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A review of forgiveness process models and a coping framework to guide future

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Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 10, 2006, pp. 1059-1085
STRELAN
A review of
ANDforgiveness
COVIC process models

A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS

MODELS AND A COPING FRAMEWORK
TO GUIDE FUTURE RESEARCH
PETER STRELAN
University of Adelaide

TANYA COVIC
University of Western Sydney

Despite substantial advances in other areas of forgiveness research, empirical eval-

uation of a fundamental aspect of forgiveness, the process itself, has been virtually
nonexistent. This article reviews the existing literature and concludes that although
numerous process models have been proposed, many lack a coherent theoretical
grounding, and few have been empirically validated. Importantly, understanding
of the forgiveness process is hindered by a lack of consensus on what forgiveness is,
and consequently what constitutes the endpoint of the process. In response to the
many shortcomings in the literature, salient issues for future research are identified.
The stress and coping model (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) is proposed as a
framework for guiding theorizing and research.

Empirical psychological research on forgiveness has increased dramati-

cally over the past two decades. Having long been considered the do-
main of theology and philosophy, the psychological antecedents,
properties, and consequences of forgiveness now have been studied in a
variety of settings—e.g., counseling, social, justice, organizational, and
cultural—with adolescents and adults, couples, families, and groups,
and as a response to a wide range of hurts and injustices. Forgiveness re-
search has been extended beyond its traditional focus on forgiveness of
others to include forgiveness of self (Maltby, Macaskill, & Day, 2001),
God (Exline, Yali, & Lobel, 1999), situations (Thompson et al., 2005), and

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Peter Strelan, Depart-

ment of Psychology, The University of Adelaide, 5005, Adelaide, Australia; E–mail: peter.
[email protected]

1059
1060 STRELAN AND COVIC

groups (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005), and within the broader theoretical
framework of retributive justice (e.g., Enright, Santos, & Al–Mabuk,
1989; Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003; Karremans & Van
Lange, 2005).
Psychological research now indicates that for many people much of
the time, forgiveness provides psychological and mental health benefits.
Forgiveness has been found to be related to better mental health, in-
creased hope, and self–esteem (Maltby, Day, & Barber, 2004; Toussaint,
Williams, Musick, & Everson, 2001). Many models and guidelines have
been proposed to help clinicians, counselors and therapists use forgive-
ness interventions (e.g., Ferch, 1998; Freedman, 2000). The different in-
terventions have been shown to be successful in reducing such negative
psychological outcomes as anger, bitterness, depression (Baskin &
Enright, 2004; Wade & Worthington, 2005), dysfunction, distress, physi-
ological stress, and coronary heart disease (Witvliet, 2001). Forgiveness
has also played a role in healing hurts at a group level (e.g., Allan &
Allan, 2000).
Much is now also known about social–cognitive influences on forgive-
ness, specifically, relationship commitment (Finkel, Rusbult,
Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002; Karremans, Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, &
Kluwer, 2003), apology, remorse, offense severity (Zechmeister, Garcia,
Romero, & Vas, 2004), rumination (McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, &
Johnson, 2001; McCullough et al., 1998), empathy (McCullough,
Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Wade & Worthington, 2003) and responsi-
bility attributions (Fincham, Paleari, & Regalia, 2002; McCullough,
Fincham, & Tsang, 2003).
In the arena of individual differences, research suggests that people
with a forgiving disposition are more likely to experience increased
hope, improved self–esteem (McCullough, 2001), greater life satisfac-
tion, and reduced likelihood of depression (Brown & Phillips, 2005).
Dispositional forgiving has also been consistently related to individual
difference variables such as vengeance–seeking (Brown, 2004;
McCullough et al., 2001), agreeableness, and neuroticism (Sastre,
Vinsonneau, Chabrol, & Mullet, 2005).
Finally, numerous measures of different aspects of forgiveness now
exist. At least six different measures of state forgiveness of others have
been developed (Hargrave & Sells, 1997; Mauger et al., 1992;
McCullough et al., 1998, 2003; Pollard, Anderson, Anderson, &
Jennings, 1998; Rye et al., 2001; Subkoviak et al., 1995). There are at least
six different measures of dispositional forgiving (Berry, Worthington,
Parrott III, O’Connor, & Wade, 2001; Brown, 2003; DeShea, 2003; Hebl &
Enright, 1993; Rye et al., 2001; Thompson et al., 2005). A number of scales
also exist to measure attitudes towards forgiveness (Brown, 2003; Kanz,
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1061

2000; Mullet, Girard, & Bakhshi, 2004; Mullet, Houdbine, Laumonier, &
Girard, 1998).
Clearly, the breadth and depth of scientific enquiry into many aspects
of forgiveness, and consequently our knowledge, has increased remark-
ably. Equally remarkable, however, is the fact that an aspect fundamen-
tal to our understanding of forgiveness remains unclear. McCullough
and Worthington’s (1994) review indicated an abundance of process
models of forgiveness in the literature, also referred to as “task–stage”
models, but a complete absence of empirical support for any of these
models. More than a decade later, little has changed. The number of pro-
cess models has increased further, yet there still remains little consensus
as to what constitutes the process. Furthermore, whatever the process,
relatively few attempts have been made to validate it.
In short, although great strides have been made to model and measure
state and trait forgiveness, the process of forgiveness itself remains em-
pirically neglected. It is not clear how forgiveness occurs—yet this would
appear to be an essential prerequisite towards a more complete under-
standing of forgiveness. Thus, the aim of this article is to review existing
process models of forgiveness and, on the basis of this review, to present
recommendations for future researchers.

