SIRE 2.

0 - List of Core questions are

highlighted in Red
INDEX
2. Certification and Documentation
2.1. Certification
2.2. Management Oversight
2.3. Structural Assessment
2.4. Defect Management
2.5. Management of Change
2.6. Statutory Management Plans
2.7. Safety Management System
2.8. General Information
3. Crew Management
3.1. Crew Qualification
3.2. Crew Evaluation
3.3. Crew Training
3.4. Crew Compliance
3.5. Crew Familiarisation
4. Navigation and Communications
4.1. Navigation Equipment
4.2. Navigational Procedures
4.3. Bridge and Machinery Space Team Management
4.4. Communications Equipment and Procedures
5. Safety Management
5.1. Emergency Response Plans and Drills
5.2. Fixed Fire Protection Systems
5.3. Portable fire fighting appliances
5.4. Life saving appliances
5.5. Permits to work
5.6. Fixed and portable gas detecting systems
5.7. Safety Management
5.8. Area Safety Inspections
5.9. Lifting and Rigging
5.10. Safe Access
5.11. Sample Management
5.12. Safety Equipment
6. Pollution Prevention
6.1. Pollution Prevention - Record Books
6.2. Cargo and Bunker Operations
6.3. Ballast Operations
6.4. Deck Area Pollution Prevention
6.5. Machinery Space Pollution Prevention
6.6. Oil Discharge Monitors
7. Maritime Security
7.1. Ship Routing
7.2. Ship Hardening and access control
7.3. Communications and Monitoring
7.4. Ship Security Officer
7.5. Cyber Security
8. Cargo and Ballast Systems
8.1. Oil
8.2. Chemicals
8.3. Oil and Chemical
8.99. All types
9. Mooring and Anchoring
9.1. Mooring Equipment Management
9.2. Emergency Towing Arrangement
9.3. Mooring and Anchoring Procedures
9.4. Mooring and Anchoring Team Management
9.5. STS Operation Management
9.6. Single Point Mooring
10. Machinery Spaces
10.1. Engineering Procedures
10.2. Machinery Status
10.3. Safety Management
10.4. Planned Maintenance Systems
10.5. Conventional Bunkering Management
10.7. Fire Protection Measures
12. Ice Operations
12.1. Ice operations training
12.2. Sub-zero LSA & FFA procedures
12.3. Sub-zero machinery operation procedures
12.4. Sub-zero cargo and ballast operation procedures
12.5. Sub-zero deck machinery operation procedures
12.6. Ice navigation procedures
2. Certification and Documentation
2.1. Certification

2.1.1. Were the Master and senior officers familiar with the company
procedure for maintaining the vessel’s statutory certification up to date,
were all certificates and documents carried onboard up to date and was the
vessel free of conditions of class or significant memoranda?

QMS : 01N.10.10.01
There was no company procedure which defined the process for managing
(indexing and filing) vessel certificates and documents to ensure compliance
with SOLAS, Class and Flag requirements.
The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
indexing and filing certificates and documents.
• There was no systematic process in place to track the validity and file all
statutory and classification certificates.
• A sampling of onboard certificates identified that a required (class or flag)
certificate or a supporting survey/test report had expired or was missing.
• The onboard tracking or filing of statutory and classification certificates had
not been maintained in accordance with company procedures.
• The operator had not uploaded a recent copy of the CSSR to the document
repository and a copy had not been made available onboard.
• The data entered in the HVPQ or PIQ was not accurate as compared to the
CSSR and vessel records.
• The vessel had been issued with:
o A condition of class.
o Memoranda relating to a defect to structure, machinery or equipment.
o A short-term certificate as a result of a defect or damage to the ship's
structure, machinery or equipment.
2.2. Management Oversight
2.2.1. Had the vessel been attended by a company Superintendent at
approximately sixmonthly intervals and were reports available to
demonstrate that a systematic vessel inspection had been completed during
each attendance declared through the preinspection questionnaire?

QMS : 01N.10.11.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• Reports were not available onboard for each declared qualifying vessel
inspection conducted by a company Marine or Technical Superintendent.
The inspection report format did not cover all operational and accessible areas
of the vessel and its equipment.
• The interval between successive qualifying inspections by either a Marine or
Technical Superintendent exceeded seven months.
• It was more than fourteen months since either the previous Marine or
Technical Superintendent inspection.
• Where the vessel was new to management there had been no Marine or
Technical inspection completed since handover or delivery.
• Remote inspections had been conducted but there was no company
procedure which defined:
o The circumstances in which a remote inspection may be used to substitute
for a physical inspection.
o The condition verification processes for all areas of the ship under inspection.
o The required content of the final inspection report.
• More than one remote inspection had been conducted when a physical
inspection could reasonably have been carried out.
• There was no evidence that each area for improvement or defect identified
within the vessel inspection reports had been followed up through the
documented company processes either as non-conformities or defect reports.
 2.2.2. Were recent ISM internal audit reports available on board, had
corrective action been taken on board to close-out any non-conformities
and had this corrective action been verified by shore management?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for scheduling and performing internal
ISM audits. Doc No: 01N.10.11.02
• No internal ISM audit had taken place for more than:
o 15 months
o 12 months, with no documentation supporting exceptional circumstances.
• The latest two internal ISM audit reports under the current operator, where
completed, were not available on board.
• There was no system for recording and tracking any non-conformities to
closure.
• Records in the system for recording and tracking any non-conformities to
closure were incomplete.
• The system for recording and tracking any non-conformities to closure:
o Was not readily available to those responsible for implementing corrective
action for any nonconformities.
o Did not impose a time limit for corrective action to be taken.
o Did not record when corrective actions were completed.
o Did not record the operator’s verification of corrective action completed, or
the evidence upon which verification was based, for example, a
superintendent’s visit or photographs.
• A non-conformity had not been closed-out within the imposed time limit.
• There was no objective evidence for the corrective action recorded to close-
out a non-conformity.
• The Master or senior officer interviewed was not familiar with the system for
recording and tracking any internal ISM audit non-conformities to closure.
• The Master or senior officer interviewed was not familiar with the internal
audit programme process.
2.2.3. Was the Master fully conversant with the company’s Safety
Management System and had Master’s Reviews of the system taken place
in accordance with the ISM Code and company procedures?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The Master was not familiar with the layout and contents of the SMS.
• The Master was not proficient in accessing the information contained in the
SMS, whether in hard copy or digital format.
• There was no company procedure requiring the periodic review of the Safety
Management System (SMS) by the Master, including: Doc No: 01N.05.03.01
The format and agenda for the review.
o The frequency of the review (at least annual). – 6monthly
o A specified time frame for company responses to the review. – 3 Months
• The Master was not familiar with the company procedure requiring the
periodic review of the Safety Management System (SMS).
• Master’s Reviews had not been performed at the frequency required by the
company procedure.
• The Master’s Review(s) had not been fully completed according to the
company format and/or agenda.
• The Master’s Review did not:
o Identify deficiencies in the SMS and suitable corrective action and/or,
o Contain suggestions for improvement in the effectiveness of the SMS.
• The operator had not responded to the Master’s Review(s) within the
specified timeframe.

2.3. Structural Assessment

2.3.1. Were the Master and Chief Engineer familiar with the company
procedure to maintain the Enhanced Survey File in accordance with
Classification Society rules, and was the vessel free of any visible or
documentary evidence of concerns with the structural condition of the hull
 or cargo and ballast tank coatings?

QMS: 01N.10.10.01
Forum 020.110.020
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that the enhanced survey
file, or electronic record, was maintained in accordance with classification
society guidance. Doc No: 01N.10.10.01
• There was no company procedure which required that the coating technical
file was maintained in accordance with classification society guidance.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
maintaining the enhanced survey file, or electronic record, and the coating
technical file.
• The enhanced survey file was found to be missing required surveys and/or
reports.
• Inspections by ship’s staff had not been recorded.
• Structural repairs were recorded as having taken place during the previous
twelve months within the enhanced survey file, but the vessel’s defect
reporting system did not include a similar report.
• Structural repairs were reported to have taken place following a
casualty/incident but there was no incident investigation report available
onboard
The condition evaluation report contained reports of substantially corroded
tanks/areas or there were areas with deep pitting recorded within the extract
of thickness measurements. (summarize the extract)
• The condition evaluation report or any subsequent classification society
reports recorded fair or poor cargo and/or ballast tank coating condition.
(report which tank(s) and rating assigned).
• Coating repairs were reported to have taken place within ballast tanks, but
the coating technical file had not been updated accordingly.
• Physical inspection of the vessel identified concerns with hull structural
integrity such as cracking, denting, distortion, significant* corrosion or thinning
of structural members which had not been subject to an occasional class
survey. (Where there is doubt as to whether corrosion or thinning is
significant* use the Hardware - slight superficial deterioration – comment
option)

2.3.2. Were the Master and Chief Engineer familiar with the company
procedure to maintain the Class Survey File, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of concerns with the structural condition
of the hull or hold space and ballast tank coatings?
QMS : Doc No: 01N.10.10.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure to ensure the vessel’s Survey File is
maintained complete and up to date.
• The Master and/or Chief Engineer were not familiar with the company
procedure to ensure the vessel’s
Survey File is maintained complete and up to date.
• The Survey File was incomplete and did not include:
o Class status reports.
o Survey reports.
o Repair history.
o Coating Technical File, where required to be carried.
• Maintenance of the protective coating system was not included in the overall
ship’s maintenance plan.
• Structural repairs were recorded within the Survey File as having taken place
during the previous twelve months, but the vessel’s defect reporting system
did not include a similar report.
• Structural repairs were recorded as having taken place following a
casualty/incident but there was no incident investigation report available
onboard.
• Physical inspection of the vessel identified concerns with hull structural
integrity such as cracking, denting, distortion, significant* corrosion or thinning
of structural members which had not been subject to an occasional class
survey. (*Where there is doubt as to whether corrosion or thinning is
significant, use the Hardware - slight superficial deterioration – comment
option.)
• A survey report contained details of substantially corroded tanks/areas or
areas with deep pitting.
(Summarise the relevant section of the report.)
• Classification society reports recorded fair or poor ballast tank coating
condition. (Report which tank(s) and rating assigned).
• Coating repairs were reported to have taken place within ballast tanks, but
the coating technical file, where required to be carried, had not been updated
accordingly.

2.3.3. Were the Master and senior officers familiar with the company cargo,
ballast & void space inspection and reporting procedure and, were records
available to demonstrate that all inspections had been accomplished within
the required time frame with reports completed in accordance with
company instructions?
QMS : Doc No: 01N.10.02.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the inspection of cargo/ballast/void
spaces which gave clear guidance on the inspection frequency, the inspection
process and reporting criteria.
• The required inspection frequency for ballast and void spaces exceeded
twelve months.
• The required inspection frequency for cargo spaces on oil and chemical
tankers exceeded thirty-six months.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company
cargo/ballast/void space inspection procedure and/or reporting criteria.
• Cargo, ballast or void space inspection(s) for any single space was overdue by
more than a month according to the company defined inspection period for
the space(s) in question.
• Any cargo, ballast or void space had been omitted from the onboard
inspection regime.
• The cargo, ballast and/or void space inspection reports were not prepared in
a standard format which permitted the reporting of coating and structural
condition in defined areas of the space in question.
• Defects to tank structure, coating or fittings were reported in an inspection
report but the defects(s) had not been transferred to the defect reporting
system for subsequent corrective action.
• There were open defect reports specifically related to damage or defects to
tank structure.
• Defects to tank structure had not been reported to the vessel's Class Society
for evaluation.

2.3.4. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for detecting leakage of liquids between cargo, bunker, ballast,
void and cofferdam spaces which included inspecting the surface of ballast
 water prior to discharge, and were records available to show that the
necessary checks had been performed?
QMS : Doc No: 01N.08.01.05

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure to periodically check empty spaces for
ingress of liquids from adjoining spaces or pipeline leakage or, to check the
surface of ballast water for contamination prior to discharge.

• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure
for periodically checking empty spaces for liquid ingress or monitoring the
levels of full or partially full tanks for migration of liquid between spaces.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
inspecting the surface of ballast water prior to discharge when a ballast tank
adjoined a cargo or bunker tank or had piping containing oil passing through it.
• Records determined that periodic checks to identify the ingress of liquids into
empty spaces had not been conducted as required by the company
procedures.
• Records determined that the surface of ballast water contained in tanks
adjacent to cargo or bunker tanks, or which had pipes containing oil passing
through them, had not been inspected prior to discharge.
• Records determined that ballast lines had not been tested where they passed
through cargo tanks or fuel tanks.
• Inspection of the ballast tank sighting arrangements determined that
numerous bolts were required to be removed from the inspection hatch or, an
enclosed space entry was needed to be made, to inspect the surface of the
ballast water within a full tank.
• Records determined that liquid leakage was detected in an empty space as a
result of structural or pipeline failure during the previous twelve months.
Records determined that ballast water or a ballast tank was contaminated by
oil from an adjacent space or pipeline leakage during the previous twelve
months.
 2.3.5. Had the vessel been enrolled in a Classification Society Condition
Assessment Programme (CAP)?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The information provided by the operator in the pre-inspection
questionnaire was inaccurate.
• The vessel operator had claimed a CAP rating for modules that were still
pending completion.
• The date of the CAP survey was inaccurately declared as the CAP certificate
issue date.
• The operator did not upload the CAP certificate to the document store and
the CAP certificate was not available onboard for review.

2.4. Defect Management

2.4.1. Were the senior officers familiar with the company procedure for
reporting defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment to shore-
based management through the company defect reporting system and was
evidence available to demonstrate that all defects had been reported
accordingly?
QMS : 01N.10.02.07
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no defect reporting system.
• There was no company procedure for managing defects to vessel structure,
machinery and equipment through the defect reporting system.
• The accompanying senior officer was unfamiliar with the company defect
reporting procedure.
• Defects entered in the defect reporting system had not been acknowledged
by shore management.
• Defects were evident onboard the vessel during the inspection that were
required to be entered in the defect reporting system but were not.
o In such cases identify the defective equipment in the negative observation
module of the Hardware response tool.
o Such observation should be limited to items listed on the supplements to the
statutory certification or subject to class survey.
• Defects which had either caused an incident or were caused by an incident
that had not been reported through the company incident reporting system for
further investigation.
Where defects were properly recorded in the defect reporting system and
acknowledged by shore management such defects should not result in a
negative observation under this question.

2.4.2. Where defects existed to the vessel’s structure, machinery or

equipment, had the vessel operator notified class, flag and/or the
authorities in the port of arrival, as appropriate to the circumstances, and
had short term certificates, waivers, exemptions and/or permissions to
proceed the voyage been issued where necessary?

QMS : 01N.10.02.07
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that defects to vessel
structure, machinery and equipment were evaluated by shore management to
determine whether notifications to Class, Flag and/or other external
stakeholders were required.
• The senior officers were not familiar with the company procedure for
notifying Class, Flag and/or other external stakeholders of defects to the
vessel’s structure, machinery or equipment after shore management
evaluation.
• There were open defect reports in the defect reporting system which were of
a significant nature but there was no evidence that class, flag and/or external
stakeholders had been informed in accordance with the company procedure.
In this case identify the defective equipment in the negative observation
module of the Hardware response tool.
• Class, Flag or external stakeholders had imposed conditions on the vessel as
a result of a defect to the structure, machinery or equipment but the vessel
had no evidence that the conditions had been complied with.

2.5. Management of Change

2.5.1. Had the company Management of Change procedure been effectively
implemented for changes affecting structure, machinery and equipment
governed by Classification Society rules or statutory survey?
QMS : Doc No: 01N.05.05.06

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company MOC procedure covering changes affecting class
and/or flag regulated structure, machinery and equipment.
• The accompanying senior officer was unfamiliar with the company MOC
process, as it applied to changes falling within the scope of this question, to
structure, machinery and equipment onboard the vessel.
• Changes falling within the scope of this question to vessel structure,
machinery or equipment, regulated by class and/or flag, had been conducted
within the previous twelve months but had not been declared on the pre-
inspection questionnaire.
• Changes to vessel structure, fittings or equipment, within the scope of this
question, had been conducted within the previous twelve months but there
was no approved MOC request form and supporting documentation onboard

2.6. Statutory Management Plans

2.6.1. Were the Master, deck officers and engineer officers familiar with the
 vessel’s Ballast Water Management Plan and were records available to
demonstrate that ballast handling had been conducted in accordance with
the plan?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The vessel did not have a Ballast Water Management Plan or a valid Ballast
Water Management Certificate.
• The Ballast Water Management Plan was not approved by the Flag Sate or
recognised organisation such as a class society.
• The Ballast Water Management Plan was not ship-specific.
• The officer designated in the Ballast Water Management Plan to be in charge
of ensuring that the plan was properly implemented was not familiar with its
contents.
• The Ballast Water Management Plan was not written in the working language
of the ship.
• The accompanying deck or engineering officer was unfamiliar with the Ballast
Water Management Plan, or the entries required to be made in the ballast
water record book.
• The Ballast Water Record Book had not been maintained in accordance with
company procedures.
• Where ballast water exchange had taken place there was no plan showing
the sequential exchange of ballast which included the longitudinal stress at
each stage of the operation.
• The ballast water treatment plant was reported to be defective in any
respect.
• Where ballast operations had not been completed in accordance with the
Ballast Water Management Plan due to defect or accident to the ballast water
treatment plant there was no evidence that the Flag and / or Port State
Authorities had been notified.
• Where Flag or Port State Authorities had imposed conditions on the vessel
due to the failure of the ballast water treatment plant, the vessel had not
complied with the conditions imposed.
• There was evidence that the ballast water treatment plant had been
bypassed in contravention to the Ballast Water Management Plan.

2.6.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the VOC Management
Plan, and had the procedures for minimising VOC emissions set out in the
Plan been implemented and documented as required?

The VOC Management Plan was not approved by the Flag State or recognised
organisation such as a Class
Society.
• The VOC Management Plan was not ship specific.
• The VOC Management Plan was not in a language readily understood by the
Master and officers.
• The person identified as responsible for implementing the VOC Management
Plan was not familiar with its contents.
• The accompanying officer was not aware of the VOC Management Plan or
familiar with the actions necessary to comply with the provisions of the Plan
(which may be incorporated in the cargo transfer plan).
• There was no evidence that the training programmes set out in the VOC
Management Plan had been implemented.
• There was no evidence that the procedures for minimising VOC emissions set
out in the Plan had been implemented during routine crude oil loading,
carriage, discharge and crude oil washing.
• The target operating pressure for the cargo tanks was not clearly indicated in
the cargo control room.
• Records required to be maintained by the VOC Management Plan had not
been maintained for all occasions when crude oil was being loaded, carried
and discharged, including crude oil washing.
• Cargo tank pressure was maintained significantly below the target operating
pressure during loading and/or carriage of crude oil, by venting to atmosphere.
 2.6.3. Were the Master and senior officers familiar with the contents and
requirements of the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and
had these been fully implemented?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The Master and/or the Chief Engineer were not familiar with the contents
and requirements of the Ship
Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).
• The SEEMP Part I did not contain a package of measures to improve the
ship's energy efficiency, and details for their implementation, such as:
o Improved voyage planning.
o Weather routeing.
o Just in time arrival.
o Speed optimization.
o Optimum trim.
o Optimum use of rudder and heading. control systems (autopilots).
o Hull maintenance.
• The package of measures listed in the SEEMP Part I to improve the ship’s
energy efficiency was not ship specific.
• There was no evidence that the package of measures listed in the SEEMP
Part I to improve the ship’s energy efficiency had been implemented and/or
monitored.
• On a ship of 5,000 gross tonnage or above:
o The SEEMP Part II did not include a description of the ship-specific method to
collect, aggregate, and report ship data with regard to annual fuel oil
consumption, distance travelled, hours underway and other data required by
regulation 22A of MARPOL Annex VI to be reported to the flag administration.
o A Statement of Compliance – Fuel Oil Consumption Reporting had not been
issued.
o There were no records of the collection, aggregation, and/or reporting of
ship data with regard to annual fuel oil consumption, distance travelled, hours
underway and other data required by regulation 22A of MARPOL Annex VI to
the flag administration.
o Records of fuel consumptions did not include all the fuel oil consumed on
board, regardless of whether the ship was underway or not:
 By the main engines, auxiliary engines, gas turbines, boilers and inert gas
generator, if fitted, and any other fuel consumer.
 For each type of fuel oil consumed e.g. HFO, DO, LNG etc.

2.7. Safety Management System

2.7.1. Was the relevant content of the SMS manuals easily accessible to all
personnel on board in a working language(s) understood by them?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The SMS manuals were not ‘user friendly’ and ship staff found it difficult
and/or time consuming to navigate to the appropriate information.
• A significant proportion of the content of the SMS manuals was not relevant
to the ship e.g. described procedures for general cargo ships, container ships
or bulk carriers.
• Manuals were in hard-copy format but there were insufficient copies at
appropriate locations.
• Manuals were only available in electronic format, but not all personnel had
ready access to a work-station and/or adequate training in accessing the SMS.
• The operator’s navigation procedures and instructions were not available on
the bridge.
• The operator’s navigation procedures and instructions were available on the
bridge in electronic format only, but a back-up independent means of power
supply to the work-station was not provided.
• All or some of the copies of the SMS manuals had not been updated with the
latest changes.
Obsolete documentation, such as procedures or checklists which had been
revised and superseded, were in use on board.
• There was no procedure to ensure that changes to the SMS were promptly
brought to the attention of the appropriate on- board personnel and
understood.
• There was no evidence that changes to the SMS had been promptly brought
to the attention of the appropriate on-board personnel and understood.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the process to access the
sections of the SMS relevant to their role.
• An interviewed rating was not able to understand the sections of the SMS
manuals relevant to their role onboard in the language(s) in which they were
provided

2.7.2. Did the SMS identify clear levels of authority and lines of
communication between the Master, ship's officers, ratings and the
company, and were all onboard personnel familiar with these arrangements
as they related to their position?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The SMS did not identify clear levels of authority and lines of communication
between the Master, ship's officers, ratings and the Company.
• A senior officer was not familiar with the lines of communication with the key
members of the operator’s organisation ashore.
• An interviewed junior officer or rating was not aware of the identity, contact
details and role of the DPA.
2.8. General Information
2.8.1. Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ)
available through the OCIMF SIRE Programme database completed
accurately to reflect the structure, outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?

QMS :
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
Where the information provided within the HVPQ misrepresented the details
of the vessel through multiple systemic inaccuracies or omissions relating to
ownership, class status, validity of certification or outfitting of the vessel:
• Make an observation within the process response tool and add a comment to
identify which questions were provided with inaccurate information.

2.8.2. Were records of the most recent Port State Control inspection
available onboard, and where deficiencies had been recorded had these
been corrected and closed out in accordance with the company procedure
for defects or non-conformities?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for managing PSC inspections.
• Where the vessel operator was utilising the OCIMF PSC Inspection
Repository, the most recent PSC Inspection Report had not been uploaded (an
allowance of five days since the completion of the inspection prior to the
synchronisation of the inspection editor should be allowed)
• The PSC inspection reports available onboard did not include the most recent
PSC inspection available on one of the PSC MOU databases.
• Where there were documented deficiencies during the last PSC inspection,
there was no documented evidence that the deficiencies had been corrected
and closed out with shore management approval.
• The PSC data provided for the last inspection through the PIQ was incorrect
in any respect.
3. Crew Management
3.1. Crew Qualification

3.1.1. Were the officers and ratings suitably qualified to serve onboard the
vessel and did the officer matrix posted on the OCIMF website accurately
reflect the qualifications, experience and English language capabilities of
the officers onboard at the time of the inspection?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The officer matrix had not been updated to reflect the officers who were on
board at the time of the inspection (an allowance will be made for any officer
that had changed within the previous four days).
• The accompanying senior officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance of
officer and rating certification records onboard.
• The details contained in the officer matrix were inaccurate in terms of:
o National Certificate of Competency (CoC).
National Certificate in advanced or basic training for oil, gas or chemical
service.
o Flag endorsements of CoC or training for oil, gas or chemical service.
o National radio operator license or flag endorsement.
o The sea service in rank.
• An officer's CoC or Flag Endorsement included a limitation that would
prevent them from performing their duties on the inspected vessel.
• A senior officer, junior deck officer or cargo/gas engineer did not hold a
certificate in advanced training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker
operations as applicable to the vessel type.
• A rating, including the pumpman, with immediate responsibility for loading,
discharging, care in transit, handling of cargo tank cleaning or other cargo-
related operations on oil, chemical or liquified gas tankers did not hold a
certificate in advanced training for tanker operations as applicable to the
vessel type.
• The sea time in rank for any officer whose records were sampled was found
to be inaccurate or records were not available to verify sea time in rank.
(verification checks will only cover up to thirty-six months sea service
onboard).
• The flag endorsement for any individual officer did not reflect the details of
the national CoC on which they were based.
• There was a concern with the standard of English language comprehension
or spoken English with an officer who was recorded as having a “good”
standard of English within the published officer matrix.

3.1.2. Were procedures and instructions contained within the Safety

Management System and signs posted around the vessel available in the
designated working language of the vessel or a language(s) understood by
the crew and, were the Master, officers and ratings able to communicate
verbally in the designated working language?

01N.05.01.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The designated working language of the vessel had not been determined by
the vessel operator. 01N.05.01.02
• The designated working language in use during the inspection was not the
same as declared through the HVPQ and/or entered in the logbook.
• An officer or rating was observed to be unable to communicate verbally in
the designated working language of the vessel.
• An officer or rating was observed to be unable to read a safety sign or
instruction in any of the language(s) in which it was displayed.
• Where the common working language was not an official language of the
Flag State, plans and notices required to be posted did not include a translation
into the designated working language.
• The sections of the Safety Management System required to be read and
understood by all onboard had not been translated into the designated
working language of the vessel and, where necessary, another language(s).
• Checklists and/or safe working procedures were not available in the
designated working language of the vessel.
 3.1.3. Did the complement of officers and ratings onboard at the time of
inspection meet or exceed the requirements of the Minimum Safe Manning
Document and the declared company standard manning for routine
operations, and had senior officers been relieved to ensure continuity of
operational knowledge?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The crew onboard on arrival at the port of inspection did not meet the
requirements of the Safe Manning
Document in any respect.
• The crew onboard on arrival at the port of inspection did not:
o Meet the standard manning level declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire, or
o Meet the company enhanced manning provision when conducting:
 Continuous/extended/repeated STS operations.
 Continuous/extended/repeated inter-harbour operations and/or short
voyages of less than 24 hours.
 Operations requiring implementation of additional security measures.
 Other specialist operations
• The number of officers onboard on arrival at the port of inspection was less
than declared through the OCIMF crew matrix.
• The machinery space was routinely operated in the manned mode at sea
while the actual number of engineers onboard was insufficient to meet the
requirements of the Safe Manning Document.
• Both senior officers from a single department were being relieved at the port
of inspection with no overlap or parallel sailing period for at least one of the
officers to cover the minimum relief interval declared through the pre-
inspection questionnaire.
3.2. Crew Evaluation
3.2.1. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a static
navigational assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced company
representative had been completed as declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
This question will only be generated when:

 The vessel operator had indicated that an appropriate static navigational assessment had been conducted
on board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve months and,

 A dynamic navigational audit had not been completed by a member

of the company staff within the previous twelve months.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The report for the static navigational assessment declared through the pre-
inspection questionnaire was not available onboard.
• The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the
assessor were not included within the report.

3.2.2. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a dynamic

navigational assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced company
representative had been completed while on passage as declared through
the pre-inspection questionnaire?

This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated,
through the pre-inspection questionnaire, that an appropriate dynamic
navigational assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced company
representative had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within
the previous two years.
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The report for the dynamic navigational assessment declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire was not available onboard.
• The dynamic navigational assessment did not cover the stages of the voyage
or was not completed during the date range as declared by the operator
through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the
assessor were not included within the report.
• The assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or
had not sailed as a senior deck officer.
• The dynamic navigational assessment report was not substantially in
alignment with the guidance document “A Guide to Best Practice for
Navigational Assessments and Audits” and the best practice guidance under
TMSA KPI 5.3.3.
• There was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for
improvement identified during the dynamic navigational assessment.
• There was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the
dynamic navigational assessment had been closed out within the due dates
indicated within the corrective action plan.

3.2.3. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a dynamic

navigational assessment by a suitably qualified specialist contractor had
been completed while on passage as declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated,
through the pre-inspection questionnaire, that an appropriate dynamic
navigational assessment by a suitably qualified specialist contractor had been
conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve
months.
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The report for the dynamic navigational assessment declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire was not available onboard.
• The dynamic navigational assessment did not cover the stages of the voyage
or was not completed during the date range as declared by the operator
through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the
assessor were not included within the report.
• The assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or
had not sailed as a senior deck officer.
• The dynamic navigational assessment report was not substantially in
alignment with the guidance document “A Guide to Best Practice for
Navigational Assessments and Audits” and the best practice guidance under
TMSA KPI 5.3.3.
• There was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for
improvement identified during the dynamic navigational assessment.
• There was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the
dynamic navigational assessment had been closed out within the due dates
indicated within the corrective action plan.

3.2.4. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that an

unannounced remote navigational assessment, which included review of
VDR & ECDIS data by an independent contractor or specialist company
representative, had been completed as declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had
indicated, through the pre-inspection questionnaire, that a remote
navigational assessment had been undertaken for the vessel being
inspected within the previous twelve months.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The remote navigational assessment report for the assessment declared
through the pre-inspection questionnaire was not available onboard.
• The remote navigational assessment did not include review of downloaded
VDR and ECDIS data as well as supporting material such as passage plans,
under-keel clearance calculations and copies (photos) of paper charts where
no ECDIS was carried.
• The remote navigational assessment covered a period solely at anchor or
open sea navigation where no navigational challenges were present.
• The remote navigational assessment did not cover the phases of the voyage
as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the
assessor were not included within the report.
• The assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or
had not sailed as a senior deck officer.
• The remote navigational assessment report was not substantially in
alignment with the OCIMF guidance document “A Guide to Best Practice for
Navigational Assessments and Audits”
• There was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for
improvement identified during the remote navigational assessment.
• There was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the
remote navigational assessment had been closed out within the due dates
indicated within the corrective action plan.

3.2.5. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a

comprehensive cargo audit by a suitably qualified and experienced
company representative had been completed as declared through the pre-
inspection questionnaire?

This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had
indicated, through the pre-inspection questionnaire, that an
appropriate comprehensive cargo audit by a suitably qualified and
experienced company representative had been conducted on board the
vessel being inspected within the previous twelve months.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The report for the comprehensive cargo audit declared through the pre-
inspection questionnaire was not available onboard.
• The comprehensive cargo audit did not cover the cargo or bunker operations
or was not completed during the date range as declared by the operator
through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the
assessor were not included within the report.
• The assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or
had not sailed as a senior deck officer onboard tankers.
• The comprehensive cargo audit report was not substantially in alignment
with the suggested best practice guidance of TMSA KPI 6.4.2
• There was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for
improvement identified during the comprehensive cargo audit.
• There was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the
comprehensive cargo audit had been closed out within the due dates indicated
within the corrective action plan

3.2.6. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a

comprehensive engineering audit by a suitable qualified and experienced
company representative had been completed as declared in the pre-
inspection questionnaire?
This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had
indicated, through the pre-inspection questionnaire, that an appropriate
comprehensive engineering audit by a suitably qualified and experienced
company representative had been conducted on board the vessel being
inspected within the previous twelve months.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The report for the comprehensive engineering audit declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire was not available onboard.
• The comprehensive engineering audit did not cover the machinery space
operations or was not completed during the date range as declared by the
operator through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the
assessor were not included within the report.
• The assessor did not hold or had not held a senior engineering officer licence
and/or had not sailed as a senior engineer officer onboard tankers.
• The comprehensive engineering audit report was not substantially in
alignment with the suggested best practice guidance of TMSA KPI 4.4.5
• There was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for
improvement identified during the comprehensive engineering audit.
• There was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the
comprehensive engineering audit had been closed out within the due dates
indicated within the corrective action plan.

3.2.7. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a

comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit by a suitably qualified and
experienced company representative had been completed as declared
through the pre-inspection questionnaire?

This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had
indicated, through the pre-inspection questionnaire, that an
appropriate comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit by a
suitably qualified and experienced company representative had been
conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous
twelve months.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The report for the comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit declared
through the pre-inspection questionnaire was not available onboard.
• The comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit did not cover the type of
mooring and anchoring operations or was not completed during the date range
as declared by the operator through the pre inspection questionnaire.
The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the
assessor were not included within the report.
• The assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or
had not sailed as a senior deck officer onboard tankers.
• The comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit report was not
substantially in alignment with the suggested best practice guidance of TMSA
KPI 6A.4.3.
• There was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for
improvement identified during the comprehensive mooring and anchoring
audit.
• There was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the
comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit had been closed out within the
due dates indicated within the corrective action plan

3.2.8. Had the vessel operator implemented a Behavioural Competency

Assessment Programme onboard and was there evidence available that
assessments were being conducted for navigation, cargo, mooring and
engineering operations by approved assessors?
The question will only be generated when the operator had declared that
a Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification programme was
in operation onboard through the pre-inspection questionnaire.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no evidence that there was a functional Behavioural Competency
Assessment and Verification Programme in operation onboard.
• The Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification Programme did
not cover navigation, cargo operations, mooring operations and engineering
operations.
• Onboard staff identified as approved assessors were not in possession of the
company defined training for approved assessors.
• There were no summary records available for the staff included in the
Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification Programme which
showed their achievements since joining the company or the inception of the
programme.
3.3. Crew Training
3.3.1. Had the Master and all navigation officers attended a shore-based
Bridge Team Management training course within the previous five years?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The Master and/or any one of the navigation officers onboard during the
inspection did not have evidence of attending a Bridge Team Simulator training
course at least equivalent to IMO Model Course 1.22 within the previous five
years.

3.3.2. Had the Master received formal ship handling training prior to
promotion or when being assigned to a new type of ship having significantly
different handling characteristics to ships in which they had recently
served?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The time in rank for the Master entered in the OCIMF Officer Matrix was
inaccurate in that the time in rank declared was greater than thirty-six months
sea service, but the Master had less than thirty-six months sea service in rank.
• There was no company training matrix available which clearly identified the
circumstances in which ship handling training was required to be completed by
a Master both at promotion and when being reassigned to a vessel having
significantly different handling characteristics.
• The vessel operator had not provided an evaluation of the handling
characteristics of vessels under management and identified where training was
necessary when transferring between vessel identified as having specific
handling characteristics due to size or number and type of propellers, rudders
or thrusters.
• The Master had less than thirty-six months sea service in rank but was not in
possession of evidence of ship handling training, designed to meet the
objective of STCW Code B-Va, provided through an in-house competency
development programme or a shore-based training course.
• The Master had been reassigned to a vessel identified by the company as
having significantly different handling characteristics within the previous
twelve months of sea service but was not in possession of evidence of ship
handling training, relevant to the new vessel’s characteristics, designed to
meet the objective of STCW Code B-Va, provided through an in-house
competency development programme or a shore-based training course

3.3.3. Had the Master, deck officers, and cargo/gas engineer where carried,
attended a shore-based simulator course covering routine and emergency
cargo operations within the previous five years?
This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had declared
through the pre-inspection questionnaire that the Master, all deck officers
and cargo/gas engineers onboard at the time of inspection had attended a
shore- based cargo operations simulator course applicable to the vessel
type within the previous five years.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The Master and/or any one of the deck officers or cargo/gas engineers
onboard during the inspection did not have evidence of attending either a full
or refresher cargo system simulator training course within the previous five
years.
• The training courses attended by the Master and/or any one of the deck
officers or cargo/gas engineers was for a vessel type other than the type of
vessel being inspected.

3.3.4. Had the Chief Engineer and all engineer officers attended a shore-
based engine room management simulator course covering routine and
emergency machinery operations within the previous five years?

This question will only be generated when the vessel operator has
indicated that the Chief Engineer and all engineer officers onboard at the
time of inspection had attended a shore-based engine room management
simulator course within the previous five years. The course should cover
routine and emergency machinery operations for the type of main
propulsion onboard the vessel.
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The Chief Engineer and/or any one of the engineer officers onboard during
the inspection did not have evidence of attending either a full or refresher
engine room management simulator course within the previous five years.
• The training courses attended by the Chief Engineer and/or any one of the
engineer officers was for a propulsion type other than the type fitted to the
vessel being inspected.

3.4. Crew Compliance

3.4.1. Was there an effective system in place to record and monitor the
hours of rest for all personnel onboard in compliance with STCW, MLC or
the regulatory requirements applicable to the vessel?

QMS : 01N.05.08.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure that defined how hours of rest were to be
managed and recorded.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure that
defined how hours of rest were to be managed and recorded and/or the
process for recording and monitoring hours of rest and any nonconformance.
• The hours of rest records were not in the ILO/MLC format which clearly
identified the hours of rest conformance in any twenty-four hour or seven-day
period.
• Physically or digitally signed hours of rest records were not available for all
crew members onboard which had been approved by the Master or their
authorised representative.
Reviewed of hours of rest records indicated that personnel had not completed
the hours of rest records to accurately reflect their work and rest hours.
• There was no evidence of hours of rest conformance/non-conformance
calculations.
• There was no evidence that shore management was informed at least
monthly of hours of rest conformance levels on board.
• There was no evidence that the shore-based management had
acknowledged significant levels of hours of rest non-conformance.

3.4.2. Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the company policy
and procedures for drug and alcohol abuse prevention and had
unannounced drug and alcohol testing taken place onboard in accordance
with the policy?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company policy or supporting procedures for the prevention of
abuse of drugs and alcohol.
• The company policy to prevent the abuse of drugs and alcohol was not
prominently displayed at appropriate locations onboard.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company policy or
supporting procedures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and alcohol.
• The accompanying officer or responsible individual was unfamiliar with the
use and testing of the alcohol breath testing device.
• The vessel did not have a breath testing device.
• The breath testing device was defective.
• The onboard supply of consumable test pieces was insufficient for the
resupply period.
• The breath testing device had not been tested or calibrated in accordance
with the company procedure or manufacturer’s instructions.
• The onboard supply of alcohol had not been administered and/or
documented in accordance with company procedure.
• Records indicated that issue of alcohol had exceeded the permitted
allowance to an individual on any single day.
• Company initiated unannounced alcohol testing had not been completed at
the frequency required by the company procedure.
• The interval between company initiated unannounced alcohol tests was
more than six months.
• The records of company initiated unannounced alcohol testing indicated that
not all personnel onboard at the time of the test had been tested or the tests
had not been completed within the required timeframe.
• The records of unannounced drug screening indicated that samples had not
been collected and analysed from all persons onboard at the time of the
screening.
• The records of unannounced drug screening indicated that the frequency of
the screening was not in accordance with the company procedure.
The interval between unannounced drug screenings was greater than twelve
months.
• The vessel did not have the stipulated number of drug screening sample
collection kits where these were required by the company procedure.
• Where an incident had taken place, there were no records of post incident
drug and alcohol tests having taken place where required to be carried out by
the company drug and alcohol abuse prevention policy
3.5. Crew Familiarisation

3.5.1. Had the company developed an effective familiarisation programme

that covered the personal safety and professional responsibilities of all
onboard personnel, including visitors and contractors, and were records
available to demonstrate that the familiarisation had been completed as
required?

QMS : 01N.05.10.01 05N-50 – TO CHECK PART I FOR TECHNICIANS

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the familiarisation process
for onboard staff, contractors and visitors.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company familiarisation
procedure and/or processes.
• Familiarisation records, in accordance with the company procedure, were
not available for any one of the selected personnel.
• Evidence was available that contractors, as defined by company procedures,
had worked onboard but there was no documented record of their
familiarisation prior to commencing work.
• The necessary familiarisation had not been carried out within the required
time frame or prior to the crewmember starting the first duty period utilising
the equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The familiarisation process did not address the principal safety,
environmental, navigation, cargo, mooring and propulsion machinery and
equipment fitted to the vessel relevant to an individual role.
• An officer or crew member demonstrated a poor understanding or familiarity
with key equipment or systems under their responsibility during the balance of
the inspection - which resulted in an observation under another question.

3.5.2. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the ship’s
lifesaving and fire extinguishing appliances and, had ongoing onboard
training and instruction taken place to maintain familiarity?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the requirement for
delivering and recording ongoing training and instruction for each piece of LSA
& FFA provided onboard.
• The fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet or lifesaving manuals
were not written in the working language of the ship.
• The fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet or lifesaving manual
were not provided in each crew mess room and recreation room, or in each
crew cabin.
• The fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet or lifesaving manuals
were not updated to reflect the LSA & FFA provided onboard.
• The onboard training and instruction records did not include all items of LSA,
including survival craft equipment, and FFA, including fixed firefighting
installations, provided onboard.
• There was no process to track that each crewmember had received training
and instruction in each piece of LSA & FFA carried onboard within the
timeframes defined within SOLAS.
• Onboard training and instruction had not been completed for all crew within
the timeframes defined by SOLAS.
• Onboard training and instruction in the use of davit-launched liferafts, where
carried, had not been completed within the previous four months.
• There were no instructions available for the safe use of a “training liferaft”,
where one was carried.
• The training liferaft, where carried, was not conspicuously marked as such.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
conducting and recording ongoing training and instruction in the use of the
ship’s LSA & FFA.
• An interviewed officer or rating was unfamiliar with the use, operation or
safety considerations of any piece of LSA or FFA provided onboard.
 3.5.3. Had the Master and navigation officers been familiarised with the
ECDIS equipment installed on board and were documented records of this
familiarisation available?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures that ensured all watchkeeping officers
are competent in the use of the onboard ECDIS prior to taking charge of a
navigational watch, that included the:
o Time scale for the familiarisation.
o Method of familiarisation with the ECDIS equipment.
o Location of the familiarisation, on board or ashore.
o Identity of the appropriately trained crew or training personnel authorised to
deliver the familiarisation.
o Means of demonstrating competency upon completion of the familiarisation
and before taking charge of a navigational watch.
o Records to be maintained.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures that
ensured that the Master and all watchkeeping officers are competent in the
use of the onboard ECDIS prior to taking charge of a navigational watch.
• The accompanying officer was found to be unfamiliar with the onboard ECDIS
installation through review of items contained within the onboard ECDIS
installation familiarisation checklist.
• The Master and/or deck officer(s) had not received approved training on
ECDIS indicated by a limitation being included on the certificate of competency
and endorsements issued to the seafarer.
• The Master and/or deck officer(s) had not been familiarised with the ECDIS
equipment installed on board in accordance with company procedures.
• There were no records available, or records were incomplete, of the
familiarisation of the Master and deck officers with the ECDIS equipment
installed on board.
• There was evidence that the Master or a deck officer had taken charge of a
navigational watch prior to being familiarised with the ECDIS equipment
installed on board.
• The onboard ECDIS installation familiarisation checklist did not substantially
cover the items included in the familiarisation checklist included as an annex to
the Nautical Institute paper “ECDIS - Industry Recommendations for ECDIS
Familiarisation”.
Do not give an observation if there is no Flag Administration approved ECDIS
type specific training certificate available.

