerned—though
it can be followed (through the Latin con-sta) to an Aryan root,
signifying “stand.”
These modifying constants, moreover, are not restricted to
suffixes, infixes, and affixes attached to roots, so as to constitute
single (or compound) words: they also occur as themselves separate
words, which admit of being built into the structure of sentences as
pronouns, adverbs, prepositions, &c. And they may occur likewise as
so-called “auxiliary verbs,” in the case of some languages, while in
the case of others their functions are served by grammatical
“inflection” of the words themselves. Thus, according to the “genius”
of a language, its roots are made to lend themselves to significant
treatment in different ways, or according to different methods. But
in all cases the roots are present, and serve as what may be termed
the back-bone of a language: the demonstrative elements, in
whatever form they appear, are merely what I have termed
modifying constants.
From this general fact we may be prepared to expect, on the
theory of evolution, that in all languages the roots should be the
oldest elements; those elements which serve only the function of
“demonstrating” the particular meaning which is to be assigned to
the roots on particular occasions, we should expect to have been of
later growth. For they serve only the function of giving specific
meanings to the general meanings already present in the roots; and,
therefore, in the absence of the roots would themselves present no
meaning at all. Consequently, as I have said, we should antecedently
expect to find that the roots are the earliest discoverable (though
not on this account necessarily the most primitive) elements of all
languages. And this, as a general rule, is what we do find. In tracing
back the family tree of any group of languages, different
demonstrative elements are found on different branches, though all
these branches proceed from (i.e. are found to contain) the same
roots. Of course these roots may be variously modified, both as to
sound and the groups of words to which in the different branches
they have given origin; but such divergent evolution merely tends to
corroborate the proof of a common descent among all the branches
concerned.[147]
I have said that all philologists now agree in accepting the
doctrine of evolution as applied to languages in general; while there
is no such universal agreement touching the precise method or
history of evolution in the case of particular languages. I will,
therefore, first give a brief statement of the main facts of language-
structure, and afterwards render an equally short account of the
different views which are entertained upon the question of
language-development. Or, to borrow terms from another science, I
will first deal with the morphology of the main divisions of the
language-kingdom, and then proceed to consider the question of
their phylogeny.

More than a thousand languages exist as “living” languages, no

one of which is intelligible to the speakers of another. These
separate languages, however, are obviously divisible into families—all
the members of each family being more or less closely allied, while
members of different families do not present any such evidence of
genetic affinity. The test of genetic affinity is resemblance in
structure, grammar, and roots. Judged by this test, the thousand or
more living languages are classified by Professor Friedrich Müller
under “about one hundred families.”[148] Therefore, again to borrow
biological terms, we may say that there are about one thousand
existing “species” of language, which fall into about one hundred
“genera”—all the species in each genus being undoubtedly
connected by the ties of genetic affinity.
But besides these species and genera of language, there are
what may be termed “orders”—or much larger divisions, each
comprising many of the genera. By philologists these orders are
usually called “groups,” and whether or not there is any genetic
relation among them is still an unsettled question. From the very
earliest days of true linguistic research, three of these groups have
been recognized, and called respectively, (1) the Isolating, (2) the
Agglutinative, and (3) the Inflectional. I will first explain the meaning
which these names are intended to bear, and then proceed to
consider the results of more recent research upon the question of
their phylogeny.
In the Isolating forms of language every word stands by itself,
without being capable of inflectional change for purposes of
grammatical construction, and without admitting of much assistance
for such purposes from demonstrative elements, or modifying
constants. Languages of this kind are often called Monosyllabic, from
the fact that the isolated words usually occur in the form of single
syllables. They have also been called Radical, from the resemblance
which their monosyllabic and isolated words present to the primitive
roots of languages of other types—roots which, as already indicated,
have been unearthed by the labours of the comparative philologist.
Thus, upon the whole, the best idea of an isolating language may be
gained by comparing it with the “nursery-language” of our own
children, who naturally express themselves, when first beginning to
speak, by using monosyllabic and isolated words, which further
resemble the languages in question by not clearly distinguishing
between what we understand as “parts of speech.” For in isolating
tongues such variations of grammatical meaning as the words are
capable of conveying are mainly produced, either by differences of
intonation, or by changing the positions which words occupy in a
sentence. Of course these expedients obtain more or less in
languages of both the other types; but in the isolating group they
have been wrought up into a much greater variety and nicety of
usage, so as to become fairly good substitutes for modifying
constants on the one hand, and inflectional change on the other.
Nevertheless, although inflectional change is wholly absent,
modifying constants in the form of auxiliary words are not so. In
Chinese, for example, there are what the native grammarians call
“full words,” and “empty words.” The full words are the monosyllabic
terms, which, when standing by themselves, present meanings of
such vague generality as to include, for instance, a ball, round, to
make round, in a circle: that is to say, the full words when standing
alone do not belong to any one part of speech more than to another.
