RESTRICTED

Erviews, two points

Operation Deans

Evidential Overview
15 March 2019

Canterbury CIB

RESTRICTED
1 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

1.1 The 15 March 2019 attacks at Masjid an-Nur on Deans Avenue and the
Linwood Islamic Centre on Linwood Avenue in Christchurch (terrorist attacks)
were the single largest terrorist incident and mass homicide that New Zealand
has experienced, involving the largest response operation ever undertaken by
the New Zealand Police. Within the space of 19 minutes, 51 people from our
community had been murdered and 40 others had gunshot injuries. Many
more were otherwise injured and affected. Many of the survivors were left with
life threatening injuries. In that same timespan Police had located and arrested
the offender Brenton Harrison Tarrant (hereafter referred to as the individual).

1.2 This evidential overview (Overview) summarises the key evidential points from
the investigation and provides a chronology of events. It is focused, in
particular, on the time the individual first opened fire through to his arrest. The
purpose of providing these key events and timings is to identify any outstanding
issues the interested parties may have that fall within the jurisdiction of the
Coroner. The issues identified will inform the Coroner’s decision on the holding
of an inquiry into the deaths of those killed in the terrorist attacks.

1.3 The Overview details what the Police investigation showed regarding the
individual’s movements on 15 March 2019, and the evidential basis confirming
timings, location, and the response of the Police and the Ambulance service in
particular. At Appendix A is a timeline of events on 15 March 2019 and at
Appendix B is a map showing the movements of the individual that day. At
Heading 9, the Overview sets out the types of information that can be made
available on request to next of kin about the deceased victims of the terrorist
attacks.

Hearings and findings in other proceedings

1.4 On 27 August 2020, the individual was sentenced by the High Court in
Christchurch to life imprisonment without parole on each of the 51 charges of
murder.1 He was further sentenced to life imprisonment for engaging in a
terrorist act, and to concurrent terms of 12 years’ imprisonment for 40 charges
of attempted murder. An agreed Summary of Facts forms the basis of that
sentence. A copy of the agreed Summary of Facts is at Appendix C. The
facts in the agreed Summary of Facts have, accordingly, already been proven.
The purpose of this Overview is not to further address those facts.

1.5 On 26 November 2020, the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist
attacks provided its report to the Governor-General containing 44
recommendations on a number of topics, focused on whether there was an
ability to prevent the terrorist attacks as set out in its Terms of Reference
(Royal Commission’s Report).2 On 8 December 2020, the Royal
Commission’s Report was made available to the public. The matters
addressed in the Royal Commission’s Report are not the focus of this
Overview.

1
R v Tarrant [2020] NZHC 2192.
2
The Royal Commission’s Report, Executive Summary, at [4].
 Core Timings

1.6 There are some core timings of events on 15 March 2019 that it is useful to
summarise at the outset. They are:

• At 1.40 pm: The first shots were fired at Masjid an-Nur;

• At 1:45:58 pm: The individual left Masjid an-Nur;
• At 1:46 pm: Police officers arrived at the surrounding area of
Masjid an-Nur;
• At 1.51 pm: Police are outside Masjid an-Nur;
• At 1.52 pm: The individual arrived at the Linwood Islamic
Centre;
• At 1:54:48pm Police entered Masjid an-Nur
• Approx. 1.55 pm: The individual left the Linwood Islamic Centre;
• At 1.57 pm: A Police pursuit of the individual was initiated;
• At 1.59 pm: Police units arrived at the Linwood Islamic
Centre;
• Also at 1.59 pm: The individual was arrested and subsequently
interviewed and charged.

2 THE INDIVIDUAL’S MOVEMENTS ON 15 MARCH 2019 PRIOR TO THE

TERRORIST ATTACKS

Actions prior to travelling to Christchurch

2.1 At 12.31 am on 15 March 2019 the individual emailed links to his own email
account with the subject line of the email “For Twitter”.3 He also emailed
himself notes with the heading 4CH and 8CH.

Excerpt from the individual’s email account

3
Document 203.
 2.2 At 12.38 am the individual saved copies of his manifesto “The Great
Replacement” onto a USB flash drive.4 At 12.46 am he emailed a copy of a
message intended for his mother to be sent prior to the attack. The subject
line in the email is “To Mum”.