DEFINITIONS OF FORGIVENESS
Virtually every psychological article published on forgiveness begins by
acknowledging the debate over a definition of forgiveness. Indeed, it ap-
pears easier to agree on what forgiveness is not (McCullough,
Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). There is a general consensus that forgive-
ness should be distinguished from related constructs such as pardoning,
excusing, condoning, and forgetting (Rye et al., 2001). Although most re-
searchers agree that forgiveness should not be confused with another re-
lated construct, reconciliation, some authors propose that reconciliation
is a desired endpoint of the forgiveness process (e.g., Fitzgibbons, 1986;
Hargrave, 1994; Pettitt, 1987; Pollard et al., 1998).
Researchers do tend to agree that forgiveness is a complex of cogni-
tive, affective, and possibly, but not necessarily, behavioral responses to
a transgression (e.g., Enright et al., 1996; Gordon & Baucom, 1998); that it
is at least an intrapersonal process and usually, but not necessarily, an
interpersonal process (e.g., Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1998). It in-
volves two fundamental dimensions, a “negative” dimension (e.g., the
reduction or giving up of resentment and anger) and a subsequent “pos-
itive” dimension (e.g., compassionate responses to a transgressor) (e.g.,
Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998; Fincham, 2000; McCullough et al.,
1997).
1062 STRELAN AND COVIC

However, an important question remains unresolved: What is the

endpoint of forgiveness? Some researchers propose that forgiveness oc-
curs when a person who has been hurt no longer experiences negative
cognitions, affect, and behavior (e.g., Gordon & Baucom, 1998; Thomp-
son et al., 2005). Others posit that forgiveness is a loving and compas-
sionate gift (Enright et al., 1998), voluntarily given to release an offender
from obligation (Exline & Baumeister, 2000). Yet, even among research-
ers who concur that positive responses towards a transgressor are fun-
damental for forgiveness, there is conjecture as to the nature of such re-
sponding. For example, McCullough et al. (1997) conceptualize the
endpoint of forgiveness as the function of a changed motivational state,
whereby the hurt individual moves from being motivated to avoid or re-
taliate, to being positively motivated towards the offender. This is a
fairly benign outcome compared to Enright et al.’s (1998) argument that
expressions of love and compassion are prerequisites for forgiving. Oth-
ers argue that interpersonal interaction and/or reconciliation is essen-
tial in order to say that forgiveness has occurred (Fitzgibbons, 1986;
Hargrave, 1994; Pettitt, 1987; Pollard et al., 1998).
The lack of agreement over the endpoint of forgiveness has important
implications for how process models of forgiveness are developed and
utilized. First, process model development reflects the conceptualiza-
tion of forgiveness embraced by their authors. For example, theorists of
the view that forgiveness is signified by a cessation of negative re-
sponses will describe the endpoint of forgiveness from the perspective
of the hurt person, whereas those who subscribe to the view that forgive-
ness means reconciliation will approach the endpoint in terms of its
implications for the relationship.
Second, model utilization will be influenced by the extent to which a
practitioner embraces the conceptualization underlying a particular
process model. Specifically, clinicians will encourage clients to strive for
a set of cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses that are consistent
with the endpoint in the process model that they have applied (e.g., the
cessation of negative responses versus loving and compassionate re-
sponses). Definitional clarity is also important in this regard to the extent
that laypersons conflate forgiveness with related constructs such as par-
doning, excusing, and reconciliation (Mullet et al., 2004). Thus, practitio-
ners need to be aware of clients’ own beliefs about what constitutes the
endpoint of forgiveness before employing a particular approach (Butler,
Dahlin, & Fife, 2002). Differing lay beliefs will also influence how for-
giveness might be promoted in nonclinical settings such as the
workplace, the justice system, and between groups (Exline et al., 2003).
The following sections summarize some of the important aspects of
the process models chosen for review.
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1063

REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS

CRITERIA FOR MODEL SELECTION
Twenty–five models were selected for review. Some of their characteris-
tics are summarized in Table 1. The models were chosen on the basis of
the following criteria: (1) the model explicitly refers to the process of for-
giveness; and (2) the model has been published in a peer–reviewed psy-
chology journal that is listed on the PsycINFO® database (using the
search term “forgiveness” in all years). To ensure comprehensiveness,
models from books, chapters, and dissertations referenced in the psy-
chology journal articles were also included.
The first criterion speaks to the definition of what constitutes a process
model of forgiveness. In the psychological context, the forgiveness pro-
cess refers to an individual’s progression through a series of interdepen-
dent (though not necessarily linear) phases, each consisting of cognitive,
affective, and behavioral responses or intentions (e.g., Enright et al.,
1998). Thus, a number of studies were excluded, specifically those mod-
eling social–cognitive predictors of state–level forgiveness (e.g.,
McCullough et al., 1997, 1998), the combined influence of personality
and contextual factors (Kaminer, Stein, Mbanga, & Zungu–Dirwayi,
2000; Worthington & Wade, 1999), and a stage–like developmental basis
to forgiveness (Enright et al., 1989). Although such models explain why
and when forgiveness might occur, they do not explicate the process of
forgiveness as defined above. Similarly, typographic models (e.g.,
Trainer, 1981), which describe categories of forgiving responses rather
than a process, were excluded, as were models that propose guidelines
for therapists to assist clients to forgive rather than describe the process
per se (e.g., Ferch, 1998; Freedman, 2000; Gordon & Baucom, 1999).

WHAT OCCURS DURING THE FORGIVENESS PROCESS?

COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Forgiveness process models tend to assume that forgiveness proceeds in
a generally sequential, stage–like manner, during which individuals
must adequately perform particular cognitive, affective, and behavioral
tasks before they are able to move onto the next stage (e.g., Gordon &
Baucom, 1998; Hargrave, 1994). Although the models may differ sub-
stantially in the labels and descriptions they use to define components of
the forgiveness process, there is some agreement among theorists that
the following stages occur during the process of forgiving: (a) initial feel-
ings of anger and hurt (Enright et al., 1996; Fitzgibbons, 1986; Gordon &
Baucom, 1998; Hargrave, 1994; Malcolm & Greenberg, 2000; Pollard et
al., 1998); (b) negative affective and cognitive consequences (Enright et
1064 STRELAN AND COVIC

TABLE 1. Summary of Process Models of Forgiveness

Psychological
Theoretical Empirical
Author Orientation Framework Validation
Augsberger, 1981 Religious None None
Benson, 1992 Religious None None
Brandsma, 1982 Religious/ None None
Therapeutic
Coleman, 1989 Popular None None
Cunningham, 1985 Religious None None
Donnelly, 1982 Religious None None
Enright et al., 1996 Therapeutic Moral and cognitive None
development
Fitzgibbons, 1986 Therapeutic None None
Gordon & Baucom, Therapeutic Model of Gordon &
1998 psychological Baucom, 2003;
trauma Gordon et al.,
2004
Hargrave, 1994 Therapeutic Contextual family Hargrave & Sells,
therapy 1997
Linn & Linn, 1978 Popular None None
Malcolm & Greenberg, Therapeutic Resolution of Malcolm, 1999
2000 unfinished business
Martin, 1953 None None
Menninger, 1996 Popular None None
Pattison, 1965 Therapeutic None None
Pettitt, 1987 Therapeutic None None
Pingleton, 1997 Religious Object relations None
Pollard et al., 1998 Therapeutic Synthesis of previous Pollard et al.,
models 1998
Rosenak & Harnden, Religious None None
1992
Smedes, 1984, 1996 Popular None None
Stanley, 1987 Religious None None
Thompson, 1983 Religious None None
Worthington, 1998, Therapeutic Batson’s (1991) None
2001 empathy–altruism
hypothesis

al., 1996; Fitzgibbons, 1986; Gordon & Baucom, 1998; Malcolm &
Greenberg, 2000; Pollard et al., 1998); (c) an acknowledgement that pre-
vious strategies of dealing with the hurt are not working (Enright et al.,
1996; Fitzgibbons, 1986; Hargrave, 1994); (d) a decision to either forgive,
or consider forgiving (Enright et al., 1996; Fitzgibbons, 1986;
Worthington, 1998, 2001); and (e) understanding of, or empathy for, the
offender (Enright et al., 1996; Fitzgibbons, 1986; Gordon & Baucom,
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1065