Moreover, one such word may present many totally different
meanings, such as to be, truly, he, the letter, thus. In order,
therefore, to notify the particular meaning which a full word is
intended to convey, the empty words are used as aids
supplementary to the devices of intonation and syntax. It is probable
that all these empty words were once themselves full words, the
meanings of which gradually became obscured, until they acquired a
purely arbitrary use for the purpose of defining the sense in which
other words were to be understood—just as our word “like,” in its
degenerated form of “ly,” is now employed to give adjectives the
force of adverbs; although, of course, there is the difference that in
isolating tongues the empty or defining words are not fused into the
full ones, but themselves remain isolated. In the opinion of many
philologists, however, “the use of accessory words, in order to impart
the required precision to the principal terms, is the path that leads
from monosyllabic to the agglutinative state.”[149]
This Agglutinative, or, as it is sometimes called, Agglomerative
state belongs to languages of the second order. Here the words
which serve the purpose of modifying constants, or marks of
relationship, become fusible with the words which they serve to
modify or define, so as to constitute single though polysyllabic
compounds, as in the above example, “un-cost-li-ness.” I have
already remarked that by long usage many of these modifying
constants have had their own original meanings as independent
words so completely obscured as to baffle the researches of
philologists.
If all our words had been formed on the type of this example un-
cost-li-ness, English would have been an agglutinative language.
But, as a matter of fact, English, like the rest of the group to which it
mainly belongs, has adopted the device of inflecting many of its
words (or, rather, has inherited this device from some of its
progenitors), and thus belongs to the third order of languages which
I have mentioned, namely, the Inflective. Languages of this type are
also often termed Transpositive, because the words now admit of
being shifted about as to their relative positions in a sentence,
without the meaning being thereby affected. That is to say, relations
between words are now marked much less by syntax, and much
more by individual change. In languages of this kind the principle of
agglutination has been so perfected that the original composition is
more or less obscured, and the resulting words therefore admit of
being themselves twisted into a variety of shapes significant of finer
grades of meaning, in the way of declension, conjugation, &c. Or, to
state the case as it has been stated by some philologists, in
agglutinative tongues the welded elements are not sufficiently
welded to admit of flexion: they are too loosely joined together, or
still too independent one of another. But when the union has grown
more intimate, the structure allows of more artistic treatment at the
hands of language-makers: the “amalgamation” of elements having
become complete, the resulting alloy can be manipulated in a variety
of ways without involving its disintegration. Moreover, this principle
of inflection may extend from the component parts to the root itself;
not only suffixes and prefixes, but even the word which these
modify, may undergo inflectional change. So that, upon the whole,
the best general idea of these various types of language-structure
may perhaps be given by the following formulæ, which I take from
Hovelacque.[150]
In the isolating type the formula of a word is simply R, and that
of a sentence R+R+R, &c., where R stands for “root.” If we
represent by r those roots whose sense has become obscured so as
to pass into the state of prefixes and suffixes significant only of
relationship between other words, we shall have a formula of
agglutination, Rr, Rrr, rR, rRr, &c. Lastly, the essence of an inflecting
language consists in the power of a root to express, by modification
of its own form, its various relations to other roots. Not that the
roots of all words are necessarily modified; for they often remain as
they do in agglutinating tongues. But they may be modified, and
“languages in which relations may be thus expressed, not only by
suffixes and prefixes, but also by a modification of the form of the
roots, are inflectional languages.” Therefore, if we represent this
power of inflectional change on the part of the root itself by the
symbol x, the agglutinating formula Rr may become Rxr. Moreover,
the modifying elements may also be inflected, words thus yielding
such formulæ as Rrx, Rrrx, &c.
Such, then, are the three main groups or orders of language. But
in addition to them we must notice three others, which have been
shown to be clearly separable. These three additional groups are the
Polysynthetic, the Incorporating, and the Analytic.
The Polysynthetic (= Incapsulating) order is found among certain
savages, especially on the continent of America, where, according to
Duponceau, more or less distinctive adherence to this type is to be
met with from Greenland to Chili. The peculiarity of such languages
consists in the indefinite composition of words by syncope and
ellipsis. That is to say, sentences are formed by the running together
of compound words of inordinate length, and in the process of
fusion the constituent words are so much abbreviated as often to be
represented by no more than a single intercalated letter. For
example, the Greenland aulisariartorasuarpok, “he-hastened-to-go-
afishing,” is made up of aulisar, “to fish,” peartor, “to be engaged in
anything,” pinnesuarpok, “he hastens:” and the Chippeway
totoccabo, “wine,” is formed of toto, “milk,” with chominabo, “a
bunch of grapes.” Thus, polysynthesis consists of fusion with
contraction, some of the component words losing their first, and
others their last syllables. Moreover, composition of this kind further
differs from that which occurs in many other types of language (e.g.
our adjectival never-to-be-forgotten), in that the constituent parts
may never have attained the rank of independent words, which can
be set apart and employed by themselves.
The Incorporating order is merely a subdivision of the
agglutinative, and represents an earlier stage of it, wherein the
speakers had not yet begun to analyze their sentences, and so still
retain in their sentences subordinate words in cumbersome variety,
as, for example, “House-I-it-built;” “They-have-them-their-books.”