2.3 At 12.52 am the individual emailed a copy of a message intended for his
sister to be sent prior to the attack. The subject line of the email is “To
Lauren”.

Travel to Christchurch

2.4 The individual can be seen on CCTV footage leaving Dunedin, driving
northbound on Portsmouth Street, Dunedin, at 8.30 am and is seen again
travelling northbound at 8.34 am on Crawford Street, Dunedin in his gold
Subaru Outback.5

2.5 At 8.42 am he can be seen driving northbound on Great King Street,

Dunedin.6

2.6 At 9.52 am the individual stopped at the Z Energy Service Station, Oamaru.
Associated CCTV shows him purchasing coffee and food there, leaving at
10.03 am.7

2.7 At 9.53 am he can be seen driving northbound on Severn Street past Cross
Street, Oamaru.8

CCTV images of the individual’s vehicle leaving Dunedin – 15 March 2019

2.8 At 10.05 am CCTV captures the individual driving northbound on Thames

Street passing Coquet Street, Oamaru.9

4
Document 2319.
5
Document 2310 and CCTV.
6
Documents 2876 and 3119.
7
Documents 546 and 2739.
8
Document 2310 and CCTV.
9
Document 2310.
 2.9 At 11.04 am he is seen driving northbound past Z Energy in Caroline Bay,
Timaru.10

2.10 At 11.08 am the individual’s vehicle can be seen in CCTV images driving
northbound past Sefton Street, Timaru and then at 11.10 am still driving
northbound past Newman Street, Timaru.11

CCTV images capturing the individual moving through Timaru – 15 March 2019

2.11 At 11.21 am the individual can be seen on the Challenge Service Station
CCTV imagery at Winchester and at 12.01 pm he can be seen driving
northbound past Agnes Street, Ashburton.12

2.12 At 12.06 pm CCTV shows him driving northbound past Moore Street,
Ashburton.13

CCTV Images of the individual moving through Ashburton – 15 March 2019

2.13 At 12.27 pm the individual’s vehicle is captured on CCTV driving onto the
Rakaia Bridge.14

10
Documents 895, 6415, 120021 and 12004.
11
Document 3073.
12
Document 3073.
13
Document 3073.
14
Document 3073.
 2.14 At 1.11 pm CCTV shows the individual’s vehicle in the Christchurch area,
driving around Sockburn roundabout and exiting onto Blenheim Road. Again
at 1.17 pm he is captured on CCTV driving eastbound on Blenheim Road,
passing Matipo Street.15

The individual’s vehicle travelling through the Blenheim Road / Matipo Street Intersection – 15 March 2019

2.15 At 1.19 pm the individual can be seen turning from Blenheim Road left into
Mandeville Street.

2.16 At 1.20 pm he was captured on CCTV passing 14A Leslie Hills Drive and
then turning around at the Belgotex building.16

The individual’s vehicle movements into Leslie Hills drive – 15 March 2019

Communications activity once in Christchurch

2.17 At 1.26 pm the individual was in a carpark near Masjid an-Nur in Leslie Hills
Drive. At that time he posted links to his manifesto “The Great Replacement”
on his Twitter account ‘Brenton Tarrant’.

2.18 At 1.26 pm he posted a status update on his Facebook profile with seven
links to websites that contain copies of the manifesto “The Great
Replacement”.17

2.19 At 1.28 pm an account belonging to the individual posted to a website

“8chan” with links to his manifesto “The Great Replacement” and the link to
the live feed video on his Facebook account.

15
Document 3073.
16
Documents 2360 and 2449.
17
Documents 203, 5655 and 5964.
 2.20 At 1.31 pm he messaged his mother on Facebook Messenger, detailing his
plans and how to respond to the media and Police inquiries. At 1.32 pm he
messaged his sister on Facebook Messenger, detailing his plans and how to
respond to media and Police inquires.18

2.21 The individual’s sister told Police that when she saw the content of the
message from the individual she panicked at what she read. She tried to call
her partner (who did not answer), then called the individual’s phone and left a
message telling him not to do it and to call her back. She left work and on
her way home she learnt from her partner of an attack on a mosque in
Christchurch. She spoke to her mother and telephoned Police in Australia
who arranged to interview her.

