A Sui Generis Regime For Traditional Knowledge
A Sui Generis Regime For Traditional Knowledge
Winter 2011
Repository Citation
J. Janewa OseiTutu, Emerging Scholars Series: A Sui Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge:
The Cultural Divide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 Marq. Intellectual Property L. Rev. 147 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol15/iss1/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It
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EMERGING SCHOLARS SERIES*
A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE
CULTURAL DIVIDE IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
J. JANEWA OSEITUTU**
* The Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review Emerging Scholars Series highlights
the work of the junior scholars who are poised to become the leading intellectual property
thinkers of the next generation.
** B.A. (University of Toronto), J.D. (Queen’s University), LL.M. (McGill University);
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. E mail:
[email protected]. I would like to thank Marina Angel, Olufunmilayo B. Arewa,
Anahita Ariya-Far, Robert A. Bohrer, Irene Calboli, Margaret Chon, Ellen Goodman, Charles C.
Jalloh, Kaisa McCandless, Chidi Oguamanam, Lisa P. Ramsey, Geoffrey Scott, Peter K. Yu, the
participants of the Drake 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable, and the participants of the
Temple University Beasley School of Law Update for Feminist Law Professors for their valuable
feedback and suggestions for the paper. Ms. Elizabeth Youngkin and Ms. Patrice Collins provided
able research assistance. The views expressed herein do not represent the views of any organization
with which I am, or have been, associated. All opinions, errors and omissions are my own.
148 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
ABSTRACT
Traditional knowledge can be protected, to some extent, under various
intellectual property laws. However, for the most part, there is no effective
international legal protection for this subject matter. This has led to proposals
for a sui generis regime to protect traditional knowledge. The precise contours
of the right are yet to be determined, but a sui generis right could include
perpetual protection. It could also result in protection for historical communal
works and for knowledge that may be useful but that is not inventive
according to the standards of intellectual property law. Developing countries
have been more supportive of an international traditional knowledge right than
developed countries. At the same time, developing countries have been critical
of the impact of intellectual property rights on social issues such as access to
medicines and access to educational materials. In light of developing country
concerns about the negative effects of strong global intellectual property
rights, this paper uses a development-focused, instrumentalist approach to
assess the implications of a sui generis traditional knowledge right. It
concludes that some of the measures sought may not achieve the desired
outcome. Although intellectual property can play a role in protecting
traditional knowledge, a sui generis intellectual property style right may
hinder the equity-oriented goals of some traditional knowledge communities.
150 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
INTRODUCTION
Some communities possess useful knowledge and traditions that have
been passed down from one generation to another. These traditional practices
and artworks, or the medicinal knowledge may be highly valued by the
community, and possibly by others. However, intellectual property law does
not necessarily protect knowledge relating to the medicinal uses of plants,
reproductions of communal works, traditional cultural practices, or spiritual
rituals. This is because much of this knowledge is not new or cannot be
identified as having been created by a particular individual.1
Far from protecting this knowledge, intellectual property law may, in some
instances, have facilitated the taking and commercialization of this traditional
knowledge by individuals or entities that are external to the traditional
knowledge-generating community. The result is often an inequitable situation
in which the knowledge is used, including for commercial purposes, without
attribution or compensation to the knowledge-generating community. This use
or taking without consent or compensation has been characterized as
“bio-piracy” or “misappropriation.”2 The taking and use (or misuse) of the
cultural works, genetic resources and knowledge of traditional and indigenous
peoples, has led to a call to protect traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions.3 This includes the possibility of
1. The various forms of traditional knowledge may implicate different kinds of intellectual
property. For example, patent law relates to medicinal traditional knowledge, whereas artistic and
cultural practices relate to copyright law, and indentifying symbols may pertain to trademarks and
geographical indications. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (provides that copyright
subsists “in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”). Patent Act of
1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (this general patentability provision states that only one who “invents
or discovers” an invention that is “new and useful” may obtain a patent).
2. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 1 (2001); Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade and Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 219 (2008).
3. In the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) context, traditional cultural
expressions can be considered a subset of traditional knowledge. Traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions are often seen as part of a single “integrated heritage.” However, due
to the specific legal and policy questions raised by traditional cultural expressions in the intellectual
property context, WIPO has separate, but parallel, work programs for traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions. See Traditional Cultural Expressions (Folklore), WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). This paper considers intellectual
property as a broad category, despite the many distinctions between patent law, copyright law, and
trademark law. The focus of this work is on the underlying similarities that inform intellectual
property law and policy. As such, reference to traditional knowledge will be used as a broad category
that may include traditional cultural expressions. Such grouping is not inconsistent with the concept
of traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, and some early documents from
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 151
the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Tradition
Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) have even defined traditional cultural expressions as a subset of
traditional knowledge. See WIPO IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
FOLKLORE —AN OVERVIEW ¶ 30, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3 (2001). 4. I use the term
“equity” in the ordinary sense of the word, meaning that which is fair and just, or appropriate in the
circumstances. See Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th ed. 1999). Naturally, what is considered “fair”
may depend on one’s perspective.
5. The traditional knowledge dialogue has also been described as a discussion about “value.”
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Piracy, Biopiracy and Borrowing: Culture, Cultural Heritage and the
Globalization of Intellectual Property 56 (Case Res. Paper Series in Legal Stud., Working Paper No.
04–19, 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=56921 (“This same combination of derogation
and appropriation or borrowing without compensation from local knowledge have been important
motivating forces behind contemporary efforts to protect local knowledge. The development of
rationales from protecting local knowledge has in turn entailed constructing arguments to justify the
worthiness of such knowledge for intellectual property protection. This is essentially a discourse
about value.”); Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing
Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, in AFTER IDENTITY 254-255 (Dan
Danielson and Karen Engle eds.,1995) (arguing that Natives need to tell Native stories and that the
law is based on European culture, which is no longer acceptable in a post-colonial era).
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
152 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
7. See Mary W.S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright: From
Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 830–32 (2009); Margaret
Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2885, 2891
(2006).
8. See, e.g., WIPO, AFRICAN GROUP SUBMISSION ON DOCUMENT WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/14/9 (2009). This can include, among others, educational or artistic
works that are subject to copyright or pharmaceutical products that are subject to patent protection.
9. Joseph Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The Role of
Intellectual Property Rights System, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2006) (“[I]n 1994,
TRIPs was at the center of multifaceted criticism, for both developing and developed countries.”);
see Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 286 (2004) (“[S]erious questions
arise as to the sustainability of the attempt in TRIPS to resolve the international externality aspects of
protecting new knowledge goods. An additional criticism leveled at the emerging IPR system is that
the agenda for increasing protection has been articulated and pushed by rich-country governments
effectively representing the commercial interests of a limited set of industries that distribute
knowledge goods.”); Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a
TRIPS-plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 3 (2003), available at
http:// www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/WIPO(A4)final0304.pdf (noting that the appropriateness of the
standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries has been seriously questioned,
and that the TRIPS standards may be too high for these countries); see James Boyle, A Manifesto on
WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009 (2004) (critiquing
TRIPS).
10. Marie Byström & Peter Einarsson, TRIPS: Consequences for Developing Countries
Implications for Swedish Development Cooperation 48–49 (2001) (consultancy report to the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)).
11. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV.
1, 10–12, 47–50 (2001) (explaining documented cases, included the well-known controversy over the
patenting of “neem,” long used in Indian villages as a traditional medicine, and outlining some of the
jurisprudence involving Australian Aboriginal artists); Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade and
Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 153
POL’Y 219, 226–31 (2008) (explaining the controversy over the Rosy Periwinkle, the Neem tree, the
Enola Bean and others).
12. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
929 (Spring 2002); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 248-61 (Spring 2001); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional
Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2001); See generally MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS
NATIVE CULTURE (2003)
13. See WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: REVISED OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/5 (2010) (Providing provisions against
misappropriation and enhancing benefit sharing. See Art. 1 and Art. 2 for rules for provisions against
misappropriation and unfair competition. See Art. 6 on benefit sharing, Art. 9 on duration of
protection, and Art. 13 for enforcement of traditional knowledge protection).
14. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 1, 10–14, 47–52 (2001); Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable Development, 19
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 219 (2008); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS Related Aspects of
Traditional Knowledge, 33 Case W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233 (Spring 2001); Christine H. Farley,
Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer? 30 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1997); Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a Policy
Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L.
REV. 629 (2007); Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARD. ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (2009); David Castle & E. Richard
Gold, Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing: From Compensation to Transaction, in
ACCESSING AND SHARING THE BENEFITS OF THE GENOMICS REVOLUTION 65 (Peter W.B. Phillips &
Chika B. Onwuekwe eds., 2007); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local
Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L.