Again, the Analytic order is merely a subdivision of the
inflectional, and represents a later stage of it. “One by one the
grammatical relations implied in an inflectional compound are
brought out into full relief, and provided with special forms in which
to be expressed.” Thus, in English, for example, inflections have
largely given place to the use of “auxiliary” words, whereby most of
the advantages of refined distinction are retained, while the
machinery of expression is considerably simplified.
 So that, on the whole, we may classify the Language-kingdom
thus:—

Order I. Isolating.
Order II. Agglutinative: (Sub-orders, Polysynthetic and
Incorporating).
Order III. Inflectional: (Sub-order, Analytic).

In the opinion of some philologists, however, the Polysynthetic

type deserves to be regarded, not as a sub-order of the
Agglutinative, but as itself independent of all the other three, and
therefore constituting a fourth order. Thus, on the one hand, we
have it said that polysynthetic languages must “simply be placed last
in the ascending order of the agglutinating series;”[151] while, on the
other hand, it is said, “the conception of the sentence that underlies
the polysynthetic dialects is the precise converse of that which
underlies the isolating or the agglutinative types; the several ideas
into which the sentence may be analyzed, instead of being made
equal or independent, are combined, like a piece of mosaic, into a
single whole.”[152]
These two representative quotations may serve to show how
accentuated is the difference of teaching with regard to this
particular group of languages. As a mere matter of classification, of
course, the question would not be of any importance for us; but as
the question of classification involves one of phylogeny, the matter
does acquire considerable interest in relation to our subject.

Turning, then, from the classification of language-types to their

phylogeny, no one disputes that what I have called the sub-order
Incorporating is genetically connected with the order Agglutinative;
or that the sub-order Analytic is similarly connected with the order
Inflectional. Indeed, these sub-orders are merely branches of these
two respective trunks. The question before us, therefore, reduces
itself to the relations between the three orders inter se, and also
between the polysynthetic type and Order II. I will deal with these
two cases separately.
On the one hand it is argued that the isolating, monosyllabic, or
“nursery” type of speech must be regarded as the most primitive—in
fact, that it presents to actual observation the continued “survival” of
that embryonic or “radical” stage of development out of which all the
subsequent growths of language have arisen. Again, the proved fact
of agglutination is seen to represent a long course of development,
wherein words previously isolated were run together into compounds
for the purpose of securing that higher differentiation of language-
growth which we know as parts of speech. Similarly, the inflectional
stage is taken to have been a further elaboration of the
agglutinative, in the manner already explained; while, lastly, the use
of auxiliary words in analytic tongues is regarded as the final
consummation of language-growth.
The theory thus briefly sketched is still maintained by many
philologists; and, indeed, in some of its parts is not a theory at all,
but a matter of demonstrable fact. Thus, it is manifestly impossible
that the phenomena of agglutination can be presented before there
are elements to agglutinate: these elements, therefore, must have
preceded that process of fusion wherein the “genius” of agglutinated
speech consists. Similarly, of course, agglutination must have
preceded the inflection of already agglutinated words; while the use
of auxiliaries can be proved to have been historically subsequent to
inflection. Nevertheless, other philologists have shown good ground
for questioning our right to regard these facts as justifying so
universal a theory as that the law of language-growth is always to
be found in these particular lines, or that all languages of one type
must have passed through the lower phase, or phases, before
reaching that in which they now appear. The most recent argument
on this side of the question is by Professor Sayce, whom, therefore,
I will quote.
“We are apt to assume that inflectional languages are more
highly advanced than agglutinative ones, and agglutinative
languages than isolating ones, and hence that isolation is the lowest
stage of the three, at the top of which stands flection. But what we
really mean when we say that one language is more advanced than
another, is that it is better adapted to express thought, and that the
thought to be expressed is itself better. Now, it is a grave question
whether from this point of view the three classes of language can
really be set the one against the other.”[153]
He then proceeds to argue that isolating languages have an
advantage over all other forms in “the attainment of terseness and
vividness;” that “the agglutinative languages are in advance of the
inflectional in one important point, that, namely, of analyzing the
sentence into its component parts, and distinguishing the relations
of grammar one from another.... In fact, when we examine closely
the principle upon which flection rests, we shall find that it implies
an inferior logical faculty to that implied by agglutination.”[154]
Elsewhere he says, “As for the primeval root-language, we have
no proof that it ever existed, and to confound it with a modern
isolating language is simply erroneous. Equally unproved is the belief
that isolating languages develop into agglutinative, and agglutinative
into inflectional. At all events, the continued existence of isolating
tongues like the Chinese, or of agglutinative like the Magyar and
Turkish, shows that the development is not a necessary one.”[155]
I could quote other passages to the same effect; but the above
are sufficient to show that we must not unreservedly accept the
earlier doctrines previously sketched. There is, indeed, no question
about the fact of language-growth as regards particular languages;
the question here is as to the evolution of language-types one from
another. And I have given prominence to this question in order to
make the following remarks upon it.