2.22 The individual’s mother told Police that on receipt of the message from the
individual she was at work, teaching, and didn’t know what to do as she had
students in her class. She waited until the end of the class before ringing her
daughter, who told her of the shootings in Christchurch. She went home
where she did a web search and saw reports of the attacks. She then went
to the Maclean Police Station in Australia due to suspicions that the individual
may have been involved in the shootings.

2.23 At 1.33 pm an email was received by Parliament and international and

domestic news agencies from the individual’s email address in which he
made threats to attack Christchurch.

2.24 The content of the email states, “I am the partisan that committed the assault”
and attached a 74-page manifesto setting out his intended actions and
beliefs. This also had links to web pages where his content could be
downloaded.

2.25 The documents he attached made reference to attacking masajid in Dunedin,

Christchurch, Linwood and Ashburton and the email was sent from the
account [email protected]

Go Pro Footage

2.26 At 1.33 pm the individual started his recording on his GoPro camera at Leslie
Hills Drive. He shared the live feed on ‘Brenton.Tarrant.9’ Facebook account;
this streamed from his helmet mounted GoPro in real time.20

2.27 The Go Pro footage from the terrorist attacks and the individual’s manifesto
have subsequently been classified as objectionable publications under the
Films, Videos, and Publications Classifications Act 1993.

2.28 The individual’s GoPro footage as he prepared at Leslie Hills Drive showed
the location of his vehicle, weaponry and his torso vest and leg area as well
as six large (30-40 round) ammunition magazines containing numerous
rounds of ammunition, all of which are black and have white writing on them.
These are clearly visible in the passenger seat of his Subaru vehicle in the
footage.

18
Document 203.
19
Documents 0091, 2003, 2134 and 2432.
20
Documents 5394 and 4389.
 Travel to Masjid an-Nur
2.29 At 1.34 pm the individual drove his vehicle exiting the carpark at Leslie Hills
Drive and then turned from Leslie Hills Drive into Mandeville Street.21 Shortly
after he passed the Placemakers on Mandeville Street.

2.30 At 1.35 pm he was at the corner of Blenheim Road and Mandeville Street. At
1.35 pm he turned from Blenheim Road into Deans Avenue and at 1.36 pm
he stopped on the side of the road on Deans Avenue.22

The individual’s vehicle driving from Blenheim Rd into Deans Avenue – 15 March 2019

2.31 The individual’s GoPro footage showed him stopped on Deans Avenue; here
he directly addressed the camera.

2.32 At 1.38 pm the individual passed Mayfair Street driving along Deans Avenue
and then can be seen driving across the frontage of Masjid an-Nur before he
turned left down the driveway adjacent to the masjid and turned around.23

The individual’s vehicle driving past Masjid an-Nur – 15 March 2019

21
Document 2007.
22
Document 2007.
23
Document 6247.
 Approach to Masjid an-Nur

2.33 At 1.39 pm the individual parked at the end of the driveway adjacent to Masjid
an-Nur, got out of the vehicle, armed himself with two firearms and walked
towards the masjid.24

Parliamentary Services notify Police of email

2.34 At 1.40 pm Parliamentary Services called the Police Communications room

advising Police of the email they had received.25

3 ATTACK AT MASJID AN-NUR

First shots fired

3.1 At 1.40 pm the individual fired his first shots at Masjid an-Nur and entered the
masjid, committing multiple murder and the attempted murder of the
worshippers present for Friday prayers. The time is taken from the CCTV
footage showing his entrance to the masjid.

Police 111 calls

3.2 At 1.41 pm a member of the public near Masjid an-Nur made the first 111
emergency call to Police.26

3.3 At this time the first event was created in the Police database where the caller
described people running away from the masjid and gunshots heard from a
semi-automatic weapon. Police deployed from Christchurch Central Police
Station as a result of that entry into the database.

3.4 The Central Police Station is 3.2 km from Masjid an-Nur.

3.5 At 1.42 pm three further calls were received by Police. In those calls,
witnesses described hearing multiple gunshots from a semi-automatic
weapon. At 1.42 pm Police dispatchers reported a ‘Priority 1 Firearms Event’
of machine gunfire at Masjid an-Nur with several Police units responding
directly to that location.

3.6 Within 25 minutes of the first 111 call the Police Communications Centre
received 68 calls from members of the public.