1998; Malcolm & Greenberg, 2000; Worthington, 1998, 2001). The latter
may arise from the recognition that the forgiver may have also required
forgiveness in the past, or may do so in the future (Cunningham, 1985;
Donnelly, 1982; Pingleton, 1997).
Five fundamental differences are also evident. First, the models with a
religious orientation emphasize the role of God’s forgiveness in the for-
giveness process (e.g., Augsberger, 1981; Benson, 1992; Brandsma, 1982;
Cunningham, 1985; Donnelly, 1982). However, God’s forgiveness is not
included at all in non–religious models. Apart from this component, re-
ligious and non–religious models are fairly indistinguishable.
Second, theorists seem to agree about the likely order of only some
process components, specifically, that awareness and expressions of an-
ger and hurt occur first, and that the second component involves nega-
tive affect and cognition. However, the ordering of the remaining com-
ponents is not so clear. For example, Worthington (1998) suggests that
empathy, humility and commitment to forgive occur in that order,
whereas Enright et al. (1996) propose that a commitment to forgive oc-
curs well before humility and empathy, and that empathy needs to occur
before humility. Disentangling component order may be an issue for fu-
ture researchers, particularly as order affects how clinicians use forgive-
ness interventions and therapies, and the extent to which a client re-
sponds. However, assigning importance to component order assumes
that the forgiveness process does in fact consist of a series of contingent
stages—a notion that is yet to be empirically supported.
Third, it is not clear the extent to which transition to each component
within the process may be contingent on cognitive, affective and behav-
ioral responses in the preceding component; which of the cognitive, affec-
tive and behavioral dimensions of each component are most salient; and
whether particular components are more salient than others (Kaminer et
al., 2000; McCullough & Worthington, 1994). For example, to what extent
is commitment to forgive (e.g., Worthington, 1998, 2001) contingent on
the realization that previously efficacious coping strategies are not work-
ing (e.g., Enright et al., 1996)? To what extent is forgiveness contingent on
achievement of primarily cognitive tasks in the early phases (e.g., Gordon
& Baucom, 1998) and primarily affective and behavioral tasks in the later
phases (e.g., Hargrave, 1994; Pollard et al., 1998)? Is the development of
empathy and understanding, for example, the most important phase in
the process? Much empirical research and theorizing suggest that it might
(e.g., McCullough et al., 1997, 1998; Wade & Worthington, 2003), how-
ever, variables relevant to this phase have not been examined within the
context of the forgiveness process per se.
Fourth, only a few models recognize the usually interpersonal nature
of the forgiveness process (e.g., Hargrave, 1994; Pollard et al., 1998;
1066 STRELAN AND COVIC

Worthington, 1998). Forgiveness, by definition, is at least dyadic, yet the

psychological field of forgiveness finds itself in the curious position of
being almost entirely concerned with the intraindividual qualities and
characteristics of the responses of the injured party. Beyond expressions
of remorse or apology, little is known about the perspective of the
wrongdoer (McCullough et al., 2000), and how relationship dynamics
influence the forgiveness process for both the wrongdoer and the victim.
Thus, the focus of analysis could be widened beyond the victim’s per-
spective to include the relationship itself (Exline & Baumeister, 2000;
Worthington & Wade, 1999).
Fifth, the models differ over what constitutes the endpoint of the for-
giveness process. Many models (e.g., Augsberger, 1981; Benson, 1992;
Brandsma, 1982; Coleman, 1989; Cunningham, 1985; Donnelly, 1982;
Enright et al., 1996) posit that loving, compassionate and benevolent re-
sponses characterize the endpoint of the process. Some models
(Fitzgibbons, 1986; Hargrave, 1994; Pollard et al., 1998) propose that in-
terpersonal interaction and reconciliation with the wrongdoer are essen-
tial to the endpoint. Others (e.g., Gordon & Baucom, 1998) imply that
forgiveness occurs when one no longer experiences negative cognition,
affect, and behavior (or behavioral intentions). Finally, some models of-
fer circular articulations of the endpoint, for example, suggesting that
the conclusion of forgiveness is “resolution by forgiveness” (Malcolm &
Greenberg, 2000); an “overt act of forgiving” (Hargrave, 1994); or when
the offended party “offers and holds onto forgiveness” (Worthington,
2001). As suggested earlier, the lack of a consensus over a definition of
forgiveness itself largely explains the lack of consensus on the endpoint
of the forgiveness process.

THE THEORETICAL BASES OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS

As Table 1 shows, some researchers have endeavored to establish their
process models within a theoretical framework. Enright et al.’s (1996)
model draws from theories of moral and cognitive development. Har-
graves’ (1994) model has its roots in contextual family therapy. Gordon
and Baucom (1998) base their model on the stages of psychological
trauma. Malcolm and Greenberg’s (2000) model is derived from a theo-
retical framework that models the resolution of unfinished business. A
key component of Worthington’s (1998) empathy–humility–commit-
ment model is grounded in Batson’s (1991) empathy–altruism
hypothesis.
These models, however, constitute only a small minority of the nu-
merous process models that have been proposed. As Table 1 indicates,
the remaining models are based predominantly on philosophical and
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1067

theological writings and/or the clinical and counseling experiences of

the authors (Walker & Gorsuch, 2004). Clearly, there is a need for a more
rigorous theory–driven approach to model development and building.

EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF MODELS

It may be seen from Table 1 that only four of the 25 models have been em-
pirically validated to some degree. Although studies have reported suc-
cess using the models of Enright and colleagues and Worthington and
colleagues as the basis for intervention (for a review, see Wade &
Worthington, 2005), the phases and steps in the models have not been
empirically validated, therefore we do not address them here. One of the
four models is concerned with resolving unfinished business in a thera-
peutic setting (Malcolm & Greenberg, 2000), another is specific to mari-
tal relationships (Gordon & Baucom, 1998), and two are specific to
family contexts (Hargrave, 1994; Pollard et al., 1998). A few studies
(Gordon & Baucom, 2003; Gordon, Baucom, & Snyder, 2004; Hargrave &
Sells, 1997; Malcolm, 1999; Pollard et al., 1998) provide empirical sup-
port for the process components proposed by each of the four models.
One study (Walker & Gorsuch, 2004) derived 87 items from an aggre-
gated 96 steps of forgiveness posited in 16 different psychological and
Christian theological process models. Their factor analysis (N = 180 pre-
dominantly Christian undergraduates) revealed five factors: hurt/an-
ger, receiving God’s forgiveness, emotional forgiveness (i.e., deciding to
forgive), empathy, and reconciliation. As might be expected given the
source of the items, the five factors are consistent with the models
reviewed here.
In terms of the ordering of components within the process, some stud-
ies have been able to distinguish participants on the basis of their re-
sponses to different aspects of the process (e.g., Gordon & Baucom, 2003;
Hargrave & Sells, 1997; Malcolm, 1999). For example, Walker and
Gorsuch (2004) used a path analysis to show that hurt/anger and receiv-
ing God’s forgiveness each predicted emotional forgiveness (i.e., decid-
ing to forgive), which predicted empathy, and in turn, reconciliation.
A number of qualifications should be noted about the efforts to empir-
ically validate some of the process models. First, the application of those
studies is limited to their respective populations (marital and family
therapeutic settings; Christian participants). Second, only one study
(Gordon & Baucom, 2003) explicitly measured each of the cognitive, af-
fective, and behavioral components of forgiveness. Third, all the studies
are cross–sectional, indicating that the various scales used measure as-
pects of what the forgiveness process might be, but not what the actual
process is, nor the extent to which the process possesses sequential and
1068 STRELAN AND COVIC

contingent qualities. Longitudinal studies are required to establish the

transitional prerequisites of the phases in the process, and none have
been reported as yet.

IMPLICATIONS OF LACK OF EMPIRICAL

VALIDATION FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE
An important limitation of the relative lack of validation studies (and the
exclusive use of cross–sectional designs in the few studies that have been
conducted) is that process models tend to be prescriptive. That is, they
suggest how forgiveness should or ought to proceed rather than how
forgiveness does proceed. This is problematic for clinicians, in a number
of ways.
First, prescriptions of forgiveness in the absence of empirical valida-
tion means it is not clear if a particular prescribed process works, or if it
does appear to work, why, and if it works for all individuals. For exam-
ple, a well–controlled experimental design may indicate the success of a
forgiveness intervention. However, if the process model upon which the
intervention is based has not been empirically validated—in other
words, if we do not know how people forgive—then there is no way of
knowing or predicting how individuals should respond when they un-
dertake a forgiveness intervention. Consequently, we cannot ascertain
what proportion of an outcome may be attributed to the forgiveness in-
tervention and what proportion to other factors known to contribute to
successful therapeutic outcomes, such as the quality of the
therapist–client relationship (Malcolm & Greenberg, 2000).
Second, prescribing how forgiveness should occur does not take into
account the possibility that a particular prescribed process may, in fact,
be inappropriate for some individuals. For example, some models pro-
pose that reconciliation is important to the forgiveness process. Al-
though reconciliation may be a desired outcome for some individuals
depending on the nature of the wrongdoing, it may not always be psy-
chologically healthy, prudent, or even possible (e.g., when the offender
is not willing to reconcile, or has passed away).
Third, therapeutic process models make assumptions about the end-
point of forgiveness, for example, that forgiveness occurs with the cessa-
tion of negative responding (e.g., Gordon & Baucom, 1998) or that com-
passionate and loving responses are necessary to say that forgiveness
has occurred (e.g., Enright et al., 1998). However, because the process it-
self has not been validated, it is not certain that clients will embrace or be
amenable to the endpoint of forgiveness as prescribed by the particular
therapeutic model being used (Butler et al., 2002).
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1069

LIMITED APPLICATIONS OF EXISTING PROCESS MODELS

As Table 1 indicates, forgiveness process models tend to have either a
Christian theological or therapeutic orientation. The specificity of the mod-
els is such that they tend not to be relevant to non–religious or nonclinical
populations, or significant social contexts such as intimate relationships,
the justice system, the workplace, and between cultural and social groups.
For example, an integral component of Christian theological process mod-
els is God’s forgiveness, yet God’s forgiveness would be irrelevant to
non–Christians and anyone who does not hold religious beliefs.
Extrapolating from therapeutic models, in particular, is problematic,
in two related ways. First, individuals who present for therapy or coun-
seling may perceive or interpret their hurts in more traumatic terms.
Therefore their experiences may well be qualitatively different from the
hurts experienced by individuals who do not present. It is also likely that
individuals who enter the clinical setting have experienced an objec-
tively more severe event (e.g., rape, incest) than those in nonclinical set-
tings for example, who may be coping with the break–up of a short–term
relationship (McCullough et al., 2000). Second, although interventions
based on therapeutic process models are reportedly successful (Wade &
Worthington, 2005), interventions follow a process prescribed by a clini-
cian. In addition, many models propose that one of the components of
the forgiveness process is a ‘decision to forgive’ (e.g., Enright et al., 1996;
Fitzgibbons, 1986; Worthington, 1998). This presumes, however, that
people deliberately set out to engage in the process of forgiveness. It is
possible that unless individuals are prompted (usually by a profes-
sional), they rarely deliberately engage in such a process. If they do, it is
not clear the extent to which therapeutic models reflect the “lay” process
of forgiving. In other words, individuals outside the clinical setting may
not attempt to deal with hurts in a deliberate, task–oriented manner, nor
in a manner consistent with therapeutic models.

WHAT ABOUT PERSONALITY AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS?