When we are told that “the continued existence of isolating
tongues like the Chinese, or of agglutinative tongues like the Magyar
and Turkish, shows that the development is not a necessary one,”
we of course at once perceive the unquestionable truth of the
statement. But the fact is without relevance to the only question in
debate. The continued existence of the Protozoa unquestionably
proves that their development into the Metazoa is not necessary; but
this fact raises no presumption at all against the doctrine that all the
Metazoa have been evolved from the Protozoa.
Similarly, when we are told that “what we really mean when we
say that one language is more advanced than another, is that it is
better adapted to express thought,” we are again being shunted
from the question. The question is whether one type of language-
structure develops into another: not whether, when developed, it is
“more advanced” than another in the sense of being “better adapted
to express thought.” This it may or may not be; but in either case
the question of its efficiency as a language has no necessary
connection with the question of its development as a language. For
it may very well be that from the same origin two or more lines of
development may occur in different directions. It is doubtless
perfectly true, as Professor Sayce says, that modern Chinese is a
higher product of evolution than ancient Chinese along the line of
isolating condensation; but this is no proof that the agglutinative
languages did not start from an isolating type, and thereafter
proceed on a different line of development in accordance with their
different “genius,” or method of growth. Naturalists entertain no
doubt that two different types of morphological structure, b and
[Greek: b], are both descended from a common parent form B, even
though b has “advanced” in one line of change and [Greek: b] in
another, so that both are now equally efficient from a morphological
point of view. Why, then, should a philologist dispute genetic
relationship in what appears to be a precisely analogous case, on the
sole ground that b is, to his thinking, no less psychologically efficient
a language than [Greek: b]?
Lastly, as I have before indicated, it appears to me impossible to
dispute that every agglutinative language, in whatever measure it
can be proved to be agglutinative, in that measure is thereby proved
to have been derived from a language less agglutinative, and
therefore more isolating. And, similarly, in whatever measure an
inflective language can be proved to inflect its agglutinated words, in
that measure is it thereby proved to have been derived from a
language less inflective, or a language whose agglutinations had not
yet undergone so much of the inflective modification.
On the other hand, as there is no necessary reason why an
isolating language should develop into an agglutinative, or an
agglutinative into an inflectional, it may very well be that the higher
evolution of isolating tongues has proceeded collaterally with that of
agglutinative, while the higher evolution of agglutinative has
proceeded collaterally with that of inflectional. If this were so, both
the schools of philology which we are considering would be equally
right, and equally wrong: each would represent a different side of
the same truth.
Thus it appears to me that, so far as the purposes of the present
treatise are concerned, we may neglect the question of phylogenesis
as between these three orders of languages. For, so long as it is on
all hands agreed that the principles of evolution are universally
concerned in the genesis of every language, it will make no
difference to my future argument whether these principles have
obtained in one or in more lines of development. There can be no
reasonable doubt that in some greater or less degree the three
orders are connected: in what precise degree this connection obtains
is doubtless a question of high importance to the science of
philology: it is of scarcely any importance to the problems which we
shall presently have to consider.
But the issue touching the relation between the polysynthetic and
other types of language is of more importance for us, inasmuch as it
involves the question whether or not we have here to do with the
most primitive type of language. In the opinion of some philologists,
“these polysynthetic languages are an interesting survival of the
early condition of language everywhere, and are but a fresh proof
that America is in truth ‘the new world:’ primitive forms of speech
that have elsewhere perished long ago still survive there, like the
armadillo, to bear record of a bygone past.”[156] On the other hand,
it is with equal certainty affirmed that “polysynthesis is not a
primitive feature, but an expansion, or, if you will, a second phase of
agglutination.”[157]
 Of course in dealing with this issue I can only do so as an
amateur, quite destitute of authority in matters pertaining to
philology; but the points on which I am about to speak have
reference to principles so general, that in trying them the lay mind
may not be without its uses in the jury-box. Moreover, philologists
themselves are at present so ill-informed touching the facts of
polysynthetic language, that there is less presumption here than
elsewhere in any outsider offering his opinion upon the matters in
dispute.[158] It is however, undesirable to occupy space with any
tedious rehearsal of the facts on which, after reading the more
important literature of the subject, my judgment is based. For what
it is worth, this judgment is as follows.
In the first place, it appears to me that those experts have an
overwhelmingly strong case who argue in favour of the polysynthetic
languages as presenting a highly primitive form of speech. Indeed,
so undifferentiated do I think they prove this type of language-
structure to be, that I agree with them in concluding that it probably
brings us nearer “the origin of speech” than any other type now
extant. Furthermore, looking to the wide contrast between this type
and that which is presented by the isolating tongues, it appears to
me impossible that the one can be genetically connected with the
other. For it appears to me that the experts on the opposite side
have no less completely proved, that the isolating tongues also
present evidence of a highly primitive origin; and, therefore, that
whatever amount of evolution and subsequent degeneration
(“phonetic decay”) the Chinese language, for instance, may be
proved to have undergone, this only goes to show that it has
throughout remained true to the isolating principle—just as the
Protozoa, through all their long history of evolution, have remained
true to their “isolating” type, notwithstanding that some of their
branches must long ago have given origin to the “agglutinated”
Metazoa. In other words, it appears to me that the experts on this
side of the question have been able to place the isolating type of
speech on as low a level of development—and, therefore,
presumably on as high a level of antiquity—as experts on the other
side have been able to claim for the polysynthetic.