4. Navigation and Communications.

4.1 Navigation Equipment
4.1.1. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for the set up and operation of the ECDIS units fitted to the
vessel and were records available to demonstrate that the ECDIS had been
operated in accordance with company procedures at all stages of a voyage?

QMS : 01N.04.02.04 /01N.04.02.10/ 01N.04.02.11 / 01N.04.03.01

04N-045
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for operating and managing the ECDIS
fitted.
• The company procedures did not provide clear guidance regarding:
o Display management
o Alarms & warnings.
o Safety contours and depths.
o Safety frame or safety cone.
o Route checking.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company ECDIS
management and operation procedures.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the operation of
the ECDIS units fitted to the vessel
• An ECDIS unit was defective in any respect. (Where the vessel carried an
additional ECDIS in excess of the ECDIS carriage requirements then record as a
comment providing an entry had been made in the defect reporting system.
Indicate the number of ECDIS required to be carried and the total fitted
onboard.)
• The second ECDIS, where required to be fitted, was not set up as a backup
unit.
• There was evidence that ECDIS settings had been incorrectly entered at any
stage of a voyage.
• There was no indication in the passage plan regarding required changes to
ECDIS settings.

4.1.2. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the
vessel, and were records available to demonstrate that the units had been
operated and tested in accordance with company procedures?

QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 01N.04.03.10 / 411.0110.02 / 411.0120.02

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for managing and operating the
radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the
vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the hazards of using
AIS data (vectors) for collision avoidance.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the difference
between the performance characteristics of X-band (9 GHz) and S-band (3 GHz)
radars.
• The radar/ARPA units had not been in operation in accordance with company
procedures.
• The radar/ARPA units had not been tested in accordance with company
procedures.
• The radar/ARPA units were defective in any respect.
• The heading, speed or positional feeds to the radar/ARPA units were
inaccurate when compared to the master devices.
• There was no indication of the scanner blind sectors affecting the radar
coverage for each radar unit.
• The radar magnetrons had not been changed in accordance with the planned
maintenance schedule.

4.1.3. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for operating and testing the steering control systems fitted to
the vessel and were records available to demonstrate that operation and
testing had been carried out in accordance with the procedures?

QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 01N.04.03.03 / 01N.04.03.04 / 01N.04.03.15

01N.04.03.16
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for managing, testing and operating
steering control systems fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for managing, testing and operating the steering control systems
fitted to the vessel.
The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the changeover
procedure between modes of steering control or action to take when steering
system alarms activate.
• Simple operating instructions with a block diagram showing the change-over
procedures for remote steering gear control systems and steering gear power
units were not permanently displayed on the navigation bridge
• The steering control systems had not been operated or tested in accordance
with the company procedure.
• The steering control systems were defective in any respect.

4.1.4. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for using the Automatic Identification System (AIS) fitted to the
vessel and were records available to confirm that periodic checks and tests
had been carried out in accordance with the procedures?

QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 417.5020.01

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no procedures for the operation and testing of the AIS system
fitted onboard.
• There was no company guidance related to the use of AIS information in
collision avoidance situations
The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedures for the operation and testing of the AIS system fitted onboard
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
guidance related to the use of AIS information in collision avoidance situations.
• There were no records of the checks and performance tests required to be
carried out on the AIS equipment fitted.
• The AIS unit was defective in any respect.
• There was as an error in the navigational data feeds to the AIS unit.
• The vessel static data was incorrectly entered in the AIS unit.
• While alongside a terminal or port area where hydrocarbon gases may be
present, the AIS was not switched off, or the aerial isolated and the AIS given a
dummy load (unless at the request of the shore authorities).

4.1.5. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedure for the use of the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System
(BNWAS) and were records available to demonstrate that it had been
operated and tested in accordance with the procedure?

QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 417.5034.01 / 417.5034.02

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for operating and testing the Bridge
Navigation Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for the operation and testing of the BNWAS.
• The BNWAS was defective in any respect.
• The password or activation key was available to others beyond the Master
and their authorised deputy.
• There were no records available to confirm that the BNWAS had been in
operation in accordance with company procedures.
There were no records available to confirm that the BNWAS had been tested in
accordance with company procedures.
• There was evidence that modifications or adaptions designed to defeat the
BNWAS were in use.
 4.1.6. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures governing the management and operation of the Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers fitted onboard and was the
fitted equipment configured, used and checked in accordance with the
procedure?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 01N.04.03.10
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for operating and managing the GNSS
receivers fitted.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the GNSS receiver
management and operation procedures, or the equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The GNSS receiver(s) were not configured in accordance with company
requirements, or the antennae coordinates were incorrectly entered.
• Periodic checks and tests had not been carried out in accordance with
procedures.
• A GNSS receiver was defective in any respect.
• The positional data provided to another piece of navigation or
communication equipment such as AIS, ARPA or a GMDSS transceiver was
erroneous.

4.1.7. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for operating and managing the echo sounder and were records
maintained to demonstrate that the equipment fitted to the vessel had
been tested and operated in accordance with the company expectations?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 414.0100.01

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no procedures for managing and operating the echo sounder and
its associated recording device.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedures for managing and operating the echo sounder and its associated
recording device.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process to
calculate the depth under the keel and verify the accuracy of the echo
sounder.
• The echo sounder had not been operated or tested in accordance with the
company procedures and manufacturer’s instructions.
• The echo sounder was not showing the expected depth indication under the
keel at the time of the inspection.
• The echo sounder or recording device was defective in any respect.
• The echo sounder depth alarm had not been set in accordance with the
company procedures.

4.1.8. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for the operation and testing of the speed and distance
measuring devices fitted to the vessel and were records available to
demonstrate that periodic tests had been completed as required by the
procedures?
QMS: 01N.04.02.04 / 414.5000.01 / 414.5000.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for the operation and testing of the speed
and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company
procedures for the operation and testing of the speed and distance measuring
devices fitted to the vessel.
• Periodic tests to verify the accuracy and/functionality of the speed and
distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel required by the company
procedures had not been completed as required.
• Periodic checks to verify the accuracy of the speed input to navigational
equipment had not been completed in accordance with company procedures.
• The speed values displayed by remote display units and ARPA, AIS or ECDIS
units were inconsistent with the master water speed and or dual axis logs as
appropriate.
A speed and distance measuring device fitted to the vessel was defective in any
respect.

4.1.9. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for the use and testing of the navigation lights and shapes, and
was there evidence that the navigation lights had been tested to confirm
full functionality and correct visibility?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 427.4400.01 / 427.4400.02

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure defining the checks and tests required to
be carried out on the navigational lights, the navigational light controller and
navigational shapes.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for conducting checks and tests on the navigation lights, the
navigation light controller or navigational shapes.
• The navigation lights and navigation light controller had not been tested in
accordance with the company procedure.
• The navigation lights or navigation light controller were defective in any
respect. (a single bulb failure on a single light would not generate an
observation).
• Navigation lights or their screens were damaged, relocated or obscured in
such a way that the required spacing and/or arc of visibility of any lights was
apparently no longer in compliance with COLREG Annex 1 requirements.
• The required navigational shapes were not onboard or were in an unusable
condition.
• Portable navigation lights, where required to be carried, were defective or
not ready for rigging.
• The vessel did not have an inventory of spare lamps for each type and
luminosity of navigation light fitted.
• The inventory of spare lamps did not conform to the navigation light
manufacturer’s specifications. (incorrect size, focal plane, luminosity, wattage
or type).
• Procedures did not include guidance on the use of LED lamps, where fitted.
• There was no effective method of ensuring LED lamps were within their
usable lifespan for luminous intensity
• LED lamps were in use beyond the lifespan specified by the manufacturer or
were in an alarm condition for reduced luminous intensity.

4.1.10. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedure for managing Marine Safety Information broadcasts by NAVTEX
and SafetyNET and were warnings affecting the vessel’s route plotted on
the voyage charts?
QMS : 01N.04.02.05 / 01N.04.03.01
There was no company procedure for managing Marine Safety Information
received through NAVTEX and SafetyNET.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for managing Marine Safety Information received through NAVTEX
and SafetyNET, or the equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The NAVTEX and/or SafetyNET EGC receiver was defective in any respect.
• The NAVTEX receiver was not programmed to receive Marine Safety
Information broadcasts from coast radio stations appropriate to the vessel’s
route.
• The SafetyNET EGC receiver was not programmed to receive Marine Safety
Information broadcasts for NAVAREAs and Coastal Warning Areas appropriate
to the vessel’s route.
• The Marine Safety Information messages received through NAVTEX and
SafetyNET had not been acknowledged and filed in accordance with the
company procedure.

4.1.11. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
 procedure for preserving data from the VDR/S-VDR and were records
available to demonstrate that tests of the equipment had been completed
as required?
QMS : 01N.02.03.02 / 01N.04.02.04
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedure which governed the setup, use and
testing of the VDR / S-VDR system fitted onboard the vessel.
• There was no company procedure which clearly defined the company
expectation for data preservation in the event of an incident onboard.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedures for VDR / S-VDR management and data preservation.
• The VDR / S-VDR was defective in any respect.
• Annual performance checks by an authorised service agent or facility had not
been carried out.
The VDR / S-VDR had not been tested as per maker's instruction after any
upgrade, maintenance or repair of the VDR / S-VDR itself.
• The VDR / S-VDR had not been tested as per maker's instruction after any
upgrade, maintenance or repair of navigational or communications equipment
providing data feeds.
• The declaration made within the pre-inspection questionnaire relating to the
VDR / S-VDR data retention period was less than required.
o If installed before 1st July 2014, minimum 12 hours before being overwritten.
o If installed after 1st July 2014, minimum of 720 hours before being
overwritten.

4.1.12. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures relating to the magnetic and gyro compasses carried onboard,
and were records available to demonstrate their accuracy and reliability?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for managing the standard magnetic,
gyro and GNSS compasses as applicable.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedures, or the equipment fitted to the vessel.
• A record of compass error for each compass fitted to the vessel was not
maintained as required by the company procedure.
• The compass error log book recorded a deviation of the standard magnetic
compass consistently exceeding the tolerance permitted by the company
procedure as compared to the deviation certificate from the previous official
compass adjustment.
• The heading shown by a compass, or a repeater, was erroneous.
• Where required, manual speed and latitude corrections for a gyro compass
were incorrectly set.
• A standard magnetic, gyro or GNSS compass was defective in any respect.
• The service records for a gyro compass indicated that periodic service was
overdue by more than 5% of the service interval.

4.1.13. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for the operation and testing of the VHF/DSC transceivers fitted
to the vessel, and were records available to demonstrate that periodic tests
and checks had been completed in accordance with company expectations?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the expectations for the use
and periodic testing of the VHF/DSC units fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for the use or testing of the VHF/DSC units fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the operation of
the VHF/DSC units fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the hazards and
limitations of using VHF radio during collision avoidance situations.
• Records indicated that periodic checks and tests required to be carried out
for the VHF/DSC units had not been completed as required by the company
procedure.
• Records indicated that details of critical communications had not been
documented as required by company procedures.
• Records indicated that the vessel had not been monitoring the correct VHF
channels as required by SOLAS, company expectations and as identified within
the passage plan.
• The VHF and/or DSC units fitted to the vessel were defective in any respect.
• The static and/or dynamic data displayed by the VHF and/or DSC units were
inaccurate.
• Where multiple VHF units were fitted on the bridge which were not all
connected to the VDR, there was no indication of which units were connected
and no instructions restricting the use of non-connected units for critical
communications.

4.1.14. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedure for testing and using the daylight signalling lamp?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / 427.4310.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no procedure which defined the company expectations for the use
and testing of the daylight signalling lamp.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for the use and testing of the daylight signalling lamp.
• The daylight signalling lamp was defective in any respect.
• There were less than three spare bulbs on board and/or the spare bulbs did
not meet the manufacturer’s specifications.
 4.1.15. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for the use and testing of the sound signaling equipment fitted
to the vessel and were records available to confirm that periodic tests had
been completed and the equipment used in accordance with company
expectations?

QMS : 01N.04.03.10 / 01N.04.02.08 / 01N.04.04.07 / 01N.04.04.08

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the company expectation
for the use of sound signals during restricted visibility, collision avoidance and
manoeuvring in compliance with the COLREGs.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
expectation for the use of sound signals during restricted visibility, collision
avoidance and manoeuvring in compliance with the COLREGs.
• There were no records available to demonstrate that the sound signalling
equipment and any automation provided had been periodically tested to verify
its effectiveness and compliance with the COLREGs.
• The sound signalling equipment, or its automation, was defective in any way.
• There was no documented evidence that the sound signalling equipment had
been used in accordance with the COLREGs during periods of restricted
visibility
4.2. Navigational Procedures

4.2.1. Were the Master and navigating officers familiar with the company
passage planning procedures and had all voyages been appraised, planned,
executed and monitored in accordance with company procedures, industry
best practice and both local and international rules?
QMS : 01N.04.03.01 / 01N.04.03.09 / 04N.045

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company passage planning procedures.
• There were no company record keeping procedures relating to navigational
activities.
• The accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company
passage planning or navigational record keeping procedures.
• There was no standard passage planning form which required the passage
plan to be documented in a consistent manner, capturing all data identified
within the procedures.
• There was no passage plan appraisal form / checklist to verify that all
information pertinent to the passage had been considered.
• The passage was planned or executed in clear contravention to collision
regulations, company navigation procedures or guidance provided on the
charts, routing guides or sailing directions.
• The charted passage plan did not include all pertinent information required
to be displayed in accordance with the company procedures.
• The passage plan was not reviewed and approved in accordance with
company procedures.
• Route checking and scanning had not been conducted prior to commencing a
voyage or when a planned voyage had been changed or updated.
• The passage plan was not substantially followed, such as passing an island or
navigational mark on the unplanned side, unless the passage plan identified
alternative routes for contingency use.
• The vessel’s position was not manually fixed in accordance with company
navigational procedures and the planned position fixing method and interval.
• Records of the progress of a voyage had not been maintained in accordance
with company procedures.

4.2.2. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
under keel clearance (UKC) policy and procedure, and were records
available to demonstrate that the required calculations had been
completed at the appropriate points during each voyage and the vessel had
remained in compliance with the UKC policy?
QMS : 01N.04.02.01 / 01N.04.03.01 / 04N.045
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no procedure defining the company under keel clearance (UKC)
policy and expectations for conducting UKC calculations at defined stages of
the voyage.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure for
conducting and documenting UKC calculations.
• Review of records indicated that the UKC calculations required to be carried
out by the company procedures had not been completed.
• Review of records indicated that the UKC policy had been violated without
explicit permission from the vessel operator.
• Review of sample calculations indicated that they had not been carried out
for the predicted time of passing a critical hydrographic feature as set out in
the passage plan.
• Review of sample calculations indicated that the speed used for calculation
had been exceeded by more than 10% when actually passing the critical
hydrographic feature.
• Review of sample calculations determined that an error had been made in
either the source data or resulting calculation when passing a critical
hydrographic feature.
• There was no evidence that UKC calculations had been reviewed during the
Master/Pilot information exchange.
• Squat information relevant to the vessel for both loaded and ballast passages
was not readily available on the bridge

4.2.3. Had the Master prepared Master's Standing Orders, supplemented by

Daily Orders, which emphasised and reinforced the company expectations
with regards to navigational requirements including restricted visibility,
CPA/BCR and minimum passing distance from navigational dangers and
navigational aids and, if so, had all navigation officers signed to
acknowledge their understanding of the same?
QMS : O1N.04.02.07 / 04N-020
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no procedure which required the Master to prepare Standing or
Daily Orders.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the content of the Master’s
Standing or Daily Orders.
• The Master had not prepared their own Standing Orders which were signed
and dated on being assigned to the vessel or at subsequent update.
• The navigation officers onboard at the time of the inspection had not signed
the Master's Standing Orders (unless they had only joined that day).
• The content of the Master’s Standing Orders degraded the company
expectations documented anywhere within the Safety Management System.
• The content of the Master's Daily Orders degraded the company
expectations documented anywhere within the Safety Management System.
• The Standing Orders did not define the Master’s expectations in respect of:
•o What was considered to be restricted visibility and the actions to take on
encountering it.
o Minimum CPA/BCR permitted during normal* navigational watches.
o Minimum passing distances from navigational dangers and/or navigational
aids during normal* navigational watches.
o How the alarms and layers for use with ECDIS/ECS were required to be set,
checked and in what circumstances they may be changed
o Calling the Master.
o The process for the Master to formally take the con of the vessel from the
officer of the watch.
o The hazards and limitations of reliance on AIS and VHF in collision avoidance
situations.
• The Master had not prepared Daily Orders which were signed, dated and
timed, to supplement their Standing Orders.
• The Master’s Daily Orders did not address the navigational concerns or
preparations relevant to the period under review.
• An OOW had not signed the Master’s Daily Orders for understanding.
• Review of any onboard records indicated that instructions contained within
the Master’s Standing or Daily Orders had not been followed.

4.2.4. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
electronic chart management procedures and were onboard ENCs and RNCs
managed, corrected and used appropriately?
QMS : 01N.04.02.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for managing ENCs and RNCs
• The declaration relating to the primary means of navigation was incorrect
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the electronic chart
management and correction procedures.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process for
applying T&P notices to ENCs and RNCs.
• There was no onboard management system to track the permits held by the
vessel for ENCs and RNCs.
• Individual ENC or RNC permits had expired prior to or during the predicted
phase of a voyage.
• The vessel had completed a voyage with missing ENC or RNC coverage.
• The vessel had not updated the ENCs and RNCs to the latest available notice
to mariners (subject to a reasonable allowance for vessel activities and
workload).
• A vessel had completed a part of a voyage with RNCs when ENCs were
available for the area in question.
• The vessels had operated in RCDS mode without availability of an
appropriate folio of up to date paper charts.
• There was no onboard management system to track Notices to Mariners
corrections applied to ENCs and RNCs.

4.2.5. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
paper chart management procedures and were onboard paper charts
managed, corrected and used appropriately?
QMS : 01N.04.04.04
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for managing paper charts.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the paper chart
management and correction procedures.
• The vessel had completed a voyage with missing or inappropriate scale
charts without any evidence that the company had been involved in identifying
mitigating actions.
• There was no systematic process to apply and remove T&P notices and
NAVTEX and NAVAREA warnings.
• The vessel had not updated voyage paper charts to the latest available
Notice to Mariners (subject to a reasonable allowance for vessel activities and
workload) or had used outdated editions.
• Paper charts in use were torn, stained or worn such that detail was likely to
be obscured from the user.
Where the vessel is fitted with ECDIS as both the primary and back up means
of navigation chart provision, and no paper charts at all are carried, then select
“Not Answerable” in each of the response tools then select "Not Applicable -
as instructed by question guidance".

4.2.6. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for testing the navigational equipment, main propulsion,
steering gear and thrusters prior to use and prior to critical phases of a
passage or operation and, did checklists or logbook entries confirm the
required tests had been completed as required?
QMS : 01N.04.03.03 / 01N.04.03.04 / 01N.04.03.15 / 01N.04.03.16
Pilot card (DNV)

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no procedure that required navigational equipment and
manoeuvring equipment to be functionally tested at defined points prior to
and during a voyage or operation.
• The accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company
procedures for testing navigational equipment and manoeuvring equipment.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any check or test required to
be carried out according to the company navigational and manoeuvring
equipment checklist(s).
• There was no evidence that the timing of the rudder movement from hard-
over to hard-over, using each steering gear power unit singly and together, had
been checked to ensure consistency with previous tests and the
Manufacturer’s specification.
• Tests required to be carried out by the company procedure had not been
completed as required.
• There was no evidence that the governing administration had issued an
appropriate waiver for a vessel on frequent voyages of short duration, where
tests were not being carried out within 12 hours prior to departure.
• Defects with navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery identified
through the testing process, which could not be immediately corrected by
onboard staff, had not been entered into the vessel’s defect reporting system.
Where a defect(s) with an item of navigational and/or manoeuvring equipment
had been identified during these tests but had NOT been rectified at the time
of inspection:
• Create a negative observation in the Hardware response tool for this
question 4.2.6, and
• Create a negative observation in the Hardware response tool of the question
relating to the particular equipment if it is included in the CVIQ for the
inspection.

4.2.7. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedure for the carriage and management of nautical publications and
was evidence available to demonstrate that publications had been
managed in accordance with the procedure?
QMS : 01N.04.02.05 / 128.0200.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for managing, ordering and updating
nautical publications.
• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for managing, ordering and updating nautical publications.
• There was no inventory of mandatory and discretionary nautical publications
required to be carried.
• Nautical publications required to be carried, in either electronic or hard copy,
in accordance with the company procedure were found to be missing, obsolete
or uncorrected.
• Where electronic nautical publications were carried, there was no evidence
that the publications were approved by flag or that the required back up
publications were available and maintained as required.
4.3. Bridge and Machinery Space Team Management
4.3.1. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures defining the minimum bridge team composition and engine
room operating mode and were records available to demonstrate that
recent voyages had been planned and executed in accordance with
company expectations?
QMS : 120N-044 / 04N-045 / 01N.04.02.04 / 01N.04.02.10
There was no procedure defining the required bridge team composition during
all stages of a voyage, including while at anchor, drifting, or conducting “at
sea” STS operations, DP operations or underway storing/personnel transfer
operations, considering traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards,
weather conditions and visibility.
• There was no procedure defining the engine room status, and when required
to be manned the engine room team composition, during all stages of a voyage
including while at anchor or drifting, or conducting “at sea” STS operations, DP
operations or underway storing/personnel transfer operations, considering
traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards, weather conditions and
visibility.
• The accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company
procedures which defined the required bridge team composition and engine
room operating mode at all stages of the voyage.
• The company procedure was ambiguous with regards to the need for hand
steering in any defined watch composition.
• The passage plan did not identify the required bridge team composition for
all stages of a voyage.
• The passage plan did not identify the required engine room operating mode
for all stages of a voyage.
• The reviewed passage plan(s) incorrectly identified the required bridge team
composition or machinery space operating mode as defined by company
procedure at any stage of a voyage.
• Records indicated that the required bridge team composition, as
documented within the passage plan, was not complied with at any single
stage of a voyage.
• Records indicated that the bridge had been operated with the officer of the
watch as the sole lookout in contravention to company procedures at any
stage of a voyage.
• Records indicated that the required engine room operating mode, as
documented within the passage plan, was not complied with at any stage of a
voyage.
• Changes in the bridge team composition from one level to another and the
times of each change were not recorded in the log book or bell book

4.3.2. Were the engineer officers familiar with the company procedures
defining machinery space operating mode and, where required to be
attended, the machinery space team composition during the various stages
of a voyage, and were records available to confirm the machinery space had
been operated accordingly?
QMS : 120N-044 / 04N-045
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no procedure defining company expectations for operating the
machinery space in either the unattended or attended mode considering traffic
density, proximity to navigational hazards and state of visibility and, other
operations such as at while at anchor, drifting, “at sea” STS operations,
Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel
transfer operations.
• There was no company procedure which defined the required machinery
space team composition considering traffic density, proximity to navigational
hazards and environmental conditions.
• The accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the company
procedures which defined the expectations for the operating status of the
machinery space or when required to be attended, the machinery space team
composition.
• The required machinery space status had not been communicated to
engineering staff to permit effective resource management.
• Records indicated that the required machinery space status, as documented
within the passage plan, was not complied with at any stage of a voyage.
• Records indicated that when operating in the attended status for
navigational purposes, the machinery space team composition was not in
accordance with the company procedure.
• Records of the machinery space status or team composition were not
available.

4.3.3. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures for integrating a pilot (or similar role*) into the bridge team and
were records available to demonstrate that the process had been followed?
QMS : 01N.04.03.07 / Pilot card (DNV) / Wheel house poster

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no procedure for integrating a pilot* into the bridge team.
• The vessel operator had not developed Master/Pilot information and/or pilot
card checklists for use onboard.
• The accompanying navigation officer was not fully familiar with the company
procedure for integrating a pilot* into the bridge team.
• The accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the practical
requirements for each item included on the Master/Pilot information and/or
pilot card checklists.
• The Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists were not available
for all operations where a pilot* was engaged.
• The Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists reviewed were
either missing, incomplete or contained erroneous safety related information
pertinent to the operations being undertaken.
• The time of the completion of the Master/Pilot information exchange was
not recorded for the operation(s) reviewed.
• The times of the transfer of the conn between the Master and pilot, between
pilots and between the Pilot and Master, as applicable, were not recorded.
• Defective equipment affecting safe navigation, manoeuvring or mooring
operations, where it existed, had not been recorded on the pilot card checklist
for the reviewed operations.

4.3.4. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company
procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge, and were
these procedures being complied with?
QMS : 01N.05.04.15 / 120N-055
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on
the bridge including guidance on:
o Bridge access by personnel with no operational bridge responsibilities.
o The use of mobile phones and other personal electronic devices.
o Internal and external communications.
o Non-essential activity.
o Internet and email access on the bridge.
o The effective management of the bridge space where it was combined with
the cargo and/or machinery control and monitoring functions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge.
• There was evidence of non-compliance with the company procedures to
prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge – give details.
Where a multifunctional bridge space was provided, an observation should not
be made relating to non-navigational activities occurring on the bridge
provided that:
• The company procedure specifically addressed the management of potential
distractions to the bridge team resulting from the operation and monitoring of
the cargo and/or machinery systems.
• The bridge space was laid out and divided up such that the operation and
monitoring of the cargo and/or machinery systems could be undertaken
without distraction to the bridge team.

4.4. Communications Equipment and Procedures

4.4.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the
Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) and was the EPIRB in
good order with records available to demonstrate that had it been inspected,
tested and maintained as required?
QMS : 422.0710 / GMDSS logbook

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and
testing of the EPIRB.
• The accompanying officer was unable to explain:
o How to perform the self-test.
o The procedure to follow if the EPIRB was accidentally activated in a non-
emergency situation.
o How to manually operate the EPIRB.
• The EPIRB was not:
o Armed and ready for automatic activation.
o Capable of floating-free unimpeded or being easily manually released.
o Clearly marked with the required information and operating instructions.
o Free of visible defects, signs of damage, degradation or cracks to the casing,
or of water ingress.
• The EPIRB battery was past its expiry date
• The hydrostatic release was not in good order or past its expiry date.
• The lanyard was:
o Tied to the vessel or the mounting bracket.
o Not in good condition and neatly stowed.
• Records were incomplete for:
o Periodic inspections and self-tests of the EPIRB
o Annual tests for all aspects of operational efficiency.
o Five-yearly maintenance at an approved shore-based maintenance facility (or
more frequent if required by the flag state).
• The EPIRB was defective in any respect.
• There was no beacon operating instructions manual available.
• There were no pictorial instructions for manual operation visible at the
location of the beacon.

4.4.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the Search
and Rescue Transmitters (SARTs), and were the SARTs in good order with
records available to demonstrate that had they had been inspected and
tested as required?
QMS : 422.2020 /GMDSS logbook
There was no company procedure to ensure that SARTs were periodically
inspected, tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and operation of
the SARTs.
• The accompanying officer was unable to explain/demonstrate how to mount
a SART on a lifeboat or liferaft.
• The accompanying officer was unable to describe how a SART transmission
would be displayed on a radar screen.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and
testing of the SARTs.
• The accompanying officer was unable to explain how to perform the self-
tests on the SART units provided onboard.
• The stowage location(s) of SARTs were not clearly marked with the
recommended symbols.
• A SART was not clearly marked with the required operating and/or testing
instructions.
• A SART battery was past its expiry date.
• The lanyard was missing from a SART.
• Records of periodic inspections and self-tests of the SARTs were incomplete.
• One or more SART was not located as required.
• One or more SART was defective in any respect.

4.4.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios and were they in
good order with records available to demonstrate that had they been
inspected and tested as required?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / GMDSS logbook / 422.0200

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure to ensure that survival craft portable two-
way VHF radios were periodically inspected, tested and ready for immediate
use in an emergency.
• Company procedures did not provide guidance on the use of the survival
craft portable two-way VHF radios for non-emergency communications.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and operation of
the survival craft portable twoway VHF radios.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and
testing of the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios.
• There were insufficient survival craft portable two-way VHF radios on board.
• The stowage location of survival craft portable two-way VHF radios was not
clearly marked with the recommended symbols and the number of radios.
• Survival craft portable two-way vhf radios or replaceable primary batteries
were not of a highly visible yellow/orange colour or marking.
• A survival craft portable two-way VHF radio was not clearly marked with the
required operating instructions.
• A survival craft portable two-way VHF radio battery was past its expiry date.
• The seal on a replaceable primary battery or radio was broken.
• Other batteries were not clearly distinguished from primary batteries by
colour or marking.
• A survival craft portable two-way VHF radio did not have provision for
attachment to clothing.
• A survival craft portable two-way VHF radio did not have a wrist or neck strap
with a weak link.
• Records of periodic inspections and tests of the survival craft portable two-
way VHF radios were incomplete.
• The survival craft portable two-way VHF radios were defective in any respect.

4.4.4. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the procedures
for sending and receiving distress, urgency and safety messages and were
suitable instructions posted by the GMDSS equipment?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for emergency communications which
gave guidance on, and designated responsibility for, distress communications
in an emergency situation.
• A qualified GMDSS operator had not been designated in the emergency
station bill as being responsible for radio communications in a distress.
• Instructions for the preparation and transmission of distress and urgency
messages using the GMDSS equipment were not clearly displayed by the
equipment.
• There was no copy of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search
and Rescue Manual Volume III, latest edition, (IAMSAR Vol III) available at the
GMDSS radio station.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the:
o Company procedures for emergency communications which gave guidance
on distress communications in an emergency situation.
o Requirements for GMDSS radio watchkeeping on their vessel.
o Procedures for sending distress, urgency and safety messages contained in
the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual
Volume III, (IAMSAR Vol III), Section 4.
o Process of preparing and transmitting distress and urgency messages using
the GMDSS equipment.
o The process for recording the details of distress, urgency and safety
messages received.

4.4.5. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the operation,
testing and maintenance of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite
communications equipment and were records available to demonstrate the
equipment was in good order?
QMS : 01N.04.02.04 / GMDSS logbook / 866.0116.01 (GMDSS batteries)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance
and log keeping of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite
communications equipment.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the GMDSS
VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment.
• The accompanying officer was unable to describe the daily, weekly and
monthly radio tests required in accordance with the SMS (including flag state
requirements) and the manufacturers’ maintenance and operation manuals.
• There was no evidence that the required daily, weekly and monthly radio
tests had been performed.
• The GMDSS reserve batteries were not charging correctly.
• There was no evidence that the capacity of the GMDSS reserve batteries had
been tested within the last 12 months.
• The GMDSS reserve battery locker:
o Contained damaged batteries.
o Was not weather tight.
o Was not properly ventilated.
o Contained inappropriate material.
• Goggles, rubber gloves, a protective apron and an eye-wash bottle were not
available in the GMDSS reserve battery locker where lead-acid/alkaline
batteries were installed.
• The GMDSS Radio Log Book did not provide a record of all events connected
with the radio communications facilities on board including:
• There was no evidence of a shore-based maintenance programme to ensure
availability of the radio equipment where this was one of the documented
maintenance choices for the vessel, or the certificate had expired.
• An item of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications
equipment was not operational or defective in any respect.
• A GMDSS printer was defective, printouts were unreadable or there were no
paper rolls available.
• GMDSS equipment aerials or antennae were in poor condition, damaged or
defective in any way.
• The emergency lighting for the radio station was not functioning.
4.4.6. Were the Master, officers and crew aware of the potential danger of
using radio or mobile telephone equipment during cargo and ballast handling
operations and was there a sufficient number of intrinsically safe portable
radios for use in operational areas?
QMS : 01N.04.03.29 / 01N.04.03.30 / 08N-015
There were no company procedures for the safe use of radio and telephone
equipment during cargo and ballast handling operations.
• The Master, an officer or a rating was unfamiliar with the company
procedures for the safe use of radio and telephone equipment during cargo
and ballast handling operations.
• There were insufficient intrinsically safe VHF or UHF portable radios available
in good working order to properly coordinate cargo, ballast and bunker
handling operations.
• MF/HF radio or radar equipment was under repair/service, but this had not
been discussed at the pretransfer conference and a safe system of work
agreed.
• MF/HF radio transmissions were observed being made during cargo and
ballast handling operations.
• Main transmitting antennae were not earthed or isolated during cargo and
ballast handling operations.
• Fixed VHF and UHF equipment was not switched to low power (one watt or
less) during cargo and ballast handling operations.
• Portable VHF or UHF radios in use had a power output of more than one
watt.
• A damaged portable VHF or UHF radio was observed in use.
• Details of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones were not prominently
displayed at the gangway.
• Non-intrinsically safe mobile phones were observed in use outside of the
accommodation block.
• Where use of intrinsically safe mobile phones was permitted outside of the
accommodation block, the equipment in use was not clearly marked or
properly certified as being intrinsically safe.
5. Safety Management
5.1. Emergency Response Plans and Drills
5.1.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the onboard emergency
response plans, and were records available to demonstrate that all
mandatory and company defined emergency drills had been completed and
documented as required by company procedures?
QMS : 01N.05.10.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the requirements to
conduct onboard emergency response drills, record the outcome and track
drills to ensure completion within the defined time frame.
• There was no uniform system of shipboard emergency contingency plans
available.
• There was no requirement to record the details of a drill which included:
o The contingency plan(s) used for a drill.
o The drill scenario.
o Any safety considerations for conducting the drill.
o A summary of the drill activities.
o The equipment used or demonstrated during the drill.
o Any lessons learnt from the drill.
o Any training requirements identified during the drill.
o Any areas for improvement to the contingency plan identified during the drill
(and communicated to the company).
o Any supplementary information that must be attached to the drill record,
such as, risk assessments, permits etc.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the system of shipboard
emergency contingency plans.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
conducting drills, recording the details of drills and what to do if a drill could
not be completed within the required due date.
• There was no schedule of emergency response drills required to be
conducted on board to test the shipboard contingency plans.
• The schedule of drills was not aligned with the requirements of ISM, SOLAS,
MARPOL, IGC, IGF or ISPS.
• Drills were overdue for completion.

5.1.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plans for the principal fire scenarios for the vessel type, and had drills taken
place to test the effectiveness of the plans in accordance with the company
procedures?
QMS : 01N.02.02.10
The vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response
plan for each of the principal fire scenarios which are appropriate to the vessel
type, which should include, but will not necessarily be limited to:
• Fire on the cargo deck.
• Fire in a cargo tank.
• Fire in the main machinery space.
• Fire in the cargo pump room or compressor room.
• Fire in the accommodation.
• Fire in a store-room.
• Fire in the galley.
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no shipboard emergency plan available for fire for one or more of
the principal fire scenarios applicable to the vessel type.
• The shipboard emergency plans for the principal fire scenarios were
insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency
plans for the principal fire scenarios applicable to the vessel.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenarios were unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plans for the principal fire scenarios applicable to the vessel type.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
bridge Log Book.
• One or more of the emergency response plans for the principal fire scenarios
had not been exercised during a drill within the previous six months.
• One or more emergency response drill for fire required by the company
onboard emergency response procedure was overdue or had not been
completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.
• A fire drill had not taken place within 24 hours of leaving port after a crew
change that had resulted in more than 25% of the crew having not participated
in a fire drill on that ship within the previous month

5.1.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the vessel’s SOPEP or
SMPEP, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the onboard
emergency response actions required by the Plan and company procedures?
QMS : SOPEP/SMPEP plan / 120N-051
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no SOPEP or SMPEP available.
• The SOPEP or SMPEP had not been maintained up to date with national
operational contact points or any other information that may have become
outdated over time or at change of management.
• The vessel had not prepared a list of specific contact details for the port of
inspection.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the content of the vessel’s
SOPEP or SMPEP.
• An interviewed officer was unfamiliar with their duties during a spill incident.
• The drill scenarios were unrealistic or inadequate to test the Plan.
• The drill scenarios did not cover operational spills for both cargo and bunker
operations.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for a spill situation required by the SOPEP,
SMPEP and/or company onboard emergency response procedure was overdue
or, had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.
5.1.4. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for enclosed space rescue, and had drills taken place to test the
effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with
company procedures?
QMS : 01N.02.02.07 / 120-057

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no shipboard emergency plan for enclosed space rescue available.
• The shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan
for enclosed space rescue.
• An interviewed officer or rating was unfamiliar with the rigging and use of
the provided enclosed space rescue hoisting arrangement(s).
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• The drill records had not been completed in accordance with the company
procedures or were missing the associated enclosed space entry permit, where
required.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for enclosed space rescue required by the
company onboard emergency response procedure was overdue or had not
been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.
• The enclosed space rescue hoisting arrangements and any associated loose
equipment provided for cargo, ballast, bunker, void and cofferdam spaces was
defective in any respect
5.1.5. Were the Master and Ship Security Officer (SSO) familiar with the
vessel’s Ship Security Plan (SSP), and had drills taken place to test the
effectiveness of the measures and procedures specified by the Ship Security
Plan?
QMS : Ship security plan / 05N-001
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no schedule of security drills or exercises required to be
undertaken by the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
• The Master or Ship Security Officer was unfamiliar with security drills or
exercises required to be undertaken to test the effectiveness of the SSP and its
contingency plans.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• Drill or exercise dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded
within the Bridge Log Book.
• The latest security drill or exercise was overdue for completion.
• Security drill or exercise scenarios required to be undertaken according to
the company drill schedule had not been completed within the defined time
frame.
• Where the ship had entered a High Risk Area in the last twelve months,
suitable security drills had not been conducted with the SPM (Ship Protection
Measures) in place, prior to entering the High Risk Area.

5.1.6. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the procedure for
launching the lifeboat(s), and had abandon ship drills taken place in
accordance with company procedures and the requirements of SOLAS and
the Flag Administration?
QMS : 01N.02.01.01 / 01N.05.10.02

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no emergency procedure for abandoning ship.
• There was no ship specific procedure for launching a lifeboat as part of an
abandon ship drill.
• The shipboard procedures were insufficiently ship-specific.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the procedure for abandon
ship or the launching of a lifeboat during an abandon ship drill.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the ship specific procedure for the
launching of a lifeboat during an abandon ship drill.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drills for abandon ship required by the company
onboard emergency response procedure and SOLAS regulation were overdue
or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.7. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for a cargo vapour or liquid release, Including potential fire, and had
drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency
response plan in accordance with company procedures?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no shipboard emergency plans for a cargo vapour or liquid
release available.
• The shipboard emergency plans for cargo vapour or liquid release were
insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency
plans for cargo vapour or liquid release.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The latest drill for cargo vapour or liquid release was overdue for completion.
• One or more of the emergency response plans for cargo vapour or liquid
release scenarios had not been exercised during a drill within the previous 12
months.
5.1.8. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for collision, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the
shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with company
procedures?
QMS : 01N.02.02.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no shipboard emergency plan developed for a collision situation.
• The shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan
for a collision situation.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
The emergency response drill for a collision situation required by the company
onboard emergency
response procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance
with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.9. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for grounding, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the
shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with company
procedures?
QMS : 01N.02.02.12
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no shipboard emergency plan developed for a grounding
situation.
• The shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.
The shipboard emergency plan for grounding did not consider:
o Assessing a grounding situation and gathering data for evaluation by a
specialist technical advisor on its impact on buoyancy, stability and structural
strength and the later decisions on mitigating actions.
o Preserving ECDIS and VDR evidence.
o Communications with the company and third parties.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan
for a grounding situation.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for a grounding situation required by the
company onboard emergency response procedure was overdue or had not
been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.10. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for loss of propulsion, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness
of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with company
procedures?
QMS : 01N.02.02.31
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no shipboard emergency plan for the loss of propulsion.
• The shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan
for the loss of propulsion.
• An interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process for
estimating the predicted drift of a disabled tanker, taking into account the
wind, current and ship’s head.
• An interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with the location and content
of the vessel’s loss of propulsion emergency response plan.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for a loss of propulsion required by the
company onboard emergency response procedure was overdue or had not
been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule

5.1.11. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for failure of electrical power, and had drills taken place to test the
effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with
company procedures?
QMS : 01N.02.02.18
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no shipboard emergency plan for the failure of electrical power
available.
• The shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan
for the failure of electrical power.
• An interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process of
estimating the predicted drift of a disabled tanker taking into account the
wind, current and ship’s head.
• An interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with the location and content
of the vessel’s failure of electrical power emergency response plan.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for a failure of electrical power required by the
company onboard emergency response procedure was overdue or had not
been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.12. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for steering gear failure, and had drills taken place to test the
effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with
company procedures.
QMS : 01N.02.02.20
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The shipboard emergency plan for steering failure was insufficiently ship-
specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan
for steering gear failure.
• An interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process for
estimating a vessel’s drift rate taking into account the wind, current and ship's
head
An officer requested to demonstrate the operation of the emergency steering
system was unfamiliar with the operation of the emergency steering gear.
• The emergency steering gear was defective in any respect.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for a steering gear failure required by the
company onboard emergency response procedure was overdue or had not
been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.13. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plan for emergency towing, including the Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB),
and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard
emergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?
QMS : Emergency towing manual
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no Emergency Towing Booklets available.
• Copies of the ETB were not available on the bridge, in a forecastle space or in
the ship’s office or cargo control room.
• The emergency towing procedures were insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the emergency towing
procedures.
• An interviewed navigation or engineer officer was unfamiliar with the
location of the ETB or the deployment process for the emergency towing
arrangements fitted to the vessel.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the emergency towing
procedures.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for emergency towing required by the
company onboard emergency response procedure was overdue or had not
been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.14. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the shipboard
emergency response plan for man overboard, including the launching and
recovering the rescue boat, and had drills taken place to test the
effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with
company procedures?

QMS : 01N.02.02.21
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no emergency response plan for man overboard.
• There was no ship specific procedure for launching and recovering the rescue
boat as part of a drill.
• The shipboard procedures were insufficiently ship-specific.
The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency
response plan for man overboard.
• An interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the ship-specific
procedure for launching and recovering the rescue boat during a drill.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with their role, as defined by the
muster list, during a man overboard situation.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The man overboard drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the
shipboard emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drills for man overboard and launching the rescue
boat required by the company procedures and SOLAS regulation were overdue
or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.15. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the shipboard
emergency response plan for recovery of persons from the water, and had
drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency
response plan in accordance with company procedures?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no shipboard emergency response plan for the recovery of
persons from the water available.
• The shipboard emergency response plan for the recovery of persons from
the water was insufficiently shipspecific.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency
response plan for the recovery of persons from the water.
• An interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the recovery of persons from
the water plan and their expected role in such an emergency response.
• The drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency response plan for the recovery of persons from the water.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• The emergency response drill for recovery of persons from the water
required by the company procedures was overdue or had not been completed
in accordance with the defined drill schedule.

