Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya

Author(s): Lisa Anderson

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3 (MAY/JUNE 2011), pp. 2-7
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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 Demystifying the Arab Spring

Parsing the Differences

Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya

Lisa Anderson

In Tunisia, protesters escalated calls for The important story about the 2011
the restoration of the country's suspended Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
constitution. Meanwhile, Egyptians rose is not how the globalization of the norms
in revolt as strikes across the country of civic engagement shaped the protesters'

brought daily life to a halt and toppled the aspirations. Nor is it about how activists
government. In Libya, provincial leaders used technology to share ideas and tactics.
worked feverishly to strengthen their Instead, the critical issue is how and why
newly independent republic. these ambitions and techniques resonated
It was 1919. in their various local contexts. The patterns
That year's events demonstrate that and demographics of the protests varied
the global diffusion of information and widely. The demonstrations in Tunisia spi

expectations—so vividly on display in Tahrir raled toward the capital from the neglected

Square this past winter—is not a result of rural areas, finding common cause with a
the Internet and social media. The inspira once powerful but much repressed labor
tional rhetoric of U.S. President Woodrow movement. In Egypt, by contrast, urbane
Wilson's Points speech, which
Fourteen and cosmopolitan young people in the
helped spark the 1919 upheavals, made its major cities organized the uprisings.
way around the world by telegraph. The Meanwhile, in Libya, ragtag bands of

uprisings of 1919 also suggest that the cal armed rebels in the eastern provinces
culated spread of popular movements, seen ignited the protests, revealing the tribal
across the Arab world last winter, is not a and regional cleavages that have beset
new phenomenon. The Egyptian Facebook the country for decades. Although they

campaigners are the modern incarnation shared a common call for personal dignity
of Arab nationalist networks whose broad and responsive government, the revolu
sheets disseminated strategies for civil tions across these three countries reflected
disobedience throughout the region in divergent economic grievances and social
the years after World War I. dynamics—legacies of their diverse

Lisa Anderson is President of the American University in Cairo.

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 Demystifying theArab Spring
encounters with modern
Europe
and decades Beyond the cosmopolitan fa$ade frequented
under unique regimes. by tourists lay bleak, dusty roads and miser
As a result, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya able prospects. It is small wonder that the
face vastly different challenges moving for Islamists' claim that the government was
ward. Tunisians will need to grapple with prostituting the country for foreign exchange
the class divisions manifesting themselves resonated in Tunisia.
in the country's continuing political unrest. Ben Ali's family was also unusually

Egyptians must redesign their institutions personalist and predatory in its corruption.
of government. And Libyans will need to As the whistleblower Web site WikiLeaks
recover from a bloody civil war. For the recently revealed, the U.S. ambassador to
United States to fulfillits goals in the region, Tunisia reported in 2006 that more than
it will need to understand these distinctions half of Tunisia's commercial elites were
and distance itself from the idea that the personally related to Ben Ali through his
Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan uprisings three adult children, seven siblings, and
constitute a cohesive Arab revolt. second wife's ten brothers and sisters.
This network became known in Tunisia as
BEN ALI'S TUNISIAN FIEFDOM "the Family."
The profound differences between the That said, although the scale of corrup
Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan uprisings tion at the top was breathtaking, Ben Ali's
are not always apparent in the popular media. administration did not depend on the kind of
The timing of the popular revolts—so accumulation of small bribes that subverted
sudden and almost simultaneous—suggests bureaucracies elsewhere, including in Libya
that the similarities these autocracies shared, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. This means
from their aging leaders and corrupt and that Tunisia's government institutions were
ineffectual governments to their educated, relatively healthy, raising the prospects for
unemployed, and disaffected youth, were a clean, efficient, and technocratic govern
sufficient to explain the wave of revolutions. ment to replace Ben Ali.
Yet the authorities that these young protesters Tunisia's military also played a less
confronted were unique in each nation—as significant role in the country's revolt than
will be the difficulties they face in the future. the armed forces in the other nations experi
Former Tunisian President Zine el encing unrest. Unlike militaries elsewhere in
Abidine Ben Ali—the first Arab dictator the Arab world, such as Egypt, the Tunisian
to fall to mass protests—initially seemed army has never experienced combat and
an unlikely victim. Tunisia has long enjoyed does not dominate the domestic economy.
the Arab world's best educational system, Under Ben Ali, it existed in the shadow of

largest middle class, and strongest organized the country's domestic security services,
labor movement. Yet behind those achieve from which Ben Ali, a former military
ments, Ben Ali's government tightly re police officer, hailed. Although its refusal
stricted free expression and political parties. to support Ben Ali's regime contributed to
In an almost Orwellian way, he cultivated the country's revolution, the military has not
and manipulated the country's international participated meaningfully in managing the
image as a modern, technocratic regime transition period and is unlikely to shape
and a tourist-friendly travel destination. the ultimate outcome in any significant way.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS ■
May/June 2011 [3]