REV. 155 (2006); CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 52–57 (2006); Chidi
Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual Property in the Globalization Epoch: The Integration of
Indigenous Knowledge, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135 (2004); Chidi Oguamanam, Local
Knowledge as Trapped Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Culture, Power and Politics, 11 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 29 (2008); Paul Kuruk, The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis Frameworks
of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 67 (2007); Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property and the Global Élites: An
Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).
154 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
knowledge can be only partially protected under the existing system.15 Others
have queried whether it should be treated as property at all.16 The question that
remains is how best to address the concerns of traditional knowledge
generating communities. Yet, the traditional knowledge right that some
developing countries and traditional knowledge proponents support is based
on an intellectual property model, and therefore, has the potential to produce
problems not unlike those which have resulted under the current system. An
international sui generis intellectual property right for traditional knowledge
may hinder access to affordable knowledge goods, including for indigenous
and local communities.
Drawing on the notion of intellectual property ‘from below,’17 this paper
aims to contribute to the discussion by evaluating the utility of an intellectual
property model for the protection of traditional knowledge. This assessment is
done in light of some of the stated goals of traditional knowledge protection,18
and with a view to the potential impact of proprietary traditional knowledge
on affordable knowledge goods.19 The creation of a new property right may
serve as both an offensive and defensive measure. This article cautions that a
legally binding instrument that creates an exclusive proprietary traditional
knowledge right may not ultimately benefit indigenous and local communities.
While it is not entirely clear what an international legal instrument
15. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges
from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929 (Spring
2002); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 233, 248–61 (Spring 2001); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2001); Christine H. Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples:
Is Intellectual Property the Answer? 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing litigation over the use of
Navajo cultural works in Australia); Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual
Recognition Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional
Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629 (2007).
16. Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in
Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARD. ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (2009). 17. I draw on the intellectual
property ‘from below’ approach as outlined by Professor Margaret Chon. The concept of viewing
international law ‘from below’ can be attributed to Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s seminal work,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD
RESISTANCE (2003). 18. See WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/5 (2010). 19. There is a variety of
perspectives from which one can evaluate traditional knowledge, including an economic,
anthropological or human rights lenses. Although I touch on these issues in this article, I do not
purport to provide an economic analysis of the propriety of protecting traditional knowledge, nor do
I pursue a detailed analysis of the issue of traditional knowledge through the lens of human rights
law.
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 155
23. See David Castle & E. Richard Gold, Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing: From
Compensation to Transaction, in ACCESSING AND SHARING THE BENEFITS OF THE GENOMICS
REVOLUTION 65, 68 (Peter W.B. Phillips & Chika B. Onwuekwe eds., 2007); Ruth L. Gana , The
Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and
Development, 18 LAW & POL’Y 315, 329 (1996) (observing that developing countries were not
signatories to the early international intellectual property treaties but the treaty provisions were often
extended to them through the colonial administration); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and
Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property
Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 160–163 (2006) (arguing that colonialism
created a unequal power dynamic between countries and that such power discrepancies influenced
intellectual property law); CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS
KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 57
(2006) (arguing that the political, legal, and economic structures in most post colonial societies
reflect colonial values and are therefore complicit in the Western industrial model. Hence, these
states and their ecological policies fail to encourage indigenous knowledge or truly reflect indigenous
aspirations); Chidi Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual Property in the Globalization Epoch: The
Integration of Indigenous Knowledge, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135, 154 (2004) (explaining
that intellectual property laws are a result of colonialism); Chidi Oguamanam, Local Knowledge as
Trapped Knowledge, Intellectual Property, Culture, Power and Politics, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
29, 32 (2008) (describing TRIPS as “the historical legacy of colonial disdain, exclusion, derogation
and appropriation as a policy framework for dealing with local knowledge”); Paul Kuruk, The Role of
Customary Knowledge Under Sui Generis Frameworks of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional
and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 67, 86–92 (2007) (discussing the effect
of colonialization on laws in Africa, the United States, and New Zealand); Peter K. Yu, World Trade,
Intellectual Property And the Global Élites: An Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1,
3-4 (2002) (“Against a background of colonial and semi-colonial history, less developed countries
begin to develop resentment toward developed countries and multinational corporations. Eventually,
this resentment might spill over to the international intellectual property system and other
trade-related areas, thus creating a legitimacy crisis within the international trading system.”);
Rosemary J. Coombe, Cultural and Intellectual Properties: Occupying the Colonial Imagination,
16.1 POLAR 8 (1993); Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development
Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99 (2000) (“The external
postcolonial development critique of the international order asserts that it, though informed by
seemingly egalitarian liberal ideals, perpetuated the ‘underdevelopment’—that is, the
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 157
entrenched economic inequality relative to the North—of Southern countries, by failing to correct
economic disadvantages bequeathed to the South by colonialism.”). 24. Dorothy E. Roberts, Why
Culture Matters to Law: the Difference Politics Makes in CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY
POLITICS, AND THE LAW, AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, EDS. 83 (1999) (Observing that
Culture matters to law and that apparently neutral legal principles that purport to disregard culture
effectively privilege the existing dominant cultural norms.)
25. In other words, various communities may generate (and may have generated greater
quantities before industrialization) ecological knowledge, community artwork, songs, or culturally
specific textiles, for example.
26. See infra Section V, Part B (“Intellectual Property Related Solutions that Don’t
158 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
Require an Expansion of the Existing Regime”); see Daniel Wuger, Prevention of Misappropriation
of Intangible Cultural Heritage Through Intellectual Property Laws in POOR PEOPLE’S
KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 183, 197 (J.
Michael Finger and Philip Schuler eds, 2004). I thank Margaret Chon for underscoring the value of
defensive uses of intellectual property.
27. I speak of a global intellectual property regime rather than the TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 6, specifically. First, while TRIPS is significant because it incorporates the Berne Convention,
infra note 94, and the Paris Convention, infra note 116, by reference and sets minimum enforceable
standards, it is only one of several intellectual property treaties. Secondly, the work on traditional
knowledge is taking place beyond the context of TRIPS. It is therefore helpful to consider the
international intellectual property system, to the extent one exists, as more than just TRIPS.
28. See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009, 2 (2004) (criticizing the WIPO for increasing intellectual property
rights to the detriment of developing countries); Laurence R. Helfer, Towards a
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 159
Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 973–974 (2007)
(describing the work of the WTO and WIPO being “brought . . . to a virtual standstill” by resistance
to the global expansion of IP rights); Open Society Institute, Geneva Declaration on the Future of
the World Intellectual Property Organization 2 (2004), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/genevadeclaration.html (stating that a uniform approach that
“embraces the highest levels of intellectual property protection for everyone leads to unjust and
burdensome outcomes for countries that are struggling to meet the most basic needs of their
citizens”).
29. Adebambo Adewopo, The Global Intellectual Property System and Sub-Saharan Africa: A
Prognostic Reflection, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 749, 749–50 (2002); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and
Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property
Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 160–63 (2006) (positing that the global
intellectual property regime reflects cultural hierarchies, with most developing country cultures
considered less advanced, and their values therefore not reflected in the IP treaties); Krishna Ravi
Srinivas, Intellectual Property Rights and Traditional Knowledge: The Case of Yoga, 47 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 2866–2871 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005298. Developing countries
were initially allowed a grace period to implement their TRIPS obligations, which has now passed.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 66 However, a further exception has been made for least
developed countries with ressect to the protection of pharmaceutical products. This exception was
created under para 7 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which states: “We also
agree that the least-developed country members will not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical
products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce
rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the right of
least-developed country members to seek other extensions of the transition periods as provided for in
Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to take the necessary action
to give effect to this pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.”
30. See Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future
of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 171 (2000) (noting the patent related health
concerns of developing country members); Lawrence R. Helfer, Towards a Human Rights
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 986–88 (2007); Charles R.
McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking
Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 548–49 (2003) (discussing the
North-South division and the negative reaction of farmers in India to the TRIPS Agreement).
31. EMMANUEL HASSAN, OHID YAQUB & STEPHANIE DIEPEVEEN, INTELLECTUAL
160 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 48 (2010). 32. PETER
DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 190–191 (1996). 33. Id.
34. Consider, for example, the comments of the United States Trade Representative
Ambassador Ron Kirk about the importance of intellectual property rights for American industries.
Ambassador Kirk’s written speech characterizes innovation and creativity as “the engines of the
American economy” and outlines an agenda which is aimed at adequately protecting American
intellectual property rights in foreign nations. His speech describes intellectual property piracy as a
“job killer” and an “export killer.” See Ambassador Ron Kirk, Protecting Tomorrow: IP and Green
Technology (April 26, 2010), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2010/april/remarks
ambassador-ron-kirk-world-intellectual (last visited October 15, 2010); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 4 (2010) (underlining the
importance of intellectual property to the United States Economy); see Nam D. Pham, The Impact of
Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property Rights on U.S. Productivity, Competitiveness, Jobs,
Wages, and Export 52 (2010), available at http://www.memopage.com/bourse/script
news/includes/openwysiwyg2/uploaded_docs/15567_gipc_execstudy.pdf (this research paper, which
was prepared for the United States Chamber of Commerce, concludes that intellectual property
industries are key to sustaining American economic growth and that they are more competitive than
non-intellectual property industries
35. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 189 (1996). 36. See
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6.