If I am right in this opinion, it follows that there must have been
at least two points of origin from which all existing languages arose
—or rather, let me say, at least two types of language-formation
upon which the earliest materials of speech were moulded. For even
the strongest advocates of the polysynthetic origin of speech do not
venture to question the highly primitive nature of the monosyllabic
type. Thus, for instance, Professor Sayce is the principal upholder of
the polysynthetic view, and yet he quotes the isolating forms of
Chinese and Taic as furnishing “excellent illustrations of the early
days of speech;”[159] and he adduces them as “examples from the
far East to show us the way in which our words first came into
existence.”[160] But if this is allowed to be so even by the leading
advocate of the polysynthetic view, I cannot conceive the possibility
of the one type having become so completely transformed into the
other as to have left no trace in the isolating type of its polysynthetic
origin. For, in view of the above admissions, we are left to conclude
that the transformation must have taken place soon after the birth of
language in any form—notwithstanding that, as Professor Sayce
elsewhere insists (in the passage already quoted), “the conception of
the sentence which underlies the polysynthetic dialects is the precise
converse of that which underlies the isolating or the agglutinative
type.”
In view of these statements, therefore, by Professor Sayce
himself, I do not think it is necessary for me to go further in
justification of the opinion already expressed—namely, that we must
recognize at least two types of language-formation upon which the
earliest materials of speech were moulded. It is probable enough
that both these types of language-formation were independently
originated in many parts of the earth’s surface at different times;
and it is possible that yet other types may have arisen, which are
now either extinct, or fused with some of the later developments of
the two which have survived. But, be these things as they may, I
believe that both the schools of philology which we are considering
have made out their respective cases; and, therefore, that they both
err in so often assuming that these cases are mutually exclusive.
It will thus be apparent that I am altogether in favour of the
polyphylectic theory of language-development. Even if it were not
for the specially philological considerations just adduced, on grounds
of merely general reasoning it would appear to me much more
probable that so useful a sociological instrument as that of articulate
sign-making should have been evolved from the sign-making of tone
and gesture, wherever the psychological powers of mankind were far
enough advanced to admit of the evolution. And, if this is so, it
clearly becomes probable that any aboriginal races which were
geographically separated would have slowly and independently
elaborated their primitive forms of utterance—supposing, of course,
that mankind had become segregated while still in the speechless
state, which, as I will subsequently explain, seems to me the most
probable supposition. And, if this were the case, it appears to me
highly improbable that languages which originated and developed
independently of one another should all have been under the
necessity of starting either on the monosyllabic, the polysynthetic, or
any other type exclusively. That the existing languages of the earth
did originate in more than one centre is now the almost universal
belief of competent authorities.[161] But too many of these
authorities are still bound by what appears to me the wholly
gratuitous and highly improbable assumption, that although various
languages thus originated in different centres, they must all have
been born with an exact family resemblance to one another, so far
as type or “genius” is concerned. But there is no basis for such an
assumption, either in the physiology or the psychology of mankind.
On the contrary, if we look to the nearest analogue of the case,
namely, the growing child, we may find abundant evidence of the
fact that the earliest attempts at articulate utterance may occur on
different types, as we saw so strikingly proved by quotations from
Dr. Hale in a previous chapter.
 In this connection I would like to conclude the present chapter by
giving prominence to an interesting and ingenious hypothesis, which
has been suggested by Dr. Hale on the basis of the facts just alluded
to.
In order that the merits of this suggestion may be appreciated, it
is desirable to remind the reader that the languages now spoken by
the native tribes of the American continent present so many and
such radical differences among themselves, that, with regard to a
large proportion of them, philologists are unable so much as to
suggest any philological classification. Thus, to quote Professor
Whitney, “as regards the material of expression, it is fully confessed
that there is irreconcilable diversity among them. There are a very
considerable number of groups, between whose significant signs
exist no more apparent correspondencies than between those of
English, Hungarian, and Malay; none, namely, which may not be
merely fortuitous.”[162] And, what is most curious, these immense
differences may obtain between neighbouring tribes who are to all
appearance ethnologically identical—as, for instance, the Algonkin,
Iroquois, and Dakota groups. Moreover, this diversity of language-
structure in some cases goes so far as to reach the very roots of
language-growth; “the polysynthetic structure does not belong in the
same degree to all American languages: on the contrary, it seems to
be altogether effaced, or originally wanting, in some.”[163] Nay, even
the isolating type of language has gained a footing, and this in its
properly monosyllabic and uninflective form.
Such being the state of matters on the American continent (and
also, though to a lesser extent, in the Southern parts of the African),
Dr. Hale suggests the following hypothesis by way of explanation. To
me it certainly appears a plausible one, and if it should eventually be
found to furnish a key for unlocking the mysteries of language-
growth in the New World, it would obviously become available as a
sufficient explanation of radical diversities of language elsewhere.