5.1.16. Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency
plans for flooding, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the
shipboard emergency response plans in accordance with company
procedures?
QMS : 01N.02.02.11
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no shipboard emergency plan available for one or more of the
flooding scenarios applicable to the vessel type.
• The shipboard emergency plans were insufficiently ship-specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency
plans for flooding situations.
• The drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company
procedure.
• The drill scenarios were unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard
emergency plan.
• Drill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the
Bridge Log Book.
• One or more of the emergency response drills for a flooding scenario
required by the company onboard emergency response procedure was
overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill
schedule.

5.1.18. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double
hull tank, and was all required equipment available and in satisfactory
condition?
QMS : 01N.02.02.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the
event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures
setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double
hull tank.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the location of the
equipment required by company procedures setting out the actions to be
taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank.
• An item of equipment required by the company procedures setting out the
actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank was:
o not available on board.
o not stowed safely and correctly.
o defective in any respect.
• Where double-hull spaces were not permanently connected to an inert gas
distribution system, there were no flexible hoses dedicated solely to inerting
double hull tanks.
• There were no records of tests for electrical continuity of the flexible hoses
designated for inerting double hull tanks.

5.1.19. Were the Master and officers familiar with the emergency
arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in
the event of flooding and were these arrangements prominently marked and
in good order?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the
collision bulkhead in the event of flooding.
• There was no shipboard emergency response plan for forecastle space
flooding.
• The company procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the collision
bulkhead in the event of flooding were not ship specific.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with company procedures to pump
out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding.
The condition of the arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the
collision bulkhead in the event of flooding was unsatisfactory in any respect
which might make the operation difficult or impossible in an emergency, such
as:
o The suction wells in the forecastle dry spaces were obstructed by stores,
ropes etc.
o Bilge wells were not provided with gratings or strainers that would prevent
blockage of the dewatering system with debris.
o Access to the remote controls was obstructed.
• The remote controls for the arrangements to pump out the spaces forward
of the collision bulkhead were not:
o At the bridge, engine control room or in a location which was accessible from
the bridge or engine control room without traversing exposed freeboard or
superstructure decks.
o Prominently marked as to their purpose.
• The arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead
in the event of flooding were defective in any respect.

5.2. Fixed Fire Protection Systems

5.2.1. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the starting
procedure for the emergency fire pump, and were records available to
demonstrate that the emergency fire pump and its location had been
maintained and tested in accordance with company procedures?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure for starting and testing the emergency fire
pump.
• Where the access to the emergency fire pump space was through the
machinery space:
o One or both air-lock doors were either open or there was evidence that they
had been held open.
o The second access door was locked or secured to prevent access to the space
from the outer decks in the event of a fire in the machinery space.
• There were no ship-specific starting instructions posted adjacent to the
emergency fire pump.
• The emergency fire pump sea suction or discharge valves were closed when
the pump was designed for remote operation.
• Where fitted, the remote hand pump for operating the emergency fire pump
sea suction valve was inoperative.
• The posted starting instructions were unclear or inadequate.
• Officers and/or ratings were not familiar with the ship-specific starting
instructions for the emergency fire pump.
• The emergency fire pump diesel engine would not start within three
attempts by either the primary or manual means.
• The emergency fire pump would not gain suction or generate the required
pressure and/or flow without manual intervention beyond that described in
the starting instructions.
• The emergency fire pump or, where fitted, its diesel engine was defective in
any respect.
• There were significant water leaks from the emergency fire pump or its
pipework.
• Engineer officers were not familiar with the operating and testing procedures
for the emergency fire pump, its engine or the fuel quick closing valve.
• There was not enough fuel in the tank to run for 3 hours or the required level
had not been established.
• There was not enough fuel available both in the tank and outside the space
to run the emergency fire pump at full load for at least 18 hours (3 + 15 h)
• The vessel was or had been trading in sub-zero temperatures but the fuel in
the tank was not designed for use in sub-zero temperatures.
• The fuel quick closing valve, where required to be fitted, was not located
outside the space or did not operate correctly.
• Records of maintenance and/or testing were not available or incomplete.

5.2.2. Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose,
testing and operation of the vessel’s fire dampers, the means of closing the
main inlets and outlets of all ventilation systems and the means of stopping
the power ventilation systems from outside the space served?
QMS : 01N.08.05.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The Master, officers or crew were not familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s fire dampers, skylights, closing devices or remote fan
stops.
• Closing devices did not operate freely.
• Closing devices were ineffective due to corrosion, worn gaskets, seized dogs
etc.
• Closing devices were not clearly marked with the spaces they served or their
open/shut positions.
• Closing devices were not marked with required warning notices e.g. battery
lockers.
• Closing devices were not marked with the required position when conduction
cargo operations.
• An interviewed officer or rating was not familiar with the required position of
each closing device while conducting cargo operations.
• Access to closing devices or fan stops was obstructed.
• Remote operated closing devices were found to be inhibited or prevented
from closing fully by obstructions.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include fire dampers, skylights, closing
devices and remote fan stops or all the required inspections, tests and
maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the vessel’s fire dampers, skylights, closing devices and remote
fan stops indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken
place.
• The vessel’s fire dampers, skylights, closing devices or remote fan stops were
defective in any way
5.2.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s fixed fire detection and fire alarm system, and was
the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and
maintained?
QMS : 811.0300.23
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the operation and
maintenance of the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system
• The Master or officers were not familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s fixed fire detection and fire alarm system
• The responsible officer was not familiar with the maintenance and testing of
the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system.
• The vessel was not provided with the fire detector testing equipment
appropriate to each type of fire/smoke detector in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions.
• Information was not displayed on or adjacent to each indicating unit about
the spaces covered and the location of the sections.
• Where the fire alarm main or repeater control panels were in a space that
was not continuously manned there was a delay between a fire being detected
and the fire alarms sounding.
• The fixed fire detection and fire alarm system was indicating a fault.
• The fixed fire detection and fire alarm system was not operational.
• One or more individual fire detector sensor was covered or disabled in any
manner.
• The machinery space had been operated in the unattended status whilst a
zone was isolated, or the fire detector and alarm system was defective.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting
systems and appliances did not include the fixed fire detection and fire alarm
system or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
firefighting systems and appliances available.
• The responsible officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Suitable instructions or component spares for testing and maintenance were
not available
Inspection of the vessel’s fixed fire detection and fire alarm system indicated
that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• The vessel’s fixed fire detection and fire alarm system was defective in any
way.

5.2.4. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system, and
was the equipment in good working order and available for immediate use,
with the release procedure and operating instructions displayed at the
control stations?
QMS : 01N.05.06.02

Ship security plan

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no safety procedures for entering the CO2 space posted at each
entrance door.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the safety precautions for
entering the CO2 space.
• The CO2 space or release cabinets were locked but there were no keys
provided.
• The machinery space carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system release
procedure, operating instructions and warning notices were not posted at the
release station.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the vessel’s fixed carbon
dioxide fire extinguishing system or all the required inspections, tests and
maintenance.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of
the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Inspection of the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system
indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not taken place.
• The machinery space carbon dioxide fixed fire extinguishing system was
defective in any respect.
• The machinery space carbon dioxide fixed fire extinguishing system was not
ready for immediate use for any reason, such as, branch pipes blanked, nozzles
or control levers inhibited, etc

5.2.5. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire
extinguishing system, and was the equipment in good working order,
available for immediate use, and with operating instructions clearly
displayed at the control stations?
QMS : 816.0200.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system
release procedure, operating instructions and warning notices, in the working
language of the ship, were not posted at the release station.
• The valves and/or system controls were not clearly identified to their
purpose and required status during system operation.
• The foam concentrate test had not been carried out within the required time
frame.
• The foam concentrate test certificate indicated that the foam was not fit for
continued use.
• Where the system also provided protection for a cargo pump room, the foam
concentrate was incompatible with the cargo being carried and no alternative
arrangement, to the satisfaction of the Flag Administration, had been
provided.
• The foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices had not been tested as
required during five yearly servicing.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
firefighting systems and appliances available.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the vessel’s machinery space
fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system or all the required
inspections, tests and maintenance.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of
the vessel’s machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing
system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Inspection of the vessel’s machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire
extinguishing system indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan
had not in fact taken place.
• The machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system
was defective in any respect.
5.2.6. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s machinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire
extinguishing system, and was the equipment in good working order and
available for immediate use, with operating instructions clearly displayed at
the control stations?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The machinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing system
or the equivalent water mist fire-extinguishing system release procedure,
operating instructions and warning notices were not posted at the release
stations in the working language of the ship.
• The valves and/or system controls were not clearly identified to their
purpose and required status during system operation.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
firefighting systems and appliances available.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting
systems and appliances did not include the vessel’s fixed pressure water-
spraying fire extinguishing system or the equivalent water mist fire
extinguishing system or, all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• There were no records of quarterly system water quality assessments, or
records showed the system contents did not meet the manufacturers’ water
quality guidelines.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of
the vessel’s fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system or the
equivalent water mist fire extinguishing system
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
• Inspection of the vessel’s fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing
system or the equivalent water mist fire extinguishing system indicated that
actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.
• The machinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system
or the equivalent water mist fire extinguishing system was defective in any
respect.

5.2.7. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s fire pumps, fire main, fire main isolating valves and
fire hydrants, and was the system and its components in good working order
and available for immediate use?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The fire pumps could not be started remotely from the navigating bridge or
fire control station.
• There was no means to verify the delivery pressure on the fire main either on
the navigating bridge or at the fire control station.
• Fire hydrant valves or fire main isolating valves did not operate freely.
• Fire main isolation valves were found to be closed.
• There was hard rust, deterioration or temporary repairs to the fire main
pipework.
• The fire pump suction or delivery valves were found to be closed
• The fire hydrant or fire main isolating valves were not clearly marked.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:
o Starting the fire pumps.
o The purpose and location of the isolating valves.
o The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck fire main.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting
systems and appliances did not include the fire mains, fire pumps, fire main
isolating valves and fire hydrants and all the required inspections, tests and
maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
firefighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the fire mains, fire pumps, fire main isolating valves and fire
hydrants indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in
fact taken place.
• The fire mains, fire pumps, fire main isolating valves or fire hydrants were
defective in any respect.

5.2.8. Were the Master, officers and galley staff familiar with the location,
purpose and operation of the fixed and portable fire extinguishing systems
provided in the galley, were the systems in good working order and available
for immediate use, and were galley ranges, exhaust vents, filter cowls free of
grease or combustible material?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no instructions posted in the galley describing the use of the
fixed fire extinguishing systems provided.
• The interviewed galley staff were not familiar with the purpose and
operation of the fixed or portable fire extinguishing or fire protection systems
in the galley.
• Oily or fatty deposits were found on galley ranges, in grease traps, within flue
pipes, around fire extinguishing nozzles, around fire detector heads and in the
filter cowls of galley vents.
• There was evidence that deep fat frying had been taking place using open
pans or a fixed deep fat fryer with no fixed fire extinguishing system.
• Automatic self-closing fire doors or serving hatch shutters were found to be
held back or restricted from closing fully.
• Manual self-closing fire doors were found held back.
• Portable fire extinguishing devices were found to be obstructed or missing
from their designated stowage.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the fire extinguishing systems
for the galley or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the fire-extinguishing systems indicated that actions recorded
in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• A fixed fire extinguishing system provided in the galley was defective in any
respect.

5.2.11. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the vessel’s fixed dry chemical powder fire extinguishing system,
and was the equipment in good working order and readily available for
immediate use, with operating instructions clearly displayed at the control
stations.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The cargo area fixed dry chemical powder extinguishing system operating
instructions were not posted at each operating station in the working language
of the ship.
• The system controls and valves were not clearly marked in accordance with
the operating instructions.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the vessel’s fixed dry chemical
powder fire-extinguishing system or all the required inspections, tests and
maintenance.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of
the vessel’s fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Inspection of the vessel’s fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing
system indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete,
including:
o The annual agitation of the dry powder by nitrogen.
o The two-yearly testing of a sample of dry chemical powder for moisture
content.
• The fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing system was defective in any
respect

5.2.12. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the fixed fire-extinguishing system in the vessel’s paint locker
and any other flammable liquid locker, and was the system in good working
order and available for immediate use?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no instructions posted outside a paint or flammable liquids locker
describing the use of the fixed fire extinguishing system provided.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of
the fixed fire extinguishing system in a paint or other flammable liquid locker.
• Paints or flammable liquids were found stored in lockers or locations not
designed to contain flammable liquids.
• Paints or flammable liquids were stored in open containers
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the fixed fire extinguishing
system for paint and flammable liquid lockers or all the required inspections,
tests and maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the fixed fire-extinguishing system indicated that actions
recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.
Storage of items in a paint or flammable liquids locker prevented the proper
functioning of the fire extinguishing system provided, for example, stored paint
tins were stacked above the level of water spray nozzles.
• Access to the controls of a paint or flammable liquid locker fire extinguishing
system were obstructed.
• The fixed fire extinguishing system for the paint locker, or any other
flammable liquids locker, was defective in any respect.

5.2.13. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the machinery space fixed water-based or equivalent local
application fire-fighting system, and was the equipment in good working
order and readily available for immediate use, with operating instructions
clearly displayed at the control stations?
QMS : 01N.07.03.08
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which described the use of the automatic
release mode of the fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system
where this function was provided.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation and
required operating mode of the system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• There were no operating instructions in the working language of the ship
posted at the system control stations.
• The system was not set on automatic release mode when required by the
company procedure.
• The machinery space was being operated in the unattended mode with the
system in manual release mode.
• The system was not ready for immediate activation either automatically or
by manual release, locally or remotely, for any reason.
• The dedicated water supply tank was not fitted with a low-level alarm, or the
minimum required operating level was not marked and maintained.
• The water supply valves, or individual manual branch discharge valves were
closed.
• System smoke, heat or flame detectors were deactivated.
• The local release stations near to the protected equipment were not clearly
marked as to their purpose.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the vessel’s fixed water-based
local application fire-fighting system.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the vessel’s fixed water-based local application fire-fighting
system indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not been
carried out.
• The fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system was defective in
any respect.
5.2.14. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose of the cargo,
ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing devices, and was there
evidence that alarm activation points had been correctly set and tested in
accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's instructions?
QMS : 01N.07.03.07
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for the operation and maintenance of the
cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the cargo,
ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the alarm activation settings of
the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing system.
• There were no records maintained for the temperature of bulkhead shaft
glands, bearings and pump casings for cargo, ballast or stripping pumps in
operation.
• The temperature sensing devices had not been checked for proper operation
and temperature comparison at the frequency defined by the company.
• The audible and visual alarms in the cargo control room or pump control
station had not been tested at the frequency defined by the company.
• One or more temperature sensing devices were out of service.
• One or more alarm activation points were found to be set to activate at a
higher temperature that permitted by the company procedure.
• One or more temperature sensors were found to be disconnected from the
required location.
• Temporary cooling devices were found to be in use to cool pump bearings.
• One or more cargo or stripping pump mechanical seals were leaking cargo
either as a liquid or a mist.
Where there was no means to observe the temperature being measured by
the temperature sensing devices in either the cargo control room or the
machinery space record the finding as a comment under the Hardware
response tool.

5.2.15. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the purpose and
operation of the vessel’s deck foam system, including portable applicators,
and was the system in good working order and available for immediate use,
with operating instructions displayed at the control station?

QMS : 816.0100.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The deck foam system operating instructions, in the working language of the
ship, were not posted in the space containing the foam concentrate tank,
pumps and control station.
• The valves and/or system controls were not clearly identified to their
purpose and required status during system operation.
• The foam storage tank was not filled to the required level.
• The foam concentrate test had not been carried out within the required time
frame.
• The foam concentrate test certificate indicated that the foam was not fit for
continued use.
• The foam concentrate was incompatible with the cargo being carried but no
alternative arrangement, to the satisfaction of the Flag Administration, had
been provided.
• The foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices had not been tested as
required during five yearly servicing
The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of
the vessel’s deck foam fire extinguishing system, including portable
applicators.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the operation and use of the
foam monitors and/or foam applicators.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the vessel’s deck foam system
or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete,
including the required foam concentrate tests.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Inspection of the vessel’s deck foam system indicated that actions recorded
in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• The deck foam system isolation valves or monitors were not free to move
through their full range of motion.
• Foam applicators prepared at the manifold were connected to the fire main
rather than the foam main.
• The deck foam system was defective in any respect.

5.2.16. Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the location,
purpose, testing and operation of the vessel’s fire doors?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure which defined the frequency of
inspections, tests and maintenance for fire doors.
• The Master, officers or ratings were not familiar with the location, purpose
and operation of the vessel’s fire doors.
• A replacement fire door did not meet the minimum fire rating as indicated on
the Fire Control Plan.
• Fire door self-closing devices did not operate properly.
• Fire doors and/or their frames, where appropriate, were:
o Obstructed.
o Held back by non-approved methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or
other such arrangements.
o Corroded or wasted.
o Subject to inappropriate cable penetrations.
o Subject to inappropriate alterations or modifications.
o Subject to gaps between fire door and frame.
o Subject to damage to the lock mechanism, strike plate or hinges preventing
the door closing properly.
o Subject to damage to the door packing or frame.
o Subject to puncture damage to the outer skin on one or both sides of the
door.
The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting
systems and appliances did not include fire doors or all the required
inspections, tests and maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the vessel’s fire doors indicated that actions recorded in the
plan had not in fact taken place.
• One or more fire door was defective in any respect.
5.3. Portable fire fighting appliances
5.3.1. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location and use
of the vessel’s firefighter’s outfits including the self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA), and was the equipment maintained in good condition and
ready for immediate use inaccordance with company procedures?
QMS : 503.4650.02 / 503.4660.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The firefighter’s suits or SCBAs were not stored in the correct location in
accordance with the fire plan; unless they were in position for cargo operations
in accordance with company procedures.
• The firefighter’s outfits were incomplete or defective in any respect.
• The SCBAs and firefighter's outfits were not prepared for immediate use with
a fully charged bottle and the required spare bottle(s).
• A SCBA was defective in any respect.
• The electric safety lamps were not explosion proof type 1
Insufficient intrinsically safe two-way portable radios were available for the
number of fire teams indicated on the muster list.
• Not all SCBA cylinders were fully interchangeable.
• The SCBAs or the spare bottles had not been serviced or pressure tested in
accordance with the maintenance plan.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:
o The firefighter’s outfit or the associated SCBA.
o The process for filling the SCBA bottles with the onboard compressor, where
provided.
• An officer or rating was unable to demonstrate the donning of a SCBA and
the safety checks required prior to entering a hazardous environment.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting
systems and appliances did not include the firefighter’s outfits, SCBA and
breathing air compressor or all the required inspections, tests and
maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
firefighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the firefighter’s outfits, SCBA or breathing air compressor
indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.

5.3.2. Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose
and operation of the vessel’s fire hoses, nozzles and international shore
connection, and was the equipment in good working order and available for
immediate use?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• Fire hoses, nozzles or international shore connections were missing from the
locations shown on the fire control plan unless laid out for cargo or bunker
operations.
• Fire hoses, nozzles or international shore connections were not ready for
immediate use.
• Fire hoses were either less than 10m in length or longer than the maximum
permitted for their location.
• The required gaskets, nuts, washers or recommended spanners were missing
from the international shore connection(s) storage location.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of
the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the
fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the fire hoses, nozzles and
international shore connections or all the required inspections, tests and
maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections
indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• An inspected fire hose, nozzle or international shore connections was found
to be defective in any respect

5.3.3. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location,
purpose and operation of the vessel’s portable fire extinguishers, and were
the extinguishers in good order and readily available for immediate use with
operating instructions clearly marked?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• Fire extinguisher(s) were missing or not located as shown in the Fire Control
Plan.
• The fire control plan did not comply with MSC.1/Circ.1275 with regards to
the distribution of fire extinguishers. (for ships constructed before 1 January
2009 make a comment only in the Hardware response tool)
• Fire extinguisher(s) were not fully charged.
• Fire extinguisher(s) were not readily available for immediate use.
Fire extinguisher(s) were not clearly marked with the information required by
A.951(23) 8.1.
• Fire Extinguisher(s) were not marked with the date of onboard inspection or
annual survey.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the inspection and
maintenance plan for portable fire extinguishers.
• In service fire extinguishers(s) were found to be defective in any respect.
• Fire extinguishers were not included in the maintenance plan for fire
protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Inspection records for inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on fire
extinguishers were incomplete.
• Inspection of an extinguisher indicated that actions recorded in the
maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.
• There were insufficient spare charges or extra extinguishers.
• An interviewed officer or rating was unfamiliar with the use and/or operation
of a portable fire extinguisher.
-----------------------------------------------------
5.3.4. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location and
purpose of the Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBDs) carried on
board, and were these devices in good order, suitably located and ready for
immediate use?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the location, inspection and
maintenance of the EEBDs.
• The EEBDs were not positioned in accordance with the fire control plan.
• There were fewer spare EEBDs onboard than indicated on the fire control
plan.
• An inspected EEBD was found defective in any respect, including:
o The cylinder pressure was outside the normal range.
o The unit was passed its expiry date.
o The donning instructions could not be read.
o The unit was not marked with its maintenance requirements, manufacturer's
trademark and serial number, shelf life (expiry date) with accompanying
manufacture date and name of approving authority.
• EEBD(s) used for training were not clearly marked.
• EEBD(s) had not been inspected and maintained according to the company
procedures and manufacturer’s instructions.
• Rechargeable EEBD cylinders had not been hydrostatically tested at the
required interval.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the location and purpose of the
EEBDs.

5.3.5. Were the Master, officers and engine ratings familiar with the purpose
and operation of the vessel’s wheeled (mobile) fire extinguishers, and was
the equipment in good order and available for immediate use with operating
instructions clearly marked?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• A wheeled fire extinguisher(s) was not:
o Fully charged.
o Readily available for immediate use.
o Marked with the required information.
o Marked with the date of onboard inspections or servicing.
o Included in the maintenance plan for fire protection systems and fire-fighting
systems and appliances.
• A wheeled fire extinguisher(s) was:
o Missing or not located as shown in the fire control plan.
o Defective in any respect.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the inspection and
maintenance plan for wheeled fire extinguishers.
• Inspection records for inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on
wheeled fire extinguishers were incomplete.
• Inspection of a wheeled fire extinguisher indicated that actions recorded in
the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.
• There were insufficient spare charges.
• An interviewed engineer officer or rating was unfamiliar with the use and/or
operation of a wheeled fire extinguisher.

5.4. Life saving appliances

5.4.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the davit-
launched lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances, and were
they in good order with records available to demonstrate that they had been
inspected and tested as required?
QMS : 01N.05.10.04 / 501.0220.02 (side launching)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no procedure to ensure the lifeboats, release mechanisms and
launching appliances were periodically inspected and tested and ready for
immediate use in an emergency.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the lifeboats,
release mechanisms and launching appliances.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and
testing of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the
lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances were incomplete.
Records of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the
lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances were incomplete.
• There were no checklists as required by SOLAS III/36 available for the
inspection of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances.
• Records indicated the lifeboat falls had been in service for longer than five
years.
• A lifeboat was not marked as required.
• There were no clear operating instructions provided in the lifeboat for the
on-load release mechanism, with a suitably worded warning notice.
• The on-load release control was not clearly marked in a colour that
contrasted with its surroundings.
• Items of lifeboat equipment were damaged, missing or improperly stowed.
• A lifeboat engine would not start.
• There were no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the
engine mounted in a conspicuous place near the engine starting controls.
• When tested, it could not be demonstrated that the gear box and gear box
train were engaging satisfactorily.
• Indicated pressure for the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, was
not with the normal range.
• The pressurised air hoses of the self-contained air-support system, if fitted,
were in poor condition.
• Nozzles for the water spray fire-protection system, if fitted, were clogged by
salt and/or scale.
• The launching appliance gearcase breather vent was blocked or painted over.
• Lifeboat davit limit switches were not operating freely.
• The lifeboat falls or gripes were in poor condition.
• Inspection of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances
indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken
place.
• The lifeboats and launching appliances and their locations were not marked
with the required symbols.
• Lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances were defective in
any respect.

5.4.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the free-
fall lifeboat, its release systems and its launching appliance, and was the
equipment in satisfactory condition with records available to demonstrate
that it had been inspected and tested in accordance with company
procedures?
QMS : 01N.05.10.04 / 501.0250.02 (free fall)
There was no company procedure to ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release
systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment were periodically
inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the free-fall
lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and
testing of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and
recovery equipment.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the
free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery
equipment were incomplete.
• Records of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the
free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery
equipment were incomplete.
• There were no checklists as required by SOLAS III/36 available for the
inspection of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and
recovery equipment.
• Records indicated the lifeboat falls had been in service for longer than five
years.
• The lifeboat was not marked as required.
• There were no clear operating instructions provided in the lifeboat for the
release system.
• The release system was not adequately protected against accidental or
premature release.
• The release system was not clearly marked in a colour that contrasted with
its surroundings.
• Items of lifeboat equipment were damaged, missing or improperly stowed.
• The locking seat harnesses were not in good order.
• The lifeboat engine would not start.
• There were no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the
engine mounted in a conspicuous place near the engine starting controls.
• When tested, it could not be demonstrated that the lifeboat gear box and
gear box train were engaging satisfactorily.
• Indicated pressure for the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, was
not within the normal range.
• Nozzles for the water spray fire-protection system, if fitted, were clogged by
salt and/or scale.
• Recovery limit switches, if fitted, were not operating freely.
• The means provided to secure the lifeboat in the stowed position were in
poor condition.
• The free-fall lifeboat was not properly secured in the stowed position.
• Safety/maintenance chains or pins were still place.
• Hydraulic hoses appeared to be in poor condition
• The rollers and/or skid ramp appeared to be in poor condition
• The free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery
equipment were not marked with the required symbols.
• Inspection of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance
and recovery equipment indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance
plan had not in fact taken place.
• The free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery
equipment were defective in any respect.

5.4.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the
dedicated rescue boat and launching appliance, and were they in good order
with records available to demonstrate that they had been inspected and
tested as required?
QMS : 01N.05.10.04 / 501.0300.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the rescue
boat and launching appliance.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and
testing of the rescue boat and launching appliance.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the
rescue boat and launching appliance were incomplete.
• Records of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the
rescue boat and launching appliance were incomplete.
• A full set of maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation
for the rescue boat and launching appliance were not available on board.
• Emergency repairs had been made to an inflatable rescue boat on board and
were pending permanent repair at an approved servicing station.
• The rescue boat was not in a state of continuous readiness, for instance, an
inflatable rescue boat was not fully inflated.
• Items of rescue boat equipment were damaged, missing or improperly
stowed.
• The rescue boat engine would not start.
• There were no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the
engine mounted in a conspicuous place near the engine starting controls.
• When tested, it could not be demonstrated that the gear box and gear box
train were engaging satisfactorily.
• Inspection of the rescue boat and launching appliances indicated that actions
recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.
• The rescue boat launching device could not be slewed manually or by reserve
power in accordance with its operating instructions.
• The rescue boat or its launching device were defective in any respect.
• There was no checklist available for the inspection of the rescue boat and
launching appliance.
• The rescue boat and launching appliance and their locations were not
marked with the required symbols.

5.4.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and
operation of the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances and
were they in good order, with records available to demonstrate that had they
had been inspected as required?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure to ensure that rocket parachute flares and
line throwing appliances were periodically inspected and ready for immediate
use in an emergency.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and operation of
the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection of the
rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances.
• There were insufficient rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances
on board.
• The stowage location(s) of rocket parachute flares and line throwing
appliances were not clearly marked with the recommended symbols and the
number of devices stowed there.
• Rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were not stowed on or
near the bridge.
• The stowage of rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances was not
water or weatherproof as required.
• Rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were not clearly marked
with brief operating instructions.
• Any of the following were past their expiry date:
o Rocket parachute flares.
o Line throwing rockets.
o Rocket lines.
• Rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were not ready for
immediate use, e.g. rockets and lines were stowed apart.
• There was no table of lifesaving signals on the bridge.
• Records of periodic inspections of the rocket parachute flares and line
throwing appliances were incomplete.
• Any one of the rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were
defective in any respect.
5.4.5. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the
liferafts, hydrostatic releases and liferaft launching appliances, where
provided, and were they in good order with records available to demonstrate
that they had been serviced, inspected and tested as required?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the liferafts,
hydrostatic releases and, liferaft launching appliances, where provided.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required servicing,
inspection and testing of the liferafts, hydrostatic releases and, liferaft
launching appliances, where provided.
• There was insufficient liferaft capacity for the number of people on board.
• A liferaft was not in a state of continuous readiness in any respect except
where the liferafts had been removed for shore servicing after arrival in port
and would be replaced before departure.
• A liferaft, other than a remotely located survival craft, was not capable of
floating free from the ship.
• Liferafts were not stowed so as to allow manual release of one raft or
container at a time.
• A liferaft painter was not permanently attached to the ship.
• The rigging of a hydrostatic release unit was not in accordance with the
manufacturer's instructions.
• A non-disposable hydrostatic release unit was not marked, or had not been
serviced, as required.
• A disposable hydrostatic release unit was not marked with, or was past, its
expiry date.
• A liferaft was not marked, or had not been serviced, as required.
• A liferaft embarkation ladder was not provided as required or was in poor
condition.
• A liferaft launching appliance, where provided, was defective in any respect.
• A remotely stowed liferaft was not provided with illumination or, an
embarkation ladder or other means of embarkation.
• Where a remotely stowed liferaft was provided with self-contained battery
lamps as the required means of illumination, there was no evidence that
recent tests had confirmed that the lamp would provide three hours of
undiminished performance.
• There were no handholds to ensure a safe passage from the deck to the head
of an embarkation ladder and vice versa.
• Servicing of liferafts, hydrostatic releases and liferaft launching appliances,
where fitted, by an authorised service station had not been completed at the
required interval.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections of liferafts, hydrostatic releases
and, liferaft launching appliances, where provided, were incomplete.

Where the liferafts fitted had an extended service interval due to provision of a
service kit for use on board, enter a comment in the Hardware response tool
and provide details of:
• The extended service interval.
• Who was trained to conduct the onboard servicing using the kit provided.
• The evidence that the extended service interval was accepted by the Flag
Administration.

5.4.6. Were the lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines, in
good order, clearly marked and correctly distributed around the ship?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was:
o Less than the required number of lifebuoys.
o An insufficient number of lifebuoys with lights
o A lifebuoy fitted with both light and lifeline.
o No lifebuoy on either side with a buoyant lifeline of the required length.
• Lifebuoys were not readily available on both sides of the ship, on each open
deck or in the vicinity of the stern.
• Lifebuoy stowage locations were not clearly marked with the approved
symbols.
• Lifebuoys were:
o Not marked with retro-reflective tape.
o Not clearly marked with ship’s name and port of registry.
o Secured in their brackets and not ready for immediate use.
o Fitted with defective self-igniting lights.
o Fitted with self-igniting lights not of an electric battery type.
o Fitted with a non-intrinsically safe light when located within the gas
hazardous area of the vessel.
• A self-activating smoke float was past its expiry date.
• The self-activating smoke float quick release mechanism was not operating
freely.
• A lifebuoy attached to a self-activating smoke float was less than 4 kg.
• Records of inspections and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the lifebuoys indicated that recorded inspections and
maintenance had not taken place
• Lifebuoys, associated lights, smoke floats or lifelines were defective in any
respect.
• The accompanying officer and/or the Safety Officer was unfamiliar with the
required maintenance and inspection of the lifebuoys, and associated lights,
smoke floats and lifelines.

5.4.7. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the immersion
suits, and were the immersion suits in good order, readily accessible and
their location(s) clearly indicated?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure which defined the actions to be taken to
ensure that immersion suits are in good order, readily accessible and their
location(s) clearly indicated.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and
tests required to be carried out for the immersion suits in accordance with the
company procedures.
• An interviewed officer or rating was not familiar with the instructions for
donning an immersion suit.
• An immersion suit of an appropriate size was not provided for each person
on board.
The stowage location(s) of immersion suits were not clearly marked, including
the number of suits in that location, with the recommended symbols.
• Immersion suits of an appropriate number were not provided at the location
of the forward liferaft or any other required remote location.
• Immersion suits were not readily accessible.
• Donning instructions were not legible.
• Immersion suits did not match the description on their storage bags – size,
type, etc.
• There was visible damage to immersion suits, e.g. failed seams, detached
zips.
• Immersion suit zippers did not slide up and down easily or were not
functional.
• Retro-reflective tape was in poor condition or missing.
• Whistles, if fitted, were missing or damaged.
• Lights, if fitted, were missing or past their battery expiry date.
• If required, immersion suits were not clearly marked to show that a lifejacket
must be worn.
• If required, immersion suits were not clearly marked to show that warm
clothing must be worn under the suit.
• If suits were vacuum-packed:
o Packaging was damaged and/or vacuum lost.
o There were no loose immersion suits available for training purposes.
o Air-pressure tests had not been performed either to manufacturer’s
instructions or at intervals not exceeding three years, or more frequently for
suits over ten years of age.
• Records of inspections and air-pressure tests carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the immersion suits indicated that recorded inspections and
tests had not taken place.
• One or more immersion suits was defective in any respect

5.4.8. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the lifejackets and
personal flotation devices (PFDs) provided on board, and was the equipment
in good condition, and properly maintained?
QMS : 01N.05.04.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures to ensure that the lifejackets required
by SOLAS were in good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly
indicated.
The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
ensure that the lifejackets required by SOLAS were in good order, readily
accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.
• There was no company procedure providing guidance on the use of “working
lifejackets”, including the servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the company procedures for the
use of “working lifejackets”.
• The lifejackets required by SOLAS, as provided, were not suitable for the type
of lifeboat installed.
• The stowage locations of lifejackets were not clearly marked, including the
number of lifejackets in that location, with the recommended symbols.
• Lifejackets of an appropriate number were not provided on the bridge, in the
engine room, at the location of the forward life-raft or any other required
remote location.
• Lifejackets were not readily accessible.
• The retro-reflective tape required to be fitted on lifejackets was in poor
condition or missing.
• Lifejacket whistles were missing or damaged.
• Lifejacket lights were missing or past their battery expiry date.
• Releasable buoyant lines, if fitted, were missing or defective.
• Means to lift the wearer of the lifejacket, if fitted, were missing or defective.
• Records of monthly inspections carried out were incomplete.
• Records of annual servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried, were
incomplete.
• Inspection of the lifejackets indicated that recorded inspections and servicing
had not taken place.
• One or more lifejacket was defective in any respect.
• “Working lifejackets” were not available for when crew members were
carrying out work overside or in an exposed position where there is a
reasonably foreseeable risk of falling or being washed overboard, or where
work is being carried out in or from a ship’s boat.

5.4.9. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the periodic testing and maintenance of the emergency lighting system, was
there evidence of periodic testing, and was the system in proper operating
condition?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for the inspection and testing of the
emergency lighting system.
• Company procedures did not require the emergency lighting to be inspected
and tested at least once per week.
• The responsible officer was not familiar with company procedures for the
inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the location of the switches
to turn on the emergency source of lighting.
• Records indicated that emergency lighting had not been inspected and
tested in compliance with company procedures.
• There were no records of the inspection and testing of the emergency
lighting system.
• One or more emergency lights were:
o Not working.
o Dirty/obscured.
o Filled with water.
Arrangements for lighting the area of water into which survival craft would be
launched were not in satisfactory condition.
• The emergency lighting system was defective in any respect.

--------------------------------------------------
5.5. Permits to work
5.5.1. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
enclosed space entry procedures, and was evidence available to demonstrate
that all enclosed space entries had been made in strict compliance with the
procedures?
QMS : 01N.05.06.02 / 05N-030
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company enclosed space entry procedures.
• The company enclosed space entry procedures had not identified all spaces
that were considered to be enclosed spaces along with corresponding
precautions for entering each type of identified enclosed space.
• There was no evidence that documented risk assessments were completed
and/or reviewed before each enclosed space entry.
• The company enclosed entry procedure did not give clear guidance on the
requirement to clean cargo, bunker and ballast tanks prior to entry based on
the previous content.
• Company procedures did not require the completion of an enclosed space
entry permit when entering a space meeting the definition of an enclosed
space. (This does not include where an alternative documented procedure
existed for entering the cargo pumproom, cargo compressor room, nitrogen
generator room, inert gas plant room or ballast water treatment plant room).
• Where company procedures did not require the completion of an enclosed
space entry permit when entering a cargo pumproom, cargo compressor room,
nitrogen generator room, inert gas plant room or ballast water treatment plant
room, there was no alternative procedure requiring:
o Atmosphere measurements for oxygen content and toxic, flammable,
explosive or asphyxiant gasses were taken and recorded prior to entry.
o That the entry and exit time of each individual who entered the space was
recorded.
• The company enclosed space entry procedures had not identified any
additional precautions required prior to entering ballast tanks as a result of the
use of the Ballast Water Management System.
• Evidence was available that enclosed space entry had taken place without
the issue of an enclosed entry permit in accordance with company procedures.
• Evidence was available that a cargo pumproom, compressor room, nitrogen
generator room, inert gas plant room or ballast water treatment plant room
had been entered without the issue of an enclosed space entrypermit or,
where a permit was not required, recording of atmosphere checks prior to
entry and recording the entry and exit times for each individual.
• Evidence was available that CABA, ELSA or EEBD sets had been used for
routine enclosed space entry as a substitute for cleaning and gas freeing a
space for safe entry.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company enclosed space
entry procedure and/or the process of using or retaining the company
enclosed space entry permits.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the enclosed space entry
procedure and their role in signing the enclosed space entry permit as either
an attendant or someone who enters the space.
• A reviewed enclosed space entry permit was found to be incomplete or
missing information required to be entered in accordance with the company
enclosed space entry procedure.
• A reviewed enclosed space entry permit indicated that not all atmosphere
measurements appropriate to the previous content or use of the space had
been taken and recorded.
• There was no documented evidence for segregating a space by blanking off
or isolating all connecting pipelines or valves and electrical power/equipment
during a reviewed enclosed space entry, where such isolation would have been
necessary.
• A cargo tank had been entered without being cleaned in accordance with the
company enclosed space entry procedure.
• An enclosed space entry permit was completed and approved by the same
individual who entered the space.
• Personal multi-gas detectors were not required to be used during enclosed
space entry.
• Dedicated rescue and/or resuscitation equipment was observed to be in poor
condition.

5.5.2. Were the Master, officers and, where directly involved, ratings familiar
with the company hot work procedure, and was evidence available to
demonstrate that hot work had been conducted in accordance with the
procedure?
QMS: 01N.05.06.03 / 05N-025 / Poster 120N-065

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company hot work procedures.
• The company hot work procedures were not in alignment with the guidance
provided by ISGOTT Chapter 9.• Evidence was available that hot work had
been conducted anywhere outside of the designated space without the issue
of a hot work permit.
• Hot work permits had been issued without:
o A risk assessment being prepared for the specific hot work task.
o A work plan being prepared for the specific hot work task.
o A work planning meeting taking place.
o Documented approval for the hot work from the shore management being
provided, where required by the company hot work procedure.
o Approval by the Master or, a designated Responsible Officer, where the
company procedure specifically permitted a permit to be approved by anyone
other than the Master.
There were no instructions for conducting hot work posted in the designated
space.
• The instructions for conducting hot work in the designated space did not
define:
o When hot work may be conducted in the designated space.
o When hot work must not be conducted in the designated space.
o Who may conduct hot work in the designated space.
o The requirement to work in the designated space with a shield or curtain
erected.
o The requirement to gain permission from the Master or designated
Responsible Officer before conducting hot work in the designated space.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company hot work
procedures, any aspect of the hot work permit process or the safety
precautions referred to within the company hot work procedures or permit.
• Evidence was available that hot work had taken place in the designated
space in contravention to the onboard instructions or the guidance provided in
ISGOTT chapter 9.
• An interviewed engine rating was unfamiliar with the designated space hot
work instructions.

5.5.3. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedure for working at height, and was there evidence that risk control
measures such as permits to work or documented risk assessments were
consistently used whenever work was undertaken at height?
QMS : 01N.05.06.10 / 503.3000.01 (Fall protection equipment)
503.3800.01 (Fall arrestor block)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company safe working procedure which included working at
height.
There was no requirement to complete a permit or risk assessment when
working at height unless the company procedure provided specific exclusions.
• There was no requirement to check PPE and specialist working at height
equipment periodically and record the inventory and condition of the
equipment.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company working at
height safe work procedures.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the requirement to conduct
periodic checks on specialist working at height PPE and equipment.
• There was evidence that work at height had been undertaken that required
either a work at height permit or a documented risk assessment but where
neither was available for review.
• Reviewed permits or risk assessments did not reflect the work at height
described and/or circumstances found onboard the inspected vessel.
• Work at height permits or risk assessments has not been approved at the
appropriate level in accordance with the company procedure.
• There were no records of inventory and/or periodic checks of specialist
working at height PPE and equipment.
• Specialist working at height PPE and/or equipment was found to be in
apparently poor condition.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the company safe working
procedures for working at height and either the related permit or risk
assessment review process.

5.5.4. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedures for working over the side, and was there evidence that risk
control measures such as standard work procedures, permits to work or
documented risk assessments were consistently used whenever work was
undertaken over the side?
QMS : 01N.05.06.10
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company safe working procedure which included working over
the side.
• There was no requirement to complete a permit or risk assessment when
working over the side unless the company procedures provided specific
exclusions.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company working over the
side safe work procedure.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the requirement to conduct
periodic checks on specialist working at height and over the side PPE and
equipment.
• There was evidence that work over the side had been undertaken that
required either a work over the side permit or a documented risk assessment,
but where neither was available for review.
• Reviewed permits or risk assessments did not reflect the work over the side
described and/or circumstances found onboard the inspected vessel.
• Work over the side permits or risk assessments has not been approved at the
appropriate level in accordance with the company procedure.
• There were no records of inventory and/or periodic checks of specialist
working at height and over the side PPE and equipment.
• Specialist working at height and over the side PPE and/or equipment was
found to be in apparently poor condition.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the company safe working
procedure for working over the side and either the related standard
procedure(s) or, the permit or risk assessment review process.