37. Convention on Biological Diversity (with annexes), concluded at Rio de Janeiro on June 5,
1992, [hereinafter CBD] 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992); WTO, Ministerial
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 161
knowledge resulting from intellectual activity in a traditional context, and includes the knowhow,
skills, innovations, practices and learning that form part of traditional knowledge systems, and
knowledge embodying traditional lifestyles of indigenous and local communities, or contained in
codified knowledge systems passed between generations. It is not limited to any specific technical
field, and may include agricultural, environmental and medicinal knowledge, and knowledge
associated with genetic resources. This general description of TK is based on the work of the
Committee itself.” See WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: DRAFT GAP
ANALYSIS: REVISION 4, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/5/(b) Rev. (2008); WIPO IGC, MATTERS
CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
AND FOLKLORE 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3 (2001).
47. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE—OPERATIONAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 11,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9 (May 20, 2002)
48. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE—OPERATIONAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 11,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9 (May 20, 2002); GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN,
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7 (2008).
49. Emmanuel Hassan, Ohid Yaqub & Stephanie Diepeveen, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 39–40 (2010) (traditional knowledge may
include: literary, artistic or scientific works, agricultural technologies and techniques, religious or
spiritual practices, dance or medical treatments); Bio-piracy of Traditional Knowledge, Traditional
Knowledge Digital Library, www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Biopiracy.asp?GL=3DEng
(last visited Sept. 8, 2010). Some aspects of Yoga and Ayurvedic medicine may be protectable as IP.
For example, some Yoga poses have been copyrighted, and certain Ayurvedic products may be
protected under trademark law. See, e.g., BIKRAM’S BEGINNING YOGA CLASS / BIKRAM CHOUDHURY
WITH BONNIE JONES REYNOLDS, Registration No. TX0005259325 (2000) (Copyright Registration).
164 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
50. See Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP.
L. REV. 433, 484–85 (Summer 2008) (noting the different types of legal protection that is available
for the two types of traditional knowledge); Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual
Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV
137, 149–60 (Spring 2005) (analyzing traditional knowledge using existing intellectual property
framework and showing the difficulty of protecting some types of traditional knowledge); Kal
Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1021, 1033 (2007) (“[R]efined products based on traditional knowledge and genetic resources are
protected via international IP law, while the underlying traditional knowledge and resources are
not.”); STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MAINTAINING BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY 4–5 (2005).
51. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty is destroyed if: the
invention was “known or used by others in the [United States]” prior to the applicant’s date of
invention, the invention was “described in a printed publication” by anyone anywhere in the world
prior to the applicant’s date of invention, the invention was described by another in an issued patent
or published patent application prior to the applicant’s date of invention, the invention was put into
public use or placed on sale for more than 1 year prior to the patent application date, or the applicant
did not in fact discover or invent the subject matter he or she seeks to patent); TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 6, at art. 27.1 (provision governing patentable subject matter).
52. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990) (this uniform code has been adopted in
45 US states as of 2007); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 39 (provision governing protectable
subject matter of trade secrets).
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 165
53. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §102 (originality requirement); Trademark Act of 1946, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1055; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 15 (provision governing protectable
subject matter of trademarks).
54. See Patent Exploitation, The TIMES OF INDIA (May 22, 2007, 12:13 AM),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Patent_Exploitation/articleshow/2065331.cms (explaining that the
yoga industry is estimated to be worth approximately $3 billion dollars in the United States and $8
billion dollars worldwide); ELIZABETH DE MICHELIS, A HISTORY OF MODERN YOGA: PATANJALI
AND WESTERN ESOTERICISM 2 (2004) (Stating generally that the origins of modern yoga that is
prevalent today began over 150 years ago).
55. See generally Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Intellectual Property Rights and Traditional
Knowledge: The Case of Yoga, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2866–2871 (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005298; BIKRAM’S BEGINNING YOGA CLASS / BIKRAM CHOUDHURY WITH
BONNIE JONES REYNOLDS, Registration No. TX0005259325 (2000) (Copyright Registration).
56. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (United Kingdom), Integrating Intellectual
Property Rights and Development Policy 76 (2002) (explaining that extracts from the neem tree have
long been used in India to fight off fungal infections, as well as for various other purposes. In 1994,
the European Patent Office granted a patent to an American company and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture for a method of controlling fungus on plants using extracts of neem oil. A coalition of
Indian farmers and non-governmental organizations alleged that the patent was based on centuries of
Indian traditional knowledge and successfully argued that it should not be patentable); Lee
Gillespie-White & Eric Garduño, Treading an Independent Course for Protecting Traditional
Knowledge, International Intellectual Property Institute (2002) (discussing the hoodia cactus). See
U.S. Patent No. 6,126,950 (filed April 10, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,368,856 (filed Aug. 2, 1993);
U.S. Patent No. 5,356,628 (filed Dec. 2, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 5,298,251 (filed July 21, 1993);
Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73,
76–77 (2003) (discussing the neem case).
57. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993).
166 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
because it had been used medicinally in India for thousands of years. The
CSIR supported its claim with a printed publication from an Indian medical
association and was successful in having the patent revoked.58 However, if the
traditional medicinal knowledge had not been documented, the patent may not
have been invalidated.59
An example of alleged biopiracy is that of the hoodia cactus plant. The
knowledge held by the San people of southern Africa about the use of the
hoodia cactus as an appetite suppressant is not protectable.60 Yet an invention
based on this knowledge was protected through patent law and licensed to
Pfizer. Several generations of the San people of
58. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993) (all claims cancelled as of April 21, 1998
in Reexamination Certificate (3500th)); Bio-piracy of Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Knowledge
Digital Library, http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Biopiracy.asp?GL=Eng (last visited
Sept. 8, 2010); Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (United Kingdom), Integrating
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 76 (2002); Alyson Slack, Turmeric, 15 TED
CASE STUDIES 700 (2004), available at http://www1.american.edu/ted/turmeric.htm; Graham
Dutfield, TRIPS Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233,
247–48 (Spring 2001); Shubha Ghosh, Traditional Knowledge, Patents, and the New Mercantilism
(Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 885, 898–902 (2003) (describing the turmeric
controversy surrounding the cancellation of Dr. Shiva’s turmeric patent); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa,
TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual
Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 172 (2006) (describing the
cancellation of all claims in U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504); Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and
Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73, 93-97 (2003) (describing the cancellation of all
claims in U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993) and mentioning turmeric patent claims that
have not been cancelled such as U.S. Patent No. 6,048,533 (filed Sept. 1, 1998) and U.S. Patent No.
5,897,865 (filed June 30, 1997)); Maggie Kohls, Blackbeard or Albert Schweitzer: Reconciling
Biopiracy, 6 CHI. KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 108, 120-21, 131 (2007) (describing the cancellation of all
claims in U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993) and stating that the turmeric case created a
negative perception of United States patent examination procedures).
59. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (Novelty is destroyed if prior art is found
describing the invention seeking patent protection. Prior art can be an invention that was “known or
used by others in [the United States]” prior to the applicant’s date of invention. In addition, it can be
an invention “described in a printed publication” by anyone anywhere in the world prior to the
applicant’s date of invention, or described by another in an issued patent or published patent
application prior to the applicant’s date of invention. In this instance, the government of India was
able to challenge the novelty of the patent because the traditional knowledge had been documented
in a printed publication. However, this is not always the case); Margo A. Bagley, Patently
Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679,
680-683 (discussing the neem controversy and how the geographic limitation in 35 U.S.C. § 102
creates problems regarding the use of inventions from developing countries).
60. See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (United Kingdom), Integrating Intellectual
Property Rights and Development Policy 77–78 (2002); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Piracy, Biopiracy,
and Borrowing: Culture, Cultural Heritage and the Globalization of Intellectual Property 15–16
(Case Res. Paper Series in Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 04-19, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596921.
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 167
southern Africa have used this plant to stave off hunger. An extract from the
plant was patented for its hunger-fighting properties, and a license was granted
to the pharmaceutical giant, Pfizer. Unlike the turmeric case, the patent on the
plant extract was not invalidated.61 The pharmaceutical giant could profit if its
Hoodia-based weight loss drug is successful, while the San remain in
poverty.62
Unfortunately, even if it has some social or economic value, medicinal
knowledge about the uses of turmeric or hoodia cannot be protected under the
current regime.63 First, the knowledge has been around for generations. It
would, therefore, fail to meet the test of novelty under patent law.64 Secondly,
the knowledge is not attributable to a particular individual or entity. In other
words, there is no identifiable creator, but possibly a collective of creators. It
has been suggested that the communal nature of traditional knowledge is not
an obstacle to protection because it is possible to have collective ownership of
an intellectual property right.65 However, while group work can be
61. U.S. Patent No. 7,166,611 (filed June 22, 2004) (this patent is cross referenced to U.S. Pat.
No. 6,376,657, granted Apr. 23, 2002, which is a U.S. National Phase of PCT/GB98/01100, filed
Apr. 15, 1998).