Starting from the facts which I have already quoted from his
paper at the close of my chapter on Articulation, he argues that if
children will thus spontaneously devise a language of their own in a
wholly arbitrary manner, even when surrounded by the spoken
language of a civilized community, much more would children be
likely to do this if they should be accidentally separated from human
society, and thus thrown upon their own resources in an isolated
condition. Now, “if, under such circumstances, disease or the
casualties of a hunter’s life should carry off the parents, the survival
of the children would, it is evident, depend mainly upon the nature
of the climate and the ease with which food could be procured at all
seasons of the year. In ancient Europe, after the present climatical
conditions were established, it is doubtful if a family of children
under ten years of age could have lived through a single winter. We
are not, therefore, surprised to find that no more than four or five
linguistic stocks are represented in Europe, and that all of them,
except the Basque, are believed, on good evidence, to have been of
comparatively late introduction. Even the Basque is traced by some,
with much probability, to a source in North Africa. Of Northern
America, east of the Rocky Mountains and north of the tropics, the
same may be said. The climate and the scarcity of food in winter
forbid us to suppose that a brood of orphan children could have
survived, except possibly, by a fortunate chance, in some favoured
spot on the shore of the Mexican Gulf, where shell-fish, berries, and
edible roots are abundant and easy of access.
“But there is one region where Nature seems to offer herself as
the willing nurse and bountiful step-mother of the feeble and
unprotected. Of all countries on the globe, there is probably not one
in which a little flock of very young children would find the means of
sustaining existence more readily than in California. Its wonderful
climate, mild and equable beyond example, is well known. Mr.
Cronise, in his volume on the ‘Natural Wealth of California,’ tells us,
that ‘the monthly mean of the thermometer at San Francisco in
December, the coldest month, is 50°; in September, the warmest
month, 61°.’ And he adds:—‘Although the State reaches to the
latitude of Plymouth Bay on the north, the climate, for its whole
length, is as mild as that of the regions near the topics. Half the
months are rainless. Snow and ice are almost strangers, except in
the high altitudes. There are fully two hundred cloudless days in
every year. Roses bloom in the open air through all seasons.’ Not less
remarkable than this exquisite climate is the astonishing variety of
food, of kinds which seem to offer themselves to the tender hands of
children. Berries of many sorts—strawberries, blackberries, currants,
raspberries, and salmon-berries—are indigenous and abundant.
Large fruits and edible nuts on low and pendent boughs may be
said, in Milton’s phrase, to ‘hang amiable.’ Mr. Cronise enumerates,
among others, the wild cherry and plum, which ‘grow on bushes;’
the barberry, or false grape (Berberis herbosa), a ‘low shrub,’ which
bears edible fruit; and the Californian horse-chestnut (Æsculus
Californica), ‘a low, spreading tree or shrub, seldom exceeding
fifteen feet high,’ which ‘bears abundant fruit much used by the
Indians.’ Then there are nutritious roots of various kinds, maturing at
different seasons. Fish swarm in the rivers, and are taken by the
simplest means. In the spring, Mr. Powers informs us, the whitefish
‘crowd the creeks in such vast numbers that the Indians, by simply
throwing in a little brushwood to impede their motion, can literally
scoop them out.’ Shell-fish and grubs abound, and are greedily eaten
by the natives. Earthworms, which are found everywhere and at all
seasons, are a favourite article of diet. As to clothing, we are told by
the authority just cited that ‘on the plains all adult males and all
children up to ten or twelve went perfectly naked, while the women
wore only a narrow strip of deer-skin around the waist.’ Need we
wonder that, in such a mild and fruitful region, a great number of
separate tribes were found, speaking languages which a careful
investigation has classed in nineteen distinct linguistic stocks?
“The climate of the Oregon coast region, though colder than that
of California, is still far milder and more equable than that of the
same latitude in the east; and the abundance of edible fruits, roots,
river-fish, and other food of easy attainment, is very great. A family
of young children, if one of them were old enough to take care of
the rest, could easily be reared to maturity in a sheltered nook of
this genial and fruitful land. We are not, therefore, surprised to find
that the number of linguistic stocks in this narrow district, though
less than in California, is more than twice as large as in the whole of
Europe, and that the greater portion of these stocks are clustered
near the Californian boundary....
“Some reminiscences of the parental speech would probably
remain with the older children, and be revived and strengthened as
their faculties gained force. Thus we may account for the fact, which
has perplexed all inquirers, that certain unexpected and sporadic
resemblances, both in grammar and in vocabulary, which can hardly
be deemed purely accidental, sometimes crop up between the most
dissimilar languages....
“A glance at other linguistic provinces will show how aptly this
explanation of the origin of language-stocks everywhere applies.
Tropical Brazil is a region which combines perpetual summer with a
profusion of edible fruits and other varieties of food, not less
abundant than in California. Here, if anywhere, there should be a
great number of totally distinct languages. We learn on the best
authority, that of Baron J. J. von Tschudi, in the Introduction to his
recent work on the Khetshua Language, that this is the fact. He
says:—‘I possess a collection made by the well-known naturalist, J.