A final limitation of current process models, specifically those which are
intrapersonal in orientation, is that they tend to focus on an individual’s
cognitive and affective processes in response to a transgression, and ne-
glect the role of personality and situational variables in the process (see
Gordon & Baucom, 1998, for an exception). However, related studies in
personality and social psychology have measured such variables but not
within a forgiveness process model.
For example, a neurotic defense style (Maltby & Day, 2004) and un-
willingness to emotionally disclose (Harber & Wenberg, 2005) have
1070 STRELAN AND COVIC

been found to be barriers to forgiveness, consistent with Enright et al.’s

(1996) theorizing that the first step in the forgiveness process is psycho-
logical defense. Some theorists (Brandsma, 1982; Enright et al., 1996;
Fitzgibbons, 1986; Menninger, 1996; Worthington, 2001) posit that cog-
nitive rehearsal of a hurtful event is a fundamental component of the for-
giveness process, and studies have shown that rumination is negatively
related to forgiveness (Brown & Phillips, 2005; McCullough et al., 1998,
2001). A common component in forgiveness process theorizing is empa-
thy, and a number of studies have established the important role that
empathy plays in individuals’ decisions to forgive (e.g., McCullough et
al., 1997, 1998; Wade & Worthington, 2003).
Other studies indicate that situation–specific factors such as commit-
ment (Finkel et al., 2002; Karremans et al., 2003), apology, remorse, of-
fense severity (Zechmeister et al., 2004), and responsibility attributions
(Fincham et al., 2002; McCullough et al., 2003) are related to individuals’
willingness to forgive. These findings are particularly relevant in sup-
port of the models that emphasize the dyadic, interpersonal nature of
forgiveness (e.g., Fitzgibbons, 1986; Hargrave, 1994; Pollard et al., 1998).
Taken together, the related empirical studies indicate the importance
of studying the personality and situational factors that influence the for-
giveness process, and the importance of conceptualizing forgiveness
process models within a broader theoretical context that includes these
factors. To that end, the models of Worthington and Wade (1999) and
Kaminer et al. (2000) are salient. Although they do not specify a forgive-
ness process in terms of all of its specific cognitive, affective and behav-
ioral components, they do provide broad, coherent theoretical frame-
works within which to identify potentially the most important
interactions between the process and personality and contextual factors.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In summary, our review of the literature on process models of forgive-
ness suggests that the following points need to be addressed in future
research:

1. What is forgiveness? Theoretical and empirical progress on the

process of forgiveness depends a great deal on how, and the ex-
tent to which, this key question is approached.
2. How do people know when they have forgiven? For theoretical,
empirical, and applied reasons, it is imperative that the endpoint
of the forgiveness process be resolved.
3. It is imperative that more studies are conducted to empirically
validate process models of forgiveness. Without increased empiri-
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1071

cal validation we should not be confident about our understand-

ing of how forgiveness occurs or its application in clinical and
nonclinical settings.
4. Greater rigor needs to be applied to conceptualizing existing or
new process models within established psychological theory, and
taking greater account of personality and contextual factors.
5. Such models should be generalizable beyond specific popula-
tions, in order to be relevant to both clinical and general popula-
tions. Alternatively, research may consider if situation–specific or
generic models are theoretically and empirically more sound.
6. In testing such models, researchers should endeavor to employ
longitudinal designs in a bid to capture the transitional and con-
tingent properties of the process. To date, no such studies have
been conducted.
7. Attention should be paid to delineating which components of the
existing models are most important in the process of forgiveness
or in encouraging forgiveness; what the order of the components
is, if indeed an order can be established; which of the cognitive,
affective, and behavioral dimensions of each component are most
important; and how these dimensions interact within and be-
tween components. To date, no such research has been conducted.

In the following sections we provide direction for how a number of the

points we have raised may be addressed in future research. It should be
fairly self–evident, in a broad sense, as to what is required to deal with
points 3 (need for empirical validation of models), 5 (generalizability of
models), and 6 (need for longitudinal studies). Thus, we will focus on
points 1, 2, 4, and 7. We will propose a theoretical framework designed
to provide an alternative to the task–stage paradigm that currently dom-
inates the literature (point 4). In doing so, we address the inter–related
issues of definitional clarity and the endpoint of forgiveness (points 1
and 2) by suggesting an alternative approach to defining forgiveness.
We also address the issue of component order and salience (point 7).

FORGIVENESS AS A COPING PROCESS:

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE FUTURE RESEARCH
We propose that Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) seminal stress and cop-
ing model provides an alternative theoretical framework for unifying
the existing body of research and guiding future research into the for-
giveness process. First, we briefly describe the model’s fundamental
principles and relevant research. Second, we explain how the forgive-
ness process is analogous to the coping process. Based on this reasoning,
1072 STRELAN AND COVIC

we propose a new definition of forgiveness. Third, we explain how con-

ceptualizing forgiveness as coping will advance theorizing and research
on the forgiveness process.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) defined coping as the thoughts and be-
haviors used by individuals to manage the internal and external de-
mands of specific situations, which are appraised as being personally sa-
lient and stressful. The extent to which an individual perceives a
situation to be stressful is determined by two separate, though interde-
pendent, appraisals. Initially, the individual engages in a primary ap-
praisal, in which an encounter or situation is assessed as being either ir-
relevant (both to one’s well-being and stake in the outcome),
benign–positive (i.e., only a good outcome is apparent), or stressful.
Stressful situations are categorized as threat (potential for harm or loss),
challenge (potential for growth, mastery, or gain), or harm–loss (an in-
jury that has already been done). Next, the person undertakes a second-
ary appraisal, which is an evaluation of one’s resources (psychological,
physical, social, material) to deal with the potentially stressful situation,
akin to asking, ‘What can I do?’ The coping process is then initiated. If an
initially stressful situation is evaluated as being manageable, such an
evaluation becomes, in itself, a form of coping. If resources are deemed
inadequate, then one continues to perceive the situation as stressful.
Once a situation has been appraised as stressful, individuals enact any
number of coping strategies designed to remove, reduce, or tolerate
stress.
Although many attempts have been made to conceptualize the nu-
merous coping behaviors within uni–dimensional frameworks, the
most well–known approach is Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984), who dis-
tinguish problem–focused coping and emotion–focused coping. The
former refers to strategies used to bring about a change or a resolution to
a situation (e.g., seeking information, planning, taking action); the latter
refers to strategies in which individuals attempt to regulate the emotions
and cognitions associated with the situation (e.g., venting emotions, ru-
minating, avoidance, accepting the problem, reinterpretation) with,
often, a subsequent assignation of new meaning to the event.
Specific situational, social, individual, and dispositional factors all in-
fluence what coping behaviors are chosen (Folkman & Moskowitz,
2000). Individuals often use a combination of the two forms of coping,
depending on the situation (Lazarus, 1999), sometimes one before the
other and sometimes simultaneously (Tennen, Affleck, Armeli, & Car-
ney, 2000). Problem–focused coping tends to be used in situations per-
ceived as changeable, and emotion–focused coping in situations per-
ceived as not amenable to change (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Typically,
however, their effects are often difficult to delineate; emotion–focused
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1073