24
Document 6247.
25
Document 2134.
26
Documents 3470 and 3471.
 3.7 Those calls, combined with information broadcast on the Police radio and
claims from the individual when arrested, led to Police needing to assess and
respond to the following threats:

• Reports of shooting events at Masjid an-Nur and in Deans Avenue

• Reports of shooting events at the Linwood Islamic Centre
• Reports of shots being fired at Christchurch Hospital
• Suspected improvised explosive devices at Masjid an-Nur
• Suspected improvised explosive devices in the individual’s vehicle
• Claims from the individual that multiple gunmen were involved

Establishment of a safe forward point

3.8 At 1.43 pm Police Communications advised attending staff of a safe forward

point on the corner of Moorhouse Avenue and Deans Avenue.

3.9 A safe forward point is a commonly employed Police ‘best practice’ procedure
where a location is identified that is close to a particular threat, but with
sufficient distance to enable Police to equip themselves with whatever
equipment is required to meet the threat and approach in a planned manner.

The individual exits and then re-enters Masjid an-Nur

3.10 The Go Pro footage shows the individual exiting the main gate of Masjid an-
Nur onto Deans Avenue at 1:42:32 pm and firing multiple shots in a southerly
and northerly direction at escaping worshippers before returning to his vehicle
and rearming with another weapon (an AR-15).

3.11 The footage then shows the individual running to the southern gate and firing
multiple shots towards the masjid’s western (rear) boundary wall at escaping
worshippers, shooting two people dead and wounding another.

3.12 At 1:43:55 pm the individual re-entered Masjid an-Nur, firing more shots,
before exiting again at 1.45 pm. At this time, he sighted several victims
escaping and fired his weapon in their direction, killing one female victim and
wounding another.27 He returned to his vehicle before leaving Deans Avenue
at 1.46 pm.

Departure from Masjid an-Nur

3.13 At 1.46 pm CCTV footage shows the individual’s vehicle drive past houses on
Deans Avenue towards Riccarton Road.28 Here he fired his Ranger 870
pump action shotgun through his windshield at persons on Deans Avenue.

3.14 The individual’s Go Pro footage shows him firing through his windshield and
passenger window at victims on Deans Avenue between Masjid an-Nur and
Riccarton Road.

27
Document 2007.
28
Documents 3042 and 2917.
 3.15 At 1:46:58 pm his vehicle is seen on CCTV driving through the intersection
and swerving around a bus at Deans Avenue and Riccarton Road.29

CCTV footage showing the individual avoiding a public bus at the corner of Riccarton Road and Deans
Avenue. The first arriving Police (Armed Offender’s Squad members) can also be seen in the red car parked
on the southern roadside of Riccarton Road. No vehicle description had been supplied at this point.

Police arrival to the surrounding area

3.16 At 1.46 pm the first Police vehicle arrived with two Armed Offender’s Squad
members, parking in the safe forward point. They were unable to see the
offender’s vehicle due to the bus and, at that time, no description of the
offending vehicle had been provided.

3.17 The two Armed Offender’s Squad members confirmed over the radio they
were making an approach to Masjid an-Nur at 1.46pm.

Two Police staff can be seen approaching the scene (corner Riccarton Road and Deans Avenue).
Still image taken from Bus CCTV footage – 15 March 2019.

The individual’s movements towards the Linwood Islamic Centre

3.18 At 1.47 pm the individual’s vehicle can be seen driving through a red light at
the intersection of Harper Avenue and Fendalton Road.30

29
Document 3073.
30
Document 3073.
 3.19 At 1.48 pm his vehicle can be seen on CCTV footage driving through Harper
Avenue / Bealey Avenue intersection, travelling in an easterly direction.31
Sirens from the first Police vehicles on their way to Masjid an-Nur can be
heard in the livestream video as the individual was driving toward the
Linwood Islamic Centre. The Linwood Islamic Centre is approximately 6 km
from Masjid an-Nur. The journey was made by the individual at high speed
(at times up to 130 km per hour).

Continued Police arrival to surrounding area

3.20 Also at 1.48 pm the first Police arrived at Argyle on the Park Motel. One
Police member stopped to assist a male with gunshot wounds while the other
proceeded towards Masjid an-Nur and held position at the pedestrian gate to
the masjid until the Armed Offender’s Squad and Special Tactics Group
officers arrived a short time later.32 These are the same Police officers that
can be seen in the image at paragraph 3.17 above.