Natterer, during his residence of many years in Brazil, of more than a
hundred languages, lexically completely distinct, from the interior of
Brazil.’ And he adds:—‘The number of so-called isolated languages—
that is, of such as, according to our present information, show no
relationship to any other, and which therefore form distinct stocks of
greater or less extent—is in South America very large, and must, on
an approximate estimate, amount to many hundreds. It will perhaps
be possible hereafter to include many of them in larger families, but
there must still remain a considerable number for which this will not
be possible.’”
I have quoted this hypothesis, as previously remarked, because it
appears to me philologically interesting; but whatever may be
thought of it by professional authorities, the evidence which the
American continent furnishes of a polygenetic and polytypic origin of
the native languages remains the same. And if there is good reason
for concluding in favour of polygenetic origins of different types as
regards the languages on that continent, of course the probability
arises that radical differences of structure among languages of the
Old World admit of being explained by their having been derived
from similarly independent sources.[164]
 CHAPTER XIII.

ROOTS OF LANGUAGE.

In the last chapter my treatment of the classification and phylogeny

of languages may have led the general reader to feel that
philologists display extraordinary differences of opinion with regard
to certain first principles of their science. I may, therefore, begin the
present chapter by reminding such a reader that I have hitherto
been concerned more with the differences of opinion than with the
agreements. If one takes a general view of the progress of
philological science since philology—almost in our own generation—
first became a science, I think he must feel much more impressed by
the amount of certainty which has been attained than by the amount
of uncertainty which still remains. And the uncertainty which does
remain is due rather to a backwardness of study than to differences
of interpretation. When more is known about the structure and
mutual relations of the polysynthetic tongues, it is probable that a
better agreement will be arrived at touching the relation of their
common type to that of isolating tongues on the one hand, and
agglutinating on the other. But, be this as it may, even as matters
stand at present, I think we have more reason to be surprised at the
certainty which already attaches to the principles of philology, than
at the uncertainty which occasionally arises in their applications to
the comparatively unstudied branches of linguistic growth.
 Furthermore, important as these still unsettled questions are
from a purely philological point of view, they are not of any great
moment from that of the evolutionist, as I have already observed.
For, so long as it is universally agreed that all the language-groups
have been products of a gradual development, it is, comparatively
speaking, immaterial whether the groups all stand to one another in
a relation of serial descent, or whether some of them stand to others
in a relation of collateral descent. That is to say, the evolutionist is
under no obligation to espouse either the monotypic or the polytypic
theory of the origin of language. Therefore, it will make no material
difference to the following discussion whether the reader feels
disposed to follow the doctrine, that all languages must have
originated in such monosyllabic isolations as we now meet with in a
radical form of speech like the Chinese; that they all originated in
such polysynthetic incapsulations as we now find in the numberless
dialects of the American Indians; or, lastly, and as I myself think
much more probably, that both these, and possibly other types of
language-structure, are all equally primitive. Be these things as they
may, my discussion will not be overshadowed by their uncertainty.
For this uncertainty has reference only to the origin of the existing
language-types as independent or genetically allied: it in no way
affects the certainty of their subsequent evolution. Much as
philologists may still differ upon the mutual relations of these several
language-types, they all agree that “von der ersten Entstehung der
Sprachwurzeln an bis zur Bildung der volkommenen
Flexionssprachen, wie des Sanskrit, Griechischen, oder Deutschen,
ist Alles in der Entwicklung der Sprache verständlich.... Sobald nur
die Wurzeln als die fertigen Bausteine der Sprache einmal da sind,
lässt sich Schritt für Schritt das Wachsthum des Sprachgebäudes
verfolgen.”[165]
Therefore, having now said all that seems necessary to say on
the question of language-types, I will pass on to consider the
information that we possess on the subject of language-roots.
First, let us consider the number of roots out of which languages
are developed—or, rather, let me say, the number of elementary
constituents into which the researches of philologists have been able
to reduce those languages which have been most closely studied. Of
course the probability—nay, the certainty—is that the actual number
of roots must in all cases be considerably less than philologists are
now able to prove.
Chinese is composed of about five hundred separate words, each
being a monosyllable. In actual use, these five hundred root-words
are multiplied to over fifteen hundred by significant variety of
intonation; but the entire structure of this still living language is
made up of five hundred monosyllabic words. In the opinion of most
philologists we have here a survival of the root stage of language;
but in the opinion of some we have the remnants of erosion, or
“phonetic decay.”[166] This difference of opinion, however, is not a
matter of importance to us; and therefore I will not discuss it,
further than to say that on account of it I will not hereafter draw
upon the Chinese language for illustrations of “radical” utterance,
except in so far as philologists of all schools would allow as
legitimate.[167]
Hebrew has been reduced to about the same number of roots as
Chinese—Renan stating it in round numbers at five hundred.[168]
But without doubt this number would admit of being considerably
reduced, if inquiries were sufficiently extended to the whole Semitic
family.
According to Professor Skeat, English is entirely made up of 461
Aryan roots, in combination with about twenty modifying constants.
