Example 4: The Big Dig

Boston ’ s Central Artery/Tunnel (CAT) project—known locally as the Big Dig—is an example of a
complex project that involves both technical/engineering problems and big political, social, and
environmental issues. A shown in Figure 14-6 28 it is a good example of a project that must
accommodate the interests of many stakeholders, including federal, state, and local governments,
many contractors, and numerous interest groups. The central artery portion of the project replaced
the elevated interstate high way that ran through downtown Boston with a tunnel. The elevated
highway (derisively called the “ green snake ” ) was an eyesore that separated Boston ’ s North End
and waterfront from the rest of downtown. Always clogged, it was handling 3 times the traffic
volume that it was designed for (200,000 vehicles per day versus 75,000). Besides replacing the
central artery, the CAT project included a tunnel under Boston Harbor to Logan Airport and new
bridges across the Charles River to Cambridge—a total of 160 lane miles over 3.7 miles of tunnels,
2.3 miles of bridges, and 1.5 miles of surface streets. Celebrated as “ the largest, most complex
highway project ever undertaken in the USA ” its original price tag was $5 billion; present estimates
put the price between 3 and 4 times that amount. Project supporters faced daunting problems. The
Massachusetts congressional delegation had to shepherd through the US Congress bills that would
pro vide most of the funding; this required taking into account the interests of—and making
promises to—a large host of ad hoc congressional allies. With approval of the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) and funding authorization, planners turned to the issue of who should have
project oversight, the Massachusetts Bay Area Transportation Authority (BATA) or the Massachusetts
Department of Public Works (DPW). Although BATA had a better construction management
reputation, DPW was given the job on the rationale that BATA is a transit, not a highway, agency. To
manage the project, DPW hired the experienced contractor team of Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff
(B/PB), a joint venture formed by two of the world ’ s largest consulting and management
engineering firms— Bechtel Civil division of Bechtel Corporation, and Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade &
Douglas. Bechtel, strong in the management of both design and construction, and Parsons
Brinckerhoff, strong in design of highways and transit facilities, complemented each other. The two
(called Joint Venture ) had partnered before as contractors for the San Francisco BART Project, and
Bechtel had worked on the English Channel Tunnel and the Disney-MGM theme park in Florida. In
accordance with the law, Joint Venture placed a draft of the project in public libraries and provided
public hearings; these resulted in DPW and Joint Venture engineers having to negotiate with
hundreds of neighborhood, business, and environmental groups, developers, and individuals, and to
mitigate issues regarding community and environmental impacts. To manage the project, CAT was
broken down into the phases of conceptual design, preliminary design, final design, and
construction. The state of Massachusetts prohibits the same firm from performing both design and
construction, so Joint Venture created the preliminary design but hired contractors for final design
and construction. The project initially consisted of 56 final design and 132 construction work
packages, each with a prime contractor. Managing the contractors responsible for artery and tunnel
design packages required especially close coordination since these packages produced contiguous
road and tunnel sections that had to dovetail. A Joint Venture team coordinated everything from the
CAT “ control center, ” where contractors poured over data about progress, graphics of the interface
connections, critical paths, and schedules. The CAT project also involved architectural design,
landscape design, and urban design for which Joint Venture subcontracted the small local firm of
Wallace, Floyd Associates. The architects like to point out that, while Joint Venture engineers
designed what the public does not see, they, the architects, designed what the public does see. Joint
Venture—a large engineering team of international reputation—felt that partnering with a small
architectural firm inti mately familiar with the locale would better enable them to meet the project ’
s complex set of needs. Getting a project off the ground involves negotiating hoops and hurdles held
by many stakeholders. After the project gets underway, the project manager remains mindful of all of
those stakeholders, and works to retain their support in ways big and small.

Case 14-3 The Big Dig: Boston ’ s Central Artery/Tunnel Project

(Refer to Example 4.) Before the Massachusetts congressional delegation could seek federal funding
for the CAT project, it first had to poll constituents about sensitive transportation issues. Then-
speaker of the House Philip “ Tip ” O ’ Neal wanted to know where his supporters—voters of East
Boston— stood. When first told about the project, he said, “ What tunnel? We ’ re not building any
tunnel. ” He changed his mind when supporters predicted that “ the trade unions are going to be
marching on you (if you veto the tunnel) ” and assured him that in East Boston “ no homes would be
lost. ” The delegation then faced formidable opposition from the Reagan administration and Federal
Highway Administration, both which initially argued that CAT was ineligible for federal funding.

An early responsibility of Joint Venture/ DPW was to prepare an environmental impact statement,
the draft of which consisted of several thick volumes. Part I described impacts in 17 categories,
including “ transportation, ” “ air qual ity, ” “ noise and vibration, ” “ energy, ” “ economic
characteristics, ” “ visual characteristics, ” “ historic resources, ” “ water quality, ” “ wetlands and
water ways, ” and “ vegetation and wildlife. ” Under “ economic characteristics ” it described
commercial and industrial activity, tourism, and employment patterns in the affected areas.
According to the report, the project would not displace any residences, but would relocate 134
businesses with 4,100 employees. At the first public hearing 175 persons spoke, including some from
the EPA and the Sierra Club, and 99 provided written commentary. The magnitude and complexity of
the project is reflected in a sampling of the public interest groups rep resented: The 1000 Friends of
Massachusetts, American Automobile Association, Archdiocese of Boston/Can-Do Alliance, Beacon
Hill Civic Association, Bikes Not Bombs, Boston Building Trades Association, Boston Society of
Architects, Charles River Watershed Association, Conservation Law Foundation of New England, and
Haymarket Pushcart Association. Project officials quickly dispelled public concern about large-scale
building demolitions and displacement of businesses and neighborhoods. In January 1991 the
Massachusetts secretary of the environment issued a certificate of approval; construction could
proceed assuming certain mitigation measures were implemented to ease environmental impacts.
The certificate recommended a planning process for utilization of the 27 new acres of downtown
Boston that would be created by the removal of the elevated Central Artery, and urged project
managers to formulate “ creative strategies ” for integrating the new highway system with mass
transit facilities, limiting downtown parking spaces, and reserving highway lanes for high-occupancy
vehicles. Beyond environmental matters, the project had to respond to issues and conditions raised
by hundreds of groups, businesses, and agencies. CAT officials put the number of early mitigation
commitments at 1,100 and the added cost to the project at $2.8 billion. The commitments address
state and federal requirements, as well as reduction of construction impacts, including $450 million
for temporary lanes, curbs, and sidewalks that would enable businesses to continue during
construction, and $230 million for the City of Cambridge and the Metropolitan District to build a park
along the Charles River.

QUESTIONS

1. From the information provided here and in Example 4, create a list of stakeholders for the
project and revise Figure 14-6 to include them, showing possible or likely links between
them. For each stakeholder, state its likely interests in the project and in what ways it could
shape or influence the conduct of the project and its tunnels, roadways, bridges, etc.
2. 2. Considering the technical aspects of the project (building tunnels, roadways, and bridges;
demolishing the old roadway structure and replacing it with parks) and its political,
economic, environmental, and social impacts (and the stakeholders with interests in each),
what characteristics (skills, back ground, competencies) would you expect of the “ ideal ”
manager or managers overseeing a project of this scope and magnitude?