3.21 The first call for the ambulance for a status 1 gunshot victim was made at
1.48pm.33

The individual’s vehicle initially through Harper / Bealey Avenues and then Bealey Avenue / Papanui Road
intersections. Stills taken from CCTV footage.

3.22 At 1.49 pm a four-man Armed Offender’s Squad contact team was deployed
from the Christchurch Central Police Station and at the same time units
commenced diverting traffic from Riccarton Road.34

Police identification of the individual’s vehicle

3.23 Also at 1.49 pm the individual’s vehicle registration number (KSH90) was
called over the Police radio for the first time after being given to attending
Police at Masjid an-Nur by a member of the public. The vehicle description
was confirmed through the Police Communications Centre.35

31
Document 3073.
32
Documents 3022 and 3601.
33
Document 2132.
34
Document 2132.
35
Documents 2554 and 2132.
 The individual’s approach to the Linwood Islamic Centre

3.24 At 1.50 pm the individual can be seen on CCTV travelling on Bealey Avenue
and then Fitzgerald Avenue, turning left into Avonside Drive from Fitzgerald
Avenue.36

Still images taken from CCTV showing the individual travelling from Bealey Avenue into Fitzgerald Avenue and
then into Avonside Road.

3.25 At that time and location the individual raised his shotgun at the driver of a
vehicle on Avonside Drive and pulled the trigger, but the firearm failed to fire.
He actioned the weapon (feeding a round into the firing chamber) and again
pulled the trigger and again the weapon failed to fire.

3.26 At that time the vehicles were approximately 3-4 metres apart and mobile. The
individual then continued driving at speed down Avonside Drive towards
Linwood Avenue, discarding his shotgun, picking up the AR-15 and placing it
ready across his lap.

3.27 At 1.52 pm the individual can be seen in CCTV footage heading southbound
passing Worcester Street on Linwood Avenue.37

4 ATTACK AT THE LINWOOD ISLAMIC CENTRE

The individual’s arrival at the Linwood Islamic Centre

4.1 At 1.52 pm the individual arrived at the Linwood Islamic Centre and parked in
the driveway. At 1.52 pm he exited his vehicle.

Ongoing Police communications

4.2 At 1.52 pm Police confirmed the intersection of Deans Avenue and Riccarton
Road was closed to southbound traffic.

4.3 At 1:52:51 pm there was a call to the Police Communications Centre

describing a vehicle with gunshots through the windscreen driving eastbound
on Bealey Avenue towards Fitzgerald Avenue. The vehicle was described as
a gold Subaru station wagon with three gunshots through the window, male
driver, 35 years, possibly wearing a blue top.

36
Documents 3073, 5394 and 4389.
37
Documents 3073 and CCTV.
 Police entrance to Masjid an-Nur

4.4 At 1.52 pm the first Police Officer arrived at the front entrance of Masjid an-
Nur and at 1.53 pm Armed Offender’s Squad permission was given for a four
man contact team to clear Masjid an-Nur.

The individual’s actions at the Linwood Islamic Centre

4.5 Once at the Linwood Islamic Centre the individual exited his vehicle and used
his lever action rifle to murder three family members as they prepared to
enter the masjid. He then murdered another worshipper through the window
into the masjid.
4.6 At 1.53 pm he ran back to his Subaru and was chased by a Linwood Islamic
Centre attendee. Once there he retrieved his AR-15.

4.7 He uplifted the Ruger AR-15 rifle and fired three shots at his pursuer, causing
them to run for their safety. He then continued to walk down the driveway
back towards the masjid at 1.54 pm.38

4.8 At the main doorway he identified worshippers inside and fired several shots
into the masjid before entering the masjid briefly. There he used the semi-
automatic AR-15 to murder victims worshipping inside.

Further Police arrive at Masjid an-Nur

4.9 At 1.53 pm a contact team of a further five Armed Offender’s Squad members
arrived at Masjid an-Nur and deployed.

Police reports from Masjid an-Nur

4.10 At 1.54 pm Police on the scene at Masjid an-Nur advised there were multiple
injured persons outside and inside the masjid and requested ambulance
attendance.