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 Lisa Anderson
Since Tunisia's protests initiated the wave regime's efficacy. The government's deteri
of unrest in the Arab world, they were more orating ability to provide basic services and
spontaneous and less well organized than seeming indifference to widespread unem
subsequent campaigns in other nations. Yet ployment and poverty alienated tens of
they demonstrated the power of the country's millions of Egyptians, a feeling that was
labor movement, as repeated strikes fueled exacerbated by growing conspicuous con

protests both before Ben Ali fled and as the sumption among a business elite connected
firstshort-lived successor government—soon to Mubarak's son Gamal. Yet the army's

replaced by a second one more amenable to carefully calibrated intervention in the

the major unions—attempted to contain the uprising indicated the continuing power
damage to what remained of his regime. of a military establishment honed by equal
The protests also revealed a sharp parts patronage and patriotism. And the
generational divide among the opposition. protesters' political and tactical sophistica
The quick-fire demonstrations filled with tion came about as a result of Mubarak's

angry youth made the generation of regime reluctant but real tolerance of a raucous and

dissidents from the 1980s, primarily union unruly press.

activists and Islamist militants then led As it assumed control of Egypt after

by Rachid al-Ghannouchi, appear elderly Mubarak's downfall, the army revealed its
and outmoded. Images of an enfeebled enormous influence in Egyptian society.
Ghannouchi returning to Tunisia after The military is run by generals who earned
20 years in exile in the wake of Ben Ali's their stripes in the 1967 and 1973 wars with
ouster reflected the radical changes in the Israel and who have cooperated closely

agenda of Tunisia's protest movement. with the United States since Cairo's 1979
Tunisians may once again prove receptive peace treaty with Jerusalem. In contrast to

to Ghannouchi's brand of political Islam, the other Arab militaries that have grappled
but only if his Islamists can capture the with unrest this year, the Egyptian army is

imagination of Tunisia's young people, who widely respected by the general populace. It
are principally concerned with receiving is also deeply interwoven into the domestic
what they see as their fair share of the economy. As a result, the military leader
country's wealth and employment opportu ship remains largely hostile to economic
nities. Tunisia's new leadership must there liberalization and private-sector growth,
fore incorporate a generation of young people views that carry considerable weight within
with only theoretical exposure to freedom the provisional government. Thus, as in
of belief, expression, and assembly into a Tunisia (although for different reasons), the

system that fosters open political debate and pace of privatization and economic reform
contestation. And it must respond to some will likely be slow, and so the emphasis of
of the demands, especially of the labor reforms will be on democratization.
movement, that will feature prominently Repairing decades of public-sector
in those debates. corrosion may also prove problematic.

Everything in Egypt—from obtaining a

EGYPT'S ARMY MAKES ITS MOVE driver's license to getting an education—is
In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak's fumbling end formally very cheap but in practice very
epitomized the protracted decline of his expensive, since most transactions, official

FOREIGN AFFAIRS •
[4] VolumegoNo.3

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 and unofficial, are accompanied by off-the
books payments. The government pays
-
schoolteachers a pittance, so public education
r subscribe www.chinadailvusa.com
is poor and teachers supplement their salaries
m
by providing private lessons that are essential
preparation for school exams. The national
police were widely reviled long before their Pleasecallus toll-free
ot 1-877-263-2459
oremailus
brutal crackdowns at the inception of the at [email protected]
January 25 revolt because they represented,
in essence, a nationwide protection racket. ChinaDailyUS Edition
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Ordinary citizens had to bribe police officers
all too ready to confiscate licenses and invent Launchedin 2009 and published
Mondaythrough
violations. The disappearance of the police theUS Edition
Friday, was createdto providereaders
intheUnitedStatesand Canadawithnewsabout
during the height of the protests—considered
Chinaand theChineseperspectiveon tradeand in
by many Egyptians a deliberate attempt to
ternational
issues.
destabilize the country—only deepened
that animosity. The process of applying Publishedin NewYork,Washington O.C.,San Fran
democratic rule of law must begin with the cisco,Chicago,LosAngelesand Houston, ChinaDaily
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Ministry will need to reestablish trust
between the police and the people.
But the remarkable discipline demon
strated by Egypt's protesters and their
subsequent wide-ranging debates about
how to reshape their country speak to the

unusually high tolerance for free expression

in Egypt (by regional standards) prior to
the revolution. The campaign to honor
Khaled Said, the blogger killed by Egyptian

police and whose death initiated the uprising,

for example, would have been unimaginable
in Tunisia. Egyptians were relatively well

prepared to engage in serious and sustained

conversations about the composition of their
future even as they understood
government,

that, whatever the outcome, the military

would not allow its institutional prerogatives
to be substantially eroded.
This latent political wisdom reflects the