5.5.5. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
working on electrical equipment and systems, and was there evidence that
risk control measures such as permits to work and/or documented risk
assessments were consistently used whenever work was undertaken on
electrical equipment and systems?
QMS : 01N.05.06.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company safe working procedure which included working on
electrical equipment or systems.
• There was no requirement to complete a permit and/or risk assessment
when working on electrical equipment or systems.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company safe work
procedure for working on electrical equipment or systems.
• An interviewed electrician or engineer officer was unfamiliar with
o The company safe working procedure for working on electrical equipment or
systems and either the related permit and/or risk assessment development,
review and approval process.
o The additional control measures required when working on:
 High-voltage systems and equipment.
 Live electrical equipment.
 Live electrical test benches.
 Electrical equipment or systems in hazardous areas.
• There was evidence that work on electrical equipment or systems had been
undertaken that required either a permit and/or a documented risk
assessment but the required documentation had not been completed or was
not available for review.
• Reviewed permits and/or risk assessments did not reflect the work on
electrical equipment or systems described and/or the circumstances found
onboard the inspected vessel.
• Work on electrical equipment or systems permits or risk assessments had not
been approved at the appropriate level in accordance with the company
procedure.
• There was no documented supervision/oversight for tasks where the
company procedure required such oversight to be in place.
• Notices of instructions for the treatment of electric shock were not posted in
spaces containing electric equipment and switchgear.

5.5.6. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the control of hazardous energy, and was evidence available, through
documented risk assessment or permits, that hazardous energy sources were
routinely identified and isolated before working on, or in, machinery,
systems or spaces where hazardous energy could be present?
QMS : 01N.05.06.04 / 01N.05.06.09 / 121.0800

There were no company control of hazardous energy procedures.

• There was no specialist LO/TO equipment available onboard.
• There was no inventory of specialist LO/TO equipment.
• Work had been completed that required either a permit, risk assessment or
other documented work procedure to identify and control hazardous energy
sources according to the company procedure, but none had been completed.
• An interviewed deck or engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company
control of hazardous energy procedures.
• An interviewed deck or engineer officer was unfamiliar with the process to
identify and document the isolation of hazardous energy sources before
starting work on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces where hazardous energy
sources were present.
• LO/TO equipment was found to be attached to machinery or systems during
the inspection but there were no accompanying permits, risk assessment or
other documented work process to document the reason for the equipment
being locked and/or tagged out.
• Permits, risk assessment or other documented work processes were in force
for hazardous energy isolation, but the isolation points identified were not
locked and/or tagged out as required by the company procedure.
• Machinery or systems were found disassembled or under repair with no
isolation of hazardous energy sources.
5.6. Fixed and portable gas detecting systems
5.6.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation,
testing, maintenance and calibration of the vessel’s portable and personal
gas measurement instruments, and was the equipment on board sufficient,
in good working order, regularly tested and periodically calibrated?
QMS : O1N.05.04.11 / Equipment manufacturer manual
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance
and calibration of the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.
• The accompanying officer was unable to explain or demonstrate:
o The type and number of portable and personal gas measurement
instruments required to be carried on board.
o The toxic gases or vapours for which tubes, chips or other consumables
required to be carried onboard.
o The purpose(s) and function(s) of each instrument, including the sensor
technology utilised and whether the instrument can be used in an inert
atmosphere and/or at above atmospheric pressure.
o The circumstances under which some sensors fitted in measurement
instruments provided may be poisoned.
o The description and quantity of spare parts and test gases required to be
carried on board.
o The method and frequency of testing and calibrating the gas measurement
instruments.
The records of equipment, testing and calibration required to be maintained.
o The circumstances under which personal gas measurement instruments must
be worn, e.g. enclosed space, cargo tank and pump room entry.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and/or operation
of the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.
• An item of the required portable and personal gas measurement instruments
was damaged or not operational.
• An item of equipment required to permit the restricted or closed sampling of
a tank atmosphere was missing or defective.
• The accompanying officer was unable to describe the testing, maintenance
and calibration of the portable and personal gas measurement instruments
required in accordance with the SMS and the manufacturers’ maintenance and
operation manuals.
• There was no evidence that the required testing, maintenance and
calibration of the portable and personal gas measurement instruments had
been performed in accordance with the SMS and the manufacturers’
maintenance and operation manuals.
• The vessel was not equipped with at least two instruments capable of
measuring concentrations of oxygen, flammable gases or vapours (% LFL), H2S
and CO in order to carry out the tests required for enclosed space entry.
• The vessel was not equipped with the required means to measure
concentrations of toxic gases or vapours that might be found in the cargoes
carried.
• There were insufficient tubes, chips or other consumables available on board
for the instruments used to measure toxic gases.
• Hoses or cables used to sample tank atmospheres were of insufficient length
to reach the bottom of the deepest tank.
• The tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for measuring toxic
gases were not suitable for the toxic gases or vapours that might be found in
the cargo being carried.
• The tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for measuring toxic
gases were past their expiry date.
• A tanker equipped with inert gas or that utilised nitrogen padding did not
have an instrument(s) capable of measuring oxygen and hydrocarbon content
(% Vol) in an inert atmosphere.
• An instrument was used for measuring hydrocarbon content in an inert
atmosphere that was not suitable for this purpose.
• The vessel was not equipped with sufficient operational personal gas
monitors to meet the requirements of the SMS for enclosed space, cargo tank
or pump room entry.
• The vessel was not equipped with sufficient operational person H2S gas
monitors for personnel involved in cargo and / or bunker operations where the
cargo or bunkers were known or suspected of having a high H2S content.
• There was no inventory available of the portable and personal gas
measurement instruments, spare parts and test gases carried on board.
• Records of the testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable and
personal gas measurement instruments required in accordance with the SMS
and the manufacturers’ maintenance and operation manuals were missing or
incomplete.
• The date when each disposable personal gas monitor was first commissioned
was not recorded in order to establish their expiry date.
• Disposable personal gas monitors were in use past their expiry date.
• Manuals, in the working language of the ship, were not available for each
item of portable and personal gas measurement instruments carried on board.
• There were insufficient test gases available for the portable and personal gas
measurement instruments.
• Test gases available on board were unsuitable for the portable and personal
gas measurement instruments carried.
• An incorrect test gas had been used to test a portable instrument.
• Records indicated the manufacturers’ recommended intervals for servicing
the equipment and/or for the replacement of parts such as filters had not been
observed.

5.6.2. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for testing the atmosphere in double-hull and double bottom
spaces for flammable gas, and were records available to confirm that
appropriate measurements had been taken using the equipment fitted to, or
provided on, the vessel?
QMS : 01N.08.01.05 / O1N.05.04.11
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the process and frequency
for testing double-hull, doublebottom and void spaces. for hydrocarbon gas
accumulation.
• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure
for monitoring double-hull, double-bottom and void spaces for hydrocarbon
gas accumulation.
• Records, or absence of records, indicated that gas measurements had not
been taken and recorded in accordance with company procedures.
• Records, or absence of records, indicated that fixed gas detector tank sensors
had been isolated without appropriate manual gas measurements being taken
in accordance with company procedures.
• The fixed gas detecting system fitted to the vessel was defective in any way.
• The fixed gas detector sensors had not been calibrated and/or the flammable
gas alarm had not been set inaccordance with company procedures.
• There was no functioning portable flammable gas detector available to take
manual gas readings.
• Flammable gasses had been detected in double-hull, double-bottom or void
spaces as a result of a structural defect within the previous twelve months.

5.6.5. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation and
maintenance of the cargo pump room fixed gas detection system, and was
the equipment fully operational with sensors calibrated and alarm activation
points set in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's
instructions?
QMS : 01N.05.04.11
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for the maintenance and operation of the
pumproom gas detection system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation and
maintenance of the pumproom gas detection system.
• The alarm activation point of one or more hydrocarbon gas sensors was
more than 10% LFL.
• The gas detection sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with
manufacturer’s instructions at the frequency defined by the company.
• The audible and visual alarms in the cargo control room, pumproom and on
the bridge had not been tested at the frequency defined by the company.
• The calibration gas used for calibration of the hydrocarbon, toxic gas or
oxygen sensors was out of date or not appropriate for use with the system.
• One or more hydrocarbon gas, toxic gas or oxygen sensors were out of
service.
• One or more hydrocarbon gas, toxic gas or oxygen sensors were inhibited or
disconnected from the sampling sequence.
• The gas detection system was defective in any respect.
• Where the pumproom gas detection system was out of service, there was no
record of manual atmosphere measurements having been taken.
5.6.6. Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation and
maintenance of the oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space,
or spaces, containing the inert gas system, and was the equipment fully
operational with sensors calibrated and alarm activation points set in
accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's instructions?
QMS : 376.0523.01 / 376.0524.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure describing the maintenance and operation
of the oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces,
containing the inert gas system.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation and
maintenance of the oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space,
or spaces, containing the inert gas system.
• The oxygen sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with
manufacturer’s instructions at the frequency defined by the company.
• The audible and visual alarms had not been tested at the frequency defined
by the company.
• The calibration gas used for calibration of the oxygen sensors was out of date
or not appropriate for use with the system.
• One or more oxygen sensors were out of service.
• One or more oxygen sensors were inhibited or disconnected from the
sampling sequence.
• The oxygen sensors and/or associated alarms were defective in any respect.
• Where the oxygen sensors and/or associated alarms fitted in the space or
spaces containing the inert gas system were out of service, there was no
record of manual atmosphere measurements having been taken prior to, and
during, entry to the space, or spaces, while the inert gas system was in
operation
5.7. Safety Management
5.7.1. Had all onboard incidents been reported and investigated in
accordance with company procedures, and was an incident investigation
report or a summarised lessons learned bulletin available for each incident at
or above a defined threshold?
QMS : 01N.05.03.07 / 01N.05.03.09
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no incident investigation report or lessons learned bulletin
available onboard for one or more of the incidents reported through the HVPQ
or PIQ, unless the vessel operator had declared that the incident investigation
was ongoing
There was evidence that the vessel had been involved in one of the incident
types listed in the inspection guidance during the 12 months prior to the
inspection but the incident had not been reported though the HVPQ and/or
the PIQ.

5.7.2. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
incident and nearmiss reporting procedure and was evidence available to
demonstrate that incidents and near-misses had been investigated and
closed out in accordance with the company procedure?
QMS : 01N.05.03.07 / 01N.05.03.03
There was no company procedure that required incidents and near-misses
were promptly reported by all ranks and investigated.
• The Master or accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the process to:
o Track each incident and near-miss through to closure.
o Document onboard incidents and near-misses.
o Report incidents or near-misses to shore-based management.
o Investigate incidents and near-misses assigned to vessel staff.
o Implement and document corrective and preventative actions.
o Communicate the outcome of a completed incident or near-miss
investigation to the vessel’s complement.
• Incident and near-miss reports had not been:
o Reported to shore-based management within the required time frame.
o Acknowledged by shore-based management.
o Investigated at the appropriate level of management either onboard or
ashore.
o Closed out with evidence of implementation of corrective and preventative
action.
• There was no system to track incident and near-miss reports through to
closure.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the process to report a near-miss.
• There was no evidence that the outcome of completed incident and near-
miss investigations had been communicated to the vessel’s complement.

5.7.3. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedure for holding and documenting shipboard safety meetings and was
evidence available that safety concerns raised at the meetings were
acknowledged and addressed by shore management?
QMS : 01N.05.02.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures which defined the process for holding
shipboard safety meetings, recording the minutes and shore management
review of the minutes of each meeting.
• Shipboard safety meetings had not been held at the frequency defined by
the company procedure or at approximately monthly intervals.
• Extraordinary safety meetings had not been held after a serious incident
onboard or during a shore management visit, where practical.
• The minutes of shipboard safety meetings had not been documented in
accordance with the required company format.
• The minutes of shipboard safety meetings had not been submitted for shore
management review.
• Shore management had not acknowledged submitted safety meeting
minutes.
• Shore management had failed to address matters included in safety meeting
minutes that required their assistance or intervention.
• There was evidence that a safety meeting had been held on the bridge while
at sea or at anchor or in the cargo control room while conducting cargo or tank
cleaning operations.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
conducting and recording the minutes of shipboard safety meetings.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the process of contributing to a
safety meeting either as an attendee or in the circumstances that they could
not attend a shipboard safety meeting.

5.7.4. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company work
planning procedures and were records available to demonstrate that
onboard work planning meetings had been conducted and documented in
accordance with the procedures?
QMS : 01N.05.05.02 / 05N-010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the requirements for
documented work planning meetings.
• Work planning meetings were not being held at the frequency defined by the
company procedure.
• Work planning meeting records had not been approved onboard in
accordance with the company procedures.
• The outcome from work planning meetings was not being recorded in the
format defined by the company procedure.
• The detail included in the work planning meeting records was not enough to
understand what a job entailed.
• Work planning meeting tasks required permits, risk assessments or detailed
work plans to be used but these were not available.
• Reviewed work planning records did not reflect the actual activities of the
vessel during the period of review.
• Work planning meeting tasks required shore management approval but
there was no evidence that approval had been provided.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company work planning
procedure or the documentation of the outcome of work planning meetings.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the location or content of the
current work planning meeting record.

5.7.5. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the purpose and
implementation of the company Stop Work Authority policy and procedure?
QMS : 01N.05.05.05 / 01N.05.02.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company Stop Work Authority policy and procedure.
• There was no evidence that Stop Work Authority was included and discussed
in work planning processes such as tool-box talks, risk assessments, daily work
planning meetings or safety meetings.
• More than one crewmember was unfamiliar with the company Stop Work
Authority policy and/or procedure.

5.7.6. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedures for risk assessment, as appropriate to their duties, and was there
evidence of the development and review of risk assessments in accordance
with the procedures?
QMS : 01N.05.05.03 / 05N-015
There was no company procedure describing the risk assessment development
and review processes.
• The company risk assessment procedure did not define:
o The circumstances in which a risk assessment must be developed or
reviewed.
o The process for developing a risk assessment.
o The process for recording the results of a risk assessment.
o The process for reviewing an available risk assessment.
o Who is responsible for completing a risk assessment.
o Who should be involved in the development of a risk assessment.
o Who is responsible for approving a risk assessment.
o Who is required to review a risk assessment before work starts on a task.
• A reviewed risk assessment was not relevant to the vessel, its circumstances
or equipment.
• A reviewed risk assessment was from a generic risk assessment library, but
had not been updated to reflect the vessel, its circumstances or its equipment.
• A risk assessment had not been approved at the appropriate management
level as defined by the company procedure.
• There was evidence that a specified task had been completed without an
appropriate risk assessment being reviewed.
• There was evidence that a new, non-routine or unplanned task that required
a risk assessment in accordance with the company procedure had been
completed without an appropriate risk assessment being developed and
approved.
• An interviewed senior officer was unfamiliar with the company risk
assessment procedure or any aspect of a risk assessment completed, reviewed
or approved by them.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with:
o The risk assessment review process prior to starting a task requiring a risk
assessment.
o The existence or content of a risk assessment for a task that they had been
directly involved with.

5.7.7. Were Safety Data Sheets (SDS) available on board for all cargo,
bunkers, chemicals, paints and other products being handled, and were crew
members familiar with their use?

QMS : 01N.05.04.05 / 01N.07.02.02 / 01N.08.03.02

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures to ensure that up to date Safety Data
Sheets are readily available for all hazardous or toxic substances carried on
board and to give guidance on the handling and stowage of these substances,
including PPE requirements.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and content of
the relevant SDSs.
• There was no SDS available for a cargo or fuel oil on board at the time of the
inspection.
• The (M)SDS for an Annex I cargo or fuel oil on board at the time of the
inspection was not in compliance with the requirements of IMO: Resolution
MSC.286(86).
• The (M)SDS for a cargo containing benzene was not in compliance with the
requirements of IMO: Resolution MSC.286(86).
• The (M)SDS for an Annex II or gas cargo on board at the time of the
inspection did not include the information for safe carriage as required by the
IBC and IGC code.
• There was no SDS available locally for a toxic or hazardous substance on
board at the time of the inspection.
Appropriate PPE, first aid and eyewash equipment was not available at the
storage location of a toxic or hazardous substance.
• The stowage of containers or packages containing a toxic or hazardous
substance was unsatisfactory.
• The storage location of a toxic or hazardous substance was not clean and
tidy.
• Incompatible toxic or hazardous substances were stowed together.
• Toxic or hazardous substances were contained in unmarked or incorrectly
marked containers.
• Toxic or hazardous substances had been transferred to, and were contained
in, unsuitable containers.
• Toxic or hazardous substances were stored in an unsuitable location.

5.7.8. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) procedure and was there evidence that
SIMOPS were considered during work planning and the required controls
implemented for the duration of such operations?
QMS : 01N.05.04.12 SIMOPS template
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which gave guidance and instruction on
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS).
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company SIMOPS
procedure.
The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the decision matrix or the matrix
of permitted operations, where these were provided and required to be used
for assessing SIMOPS.
• There were no records available to demonstrate that SIMOPS had been
considered during the onboard work planning process.
• Records of SIMOPS controls had not been maintained in accordance with the
company SIMOPS procedure through documents such as:
o Work planning meeting records.
o Risk assessments.
o SIMOPS plan/interface documents.
• There was evidence of SIMOPS taking place that would have required the
company SIMOPS work review and documentation process to be used but no
records were available for review.
• There was evidence of SIMOPS taking place which were specifically
prohibited by the company SIMOPS procedure.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the term SIMOPS and what their
responsibilities would be with regards to their assigned task when SIMOPS
were being undertaken.
-----------------------------------------------
5.8. Area Safety Inspections
5.8.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
safety inspections of the main deck areas, and had inspections been effective
in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
QMS : 01N.05.02.02 / 01N.05.02.03 / 128.0300.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of
the main deck areas were conducted at appropriate intervals by the
designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,
safety and the environment.
• Records of safety inspections of the main deck areas were missing or
incomplete.
• There was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the
main deck areas.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which
required that safety inspections of the main deck areas were conducted at
appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to
be conducted in accordance with the company main deck areas inspection
checklist.
• Safety inspections of the main deck areas were ineffective as demonstrated
by any of the potential deficiencies listed below:
o Non-skid coatings or gratings were not provided in working areas or on
walkways.
o Working areas and/or walkways were not clearly marked.
o Trip hazards were not clearly marked or highlighted with contrasting paint.
o Light fittings in gas-hazardous areas had:
 Cracks in metal casings or covers.
 Cracked or broken glass.
 Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.
 Flame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.
 Gaskets present between mating metal surfaces.
 Paint covering safety features such as relief holes, passages etc.
o Deck wiring and/or conduit runs were not in a satisfactory condition.
o There was leakage from a cargo, cargo heating, inert gas or hydraulic system
on deck.
o A number of deck lights were not operational.
o Deck lighting was not adequate to allow:
 Sufficient visibility to permit safe access to all areas of the deck.
 The safe use of mooring equipment.
 The monitoring of the deck area for spills and leakages.
 The monitoring of all deck areas and the adjacent surrounding areas to
prevent unauthorised access.
o A roller fairlead or other item of rotating deck equipment was not well
maintained and free to rotate.
o Fairleads being used with synthetic lines were grooved or roughened.
o A mooring or towing fitting was not clearly marked with its SWL in tonnes (t)
by weld bead outline.
o A weathertight door to a deck house was not in a satisfactory condition and
capable of being properly secured.
o Flammable liquids were stored in a deck house which was not specifically
designed and classified.
o Lube oil, other oil drums or spare parts/stores were not safely stowed and
secured on deck.
o Drums stowed on deck were not marked with their content.

5.8.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
safety inspections of the machinery spaces, and had inspections been
effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
QMs : 01N.05.02.02 / 01N.05.02.03 / 128.0300.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of
the machinery spaces were conducted at appropriate intervals by the
designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,
safety and the environment.
• Records of safety inspections of the machinery spaces were missing or
incomplete.
• There was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the
machinery spaces.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which
required that safety inspections of the machinery spaces were conducted at
appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to
be conducted in accordance with the company machinery spaces inspection
checklist.
• Safety inspections of the machinery spaces were ineffective as demonstrated
by any of the potential deficiencies listed below:
o Suitable metal containers with an integral cover were not provided for the
storage of cotton waste, cleaning rags or similar materials after use, and/or
these were not emptied frequently.
o Wood, paints, solvents, oil or other flammable materials were stored in
boiler rooms or machinery spaces including steering gear compartments unless
specifically identified areas had been prepared and approved for storage of
such items.
o Suitable eye-protection and PPE was not readily available where required, for
example for welding, handling chemicals or operating a lathe or fixed or
portable grinding wheel.
o Lagging and insulation on high temperature surfaces such as steam pipes,
exhaust pipes etc. was missing, in poor condition or impregnated with oil.
o Safety notices and signs appropriate to the specific compartments were not
posted to indicate hazards and obstructions or control measures to be taken
where the hazard or obstruction could not be removed.
o Pipelines were not colour coded or labelled to indicate their contents.
o There were broken or defective light fittings in the machinery spaces.
o There were unprotected open hatchways through which persons may fall or
on which they may trip.
o The guardrails or fencing of any protected open hatchway were not in good
order.
o Floor plates had been removed and the opening left unguarded or
insufficiently lit.
o Floor plates were unsecured, uneven, or having gaps, presenting a trip and
fall hazard.
o Safety guards were not in place for all machinery, rotating shafts or
equipment, as necessary.
o There were visible oil leaks from any machinery.
o Purifier rooms and fuel and lubricating oil handling areas were not ventilated
and/or clean.
o There was an accumulation of waste oil in the bilges or in save-alls in way of
machinery space fuel, lube and hydraulic oil service, settling and storage tanks.
o Tank tops and bilges were not painted a light colour so that leaks may be
readily located.
o Engine-room bilges contained rubbish or other substances that might
prevent the bilges being readily and easily pumped.
o Spare gear was not properly stowed and/or items of machinery under
overhaul were not safely secured to prevent them breaking loose and causing
injury or damage in heavy weather.
o Spare gear, tools and other equipment or material was left lying around,
especially near to steering gear rams, switchboards or batteries.
o Flammable materials were left or stored near switchboards.
o Gauge glass closing devices on oil tanks were not of a self-closing, fail-safe
type or were inhibited.
o Self-closing sounding devices to double bottom tanks were not in good order,
closed and capped.
o Non-approved hold-open methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or other
arrangements were used to hold any fire door in the machinery spaces open
where it was required to be self-closing.
• There was a safety deficiency of any kind in the machinery spaces.

5.8.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
safety inspections of the cargo pumproom, and had inspections been
effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
QMS : 01N.05.02.02 / 01N.05.02.03 / 128.0300.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of
the cargo pumproom be conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated
Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and
the environment.
• Records of safety inspections of the cargo pumproom were missing or
incomplete.
• There was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the
cargo pumproom.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which
required that safety inspections of the cargo pumproom were conducted at
appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer
The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be
conducted in accordance with the company cargo pumproom inspection
checklist.
• Safety inspections of the cargo pumproom were ineffective as demonstrated
by any of the potential deficiencies listed below:
o Pumproom lighting was not fully operational.
o Pumproom lighting was inadequate to illuminate the space.
o Pumproom light fittings had:
 Cracks in metal casings or covers.
 Cracked or broken glass.
 Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.
 Flame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.
 Gaskets present between mating metal surfaces.
o The pumproom ventilation was not:
 operating in extraction mode.
 interlocked with the pumproom lighting.
 operating at the correct (lower) suction.
o The pumproom fan(s) were running noisily or with excessive vibration.
o The pumproom bilges were not clean and dry.
o Cargo residue had been drained to the pumproom bilge.
o There were leaks from pumps, pipelines, valve glands or instrumentation.
o Cargo or ballast pipelines were temporarily repaired with patches or
bandages.
o Spray shields or spray protection covers around the glands of cargo pumps or
detachable connections were missing or damaged.
o Bulkhead seals were defective in any respect.
o Exposed rotating shafts were not protected with guards.
o Pipe lagging was impregnated with oil or missing from sections of hot piping
intended to be lagged.
o Items stored in the pumproom were not properly secured against
movement.
o Paint or other flammable material was stored in the pumproom unless
contained within an area specifically designed and designated for such storage.
o The pumproom rescue harness was not fit for use and rigged for immediate
operation.
o Safety chains to prevent falling through open vertical ladder accesses were
missing or not connected.
o Cargo and ballast pump emergency stop buttons were not clearly marked.
o The pumproom telephone was defective.
• There was a safety deficiency of any kind in the pumproom.

5.8.4 Were the Master and officers familiar with the procedure for safety
inspections of the cargo machinery rooms, and had inspections been
effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
 There was no company procedure which required that safety
inspections of the cargo machinery rooms be conducted at
appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify
hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.
 Records of safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms were
missing or incomplete.
 There was no checklist(s) provided to facilitate the safety inspections of
the cargo machinery rooms.
 The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure which required that safety inspections of the cargo
machinery rooms were conducted at appropriate intervals by the
designated Safety Officer.
 The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks
required to be conducted in accordance with the company cargo
machinery rooms inspection checklist(s).
 Safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms were ineffective
as demonstrated by any of the potential deficiencies listed below:
o Entry requirements were not posted at the entrance to the cargo
machinery rooms.
o There was no warning notice posted outside the cargo
machinery rooms requiring the use of ventilation prior to
entry.
o Cargo machinery room lighting was not fully operational.
o Cargo machinery room lighting was inadequate to illuminate the
space.
o Cargo machinery room light fittings had:
 Cracks in metal casings or covers.
 Cracked or broken glass.
 Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or
explosion-proof enclosures.
 Flame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing
bolts.
 Gaskets present between mating metal surfaces.
o The compressor room ventilation system was not maintaining
negative relative pressure.
o The motor room ventilation system was not maintaining relative
positive pressure.
o The air-lock ventilation system was not maintaining relative
positive pressure
o The cargo machinery room fan(s) were running noisily or with
excessive vibration.
o There were gas leaks evident in the compressor room.
o Cargo machinery room ventilation inlet or outlet grilles were
obstructed.
o The cargo machinery room gas sampling heads and/or
ventilation points were incorrectly set for the cargo being
carried.
o The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the location
and/or status of the gas sampling heads in the cargo
machinery room.
o Audible and/or visual air lock alarms were not operational.
o There were no records of tests of the air lock alarm and shut
down system.
 o Airlock door seals were damaged or ineffective.
o Hold back arrangements were fitted to air-lock doors and/or
doors were held open.
o Cargo machinery room electrical fittings were found to be
damaged/modified.
o A bulkhead seal between the compressor and motor
rooms was not gas tight and operating effectively e.g. a
lubricating oil reservoir was low or empty.
o An exposed rotating shaft was not protected with a guard.
o Flammable materials were found stowed in a cargo machinery
room.
o Items stored in the cargo machinery room were not properly
secured against movement.
o Materials were stowed in a cargo machinery room that
obstructed safe unrestricted access to operate valves or
rescue an injured person.
o Arrangements to deal with drainage of the cargo machinery
room were blocked/ineffective.
o Compressors were not isolated whilst carrying a cargo of
Ethylene Oxide or Propylene Oxide.

Where the entry procedures for the compressor room posted at the
entrance were not in alignment with the enclosed space entry procedure
contained in the SMS or, compressor room entry was authorised without
full compliance with the enclosed space entry procedure, make a negative
observation under question 5.5.1.

Where a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety

inspections of the cargo machinery rooms, this should be documented
within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a
specific question relating to the hardware included in the CVIQ.

5.8.5. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
safety inspections of the forecastle, and had inspections been effective in
identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?

QMS : 01N.05.02.02 / 01N.05.02.03 / 128.0300.05

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of
the forecastle were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated
Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and
the environment.
• Records of safety inspections of the forecastle were missing or incomplete.
• There was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the
forecastle.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which
required that safety inspections of the forecastle were conducted at
appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to
be conducted in accordance with the company forecastle inspection checklist.
• Safety inspections of the forecastle were ineffective as demonstrated by any
of the potential deficiencies listed below:
o Weathertight doors to the forecastle space were not in satisfactory condition
and capable of being properly secured.
o Forecastle spaces were not well illuminated, free of water, and/or clean and
tidy.
o Stores, spare parts etc. were not properly secured against movement.
o Flammable liquids were stored in the forecastle which was not specifically
designed and classified.
o Access to bitter end securing arrangements, safety equipment and bilge
wells/alarms was not clear and unobstructed.
o Chain lockers were not clearly marked as enclosed spaces and/or the doors
securely closed.
o Thruster rooms, transfer pump rooms or other any other interconnected
spaces were not clearly marked with required safe entry controls and
requirements.
o Electrical or hydraulic equipment or other machinery in the forecastle spaces
was not in satisfactory condition.
o Starter panels were not protected from leakage from SW line flanges and/or
the watertight entrance door to the space.
o There was evidence of leakage from the anchor wash SW lines into the
space.

5.8.6. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
safety inspections of the accommodation, and had inspections been effective
in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
QMS : 01N.05.02.02 / 01N.05.02.03 / 128.0300.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of
the accommodation were conducted at appropriate intervals by the
designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,
safety and the environment.
• Records of safety inspections of the accommodation were missing or
incomplete.
• There was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the
accommodation.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which
required that safety inspections of the accommodation were conducted at
appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to
be conducted in accordance with the company accommodation inspection
checklist.
• Safety inspections of the accommodation were ineffective as demonstrated
by any of the potential deficiencies listed below:
o Accommodation spaces were not well illuminated, clean, tidy, in a hygienic
condition and/or obstruction free.
o There were overloaded electrical sockets.
o The condition of electrical equipment was not satisfactory (give details).
o Smoking regulations were not being observed.
o Laundries contained accumulations of clothing that could constitute a fire
hazard.
o Laundry driers and/or vents contained accumulations of lint and fluff that
could constitute a fire hazard.
o A weathertight door, window or porthole was not in good order and capable
of being properly secured.
o The ship's hospital was not ready for immediate use but was being used as
an additional cabin or storeroom.
o The refrigerated room alarm was not operational.
o The refrigerated room alarm had not been regularly tested.

5.8.7. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom, and had
inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the
environment?
QMS : 01N.05.02.02 / 01N.05.02.03 / 128.0300.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of
the ballast and/or bunker pumproom be conducted at appropriate intervals by
the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to
health, safety and the environment.
• Records of safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom were
missing or incomplete.
• There was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the
ballast and/or bunker pumproom.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which
required that safety inspections
of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom were conducted at appropriate
intervals by the designated Safety Officer.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to
be conducted in accordance with the company ballast and/or bunker
pumproom inspection checklist.
• Safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom were ineffective
as demonstrated by any of the potential deficiencies listed below:
o Pumproom lighting was not fully operational.
o Pumproom lighting was inadequate to illuminate the space.
o Pumproom light fittings had:
 Cracks in metal casings or covers.
 Cracked or broken glass.
 Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.
 Flame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.
 Gaskets present between mating metal surfaces.
o The pumproom ventilation was not:
 Operating in extraction mode.
 Operating at the correct (lower) suction.
 Operational due to the failure of the single fan fitted. (Give details of
alternative temporary arrangements in place.)
o The pumproom fan(s) was running noisily or with excessive vibration.
o The pumproom bilges were not clean and dry.
o There were leaks from pumps, pipelines, valve glands or instrumentation.
o Bunker or ballast pipelines were temporarily repaired with patches or
bandages.
o Bulkhead seals were defective in any respect including grease/oil cups that
were cracked/broken/missing or below the minimum level
Exposed rotating shafts were not protected with guards.
o Pipe lagging was impregnated with oil or missing from sections of hot piping
intended to be lagged.
o Items stored in the pumproom were not properly secured against
movement.
o Paint or other flammable material was stored in the pumproom unless
contained within an area specifically designed and designated for such storage.
o The pumproom rescue harness was not fit for use and rigged for immediate
operation.
o Safety chains to prevent falling through open vertical ladder accesses were
missing or not connected.
o Bunker and ballast pump emergency stop buttons were not clearly marked.
o The pumproom telephone was defective.
• There was a safety deficiency of any kind in the pumproom.
5.9. Lifting and Rigging
5.9.1. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company lifting
and rigging procedures, and was evidence available to demonstrate that each
item of lifting and rigging equipment had been maintained, inspected and
tested in accordance with the procedure?
QMS : 01.07.06.03 / 383.0100 / 452.0100 / 452.3500 / 452.4500
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for the management of lifting and rigging
equipment.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
the management of lifting and rigging equipment.
• Certification for lifting equipment and loose gear covered by a Classification
Society programme had not been maintained in accordance with the
Classification Society requirements:
• An item of lifting equipment and loose gear covered by a Classification
Society programme was out of service.
• An item of lifting equipment or loose gear covered by a Classification Society
programme was found to be defective in any respect.
• There was no inventory of lifting and rigging equipment for all equipment
that was not covered by a Classification Society programme.
• The inventory of lifting or rigging equipment had not been maintained in
accordance with company rigging and lifting procedure:
• Manufacturer’s test certificates were not available for each item of rigging
equipment and, lifting equipment fall and topping lift wires.
• Items of rigging equipment or, fall or topping lift wires, had not been
removed from service in accordance with the company retirement criteria.
• Items of lifting or rigging equipment were not marked in accordance with the
company lifting and rigging procedure.
• Items of lifting or rigging equipment had not been periodically inspected by a
competent person in accordance with the company procedure.
• Items of lifting or rigging gear which had not been removed from service
were found to be in an apparently unsatisfactory condition.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the inventory of lifting and
rigging equipment.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the markings required on each
item of lifting or rigging equipment and/or the checks required to be
undertaken before using the item during routine work.

5.9.2. Where the vessel was fitted with a single cargo hose handling crane,
was a risk assessment available which identified the minimum spare parts
that must be carried onboard to ensure continued operation in the event of a
single component failure, and were the identified spare parts available
onboard?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no risk assessment available which identified the minimum spare
parts that must be carried for a single hose handling crane.
• There was not at least one spare hydraulic hose suitable to replace any
hydraulic hose fitted to the hose handling crane.
• Any other spare parts identified by the risk assessment as being essential for
the continued use of the hose handling crane were not available onboard.
5.10. Safe Access
5.10.1. Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the
company procedures for rigging the pilot boarding arrangements, and was
the equipment provided in satisfactory condition and used in accordance
with industry best practice?
QMS : 01N.04.03.07 / 01N.04.03.07a
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for the safe rigging of the pilot boarding
arrangements.
• An inspected pilot ladder was found:
o Without any identification to connect it to its manufacturer’s certificate or
maintenance records.
o With defects or arrangements which were specifically identified as
unacceptable on BPG Checklist A4.
o Constructed with materials or in a manner that did not comply with BPG
Checklist A4.
o Without manufacturer’s certificates or maintenance records.
o To have been repaired in a manner which did not conform to the
manufacturer’s instructions.
• The pilot access arrangements did not conform to the requirements of BPG
Checklist A4.
• The pilot boarding position was not within the parallel body length of the
vessel for all normal operating draughts.
• Where a combination ladder was required due to the vessel’s freeboard, the
means to secure the pilot ladder and the accommodation ladder to the ship’s
side was missing or broken.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
rigging and recovering the pilot boarding arrangements.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the pilot boarding
arrangements provided.
• An interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and
recover the pilot boarding arrangements.
• An item of equipment related to the pilot boarding arrangement was found
to be missing or defective.
• The pilot boarding illumination was defective.
• The pilot ladder securing arrangement did not ensure that the weight of the
pilot ladder was supported by the side ropes.
• The gateway in the rails or bulwark opened outwards, did not have a means
to hold it open or impeded the safe passage of the pilot when embarking or
disembarking.
• The deck area in the vicinity of the pilot boarding area did not have a non-slip
finish.
• Where a pilot boarding arrangement was in the rigged condition during the
inspection it was observed to be rigged in a manner that did not conform to
ICS BPG5 Checklist A4 or the vessel’s pilot boarding arrangement rigging
drawings.
• A damaged or retired pilot ladder was retained onboard but was not clearly
marked to prevent its use for either pilot transfer or any other purpose
-------------------------------------------------
5.10.2. Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the
company procedures for rigging the accommodation ladders, and were the
accommodation ladders in good order and used in accordance with the
company procedure and manufacturer’s instructions?
QMS : 01N.05.06.10
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure that described the safe rigging of an
accommodation ladder.
• The maintenance records for the accommodation ladders were missing or
incomplete.
• The certificate(s) for the five-yearly load test of an accommodation ladder
was not available or the test had not been completed within the required time
frame.
• There was no evidence that the accommodation ladder fall wires had been
replaced within the previous five years or, the manufacturer’s certificate was
not available for a fall wire in service.
• The fall wire was not long enough to permit the accommodation ladder to be
deployed at the maximum freeboard whilst leaving sufficient turns on the
winch drum.
• An inspected accommodation ladder was found:
o Without plates or markings showing the restrictions on the safe operation
and loading, including the maximum and minimum permitted design angles of
inclination, design load, maximum load on bottom end plate.
o With defects such as fractures, corrosion or deformation, to the structure of
the ladder, steps, handrails, stanchions, turntables, rollers, pivots or lifting
arrangements.
With defects to its hoisting arrangements.
o With defective fall wire(s).
o To have temporary repairs to the main structure or strength members of the
ladder or its hoisting system.
o Any other defect that compromised its safe use.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
rigging and recovering an accommodation ladder.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation or rigging of the
accommodation ladder provided.
• An interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and
recover an accommodation ladder.
• The accommodation ladder illumination was defective.
• Where an accommodation ladder was rigged during the inspection:
o It was observed to be rigged or used in a manner that did not conform to the
accommodation ladder design limitations.
o The bottom platform had not been adjusted to keep it level when deployed
at the boarding level.
o A safety net had not been rigged when required by the company procedure.
o There was no lifebuoy, light and line available at the gangway landing area.
(The line should be connected to the lifebuoy and light)

5.10.3. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedure for providing safe access to the vessel while alongside a
terminal/berth, and was safe access provided by the ship’s portable
gangway, the vessel’s accommodation ladder or a shore gangway?

QMS : 01N.05.06.10 / 01N.05.04.02

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which described the requirements for
providing safe access to the vessel while alongside a terminal/berth.
• The maintenance records for the portable gangway, where provided, were
missing or incomplete.
• Where a portable gangway was provided:
o The certificate for the five-yearly load test of the portable gangway was not
available or the test had not been completed within the required time frame.
o The portable gangway was found:
 Without plates or markings showing the restrictions on the safe operation
and loading, including the maximum and minimum permitted design angles of
inclination and design load.
With defects such as fractures, corrosion or deformation, to the structure of
the ladder, steps, handrails, stanchions, rollers, or lifting arrangements.
 With deteriorated tread/non-skid provision on each step surface.
 To have temporary repairs to the main structure or strength members of the
gangway.
 Any other defect that compromised its safe use.
• The embarkation and disembarkation area illumination provided by the
vessel was defective.
• Where a ship’s portable gangway or accommodation ladder was rigged
during the inspection as a means of embarkation or disembarkation to the
terminal, it was observed to be rigged or used in a manner that did not
conform to the design limitations of the equipment.
• A safety net had not been rigged where required by the company procedure
and/or the guidance provided by ISGOTT6 16.4.3.4.
• A portable gangway was resting on handrails not designed to take the load.
• Where a gangway was resting on the ship’s handrails or bulwark, there was
no bulwark ladder provided to give safe access between the deck and the head
of the gangway.
• There was no lifebuoy, light and line available at the gangway landing area.
(The line should be connected to the lifebuoy and light)
• There was no warning sign displayed at the gangway required by the
company procedure and/or ISGOTT6 23.10.1.
• There was no sign displayed at the gangway warning of the specific dangers
of the cargo being handled (e.g. High H2S) or operations being undertaken (i.e.
nitrogen purging).
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
providing safe access to the vessel while alongside a terminal/berth.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the safe rigging of a portable
gangway or accommodation ladder while at a terminal/berth.
• An interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and
recover the portable gangway, where provided.

5.10.4. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company personnel
transfer by crane procedure, and where a personnel transfer basket (PTB)
and accessories were provided, were these in satisfactory condition and used
in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer’s
recommendations?

There was no company procedure describing the requirements for transfer of

personnel by crane.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The company procedure describing the requirements for transfer of
personnel by crane.
o The use of the PTB or accessories for personnel transfer by crane.
o The checks on the PTB and accessories required to be carried out before
personnel transfer by crane is undertaken.
o The risk assessment and personnel transfer by crane plan development
process.
o The contingency plan for crane failure during personnel transfer by crane.
• There were no manufacturer’s test certificates available for the PTB or lifting
accessories.
• The crane(s) used for personnel transfer were not certified for personnel
transfer contrary to the response to HVPQ question 13.1.7.
• There was no contingency plan for the failure of the crane during personnel
transfer.
• There were no training records available for the personnel designated for
personnel transfer by crane operations.
• Maintenance, inspection or testing of the crane, PTB or accessories had not
been conducted in accordance with the company procedure or the
manufacturer’s recommendations.
• Records of maintenance, inspection or testing for the crane, PTB or
accessories were incomplete or missing.• The PTB or lifting accessories were
not marked with:
o The SWL or capacity.
o The empty weight.
• Taglines meeting the recommendations of the OCIMF information paper
were not provided.
• Taglines were terminated with knots or back-splices.
• The PTB had not been replaced in accordance with the company PTB
retirement policy or manufacturer’s recommendations.
• Personnel transfers by crane had taken place without a risk assessment
and/or personnel transfer by crane plan being developed to address the
circumstances at the time of transfer.
• There was evidence that personnel transfer by crane had taken place using a
device or arrangement other than an approved PTB provided by either the
passive or active vessel.

5.10.5. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for helicopter/ship operations, and had these procedures been complied
with?
QMS : 01N.02.02.15 / 01.07.16.01 / 04N-001
• There were no procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations
including:
o Helicopter operations risk assessment.
Page 598 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library: Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)
o Training and emergency drill requirements.
o Preparation of a Helicopter Landing/Operating Area Plan.
o Use of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or
equivalent).
o Deck Party Officer and Deck Party Crew assignment.
o Emergency tools and equipment requirements.
o Restrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures providing
guidance on helicopter/ship operations or the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship
Operations.
• There was no helicopter operations risk assessment available.
• There was no evidence that the helicopter operations risk assessment had
been reviewed in accordance with the company procedures.
• There was no record of the required training and emergency drills taking
place.
• There was no copy of the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations on board.
• There was no Helicopter Landing/Operating Area Plan available.
• The ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent)
had not been completed prior to performing helicopter/ship operations.
• The emergency tools and equipment required by the ICS Guide to
Helicopter/Ship Operations were not readily available.
• Restrictions on cargo / crane operations during helicopter/ship operations
had not been complied with.