The individual’s exit from the Linwood Islamic Centre

4.11 At 1.55 pm the individual is seen in his Go Pro footage running down the
driveway to his vehicle, re-entering his vehicle and leaving the Linwood
Islamic Centre; again being pursued by the same person who had chased
him earlier.

38
Documents 4389.
 Police pursuit

4.12 At 1.57 pm Police initiated a pursuit of the offending vehicle along Brougham
Street near Waltham Road, heading westbound.39

CCTV images of the Police initiating a pursuit with the individual

4.13 At 1.58 pm Police confirmed over the radio they were in pursuit of a gold
Subaru passing through Colombo Street.40

4.14 At 1.59 pm Police forced the individual off the road during pursuit where he
was subsequently detained and arrested.41

CCTV Image showing the individual’s vehicle being forced off the road by Police

Police arrive at the Linwood Islamic Centre

4.15 At 1.56 pm the Police communications room received the first call regarding
shots being fired on Linwood Avenue.

4.16 At 1.59 pm CCTV shows Police cars driving on Linwood Avenue arriving at
the Linwood Islamic Centre.42

Arrest of the individual

4.17 At 2.00 pm the arrest procedure was carried out and the individual was
apprehended along with firearms. Possible improvised explosive devices in
the rear of his car were identified.43

39
Documents 2132, 2554, 3073, 1473 and 1475.
40
Documents 2132, 2554, 1473 and 1475.
41
Document 3073.
42
Document 2236.
43
Documents 2132 and 2554.
 Further Ambulance call-out

4.18 At 2.00 pm the Armed Offender’s Squad again reported multiple people
needed ambulance care at Masjid an-Nur.

Police reports from the Linwood Islamic Centre

4.19 At 2.02 pm Police confirmed at least three fatalities at the Linwood Islamic
Centre and ambulances were requested. Police ensured the offender had
left the immediate area and confirmed the male offender description matched
that of the person apprehended in the pursuit.

Police reports regarding the individual’s vehicle

4.20 At 2.03 pm Police confirmed the vehicle in Brougham Street had items
believed to be explosives in it.

Further police reports from the Linwood Islamic Centre

4.21 At 2.04 pm Police advised that one firearm was located at the Linwood
Islamic Centre and at least six fatalities. They requested more units and an
ambulance at that location.

Police follow-up on reports of shooting at hospital

4.22 At 2.06 pm Police confirmed with Christchurch Public Hospital staff there had
been no shots fired at the hospital. This was in response to information
coming over the Police radio of possible shots at that location.

Police response to claims by the individual and items in his

vehicle

4.23 At the time of his arrest, the individual reported that 50 others were involved
in the terrorist attacks around the world, all with tactical knowledge and “at
least six” of those were active in Christchurch that day (five others).44 A short
time later this was amended to state there “could be nine shooters” and then
a short time after that he said, “there are nine shooters, I’m the tenth”.

4.24 These statements required Police to react to several reports around

Christchurch at that time concerning suspicious behavior until it was identified
through investigation of the individual’s home address and online activity
sometime later that he was a sole offender acting alone.

4.25 Located in the rear of the individual’s vehicle were four large petrol containers
with devices attached which appeared to be improvised explosive devices.
The effect of this was that a large area was cleared and members of the
public evacuated until this area was cleared by NZ Defence Force staff. Fire
and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) were also notified, and attended, as is
standard practice when dealing with potential explosive devices.

4.26 This caused several Police resources to be deployed around the city for a
significant period.

44
Document 2132.
 4.27 By approximately 3.20 pm the individual’s Dunedin address had been
identified and confirmed.

4.28 By 4.30 pm Armed Offender’s Squad members had surrounded the address.
Entry was made into his address and that address was held for a full search
that was completed on 16 March 2019.

5 INITIAL RESPONDERS AND THEIR ROLES: POLICE AND AMBULANCE

SERVICES

5.1 Immediately after the attack at Masjid an-Nur, members of the public assisted
those shot on Deans Avenue, with one witness placing three victims in his
private motor vehicle and driving them directly to Christchurch Hospital at the
same time as Police arrived on scene.45

5.2 The first responders at the masjidain consisted of a mix of uniform Police staff
and highly trained members of the Armed Offender’s Squad and the Special
Tactics Group. These specialist officers initially took control of the first aid
and triage process at the masjidain once it had been confirmed the offender
was no longer present and the risks had been assessed and were being
managed.