62. See Rachel Wynberg, Rhetoric, Realism and Benefit-Sharing: Use of Traditional
Knowledge of Hoodia Species in the Development of an Appetite Suppressant, 7 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 851, 865 (2004) (from the Benefit Sharing Agreement between the CSIR and the San, only
between 0.03 percent and 1.2 percent of net sales of the product is given to the San because the San
royalty only constitutes royalties received by CSIRfor the product); Rachel Wynberg, Sharing the
Crumbs with the San, BioWatch South Africa (March 2003), available at
http://www.biowatch.org.za/main.asp? include=docs/clippings/csir-san.htm (potential commercial
profitability of the drug was estimated to be between $1 billion and $8 billion USD a year); see also
Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder & Roger Chennells, Green Diamonds of the South: An Overview
of the San-Hoodia Case, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CONSENT AND BENEFIT SHARING: LESSONS
FROM THE SAN-HOODIA CASE 89–124 (Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder & Roger Chennells eds.
2009); Rachel Wynberg et al., Policies for Sharing Benefits from Hoodia, in Indigenous Peoples,
CONSENT AND BENEFIT SHARING: LESSONS FROM THE SAN-HOODIA CASE 127-41 (Rachel Wynberg,
Doris Schroeder & Roger Chennells eds., 2009).
63. See Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior
Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 680–683 (2003) (discussing the neem controversy and
how the geographic limitation in the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102 creates problems with
respect to the use and patenting of inventions that originate in developing countries). 35 U.S.C. § 102
allows for the patenting of an invention unless it was known or used by others in the United States, or
patented or described in a printed publication in the United States or another country before it was
invented by the patent applicant. So, if an invention was known or used by others in a foreign country
but not patented or described in any printed publication, 35 U.S.C. §102 does not prohibit it from
being patented in the United States.
64. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (This provision requires that the invention
be new. Therefore, if there is documentation that the invention was already within the public domain
prior to filing the patent application, a patent may not be issued). 65. See Patent Act of 1952, 35
U.S.C. § 116 (This provision allows a group of inventors
168 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
protected under intellectual property law, the group still needs to be clearly
identified as a collective of individuals who have each contributed to the
creation or the innovation.66
The inability to protect traditional knowledge leads to what appears to an
inequitable result. The inadequacy of intellectual property law in preventing
such uses has prompted a call to protect this intergenerational knowledge.67
This becomes a question of equity because persons foreign to the group make
use of their knowledge and are able to profit by obtaining formal legal
protection through the use of intellectual property laws. Yet, the same laws are
not effective in protecting the range of useful knowledge of these local and
indigenous groups. The contradiction lies in the fact that intellectual property
rights were sought because of the perceived value in the knowledge, yet the
knowledge itself is not subject to any kind of internationally recognized legal
right. The essence of the critique is about the injustice of the situation. In other
words, it seems that the local and indigenous communities are not being
treated fairly in these exchanges.
This is not to say that traditional knowledge cannot receive any protection
under existing laws. Traditional knowledge and intellectual property converge
in some areas but are quite distinct in other respects.68 Thus, some kinds of
traditional knowledge can be protected as intellectual property. For example,
traditional knowledge holders make use of trademarks and geographical
indications to protect marks
to jointly file for one invention even if the group of inventors did not “physically work together or at
the same time” and did not make the same “type or amount contribution.” However, all inventors
must apply jointly and make the required oath of inventorship as described in 35 U.S.C. § 115).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 172 (Third World
Network ed., 2008) (referring to U.S. patent no. 5,304,718 on quinoa which was subsequently
invalidated, and products based on plant materials and knowledge from indigenous communities
such as Neem tree, kava, barbasco, endod, and turmeric) (citing Pat Roy Mooney, The Parts of Life:
Agricultural Biodiversity, Indigenous Knowledge, and the Role of the Third System, 152–54 (1998));
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge,
and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP L. REV. 155, 168–79 (2006);
Dr. Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights & Benefit Sharing,
11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 785 (Summer 2003); Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and
Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENTL. L. & POL’Y 219 (2008); Christine H. Farley,
Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1997); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 233 (Spring 2001).
68. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L.
REV. 433, 443–53 (Summer 2008).
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 169
69. Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All There Is? Beating Global Monopolists at Their Own
Marketing Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 123, 155–58 (2008) (identifying the use of
trademark law as a way to strengthen local identities and protect traditional knowledge). One
example is that of the Maori trademark in New Zealand; Creative Nz Agrees To Transfer Maori
Trademark—Toi Iho Tm, VOXY.CO.NZ (May 21, 2010, 6:12 PM),
http://www.voxy.co.nz/national/creative-nz-agrees-transfer-maori-trademark-toi-iho
tm/5/49511 (describing the transfer of the Toi Iho trade marks to the Toi Iho Foundation); Susy
Frankel, Trademarks and Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Intellectual Property, in TRADEMARK
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 433, 434 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie
& Mark D. Janis, eds., 2008) (“Indigenous peoples have recognized that . . . existing trademark
regimes may be a means by which to protect their cultural icons, signs, and symbols.”).
70. See, e.g., COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION
AND PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, THE MATAATUA
DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1
(1993); Mathew Rimmer, Australian Icons: Authenticity Marks and Identity Politics, 3 INDIGENOUS
L.J. 139, 153–54, 164–65 (2004) (describing the limitations of existing copyright, trademark law, and
authenticity marks in protecting aboriginal artwork); Graham Dutfield, Protecting Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore: A Review of Progress in Diplomacy and Policy Formulation, International
Trade & Sustainable Development Series, 6–7 (2003), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Dutfield%20%20Protecting%20TK%20and%20Fol
klore%20-%20Blue%201.pdf (“Asserting a property right over knowledge is insufficient to prevent
abuses when so much traditional knowledge has fallen into the public domain and can no longer be
controlled by the original TK holders.”).
71. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998–1999), 6 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/index/html.
72. Id. at 16, 25; WIPO, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
art. 2 (viii), (amended 1979).
170 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
73. For example, the inclusion of geographical indications in TRIPS represented the first time
that this subject matter was acknowledged in a global agreement as a category of intellectual
property. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 22, 23. Indications of sources were recognized
in the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International
Registration, 923 U.N.T.S. 205 (1958). However, this agreement has only 27 signatories. See Lisbon
Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration:
Objective and Main Features, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/general (last visited Nov. 4,
2010).
74. WIPO: Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, art. 5 (1997). This is
because compilations of data would not necessarily be able to recieve copyright protection due to the
requirement that there be some minimal creativity.
75. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 97, 123–124 (2007).
76. J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES J. INT’L L. 441, 450–51 (Summer 2000) (noting developing
country concerns about the costs associated with IP protection, including issues such as access to
medicines); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 (2007); DUTFIELD &
SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9 (Edward Elgar, 2008) (observing that
intellectual property rights generally result in increased prices and a reduced access to knowledge).
77. Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV 130, 132, 166 (2009); see Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the
Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115,
1116–1118 (2009) (discussing how various nations attained high levels of
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 171
economic growth without having strong intellectual property rights); see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 27 (2010) (observing that despite significant efforts,
it is difficult, to quantify the net effect of counterfeiting and piracy on the economy). But see Viktor
Mayer-Schönberger, The Law as Stimulus: The Role of Law in Fostering Innovative
Entrepreneurship, 6 J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 153, 166–68 (2010) (arguing that the patent
system overall tends to benefit entrepreneurs). See Rod Falvey, Neil Foster & David Greenaway,
Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONALISATION OF ECONOMIC
POLICY 7–9 (2004) (showing a positive relationship between intellectual property protection and
economic growth); see, e.g., Walter G. Park & Juan Carlos Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights and
Economic Growth, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 51 (1997) (stating that intellectual property rights
indirectly affect economic growth).
78. See Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights Protection:
A Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA, 115,
118, 140–41 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007).
79. Adebambo Adewopo, The Global Intellectual Property System and Sub-Saharan Africa: A
Prognostic Reflection, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 749, 754–69 (2002); CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2000) (discussing how industrialized
countries only sought strong intellectual property rights once they had attained a certain level of
industrialization and economic development).
172 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
85. The United States is seen as one of the primary opponents to an international regime to
protect TK. See Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a
Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 629, 683–86 (2007).
86. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS/EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5–7, 12–4 (2007),
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/igc/pdf/usa_tk-tce.pdf (responses to
Questions 5, 6, and 8).
87. WIPO, BANDUNG DECLARATION ON THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL CULTURAL
EXPRESSIONS, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 8, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/12 (2007) (submitted by Indonesia).