coping can facilitate problem–focused coping by regulating the distress

that can mitigate problem–focused strategies, and problem–focused
coping can reduce the perceived salience of a threat and consequently
reduce stressful emotional responses (Carver & Scheier, 1994).
It is important to note that the coping process is distinct from its out-
come. In other words, coping refers to efforts to manage demands, irre-
spective of how successful those efforts are in reducing stress (Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984). Thus, some coping behaviors tend to be adaptive, spe-
cifically, “approach” types of coping such as the seeking of social sup-
port or problem–focused coping. Others, however, may be maladaptive,
for example, “avoidance” types of behaviors such as self–blame, wishful
thinking, escapism, denial, and mental or behavioral disengagement
that typically have negative implications for outcomes (Carver &
Scheier, 1994). The reappraisal of the latter types of responses as ineffec-
tive will lead, in turn, to another round of primary and secondary ap-
praisals and the implementation of alternative (or sometimes the same)
coping strategies.
As the relationships between the primary and secondary appraisals
and the categories of coping suggests, coping is a complex, dynamic,
and multidirectional process. A fundamental principle of coping theory
is that a stressful event is not static, rather it evolves and unfolds. Thus,
coping is an ongoing transaction between the threat, primary and sec-
ondary appraisals, and the response. Therefore, as threat perceptions
and appraisals interact and change over time coping behaviors will also
change over time (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Consequently, the coping
process is often characterized by apparently contradictory emotions and
states of mind during any given stage of a stressful encounter (Folkman
& Moskowitz, 2000). In short, the coping process generally is not linear.
Rather, it is best characterized as an ongoing series of feed-back and
feed–forward loops in which threats are constantly reappraised; coping
strategies are reevaluated and often alternative strategies applied; and
positive and negative emotions cooccur as individuals seek equilibrium.

HOW THE FORGIVENESS PROCESS IS

ANALOGOUS TO THE COPING PROCESS
Others have already suggested and/or examined the conceptual link be-
tween forgiveness and coping (e.g., Berry et al., 2001; Maltby, Day, &
Barber, 2004; Worthington & Scherer, 2004). Ours, however, is the first
attempt to theoretically refocus the existing research and provide a
broad theoretical framework, which is currently lacking, by explicating
the potential relationship between the coping and forgiveness processes.
1074 STRELAN AND COVIC

Below we outline six ways in which the forgiveness process is analogous

to the coping process.
The Forgiveness Process is a Reaction to a Stressor. The negative cogni-
tive, affective and behavioral reactions one may have in response to a
transgression may be conceptualized as stress reactions (Berry et al.,
2001). The process one goes through in order to forgive another may be
viewed as a means of reducing the stress reaction (Worthington &
Scherer, 2004).
Reactions to a Transgression Are Primary and Secondary Appraisals. More
specifically, the reactions one has to a transgression at any point in the for-
giveness process may be conceptualized as primary and secondary ap-
praisals. For example, when a transgression has just occurred, a primary
appraisal of the event will include asking questions like, “was this hurt-
ful?” (harm–loss); “will this hurt me?” (threat); or “is this an opportunity
for me/my relationship?” (challenge). If the transgression is appraised as
harm–loss or threat, then a secondary appraisal (“what can I do?”) may
include initial reactions of anger, retaliation or withdrawal. If the trans-
gression is appraised as a challenge, the secondary appraisal may include
empathic or conciliatory responses. Such primary and secondary apprais-
als will continue to be conducted throughout the process of coping with
the transgression. For example, an individual may identify the source of
their stress not as the initial transgression, but rather, the fact that they
continue to ruminate about it. A secondary appraisal may involve recog-
nizing the nonconstructive effects of rumination and, in turn, a decision to
reframe the transgression. The same individual may eventually appraise
what was initially a threat as an opportunity for mastery of a challenge
(i.e., they now feel confident that they have gotten over the hurt) and
consequently express benevolence and goodwill towards a transgressor.
Coping Strategies Describe How People Forgive. The two main coping
strategies provide a framework with which to explain both what people
do in the forgiveness process, and how they forgive. The forgiveness pro-
cess may be conceptualized as emotion–focused coping when it is con-
cerned primarily with the internalized responses to a transgression. For
example, emotion–focused coping may be used when the perceived best
way of coping with a transgression is to attempt to ameliorate the nega-
tive responses one is experiencing, such as anger and hostility. The for-
giveness process may be conceptualized as a problem–focused coping
strategy when it is concerned with the problem that caused the stress, for
example, discussing with the offender what happened and/or seeking
some form of redress; deciding to leave a relationship or a situation; or
simply working out what to do next.
Coping processes are not inherently good or bad (Lazarus & Folkman,
1984) but may be considered in terms of their effectiveness in a given sit-
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1075

uation. For example, an emotion–focused coping strategy would be ef-

fective as a regulatory response to a very recent, highly upsetting trans-
gression, but over time focusing on one’s emotions could have negative
consequences, for example, a tendency to ruminate over the transgres-
sion. Rumination has been shown to be an important barrier to forgive-
ness (e.g., McCullough et al., 2001). Similarly, problem–focused coping
operationalized as leaving a relationship may be effective in a situation
where the hurt person was already emotionally prepared to leave, but
such behavior may not be appropriate if the emotional contemplation
has not taken place.
Forgiveness and Coping Can Also Be Future–Oriented. Coping has tra-
ditionally been understood as a survival strategy. However, recent theo-
ries of coping propose that coping can also be understood in future–ori-
ented terms. Research indicates that coping has been viewed as an
opportunity for growth, the acquisition of new coping skills, and spiri-
tual transformation (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000). For example, one
coping study found that caregivers reappraised potentially painful, ex-
haustive and stressful experiences as worthwhile (Folkman, Chesney, &
Christopher–Richards, 1994). Such a reappraisal subsequently provides
an individual with evidence of the ability to deal with difficult situations
and to therefore draw on that ability in the future.
Schwarzer and Knoll (2003) propose three types of future–oriented
coping: anticipatory coping (dealing with future events that one per-
ceives are fairly certain to happen soon); preventive coping (dealing
with an uncertain distant future threat); and proactive coping (dealing
with upcoming challenges that are potentially self–enhancing). Antici-
patory and preventive coping can be applied to the forgiveness process
to the extent that individuals’ motivations to forgive may be quite in-
strumental, such as a hurt person taking into account the need to pre-
serve a valued relationship. For example, a hurt person might predict
that unless he or she forgives the transgression, the relationship may be
irreparably damaged or weakened. Alternatively, individuals may real-
ize that they themselves may be in a situation one day where they too
will need forgiving. A person forgiving in either of these contexts would
be engaging in anticipatory or preventive coping as a way of preserving
valued relationships.
Proactive coping is a way in which individuals can improve, grow,
and render life meaningful as a consequence of dealing with a forthcom-
ing challenge (Schwarzer & Knoll, 2003). In forgiveness terms, such a
challenge may be conceptualized as moving beyond getting over a
transgression to viewing the ultimate response to a transgression as an
opportunity for one, or a relationship, to improve and grow. For exam-
ple, an individual may come to the realization that a once–hurtful trans-
1076 STRELAN AND COVIC