5.10.6. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for helicopter/ship operations, and had the crew involved received
appropriate training?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations
including:
o Helicopter operations risk assessment.
o Identification of job roles and responsibilities for all personnel involved.
o Training requirements of all personnel involved.
o Emergency drill requirements.
o Use of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or
equivalent).
o Emergency tools and equipment requirements.
o Restrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations.
o Reasons for, and extent of, any operational limitations.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures providing
guidance on helicopter/ship operations or the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship
Operations.
• There was no helicopter operations risk assessment available.
• There was no evidence that the helicopter operations risk assessment had
been reviewed in accordance with the company procedures.
• No HLAC was available, and there were no/incomplete records of
appropriate formal accredited training courses such as Offshore Helicopter
Landing Officer (HLO) and Offshore Helideck Assistant (HDA) followed by ship-
specific familiarisation of the helicopter facilities and operations for all
personnel involved.
• There were no records of emergency drills in helicopter/ship operations.
• There was no copy of the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations on board.
• The ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent)
had not been completed prior to performing helicopter/ship operations.
• The required emergency tools and equipment as set out in the ICS Guide to
Helicopter/Ship Operations were not readily available.
• Restrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations had not
been complied with.

5.10.7. Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the escape routes
from the machinery spaces, pump rooms, compressor rooms,
accommodation spaces and, when in port, from the vessel, and were these
routes clearly marked, unobstructed and well illuminated?
QMS : 01N.05.04.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which defined the requirements for
identifying and marking escape routes.
• The escape routes from within the accommodation spaces, machinery
spaces, pump rooms, compressor rooms, thruster rooms or any other spaces
where a person could become disorientated in an emergency were not marked
with signs in accordance with IMO guidance.
• The accompanying officer could not direct the inspector to the escape route
from any location within the vessel where there was potential to take a route
to a dead end or space with no exit to an outside deck.
• External doors forming part of an escape route were locked or bolted with no
means of rapid opening from the inside.
• An officer or rating was unable to demonstrate the opening of an external
door which formed part of an escape route from the inside.
• Except in circumstances where security procedures required external doors
to be secured to make entry from the outside impossible, the accompanying
officer was unable to explain how a properly equipped firefighting team would
be able to access through an external door forming part of an emergency
escape route.
• A means of escape was blocked or obstructed.
• Self-closing doors forming part of an escape route would not close and latch
without intervention when released.
• More than one bulb was unlit in any enclosed escape trunk.
• The escape route from the accommodation to the shore means of access was
not marked.
• The escape route from the accommodation to the shore means of access was
routed over moorings lines under tension or passed across the outboard side
the cargo manifold in use unless there was no alternative to such routing

5.11. Sample Management

5.11.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
addressing the management of samples of bunker fuel oil and Annex I and/or
Annex II cargoes as applicable, and were samples being properly stored and
eventually disposed of?
QMS : 01N.07.02.10 / 01N.08.02.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures addressing the management of bunker
fuel oil and Annex I and/or Annex II cargo samples as applicable, including:
o Marking/labelling of samples.
o Storage arrangements.
o Records to be kept.
• The responsible officer was not familiar with the company procedures
addressing the management of bunker fuel oil or Annex I and/or Annex II cargo
samples, as appropriate.
• The designated storage space(s) for samples was:
o Insufficient for the quantity of samples being retained.
o Accessible from the accommodation.
o Not within the cargo area for MARPOL Annex II samples.
o Subject to high temperatures.
o Inadequately ventilated.
o Not protected by a fixed firefighting system or readily available portable
firefighting equipment.
• Samples were:
o Stored outside the designated storage space(s).
o Retained beyond the period indicated in the company procedures.
o Not disposed of as required by the company procedures.
• Bunker fuel oil samples were not marked as required by MEPC.96(47) or
MEPC.1/Circ.864/rev.1 as appropriate.
• Annex I cargo samples were not marked as required by company procedures.
• Annex II cargo samples were not marked as recommended in the ICS Tanker
Safety Guide.
• A log was not kept of all:
o bunker fuel oil samples.
o cargo samples.
• The disposal of cargo samples had not been recorded in the Oil Record Book
Part II or Cargo Record Book as applicable.
• The disposal of bunker samples had not been recorded in the Oil Record
Book Part 1.
• The design of a sample locker did not ensure that sample bottles were
securely stored and protected from damage.
• Annex II cargo samples that might react dangerously with one another were
not separated in the sample locker.
• Inhibited Annex II cargo samples had been retained on board beyond the
period that the inhibitor remained active, as stated on the inhibitor certificate.

5.12. Safety Equipment

5.12.1. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedures that addressed the use of respiratory protective equipment
during cargo operations, and did the procedures prohibit the use of filter
type respirators for this purpose?
QMS : 01N.05.04.01 / 01N.07.02.01 / 01N.07.02.06 / 01N.08.06.06
01N.08.07.01 / 01N.08.07.03 / 01N.08.07.06 / 01N.08.07.10
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the use of respiratory protective
equipment during cargo operations.
• The company procedures for the use of respiratory protective equipment
during cargo operations did not prohibit the use of filter type respirators
during cargo operations.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the use of respiratory protective equipment during cargo operations.
• Filter type respirators were observed being used by crew members involved
in cargo operations.

5.12.2. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location and
operation of the decontamination showers and eyewash stations on deck,
and were these facilities suitably marked, easily accessible and ready for use?
QMS : 08N-005
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which ensures that decontamination
showers and eye wash stations on deck were ready for use.
Page 618 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library: Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the location and operation of the
decontamination showers and eyewash stations on deck.
• The decontamination showers and eye wash stations on deck were not
o Ready for use.
o Suitably marked.
o Easily accessible.
o Regularly inspected and tested as required by company procedures.
o Provided with insulation and a recirculation system or a fully heat-traced
line.
• Sections of freshwater piping supplying the showers or eye wash stations
required to be heat traced and/or insulated were found with the insulation
and/or heat tracing removed.
• The fresh water supply to a shower or eyewash station was found to be
either frozen or scalding hot.
6. Pollution Prevention
6.1. Pollution Prevention - Record Books

6.1.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
maintaining the Cargo Record Book, and did the entries contained in the
Cargo Record Book accurately record the cargo related operations required
to be documented by MARPOL Annex II?
QMS : 01N.10.06.01 / 01N.08.05.06 / 01N.08.03.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for maintaining the Cargo Record Book in
accordance with MARPOL Annex II and any Flag Administration instructions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedures for
maintaining the CRB in accordance with MARPOL Annex II and any Flag
Administration instructions.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no
instructions available for the use of the electronic record book system.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no
Declaration from flag/class authorising its use.
• There was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the
electronic record book system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s
network.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be
made in the CRB
• The entries in the CRB:
o Were not an accurate record of cargo operations.
o Did not correctly identify cargoes by their correct technical name according
to the Certificate of Fitness.
o Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex II.
o Did not record all cargo related operations required to be recorded by
MARPOL Annex II.
o Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.
o Were not verified and signed by the Master on completion of each page.
o Were not supported by a receipt or certificate when tank washings were
disposed to a reception facility.
• Where a prewash operation had been carried out in accordance with
MARPOL Annex II requirements, the required entry in the CRB had not been
endorsed by the local port authority inspector or equivalent.
• Tank washings disposal to the sea had not been made in compliance with
MARPOL Annex II.
• A pollution incident (accidental or other exceptional discharge) was recorded
in the CRB.
• Where a vessel was an oil/chemical carrier MARPOL Annex I cargo operations
had been entered in the Cargo Record Book rather than the Oil Record Book
Part II.

6.1.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for
maintaining the Oil Record Book Part II, and did the entries contained in the
Oil Record Book Part II accurately record the cargo related operations
required to be documented by MARPOL Annex I?
QMS : 01N.10.06.01 / 01N.08.05.07 / 01N.08.03.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part II
(ORB II) in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration
instructions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedure for
maintaining the ORB II in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag
Administration instructions.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no
instructions available for the use of the electronic record book system.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no
Declaration from flag/class authorising its use.
• There was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the
electronic record book system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s
network.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be
made in the ORB II.
• The entries in ORB II:
o Were not an accurate record of cargo operations.
o Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex I.
o Did not record all cargo related operations required to be recorded by
MARPOL Annex I.
o Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.
o Were not verified and signed by the Master on completion of each page.
o Were not supported by a receipt or certificate when wash water was
disposed to a reception facility.
o Were corrected in a manner which was not in compliance with the company
procedure.
• Discharge of water from the slop tanks into the sea had not been made in
compliance with MARPOL Annex I.
• Ballast water had been loaded into a cargo tank or cargo tanks after the
carriage of crude oil, but the cargo tank(s) had not been crude oil washed.
The oil discharge monitoring equipment was, or had been, out of service but
there was no entry in ORB II for when the equipment was taken out of service
and, if applicable, returned to service.
• A pollution incident (accidental or other exceptional discharge) was recorded
in the ORB II.
• Where a vessel was an oil/chemical carrier, MARPOL Annex II cargo
operations had been entered in the ORB II rather than the Cargo Record Book.

6.1.3. Were the Master and engineer officers familiar with the company
procedure for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I, and did the entries
contained in the Oil Record Book Part I accurately record the machinery
space operations required to be documented by MARPOL Annex I?
QMS : 01N.10.06.01 / 01N.06.05.06
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I
in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no
instructions available for the use of the electronic record book system.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no
Declaration from flag/class authorising its use.
• There was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the
electronic record book system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s
network.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedure for
maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and
any Flag Administration instructions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be
made in the Oil Record Book Part I.
• The entries in the Oil Record Book Part I:
o Were not an accurate record of machinery space operations.
o Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex I.
o Did not record all machinery space operations required by MARPOL Annex I.
o Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.
o Were not verified and signed by the Master upon completion of each page.
o Were not supported by a receipt or certificate when sludge or bilge water
was disposed to a reception facility.
o Were corrected in a manner which was not in compliance with the company
procedure.
• The oil filtering equipment, its alarm or automatic stopping device was, or
had been, out of service but there was no entry in the ORB I for when the
equipment failed and, if applicable, was returned to service.
Bilge water had been discharged in a Special Area, but the oil filtering
equipment was not fitted with an alarm and an automatic stopping device
(IOPP Certificate Supplement 2.2.1) or this equipment was out of service.
• A pollution incident (accidental or other exceptional discharge) was recorded
in the ORB I.
• Where sludge or bilge water had been transferred to a cargo area slop tank
there was no reciprocal entry in Oil Record Book Part II.
• Where sludge or bilge water had been disposed of to a reception facility,
there was no receipt or certificate detailing the quantity of residues or oily
mixture transferred, available with the ORB I.
• Where sludge had been incinerated, the volume of sludge disposed of was
inconsistent with the capacity of the incinerator in sludge burning mode.
• Where bilge water had been discharged through the oil filtering equipment,
the volume of bilge water disposed of was inconsistent with the capacity of the
oil filtering equipment.
• The disposal of accumulated sludge or bilge water could not be accounted
for through the entries provided in the ORB I
• The capacity of one or more oil residue tanks referred to in an ORB I entry
did not correspond with the capacities listed on the supplement to the IOPP
certificate.

6.1.4. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
maintaining the Garbage Record Book in accordance with the Garbage
Management Plan, and did the entries contained in the Garbage Record Book
accurately record the garbage management activities required to be
documented by MARPOL Annex V?
QMS : 01N.10.06.01 / 01N.06.05.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for maintaining the Garbage Record Book,
either in paper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex V and
any Flag Administration instructions.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no
instructions available for the use of the electronic record book system.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no
Declaration from flag/class authorising its use.
• There was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the
electronic record book system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s
network.
• The was no Garbage Management Plan available onboard.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedure for
maintaining the Garbage Record Book in accordance with MARPOL Annex V
and any Flag Administration instructions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the Garbage Management
Plan.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be
made in the Garbage Record Book.
• The entries in the Garbage Record Book:
• Where garbage had been disposed of to a reception facility, there was no
receipt or certificate detailing the quantity and categories of garbage disposed
of.
• There was no evidence that food waste disposed of overboard through a
waste disposal unit (comminuter or grinder) had been recorded on the GRB.
• Garbage was stored onboard in an unhygienic manner.
• Garbage was not being segregated into the required categories in
preparation for final disposal either by incineration or to a reception facility.
• Dangerous or toxic garbage was found to be mixed with general garbage.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the garbage management
practices onboard.

6.1.5. Were the Master and engineer officers familiar with the company
procedure for maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, and
did the entries contained in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book
accurately record the operations and emissions required to be documented
by MARPOL Annex VI?
QMS : 01N.06.02.05 / 01N.10.06.01 / 07N-050
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure that described the requirements for
maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, either in paper or
electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI and any Flag
Administration guidance.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures that
described the requirements for maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances
Record Book, either in paper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL
Annex VI and any Flag Administration guidance.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no
instructions available for the use of the electronic record book system.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no
Declaration from flag/class authorising its use.
• There was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the
electronic record book system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s
network.
• An item of equipment on board containing ozone-depleting substances was
not included in the Supplement to the International Air Pollution Prevention
Certificate (IAPP Certificate), section 2.1.
• The entries in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book:
o Were not an accurate record of operations and/or emissions involving ozone-
depleting substances.
o Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex VI.
o Did not record all operations and/or emissions required by MARPOL Annex
VI.
o Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.
o Were not verified and signed by the Master upon completion of each page.
o Were not supported by a receipt or certificate for the discharge of ozone-
depleting substances to land-based reception facilities.
o Were corrected in a manner which was not in compliance with the company
procedures.

6.1.6. Were the documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI

Regulation 13 for the control of NOx and associated emissions in good order?
QMS : 01N.06.02.05 / 742.4100
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for maintaining the documents and
records required by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical
Code.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
maintaining the documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI
Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical Code.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the NOx abatement system
installed on board, or its operation.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the actions to be taken in the
event that a NOx abatement system fitted suffered a failure that could not be
rectified within one hour.
• Technical Files were not available for all diesel engines listed in paragraph
2.2.1 of the vessel’s International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate.
• Record Books of Engine Parameters were not available for all those engines
required to undergo Engine Parameter Checks at initial and subsequent
surveys.
• Record Books of Engine Parameters had not been maintained in accordance
with company procedures.
• On a vessel constructed after the applicable date, there were no records of
diesel engine Tier and on/off status on entering/leaving an NECA.
• There was evidence that Tier II engines had been operated in an applicable
NECA.
• On a vessel with Exhaust Gas Recirculation equipment, records of the
discharge of solid residues and bleed-off water had not been maintained in
accordance with company procedures.
• The accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the strategy for
monitoring the catalyst condition/degradation in an SCR system installed on
board, and/or its implementation and associated equipment.
• There were no records available, paper or electronic, of continuous or spot-
checked NOx levels associated with an SCR system fitted on board.
• Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no
instructions available for the use of the electronic record book system.
Where the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no
Declaration from flag/class authorising its use.
• There was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the
electronic record book system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s
network

6.2. Cargo and Bunker Operations

6.2.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the arrangements to drain
the cargo pumproom bilges in the event of flooding or accidental leakage,
and were these arrangements in good order?
QMS : 803.5010 / 01N.02.02.11
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for draining the pumproom bilges.
• There was no shipboard emergency response plan for pumproom flooding.
• The company procedures did not provide guidance on:
o Transferring bilge contents to cargo/slop tanks or other containment tanks
without risk of pollution.Page 650 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library: Part 1
Version 1.0 (January 2022)
o Pumping out the pumproom in the event of flooding, including controlling
the bilge pump and suction and discharge valves remotely from the upper
deck.
o Periodic testing of the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
draining the pumproom bilges.
• There was evidence that the disposal of the content of the pumproom bilges
or bilge wells had not been documented within the Oil Record Book part II.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the location and purpose of
the remote controls for the bilge pump and suction and discharge valves.
• There were no means available to operate the bilge pump and suction and
discharge valves remotely.
• Valves, including steam delivery and condensate return valves, required to
remain in the open position to permit emergency bilge pumping were shut
with no means to open them remotely.
• The means available to operate the bilge pump and suction and discharge
valves remotely were defective in any respect.
• There was no evidence of periodic testing of the arrangements for draining
the pumproom bilges.
• The bilge pump was defective in any respect

6.2.2. Were cargo system overboard and sea suction valves checked and
verified as closed and secured prior to commencement of cargo transfer, and
where provided, were sea valve-testing arrangements in order and regularly
monitored for leakage?
QMS : 01N.08.03.02 / 01N.10.09.01 / 08N 005
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures to prevent cargo spillages through cargo
system overboard and sea suction valves that included detailed guidance on:
o Taking ballast into cargo tanks via sea-valves.
o Line displacement with sea water.
• And precautionary measures including:
o Checking cargo system overboard and sea suction valves are closed and
secured prior to commencement of cargo transfer.
o Checking cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for leakage, where
arrangements are fitted.
o Testing cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for integrity between
dry-docks, where arrangements are fitted.
o The maximum test pressure to which sea valve arrangements should be
submitted.
o Recording these checks and tests.
o Posting suitable anti-pollution notices next to cargo system overboard and
sea suction valves and at the pump operating position.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
prevent cargo spillages through cargo system overboard and sea suction
valves.
• Cargo system overboard valves and/or cargo system sea suction valves had
not been fully closed prior to commencement of cargo transfer.
• Cargo system overboard valves and/or cargo system sea valves had not been
secured using a Lockout/Tag-out system prior to commencement of cargo
transfer.
• Where provided, in-line blanks had not been inserted.
• Where a Lock-out/Tag-out system was not practical as with hydraulic valves,
suitable marking to indicate clearly that the valves were to remain closed had
not been used.
• There were no records of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves
being checked as closed and secured prior to commencement of cargo
transfer.
• Where arrangements for monitoring and testing cargo system overboard and
sea suction valves were fitted:
o There were no records of checking cargo system overboard and sea suction
valves for leakage.
o The pressure/vacuum gauge indicated that there was leakage past one of the
cargo system overboard and/or sea suction valves.
• There were no records of testing cargo system overboard and sea suction
valves for integrity between drydocks.
• The leak detecting arrangement for the direct sea suction valves was not
fitted with a pressure/vacuum gauge.
• The pressure/vacuum gauge fitted was damaged/defective.
• The arrangements were not positioned so that both readings and samples
could be taken from a point far enough above the pumproom lower platform
level that there was no possibility of human exposure to gas concentrations
which may accumulate below the floor plates.
• Suitable anti-pollution notices were not posted next to overboard valves
and/or cargo system sea valves and/or at the pump operating position.

6.2.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
inspections and pressure tests of the bunker oil (HFO and MDO) pipeline
system, and had the tests been performed and the results suitably recorded?
QMS : 01N.10.09.01 / 01N.10.02.02 / 701.0110.02 / 792.0120.21
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the inspection and pressure testing
of the bunker pipeline system including guidance on the:
o Equipment to be inspected/tested.
o Inspection and test frequency.
o Testing method(s).
Page 658 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library: Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)
o The test pressure.
o Disposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.
o Records to be kept.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the inspection and pressure testing of the bunker pipeline system including the
testing method.
• There were no records of inspection and testing of the bunker pipeline
system.
• There were no records of the disposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline
system.
• There were no records of the testing of the bunker system relief valve, where
fitted.
• The bunker pipeline system was not marked with the date of the last test and
the test pressure.
• The bunker pipeline system had not been tested:
o To 100% of MAWP within the last 12 months.
o To 150% of MAWP twice in the last 5 years.
o With a suitable liquid but tested with air or inert gas instead.
• A section of pipeline, pressure gauge, valve, remotely operated valve, tank
level alarm or emergency shutdown device that formed part of the bunker
pipeline system was defective in any respect.

6.3. Ballast Operations

6.3.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the safe operation of the ballast water management system (BWMS), and
was the equipment in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the
company procedures and manufacturer’s instructions?
QMS : 01N.08.04.01 801.3000
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and
maintenance of the ballast water management system (BWMS), including
guidance on:
o Who is responsible for supervising the use of the BWMS.
o Who is permitted to use the BWMS.
o Identification of hazards to the crew presented by the operation of the
BWMS.
o Mitigation measures for hazards presented by the operation of the BWMS.
o Use, handling and storage of any active substances, such as chemicals, used
by the system for disinfection or neutralisation.
o Safe disposal of any by-products of the process.
o The possible effect of water density, water temperature and suspended
solids on the operation of the BWMS.
o Actions in the event of the failure of the BWMS.
o Records to be kept of the operation of the BWMS.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation, inspection and maintenance of the BWMS, particularly the
hazards from the operation of the equipment and the handling and storage of
any chemicals used.
• There were no records of the required inspection and maintenance of the
BWMS in the vessel's maintenance plan.
• There were no records of the operation of the BWMS.
• The BWMS was not fully operational, including pumps, filters and back-flush
arrangements.
• BWMS self-monitoring data indicated that the equipment had not operated
correctly at the last ballast/deballast operation.
• The BWMS had been modified and/or by-passed.
• The BWMS was defective in any respect.
• There was insufficient stock of the required chemicals for injection.
• Storage and/or handling arrangements for the required chemicals were not
satisfactory.

Where the entry procedures for the space containing the BWMS posted at the
entrance were not in alignment with the enclosed space entry procedure
contained in the SMS for such a space or, entry into the space containing the
BWMS was authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the
enclosed space entry procedure, make a negative observation in the Process
response tool of question 5.5.1.

6.4. Deck Area Pollution Prevention

6.4.1. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedures for the removal of small quantities of oil or chemical spilled and
contained on deck, and was suitable response equipment available, in
satisfactory condition and effectively deployed?
QMS : 01N.02.02.04 / 010-020 /489.XXXX / SOPEP/SMPEP/MARPOL
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the removal of oil or chemical spilled
and contained on deck.
• There was no inventory of spill clean-up equipment on board.
• The records of periodic inspections of the inventory of spill clean-up
equipment were missing or incomplete.
• There were no instructions available for the safe use of the spill clean-up
equipment, including PPE requirements.
• Company procedures did not contain:
o A provision that no chemical agent should be used in response to pollution
on the sea without authorization of the appropriate coastal State and that such
authorization should also be requested, when required, for use of containment
or recovery equipment.
o Guidance on the proper disposal of removed oil or chemical and clean-up
materials.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the:
o Company procedures for the removal of oil or chemical spilled and contained
on deck.
o Location, purpose or safe use of the spill clean-up equipment on board,
including PPE requirements.
• Actual quantities of spill clean-up equipment on board were significantly
different to the latest inventory.
• There were inadequate quantities of spill clean-up equipment on board.
• Suitable spill clean-up equipment was not available at the manifold.
• There was no adequate means for the rapid disposal of oil or chemical at the
aft end of the main deck on both sides of the vessel.
• Where the transfer of spilled oil or chemical to a cargo/slop tank was not an
option, there was no alternative means to collect spills and water from the
deck into an enclosed container with a capacity of at least 2 m3.
• Hand scoops, shovels, or buckets provided were not of the non-sparking
type.
• Portable pumps were:
o Not bonded(earthed) to the vessel’s structure.
o Not mounted to prevent movement and subsequent damage during
operation.
o Not ready for immediate use e.g. no air available.
o Arranged to discharge to a cargo/slop tank via the insertion of the spill pump
discharge hose through a tank opening such as a sighting port.
• For non inerted vessels, the portable pumps were not provided with a
connection to a full depth sounding pipe or other connection which avoided
the free fall of liquid in the receiving tank.
• For any reason, it appeared that the dump valves would not be effective in
draining spilled oil or chemical from the deck.
• Where there were restrictions for the use of dump valves, these were not
clearly posted at or near the location of the dump valves.
• Spill clean-up equipment was defective or deficient in any respect.
• There was no permanently fitted spill tank, with suitable means of draining,
or a portable drip tray, fitted under each tanker/terminal manifold connection.
• A plastic or other non-metallic portable drip tray had been placed under a
tanker/terminal manifold connection without bonding.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the location and use of the
oil/chemical spill clean-up material and PPE provided, including the specific
PPE required for the cargoes being carried.

6.4.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the disposal of accumulations of water contaminated with oil and/or marine
pollutants in the forecastle and other internal spaces, and had the
procedures been implemented?
QMS : 01N.02.02.11 / 792.0220 / 803.0500 / 120N-023
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily waste
or other marine pollutants accumulated in internal space bilge wells including:
o Identification of relevant spaces.
o Measures to minimise oily waste generation.
o Monitoring of bilge levels, by inspection or sensor/alarm.
o Arrangements for proper disposal of any oily and/or marine pollutant waste
generated.
o Record keeping.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
ensure proper disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutants accumulated in
internal space bilge wells.
• There was evidence that a disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutant
had taken place, for example after a hydraulic leak in the forecastle, but there
was no record of how the oily waste or marine pollutant had been disposed of.
• Arrangements for the proper disposal of oily waste or other marine
pollutants accumulated in internal space bilge wells were inadequate.
• Arrangements to prevent unauthorised discharge of oily waste and/or
marine pollutant were inadequate.
• The bilge well of an internal space contained a significant quantity of oily
waste or marine pollutant.
6.5. Machinery Space Pollution Prevention
6.5.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the emergency
arrangements to pump out the machinery space bilges in the event of
flooding, and were these arrangements prominently marked and in good
order?
QMS : 803.5000 / 792.0210 / 01N.02.02.11 / 01N.06.05.06
Poster 120N-000
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
Page 674 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library: Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)
• There was no company procedure for the use of the emergency bilge
pumping arrangements in the machinery spaces.
• There was no shipboard emergency response plan for machinery space
flooding.
• The company procedures did not include guidance on:
o The use of the various pumps connected to the bilge system, their direct
suctions and overboard valves.
o The use of the emergency bilge suction.
o MARPOL requirements concerning the discharge into the sea of oil or oily
mixtures necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of the ship or saving
life at sea or resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment.
o Ship specific requirements to seal suction and/or overboard valves,
depending on the ship’s equipment and design, to prevent unauthorised
discharge of oil or oily mixtures.
• The accompanying or interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with
o The location and purpose of the various pumps connected to the bilge
system, their direct suctions and overboard valves.
o The location and purpose of the emergency bilge suction.
o The sequence of opening and closing valves and starting the appropriate
pump to effectively commence pumping out the bilges in an emergency.
o MARPOL requirements concerning the discharge into the sea of oil or oily
mixtures in an emergency flooding situation.
o Company requirements to seal suction and/or overboard valves to prevent
unauthorised discharge of oil or oily mixtures.
• The emergency bilge suction valve was not readily accessible.
• The emergency bilge suction valve was not clearly marked as to its purpose.
• The emergency overboard discharge valve(s) were not provided with a notice
warning against accidental opening.
• Emergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves had not been sealed in
accordance with company procedures.
• Seals on emergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves were not easily
breakable.
• The condition of the emergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves was
unsatisfactory in any respect which may make the operation of the valve
difficult or impossible in an emergency.
• The emergency bilge pumping system or lines were defective in any respect.
• There was evidence that the emergency bilge discharge arrangements had
been used for the disposal of daily machinery space bilge accumulations.

6.5.2. Were the engineer officers familiar with the company procedure for
the safe use of the incinerator, and was the incinerator in satisfactory
condition and used in accordance with the company procedure and in
compliance with MARPOL?
QMS : 01N.06.05.01 / 445.0100
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which described the safe use of the
incinerator.
• There was no risk assessment available for the safe operation of the
incinerator.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure or risk
assessment for the safe operation of the incinerator.
• An interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with:
o The company procedures or risk assessment for the safe operation of the
incinerator.
o The PPE that must be worn when loading garbage into the incinerator.
o The process to safely load garbage into the incinerator.
o The items that were prohibited from being incinerated.
o The actions to take if the incinerator fails or develops a fault.
• The incinerator was out of service or defective in any respect.
• A list of items prohibited from being incinerated was not posted in the
incinerator space.
• Operating instructions were not posted by the incinerator controls.
• There was evidence of localised overheating or exhaust gas leakage from the
combustion chamber or exhaust trunk.
• There was evidence that the safety interlocks on the garbage loading chutes
were defective or being bypassed.
• There was evidence of oil dripping around the incinerator casing and/or
cooling space.
• There was evidence that prohibited items were being incinerated.
• There was evidence that the incinerator had been used to incinerate garbage
or sludge at times or places where MARPOL, local regulations or company
procedure prohibited the use of the incinerator.
• There was evidence that the main or auxiliary power plant of boilers had
been used to incinerate sewage sludge and/or sludge oil at times or places
where MARPOL, local regulations or company procedure prohibited this
practice.
• Waste had been allowed to accumulate around incinerator spaces other than
in the correct storage facilities.
6.6. Oil Discharge Monitors

6.6.1. Were the Master and engineer officers familiar with the company
procedures for the use of the oil filtering equipment, and was the oil filtering
equipment in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the
company procedure, manufacturer’s instructions and MARPOL Annex I?
QMS : 01N.06.05.06 / 120N-047,120N-023 / 803.2500
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which described the use of the oil filtering
equipment provided.
• The 15 ppm bilge alarm sensor had not been calibrated within the previous
five years or within the time frame specified by the manufacturer’s operation
and maintenance manual, where this was less than five years.
• The oil filtering equipment overboard valve was not closed and/or was not
secured and sealed to prevent accidental opening.
• There was no warning sign posted at the overboard valve indicating that the
valve was only to be operated with the authority of the Chief Engineer or the
Master.
• There was evidence that the oil filtering equipment or its system pipework
had been tampered with.
• The oil filtering equipment or its system pipework flanges and connections
were not sealed as per the manufacturer's or shipowner's approved drawing
and/or instructions to prevent tampering.
• The oil filtering equipment was defective in any respect.
• There were no records of inspection and maintenance of the oil filtering
equipment in the vessel’s maintenance plan.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure which described the use of the oil filtering equipment provided.
• An engineer officer was unable to demonstrate the operation and proper
functioning of the oil filtering equipment, automatic stopping device, 15 ppm
bilge alarm and/or 15 ppm bilge alarm recorder.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with:
o The restrictions on use of the oil filtering equipment in accordance with the
company procedure and the design of the equipment.
o The actions to take if the oil filtering equipment was defective.
o The actions to take if the oil filtering equipment or its associated pipework
was found to have been tampered with.
o The actions to take if any piping system in the machinery space was
suspected as being used to illegally pump bilge water or sludge overboard.

6.6.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the use of the oil discharge monitoring and control system, and was the oil
discharge monitoring and control system in satisfactory condition and used in
accordance with the company procedures, manufacturer’s instructions and
MARPOL Annex I?
QMS : 01N.08.05.07 / 08N-10 / 382.3500 / Poster 120N-023
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which described the use of the oil
discharge monitoring and control system provided.
• The oil discharge monitoring and control system was defective in any
respect.
• The oil discharge monitoring and control system was apparently modified or
fitted with connections which were not part of the original design.
• Maintenance and testing of the oil discharge monitoring and control system
had not been conducted in accordance with the company procedures and the
manufacturer's operation and maintenance manual.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which
described the use of the oil discharge monitoring and control system provided.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:
o The restrictions on use of the oil discharge monitoring and control system in
accordance with the company procedure and the design of the equipment, if
any.
o The actions to take if the oil discharge monitoring and control system was
defective.
o The test run and calibration function of the oil discharge monitoring and
control system.
• The oil discharge monitoring and control system had been used to discharge
oil mixtures overboard while in manual mode or with any of the data feeds in
manual mode, without authorisation from shore based management.
• The oil discharge monitoring and control system had been used to discharge
oil mixtures overboard which were not compatible with the sensors fitted.
• The printed data from the recording device was illegible.
• The stored data from the recording device was unavailable for review or
download.

7. Maritime Security
7.1. Ship Routing

7.1.1. Was security threat and risk assessment an integral part of voyage
planning, and did the passage plan contain security related information for
each leg of the voyage?
QMS : 01N.04.03.01 / 01N.09.02.01 / 04N-45
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The vessel did not have the appropriate security information available such
as:
o Relevant security charts.
o Industry best management practice guidance (BMP) publications.
o Regional Security Guidance (e.g., ReCAAP Guidance)
o Company specific guidance.
• No security risk assessment had been performed for a recent voyage.
• Completed voyage security risk assessments did not identify ship protection
measures where required.
• No company specific guidance regarding recommended routeing had been
provided for a recent voyage through a high-risk area.
• There was no evidence that the voyage security risk assessment had been
reviewed and updated prior to entering an area which required an increased
state of readiness and vigilance, and the passage plan amended if necessary.
• The passage plan did not contain appropriate security related information for
each leg of the voyage.
• Bridge security cards or checklists were not available.

7.2. Ship Hardening and access control

7.2.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
hardening the vessel when entering areas of increased security risk, and was
there a Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) available?
QMS : SSP/VHP / DNV navigator / 180.0600 / 813.1100
01N.09.02.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for hardening the vessel when entering
areas of increased security risk.
• The Ship Security Officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
hardening the vessel when entering areas of increased security risk.
• There was no Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) available.
• The Vessel Hardening Plan was not ship-specific.
• The VHP did not include a list of materials needed to implement the VHP and
the required quantities.
• There was no inventory of the hardening materials currently on board.
• There were no records of inspection and maintenance of security equipment
such as water cannons, CCTV, infrared cameras, etc.
• The inventory of hardening materials clearly did not reflect actual quantities
on board.
• There was no record of the VHP being properly implemented prior to sailing
into or through an area of increased security risk.

7.2.2. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company
procedures to control access to the vessel in port and to ensure the safety of
visitors, and were these procedures effectively implemented?
QMS : SSP / 01N.09.02.01 / 01N.05.04.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures to control access to the vessel in port
and to ensure the safety of visitors.
• The gangway watchman was unfamiliar with the company procedures to
control access to the vessel in port and to ensure the safety of visitors.
• The Master had not provided the terminal with a list of approved visitors,
including Agents, Surveyors, Loading Masters and the SIRE inspector.
• A continuous gangway watch was not maintained.
• There were no regular patrols of the deck to monitor potential unauthorised
access points e.g. hawse pipes, mooring ropes etc.
• CCTV coverage of the vessel access points was not monitored, where CCTV
systems were provided.
• Visitors to the vessel were not required to provide photo identification.
• Visitors were not provided with visitor passes.
• No records were maintained of visitors boarding and leaving the vessel.
• Visitor baggage was not searched in accordance with the company
procedures for the appropriate security level.
• Visitors were not escorted from the gangway to the accommodation.
• There was no notice board at the access point to the vessel displaying the
appropriate warnings to visitors, including the particular risks from toxic or
hazardous cargoes being handled and the operations taking place.
• Visitors to the vessel were not provided with an overview of the hazards
present and the safety precautions to observe while they are on board, (which
may be via a Visitor Information Card), including:
o Smoking regulations.
o Restrictions on movement around the vessel.
o Restrictions on mobile phones and portable electronic equipment.
o Briefing on the hazards of the cargo and any operations taking place e.g.
loading, tank-cleaning or gas-freeing.
o The use of appropriate PPE while onboard.
o Emergency signals and actions in the case of an emergency.
o Drug and alcohol policy.
7.3. Communications and Monitoring

7.3.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with regional maritime security
reporting requirements and operation of the ship security alert system (SSAS)
and had this equipment been regularly tested?
QMS : 01N.09.02.01 / 417.5027 / 180.0100 / 120N-005
120N-024 / 04N-45
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the 24-hour contact details
of the company security officer (CSO).
• The 24-hour contact details of the CSO were not posted appropriately.
• The Master and/or SSO were not familiar with the company procedures for
voluntary security reporting in VRAs.Page 702 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question
Library: Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)
• There was no evidence that participation in an operational VRA had been
considered during the passage planning phase.
• Where the company procedure required participation in a VRA, there was no
evidence that reporting to a VRA had been undertaken in accordance with the
scheme
• It was reported that there were no records of the regular testing of:
o The SSAS and/or the LRIT.
o Dedicated standalone security communications equipment.
• The accompanying officer was not aware of the purpose and operation of the
SSAS, LRIT and/or dedicated standalone security communications equipment.
• It was reported that an item of security communication equipment was
defective in any respect.

7.4. Ship Security Officer

7.4.1. Did the Ship Security Officer (SSO) have a valid Certificate of Proficiency
and a full understanding of their role, and were ship security records of port
calls being maintained as required by SOLAS?
QMS : DNV navigator / SSP / 01N.03.05.01 / 01N.03.03.05
01N.09.02.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The SMS did not clearly designate who should be SSO.
• The SMS did not contain a description of the role of the SSO, and a list of
their duties.
• The SSO did not have a valid Certificate of Proficiency.
• The designated SSO was not a member of the crew.
• The SSO did not have a full understanding of their role, responsibilities, and
duties. For example, they were not familiar with one or more of the following:
o Purpose of the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
o Operation, testing and maintenance of security equipment on board
o Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP).
o Identity, role and contact details of the CSO
o Role of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)
Page 706 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library: Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)
• An interviewed rating had no knowledge of security procedures or response
to security alarms
• There was no evidence of regular security inspections of the vessel by the
SSO.
• Ship security records were not being maintained as required by SOLAS

7.5. Cyber Security

7.5.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
cyber security risk management, and had these procedures been fully
implemented?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for cyber risk management that:
o Identified the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and
management both ashore and on board.
o Identified the IT and OT systems at risk on board.
o Described technical protection measures to protect against a cyber incident.
o Described procedural protection measures to protect against a cyber
incident.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
cyber risk management.
• A space containing sensitive IT or OT control equipment was not securely
locked.
• There was no inventory/register of sensitive IT/OT systems fitted on board.
• Physical access to sensitive user equipment (such as exposed USB ports on
bridge systems) was not secured or disabled.
• Company procedures did not designate who on board should have an
administrator profile and/or who should manage user profiles.
• Back-up facilities were not available or not used.
• Officers were not familiar with the back-up arrangements for OT systems
critical to navigation and propulsion.
• There was no evidence of formal approval for a technician observed on
board to access sensitive equipment such as ECDIS etc.
• There was no evidence that portable media observed in use had been
checked for malware etc. in a computer not connected to the ship’s control
network.
• It was reported that:
o On-board computers were not protected by anti-virus software.
o Anti-virus software had not been regularly updated.
o Application software had not been regularly updated with upgrades and
security patches.
o A crew member other than a senior officer had an administrator profile.
o User profiles allowed computer workstations to be used for other than their
intended purpose.
o User profiles were not actively managed.
o Generic user profiles and passwords were passed on at crew changes.
• The accompanying officer had not received cyber security training as
appropriate to their responsibilities and duties.
• User names and passwords were posted at workstations.
• It was observed that passwords were not required to access workstations.
• There was no evidence that cyber security awareness was actively promoted
on board.
• There were no cyber contingency plans addressing the loss of:
o Function or reliability of navigational equipment e.g., ECDIS.
o Availability or integrity of external data sources such as GNSS.
o Connectivity with the shore including GMDSS communications.
o Control systems for critical systems such as propulsion, steering etc.
• There were no hard copies of cyber contingency plans.
• Contact details were not readily available for technical support from the
operator’s IT department or external IT contractors as appropriate.

8. Cargo and Ballast Systems

8.1. Oil
8.1.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the use of the inert gas system, and had the inert gas system been used in
accordance with ISGOTT guidance, with cargo tanks maintained in an inert
condition at all times, except when it was necessary to be gas-free for entry?
QMS : 01N.08.05.04 / 01N.08.05.05 / 01N.08.05.06 / 08N-005 / 08N-010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert
gas system which included:
o Inerting empty cargo tanks.
o Operation during discharge, de-ballasting, COW and tank cleaning.
o Purging tanks before gas freeing.
o Topping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other
stages of the voyage.
o Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the actions to be taken in the
event of a failure of the inert gas system.
• The inert gas system was not in use at the time of the inspection, although its
use was required by company procedures and/or ISGOTT guidance.
• Inerted cargo tanks were not being maintained at positive pressure of at
least 100mm Water Gauge (WG).
• The inert gas pressure in the cargo tanks/inert gas main had not been
maintained within the range of values identified within the cargo and ballast
transfer plan throughout the discharge operation.
• Inert gas was being delivered to the cargo tanks with an oxygen content in
the IG main of more than 5% by volume.
• The oxygen content of a randomly sampled cargo tank was more than 8% by
volume.
• Periodic checks had not been performed on the oxygen content of cargo
tanks.
• Sampling of cargo, tank cleaning and gas freeing records showed that the
inert gas system had not been used in accordance with company procedures
and/or ISGOTT guidance.
• Records of the operation of the inert gas system were missing or incomplete
------------------------------------------------------------------
8.1.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
and international regulations for the planning, preparation, conduct and
documentation of crude oil washing operations (COW), and was the COW
system in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the company
procedures for each COW operation?
QMS : 01N.08.05.01 / 08N-010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct
and documentation of crude oil washing which included the:
o Roles, responsibilities and qualifications of those involved in COW
operations.
o Requirement for crude oil washing of cargo tanks for:
 Sludge control purposes.
 Preparation for the carriage of ballast in a cargo tank or tanks.
o Suitability of crude oils for crude oil washing.
o Use of dry crude oil for washing.
o Inspection and testing of COW equipment.
o Planning of COW operations.
o Testing of cargo tank oxygen content prior to COW.
Page 12 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022)
o Completion of COW checklists.
o Maintaining records of COW operations.
• The person in charge of crude oil washing operations at the time of
inspection was not familiar with the company procedures for the planning,
preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil washing or the contents
of the COW manual.
• The person in charge of crude oil washing operations at the time of
inspection was not suitably qualified in accordance with company procedures.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil washing or
the contents of the COW manual.
• The vessel did not have an approved COW manual.
• Alterations had been made to the COW system, but the COW Manual had
not been updated to reflect these changes.
• The oxygen content of a tank being crude oil washed was more than 8% by
volume.
• The oxygen content of each cargo tank being crude oil washed had not been
tested with portable equipment within 30 minutes prior to commencement of
COW and the result recorded in the appropriate COW records.
• Records had not been maintained of all COW operations.
• Cargo tanks had not been crude oil washed at the required frequency for
sludge control purposes.
• The crude oil washing cycles and washing durations used for COW operations
were not in accordance with the instructions in the COW manual.
• One or more of the operational checklists in the COW manual had not been
completed as required.
• There was no evidence that, prior to arrival in port, the tank washing system
had been pressure tested to normal working pressure, examined for leaks and
any leaks rectified.
• There was a leak from the COW pipeline system during operation.
• A pressure gauge(s) on the tank cleaning line was missing, defective or
inaccurate.
• The pressure in the tank cleaning line was not as required by the COW
manual.
• COW machines were turning in tanks not being crude oil washed, indicating
leaking valves to fixed tank cleaning machines.
• A cargo tank(s) had not been de-bottomed by at least one metre prior to
being used as a source of crude oil for washing.
• A slop tank had not been completely discharged ashore prior to being used
as a source of crude oil for washing. (A slop tank may be considered as a cargo
tank if it had not contained slops since the previous occasion when it had been
loaded with crude oil.)
• The tank washing water heater had not been blanked off before crude oil
washing.
• Hydrants fitted to the crude oil washing line were not fitted with blanks or
caps.
• There was significant corrosion, pitting, soft patches and/or other temporary
repairs on the pipework or components of the COW system.
• The crude oil washing system was defective in any respect.
Where the vessel had not conducted or was not planning to conduct COW
operations during the inspection the question should be addressed based on
the records from the previous COW operation.
Where no COW operations had taken place during the previous six months, a
comment should be made in the process drop down indicating the last time
COW operations were recorded as having taken place.