88. WIPO, AFRICAN GROUP SUBMISSION ON WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/14/9 (2009).
89. Id. at Annex I, page 1.
90. WIPO, AFRICAN GROUP SUBMISSION ON WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/14/9 (2009).
174 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 II.
B. An Instrumentalist Approach
Property rights in intangible goods can affect the distribution of
with the mark. Patents, for example, provide an incentive for commercializing new inventions to
compensate for the costs involved in developing and bringing a new product to the market.
Moreover, they decrease secrecy and increase the pool of knowledge that is available to society. See
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003). Patenting requires that the invention be disclosed such that a skilled
third party could reproduce the invention, thereby leading to the dissemination of knowledge. Patents
can thus be said to curtail the desire to keep inventions secret. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6,
at art. 29.1; U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §111, 112 (requiring that the patent application contain a
specification, with a written description of the invention, as well as an explanation of how to make
and use the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same”).
96. Edward C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
31, 47–48 (Winter 1989).
97. See, e.g., JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 30–31 (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
Though this explanation is often used to explain patent law, it is applicable to other forms of
intellectual property as well.
98. Professor Long suggests that, though intellectual property has been justified on the basis of
natural law, labor theory, and personality theory, the TRIPS Agreement has established the theory of
utilitarianism, and trade utilitarianism in particular, as the single international philosophy of
intellectual property rights. See Doris Estelle Long, “Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing the
Policies of Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 243 (2002).
99. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821, 2831 (2006) (observing that there has been a focus on the wealth maximizing function of
intellectual property).
100. Id. at 2823, 2858 (suggesting that intellectual property should be responsive to
development paradigms and advocating a principle of substantive equality).
176 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
power in favor of the rights holders.101 This is because certain abstract objects
relate to physical or knowledge resources upon which many may depend.102
The push to protect traditional knowledge can be characterized, in part, as a
response to the perceived unequal distribution of power.103 This is largely due
to the expansion of developed country standards for intellectual property
protection for all countries without regard to their differing levels of
development.104 The traditional knowledge narrative appears to be partly driven
by a desire for a more equitable international intellectual property system, one
that is seen to value the contributions of both the developed and the
developing world.105
Professor Drahos proposes an instrumentalist approach to intellectual
property, which considers the social costs of intellectual property protection.106
He characterizes intellectual property rights as “liberty-intruding privileges of
a special kind,” which can lead to factionalism and to a concentration of
private power.107 It follows that if intellectual property is considered from a
distributive justice perspective, the scope of these rights should be limited.108
This approach strives to achieve more than a simple cost-benefit analysis and
conceives
Even more pertinent to the discussion about excluded subject matter, is the
international recognition that not all forms of knowledge should fall within the
ambit of intellectual property law. For instance, TRIPS enshrines the
established principle that copyright law extends to the expression of an idea,
but not to the idea itself.119 Further, with a view to protecting public health and
morality, WTO members may exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical
methods from patentability.120 Additionally, the policy objective of curtailing
monopolies on language means that generic words are not protectable as
trademarks.121 In other words, there may be policy reasons for preventing some
types of knowledge from being subject to property rights.
Finally, TRIPS, which incorporates by reference the main provisions of
the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention, explicitly acknowledges in
Articles 7 and 8 the importance of a balanced intellectual property regime.122
Article 7 states:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations [emphasis
added].123
This is consistent with a distributive justice analysis of intellectual
property law as well as with the notion that intellectual property policy should
serve some broader public good.124
The arguments about equity and fairness that are raised in the context of
the traditional knowledge narrative reinforce the need to take the distributive
justice aspects of intellectual property policy into account in determining the
appropriate model for the protection of
traditional knowledge.
125. Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable Development, 19 Colo. J. INT’L ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 219, 249–52 (Summer 2008).
126. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L.
REV. 433, 448–53 (Summer 2008).
127. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, THE MATAATUA
DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
(1993). The conference was convened by the Nine Tribes of the Mataatua in New Zealand and
attended by more than 140 delegates from fourteen countries.
128. Id. at 1.
129. Kari-oca Conference, Appendix 5 (May 25–30, 1992) [hereinafter IPEC]. 130. Id. ¶¶ 99, 102.
Other traditional knowledge related statements can be found in paragraphs 28 and 96 of the IPEC.
With respect to the criminalization of the taking of traditional knowledge, the notion that the illegal
taking should be considered a crime is not a concept that is foreign to intellectual property law.
Indeed, TRIPS, Article 61 requires the criminalization of trademark counterfeiting or copyright
piracy that takes place “on a
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 181
a. Exclusion
Intellectual property rights prevent others from making use of the
protected creation without the consent of the right holder. This is similar to the
protection sought for traditional knowledge insofar as traditional knowledge
holders seek to prevent others from making use of their intangible goods
without consent.131 However, because the right holder is clearly identified in
the intellectual property context, the excluded other is also well defined. In the
traditional knowledge context, it may not be clear precisely whom is the
“other” to be excluded.132 This is because the boundaries of the category for
traditional knowledge holder are amorphous.133
b. Economic Rationale
Some traditional knowledge holders may be opposed to commercializing
goods that have been created from the use of traditional knowledge and
genetic resources because they consider it sacred.134 Thus, even if permission
were sought to use the traditional
commercial scale.”
131. Among the objectives of traditional knowledge protection is the requirement for prior
informed consent. See infra note 140.
132. See the discussion of “indigenous person” at section III (B) of the paper. 133. Indeed, it
may not be possible to create clear boundaries, particularly if, as discussed in the paper, not all
indigenous persons are traditional, and not all traditional persons are indigenous.
134. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L.
REV. 433, 455 (Summer 2008); WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 2, WIPO
Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001).
182 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
135. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L.
REV. 433, 457 (Summer 2008); WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 2, WIPO
Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001).
136. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, THE MATAATUA
DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1–2
(1993) (declaring that “Indigenous Peoples of the world have the right to self determination and in
exercising that right must be recognised as the exclusive owners Of their cultural and intellectual
property . . . .”).
137. See, e.g., COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF
DISCRIMINATION AND PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, THE
MATAATUA DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 1–2 (1993); (recognizing that “Indigenous Peoples are capable of managing their traditional
knowledge themselves, but are willing to offer it to all humanity provided their fundamental rights to
define and control this knowledge are protected by the international community . . . .”).
138. WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROTECTION
OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶¶ 7, 15, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001).
139. WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 (2006). This is one of the documents that will serve
as the basis of discussion for an international instrument to protect traditional knowledge. The
enumerated policy objectives are as follows: recognize value, promote respect, meet the actual needs
of traditional knowledge holder, promote conservation and preservation of traditional knowledge,
empower holders of traditional knowledge and acknowledge the distinctive nature traditional
knowledge systems, support traditional knowledge systems, contribute to safeguarding traditional
knowledge, repress unfair and inequitable uses, concord with relevant international agreements and
processes, promote innovation and creativity, ensure prior informed consent and exchanges based on
mutually agreed terms, promote equitable benefit-sharing, promote community development and
legitimate trading activities, preclude the grant of improper intellectual property rights to
unauthorized parties, enhance transparency and mutual confidence, and complement
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 183
“promote the fair and equitable sharing and distribution of monetary and
non-monetary benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge.”140
In addition to the objectives outlined by WIPO, the language in
international instruments, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity
(“CBD”) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources provide
further evidence that there is some interest in commercializing traditional
knowledge, or at least sharing in the economic benefits derived therefrom.141
For example, the CBD Article 8(1)(j) encourages an “equitable sharing of the
benefits” arising from the use of traditional knowledge.142 Article 15(5) of the
CBD requires State parties to obtain prior informed consent before accessing
genetic resources.143 The wide support for these treaties, as evidenced by the
number of signatories, suggests that there are a significant number of nations
whose indigenous stake-holders support the idea of prior informed consent
and equitable benefit sharing if a product based on traditional knowledge is
commercialized.
It seems reasonable to conclude therefore that part of the policy rationale
underlying the protection of traditional knowledge is commercial. Traditional
knowledge is said to play an important role in
the global economy, with the market value of plant-based medicines sold in
developed countries estimated to be worth billions.144 Also, some indigenous
groups may view their traditional knowledge as private property that is
capable of commercialization.145 Thus, the commercial nature of intellectual
property law is not necessarily incompatible with traditional knowledge
protection.