gression is now an opportunity to learn more about oneself; or, they may
determine that a benevolent response to a transgressor is important for
their own self–esteem or the good of a relationship. Thus, whereas tradi-
tional problem–focused and emotion–focused strategies might be anal-
ogous to the ‘negative dimension’ of forgiving (i.e., getting over a trans-
gression), proactive coping is analogous to the way in which individuals
within the forgiveness process may move from surviving a transgres-
sion to responding positively to it, that is, feeling better within oneself
(Gordon & Baucom, 1998) and/or acting benevolently towards a trans-
gressor (McCullough et al., 1997). Forgiveness conceptualized as a
proactive coping strategy may subsequently help to alleviate concerns
that forgiveness should not be reduced to merely being a survival
mechanism (e.g., Enright et al., 1998).
Forgiveness is Both an Intra and an Interpersonal Process. Coping con-
sists of both intrapersonal (i.e., appraisals and choice of coping strate-
gies) and interpersonal (i.e., social and situation–specific factors) pro-
cesses. Forgiveness is the same. The cognitive, emotional and behavioral
responses that one has to a transgression are influenced by external so-
cial and situation–specific factors, and vice versa.
Forgiveness is a Dynamic, Unfolding Process. Analogous to the coping
process, the forgiveness process is rarely linear. Anecdotal and clinical
evidence (e.g., Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000) indicate that individuals
move back and forwards within the forgiveness process until they reach
a point of psychological equilibrium. Thus, both positive and negative
responses cooccur during the process (e.g., one might feel empathy for
an offender and yet still be angry with him or her), just as they have been
shown to occur in coping research (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000); pri-
mary and secondary appraisals continue to be conducted, and influence
the other; and different coping strategies will be enacted depending on
the situation.
In this section we have proposed a number of ways in which the pro-
cess of forgiveness is analogous to coping: It is a dynamic process occur-
ring in response to a stress reaction, and consists of primary and second-
ary appraisals and subsequent strategies for dealing with the stressor.
Next, we propose an alternative approach to defining forgiveness based
on the coping model.

A NEW DEFINITION OF FORGIVENESS

We have argued that forgiveness is a process of coping with a stressful
situation. Here we offer a definition of forgiveness that reflects such a
conceptualization. It is this: “Forgiveness is the process of neutralizing a
stressor that has resulted from a perception of an interpersonal hurt.”
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1077

There are three important points to note about this definition. First, the
forgiveness process is initiated by perception of an interpersonal hurt.
Second, forgiveness is first and foremost a process, as distinct from an
outcome. Thus, no specific endpoint of forgiveness is prescribed.
Rather—and this is the third point—consistent with the coping model,
the endpoint of forgiveness is signified when the stressor that initiated
the forgiveness process has been neutralized. “Neutralization” will
mean different things to different individuals. Some will identify the
cessation of negative responses as congruent with “neutralization” (e.g.,
Thompson et al., 2005); others will identify overt positive responses to-
wards a transgressor as synonymous with “neutralization” (e.g.,
Enright et al., 1998). Either way, an essential aspect of the definition is
that forgiveness as an outcome can be said to have occurred when the
stress resulting from a transgression—that is, the conglomeration of
negative cognitions, affect, and behaviors—no longer adversely affects
the person who has been hurt.
How does this definition add value to forgiveness theorizing and re-
search? We think it has two promising properties. First, it may help to re-
solve the problem of defining forgiveness in terms of an endpoint. Most
conceptualizations of forgiveness state, or at least imply, that there is
some objective endpoint to forgiveness, that is, forgiveness is prescribed
as an either/or proposition. For example, forgiveness is or is not a cessa-
tion of negative responses; it is or is not a loving, compassionate re-
sponse. Instead, our definition recognizes the subjective experience of
forgiveness. Our definition also recognizes that the endpoint of the for-
giveness process will vary depending on the individual. Indeed, for
some individuals, there may not even be an endpoint so much as an
eventual realization—and perhaps only in hindsight—that they no
longer feel or think negatively, or they are now responding positively to
a transgressor.
Second, the definition is consistent with the coping process. Next, we
describe how framing forgiveness as coping will advance theory and re-
search into the forgiveness process.

HOW COPING MODELS WILL ADVANCE THEORIZING

AND RESEARCH ON THE FORGIVENESS PROCESS
Forgiveness as Coping Better Reflects the Process of Forgiving. The cop-
ing model offers a more viable alternative to the dominant paradigm in for-
giveness theorizing, the task–stage approach, which presumes that the for-
giveness process is essentially linear and contingent on task achievement at
various stages. However, clinical and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Enright &
Fitzgibbons, 2000) indicates that generally people do not in fact deal with
1078 STRELAN AND COVIC