8.1.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the isolation of individual cargo tanks from the common venting system in
accordance with SOLAS, and were these procedures being followed?
QMS : 01N.08.05.04 / 08N-005 376.0910.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the isolation of individual cargo
tanks from the common venting system which included:
o Maintenance and pre-operational testing of isolating valves.
o Checking the operational status of isolating valves prior to commencing
operations.
o Locking arrangements for isolating valves, under the control of the
responsible officer.
o Guidance on personnel authorised to operate the isolating valves.
o Provision of clear visual indication of the operational status of the valves or
other acceptable means of isolation.
o A method of recording the current position of the valves/means of isolation
at the cargo control room/position.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the isolation of individual cargo tanks from the common venting system.
• An isolating valve was incorrectly set.
• The operational status of an isolating valve was not in accordance with the
record or display of current status.
• There was no record or display of the current status of the isolating valves.
• There was no locking arrangement for an isolating valve or valves.
• An isolating valve was not locked in position.
• Locking arrangements for the isolating valves were not under the control of
the responsible officer.
• There were no records of maintenance or testing of isolating valves.
• There were no records of pre-operational checks of isolating valves.
• There was no clear visual indication of the operational status of an isolating
valve or valves.
• Operation of isolating valves was not restricted to authorised personnel.
• An isolating valve was defective in any respect.

8.1.4. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations
after the carriage of volatile products, and had these procedures been
followed?
QMS : 01N.08.05.06 / 01N.08.05.04 / 01N.08.05.05 / 08N-010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for planning and documenting cargo
tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile products that addressed:
o Tank washing and gas freeing plans.
o Record keeping requirements.
o Risk assessment.
o Supervision.
o Preparation.
o The required atmosphere for tank washing.
o Special tank cleaning procedures including, where applicable:
 Using chemicals in wash water.
 Using chemicals for local cleaning.
 Steaming.
o Purging and gas freeing.
• The officer responsible for tank cleaning operations was not familiar with the
company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning
operations after the carriage of volatile products.
• Tank washing and gas freeing plans and supporting records were not
available for recent tank cleaning operations.
• Records and interviews indicated that:
o Tank cleaning operations had not been carefully planned.
o A tank cleaning plan had not been followed.
o Tank cleaning, including after discharge of a slop tank, had been conducted
without the use of inert gas.
o The potential hazards of planned tank washing operations had not been
systematically identified and risk assessed, including the risks from any tank
cleaning additives used.
o Appropriate preventative measures had not been put in place to reduce the
identified risks to ALARP.
o Tank cleaning operations had not been documented in accordance with
company procedures.
o Tank cleaning operations had not been supervised by a Responsible Officer.
o Officers and ratings involved in tank washing operations had not been
briefed by the Responsible Officer on their roles and responsibilities.
o Steam had been introduced into a tank that may have had a flammable
atmosphere.

8.2. Chemicals
8.2.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the operation of the inert gas system, and had the inert gas system been
used in accordance with these procedures, industry guidance, and SOLAS and
IBC regulations?
QMS : 01N.08.05.04 / 01N.08.05.05 / 01N.08.05.06 / 08N-005 / 08N-010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert gas
system which included:
o Inerting empty cargo tanks.
o Inerting tanks before commencement of unloading.
o Operation during discharge and tank cleaning.
o Purging tanks before gas freeing.
o Topping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other
stages of the voyage.
o Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the actions to be taken in the
event of a failure of the inert gas system.
• The inert gas system was not in use at the time of the inspection, although its
use was required by industry guidance, SOLAS and IBC regulations and/or
company procedures.
• Inerted cargo tanks were not being maintained at positive pressure.
• Inert gas was being delivered to the cargo tanks with an oxygen content in
the IG main of more than 5% by volume.
• The oxygen content of a randomly chosen inerted cargo tank was more than
8% by volume.
• Periodic checks had not been performed on the oxygen content of cargo
tanks.
• Sampling of cargo, tank cleaning and gas freeing records showed that:
o The inert gas system had not been used in accordance with industry
guidance, SOLAS and IBC regulations and/or company procedures.
o When inerting a loaded tank before commencement of unloading, inert gas
had not been introduced into the tank through the distribution system while
venting vapours in the tank to atmosphere.
o When inerting a loaded tank before commencement of unloading, the
inerting operation had not continued until the oxygen content in the ullage
space was at or below 8% by volume.
• Records of the operation of the inert gas system and/or inerting of cargo
tanks were missing or incomplete.

8.2.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
that addressed the carriage of inhibited cargoes, and had these procedures
been followed?
QMS : 01N.08.06.01 / 01N.02.02.29
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures that addressed the carriage of inhibited
cargoes and included guidance on:
o Inhibited cargo certificates of protection.
o Temperature monitoring of inhibited cargoes and adjacent spaces.
o Inerting of inhibited cargoes and monitoring of the oxygen level in the vapour
space.
o Preventing a build-up of solid polymers in the venting system.
o The use of compressed nitrogen to clear arms/hoses after loading.
o The addition of extra inhibitor when provided on board.
o Contingency planning for uncontrolled polymerisation.
• The responsible officer was not familiar with the company procedures that
addressed the carriage of inhibited cargoes.
• There was no certificate of protection on board for an inhibited cargo, in
accordance with IBC 15.13.3.
• The stated duration of effectiveness of the inhibitor had expired prior to
discharge.
• Temperatures of an inhibited cargo had not been monitored during the
voyage on at least a daily basis or as recommended by the cargo
manufacturer.
• Temperatures of spaces adjacent to inhibited cargoes had not been
monitored on at least a daily basis.
• The oxygen level in the vapour space of a cargo protected by an oxygen
dependent inhibitor had not been monitored.
• A cargo protected by an oxygen dependent inhibitor had been inerted before
loading or during carriage.
• There was no evidence that venting systems had been regularly inspected for
the build-up of solid polymers, e.g. log book entries or standing orders.
• Parts of the venting system were blocked by solid polymers.
• Compressed nitrogen had been used to clear the arms/hoses after loading a
cargo with an oxygen dependent inhibitor.
• There was no contingency plan in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation
and a rapid rise in temperature of an inhibited cargo.

8.2.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the information contained
in the Procedures and Arrangements Manual, Certificate of Fitness for the
Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk, the IBC Code and the latest
MEPC.2/Circular, and was this information readily available to the officers
engaged in cargo planning and operations?
QMS : 01N.08.06.02 / IBC code / P & A manual / Certificate of fitness

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The officer responsible for cargo planning and operations was not familiar
with the information contained in the P&A Manual, Certificate of Fitness for
the Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk, the IBC Code and/or the
latest MEPC.2/Circular.
• The officer responsible for cargo planning and operations was not familiar
with the “stripping quantities” for each cargo tank.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the information contained in
the P&A Manual, as it related to their duties.
• The P&A Manual was not readily available.
• On a ship engaged in international voyages, the P&A Manual was not
available in either English, French or Spanish.
• The information contained in the IBC Code was not readily available.
• A copy of the list of permitted cargoes was not readily available.
• A copy of the MEPC.2/Circular was not readily available.
• The MEPC.2/Circular available was not the latest edition

8.2.4. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations
after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products, and had these procedures
been followed?
QMS : 01N.08.05.06 / 08N-010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for planning and documenting cargo
tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products
that addressed:
o Tank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes.
o Written tank washing and gas freeing plans.
o Risk assessment.
o Tank washing procedures and arrangements.
o The required atmosphere for tank washing.
o Manufacturer’s coating guidelines.
o Special tank cleaning procedures including, where applicable:
 The use of washing media other than water.
 Recirculation washing.
 Using chemical additives in wash water.
 Using chemical solvents or other agents for local cleaning.
o Gas freeing.
• The officer responsible for tank cleaning operations was not familiar with the
company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning
operations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products including:
o The relevant sections of the P&A Manual.
o Tank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes.
o Manufacturers' tank coating guidelines.
• Tank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes were not available on
board.
• Manufacturers' tank coating guidelines were not available on board.
• The latest version of MEPC.2/Circular listing approved tank cleaning agents
was not available on board.
• Records of written tank washing and gas freeing plans were not available for
recent tank cleaning operations.
• Written tank cleaning plans did not include:
o The type of cargo to be cleaned from each tank, and its characteristics. SDS
should be available so that personnel involved are familiar with the hazards.
o The major risks during cleaning including toxicity, flammability,
corrosiveness, reactivity, and temperature as well as the safety precautions to
be taken.
o The safety equipment and PPE to be available and ready for use throughout
the operation and during connecting and disconnecting of hoses at the cargo
manifold.
o The tanks to be cleaned, cleaning method, cleaning sequence and gas freeing
arrangements.
o Monitoring the pumping of tank washings to ensure correct
discharge/transfer.
o MARPOL requirements for the disposal of cargo residues and cleaning water
(slops).
o Segregation of slops to avoid mixing different categories of product, and
o Necessary actions required to keep the cargo deck area free from cargo
vapours during tank washing and gas freeing operations.
• Records and interviews indicated that:
o Tank cleaning plans had not been developed in accordance with the
procedures and/or the P & A Manual.
o Tank cleaning operations had not been documented in accordance with
company procedures.
o Tank cleaning operations had not been conducted in accordance with the
tank cleaning plan.
o Tank cleaning operations had not been supervised by a responsible officer.
o Officers and ratings involved in tank washing operations had not been briefed
by the responsible officer on their roles and responsibilities.
o When washing with portable machines, the tank atmosphere had not been
treated as non-inert.
o Steam had been introduced into a tank that may have had a flammable
atmosphere.
Page 40 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022)
o Tank cleaning plans did not address the risks from tank cleaning additives
used.
• Cleaning additives that were not cargo were not stored according to the
requirements of the IMDG Code.
• Tank cleaning operations were taking place that were not in accordance with
the written tank cleaning plan.
• Tank cleaning operations were taking place that were not in accordance with
company procedures and/or the P&A Manual.
• A washing medium other than water had been used to wash a tank, such as
mineral oil or chlorinated solvent, but tank washing procedures involving the
use of such a medium were not available in the P&A Manual.

8.2.5. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes during
cargo stowage planning, and had these procedures been followed?

QMS : 01N.08.06.01 / 01N.08.06.02 / 01N.08.06.04

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for cargo stowage planning that
included:
o Identification of incompatible cargoes using recognised compatibility charts.
o Means of segregation of incompatible cargoes, including ship specific
arrangements.
• The officer responsible for cargo stowage planning was not familiar with
company procedures for identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes.
• The officer responsible for cargo stowage planning was not familiar with the
contents and use of the compatibility charts provided on board.
• There were no compatibility charts issued by a recognised authority available
on board.
• The compatibility charts provided on board did not contain the latest
information available.
• The chart table footnotes and the data sheets for two particular cargoes had
not been consulted during stowage planning.
• Two incompatible cargoes had been stowed adjacent to each other or in a
configuration that did not provide double barrier separation.
• Incompatible cargoes had been stowed in tanks that shared a common
venting system.
• Tank cleaning had been carried out after carriage of two incompatible
cargoes without identifying mitigations in the tank cleaning plan.
• Operational means of segregation were observed to be not as indicated in
the cargo stowage plan.
• The cargo stowage plan did not identify when care should be taken to avoid
the co-mingling of noncompatible cargoes, which cargoes were involved, and
the means of segregation.

8.2.6. Were there sufficient escape sets as required by the IBC Code for
everyone on board, and did the sets provide suitable respiratory and eye
protection?
QMS : 503.4600 / Certificate of fitness / IBC code
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The escape sets provided:
o Did not have a design duration of at least 15 minutes.
o Were not included in the company procedures for the use and maintenance
of EEBDs and the onboard maintenance plan.
o Used filter-type respiratory protection.
o Did not provide suitable eye protection.
o Were not suitably marked as not to be used for fire-fighting or cargo-
handling purposes.
o Were not in addition to the EEBDs required by SOLAS to be located in the
accommodation and machinery spaces.
• An escape set:
o Was not fully charged.
o Had not been inspected and maintained in accordance with the onboard
maintenance plan.
o Had been used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.
o Had been used as the primary means for entering spaces or compartments
with unsafe atmospheres.
• There were insufficient escape sets for everyone on board at the time of the
inspection, including any contractors, supernumeraries, visitors etc.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the locations, purpose and
operation of the escape sets provided

8.2.7. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
relating to the safety equipment required by the IBC Code, including SCBAs,
and was the equipment in satisfactory condition ready for immediate use?

QMS : 506.2310 / 01N.05.04.01 (PPE) / 01N.08.06.07 (Chemical)

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures relating to the safety equipment,
including SCBAs, required by the IBC Code, giving guidance on:
o Stowage and maintaining readiness of the equipment.
o Inspection and testing of the SCBAs.
o Non-emergency use of the SCBAs, including maximum individual daily use
and required rest periods.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures
relating to the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IBC Code.
Page 50 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022)
• There were less than three complete sets of safety equipment on board, in
addition to those required by SOLAS regulation II-2/10.10 for fire-fighting
purposes.
• A set of safety equipment did not contain:
o one self-contained air-breathing apparatus (not using stored oxygen).
o protective clothing, boots, gloves and tight-fitting goggles.
o fireproof lifeline with belt resistant to the cargoes carried.
o explosion-proof lamp.
• The protective suits where not suitable for:
o All chemicals listed on the certificate of fitness identified under column ‘o’ in
the table of chapter 17 of the IBC code.
o Use in a flammable atmosphere.
• For the safety equipment required by the IBC, the vessel was not equipped
with either:
o One set of fully charged spare air bottles for each breathing apparatus,
o A special air compressor suitable for the supply of high-pressure air of the
required purity,
o A charging manifold capable of dealing with sufficient spare air bottles for
the breathing apparatus;
or
o fully charged spare air bottles with a total free air capacity of at least 6,000 l
for each breathing apparatus on board in excess of the requirements of SOLAS
regulation II-2/10.10.
• The sets of safety equipment were not stowed:
o Outside hazardous areas.
o In a suitable, clearly marked, easily accessible place.
• The sets of safety equipment were not ready for immediate use because:
o Air cylinders, including spares, were not fully charged.
o Adjusting straps were not kept slack so as to enable the SCBAs to be donned
quickly.
o Protective clothing, boots and gloves were not ready to be donned quickly.
• The SCBA required by the IBC had not been:
o Inspected at least once a month by a responsible officer, and the inspection
recorded in the ship’s logbook.
o Inspected and tested by an expert within the last 12 months.
• Where the SCBA required by the IBC code had been tested onboard by an
‘expert’ member of the crew:
o A copy of the manufacturer's training course certificate for the specific type
of SCBA carried on board for the crewmember who performed the service was
not available with the maintenance records.
o The specialist equipment required by the manufacturer to conduct the annual
servicing was not available onboard

8.2.8. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
addressing the protective equipment required by the IBC Code, and was this
equipment in satisfactory condition and suitable for the products being
handled?
QMS : 506.2310 / 01N.05.04.01 (PPE) / 01N.08.06.07 (Chemical)

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures addressing the protective equipment
required by the IBC that included:
o A list of protective equipment to be available on board based upon risk
assessment and considering the products to be carried.
o What protective equipment was required to be worn for the different types of
operations on board, and products handled, preferably in the form of a cargo-
specific PPE matrix.
o Crew training in the correct use of the protective equipment.
o Checks to be made that protective equipment is being correctly worn prior to
entering a working area.
o Assessment of a user’s fitness to wear particular protective equipment in
given climatic conditions.
o Guidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a Type
1/level A and Type 3/level
B suit protective suit, if applicable.
o How protective equipment should be cleaned and stored.
o Actions to be taken if defects are identified in protective equipment.
o Frequency of inspection of the protective equipment and records to be kept.
• The officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company
procedures addressing the protective equipment required by the IBC Code.
• The PPE matrix, where provided, was not cargo-specific.
• PPE terminology was not standardised across all company documents.
• A crew member was observed not wearing adequate protective clothing
where there was a risk of accidental exposure to toxic or corrosive products or
their vapours.
• A crew member was observed wearing protective clothing incorrectly where
there was a risk of accidental exposure to toxic or corrosive products or their
vapours.
Page 55 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022)
• Protective equipment in use did not provide the degree of protection specified
as being required in the SDS of a cargo being handled.
• Face shields were being worn when disconnecting hoses at the manifold or
during any other operation where there was a risk of being splashed or sprayed
with product under pressure.
• Safety spectacles were being used as eye protection in a chemical
environment.
• Protective equipment was not stored in an easily accessible, ventilated space,
designed for the purpose.
• Protective equipment in use was stored within the accommodation in an
unauthorised space or spaces.
• Items of the protective equipment required by company procedures were not
available on board.
• There was no chemical resistance list available for the protective suits
provided on board.
• There was no evidence that chemical suits were suitable for use in a
flammable atmosphere.
• An item of protective equipment in use was in poor condition.
• Gloves, boots and/or head gear were of inferior chemical resistance than the
protective suits provided.
• Protective equipment was not available in a suitable quantity and range of
sizes to fit the crew on board.
• A deck officer or rating was unfamiliar with the selection and donning of a
full set of protective equipment including a protective suit.

8.3. Oil and Chemical

8.3.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and
testing of the inert gas generator, and had the system been operated and
maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and company
procedures?
QMS : 376 (IGG component) / 01N.08.05.04 / 01N.05.06.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing
and maintenance of the vessel’s
inert gas system which included the:
o Inert gas generator
o Gas regulating valve
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for the
operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s inert gas
system.
• Where the inert gas plant was contained in an enclosed room or space, there
were no safe entry procedures posted at each entrance to the room.
• The records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant were
missing or incomplete.
• The gas regulating valve or remote controlled isolation valves were being
operated on local control.
• Local or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices were disconnected
or defective.
• There were significant gas or liquid leaks from the inert gas plant.
• Blower(s) were suffering excessive vibration.
• Where only one blower was provided, there were insufficient spare parts
available for the blower and prime mover.
• Where the inert gas generator was not located in the machinery spaces the
compartment was not provided with adequate positive-pressure-type
mechanical ventilation.
• The inert gas plant was defective in any respect.

8.3.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and
testing of the nitrogen generator inert gas system, and had the system been
operated and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions
and company procedures?
QMS : 376.8000 (Nitrogen generator component) / 01N.08.05.04
01N.08.06.06 / 01N.05.06.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing
and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the nitrogen
generator and its associated equipment.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for the
operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s inert gas system
including the nitrogen generator.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the dangers from:
o An oxygen deficient atmosphere as a result of nitrogen leakage.
o The oxygen-enriched exhaust from the nitrogen generator.
• The record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including
defects and their rectification, was missing or incomplete.
• Any of the following visual and audible alarms was inoperative:
o Failure of the electric heater, if fitted.
o Low feed-air pressure or flow from the compressor.
o High-air temperature.
o High condensate level at the automatic drain of the water separator.
• The independent mechanical extraction ventilation system serving a
dedicated space containing the air compressor and nitrogen generator or the
nitrogen receiver or buffer tank was not operating correctly.
• Where the air compressor and nitrogen generator, nitrogen receiver or
buffer tank were installed in a dedicated compartment, there were no safe
entry procedures posted at each entrance to the compartment.
• The nitrogen generator and its associated equipment was defective in any
respect.

8.3.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and
testing of the flue gas inert gas system, and had the system been operated
and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and
company procedures?
QMS : 376 (IG component) / 01N.08.05.04 / 01N.05.06.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing
and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the:
o Boiler uptake valves.
o Scrubber.
o Demister.
o Blowers.
o Gas regulating valve.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for the
operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s inert gas
system.
• Where the inert gas plant was contained in an enclosed room or space, there
were no safe entry procedures posted at each entrance to the room.
• The records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant was missing
or incomplete.
• The gas regulating valve or remote controlled isolation valves were being
operated on local control.
• Local or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices were disconnected
or defective.
• There were significant gas or liquid leaks from the inert gas plant.
• Blower(s) were suffering excessive vibration.
• The inert gas plant was defective in any respect.

Where the entry procedures posted at the entrance(s) to the space or spaces
containing the inert gas system were not in alignment with the enclosed space
entry procedure in the SMS or, entry into a space containing the inert gas
system was authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the
enclosed space entry procedure, make an observation under question 5.5.1.

8.3.4. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and high-
high-level alarms, and were these alarm systems fully operational and
properly set?
QMS : 381.4090 (no jobs) / 01N.08.03.01 / 08N-005
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting
of the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm systems.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the
cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm systems.
o The circumstances under which the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level
alarm systems or individual cargo tank alarms may be isolated and the
safeguards to ensure they were always in operation during cargo transfer
operations.
• The company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the
cargo tank high-level and highhigh-level alarm systems did not include:
o The mandatory use of the alarms during all loading, discharging and transfer
operations.
o Set points for all alarms.
o Testing procedures and frequency.
o Records of testing and maintenance to be kept.
o Guidance on the use of shipboard automatic closing valves, if fitted.
o Procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo loading,
discharge or transfer operations in the event of a failure of the cargo tank high-
level or high-high-level alarm system or a single alarm for an individual cargo
tank.
• High-level and/or high-high-level alarms were not in operation at the time of
inspection, during loading, discharging or transfer operations.
• High-level alarms were not fitted.
• High-high-level alarms were not fitted.
• High-level and high-high-level alarms were not independent of each other.
• High-high-level alarms were not independent of the fixed tank gauging
system.
• High-level alarms were set at or above the high-high-level alarm activation
point.
• High-level and high-high-level alarm indicator panels etc. were not clearly
identified as such.
• High-level and/or high-high-level alarm audible and/or visible alarms were
not operational in the cargo control room or on deck.
• High-high-level alarms were not set at a level to allow the person in charge of
transfer operations to stop the cargo transfer before the tank overflows
(typically 98% of the tank capacity).
• High-level and/or high-high-level alarms had not been regularly tested in
accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.
• In a chemical ship, the:
o High-level alarms were not independent of the fixed gauging system.
o High-high-level alarms did not provide an agreed signal for sequential
shutdown of onshore pumps and/or valves and ship’s valves. (the signal may
be dependent on operator intervention)
o Shipboard automatic closing valves were in use without the specific approval
of the flag sate and or port state authority.
• The high-level and/or high-high-level alarms were permanently silenced or
inhibited
• The high-level and/or high-high-level alarms were defective in any respect.
8.3.5. Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the
company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static
accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks, and were these procedures being
followed?
QMS : 01N.08.01.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling
flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks that described the
additional precautions to be taken against static electricity including:
o A description of the dipping, ullaging and sampling equipment to be used.
o Bonding/earthing/cleaning procedures for this equipment.
o Settling time after completion of operations.
o Additional precautions if the vessel is not fitted with properly designed and
installed full length sounding pipes.
o Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed tank gauging system,
if fitted.
• The officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company
procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator
cargoes in non-inerted tanks.
• A deck rating was not familiar with the company procedures for dipping,
ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted
tanks as they related to their duties.
• There was no information available on the type of sounding pipes fitted in
the cargo tanks.
• In a vessel fitted with a fixed tank level gauging system but not fitted with IG
and not fitted with full depth sounding pipes, the operator's procedure to be
followed in the event of failure of the fixed gauging system did not adequately
address the additional precautions required for dipping, ullaging and sampling
flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.
• Metallic components of any equipment used for dipping, ullaging and
sampling were not bonded to the metal structure of the vessel.
• Metal ullaging, dipping, gauging or sampling equipment was introduced into
a cargo tank during product transfer or within 30 minutes of completion
without the use of a full-length sounding pipe.
• A non- metal sampling container of more than one litre capacity was
introduced into a cargo tank during product transfer or within 30 minutes of
completion without the use of a full-length sounding pipe.
• Ropes or tapes made of synthetic materials had been used for lowering
ullaging and/or sampling equipment into cargo tanks.
• A non-metal sampling container was rubbed dry prior to being introduced to
a cargo tank.
• Sounding pipes used for dipping, ullaging and sampling cargo tanks were not
metallic and/or did not extend the full depth of the tank and/or were not
effectively bonded and earthed to the tank structure.

8.3.6. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for loading flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-
inerted tanks, and were these procedures being followed?
QMS : 01N.08.01.02 / 01N.08.03.03
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for loading flammable static
accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks which described:
o The identification of flammable static accumulator cargoes.
o The precautions to be taken against hazards from static electricity when
loading these cargoes.
• The officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company
procedures for loading flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted
tanks.
• A flammable static accumulator cargo was loaded into a non-inert tank with:
o An initial rate of more than 1 m/sec at the individual tank inlets.
o An initial rate of less than 1 m/sec at the individual tank inlets, but for
shorter than the required period:
 30minutes or the time taken to load twice the content of the shore pipeline
content whichever is the lesser.
 But which must include the time to fill the tank to a depth equal to twice the
diameter of the filling pipe.
o A bulk rate of more than 1 m/sec when the cargo was not “clean”.
• A flammable static accumulator cargo was loaded into a non-inert tank:
o Over the top.
o In such a way to produce splash filling.
• Upon completion of loading a flammable static accumulator, cargo lines were
blown using compressed air.
• A low volatility static accumulator cargo was loaded into an uncleaned non-
inerted tank that had previously contained a high volatility cargo, without
following the precautions to be taken against hazards from static electricity.

8.3.7. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and
calibration of the inert gas system fixed oxygen analyser, and had the
equipment been operated, maintained and calibrated in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions and company procedures?
QMS : 01N.08.05.04 / 376.0520
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing
and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the fixed
oxygen analyser.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation,
inspection, testing and maintenance of the fixed oxygen analyser including the:
o Method and frequency of calibration.
o Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed analyser.
• The records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant were
missing or incomplete.
• The fixed oxygen analyser had not been:
o Operated, maintained and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer’s
instructions and company procedures.
o Calibrated within 24 hours prior to starting the inert gas system for each
cargo, purging or inerting operation.
• The zero and/or span gas used to calibrate the fixed oxygen analyser was
unsuitable, out of date or not available.
• There were no clear instructions provided for operating, calibrating and
testing the fixed oxygen analyser in the vicinity of the equipment.
• The fixed oxygen analyser was defective in any respect.

8.3.8. Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the cargo system
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system, where fitted, and/or the cargo pump
emergency stop controls, and was there evidence that the systems and
equipment had been tested in accordance with company procedures?
QMS : 08N-005 / 381.4000.23
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which described the testing and operation
of cargo system:
o Emergency shutdown systems.
o Automated cargo pump shutdown systems and associated sensors.
o Cargo pump emergency stop controls.
• The testing of the ESD, automated shutdown or cargo pump emergency stop
controls and systems had not been tested in accordance with the company
procedure.
• The ESD system, automated cargo pump shutdown or cargo pump
emergency stop controls or systems were defective in any respect.
• The manual ESD system control or the cargo pump emergency stop controls
were not clearly marked and ready for immediate use.
• Access to a manual ESD system control or cargo pump emergency stop
control was obstructed.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the ESD system, where fitted.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with what abnormal or alarm
conditions could cause a cargo pump to shut down automatically.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
the testing of the ESD, automated cargo pump shutdown and/or the testing of
the cargo pump emergency stop controls.
• An interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the location and operation of
the cargo pump emergency stop controls, the circumstances in which they
should be activated or the actions to take after the emergency stop control
had been activated.

8.3.9. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines, and were
records available for these activities?
QMS : 01N.08.05.02 / 01N.10.02.02 / 352.8000 / 382.2000 / 376.0900
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the inspection and testing of cargo,
vapour and inert gas pipelines that included:
o The frequency of visual external examinations
o The frequency of hydrostatic pressure testing of cargo transfer systems.
o The requirement to hydrostatically pressure test a cargo transfer system
after repairs, modifications or sectional replacement.
o Records to be maintained of inspections and tests.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines.
• The MAWP of the cargo transfer system had not been determined and
documented.
• The determination of the MAWP of the cargo transfer system was
inconsistent with the ship's drawings or cargo pump performance curves.
• The cargo transfer system had not been hydrostatically pressure tested to
100% MAWP within the last 12 months.
• There was evidence that cargo system piping had undergone repairs,
modifications or sectional replacement that would potentially affect its
integrity since the last hydrostatic test without being retested upon
completion of the work.
• The cargo transfer system had not been hydrostatically pressure tested to at
least 150% MAWP at least twice within any five-year period.
• The cargo transfer system pressure testing was performed using compressed
air or inert gas.
• Cargo system pipelines were not marked with the date and pressure of the
last test.
• Cargo, vapour or inert gas pipelines had not been inspected and/or tested as
required by company procedures.
• There were no records of the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and/or
inert gas lines as required by company procedures.
• Inspection of the cargo, vapour and/or inert gas pipelines indicated that the
required inspections and tests had either not been performed or were
ineffective.
• The visual inspection of the cargo system, vapour or inert gas pipelines
determined that the pipelines or any of their components were in an
unsatisfactory condition.
-----------------------------------------------------
8.3.10. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the inspection, testing and operation of the vapour collection system, and
was this equipment in satisfactory condition?
QMS : VECS manual / 381.5700 / 01N.08.05.02 / 05N-050
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the inspection, testing and operation
of the vapour collection system which included:
o A line diagram of the tanker’s vapour collection piping indicating the
locations and purpose of all control and safety devices.
o The initial transfer rate
o The maximum allowable transfer rate as limited by the venting capacity of
the pressure or vacuum relief valves, or any other factor which would limit the
transfer rate.
o The maximum pressure drop in the vessel’s vapour collection system for
various transfer rates.
o The relief settings of each pressure and vacuum valve.
o Pre-transfer procedures, including tests of P/V valves, tank level gauges and
alarms, and high- and low-pressure alarms.
o Procedures to be followed in the event of a fault during vapour collection
operations.
o Training and familiarisation requirements.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the inspection, testing and operation of the vapour collection system.
• The pressure sensing device in the main vapour collection line was
inoperative.
• The visible and audible high- and low-pressure alarms at the cargo control
room or position were defective in any respect.
• The high- and low-pressure alarms were not set as required by company
procedures.
• There was no evidence that the person(s) in charge of transfer operations
had received suitable training/familiarisation covering the particular system
installed on the tanker.
• The vapour collection system was not approved by the Flag State or
recognised organisation (such as a class society).
• Where vapour hoses were provided onboard chemical tankers in accordance
with IMO MSC/Circ.585 2.2.1, there was no evidence of proper maintenance
and testing
• The vapour collection system was defective in any respect.
8.3.11. Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the
company procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile
products in a non-inert atmosphere, and had these procedures been
followed?
QMS : 01N.08.05.06 / 01N.08.01.02 / 01N.08.01.03 / 382.1880
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage
of volatile products in a noninert atmosphere that included,
o Precautions to:
 Control the fuel in the tank atmosphere.
 Control the sources of ignition in the tank.
o Bonding of portable tank washing machines and hoses.
o Testing tank cleaning hoses.
o Avoiding the free-fall or spraying of water into a tank.
o Prohibition of steaming.
• The officer responsible for tank washing operations was not familiar with the
company procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile
products in a non-inert atmosphere.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the company procedures relating
to introducing sounding rods and other equipment into a tank during tank
washing after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert atmosphere.
• Records and interviews indicated that before tank washing in a non-inert
atmosphere:
o The tank bottom and/or the pipeline system had not been flushed and
stripped.
o The tank atmosphere had not been ventilated to less than 10% LFL.
o The electrical continuity of portable hoses had not been tested or tested
resistance exceeded 6 ohms per metre length.
o The portable tank washing hoses were not indelibly marked for identification
purposes.
o The electrical continuity of portable hydrant/hose/machine connections had
not been tested.
• Records and interviews indicated that during tank washing in a non-inert
atmosphere:
o The tank atmospheres had not been tested frequently
o The tank atmosphere had exceeded 35% LFL, but washing had continued.
o The tank washing had recommenced with a tank atmosphere above 10% LFL.
o Wash water throughput was above the recommended levels.
o Recirculated water was used for washing.
o Steam had been injected into a tank that was not verified as being gas free.
o Steam had continued to be injected while the atmosphere exceeded 10%
LFL.
o The recommended methods/equipment had not been used for dipping
tanks.
o The liquid level in the slop tank was not maintained at least one metre above
the discharge inlets.
• Tank cleaning equipment was defective or deficient in any respect.

8.3.12. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the use of portable cargo ullage/temperature/interface (UTI)
measurement and sampling equipment, and was the equipment in
satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the company procedures?
QMS : 01N.08.01.04 / 01N.08.02.02 / 01N.08.02.03
01N.08.01.02 / 08N-005 / 381.4800 / 381.4900
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures describing the use, operation, testing,
calibration and servicing of the of portable cargo ullage/temperature/interface
(UTI) measurement and sampling equipment.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures
describing the use, operation, testing and maintenance of the UTI
measurement and sampling equipment.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The service rating of the portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment
provided onboard.
o The service and calibration requirements.
o The pre-operational checks of portable UTI measurement and sampling
equipment.
o The procedures for safe use of the equipment including PPE and RPE
requirements.
o The bonding requirements for using the UTI measurement and sampling
equipment.
• An interviewed deck rating was not familiar with the company procedures for
safe use of the portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment including
PPE and RPE requirements.
• The portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment in use was not of
the correct rating for the cargo being handled, e.g. equipment rated as
‘restricted’ was being used in tanks where the cargo being handled required a
‘closed’ device.
• Portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment was not being used in
accordance with the company procedures for safe use including PPE and RPE
requirements.
• There was no control of the opening of vapour locks and/or ullage ports by
unauthorised personnel e.g. cargo inspectors.
• Where open cargo measurement and sampling was permitted, cargo tank
openings had been left open after gauging had been completed.
• Portable UTI measurement or sampling equipment was being used without
being bonded in a non-inert atmosphere or where the company procedure
required bonding to be in use.
• One or more vapour locks were noted to be leaking during use or when
closed with the cap on.
• One or more vapour lock was observed to be damaged or missing.
• Inappropriate measurement or sampling equipment was observed being
used through the vapour locks (e.g. sounding rods which did not fit on the
vapour locks provided).
• Portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment had not been serviced
or calibrated according to manufacturer’s instructions or did not have the
associated certificates.
• No fixed ullage system was fitted but there were insufficient portable UTI
units provided to simultaneously gauge each tank being worked, plus two
spares.
• More than two portable UTI measurement units were out of service on a
vessel with no fixed cargo level measurement system.
• There were less than two operational UTI measurement units on a vessel
fitted with an operational fixed cargo level measurement system.
Where a vessel was fitted with a fixed cargo level measurement system which
was out of service, make a comment in the Hardware response tool to record
the number of functioning UTI measurement units that were available.
Address the defective fixed cargo level measurement system through question
8.99.5
Address any issues relating to measurement or sampling of static accumulator
cargoes in non-inert tanks through question 8.3.5

8.3.13. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank venting systems in
accordance with SOLAS, and were these systems correctly set?
QMS : 01N.08.05.02 / 08N-005 / 381.4010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation of the primary and
secondary cargo tank venting systems in accordance with SOLAS which
described:
o The primary and secondary system for each anticipated cargo tank/group
configuration.
o The associated settings of the pressure/vacuum sensor alarms, where fitted.
o Maintenance, test and calibration procedures for the cargo tank
pressure/vacuum monitoring system per the manufacturer’s instructions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank venting systems in
accordance with SOLAS.
• The primary and secondary venting arrangements were not as described in
the HVPQ and/or PIQ.
• The means of providing ‘secondary means of allowing full flow relief’ did not
comply with the SOLAS requirements.
• Cargo tanks were fitted with vapour isolating valves which might be damaged
or inadvertently closed but were not fitted with either full-flow P/V valves or a
pressure/vacuum monitoring system.
• Cargo tanks were fitted with vapour isolating valves which would be
intentionally closed for vapour segregation purposes but were not fitted with
either two full flow P/V valves or a P/V valve and a pressure/vacuum
monitoring system on the cargo tank side of the cargo tank vapour isolating
valve.
• On a chemical carrier, cargo tanks were fitted with an independent P/V valve
but there was no secondary protection in the form of a second full flow P/V
valve or a pressure/vacuum monitoring system.
• The cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system alarms were not set to
operate at the correct value.
• One or more cargo tank pressure sensors were not operational.
• One or more cargo tank pressure sensors appeared to be inaccurate.
• The cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system was defective in any
respect.
• There were no records of tests and/or calibration of the cargo tank
pressure/vacuum monitoring system per the manufacturer’s instructions.
In the circumstances that the ‘secondary means of allowing full flow relief’ did
not comply with the requirements of SOLAS, the supporting comment should
describe why the requirements were not met

8.3.14. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo tank
venting systems, and were the systems in satisfactory condition?
QMS : VECS manual / 375.0100 / 375.0500 / 375.0600
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting
systems.
• There were no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo
tank venting systems.
• P/V valves and/or high velocity vents had not been checked for free
movement prior to the commencement of each cargo operation as required by
the Ship Shore Safety Check List – Part 1A. Tanker checks prearrival, item 6.
• No information was available regarding the maximum permissible loading
rate for each cargo tank and in the case of combined venting systems, for each
group of cargo tanks.
• The flame screen for a P/V valve or mast riser was damaged, clogged or
missing.
• A P/V valve and/or high velocity vent was passing vapour or drawing air
inside its design pressure or vacuum setting.
• High velocity vents had been jacked open during cargo operations.
• A vapour line was in unsatisfactory condition, for example, heavily corroded
or with soft patches.
• A P/V valve or high velocity vent was defective in any respect.
8.3.15. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps, and had
regular purging of the cofferdams taken place to identify any excessive
leakage?
QMS : 351.0200 (Framo) / 351.2000 (Marflex) / 801.0100 (Ballast)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for monitoring leakage into the
cofferdams of deepwell pumps.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The company procedure for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of
deepwell pumps.
o The connections, controls and indicators used during the purging process.
Page 113 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022)
o The maximum pressure permitted for the purging medium.
o The purging medium required for the types of cargo recently carried.
o The manufacturer’s and company guidance on the use of liquid to fill the
cofferdams for specialty products, where this practice was utilised.
• Purging had not been carried out as required by the company procedure for
monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.
• There were no detailed records of purging as required by the company
procedure for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.
• Records of purging indicated leakage levels above the manufacturer’s set
limits for cargo, hydraulic oil or lubricating oil for one or more pump, but no
defect report(s) had been created to resolve the situation at the next suitable
opportunity.
• Records of purging indicated that the cofferdam of one or more pump was
apparently blocked, but no defect report(s) had been created to resolve the
situation at the next suitable opportunity.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the safety precautions to be
taken when purging the deepwell pump cofferdams.
Where purging records indicated that one or more pumps had leakage levels
above the manufacturer’s set limits or that the cofferdams were blocked, but a
defect report had been created to correct the situation at the next suitable
opportunity, enter a comment in Hardware response tool and provide brief
details of the defects recorded

8.3.16. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation,
testing and maintenance of the non-return devices installed in the inert gas
system, and were these devices in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 376.0700 (Deck seal) / 376.0911 (NRV)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing
and maintenance of the inert gas system that included the:
o deck seal or double block and bleed arrangement
o non-return valve
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system that
included the:
o deck seal or double block and bleed arrangement
o non-return valve
• There was no evidence that the IG main non-return valve had been opened
and inspected as required by company procedures.
• There was no evidence that the block and bleed valve arrangement, where
fitted, had been tested/inspectedfor automatic operation and tightness.
• The deck seal level gauge was not clear and readable.
• The deck seal water level was not as required.
• The fabric condition of the deck seal, including pipework, was not
satisfactory.
• There was no evidence to show the deck seal had been opened and
inspected, including pipework, as required by company procedures.
• The valves of the double block and bleed arrangement were not operating
automatically as required.
• The non-return devices installed in the inert gas system were defective in any
respect.

8.3.17. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and
other portable pipework, and were these items in satisfactory condition and
properly fitted when in use?
QMS : 352.8000.03 / 352.9000.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the use, inspection and testing of
manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework that included
guidance on:
o The correct use of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable
pipework.
o Provision of test certification.
o Suitable storage arrangements, including the protection of flange faces.
o Regular inspection.
o Pressure testing at least annually.
o Records to be maintained of inspections and tests.
• There was no inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other
portable pipework.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other
portable pipework.
• Test certification was not available for a manifold reducer, spool piece or
other item of portable pipework.
• There were no records available for the inspection and testing of manifold
reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework as required by company
procedures.
• Inspection of the manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable
pipework indicated that the required inspections and tests had either not been
performed or were ineffective.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework:
o Had not been pressure tested to 100% MAWP within the last 12 months.
o Was not marked with the date and pressure of the last test.
o Did not have the same certified rating (MAWP) as the fixed manifold piping
to which it was connected.
• The position of handles or lugs on reducers in use during cargo transfer
operations interfered with quick acting coupling devices or the bolting of
flanges.
• More than one spool piece or reducer was fitted between the fixed manifold
flange and the flange presented for connection.
• The flange face of a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable
pipework was visibly damaged, corroded or in an unsatisfactory condition.
• Where a long reducer or spool piece was in use, it was not properly
supported to prevent undue stress. (applicable to chemical tankers only)
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for
cargo transfer at the time of the inspection was defective in any respect.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for
cargo transfer at the time of the inspection had been repaired but there was
no evidence that it had been pressure tested on completion of the repairs.
8.3.18. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation,
testing and maintenance of the pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) device(s)
installed in the inert gas main, and was this device(s) in satisfactory
condition?
QMS : 375.0500
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing
and maintenance of the inert gas system that included the pressure/vacuum-
breaking devices.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system that
included the pressure/vacuum-breaking devices.
• The fabric condition of a P/V breaker was unsatisfactory.
• P/V breaker flame screens were damaged, missing, fitted with gaps, or had
been repaired with mesh which did not conform to the required mesh gauge
specification.
• The liquid level in a P/V breaker indicated that the device was not filled to
the design settings.
• The P/V breaker liquid level gauge was not clear and readable.
• A P/V breaker was not marked with the:
o Design pressure and vacuum opening settings.
o Date of the last inspection.
o Type/quantity of anti-freeze and the lowest allowable temperature.
• A P/V breaker was
o Set to operate at a lower pressure than that of the secondary venting system
o Not set within the safe parameters of the tank structure.
o Defective in any respect.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The purpose of a liquid P/V breaker.
o The process to verify the liquid level in a liquid P/V breaker.
8.3.19 Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and
testing of the indicators and alarms in the inert gas system, and had the
equipment been operated, maintained and calibrated in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions and company procedures?
QMS : 376.0500.01 / 376.0500.02
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing
and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the indicators
and alarms.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation,
inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system indicators and
alarms including the:
o Method and frequency of testing and calibration of the indicators and
alarms.
o Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of any of the indicators and
alarms.
• The record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including
defects and their rectification, was missing or incomplete.
• The inert gas control panel pressure indicator and/or recorder was:
o Defective in any respect.
o Not consistent with local pressure indicator(s) on deck.
• The inert gas control panel oxygen content indicator and/or recorder was
o Defective in any respect.
o Not consistent with the local indicator at the fixed oxygen analyser.
• The inert gas pressure indicator fitted in the navigating bridge was
inoperative or not consistent with the inert gas control panel pressure
indicator.
• The machinery space control room/machinery space inert gas oxygen
content indicator was inoperative or not consistent with the local indicator at
the fixed oxygen analyser.
• Any of the required audible and visual alarms in the inert gas control panel or
in the engine control room/machinery space were inoperative.
• The independent audible alarm or automatic shutdown of cargo pumps at
low-low inert gas pressure in the inert gas main was inoperative.
• There were no clear instructions provided for operating, calibrating and
testing all instruments and alarms.
• There were no suitable calibration facilities provided for the inert gas
instrumentation.
• There were no records of calibration for the inert gas instrumentation.
• Inert gas instruments were not graduated to a consistent system of units, for
example, inert gas pressure indicators.
• Inert gas system indicators and alarms were defective in any respect.