Despite this common commercial aspect, the economic objective of
traditional knowledge is related to the sharing of benefits from the
commercialization of such knowledge rather than as a way to recoup the costs
associated with commercialization. The traditional knowledge objective of
equitable benefit sharing would be consistent with a development-focused
distributive justice approach to intellectual property. This would move away
from the main distributive economic aspect of classical intellectual property
law, which aims to distribute the costs of innovation and commercialization.146
This classical intellectual property economic distribution serves to create
incentives for innovation. By comparison, traditional knowledge aims to
achieve a more equitable outcome in the sense that the benefits arising from
the use and commercialization of the property are shared. Thus, the
underlying economic policy justifications remain somewhat distinct from one
another. This emphasizes the importance of the equity seeking distributive
justice elements to traditional knowledge.
c. Innovation
One could list innovation as another shared policy objective of intellectual
property rights and a traditional knowledge right. Intellectual property policy
aims to stimulate innovation, and thereby the development of new intangible
goods. Traditional knowledge protection is also supposed to promote
innovation and creativity and to enhance the transmission of traditional
knowledge within indigenous and traditional communities.147
At the same time, the innovation intellectual property seeks to
148. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: OPERATIONAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 11,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9 (2002).
149. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra note
166.
150. Id.; see Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 97, 112 (Spring 2007).
151. WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROTECTION
OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 15, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14
(2001); UNESCO Symposium on the protection of traditional knowledge and expressions of
indigenous cultures in the Pacific Islands, Noumea, 15-19
186 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
heritage, while the other seeks to promote creativity, innovation, efficiency and
commercialization.159 Control over cultural goods, heritage, and expressions is
not considered to be the primary objective of intellectual property
protection.160 Rather, at this time, the predominant rationale for intellectual
property rights is to stimulate innovation and creativity.
For example, certain cultural songs, paintings, or books may be subject to copyright protection.
Geographical indications may be a form of intellectual property that can be used to protect elements
of culture.
159. Various scholars have observed the inconsistency between the objective of protecting
cultural property and the goals of intellectual property policy. See SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS
CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 17–19 (2005) (stating that the
utilitarian policy objective of enriching the public domain is among the greatest barriers to the
protection of cultural products); Christine H. Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is
Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 55 (1997) (pointing out that, with respect to copyright law, what some traditional knowledge
advocates seek is contrary to the goal of disseminating of information that copyright law seeks to
encourage, and that it runs the risk of diminishing the public domain).
160. Whether intellectual property law has slowly been taking on a new role may be worthy of
further consideration. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123
HARV. L. REV. 810, 816–17 (2010) (arguing that intellectual property rights are increasingly used as
an indication of authenticity).
161. WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES 3, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 (2006). 162. Id. at 4.
163. For example, scientific theorems and mathematical principles are not patentable. 164. U.N.
EDUC. SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage (2003) (signed by 118 states as if December
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 189
the WIPO forum from there. The definition of intangible cultural heritage is
similar to that of traditional knowledge and would appear to cover much of the
same subject matter.165 The preamble to the UNESCO Convention refers to
certain international instruments, including the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights.166 It goes on to recognize the importance of safeguarding the
“intangible common heritage of humanity” and notes the absence of a binding
multilateral agreement to protect intangible cultural heritage.
The UNESCO Convention requires State parties to take measures to
safeguard intangible cultural heritage within their territories, and establishes
policy and educational commitments for the State parties to undertake in order
to do so.167 However, it does not establish specific legal mechanisms for the
protection of this heritage. Further, Article 3 of the UNESCO Convention
provides that it should not be interpreted as affecting any rights or obligations
under any international intellectual property conventions.168 By comparison,
WIPO has the task of creating effective legal protections for traditional
knowledge.169
If the ultimate goal is to shift the global intellectual property regime to one
that is more favorable to the poor or to communities that have been
disadvantaged by intellectual property laws, a sui generis traditional
knowledge right may not be the most effective solution. Indeed, it could have
the opposite effect.
2009 but notable exceptions include the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand),
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php
URL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
165. Article 2.1 of the Convention defines intangible cultural heritage as “the practices,
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills— as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts and
cultural spaces associated therewith— that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals
recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from
generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their
environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of
identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.” Examples
of intangible cultural heritage listed in Article 2.2 of the Convention include oral traditions and
expressions, performing arts, social practices, rituals and festive events, knowledge and practices
concerning nature and the universe, and traditional craftsmanship. This broad definition would
include most, if not all, of what has been defined as traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions at WIPO. Id.
166. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res 217A(III), U.N.Doc
A/180 at 71 (1948).
167. UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, art. 11,
13, 14 (2003).
168. Id. at art. 3.
169. Of course, since the negotiations are taking place outside of the WTO, it remains to be
seen how any new agreement will intersect with WTO Members TRIPS obligations.
190 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
170. Whether or not one links the concept of “public domain” to intellectual property, under
the current international regime, there are no globally recognized proprietary rights in those forms of
traditional knowledge that do not meet the criteria for protection under intellectual property law.
Hence, from an intellectual property perspective, it is legally available to the public, provided that it
has not been kept secret.
171. Mataatua Declaration, Recommendation 2; WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC
RESOURCES ¶ 15, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001); see Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant
Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign
Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629, 655 (2007); Graham Dutfield,
TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 251 (Spring
2001).
172. As WIPO has correctly observed, it is possible to have a group of rights holders. Such a
group would normally be a collective of identifiable individuals. It is also possible to have a single
entity having some public or official status as the right holder, in the case of certification marks, for
example, that is the right holder for the entitled group.
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 191
shorter for more restrictive rights. Thus, for example, the agreed upon
minimum term of patent protection is twenty years from the date of the filing
of the patent application.182 Patent protection is available only for a single
invention, so if someone else develops the same invention, the patent will only
go to one inventor.183 Copyright, by comparison, results in a more limited
monopoly.184 Under the Berne Convention, the minimum copyright term for
literary and artistic works is the life of the author plus fifty years.185 However,
copyright law allows for the same independent creation to be protected,
provided it is not a copy of someone else’s original work. In this sense,
copyright is a less restrictive form of protection. The longer term of copyright
protection is, therefore, less detrimental to society as compared to a lengthy
patent term.
In other words, intellectual property law needs to be balanced so that the
state granted monopoly over intellectual creations is not, ultimately,
detrimental to the public. However, due to its intergenerational nature,
traditional knowledge could be protected indefinitely and even retroactively.
This may not be consistent with the equity-oriented objective of access to
affordable traditional knowledge goods. Thus, any indefinite right granted
should be relatively less restrictive in order not to offend the principle of a
balance between the interests of the right holder and the public.186
provided for trademarks. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 18. 182. Id. at art. 33. For a
patent to be granted the innovation must be new, useful and non-obvious. Once an innovation has
been invented, the same invention can no longer meet the criteria for patent protection, and a second
patent will not be granted. See id. at art. 27(1).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27.1 (setting out
requirement of novelty for patentability); 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (g), 135 (provisions on interference).
184. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (provides that copyright subsists in “original
works of authorship”—two individuals can individually paint the same scene and each will be
entitled to copyright protection for her work).
185. Berne Convention, supra note 94, at art. 7(1); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 12.
186. For a more in depth discussion on this point, see J. Janewa OseiTutu, Traditional
Knowledge: Is Perpetual Protection a Good Idea? 50 IDEA No. 4, 697 (2010).
194 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
not clear, however, how to identify the persons who would comprise this
group.194 In the intellectual property context, when the right holder is a group,
the boundaries of the group are normally clearly delineated, and the group is
usually comprised of a collection of identifiable individuals.195
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous People (“DRIP”).196 Unfortunately, the DRIP contains
no definition of an indigenous person.197 In any event, the meaning of
indigenous person may be different in the traditional knowledge context than
in other areas. Further, the term “indigenous” may have multiple meanings in
the context of the traditional knowledge discussion.
In the absence of an agreed upon definition, I start by looking at a plain
language meaning of the term.198 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the
term “indigenous” as meaning, “originating or naturally occurring in a
particular place; native.”199 This terminology has been utilized to describe the
people European adventurers met at the lands they found. Hence, the peoples
Europeans met in the Americas have been referred to as “natives” as have the
peoples Europeans encountered when they voyaged to places such as India
and Africa. In an early study, WIPO took as a working definition of
indigenous
204. Id.
205. See Mataatua Declaration, Recommendation 2.
206. I recall being struck by the sight of a Masai man walking through the streets of a small
dusty town in Tanzania, wearing the telltale traditional bright Masai cloth and the traditional Masai
footwear, listening to his iPod as he walked along, his cell phone tucked in his belt. Given that the
Masai are essentially herdsmen and cattle ranchers, he may depend on the land, and probably rears
his cattle in accordance with traditional methods handed down from generation to generation. At the
same time, he will likely have modern elements to his life, and may well make use of new
technologies that are protected by intellectual property rights, such as mobile phones, to conduct
business.
207. WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 29, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009). 208. Id. ¶ 31;
Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VANDERBILT JRNL. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1163 (2008) (observing
that, while it is not consistent with his understanding of the term, some African nations claim that all
Africans are indigenous).
209. WIPO IGC, POSITION PAPER OF THE ASIAN GROUP AND CHINA 1, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/10 (2001).