stressors in a sequential, linear manner. Thus, forgiveness is more appro-

priately conceptualized as a dynamic process, where one’s responses to a
transgression constitute a series of reappraisals and feedback and
feedforward loops (e.g., Enright et al., 1998; Malcolm & Greenberg, 2000)
rather than a rigid set of contingent tasks to be achieved.
Forgiveness as Coping Better Reflects the Interaction Between Internal and
External Factors. A limitation of existing forgiveness process models is
that the overwhelming majority disregard the influence of personality,
social, and situation–specific factors on the forgiveness process. The
coping model, however, places a great emphasis on the individual’s
transaction with his or her environment, and this is reflected in a com-
mensurately large research literature (Folkman and Moskowitz, 2000).
Coping is not just a process internal to the individual; it also reflects the
fact that external influences can impact on the individual, and vice versa.
Thus, the coping model provides a framework for understanding both
intrapersonal cognitive and affective responses, and the influence of in-
terpersonal interactions and situational factors. By conceptualizing for-
giveness within the framework of coping, the nature of the person–envi-
ronment interaction is more clearly realized and the forgiveness process
is not viewed isolated from its context.
Forgiveness as Coping Better Describes How Forgiveness Occurs. T a s k –
stage models suggest what happens when people engage in the forgive-
ness process, but are less clear in specifying how forgiveness occurs. In
contrast, the coping strategies introduced above provide a framework
with which to explain both what people do in the forgiveness process
and how they go about forgiving, while at the same time taking into ac-
count individual differences and social and situation–specific factors in
responses to a transgression. Specifically, people go about forgiving by
using a combination of problem–focused, emotion–focused, and
future–oriented strategies.
Forgiveness as Coping Means Focusing on the Process Not an Endpoint.
A fundamental concern in the literature is the lack of agreement over an
endpoint of forgiveness. As we have noted, the debate has implications
for how forgiveness process models are developed and utilized. At-
tempting to specify an endpoint is problematic not only for theorists and
researchers, but also for clinicians, and—attempts to promote forgive-
ness within other—nonclinical contexts. The main issue is that prescrib-
ing an endpoint suggests there is some objective, definable point at
which all individuals must arrive before they can say they have for-
given—yet not everyone will subscribe to the same endpoint, let alone
agree that there is in fact an endpoint.
Forgiveness as coping, however, means that forgiveness is all about
process, not outcome. Specifically, the process of forgiving produces dif-
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1079

ferent outcomes for different individuals, and not all appraisals and
strategies used in the forgiveness process inevitably lead to a satisfac-
tory or forgiving outcome. Some coping strategies are adaptive, such as
taking the perspective of the offender or reframing the transgression,
and some appraisals conclude that the transgression is not a threat but a
challenge; other coping strategies are maladaptive, such as excessive ru-
mination, and some appraisals continue to conclude that the stressor is a
harm–loss or threat event. In most cases, adaptive strategies should lead
to more positive responses whereas maladaptive strategies would be
less likely to result in such responses. It is possible, however, that some
apparently maladaptive strategies could also eventually lead to positive
outcomes. For example, rumination may lead to greater insight into how
one deals with transgressions.
In other words, when forgiveness is conceptualized as coping, the fo-
cus is on how one copes with a transgression, not on the outcome that
one should reach. In our new definition, the only possible out-
come—and one which is only implied—is that the stressor with which
one is attempting to cope is neutralized. As we have argued, individu-
als’ interpretations of “neutralization” will differ: for some it will mean
the cessation of negative cognitions and affect; for others it will mean ex-
pressing benevolently towards a transgressor. The main point here is
that forgiveness as coping means avoiding getting bogged down with
nebulous endpoints and outcomes—as appears to be the case at present
in the literature—and instead focusing on what an individual actually
does in order to produce a response that they interpret as “forgiving.”
Forgiveness as Coping Means Focusing on the Salience of Components, not
on the Order. Forgiveness as coping suggests that identifying a compo-
nent order for all individuals across all situations is less important than
what the current task–stage approach implies. Because forgiveness as
coping is a dynamic, interactive process, individuals may move back
and forwards between components rather than in a linear fashion as
task–stage models suggest. Thus, it may be more useful to think of the
components simply as reflecting different ways of coping, which may
occur and potentially reoccur at different points during the forgiveness
process, and to address which components may be most salient as ways
of coping, while taking into account personality, social, and situa-
tion–specific factors. For example, developing empathy for the trans-
gressor has been found to be a key predictor of a forgiving response,
whereas prolonged rumination has been found to be a barrier. Perhaps
empathy and prolonged rumination are, respectively, salient adaptive
and maladaptive coping responses within the forgiveness process?
Indeed, rather than attempting to specify component order, it may be
more fruitful to investigate what people must at least experience or do
1080 STRELAN AND COVIC

before they are able to forgive someone. For example, perhaps the mini-
mum requirement for forgiveness is that the individual feels and ex-
presses anger and hurt, that they realize that other strategies for dealing
with the hurt are not working (e.g., rumination), and that they feel some
empathy for the transgressor. In short, we argue that forgiveness as cop-
ing advances theorizing by focusing not on component order but on
arguably the more important issue of component salience.
The Coping Literature Offers Improved Methodology for Studying the For-
giveness Process. Forgiveness research will benefit methodologically
from the vast coping literature. As we have noted, one of the important
limitations of existing empirical process work in forgiveness is the com-
plete reliance on between–person cross–sectional measures to answer
questions that essentially require within–person, longitudinal re-
sponses. Forgiveness research in general is also characterized by a reli-
ance on questionnaires to gather information, an approach that is not op-
timal for capturing the nuances of the forgiveness process which, by
definition, is dynamic and constantly evolving. Furthermore, those very
measures tend to reflect prescribed conceptualizations of forgiveness.
The coping field has also had to address such shortcomings (Tennen et
al., 2000) and consequently forgiveness researchers may learn much
from how coping researchers have responded. For example, a highly
promising strategy is known as the “daily process approach” (for a re-
view, see Tennen et al., 2000). This strategy emphasizes the measure-
ment of day–to–day changes that take place over time and conditions, al-
lowing coping researchers to examine at a microanalytical level the roles
and relationship of different coping strategies within a person, yet still
drawing a sufficiently large enough N to allow generalization of find-
ings. Innovative techniques such as computerized diaries (e.g., palm pi-
lots) for participants to record and time– and date–stamp events facili-
tate data collection and avoid the constraints inherent in using
questionnaires. Given how closely the forgiveness process mirrors the
coping process, there are clear benefits to applying the daily process ap-
proach to the forgiveness process particularly its potential to capture
how forgiveness proceeds.

CONCLUSION
There are a number of theoretical and empirical limitations associated
with forgiveness process models. We have proposed that conceptualiz-
ing forgiveness as analogous to the process of coping will go a long way
towards not only addressing the limitations but also significantly ad-
vancing forgiveness theorizing and research. We expect that conceptu-
alizing forgiveness as coping will be seen by some as controversial. At
A REVIEW OF FORGIVENESS PROCESS MODELS 1081

the very least, we hope that our effort will stimulate greater efforts to
come to grips, both theoretically and empirically, with the forgiveness
process.

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