8.3.20. Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose and operation
of the connections and interconnections to the inert gas system for routine
and emergency inert gas operations, and were these arrangements in
satisfactory condition and clearly identified as to their purpose?
QMS : 01N.02.02.03 / 01N.08.05.04
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and
maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the arrangements
for the:
o Supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency.
o External supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel’s inert gas
system.
o Connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for
inerting, purging and gasfreeing, if fitted.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the arrangements for the:
o Supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency, including the
forepeak.
o External supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel’s inert gas
system.
o Connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for
inerting, purging and gasfreeing, if fitted.
• The connection for the external supply of inert gas was not clearly marked
with its purpose.
• The spool piece to isolate the inert gas supply main from the cargo piping
system had been left in place.
• There was no evidence of inspection and maintenance of the non-return
valve between the inert gas supply main and the cargo piping system.
• Portable hoses required to connect the inert gas supply main to the double-
hull spaces were damaged or missing.
• One or more of the connections to the inert gas supply main were defective
in any respect.

8.3.21. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure
for cargo heating, and was the cargo heating system in satisfactory condition
and tested and used in accordance with the company procedure?
QMS : 01N.08.02.04 / 365.0500 / 08N-005
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures describing the operation, testing and
maintenance of the cargo heating system.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures
describing the operation, testing and maintenance of the cargo heating system
including any cargo temperature limits.
• The cargo heating system had not been operated and/or tested in
compliance with company procedures.
• There were no records of the cargo heating system testing.
• There were no records of cargo heating operations.
• The cargo heating system had not been isolated where required in
compliance with company procedures.
• There were no records of the regular monitoring of the cargo heating system
return to detect leakage.
• Inspection of the observation tank or hot well indicated there was significant
leakage in the cargo heating system.
• There were leaks of heating medium from the associated pipework on deck
or in the engine room.
• One or more temperature sensors in the remote temperature indicating
system were defective.
• Cargo heating records indicated cargo temperature limits had been
exceeded.
• There was significant corrosion, pitting, soft patches and/or other temporary
repairs on the pipework or components of the heating system.
• The cargo heating system was defective in any respect.

8.3.22. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for managing on-board doping operations, and had these procedures been
complied with?
QMS : 01N.08.03.08
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for managing on-board doping
operations that included:
o Reviewing the supplier’s/contractor’s doping plan.
o Performing a risk assessment of the proposed operation.
o Supervising the doping operation.
• The officer responsible for cargo operations was not familiar with the
company procedures for managing onboard doping operations.
• The vessel had not been provided with the supplier’s/contractor’s plan for an
on-board doping operation.
• A risk assessment had not been performed based upon the
supplier’s/contractor’s plan for an on-board doping operation.
• The doping plan and/or risk assessment did not include:
o Any flammability or toxicity hazards associated with the additive.
o The method of doping to be used and any operational restrictions.
o Arrangements for supervision by ship’s crew.
o PPE and handling equipment requirements.
o Contingency measures including the method of clean-up of any spillages.
o Storage arrangements of any additives to be carried on board.
o Appropriate anti-static precautions if tanks were not inerted.
• There was no evidence that the doping plan and/or risk assessment had been
discussed by all personnel involved on the ship and in the terminal, including
contractors.
• There was no Safety Data Sheet:
o Available for the additive(s) used for doping.
o Kept in the vicinity of the doping operation.
• Doping had taken place via an open tank lid when alternative methods were
available.
• The doping method utilised involved free fall of additives into non-inerted
cargo tanks.
• Additives were stored on board in a manner that did not reflect the
flammability or toxicity hazards indicated in the associated Safety Data Sheet.
• Pressure test records were not available for the injection system used for
doping.
• PPE as required by the doping plan and/or risk assessment was not being
utilised.
• Contractors were not being supervised by ship’s crew as required by the
doping plan and/or risk assessment.
8.3.23. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the maintenance, testing and calibration of the cargo temperature
monitoring equipment, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 01N.08.01.04 / 381.4000 / 381.4010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the maintenance, testing and
calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment in accordance with
manufacturer’s instructions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the maintenance, testing and calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring
equipment.
• The accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate the operation of the
fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment, including alarms.
• There were no records of checks, tests or calibration of the cargo
temperature monitoring equipment.
• The fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been tested and
calibrated in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.
• The fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been calibrated
within the last 30 months.
• Portable cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been tested and
calibrated in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.
• One or more temperature sensor in the fixed cargo temperature monitoring
system was defective.
• The visible and/or audible alarm in the fixed temperature monitoring system
was defective.
• The cargo temperature monitoring equipment was defective in any respect.
8.3.24. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for managing cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds, and were
the manifold arrangements in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 01N.08.03.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures which described the management of
cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds to prevent and detect
leakages.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures
which described the management of cargo and vapour connections at the
cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages.
• A manifold connection was:
o Secured with damaged bolts or bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or
material.
o Not fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.
o Made using improvised arrangements such as a G-clamp or similar device.
• Where a hose or marine loading arm was secured by camlocks, one or more
cams had not properly engaged with the manifold flange.
• A marine loading arm was improperly supported by jacks or similar
arrangements.
• The jacks for a marine loading arm were supported by items not designed to
support the load, such as empty oil drums.
• Cargo hoses were not properly supported during cargo transfer.
• On a chemical tanker, manifold flanges in use were not fitted with spray
guards whilst handling acids, or another cargo that was toxic or corrosive.
• A manifold pressure gauge was:
o Not fitted on the outboard side of the manifold valve.
o Missing from an unused manifold connection.
o Indicating an increased pressure and possible manifold valve leakage.
• A manifold pressure gauge stem was not fitted with a valve or cock and/or
was not capped when not in use
• A manifold blank flange was not:
o As thick as the end flange it was bolted to and there was no supporting
documentation to show it was of the same working pressure rating as the line
or system it was connected to.
o Made of steel or other approved material.
o Secured with bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material.
o Fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.
• There was a cargo or bunker leak from an unused manifold.
• An unused manifold was not blanked.
• A manifold sample point or drain was not blanked or capped when not in
use.
• A manifold sample point or drain was positioned to drain directly onto the
deck.
• The manifold(s) had been drained into the open drip-trays.
• Fixed and/or portable drip-trays had not been drained and cleaned of cargo
residues.
• There was no permanent or portable drip-tray underneath a manifold
connection.
• Plywood or canvas sheeting had been placed across the manifold drip tray
gratings to prevent minor spillages entering the drip tray freely.
• A portable drip-tray was made of plastic or another non-metallic material but
was not bonded to the ship’s structure.
• Manifold drip-tray drains to deck were not fitted with valves and capped.
• On a chemical tanker, there were no suitable means to ensure incompatible
cargoes were not mixed in manifold drip trays and/or drain tanks.
• Vapour manifold presentation flanges were not fitted with the required stud
at the 12 o’clock position.
• Vapour manifold connections, including reducers, were not painted/marked
as required.
• An elevated manifold working platform did not have effective edge
protection and was not properly identified and marked by warning signs to
prevent falls.
• The midships hose-handling crane was being used to handle stores etc. whilst
cargo operations were taking place.
• An unused stern manifold was not isolated from the main cargo pipeline
system by a blank or the removal of a spool piece.
• The dangerous area extending at least three metres from the stern manifold
valve in use was not clearly marked to prevent access by unauthorised
personnel

8.3.25. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for receiving nitrogen from shore for operations such as inerting,
purging or padding cargo tank, or for clearing cargo lines?
QMS : 01N.08.06.06
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which described the processes for
receiving nitrogen from the shore for operations such as for operations such
as, inerting, purging or padding cargo tanks or for clearing cargo lines.
• Company procedures did not describe the actions to be taken to avoid over
pressurisation of cargo tanks when nitrogen is received from shore, including
the:
o Requirement to carry out a risk assessment prior to operations.
o Choice of connection and piping system for receiving the nitrogen.
o Methods of controlling the incoming flow of nitrogen.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures
which described the procedure for receiving nitrogen from the shore for
operations such as inerting or purging tanks, for padding cargo tanks or to clear
lines.
• Risk assessments were not available for operations where the vessel received
nitrogen from ashore.
• Ship shore safety checklists for cargo operations that included receiving
nitrogen from shore had not been completed to document the agreed
procedures to receive nitrogen, the maximum pressure and the flow rate.
• Records showed that hoses or loading arms containing flammable cargo had
been cleared to the ship using compressed air.

8.99.1. Were the Master and all officers directly involved in cargo transfer
operations familiar with the company procedure for planning cargo and
ballast transfers, and were records available to demonstrate that cargo
operations had been planned in accordance with the company procedure and
conducted in accordance with the agreed plan?
QMS : 01N.08.03.01 / 01N.08.03.02 / 01N.08.03.05 / 08N-005
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure:
o That required cargo and ballast transfer plans to be prepared with defined
content applicable to the vessel type and the equipment and systems fitted.
o Which defined the record-keeping requirements for cargo and ballast
transfer operations.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the:
o Company procedures for cargo and ballast transfer planning.
o Company requirements for maintaining records of cargo and ballast
operations.
• The reviewed cargo and ballast transfer plan was:
o Missing key information required by the company procedures.
o Missing draught, trim and stress calculations at key stages of the cargo and
ballast operation.
o Not signed by all deck officers and, where required, engineer officers and/or
was not approved by the Master.
• Where the cargo and/or ballast sequence or operations had to be updated
due to changes in circumstances, the cargo and ballast transfer plan had not
been updated and then re-approved by the Master and acknowledged by the
officers involved in the cargo/ballast operation.
• The reviewed cargo and ballast transfer records:
o Indicated that the cargo and ballast plan was not followed.
o Indicated that cargo-related operations were conducted which were not
included in the cargo and ballast transfer plan.
o Did not comply with company record keeping requirements.
o Did not include sufficient detail, within the aggregated cargo records, to
reconstruct the progress of the cargo operation and determine which tanks,
pumps and lines were involved at any point during a cargo transfer.
• The cargo space venting or tank atmosphere management was not
conducted in accordance with the cargo plan.

8.99.2. Were the Master and all officers with a direct responsibility for cargo,
tank cleaning or ballast operations familiar with the requirements of the
ISGOTT Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and, were appropriate sections of
the SSSCL in use with all applicable provisions and agreements maintained
throughout?
QMS : 08N-015 / 01N.08.03.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required the relevant sections of a
SSSCL in accordance with ISGOTT Sixth Edition to be completed during every
cargo, tank cleaning or ballast operation at a terminal or during defined ship to
ship transfer operations.
• The relevant sections of the SSSCL in use were not in alignment with the
guidance provided in ISGOTT Sixth Edition.
• The sections of the SSSCL relevant to the operation being undertaken or
reviewed had not been completed or were not in use.
• There were open defect reports for equipment or systems relevant to the
SSSCL which had not been brought to the attention of the Terminal
Representative through a documented remark in the relevant sections of the
SSSCL.
• Inspection of the vessel determined that equipment or systems relevant to
the SSSCL were defective and there was neither an open defect report in the
defect reporting system nor a documented remark in the relevant sections of
the SSSCL.
• Items in the relevant SSSCL checklists had been answered as "yes" when
there was evidence that the item reported on was not in accordance with the
referenced guidance provided in ISGOTT Sixth Edition.
• The vessel was found to be violating any of the documented agreements
identified in SSSCL Part 6, tanker and terminal pre-transfer agreements.
• The cargo and ballast transfer plan had not been updated, where required, to
reflect the documented agreements reached during the tanker and terminal
pre-transfer meeting.
• Inspection of the vessel determined that any item included in SSSCL Part 8,
repetitive checks was not maintained in the required condition.
• The accompanying officer or any officer having a responsibility for cargo
operations was unfamiliar with the relevant sections of the SSSCL applicable to
the vessel or any check or declaration made therein.
• A responsible officer had not conducted the repetitive checks required by the
SSSCL Part 8 on deck at least once during each cargo watch period.

8.99.3. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
which provided guidance on the level of supervision and support for cargo /
port operations, and were operations supervised and supported by an
appropriate team in accordance with the company procedures?
QMS : 01N.08.03.01 / 08N-005
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures that provided guidance on the
supervision and support levels required during cargo / port operations.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures that
provided guidance on the supervision and support levels required during
cargo / port operations.
• The cargo / port planning documentation did not include the level of
supervision and support required during the various stages of cargo / port
operations.
• The cargo / port planning documentation was not developed in alignment
with the company procedures that provided guidance on the supervision and
support levels required during cargo / port operations.
• The level of supervision and support in the cargo control room and on deck
observed during the inspections was not in alignment with the company
procedures that provided guidance on the supervision and support levels
required during cargo / port operations.
• The cargo operation team supervisors and/or support were observed to be
involved with a conflicting operation (SIMOPS) and distracted from their
designated duties documented within the cargo / port plans.
• Operations identified by the company procedures as requiring senior officer
supervision, such as, crude oil washing, commencing loading/discharging
operations or completing loading/discharging operations were not supervised
as required.

8.99.4. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for checking and testing cargo and ballast system valves, and were the valves
and the remote control system in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 831.0100.01 / 831.0330.01 / 831.0340.01 / 831.0350.01

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for the regular checking and testing of
cargo and ballast system valves which included the:
o Frequency of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves.
o Records to be kept of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves.
o Procedure for checking of the time taken for power operated valves to move
from open to closed, and from closed to open, and the optimum times.
o Verification of the accuracy of local and remote valve indicators.
o Procedure for testing the emergency valve control mode and local hand
pumps, as applicable to the vessel.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The company procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo and
ballast system valves.
o The emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to
the vessel.
• There were no records of regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast
system valves.
• Checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves did not include:
o Checking and recording the time taken for power operated valves to move
from open to closed, and from closed to open.
o Verifying that the local and remote valve indicators were showing the correct
position of the valve.
o Testing the emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as
applicable to the vessel.
• Records indicated that power operated valves were not operating in the
optimum times.
• A cargo or ballast system valve indicator was observed to be indicating the
incorrect position of the valve. (e.g. the valve signal was set to full open or full
closed, but the valve indicator did not reflect the order by showing an
intermediate position or by continuing to flash).
• A hydraulically operated cargo or ballast system valve was isolated from the
hydraulic system due to suspected hydraulic leakage.
• A cargo or ballast system valve designed to be remotely operated was
disconnected from the remote control system and was being operated
manually.
• The valve hydraulic system was not maintained at normal operating pressure
during cargo transfer operations due to suspected hydraulic oil leakage in the
system.
• The valve hydraulic system or pneumatic system was not set to automatically
maintain the normal system operating pressure throughout cargo and ballast
transfer operations.
• There was evidence of excessive hydraulic oil loss from the valve hydraulic
system.
• A cargo or ballast system valve was observed to be defective in any respect.
• The cargo and ballast system valve remote control system was defective in
any respect.
• There was no functional emergency valve control mode local hand pump
available.

8.99.5. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison of the
fixed cargo tank level gauging system, and was the system in satisfactory
condition and fully operational?
QMS : 01N.08.02.02 / 381.4000 / 381.4010
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing,
calibration and comparison checks of the fixed tank level gauging system based
on the manufacturer’s instructions.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration
and comparison checks of the fixed tank level gauging system.
o The actions to take if the fixed gauging system or an individual cargo tank
fixed gauging device is defective or unreliable.
o The setting and monitoring of any level alarms built into the fixed tank level
gauging system.
• Testing and calibration of the fixed tank level gauging system had not been
performed in accordance with the company procedures and/or manufacturer’s
instructions.
• There were no records available of testing and calibration of the fixed tank
level gauging system.
• Fixed tank level gauges had not been regularly checked against portable
equipment or secondary tank level gauges, where practicable, and records of
the comparison maintained.
• There were significant discrepancies in the comparison between the fixed
tank level gauges and the portable or secondary gauges.
• There was no procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued
cargo transfer operations in the event of a failure of the fixed tank level
gauging system.
• The fixed tank level gauging system was inoperative, and gauging was being
performed using portable equipment.
• The fixed tank level gauging system was unreliable, and gauging was being
performed using portable equipment.
• Level alarms built into the fixed ullaging system, if any, were permanently
silenced or inhibited
• The fixed tank level gauging system was defective in any respect.
Where the vessel was not fitted with fixed cargo tank level gauging equipment,
select “Not Answerable” in each of the response tools then select "Not
Applicable - as instructed by question guidance.

8.99.6. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedure and manufacturer’s instructions for the periodic testing of the
stability and loading instrument(s), and were records maintained to confirm
that tests had been completed in accordance with the procedure?
QMS : 01N.10.02.04 / 381.1000.01 / Forum 020.110.020
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure requiring the periodic testing of the
vessel’s loading instrument.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures or
the manufacturer’s instructions for testing the loading instrument.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the damage stability functions
of the loading instrument.
• The vessel had not completed the periodic verification of the loading
instrument accuracy in accordance with the company procedures or the
manufacturer’s instructions.
• Records were not available for the periodic verification of the loading
instrument accuracy.
• Records were not available for the verification of the loading instrument
accuracy at Special Survey in the presence of a Class Surveyor.
• The loading instrument in use was defective in any respect.
• The vessel did not have a loading instrument but there was no clear evidence
that the vessel was exempt from the requirement to carry such a device.

8.99.7. Where the vessel was subject to loading restrictions and/or intact
stability concerns at any phase of a voyage or cargo operation, had the
company developed procedures to manage these restrictions and/or
concerns, and were the Master and cargo officers familiar with the company
procedures?
QMS : 01N.08.06.03 / Stability booklet / Loading instrument
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
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• The vessel operator had not correctly declared any loading limitations or
stability concerns applicable to the vessel through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
• The vessel was subject to loading limitations or stability concerns, but the
vessel operator had not developed procedures to manage the issues onboard
the vessel.
• The vessel was subject to loading limitations or stability concerns, but there
were no warning signs posted to notify the officers with cargo related
responsibilities of the issues onboard the vessel.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the loading limitations or
stability concerns applicable to the vessel, where they existed.
• The cargo plans had not been developed to address loading limitations or
stability concerns where they existed.
• Vessel records determined that the guidance provided by the company
procedure to address loading limitations or stability concerns had not been
complied with.
• The vessel had undergone weight variations due to the installation of a
scrubber or ballast water treatment system, or major structural modifications,
but there was no evidence that the loading instrument and/or stability booklet
had been updated to take account of the changes where appropriate.

8.99.8. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the selection, inspection, testing and storage of cargo transfer hoses, and
were the hoses in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 01N.10.02.02 / 352.2200.01 (Portable Cargo pump hose)
352.2300.01 (Cargo transfer hose)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the selection, inspection, testing,
storage, and retirement of cargo transfer hoses.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the selection, inspection, testing, storage, and retirement of cargo transfer
hoses.
• A ship supplied cargo transfer hose:
o Was not clearly marked with the required information.
o Had not been inspected within the last 12 months to confirm suitability for
continued use.
o Had not been pressure tested within the last 12 months to confirm suitability
for continued use.
o Had not been retired in accordance with the company set criteria.
o Had visual damage as detailed in the guidance but had not been withdrawn
from service.
o Had not been tested for electrical continuity since the last hydrostatic test.
o Was not compatible with the cargo being handled and/or the cargo
temperature.
o Had a maximum working pressure of less than 1MPa (approximately 145 psi
or 10.2 kg/cm2).
o Was stored or used with a bend radius less than the minimum bend radius
(MBR) information provided by the manufacturer.
• It could not be confirmed if a ship supplied cargo transfer hose was
compatible with the cargo being handled and/or the cargo temperature.
• There was no:
o Record of the service history of ship supplied cargo transfer hoses.
o Valid certificate and/or documentation on board for a ship supplied cargo
transfer hose.
o Documentary evidence for hydrostatic test data marked on a ship supplied
cargo transfer hose.
o Record of the temporary and permanent elongation during pressure testing
for each cargo transfer hose.
• Cargo transfer hoses were stored in unsuitable conditions or in an unsuitable
manner.
• Cargo transfer hoses on an LNG carrier had not been pressure tested prior to
each use or in accordance with an alternative documented procedure to
ensure their integrity.
• Portable cargo pump hoses were:
o Damaged or in poor condition.
o Had not been tested and maintained in accordance with manufacturers
guidelines.
• Flow rate through a cargo transfer hose exceeded the maximum permitted
flow rate stated by the hose manufacturer where flow rate was a limiting
design factor.
• Ship supplied cargo transfer hoses were defective in any respect.
8.99.9. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for periodically verifying the accuracy of cargo and ballast system controls
and indicators, and were legible and up-to-date pipeline and/or mimic
diagrams available at the cargo control location(s) and in the pumproom(s) as
applicable?
QMS : CCR diagrams / 381.1000.02 (Draught) / 01N.10.02.03
352.2000 / 352.2100 / 352.3000 / 351.9000.01 (Framo, Marflex)
381.4000.22
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• Legible and up to date pipeline and/or mimic diagrams were not available in
the pumproom(s) and/or at the cargo control location(s).
• Pipeline and/or mimic diagrams had not been updated to reflect
modifications or additions to the pipeline systems.
• Pipeline systems were not marked/identified consistently with the cargo
systems mimic diagram or display.
• There was no company procedure which ensured that:
o All cargo and ballast system pressure, temperature and level sensors are
periodically verified for accuracy.
o Cargo information displays and mimics are checked periodically to verify that
information is being transferred and displayed correctly.
o Cargo and ballast system controls incorporated into cargo information
displays and mimics are functioning properly.
• There were no records for the periodic verification of sensor, information
display, or cargo and ballast system control accuracy and/or function checks.
• A cargo or ballast pump was being controlled from the machinery space or
the main deck local control station due to a defect in the remote control
system.
• A cargo or ballast pump speed/electrical load indicator was inaccurate or out
of service.
• The draught gauges were inaccurate.
• The local and/or remote pressure sensor displays for the cargo or ballast
system/plant were inaccurate.
• The local and/or remote temperature sensor displays for the cargo or ballast
system/plant were inaccurate.
• The cargo systems mimic diagram or display was indicating incorrect
information such as:
o Cargo or ballast pump status.
o Cargo or ballast plant status.
o Cargo or ballast pipeline pressure or temperature.
o Draught, list or trim.
o Cargo tank level.
o Cargo tank pressure.
o Cargo tank temperature.
o Cargo and ballast valve remote control system hydraulic pressure.
o Cargo or ballast system valve position. (this includes manual indication)
o Inert gas system status.
o Inert gas system valve position. (this includes manual indication)
o The venting system valve position. (this includes manual indication)
o The stripping system valve position and status. (this includes manual
indication)
o Cargo and ballast system alarms.
o Cargo system controls and indicators were defective in any respect.

8.99.10. Were the Master and officers a familiar with the company
procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the bonding arrangements
for independent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines and, were
these arrangements in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 352.8000.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of
the bonding arrangements for independent cargo tanks, process plant and
cargo pipelines.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the inspection and maintenance of the bonding arrangements for independent
cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines or the particular arrangements
on board the vessel.
• Bonding straps or other bonding arrangements, where required by the
original vessel design, were:
o Missing
o Mechanically damaged
o Functionally compromised by high resistivity contamination e.g. corrosive
products or paint.
o Coated in paint hampering effective inspection.
• Bonding arrangements were defective in any respect.

8.99.11. Was there a procedure in place to complete an independent check of

the entire cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline system prior to
commencement of cargo operations to ensure that valves, vacuum breakers,
sampling connections, drains and unused connections or interconnections
were correctly set, and blanked or capped, where appropriate?
QMS : 01N.08.03.02 / 01N.08.03.05 / 08N-005
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures to ensure that that the entire cargo
liquid, vapour and venting pipeline system is independently cross-checked by a
second person under the control of the responsible officer prior to
commencement of cargo operations.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
ensure that that the entire cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline system is
independently cross-checked by a second person under the control of the
responsible officer prior to commencement of cargo operations.
• There was no documentary evidence that the independent cargo system
pipeline cross-checks had been completed before commencing cargo
operations.
• The valve for a cargo pipeline drain, stub piece, sampling connection or
vacuum breaker was not closed during cargo operations.
• A cargo pipeline system drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum
breaker was not fitted with a valve.
• A cargo pipeline system drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum
breaker was not capped or blanked as necessary during cargo operations.

9. Mooring and Anchoring

9.1. Mooring Equipment Management
9.1.1. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for the testing and correct operation of the mooring winch
brakes, and were records available to demonstrate that brakes had been
tested periodically, after maintenance or when there was evidence of
premature brake slippage?
QMS : Document tree / QMS02.02.03 / Ship-specific MSMP, LMP
050-014a/b
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which provided instructions for the use
and testing of the mooring winches brakes fitted to the vessel.
• The vessel was not provided with a Mooring System Management Plan
(MSMP) which was in alignment with MEG4.
• The accompanying deck officer was not familiar with the company
procedures for the operation, setting and testing of the mooring winch brakes.
• The accompanying deck officer or observed crew were not familiar with the
operation and setting of the mooring winch brakes.
• The brake testing equipment was not maintained in good condition, or the
hydraulic jack pressure gauge had not been calibrated before use where brake
testing equipment was carried.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been periodically tested in accordance
with the company procedure or the Mooring System Management Plan
requirements.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been tested on completion of any repairs
or maintenance which affected the mooring winch brake mechanism assembly.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been retested where there had been
evidence of premature brake slippage or related malfunctions.
• The mooring winch drums were not marked with the date of the previous
test, the primary brake load capacity, the reeling direction or the brake setting
torque or hydraulic brake assist setting pressure (as applicable to the brake
type).
• The brake on any single mooring drum in active mooring service was
observed to be incorrectly set.
• A stopper arrangement, e.g. a locking nut on the threaded end, was used on
the tightening screw of the brake to set the brake torque.
• A mooring line was reeled onto a mooring drum in the wrong direction for
the correct operation of the brake mechanism.
• Where the vessel was provided with split drums there was more than one
layer of line on the tension side of a drum.
• Where the vessel was provided with split drums there were insufficient turns
of line, as determined by the company procedure or MSMP, on the tension
side of the drum.
• The mooring winch drum brake mechanisms, brake drums or brake band
linings were apparently defective on any mooring winch. This would include
where brake drums had more than a light layer of superficial surface rust.

9.1.2. Was the vessel satisfactorily moored in accordance with both the
terminal mooring plan and the mooring configurations permitted by the
vessel’s Mooring System Management Plan?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The vessel was not provided with a Mooring System Management Plan
(MSMP) which was in alignment with MEG4.
• The Mooring System Management Plan was not developed to include the
permissible mooring configurations for optimal, sub-optimal and alternative
mooring arrangements for conventional tanker berths and, where used,
conventional buoy moorings.
• The Mooring System Management Plan was not developed to show the
maximum permitted deviation from the horizontal angles of lines to the
perpendicular of the ships fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines.
• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the process for
comparing the published or proposed terminal mooring plan with the mooring
configurations permitted within the Mooring System Management Plan.
• The vessel was moored in a pattern that was not in accordance with the
published terminal mooring plan.
• The vessel was moored in a pattern that was not in accordance with the
mooring configurations permitted by the Mooring System Management Plan.
• The vertical angle (in true elevation) of any mooring line exceeded the limit
identified within the Mooring System Management Plan.
• The vessel had deployed fewer lines than required by either the published
terminal mooring plan or the mooring configurations permitted by the
Mooring System Management Plan.
• The vessel had not utilised supplementary shore-lines required by the
terminal mooring plan.
• Where the vessel had been subject to a mooring analysis for the terminal or
berth, the actual mooring configuration was not in accordance with the plan
developed through the mooring analysis.
• Where the vessel was double banked there was no analysis available to
demonstrate that the mooring plan had been verified as providing sufficient
restraint for both the inside and outside vessels.

Where the terminal had not published a mooring plan and the vessel could
demonstrate that it had made efforts to obtain the plan through its operator
or agent then make a comment under the Process response tool.

9.1.3. Were the Master, deck officers, and ratings involved with mooring
operations, familiar with the content of the Line Management Plan and was
the plan maintained in accordance with company instructions with mooring
line, mooring tail and joining shackle certificates available for each item
included within the Line Management Plan?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The vessel was not provided with a Line Management Plan (LMP).
• The vessel had not retained manufacturer’s product certificates for all
mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles onboard referenced against
each item’s location.
• The LMP was not developed in alignment with the sections and subsections
of MEG4 table 5.2, as a minimum.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the content of the LMP and
how the information was to be recorded and managed within it.
• An interviewed rating who was involved with mooring operations was
unfamiliar with the existence of the LMP or content relevant to their role
onboard.
• The LMP had not been maintained accurately. (Inspection determined that
lines, tails or shackles were in the wrong location or items were onboard which
were not included in the LMP).
• Mooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle inspections had not been
completed and documented in accordance with the LMP.
• Mooring lines, mooring tails or joining shackles in use or provided as spares
were in a condition that indicated the inspection processes required under the
LMP were ineffective.
• Joining shackles were fitted the wrong way around according to the shackle
design.
• Mooring wires were connected to mooring tails using a cow hitch or an
inappropriate shackle.
• A mooring line or mooring tail was in service beyond the stated company
retirement criteria.
• A mooring line or mooring tail was in service which had suffered damage to
such an extent that it should have been taken out of service for repair or
retirement.
• Splicing of mooring lines had been undertaken onboard but the resulting
splices were not in accordance with the line manufacturer’s instructions.
• Mooring lines had not been “end for ended” or rotated in service in
accordance with the line management plan wear zone management process.
• A mooring line, mooring tail or joining shackle had parted in service during
the previous six months but there was no incident investigation report
onboard to document the causes of the failure.

9.1.4. Did all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles, including
those carried as spares, meet industry guidelines?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not based on the existing
arrangements and equipment fitted on board.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the vessel specific emergency
towing procedure (ETB).
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the emergency towing
equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the process of deploying the
emergency towing equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not available on the bridge, in
the ship’s office or cargo control room and in the forecastle space.
• The emergency towing arrangements were defective in any respect.
• The ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure (ETB) was
missing, in the wrong location or defective in any way.
• The emergency towing equipment was not ready for immediate use in any
respect.
9.2. Emergency Towing Arrangement
9.2.1. Were the Master and all officers familiar with the vessel specific
emergency towing procedure, and was the emergency towing equipment,
where fitted, in satisfactory condition and ready for immediate use?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not based on the existing
arrangements and equipment fitted on board.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the vessel specific emergency
towing procedure (ETB).
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the emergency towing
equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the process of deploying the
emergency towing equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not available on the bridge, in
the ship’s office or cargo control room and in the forecastle space.
• The emergency towing arrangements were defective in any respect.
• The ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure (ETB) was
missing, in the wrong location or defective in any way.
• The emergency towing equipment was not ready for immediate use in any
respect.

9.3. Mooring and Anchoring Procedures

9.3.1. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company
procedures for anchoring operations, and were records available to confirm
that recent anchoring operations had been conducted in compliance with
company expectations?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures with supporting checklists which
covered the process of anchoring and included:
o The selection of an anchorage taking into account the proximity and density
of other vessels at anchor, the quality of the seabed and the proximity of
navigational dangers.
o The maximum depth of water permitted for normal anchoring operations.
o The required level of supervision of the anchoring party.
o The minimum composition of the anchoring party.
o The maximum environmental conditions permitted for anchoring.
o The environmental conditions at which the vessel would be expected to have
departed an anchorage.
o The checks required to be carried out for the anchoring equipment and
power system prior to, and upon completion of, anchoring operations.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for
anchoring operations.
• The vessel had anchored, or remained at anchor, with environmental
conditions in excess of the limits provided by the company.
• The vessel had anchored in a water depth that exceeded the limit set by the
company.
• The maximum anchorage depth in metres was not either marked on the
windlass or posted on the bridge.
• The checks required to be completed prior to and during anchoring
operations had not been completed as required.
• The anchoring systems (windlass, anchor, chain, stoppers, power system)
were defective in any respect.
• The accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate how to verify that the
windlass brake was correctly adjusted.
• When in coastal waters and port the anchors were not free to use in an
emergency – the chain was resting against the stopper bar preventing it being
lifted without the use of the windlass.

9.4. Mooring and Anchoring Team Management

9.4.1. Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the
company procedure that defined mooring team supervision and composition
for the various mooring and anchoring operations likely to be undertaken,
and was evidence available that each mooring work space had been
supervised and manned in accordance with company expectations?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• MSMP sections, relating to Manning and Training and Mooring Operations
Plans and Procedures, had not been developed to specify the mooring or
anchoring team composition or identified the required level of supervision at
each mooring workspace.
• The accompanying deck officer was unable to identify the company
procedure defining who should supervise each mooring and anchoring
workspace and the minimum workspace composition when requested to do
so.
• An interviewed deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was
unfamiliar with the company expectations with regards to mooring or
anchoring team composition or workspace supervision.
• Review of hours of rest or other records determined that the company
expectations relating to mooring or anchoring team composition or supervision
had not been complied with.
• Where an unlicenced crew member was permitted to supervise an anchoring
or mooring workstation there was no evidence that they had completed the
training courses or the competency assessment as required by the company
for fulfilling the role.
• Where the company procedure permitted an unlicenced crewmember to
supervise a mooring or anchoring workspace enter a comment in the Process
response tool and describe the circumstances in which this was permitted.

9.4.2. Were the deck officers and ratings involved with mooring operations
familiar with the safe operation of the mooring winches and the dangers of
working with and around mooring lines during mooring operations and while
under tension?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which included the considerations for
operational safety during mooring operations or in areas where mooring lines
were under tension.
• A deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with
the company mooring procedure which defined the considerations for
operational safety during mooring operations and in areas where there were
mooring lines under tension.
• A deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with
the danger of snap-back and how this was communicated onboard the vessel
prior to and after mooring operations.
Page 403 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022)
• Interviews with deck officers or ratings involved in mooring operations
indicated that toolbox talks were not taking place prior to each mooring
operation.
• Ship’s personnel or visitors were observed stepping over lines under tension
when there was a route which avoided the need to do so.
• There were no warning signs or barriers to prevent personnel from
approaching a mooring line under tension.
• The mooring drums were left in gear while the drum was in active mooring
service with the brake applied.
• The safety locking pins for the winch drum clutch mechanisms were missing
or not used.
• The mooring winch control levers were stiff and did not return to the neutral
position when released.
• The mooring winch controls were not clearly marked with the direction of
heave and slack.
• There was evidence that mooring winch controls had been fastened in the
heave or slack position at some point in the past.
• The winch control and drum access platforms were damaged, uneven or had
missing plates.

9.5. STS Operation Management

9.5.1. Were the appropriate industry checklists used during STS operations,
and were comprehensive records of these operations maintained?
QMS : 01N.04.04.01 / 01N.08.03.07 / 04N-005 / 04N-010 / BRD 122
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which required the vessel to use the
checklists identified by the OCIMF* STS Transfer Guide.
• There was no company procedure which required that comprehensive STS
records were maintained onboard.
• The accompanying deck officer was not familiar with the company procedure
for the use of checklists during STS operations.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure for
the retention of records relating to STS operations.
• Review of checklists in use at the time of the inspection or from past STS
operations indicated that the wrong STS checklists were used i.e. “at sea”
checklists were used for “in port” operations or vice-versa.
• Individual STS checklists were either not used or missing.
• Review of individual STS checklists identified that items had been checked
off, but the required evidence was missing.
• Standard pre-transfer checklists had not been used to supplement the STS
checklists.
• Where vapour balancing had been conducted there was no vapour balancing
checklist used.
• Physical inspection of the vessel during an STS operation determined that
checks required by the STS checklists had not been accomplished.
• Repetitive checks required by the STS checklists had not been completed.
• Review of records for past STS operations identified that checklists or
required records were missing.
• Review of completed “in port” pre -transfer STS checklists indicated that the
confirmation of checks and signatures required from the second vessel, and
the terminal where applicable, involved in the STS operation had not been
completed

9.5.2. Where the vessel was involved in an “at sea” STS operation, was an
accurate Joint Plan of Operation available onboard, were the Master and
deck officers familiar with its content, and were operations being conducted
in accordance with its requirements?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no procedure which required that a Joint Plan of Operation (JPO)
was developed for every STS operation.
• The vessel did not have onboard a JPO which reflected the specific STS
operation being undertaken.
• The JPO did not include all information required by the OCIMF* STS Guide
relevant to the operation being undertaken.
• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure
which required a JPO to be developed for every STS operation.
• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the content of the JPO.
• An interviewed deck officer or deck rating had not been briefed regarding the
content of the JPO prior to the commencement of the STS operation.
• The risk assessment contained in the JPO did not reflect the location or type
of STS operation that was being undertaken.
• The JPO did not address the measures in place to eliminate the potential for
incendive arcing between the two vessels.
• The measures to eliminate incendive arcing identified within the JPO had not
been implemented.
• There was no evidence that the mandatory notifications to comply with local
or government regulations had been made.
• The vessel was not moored in accordance with the JPO.
• The vessel had continued the STS operation or cargo transfer operations
despite the environmental operating parameters being exceeded.

9.5.3. Were the Master, officers and deck ratings familiar with the vessel’s
STS Operations Plan?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The vessel did not have an STS Operations Plan. (irrespective of whether the
vessel had been involved in STS operations.)
• Where the vessel had been involved in the STS transfer of Annex 1 cargo the
STS plan had not been approved by the vessel’s Administration. (except where
specifically exempted by MARPOL Annex 1 Regulation 40)
• Where the vessel was not involved in the carriage of Annex 1 cargo, the
content of the STS Operations Plan was not in alignment with Annex A of the
OCIMF Ship to Ship Transfer Guide.
• The onboard STS Operations Plan were found to be outdated or incomplete.
• One or more copies of the STS Operations Plan was missing from the
following locations; bridge, cargo transfer control station or engine room.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the location and content of
the STS Operations Plan.
• An interviewed deck rating who was onboard during a recent STS operation
was unfamiliar with the location and content of the STS Operations Plan.

9.6. Single Point Mooring

9.6.1. Were the vapour collection system manifold arrangements suitable for
hose handling at buoy moorings?
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
For a vapour return system manifold (VRSM) which was designed for use at
single buoy moorings:
• The vapour manifolds were not supported to the same strength as the cargo
manifolds.
• Hose rails did not extend beyond the vapour manifolds.
• Hose rails serving the vapour manifolds were not:
o Of the same strength and construction throughout their length.
o Fitted with stopper plates at both the forward and aft ends of the hose rails.
• The vapour manifolds were not fitted with the necessary:
o Closed chocks.
o Cruciform bollards.
o Deck pad-eyes.
• The fittings for securing the vapour hose were not permanently marked with
their safe working load (SWL).
• There were no means to drain the vapour manifold to avoid risk of liquid
carry-over into the floating hose.

9.6.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for
mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO and were the fittings required accurately
described in the HVPQ?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals
that included:
o Guidance on preparations for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
o Instructions for safe mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
o Inspection and maintenance instructions for the bow stopper(s).
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals, as they related to their duties.
• The actual physical arrangements for mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO terminal
were not as described in the HVPQ - provide details.
• There was no certificate, issued by an independent authority, such as a
Classification Society, available for the:
o Bow stopper(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.
o Closed bow fairlead(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.
• The bow stopper(s) was not permanently marked with the SWL and
appropriate serial number.
• The SWL of the closed bow fairlead(s) was less than the SWL of the bow
stopper(s).
• There were no records of inspection and maintenance of the bow stopper(s).
• There was an obstruction or fitting (e.g. a hatch with securing dogs) close to
the route of the pick-up line or chain.
• At the SPM or FS(P)O terminal where the inspection took place:
o The winch stowage drum was not of sufficient size to accommodate the pick-
up line.
o The winch warping drum had been used to handle the pick-up line.
o Wedges had been used between the pin and tongue of the bow chain
stopper(s).
o A Smit type towing bracket had been used as a bow chain stopper.
• A bow stopper(s), roller lead(s) or closed bow fairlead(s) was defective in any
respect
10. Machinery Spaces
10.1 Engineering Procedures

10.1.1. Had the Chief Engineer prepared Standing Orders, supplemented by

Daily Orders, which emphasised and reinforced the company expectations
with regards to engine room management and, if so, had all engineer officers
signed to acknowledge their understanding of the same?
PMS : 01N.07.03.06 / 07N-030 / 07N-035
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure defining the requirement for the Chief
Engineer to prepare Standing and Daily Orders.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the content of the
Chief Engineer’s Standing or Daily orders.
• The Chief Engineer had not prepared their own Standing Orders which were
signed and dated at the time of taking over the responsibilities as Chief
Engineer.
• The engineer officers onboard at the time of the inspection had not signed
the Standing Orders, (unless they had only joined that day).
• The content of the Standing Orders was in contradiction to the company
procedures for managing the machinery space or any machinery or equipment.
• The Standing Orders did not define the Chief Engineer’s expectations in
respect of:
o Entry into the machinery spaces during periods of UMS.
o The actions to be taken when a machinery space alarm is activated,
particularly when equipment involved was identified as critical.
o The actions to be taken when machinery or equipment is found to be
defective.
o Supervision and documentation of bilge water, sludge, fuel oil and lube oils
transfers and disposal.
o Instructions for the supervision and documentation of Incinerator use.
o Instructions and limitations for hot and cold work in the engine room
workshop.
• The Chief Engineer had not prepared Daily Orders which were signed, dated
and timed, to supplement their Standing Orders (not generally required for
days where vessel was operating with periodically unmanned machinery
spaces and in open ocean).
• The watchkeeping engineer officers had not signed the Chief Engineer’s Daily
Orders for understanding.
• Review of Engine Room Log Books and/or other records indicated that
instructions contained within the Chief Engineer’s Standing or Daily orders had
not been followed. (A negative observation should not be raised where a
change in circumstances, such as a delay in mooring/unmooring had occurred.)