changes that transformed Egyptian society

over the last 15 years, even while the country's

aging and ineffectual autocracy remained in

place. As Tahrir's protesters were at pains

[5l

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 Lisa Anderson
to demonstrate, Egypt has a culture of deep secession—or multiple separate secessions—
communal bonds and trust, which mani from a failed state.
fested itself in the demonstrators' incredible Libya under Qaddafi has borne traces of
discipline: their sustained nonviolence, the Italian fascism that ruled the country in
their refusal to be provoked by thugs and its colonial days: extravagance, dogmatism,
saboteurs, their capacity to police them and brutality. In the name of his "permanent
selves and coordinate their demands, and revolution," Qaddafi also prohibited private
their ability to organize without any central ownership and retail trade, banned a free
ized leadership. Perhaps the finest example press, and subverted the civil service and
of this egalitarian spirit was the appearance, the military leadership. In the absence of
in communities rich and poor, of spontaneous any public-sector bureaucracy, including a
citizen mobilizations to maintain order reliable policeforce, kin networks have
once the police had disengaged. All these provided safety and security as well as access
developments should give one cause for to goods and services. It was along such

optimism today about the new Egypt's po networks that Libyan society fractured
tential to build and sustain an open society. when the regime's capacity to divide and
rule began to unravel at the beginning of
THE WRECKAGE OF LIBYA the protests. Meanwhile, Qaddafi had dis
Whereas demonstrators in Tunis and Cairo tributed his armed forces across a deliber

successfully ousted their former rulers, ately confusing and uncoordinated array
Tripoli collapsed into a protracted civil war. of units. Some forces joined the opposition
Its sustained fighting resulted from Libyan quickly but were prevented from organizing
leader Muammar al-Qaddafi's four-decade effectively or deploying sophisticated
long effort to consolidate his power and military equipment.
rule by patronage to kin and clan. Years of This lack of social and governmental

artificially induced scarcity in everything cohesion will hamper any prospective

from simple consumer goods to basic med transition to democracy Libya must first
ical care generated widespread corruption. restore security and introduce the law and
And the capricious cruelty of Qaddafi's order missing for decades under Qaddafi's

regime produced widespread and deep regime. As daunting as that task may
seated suspicion. Libyans' trust in their seem, further difficulties lie on the horizon:
and in one another, eroded, trust across clans and provinces;
government, reviving
and they took refuge in the solace of tribe and reconstructing public administration;
family Libyan society has been fractured, strengthening civil society through political
and every national institution, including parties, open media, and nongovernmental
the military, is divided by the cleavages of organizations. Libya's decades of interna
kinship and region. As opposed to Tunisia tional isolation have left the generation in
and Egypt, Libya has no system of political its 30s and 40s—the one likely to assume
alliances, network of economic associations, leadership in a new Libya—poorly educated
or national organizations of any kind. and ill equipped to manage the country.
Thus, what seemed to begin as nonviolent Others have been co-opted by the regime

protests similar to those staged in Tunisia and stand to lose should Qaddafi fall. The
and Egypt soon became an all-out challenge for Libya is both simpler and

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 Demystifying theArab Spring
more vexing than those facing Tunisia and and doesn't steal from the people; the
freedom to live as you choose. These
Egypt: Libya confronts the complexity not
of democratization but of state formation. are not just American ideas; they are
human rights. And that is why we will
It will need to construct a coherent national
support them everywhere.
identity and public administration out of
Qaddafi's shambles. His proclamation did not produce this

year's democratic upheavals in the Arab

THE AHEAD
CHALLENGES
world, but it set expectations for how the
The young activists in each country have been United States would respond to them. If

sharing ideas, tactics, and moral support, but Washington hopes to fulfill its promise to
they are confronting different opponents support these rights, it will need to acquire
and operating within different contexts. a nuanced understanding of the historic
The critical distinctions between Tunisia, circumstances of the uprisings. The Obama

Egypt, and Libya will shape the outcomes administration must encourage and rein
of their respective movements. While in various constituencies and institutions in
Tunisia and Egypt grapple in their own each country, from championing the labor

ways with building political institutions— movement in Tunisia to curtailing the mil
constitutions, political parties, and elec itary in Egypt. In each case, the United
toral systems—Libya will need to begin States cannot
pursue
the
goals
so
eloquently

by constructing the rudiments of a civil identified by Obama without discarding

society. While Egypt struggles with the the notion of a singular Arab revolt and

long shadow of military rule, Tunisia and grappling with the conditions of the

Libya will need to redefine the relationship countries themselves

between their privileged capital cities and

their sullen hinterlands. Tempting as it is
to treat the Arab uprisings as a single
movement, their causes and future mis

sions demonstrate the many variations

between them.

These distinctions will matter for the

United States and its allies. In June 2009,
little more than 90 years after Woodrow
Wilson's ringing endorsement of self
determination, U.S. President Barack
Obama invigorated the Muslim world
with his historic speech in Cairo. There,
he declared that he has

an unyielding belief that all people

yearn for certain things: the ability to
speak your mind and have a say in how
you are governed; confidence in the rule
of law and the equal administration of
justice; government that is transparent

FOREIGN AFFAIRS ■
May/June2011 [?]

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