Lec 3
Lec 3
Srimanta Bhattacharya
Encryption Scheme: Framework
Insecure channel
Encryption Decryption
Plaintext(M) Ciphertext Ciphertext
(C) (C) Plaintext(M)
Sender Receiver
tux@linux#
Adversary
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Encryption Scheme: Ingredients
Spaces:
• M- Set of all possible messages.
• K- Set of all possible keys.
• C- Set of all possible ciphertexts
Normally these sets are {0, 1}ℓ for appropriate ℓ (to be made precise later)
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Encryption: Syntax
• k ← Gen()
w.l.o.g. k ←$ K.
• c ← Enck (m)
How is m chosen?
Idealized with a probability distribution on M.
Required for analysis. Not a part of the encryption scheme.
The distribution is known to the adversary.
• m = Deck (c)
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Perfect Secrecy
An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space Mis perfectly
secret if for every probability distribution over M, every message m ∈ M
and every ciphertext c ∈ C with Pr{C = c} > 0:
Pr{M = m|C = c} = Pr{M = m}
How non-trivial is the idea?
Is there a perfectly secret scheme?
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Is there a scheme which is not perfectly secret?
Perfect Secrecy: Equivalent formulation
, or equivalently
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Proof of Equivalence
= Pr{M = m}
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One-Time Pad
• M = C = K = {0, 1}ℓ
• Gen: K ←$ K.
• Enc: Given a k ∈ K and m ∈ M, c = k ⊕ m.
• Dec: Given a k ∈ K and c ∈ C, c = k ⊕ c.
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One-Time Pad: Facts and Limitations
Limitations:
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Limitation of Perfect Secrecy
Can an encryption scheme with |K| < |M| provide perfect secrecy?
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Perfect Secrecy: Eavesdropping Experiment (Indistinguishability
Game)
• A selects m0 , m1 ∈ M.
• C selects b ←$ {0, 1} and k ←$ K, sends c = Enck (mb ) to A
• A outputs b ′ ∈ {0, 1}
Goal is to exploit the above fact and construct an adversary A who will
win the indishtinguibality game with probability more than 21 .
Strategy for the adversary A
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Π is perfectly secret ⇒ Pr{Priveav
A ,Π } =
1
2
To show if Pr{Priveav 1
A ,Π }> 2 then Π is not perfectly secret
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Vigenrre Cipher: Indistinguishability Game
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Shannon’s Characterization
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