5.3 The Police Armed Offender’s Squad is maintained in each Policing District in
New Zealand. They provide the tactical response to people who are, or are
believed to be, armed and a danger to themselves and the public.

5.4 The Police Special Tactics Group provide assistance with escalating Armed
Offender situations needing greater tactical resources or situations that are
beyond the capability or capacity of the Armed Offender’s Squad. They are
also responsible for the tactical intervention in incidents involving terrorism,
hostage rescue and other duties requiring the Special Tactics Group’s tactical
skills and expertise. To become a member of the Special Tactics Group, you
first must be a member of the Armed Offender’s Squad.

5.5 Both these groups are highly trained and receive regular training more
advanced than the regular Police Constable.

Medical training of the Armed Offender’s Squad and the Special

Tactics Group

5.6 The basic first aid course completed by all sworn members of the Police is
expanded upon to become a qualified Armed Offender’s Squad medic.

5.7 All Armed Offender’s Squad medics receive advanced training alongside
hospital emergency workers with a focus on:

• Recognising symptoms
• Signs of hypovolemic shock (shock from severe dehydration or blood
loss)
• Recognising the signs of symptoms of tension pneumothorax (a
complication from a collapsed lung)
• Preparing and administering chest seals

45
Document 1938.
 • Reacting to chest gunshot wound injuries
• Taking blood pressure, pulse, respiration rate and basic pain levels
when the situation dictates.

5.8 Armed Offender’s Squad medics are also trained in administering pain relief
and have been trained in triage in mass casualty events and the treatment
and management of broken bones.

5.9 Special Tactics Group medics are qualified in all aspects of an Armed
Offender’s Squad medic. Additionally, they undertake training alongside
Ambulance crew with more in-depth training on baseline signs, pain relief,
advanced training in triage and mass casualty response, along with
administering saline via intravenous drip and understanding prolonged field
care.

5.10 In addition, Special Tactics Group medics also receive training in the
management of minor traumatic brain injuries, hypothermia prevention and
blast injuries.

5.11 The Special Tactics Group trauma medic course provides an advanced
combination of first aid and the use of medical equipment, involving training
in responding to certain injuries, stopping or preventing certain medical
events and using certain medicines and equipment. This includes training
on:

• Massive hemorrhaging
• Use of tourniquets, wound and gauze packing with Israeli field
dressings
• Airways – use of the head tilt / chin lift / body position / airway
• Respirations – bag / valve / mask / chest seals
• Circulation
• Head injury – managing head injuries
• Hypothermia
• Use of oral pain relief

5.12 Special Tactics Group medics are required to be annually certified and
receive refresher training annually.

5.13 Special Tactics Group medics also attempt to complete 40 hours of ride-
along training with St John Ambulance certified paramedics. This allows real
time training and observation as well as hands-on medical treatment of some
patients in real life situations to gain invaluable experience.

5.14 At both scenes the initial responders consisted of Armed Offender’s Squad,
Special Tactics Group and uniform first responders. A specialist training
course was being held in Christchurch that day and a number of national and
international Police from that course deployed to the masjidain to provide
assistance.

5.15 At the time of initial attendance there were a mass of reports over the Police
radio that contained conflicting information leading to the belief that the
offender had returned to Masjid an-Nur, when in fact this was explained by
the delay in the livestreaming video.
 5.16 This resulted in further clearances being required by attending Police of
Masjid an-Nur before they could enter.

6 INITIAL RESPONDERS – MASJID AN-NUR

Police (including the Armed Offender’s Squad and the Special

Tactic’s Group)

6.1 Paragraph 3.17 above shows the first two Police Officers to arrive at the
surrounding area of Masjid an-Nur. One officer provided first aid to a gunshot
victim in the outer scene at 1.46 pm. The second officer arrived at the
pedestrian gate at 1.51 pm. Entry into Masjid an-Nur was made at 1:54:48
pm.