[169] The remote progenitor, Sanskrit, has been estimated to present
as many as 850 roots, or, according to Benfey, just about twice that
number.[170] On the other hand, Max Müller, as a result of more
recent researches, professes to have reduced the total number of
Sanskrit roots to 121.[171]
It is needless to give further instances. For these are enough to
show that, even if we were to regard the analytic powers of
comparative philology as adequate to resolve all the compounds of a
language into its primitive elements the estimate of Pott would
probably be high above the mark, when he states that on an
average the roots of a language may be taken at a thousand.[172]
Seeing that Chinese only contains in its whole vocabulary half that
number of words, and that both Hebrew and English have similarly
yielded each about five hundred radicals in the crucible of more
modern research, I think we may safely reduce the general estimate
of Pott by one-half, and probably would be nearer the truth if we
were to do so by three-quarters, or more. At all events, we may be
satisfied that the total number of radicals sufficient to feed the most
luxuriant of languages is expressible in three figures; and this, as we
shall presently see, is enough for all the purposes of my subsequent
discussion.
Passing on now from the question of number to that of character,
we have first to meet the question—What are these roots? Are they
the actually primitive words of pre-historic languages, or are they
what Max Müller has aptly termed “phonetic types”? Here again we
encounter a difference of opinion among philologists. Thus, for
instance, Professor Whitney tells us that the Indo-European
languages are all descended from an original monosyllabic tongue,
and, therefore, that “our ancestors talked with one another in simple
syllables, indicative of ideas of prime importance, but wanting all
designation of their relations.”[173] On the other hand, it is objected
to this view that “such a language is a sheer impossibility;”[174] that
“there could be no hope of any mutual understanding” with a
language restricted to such isolated and general terms, &c.[175] On
this side of the question it is represented that “roots are the
phonetic and significant types discovered by the analysis of the
comparative philologist as common to a group of allied words;”[176]
that “a root is the core of a group of allied words,”[177] “the naked
kernel of a family of words.”[178] Or, to adopt a simile previously
used in another connection, we may say that a root as now
presented by the philologist is a composite photograph (or
phonogram) of a number of words, all belonging to the same pre-
historic language, and all closely allied in meaning.
 The difference of authoritative teaching thus exhibited is not a
matter of much importance for us. Nor, indeed, as we shall
subsequently see, is it a difference so great as may at first sight
appear. For even the phonetic-type theory does not doubt that all
the aboriginal and unknown words, out of the composition of which
a root is now extracted, must have been genetically allied with one
another, and exhibited the closeness of their kinship by a close
similarity of sound. Therefore, it does not make any practical
difference whether we regard a root as itself a primitive word, which
was used in some such way as the Chinese now use their
monosyllabic terms; or whether we regard it as a generalized
expression of a group of cognate words, all closely allied as to
meaning. In fact, even so strong an adherent of the phonetic-type
theory as Professor Max Müller very clearly states this, where he
says that, although “the mere root, quâ root, may be denied the
dignity of a word, as soon as a root is used for predication it
becomes a word, whether outwardly it is changed or not.”[179]
Seeing, then, that this difference of opinion among philologists is
not one of great importance for us, I will henceforth disregard it.
And, as it will be conducive to brevity, if not also to clearness, I will
speak of roots as archaic words, although by so doing I shall not
intend to assume that they are more than phonetic types, or the
nearest approach we can make to the words out of which they were
generated.
We may next consider the kind of meanings which roots convey.
Antecedently we might form various anticipations on this head, such
as that they should be imitative of natural sounds, expressive of
concrete ideas, and so forth. As a matter of fact, we find that they
are not expressive of natural sounds; but, as far as we have now
any means of judging, quite arbitrary. Moreover, they are not
expressive of concrete or particular ideas; but always of abstract or
general. Here, then, to begin with, we have two facts of apparently
great importance. And they are both facts which, at first sight, seem
to countenance the view that, in its last resort, comparative
philology fails to testify to the natural origin of speech. But we must
look into the matter more closely, and, in order to do this most fairly,
I will quote from Professor Max Müller the 121 roots into which he
analyzes the Sanskrit language. This is the language which has been
most carefully studied in the present connection, and of all its
students Professor Max Müller is least open to any suspicion of
inclining to the side of “Darwinism.” The following is a list of what he
calls “the 121 original concepts.”

1. Dig.
2. Plat, weave, sew, bind.
3. Crush, pound, destroy, waste, rub, smooth.
4. Sharpen.
5. Smear, colour, knead, harden.
6. Scratch.
7. Bite, eat.
8. Divide, share, eat.
9. Cut.
10. Gather, observe.
11. Stretch, spread.
12. Mix.
13. Scatter, strew.
14. Sprinkle, drip, wet.
15a. Shake, tremble, quiver, flicker.
15b. Shake, mentally, be angry, abashed, fearfully, etc.
16. Throw down, fall.
17. Fall to pieces.
18. Shoot, throw at.
19. Pierce, split.
20. Join, fight, check.
21. Tear.
22. Break, smash.
23. Measure.
24. Blow.
25. Kindle.
26. Milk, yield.
27. Pour, flow, rush.
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