198 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
1. Cultural Exchange
Culture is not static. Rather, various cultures interact to borrow from and
influence one another.211 Depending on the level of exclusivity of a sui generis
traditional knowledge right, one indigenous or traditional community could
find that it is unable to make free use of traditional knowledge from another
indigenous or traditional community. There is also the risk of a reduced
availability of traditional knowledge to those within that traditional society
who don’t have rights of access. Furthermore, the current concept of
traditional knowledge may be relatively easily broadened to include not only
developing
210. I acknowledge there may be cost barriers to obtaining intellectual property rights. 211. Cultural
exchange means that Asian arts such as acupuncture, Karate, and Yoga have become common in the
Western world as well as throughout the developing world. Thus one can find Karate classes
everywhere—from Africa to Europe to North America. Further, cultural migration and exchange
lead to cultural traditions such as African American step dancing that are derived from African
traditional dances. At the same time, young Africans have incorporated African American step
dancing and hip hop dancing into their youth culture. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Piracy, Biopiracy
and Borrowing: Culture, Cultural Heritage and the Globalization of Intellectual Property, 20- 21
(Case Res. Paper
Series in Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 04-19, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=596921 (observing that to ignore the role of borrowing among
cultures creates a static view of culture and that notions of piracy and biopiracy demonize
borrowing); id. at 60–62 (“The potential complexities involved in establishing cultural boundaries are
often ignored in public discourse about local knowledge,” and arguing that culture is not static and
any “process of borrowing necessarily involves acts of appropriation.”).
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 199
country cultural heritage and knowledge but also the cultural heritage and
knowledge of some European communities.
For example, methods of wine and cheese production tend to be based on
cultural practices of European groups who could be considered “indigenous,”
in the purest sense of the word, to their localities. The value Europeans place
on their cultural food products is reflected in the European demand for
increased international protection for geographical indications.212 In bi-lateral
trade agreements, the European Union has also sought protection for
“traditional expressions” for European wines.213
The knowledge about the uses of the neem tree or turmeric may be
valuable intergenerational knowledge. However, there are many other kinds of
ancient knowledge, which appear to have been discounted. One might argue
that if traditional knowledge is about power and inequality, a discussion that
excludes the colonial context is not a true discussion at all.214 In my view, it
becomes a discussion about the characteristics of the knowledge and not about
the characteristics of the generators of the knowledge. This allows the analysis
to focus on the nature of the property, instead of the nature of the property
owner.
The next section turns to a discussion of some common household items to
illustrate that intergenerational knowledge is not necessarily exclusive to
particular ethnic groups.
212. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 22–24 (provisions on geographical
indications); Daniel Gervais, The Lisbon Agreement’s Misunderstood Potential (The WIPO Journal,
Working Paper No. 10-21, 2009) (discussing renewed interest in the Lisbon Agreement and the
relationship between geographical indications and appellations of origin); Irene Calboli, Expanding
the Protection of Geographical Indications of Origin Under TRIPS: “Old” Debate or “New”
Opportunity?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181, 182 (2006).
213. See, e.g., Canada and the European Community on Trade in Wine and Spirits Agreement
(Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-dpci/ag-ac/4971-eng.htm; Agreement
Between the European Community and Australia on Trade in Wine (Dec. 1, 2008) (replaces 1994
Agreement).
214. Dorothy E. Roberts, Why Culture Matters to Law: the Difference Politics Makes in
CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE LAW, AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS,
EDS. 83 (University of Michigan Press, 1999) (noting that culture matters to law and that apparently
neutral legal principles that purport to disregard culture effectively privilege the existing dominant
cultural norms)
200 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
right make sense in the context of intellectual property law and whether a
property right is a good solution if there are other alternatives available. In my
view, because traditional knowledge seems to be primarily about equity, the
solution should focus on achieving a more equitable intellectual property
outcome. This can be done through means other than the creation of new
property rights. On the other hand, one might observe that property rights are
linked to power and equality. However, if the distinction between traditional or
indigenous peoples and non-traditional peoples fails to achieve clarity in an
international instrument, I query whether more equality is likely to be
achieved. For example, will indigenous and local people improve their
economic condition or have increased access to affordable knowledge goods?
If traditional knowledge is primarily about the dynamics of inequality, a
new intellectual property style right is a poor solution. First, traditional
knowledge seems to be partially a response to the overreach of the intellectual
property system. Second, I query the efficacy of addressing what appears to be
partly an issue of human rights and political inequality through the use of an
intellectual property model. This is particularly so in light of the reasons for
having intellectual property rights and some of the problems that may be
associated with them. Third, the overreach of intellectual property law is not
limited to developing countries and poor people.219 The defects of the
intellectual property system from a traditional knowledge perspective should
be characterized not as a North-South issue but as an excessive intellectual
property rights issue. This does not mean that intellectual property rights do
not have a disparate impact on certain groups, nor does it mean that this
disparate impact should go unacknowledged. However, the better solution is to
curtail the intellectual property system, not to expand it.
The potentially broad category of rights holders, combined with the
possibility of perpetual protection make a sui generis traditional knowledge
right likely to increase the cost while decreasing the accessibility of traditional
knowledge goods. Creating more property rights in intangibles is not
necessarily beneficial for the global public,
219. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Myriad
Genetics”) (The court invalidated patents held by Myriad genetics that pertain to testing for a genetic
predisposition to breast cancer. The plaintiffs included the Association for Molecular Pathology, the
American College of Medical Genetics, the American Society for Clinical Pathology, the College of
American Pathologists, various individual scientists, medical professional, and patients who were in
need of the testing. The decision has been appealed.).
202 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
223. James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE
L. & TECH REV. 0009, 2 (2004) .
224. Id. at 11 (encouraging a return to the “rational roots of intellectual property rather than an
embrace of its recent excesses”).
225. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
97, 106 (2007).
226. The problem seems to be not just that intellectual property rights are unavailable for all
kinds of traditional knowledge. Rather, there is some level of discontent about the ability of persons
and entities external to the knowledge generating community to obtain intellectual property rights
over traditional knowledge based goods. This explains the use of the term “bio-piracy.”
227. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 302 (1997) (“Now
that there is time to be more reflective, we should recognize that as far as developing countries are
concerned, the TRIPS Agreement could have a substantially different impact from the remainder of
the WTO agreements. One effect is obvious: the cost to member states of enforcing intellectual
property rights is formidable. Monitoring is expensive, the obligation to destroy infringing materials
entails high social costs, and countries with weak civil justice systems must spend the money to
create them. All of this is in addition to the cost of setting up copyright, trademark, and patent offices
and staffing them with trained personnel. Even after these costs are borne, the TRIPS Agreement
may present a significant problem to developing countries.”); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the
Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 335, 348–49 (1997)
(“[D]eveloping countries face real difficulties in overcoming technological lag at socially acceptable
costs, and most of the benefits they may derive from implementing the substantive standards will
take time to accrue.”).
204 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
228. Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979,
1004–05, 1007 (2009) (discussing the balancing aspects of the TRIPS Agreement). 229. Paul Kuruk,
Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a Policy Response to the
Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629,
689–92 (2007) (observing that developing countries have sought to negotiate traditional knowledge
protection at the WTO in exchange for higher levels of IP protection based on the principle of
reciprocity, and advocating this negotiating strategy as a fair one given the sacrifice made by
developing countries to implement TRIPS for the benefit of developed countries); see Graham
Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 271
(Spring 2001); Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP.
L. REV. 433, 482–83 (Summer 2008). 230. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 111–12 (Spring 2007); see Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPS
Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES
J. INTL L. 441, 451–52 (Summer 2000) (noting the concern the benefits of higher levels of intellectual
property protection are unevenly distributed to the detriment of developing countries, while
developing country proposals for a new form of intellectual property to protect traditional
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 205
2. A Question of Justice
The protection of traditional knowledge may be seen as not only an
intellectual property issue, but also as a trade and human rights issue.237
235. See, e.g., Søren Holm, Me, Myself, I—Against Narcissism in the Governance of Genetic
Information, in THE GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION: WHO DECIDES? 37 (Heather
Widdows & Caroline Mullen eds., 2009) (discussing whether the individual, the family, or the state
should retain control over genetic information); see also, Heather Widdows, Constructing Communal
Models of Governance: Collectives of Individuals or Distinct Ethical Loci?, in THE GOVERNANCE
OF GENETIC INFORMATION: WHO DECIDES? 75, 84–85 (Heather Widdows & Caroline Mullen eds.,
2009). The matter of the taking of the genetic materials of indigenous groups has been raised in the
genetic information debate as well. However, the discussion is not with respect to cultural property,
nor intellectual property rights, but rather the question of fairness and informed consent.
236. Patents related to genetic materials and life forms are not without controversy. Some
countries have decided not to grant patents on life forms. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada
decided that the Harvard onco-mouse was not patentable subject matter under Canadian law. See
Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.).