10.1.2. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
company procedures for testing main propulsion, steering gear, thrusters and
power generation plant prior to use and at critical points during a voyage or
operation, and were checklists and log book entries completed as required?

QMS : 01N.07.04.01 / 01N.07.04.02 / 01N.07.04.03

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no documented procedure for testing and checking equipment
and machinery at defined points in the voyage.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the machinery
testing process or any test or check that was required to be carried out by the
vessel specific checklist.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the local operation of
the steering gear.
• Checklists did not reflect the equipment fitted to the vessel or the tests
and/or checks required to be carried out at defined points prior to and within
the voyage.
• Machinery and equipment tests and/or checks required by the company
procedures had not been completed and documented.
• Defects detected during the equipment and machinery testing process had
not been recorded as either being repaired immediately or entered into the
defect reporting system for later rectification.

10.1.3. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with company
procedures for periodic rounds and monitoring of the machinery space, and
were log book entries and checklists available to confirm that the rounds had
been completed as required?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no procedure that required periodic machinery space rounds.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedures for monitoring the machinery spaces.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks
required to be conducted during the machinery space rounds and included on
the checklists.
• There were no vessel specific checklists for periodic rounds of the machinery
space.
• The periodic rounds of the machinery spaces had not been carried out in
accordance with the company procedure.

10.1.4. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with company
procedures for periodic machinery space rounds and monitoring of the
machinery space during both manned and unmanned (UMS) periods, and
were log book entries and checklists available to confirm that the inspections
had been completed as required?
QMS : 01N.07.03.07 / 01N.07.03.08 / 01N.07.03.09 / 01N.07.03.10
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no procedure that required periodic machinery space rounds
during manned periods and prior to unmanned periods.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedures for monitoring the machinery spaces during manned and
unmanned operation.
• There were no vessel specific checklists for periodic inspections of the
machinery space during manned periods and prior to unmanned operation.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks
required to be conducted during the machinery space rounds and included on
the checklists.
• The periodic rounds of the machinery spaces had not been carried out in
accordance with the company procedures.
• The machinery space had been operated in the unmanned mode for a period
exceeding that permitted by company procedures and/or class rules.
• The machinery space had been operated in the unmanned mode in
circumstances where company
procedures required the machinery space to be operated in the manned
mode.
• The vessel had been operated in the manned mode during open sea passages
due to reliability concerns where the cause of the concern was not entered
into the defect reporting system for rectification.
• The vessel had been operated in the UMS mode with equipment and/or
systems required under SOLAS II-1 Part E out of service or defective.

10.1.5. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
operation, inspection and testing of the means provided to control
propulsion machinery and related auxiliary systems locally in the event of
failure of a remote-control system?
QMS : 01N.02.02.19 / 05N-001
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
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• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing
of the means provided to control the propulsion machinery and related
auxiliary systems locally.
• The accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the purpose,
operation and testing of the propulsion local control systems.
• Ship specific operating instructions for the local control systems were not
posted close to the control locations
• The planned maintenance system did not include the means provided to
control the propulsion machinery locally or the required inspections and tests
• Records of inspections and tests carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the local control locations indicated that actions recorded in
the planned maintenance system had not in fact taken place.
• The means of communication from any local control location was not ready
for immediate use or was defective
• There was no notice posted, either on the navigating bridge or the machinery
space, indicating the failure mode of the CPP, if fitted.
• An interviewed navigation officer was unaware of the CPP failure mode, if
fitted.
• The local control systems were defective in any respect.

10.2. Machinery Status

10.2.1. Were the officers familiar with the starting procedure for the
emergency generator and were records available to demonstrate that the
emergency generator had been tested according to company procedures?
QMS : 665.0300.01 / 665.0300.02 / 665.1700.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for operating, testing and maintaining the
emergency generator.
• The emergency generator was not set up to start and supply power to the
emergency switchboard
automatically in the event of a power interruption.
• Ship specific starting instructions were not posted adjacent to the
equipment.
• Posted starting instructions were unclear or inadequate.
• Officers were not familiar with the ship specific starting procedure for the
emergency generator and connecting it to the emergency switchboard.
• The emergency generator would not start within three attempts by either
the primary or secondary means.
• The voltage or frequency delivered by the emergency generator to the
emergency switchboard was outside acceptable limits.
• The emergency generator or emergency switchboard was defective in any
respect.
• There was no spare starter motor, where required.
• There was no evidence that the spare starter motor had been tested in
accordance with company procedures.
• Engineer officers were not familiar with the operating and testing procedures
for the emergency generator or quick closing valve.
• Records for testing the emergency generator or fuel quick closing valve were
not available or incomplete.
• The emergency generator had not been run onload in accordance with the
company procedure.
• Electrical consumers connected to the emergency switch board had not been
put onload to verify their continued satisfactory performance in accordance
with company procedures.
• There was not enough fuel in the tank to run for 18 hours or the required
level had not been established and marked on the fuel level gauge.
• The vessel was or had been trading in sub-zero temperatures but the fuel in
the tank was not designed for use in sub-zero temperatures.
• The fuel quick closing valve did not operate correctly.
• The fuel quick closing valve was closed at the time of inspection.
• The fuel quick closing valve was not readily accessible in an emergency.
• The fire-flaps serving the space did not operate correctly.
• Electrical insulation mats had not been positioned in front and behind the
emergency switchboard.
• The emergency generator exhaust piping was wasted or in poor condition.

10.2.2. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
company procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of
the ship’s emergency batteries, and were the batteries fully charged and in
satisfactory condition?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance
and testing of the emergency battery source of electrical power, including:
o Inspection of the batteries.
o Assessment of the condition of the batteries.
o Periodic testing of the complete emergency battery system.
o The battery retirement criteria based on either the maximum service life
and/or functional condition.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the emergency battery
source of electrical power.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the periodic testing of the
complete emergency battery system including bringing the system online as
part of a blackout simulation test.
• There were no records of the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of
the emergency battery source of electrical power.
• There were no records of the periodic testing of the complete emergency
battery system including bringing the system on load as part of a blackout
simulation test.
• Records indicated that regular inspection, maintenance and/or testing of the
emergency battery source of electrical power had not taken place in
accordance with company procedures.
• Records of testing of voltage and specific gravity indicated that the batteries
were not in satisfactory condition.
• The batteries had not been replaced in accordance with the company defined
retirement criteria.
• The batteries were not in satisfactory physical condition.
• The metal terminals of the batteries were exposed and not protected by
rubber or plastic caps or other protective devices to prevent arcing or shorting.
• The battery locker or compartment was being used for storage or contained
inappropriate material.
• The batteries were not fully charged.
• The battery charger was defective in any respect.

10.2.3. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
company procedures for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the
exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS), and were required safety and regulatory
measures being complied with?
QMS : 01N.06.02.05 / PMS component 742

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for the operation, calibration and
maintenance of the exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS) that included:
o The identification of associated hazards.
o Crew training requirements.
o PPE and signage requirements.
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o Instructions for routine operations, calibration and maintenance.
o Actions to be taken in the case of system failure or deviation from normal
operation.
o Records to be kept (may be electronic or hard copy).
• There were no risk assessments available for the operation, calibration and
maintenance of the EGCS.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.
• There was evidence that the vessel had operated the EGCS in locations
where the company procedure or local/national regulations prohibited its use.
• There was evidence that spent/waste chemicals and/or residual
sludge/wastewater had not been managed and disposed of in accordance with
the company procedures and/or any applicable regulation.
• The chemicals and/or compressed gasses used or produced by the EGCS
were not stored in accordance with company procedures.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the routine operation of the
EGCS.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with how to close the EGCS
overboard valve in an emergency.
• There was no evidence of crew training or familiarisation in the operation,
calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.
• The following documents were not available on board:
o Sox Emissions Compliance Plan.
o EGCS Technical Manual.
o Onboard Monitoring Manual.
o EGCS Record Book or electronic logging system.
• The maintenance and calibration of the EGCS was not included in the
planned maintenance system.
• The maintenance and calibration of the EGCS had not been carried out as
required by the planned maintenance system.
• The EGCS record book had not been maintained as required by company
procedures.
• The EGCS was or had been defective but there was no evidence that
notifications had been made to the relevant Authorities as required by IMO:
MEPC.1/Circ.883.
• The EGCS was defective in any respect.

10.2.4. Were seawater pipelines, sea chests and seawater pumps in

satisfactory condition and free of temporary repairs?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• A seawater pipeline, sea chest, storm valve, hull penetration or seawater
pump was corroded with pitting or hard rust/scale (give details and location).
• A seawater pipeline, sea chest, storm valve, hull penetration or seawater
pump was leaking (give details and location).
• Fixed expansion joints (bellows) in a seawater pipeline were deformed.
• A pipeline was worn/thinned in way of a clip or support.
• A series of pipe clips and/or supports in a single pipe length were heavily
corroded or missing.
• There was a temporary repair on a seawater pipeline e.g. a clamp or bandage
(give details and location).
• There was an unacceptable ‘permanent’ repair on a seawater pipeline e.g. a
doubler plate or coupling (give details and location).
• Pipe clips or supports had not been replaced after a pipeline repair.
• There was no evidence of class approval for a completed repair to a seawater
pipeline.
• Flexible hose(s) had been rigged as a replacement for a failed metal pipe

10.2.5. Were the officers familiar with the company procedure for testing the
bilge monitoring devices within their area of responsibility, and were records
available to demonstrate that the bilge monitoring devices and associated
alarms had been tested in accordance with the company procedure?
QMS : 792.0210 (ER bilge alarm) / 792.0220
(Forecastle, Bow Thruster, Cargo & ballast pumproom, BWTS)

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure which required that all bilge level
monitoring devices and water level detectors were periodically tested.
• The accompanying deck or engineer officer was not familiar with company
procedure for the testing of the bilge level monitoring devices and water level
detectors within their area of responsibility.
• There were no records available to demonstrate that the periodic testing of
all bilge level monitoring devices and water level detectors and their
associated alarms, including any activation delay, had been completed in
accordance with company procedures.
• A bilge level monitoring device and / or water level detector and/or its
associated alarm was defective in any respect.
• There was evidence that bilge level monitoring devices or water level
detectors and/or their associated alarms and indicators had been modified or
prevented from activating as designed.
• One or more of the following spaces was not protected by a bilge level
monitor or water level detector:
o Cargo pumproom,
o Ballast pumproom,
o Main machinery space,
o Bow thruster space.
o For OBO carriers only, in ballast tanks forward of the collision bulkhead.
o For OBO carriers only, in any dry or void space other than a chain locker
forward of the foremost cargo hold.

10.2.6. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the
emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir, and was the
equipment in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 731.0310.07 (Emergency air compressor)
731.1040.01 (Emergency air reservoir)

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for:
o The operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor and
emergency air reservoir.
o The use of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir for
bringing machinery into operation from the dead ship condition.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the
emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir.
o The actions necessary to use the emergency air compressor and/or
emergency air reservoir to start a main generator engine.
• There were no records of regular inspection and testing of the emergency air
compressor and emergency air reservoir.
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• Records indicated that the emergency air compressor and emergency air
reservoir had not been regularly inspected and tested in accordance with
company procedures.
• The emergency air reservoir was not at the required pressure.
• The emergency air compressor was defective in any respect.

10.3. Safety Management

10.3.1. Was suitable deck insulation provided to the front and rear of
electrical switchboards, and was it in good order?
QMS : 01.12.03.02 / 090-009
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• Switchboards were not provided with deck insulation to the front and/or
rear.
• The deck insulation matting or composite insulating deck covering was
incomplete or damaged.
• The deck insulation matting or composite insulating deck covering provided
was not suitable for the specific voltage of the switchboard.
• There was no certification, marking or other documentary evidence of the
rating of the deck insulation provided.

10.3.2. Were the engineer officers familiar with the purpose and setting of
the insulation monitoring devices provided on the primary and secondary
distribution systems, and were the distribution switchboards free of
significant earth faults?
QMS : 871.0100.25 (MSD)
872.0100.23 (ESBD)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure which:
o Provided guidance for the setting values for the IMDs for 110v, 220v, 440v
and any other voltages used for the primary or secondary distribution systems.
o Where a vessel was only provided with earth insulation lamps as the IMD,
provided guidance on interpreting the indications for low insulation faults.
o Required that the causes of earth faults are investigated and corrected with
the aim to maintain the insulation values as close to infinity as possible.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure
which provided guidance for the setting values for the IMDs for 110v, 220v,
440v and any other voltages used for the primary or secondary distribution
systems.
• Where the vessel was only provided with earth insulation lamps as the IMD,
the accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure which
provided guidance on interpreting the indications for low insulation faults.
• The accompanying officer was not able demonstrate the IMD alarm setting
point or describe how to interpret the earth low insulation indicator lamps.
• An IMD was inoperative or defective in any respect.
• An IMD alarm set point had been adjusted to inhibit the generation of
alarms:
o When abnormally low insulation values were detected.
o When detecting insulation values lower than the guidance provided in the
company procedure.
• The Insulation Monitoring Device for a 440-volt system showed an insulation
resistance of less than 5 megohms (specify indication).
• The Insulation Monitoring Device for a 220-volt system showed an insulation
resistance of less than 2 megohms (specify indication).
• The Insulation Monitoring Device for any primary or secondary distribution
system showed an insulation resistance value of less than that required by the
company procedure (specify required value and indication).

10.3.3. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
company procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS
operation, including the operation and testing of the dead man alarm, if
fitted?
QMS : 01N.07.03.08 / 120N-027a / 792.0810.21
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for safe entry into the machinery
space(s) during UMS operation requiring that:
o During unattended periods, no-one enters the machinery spaces alone, for
example to carry out final evening checks, without first informing the bridge.
o During unattended periods, contact should be maintained with the bridge at
frequent predetermined periods during any entry, unless a dead man alarm is
fitted.
o A rating should not be assigned any duty which involved them attending the
engine room alone during unattended periods.
o Where a single engineer maintains a watch, contact is maintained with the
bridge or cargo control room at frequent predetermined periods, unless a dead
man alarm system is fitted.
o The dead man alarm, if fitted, is regularly tested and the results recorded.
• An engineer officer was not familiar with the company procedures for safe
entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.
• A navigation officer was not familiar with the company procedures for safe
entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.
• Safe entry requirements were not clearly posted at the normally accessible
entrance to the machinery space including the requirements to use the dead
man alarm (where fitted) during rounds in the machinery space.
• There was no evidence that the dead man alarm, if fitted, had been regularly
tested as required by company procedures.
• The dead man alarm activation period was observed to be greater than that
specified by the company procedures and/or greater than 30 minutes.
• The dead man alarm, if fitted, was defective in any respect.

10.3.4. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
operation of the engineers’ alarm, and was the alarm in good order, tested
regularly and the results recorded?
QMS : 01N.07.03.08 / 792.0110.21
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation and testing of the
engineers’ alarm that included:
o A description of its operation.
o Requirements for regularly testing the alarm and recording the results.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation and testing of the engineers’ alarm.
• The accompanying officer could not identify the locations of the engineers’
alarm activation points within the machinery spaces.
• There were no records of the regular testing of the engineers’ alarm.
• Records indicated the engineers’ alarm had not been tested as required by
company procedures.
• The engineers’ alarm was defective in any respect.

10.3.5. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
operation of the machinery alarm, and was the alarm in good order, tested
regularly and the results recorded?
QMS : 792.0500.21
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation and testing of the
machinery alarm that included:
o A description of its operation.
o Requirements for regularly testing the alarm and recording the results.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation and testing of the machinery alarm.
• The accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the separate
functions of the machinery alarm panel in the engine room.
• A navigation officer was not familiar with the separate functions of the
machinery alarm panel on the bridge.
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• There were no records of the regular testing of the machinery alarm.
• Records indicated the machinery alarm had not been tested as required by
company procedures.
• The audible alarm in the engine room was not operative.
• The visual display of the separate alarm functions in the engine room was not
fully functional.
• The audible and visible alarm on the bridge was not fully functional.
• The audible and visible alarm in public rooms and in the engineers' cabins
was not fully functional.
• The machinery alarm was defective in any respect.

10.3.6. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for the operation, inspection and regular testing of watertight doors, and
were the watertight doors in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 513.0300
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and regular
testing of watertight doors.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
the operation, inspection and regular testing of watertight doors.
• An interviewed rating was unable to describe or demonstrate the local
operation of a watertight door.
• The rubber gasket on a sliding watertight door was damaged, in poor
condition or missing.
• There was hydraulic oil leakage from the operating mechanism of a sliding
watertight door.
• A sliding watertight door could not be closed from the bridge.
• The local audible alarm and/or light for a sliding watertight door was
inoperative when the door was remotely closed from the bridge.
• The watertight doors open/closed indication on the bridge was not fully
operative.
• A sliding watertight door could not be operated using the manual and/or
emergency operation adjacent to the door.
• There were no instructions for use, local control, remote control and
emergency operation, clearly posted adjacent to a sliding watertight door.
• The remotely operated sliding watertight doors had been left in the
emergency “doors closed” mode on the bridge.
• A door or hatch cover that was required to be normally closed at sea was not
clearly marked to that effect.
• A door or hatch cover that was required to be normally closed at sea was
indicated as closed on the bridge but was in fact open, or vice-versa.
• Watertight doors had not been tested at least at every fire drill.
• A watertight door was defective in any respect.
10.3.7. Was gas welding and cutting equipment in good order, and spare
oxygen and acetylene cylinders stored apart in a well-ventilated location
outside of the accommodation and engine room?
QMS : 441.2300.01 / 441.2300.02 / 441.2300.03 / 441.2300.04
441.2300.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• Gas cylinders were not properly secured in their location.
• Gas cylinders were not secured such that they could be easily released in the
case of fire.
• Protective caps were not screwed in place on cylinders not in use or being
moved.
• The valve on an empty cylinder was open.
• A supply valve on a gas cylinder had been left open after completion of work.
• Oxygen and acetylene cylinders were stored together.
• Empty cylinders were not kept separate from full ones.
• Cylinders were stored with the valve end down.
• The cylinder storage location was:
o Subject to extreme temperatures.
o Exposed to salt or other corrosive chemicals.
• The cylinder storage location was not:
o Well ventilated and outside of the accommodation and engine room.
o Away from heavy traffic areas.
o Free of sources of ignition and/or combustible material.
o Clearly marked with suitable signage, including ‘No Smoking’.
• Cylinders’ valves, controls and associated fittings were contaminated with oil,
grease or paint.
• A gas cylinder was in use without the correct pressure-reducing regulator.
• Spring-loaded non-return valves were not fitted adjacent to the torch in the
oxygen and acetylene hoses.
• Flashback arrestors were not provided in the oxygen and acetylene hoses at
the low-pressure side of regulators.
• Flashback arrestors were not fitted on both the torch and the regulator for
long lengths of oxygen and acetylene hose.
• Acetylene distribution piping and pipe fittings were not of seamless steel.
• Oxygen distribution piping and pipe fittings were not of seamless steel or
copper.
• There were bolted flanged joints in the fixed piping for the distribution of
oxygen and/or acetylene.
• Rubber hoses were used in the oxygen and/or acetylene distribution piping.
• There was no evidence that flashback arrestors and regulators had been
o Inspected and checked annually.
o Replaced with a new or refurbished unit 5 years from the date of
manufacture or as per
manufacturer’s recommendations.
• Oxygen and/or acetylene hoses were in visibly poor condition or damaged.
• Leaking oxygen and/or acetylene hoses had been repaired rather than
cropped or replaced.
• Propane was in use in the gas welding and cutting system.
• The appropriate PPE was not available for gas cutting and welding
operations.
• The PPE for gas cutting and welding operations was contaminated with oil,
grease or other flammable substances.
• The gas cutting and welding equipment was defective in any respect.
10.3.8. Were engineer officers and ratings familiar with the safety
precautions for the use of electric welding equipment, were these safety
precautions posted, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?
QMS : 441.2300.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the safety precautions for
electric welding.
• An interviewed rating was not familiar with the safety precautions for electric
welding.
• Safety precautions for electric welding were not posted in the engine room
workshop or other appropriate location.
• Equipment, such as welding curtains or screens, required by the safety
precautions for electric welding were missing or in unsatisfactory condition.
• The supply wiring was not adequate to carry the electrical current demand
without overloading.
• There was evidence that the ship's structure had been used as the earth
return.
• In the case of a welding work station, the earthing connection was not next
to the work site with the cable leading directly back to the welding machine.
• Insufficient earth return cable was provided to match the length of the
welding cable.
• The insulation of flexible electrical cables was worn, damaged or spliced.
• The electric welding power source had a direct current (DC) output exceeding
70V.
• The electric welding power source had an alternating current (AC) output
exceeding 25V.
• There was no local switching arrangement or other suitable means provided
for rapidly cutting off current from the electrode.
• An electrode had been left in the holder after completion of work.
• The electrode holder was not fully insulated.
• Spare electrodes were not stored in suitably dry conditions.
• The electric welding equipment was defective in any respect.
• The appropriate PPE was not available for electric welding operations.
• The PPE for electric welding operations was contaminated with oil, grease or
other flammable substances

10.4. Planned Maintenance Systems

10.4.1. Were the responsible vessel staff familiar with the company
procedure for managing and using the planned maintenance system, and was
the system updated with an accurate record of onboard maintenance and
spare parts in accordance with the procedure?
QMS : 01.07.06.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for managing the planned maintenance
system.
• The accompanying responsible officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedure for managing the planned maintenance system.
• The accompanying responsible officer was unfamiliar with the operation of
the planned maintenance system.
• An interviewed deck officer or junior engineer was unfamiliar with the
process of completing and recording tasks assigned to them within the planned
maintenance system
• Defects to structure, machinery or equipment were recorded in the planned
maintenance system but were not transferred to the defect reporting system,
if not a combined system.
• Defects to structure, machinery or equipment were entered in the defect
reporting system but the work necessary to rectify the defect had not been
entered into the planned maintenance system as an unplanned task against
the appropriate vessel component.
• Planned or unplanned maintenance tasks within the planned maintenance
system were overdue, either by the original due date or by more than the
permitted grace period allowed by the company procedure, where defined,
without documented shore-based approval on a case by case basis.
• An item of equipment required for the safe operation of the vessel was not
included in the planned maintenance system.
• Tasks had been deferred within the planned maintenance system without
documented shore management approval.
• Spare parts inventories for equipment identified as critical were not
marked/tagged with minimum stock levels.
• Spare parts inventory listed in the planned maintenance system for
equipment identified as critical was less than the required minimum stock.
• Spare parts listed in the planned maintenance system for either critical or
non-critical equipment were not found in the designated store location, or the
stock levels were incorrect as compared to the stock declared in the planned
maintenance system.

10.4.2. Did the vessel operator subscribe to a lube oil and hydraulic oil
analysis program and was a procedure in place to act on the results and
trends identified by the analysis?
QMS : 01N.07.05.01 / PMS component 718
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• The vessel did not have a programme for the routine sampling and analysis
of lubricating and hydraulic oils.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for
managing the lubricating and hydraulic oil analysis programme.
• One or more oils required to be sampled and analysed had not been landed
for analysis in alignment with the programme, unless the analysis due date was
during the previous voyage or there was objective evidence of vessel had not
been able to land the samples in previous ports / regions.
• One or more oils analysed during the previous two cycles of oil analysis had
resulted in a “critical” (red) status.
• There was no evidence that the recommended or instructed actions to
correct the condition of an oil analysed with a “critical” or “warning” status
had been undertaken

10.5. Conventional Bunkering Management

10.5.1. Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, and ratings involved in
bunkering operations, familiar with the company bunkering procedures, and
were records available to demonstrate that bunker operations had been
planned and conducted in accordance with the company procedure?
QMS : 01N.07.02.02 / 07N-200
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure that required bunker transfer plans to be
prepared with defined content in
alignment with ISGOTT Chapter 24 and TMSA KPI 6.2.5.
• There were no supporting checklists for pre-arrival, checks after mooring,
pre-transfer conference, prebunkering, repetitive checks or post-bunkering.
• There was no company procedure which defined the record-keeping
requirements for bunkering operations.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for
bunker transfer planning.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company requirement for
maintaining records of bunkering operations.
• Where interviewed, an engine room rating was unfamiliar with the duties
assigned to them within the bunkering plan during a recent bunkering
operation.
• Bunker tank ullage space atmosphere checks for flammable or toxic vapours
required to be taken before, during or after the bunkering operation had not
been taken and recorded in accordance with the company procedure.
• The reviewed bunkering plan was missing key information required by the
company procedure.
• The bunkering plan did not identify the personnel, and their assigned roles,
required to be involved in the bunkering operation.
• The reviewed bunkering plan was not signed by all officers involved and/or
was not approved by the Master and Chief Engineer.
• The reviewed bunker transfer records indicated that the bunkering plan was
not followed.
• The reviewed bunkering records were insufficiently detailed to permit the
reconstruction of the bunkering operation for comparison with the bunker
transfer plan.
• Checklists required to be completed before, during and/or after the
bunkering operation had not been completed.

10.5.2. Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the
company procedures for bunker fuel oil sampling and analysis, and were
records available to demonstrate that samples had been taken and retained
or analysed in accordance with the procedure?
QMS : 01N.07.02.10 / 01N.07.02.04
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for managing fuel oil samples, arranging
fuel oil analysis and the remedial actions to be taken where fuel oil quality
raised a concern.
• The accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the company
procedures for fuel oil sampling, sample retention or fuel oil analysis.
• Bunker delivery notes were not available for each delivery of marine distillate
and residual fuel oil.
• Bunker samples had not been retained for each delivery of marine distillate
and residual fuel oil.
• There was no company requirement to arrange for fuel oil analysis on every
occasion marine residual fuel oil was loaded for consumption onboard.
• There was no guidance regarding the required frequency of marine distillate
fuel oil analysis.
• Fuel oil analysis had not been performed in accordance with company
procedure and/or the instructions from the fuel oil analysis contractor.
• Fuel oil samples had not been retained in accordance with company
procedures or as required by MARPOL annex VI.
• There was no evidence that advisory notes contained within bunker analysis
reports had been complied with.

10.5.3. Were the Chief Engineer and senior engineer officers familiar with the
company and vessel specific fuel changeover procedures, and were records
available to demonstrate that fuel grade changeovers had been completed in
compliance with the procedures and MARPOL regulations?

QMS : 01N.06.02.05
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure describing the changeover of fuel grades
onboard.
• There were no ship specific fuel grade changeover procedures.
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company
procedures describing the changeover of fuel grades onboard .
• The accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the vessel specific
fuel grade changeover procedures.
• Records for changing of fuel grades were either missing or inaccurate.
• Entries had not been made in the appropriate Log Book to record the volume
of low sulphur fuel oils in each tank as well as the date, time and position of
the ship on:
o The completion of the fuel changeover process prior to entering an ECA.
o The start of the fuel changeover process when departing an ECA.
• The vessel had conducted a fuel changeover in contravention of any
geographical or situational safety restrictions contained within the company
procedures.
• The vessel had been operating at any stage of the voyage in contravention of
MARPOL Annex VI
regulations.

10.7. Fire Protection Measures

10.7.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose,
testing and operation of the vessel’s remote controls for fuel and lube oil
valves, emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank quick closing
valves, and were the systems in good working order?
QMS : 812.2000.02

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure for the inspection, testing and
maintenance of the remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency
fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank quick closing valves.
• The remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube
oil pump shut-offs were not clearly marked and identified.
• The access to remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel
and lube oil pump shut-offs was obstructed.
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• Quick closing valve(s) were not properly armed.
• Quick closing valve(s) were secured open by external means.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:
o The purpose, location and operation of the remote controls for fuel and lube
oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs.
o The purpose, location and operation of the oil tank quick closing valves.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-
fighting systems and appliances did not include the remote controls for fuel
and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs, and quick
closing valves or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.
• There was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and
fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the
vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.
• Inspection of the remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency
fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs, and quick closing valves indicated that actions
recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• The remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube
oil pump shut-offs, or quick closing valves were defective in any way

10.7.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the measures to prevent
fire in the machinery spaces caused by flammable liquid spraying onto a hot
surface and, were the protective measures provided regularly inspected and
properly maintained?
QMS : 703.0110.01 / 751.1000.01
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure that set out the actions to be taken to
ensure the integrity of the measures in place to prevent fires in the machinery
spaces caused by a flammable liquid spraying onto a hot surface.
• The records of periodic inspections verifying that fire prevention measures in
the machinery spaces relating to hot surfaces and flammable liquids were
missing or incomplete.
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• There was no ship-specific checklist to facilitate the inspection of the fire
prevention measures, which included the measures relating to hot surfaces
and flammable liquids in the machinery spaces.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures that
set out the actions to take to ensure the integrity of the measures in place to
prevent fires in the machinery spaces caused by a flammable liquid spraying
onto a hot surface.
• The accompanying office was unfamiliar with the fire prevention measures
required to be fitted in the machinery spaces.
• There was ongoing leakage from the fuel or lube oil piping systems within the
machinery space.
• The outer protective skin of a fuel pump discharge line was visibly damaged
or in poor condition.
• A flexible fuel hose was visibly damaged or in poor condition.
• The drainage arrangement for jacketed fuel lines was found to be
disconnected.
• The accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate the correct functioning
of a dedicated engine fuel oil system leakage alarm.
• A dedicated engine fuel oil system leakage alarm was not functioning
correctly.
• A spray shield was missing or was in poor condition around a flanged joint,
flanged bonnet or any other threaded connection in fuel oil piping systems
under high pressure which were located above or near units of high
temperature.
• Main or auxiliary engine indicator cocks were not capped with their insulated
covers fitted while the engine was running.
• Insulation covering high temperature or hot surfaces, such as steam pipelines
and exhaust manifolds was missing or improperly installed.
• Insulation covering high temperature or hot surfaces, such as steam pipelines
and exhaust manifolds was damaged or soaked in oil.
10.7.3. Were the main engine crankcase oil mist detectors, engine bearing
temperature monitors or equivalent devices and associated alarms in good
order?
601.6610 (ME general alarm)
601.6612.01 (OMD testing)
01N.07.03.07 (OMD alarm actions)
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• There was no company procedure for the crankcase oil mist detectors,
engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices which described:
o Alarm set points.
o Actions to be taken in the event of an alarm.
o Testing procedures and frequency.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the action to be taken in the
event of an alarm from the crankcase oil mist detector, engine bearing
temperature monitor or equivalent device.
• The accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate a test of the oil mist
detector or equivalent device alarm.
• The testing and servicing of the oil mist detectors, engine bearing
temperature monitors or equivalent devices had not been completed in
accordance with company procedures.
• The calibration of the oil mist detector sensors had not been completed in
accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions and/or at the recommended frequency.
• The alarm for the oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or
equivalent device was inoperative.
• The alarm set point for the oil mist detector was set above 5% of the LEL or
approximately 2.5mg/l.
• The oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or equivalent
device was defective in any respect.
10.7.4. Where hydraulic power packs were located within the main engine
compartment, were fire protection measures provided, and if so, where they
in satisfactory condition?
QMS : Component 351.5500
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation
• Hydraulic power packs of more than 50 kW with a working pressure more
than 100 bar were not installed in specially dedicated spaces with a separate
ventilation system.
• The hydraulic power packs were located within the main machinery space,
not in a specially dedicated space, but there was either:
o No oil mist detector fitted, or
o No encapsulation of the pumps and high pressure piping protected by a leak
detection device.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the fire protection measures
associated with the hydraulic power packs.
• If fitted, the oil mist detector had not been regularly tested in accordance
with manufacturers’ recommendations.
• If fitted, the oil mist detector was defective in any respect.
• If fitted, the level alarm or other means of leak detection had not been
regularly tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations.
• If fitted, the level alarm or other means of leak detection was defective in any
respect.
• Where a hydraulic power pack system was of an encapsulated design, parts
of the encapsulation had been removed or were damaged.
• Wire runs, kick-pipes, or other passes through a bulkhead to the specially
dedicated space were not sealed with a fire-retardant putty or similar material.
• A door to the specially dedicated space was left/tied open while the
hydraulic power packs were in operation.
• There were leaks from the hydraulic power packs or associated pipework.
12. Ice Operations
12.1. Ice operations training
12.1.1. Where the vessel traded in polar waters, had the Master, Chief Mate
and officers in charge of a navigational watch undertaken the additional
training required by the Polar Code?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The Polar Water Operational Manual did not define what additional training
the Master, Chief Mate and officers of the navigational watch must have to
comply with the company Ice Navigator policy and the Certificate for Ships
Operating in Polar Waters.
• Where the Master and/or Chief Mate were not substituted they were not in
possession of a certificate of Advanced Training for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters (unless the vessel was operating in open waters only).
• Where the Master and/or Chief Mate were not required to have Advanced
Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, due to substitution or exclusively
open water operations, the Master and/or Chief Mate did not have a
certificate for Basic Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.
• The officers in charge of a navigational watch were not in possession of a
certificate for Basic Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.
• The person(s) used to substitute for Master and/or Chief Mate in the role of
Ice Navigator did not have the appropriate certificate of competency and
Advanced Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.
12.2. Sub-zero LSA & FFA procedures
12.2.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
to ensure the operability of the life-saving and fire-fighting systems and
equipment in sub-zero temperatures, and had these procedures been
complied with?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures to ensure that life-saving and fire-
fighting systems and equipment remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
ensure that life-saving and firefighting systems and equipment remain
operable in sub-zero temperatures.
• The accompanying officer could not identify the locations of the drain points
for the deck fire and/or foam line.
• There were no winterisation checklists available for use.
• There were no measures to ensure the operability of eye wash stations and
de-contamination showers during freezing temperatures.
• Where fire and lifesaving systems were provided with insulation and/or heat
tracing, either the insulation was missing, or the heat tracing system was not
fully functional.
• Periodic inspections of all safety-related systems had not been undertaken
during exposure to sub-zero temperatures to ensure the effectiveness of the
precautions being taken.
• Life rafts were not rated for safe operation according to the environmental
conditions likely to be experienced.
• Existing damage to a lifeboat hull would allow water ingress which, if
subjected to freezing, could cause severe damage to the boat’s structure.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedure for starting an
extremely cold lifeboat engine.
• The procedure for starting an extremely cold lifeboat engine was not posted
in the lifeboat.
• During an inspection taking place when the vessel was prepared for sub-zero
temperatures:
o The correct grade of oil to be added to the lifeboat engine cold starting pots
was not available in the lifeboat.
o The heaters in the lifeboat engines were not being used.
o The doors of an enclosed lifeboat were frozen shut.
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o The lifeboat engine fuel was not an appropriate grade of diesel or gas oil.
o The recirculating lifeboat engine cooling system was not protected with an
anti-freeze solution.
o The lifeboat spray system had not been drained.
o Precautions had not been taken to avoid the drinking water freezing.
o There was no ice removal mallet readily available in the vicinity of survival
craft.
o Eye wash stations were inoperable or unavailable.
o Water or foam fire extinguishers were exposed to freezing temperatures.
o Water or foam extinguishers had been removed to prevent freezing and not
replaced with suitable extinguishers.
o Fire and/or foam lines had not been drained from their lowest point.
o Drain valves to fire and/or foam lines had not been closed after draining.
o Monitors and hydrants were not protected by canvas covers to prevent
snow/ice accumulation.
o Water curtain and spray systems had not been drained.
o The temperature in a space containing bulk storage tanks for fixed foam
systems and/or drums and canisters of foam for portable branch pipe
appliances was below zero.
o Any item of lifesaving or firefighting system or equipment was not operable
or ready for immediate use due to freezing, snow accumulation or ice
accretion.
o Escape routes and access to fire-fighting and life-saving equipment were
obstructed by snow and/or ice accumulations
Where a lifesaving or firefighting system was provided with a working heating
arrangement (e.g. insulation and either recirculation or trace heating), an
observation should not be recorded if such a system was not drained down as
would be expected if no heating system was provided.

12.3. Sub-zero machinery operation procedures

12.3.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
to ensure the operability of the engine room machinery and systems in sub-
zero temperatures, and had these procedures been complied with?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures to ensure that engine room machinery
and systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
ensure that engine room machinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero
temperatures.
• There were no winterisation checklists available for use.
• Company procedures to ensure that engine room machinery and systems
remain operable in sub-zero temperatures had not been complied with, which
may include:
o Prior to entering an area of low temperatures, failing to check, where
applicable:
 Fore and aft draughts were within the limits required by the ice class
notation.
 Sea-chest strainers.
 Steam heating and/or other arrangements to keep sea-chests clear of ice.
 Heating systems in fuel, bilge and lubricating oil tanks.
 Heating systems for the emergency generator.
 Anti-freeze in the emergency generator cooling system.
 Water levels in recirculating cooling systems.
 Water content of stern tube oil.
 Suitability of oils and greases.
 Arrangements to ensure control air is dry.
 Arrangements to prevent the icing up of air pipes to settling and service
tanks required for the operation of the main propulsion plant and essential
auxiliaries.
o While operating in an area of low temperatures, not:
 Operating with the engine room manned when appropriate.
 Applying steam heating on sea-chests continuously.
 Using space heaters in engine, steering gear, emergency battery rooms and
emergency fire pump space.
 Keeping emergency generator room external vent flaps and supply fan
damper closed.
 Changing over from heavy fuel oil to diesel oil prior to closing down the main
engine.
 Keeping hydraulic motors, including steering motors, running continuously.
 Operating pneumatic and manual vent flaps to keep them free.
 Adjusting engine room ventilation to maintain suitable temperatures and
avoid local
cooling of fuel systems.
 Monitoring freshwater tanks and piping for freezing.
• Any system or equipment required to maintain the engine room machinery
and equipment functional in subzero temperatures was defective in any
respect.
12.4. Sub-zero cargo and ballast operation procedures
12.4.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
to ensure the operability of the cargo and ballast systems in sub-zero
temperatures, and had these procedures been complied with?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems
remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
ensure that cargo and ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero
temperatures.
• There were no winterisation checklists available for use.
• Company procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems remain
operable in sub-zero temperatures had not been complied with, which may
include failing to:
o Test the integrity of deck lines prior to use to ensure they are tight.
o Check ballast water salinity and exchange if necessary.
o Where fitted, operate ballast tank heating or bubbling systems in good time.
o Protect equipment on deck with canvas covers, including:
 Hydraulic cargo and COW valves.
 COW machines.
 P/V valves.
 Mast riser vent valve.
 IG main and inlet valves.
 Deepwell pump motors and shafts.
 Ballast tank vents.
o Check that:
 Valves on deck are well greased and their gearboxes free of water.
 Deck seal heating arrangements are operational.
 Anti-freeze levels in P/V breaker and stripping system vacuum pumps are
correct.
 Cargo compressors that require antifreeze and/or a heating system are
properly prepared
for cold weather.
o Drain equipment, including:
 Cargo, COW, and tank cleaning lines and valves, after testing or use.
 Tank cleaning heater.
 Heating coils.
 Manifold drip-trays.
 Deck air-line.
 Ballast system, including ballast monitor.
 Oil discharge monitoring system.
 Pumproom steam lines, if not to be used.
o Activate hydraulic cargo, COW and ballast valves frequently while in sub-
freezing temperatures to
avoid freezing/blockage.
o Check P/V breaker, P/V valves and flame screens immediately before
commencing and during cargo operations.
o Start cargo pump and valve hydraulic systems in good time before they are
needed.
o Ensure deck seal heating is functioning and checked regularly during cargo
operations.
o Check canvas covers are removed from ballast tank vents before
ballasting/deballasting.
12.5. Sub-zero deck machinery operation procedures
12.5.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
to ensure the operability of the deck machinery, including mooring systems,
in sub-zero temperatures, and had these procedures been complied with?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures to ensure that deck machinery,
including mooring systems, remains operable in sub-zero temperatures.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to
ensure that deck machinery, including mooring systems, remains operable in
sub-zero temperatures.
• There were no winterisation checklists available for use.
• Periodic inspections of all deck machinery had not been undertaken during
exposure to sub-zero
temperatures to ensure the effectiveness of the precautions being taken.
• Company procedures to ensure that deck machinery, including mooring
systems, remains operable in subzero temperatures had not been complied
with, which may include not:
o Ensuring hydraulic systems contained a suitable grade of hydraulic oil.
o Circulating hydraulic system oil continuously when the external temperature
was below 0°C to ensure that the fluid systems were maintained at working
temperatures.
o When leaving machinery (e.g., winches) running, paying careful attention to
the regular lubrication of the equipment.
o Operating and testing cargo handling cranes prior to the vessel entering sub-
zero temperatures.
o Checking heating arrangements in cranes were operational.
o Adequately covering the pneumatic or electrical motors used for raising or
lowering accommodation ladders to prevent ice accretion.
o Closing the main air valve to deck and draining the airline down.
o Protecting control boxes and motion levers for deck machinery with canvas
covers.
o Protecting mooring wires and synthetic ropes with canvas covers to stop ice
accretion until they were required for use.
o Prior to arrival in port, proving winches, windlasses and anchors to be
operational.
o Ensuring the continued operability of pneumatic oil spill pumps, where
provided.
• Inspection of the vessel during periods of sub-zero temperatures determined
that deck machinery and/or mooring systems required for planned or
emergency use were inoperative due to freezing and/or ice accretion.

12.6. Ice navigation procedures

12.6.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures
for navigating in areas affected by ice, and had they received suitable
training?

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice
that included, as appropriate,
guidance on:
o Passage planning in areas affected by ice.
o Bridge/engine room team composition in areas affected by ice.
o Pilotage in ice.
o Actions to take when ice is detected.
o Freezing spray.
o Navigation in pack ice.
o Position fixing in ice conditions.
o Charts and positions in remote locations.
o Radar use in ice conditions.
o Limitations of compasses in high latitudes.
o Shiphandling in ice.
o Anchoring in ice.
o Avoiding hull and propeller/propulsion system damage in ice.
o Berthing/unberthing in ports with ice.
o Working with icebreakers.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for
navigating in areas affected by ice.
• The company procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice were not
supported by suitable checklists.
• Checklists for navigating in ice had not been completed to company
requirements.
• The passage plan for the last voyage affected by ice did not take into account
the additional factors presented by navigation in areas affected by ice, such as:
o The limits of ice pack, ice bergs and sea ice.
o The verification of draughts to meet the min/max draughts required by the
vessel's ice notation.
o The change in status of manoeuvring machinery.
o The change in status of bridge and/or machinery space manning levels.
• Records showed that while navigating in an area affected by ice:
o The required bridge/engine room team composition had not been complied
with.
o The vessel's draught had not been adjusted to meet the min/max draught
required by the vessel's ice notation.
• There were no records of crew training with regard to operating ships in ice.
• When navigating in or near areas affected by ice, the Master, an officer in
charge of a navigational watch or an officer in charge of an engineering watch
had not received suitable training for operating ships in ice.