237. Stephen J. Munzer & Kal Raustiala The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in
Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 48 (“[T]he contemporary debate about
TK centers on economically subordinate groups, almost always indigenous peoples, and the
movement of their understanding or skill to economically more powerful Western (or Westernized)
groups or nations.”); WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 30, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009). I acknowledge that
intellectual property rights have sometimes been characterized as human rights based on Article 27
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. res. 217A(III), U.N.Doc A/180 (1948). However, Intellectual Property rights are
generally treated a property rights, rather than human rights. Further, Articles 27(1) and (2) of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights recognize a right for all persons to enjoy the benefit of
scientific and literary creations, while at the same time acknowledging the right of the creator to the
material and moral interests in his or her work. This would be consistent with a balanced approach to
intellectual property protection rather than a creator-focused
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 207
kind of logic that has led to the development of policies that have prompted a
fair amount of scholarly and public critique of the current intellectual property
system.242 However, instrumentalist intellectual property policy should not be
weighted in favor of the protected information, person or group to the
detriment of the public. This would be contrary to the goals of distributive
justice.
Intellectual property rights can be described as the relationship between
individuals in respect of their desire to control intangible goods or abstract
objects.243 Can we find a way to minimize abuses in the dynamic of this
relationship between commercial entities and individuals? This appears to be a
significant element of the problem faced by traditional knowledge holders.
The status quo seems to reflect a preference for the interests of commercial
entities to the detriment of individual persons or communities. By
re-characterizing the problem that needs to be addressed, effective alternative
solutions can be developed.
Jefferson rejected a natural rights view on intellectual property and instead adopted a utilitarian
approach. See Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization,
and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1030 (2006) (stating that Jefferson doubted “natural
rights to property of any sort”).
242. See e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS (1996); PETER DRAHOS &
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2003);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS; MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008); MICHAEL PERELMAN, STEAL THIS IDEA (2002); Margot
Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 254–56 (2009) (criticizing the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) India
Plans Front to Nip New Piracy Law, THE ECON. TIMES (May 29, 2010), available at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5986902.cms (discussing India’s concerns over the
effects of ACTA on exports of information technology and medicine as well as India’s efforts in
getting other developing countries to unite together in opposition to ACTA); WTO, Council Debates
Anti-counterfeiting Talks, Patents on Life, WTO News Items (June 9, 2010), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/trip_08jun10_e.htm (noting that China and India
conducted lengthy statements against ACTA and how ACTA conflicts with the TRIPS Agreement);
Monika Ermert, Indian Official: ACTA Out of Sync With TRIPS and Public Health, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (May 5, 2010), http://www.ip
watch.org/weblog/2010/05/05/indian-official-acta-out-of-sync-with-trips-and-public health/(stating
that ACTA will be hard on India due to juggling of competing public policy issues, IPR protection
and public health.); Doug Palmer, U.N. Urged to Probe U.S. Trade Stance on Generic Drugs,
REUTERS (Jul 20, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66J1CG20100720 (stating that
AIDS groups are accusing the United States of “using the ‘Special 301’ report to pressure countries
to give up certain public health rights they have under a World Trade Organization agreement on
intellectual property rights known as TRIPS.”).
243. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 5 (1996); SUSAN
SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 159
(2005).
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 209
244. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report 15 (2010) (noting that,
despite the grace periods given for TRIPS implementation, many developing countries have yet to
establish effective mechanisms for enforcing intellectual property rights while some are still
finalizing legislation to implement their TRIPS obligations); WTO dispute resolution panels have
been established to resolve various TRIPS disputes relating to its implementation or enforcement.
See, e.g., WTO, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights (Request for the Establishment of Panel by the United States) (2007); WTO, European
Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products
and Foodstuffs (Request for the Establishment of Panel by the United States) (2003); WTO,
European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs, (Request for the Establishment of Panel by Australia) (2003); WTO,
Canada— Term of Patent Protection, (Report of the Appellate Body) (2000); WTO, United States—
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, (Report of the Panel) (2000); WTO, India—Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (Complaint by the European
Communities and their Member States) (1998).
210 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
2. Mediation
The use of the WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center as an option for
resolving traditional knowledge-related disputes has been suggested and is
worth exploring.252 The WTO also has a dispute resolution mechanism that can
be used for TRIPS-related disputes between WTO Member States.253 However,
the WTO does not resolve disputes that are unrelated to State obligations
under the WTO agreements, nor does it serve to resolve disputes between
private parties. The WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center, by comparison,
was established for the purpose of resolving international disputes between
private parties.254 It has been effectively used to resolve numerous domain
name disputes.255
In light of the poor economic situation of many indigenous and traditional
peoples, mediation and arbitration could be quite useful as a less costly
alternative.256 In the context of alternative dispute resolution, existing soft law
norms outside the intellectual property framework that encourage good
corporate behavior could also be considered as a
resource.257 Any such process would have to be sensitive to the reality that in
such disputes, one side could have significantly more financial or
informational resources.258 It would be important to take this into account in
order to adequately address the concerns of both the intellectual property right
holder and the relevant traditional knowledge community.
3. Capacity Building
WIPO and the WTO could assist developing countries and indigenous
peoples in documenting their traditional knowledge. India established a
Traditional Knowledge Digital Library consisting of 200,000 traditional
Indian medicine formulations and gave the European Patent Office access to
the database for the purposes of patent searches and examinations.259
According to the Government of India, there have been more than 2,000 cases
annually of misappropriation of Indian traditional medicinal knowledge since
the time the WIPO IGC was established.260 Nonetheless, the documentation
has been useful in enabling the Indian government to contest certain patents.261
WIPO and the WTO already provide technical assistance to developing
countries.262 For those who cannot afford to collect the relevant traditional
knowledge data and set up systems such as that developed by India, technical
assistance could be provided through existing international mechanisms.
4. Education
WIPO should continue to promote further education on the use of the
existing intellectual property system in order to assist traditional knowledge
communities to prevent misappropriation.263 Although the
257. See, e.g., The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and
Clarifications, COMM. ON INT’L INV. AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER. (Oct. 31, 2001), available at
http://busa.org.za/docs/Guidelines.pdf.
258. Some multinational corporations have revenues greater than the gross domestic product of
entire countries. This may make it difficult for some countries to adequately represent their position.
See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED
WORLD ECONOMY 73–75 (2007).
259. WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 42, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009). 260.
Id.
261. For example, the patent related to turmeric.
262. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 67 (provision on technical cooperation);
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 4(v) (amended 1979)
(provision on technical cooperation).
263. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 4(vi) provides
that WIPO “shall assemble and disseminate information concerning the protection of intellectual
property . . . .”
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 213
5. National Measures
Some countries have taken measures to explicitly protect their traditional
knowledge and cultural property in the absence of an international
agreement.264 This is an important step because, as sovereign states, national
governments control access to their territories and resources. If biopiracy, for
example, is a significant problem for a particular nation, then tighter national
controls will have a greater effect than an international instrument to protect
traditional knowledge as a new form of intangible property. Unfortunately,
some governments may not be sufficiently resourced to exercise the necessary
control. Further, the affected community may be a minority group whom the
government does not effectively represent. This presents a variety of
challenges that would have to be addressed at the national level and possibly
with the assistance of the international community.
CONCLUSION
Classical intellectual property rights serve a public function in exchange
for the time-limited private right that is granted by the state. Property rights in
intangible goods must be justified because they effectively remove certain
categories of knowledge products from the public sphere. As discussed, there
is a risk of public harm, including an undue concentration of power, in
creating excessively strong intellectual property rights. Likewise, there is a
risk of harm if intellectual property law develops to include subject matter that
would be better protected through the use of a less monopolistic means.
Certainly, the international intellectual property system needs to reflect
competing values, which means it must recognize and respect other interests.
As intellectual property minimum standards have
264. WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 20, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009); WIPO IGC,
Comparative Summary of TCE Sui Generis Legislation, Annex II, WIPO Doc. GRTKF/IC/9/INF/4;
Copyright Act 2005, § 17 (Ghana) (providing perpetual protection for Ghanaian folklore); N.Z.
Trade Marks Act, 2002, § 17 (prohibiting the registration of marks that are likely to offend a segment
of the community, including the Maori); Law introducing a Protection Regime for the Collective
Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from Biological Resources Law No. 27811, 2002 (Peru)
(providing sui generis protection for indigenous knowledge); Special System for the Collective
Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples Law No. 20, June 26, 2000 (Pan.).
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265. If one accepts the view that traditional knowledge represents intangible developing
country goods while intellectual property represents intangible developed country goods, then from
that standpoint, the cultural divide already exists. As I argue in this paper, however, this dichotomy is
not accurate.
266. For the position of the Government of the United States, see http://www.ustr.gov/acta. For
more critical perspectives, see Professor Michael Geist’s commentary at
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4525/135/. See also American
2011] A SUI GENERIS REGIME FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 215