6.2 Inside the masjid, Police cleared each individual room and confirmed that the
offender was not present among those at the scene and that the scene was
secure. This also involved ensuring that there were no explosive devices or
other means of harming people left or set within the scene. It is part of Police
training in response to acts of terrorism that some terrorists conduct
secondary attacks on first responders by the use of explosive devices or
some other harmful device. Police went through the process of assessing
Masjid an-Nur as safe for other first responders to enter a total of three times.
The first was a clearance to locate obvious threats, the second was a
clearance to check cupboards and smaller areas where suspects may be
hiding, and the third clearance was due to reports indicating that the offender
may have returned to the masjid, as set out at paragraphs 5.15 and 5.16
above. The third clearance occurred once ambulance staff (see below) were
inside the masjid.

6.3 Having entered the masjid, in tandem with the clearance process set out at
paragraph 6.2, Police immediately tended to the wounded, triaged those
persons and removed them for further care as soon as practicable.

6.4 Due to the nature of the wounds inflicted on those who were injured and due
to transmission issues over the Police radio because of the volume of radio
traffic, Police ran to the safe assembly point to get ambulances to come to
the scene. During this time, at the direction of the Police, several victims
were removed to the Christchurch Public Hospital with the assistance of
members of the public in their private motor vehicles.

Ambulance services

6.5 Ambulance staff arrived on scene at 2.04 pm. The first ambulance was
granted access to the masjid at 2.08 pm after Masjid an-Nur was secured and
cleared by Police and after it was successfully communicated that it was safe
for the ambulances to have access, which, as set at paragraph 6.4, was a
message that Police had to deliver in person to ambulances waiting at the
safe forward point due to issues with the volume of traffic over the Police
radio. Ambulance staff commenced first aid treatment and transported
victims to the Christchurch Public Hospital.

6.6 All victims were then triaged by paramedics and the initial verifications of death
were completed as part of this triage process.
 First aid provided and ability to survive injuries

6.7 A number of victims who survived received life-saving first aid at the scenes
by first responders.

6.8 A total of two victims that were transported to hospital still exhibiting signs of
life subsequently died in hospital. Many of those injured had suffered extensive
and life-threatening injuries.

6.9 An expert pathologist’s opinion is that those who were killed at Masjid an-Nur
had suffered inevitably fatal injuries which meant they would not have survived
had they been evacuated to Christchurch Hospital Emergency Department
sooner. A total of 42 of the 43 victims killed at Masjid an-Nur had received
inevitably fatal gunshot wounds. The remaining person killed had received
injuries which in their totality the pathologist considered to be rapidly lethal at
the scene, and therefore not survivable.46

7 INITIAL RESPONDERS – LINWOOD ISLAMIC CENTRE

Police

7.1 Police arrived at the Linwood Islamic Centre at 1.59 pm and made the scene
secure, searching each individual room and vehicles to clear the area and
ensure it was safe. While this was being completed other Police officers
immediately assisted the wounded victims, commencing first aid and triaging
the need for further medical care. Other first responders were brought in to
assist once it was considered safe to do so (see paragraph 7.4 below).

7.2 Police staff who attended this masjid also consisted of Armed Offender’s
Squad and Special Tactics Group officers as well as normal constabulary
members.

7.3 The Police national medical portfolio holder for the Special Tactics Group
oversaw the initial emergency medical care of all persons and managed and
oversaw the initial care and triage of the wounded.

Medical staff

7.4 Shortly after the Police made the scene safe, doctors and nurses were
brought onto the scene from an adjoining medical centre to assist with some
victims being transported directly to hospital by Police vehicle.

Ambulance services

7.5 When the first ambulance arrived, paramedics took control of the triage and
first aid care for the victims. All victims were triaged by paramedics and/or
first responders with paramedic qualifications.

7.6 Along with the paramedics, Police used the expertise of doctors from the
nearby medical centre to verify the deaths of those at Linwood Mosque.

46
Statement of Martin Sage dated 29 December 2020.
 Ability to survive injuries

7.7 An expert pathologist’s opinion is that those who were killed at the Linwood
Islamic Centre had suffered inevitably fatal injuries that meant they would not
have survived had they been evacuated to the Christchurch Hospital
Emergency Department sooner. Six of the seven victims killed at the
Linwood Islamic Centre suffered inevitably fatal gunshot wounds. The
seventh person had a pattern of injury considered rapidly fatal at the scene.
Surgical intervention may have been able to salvage the injuries but only in
circumstances where the victim was virtually at the hospital at the time the
injuries were received.47

8 VICTIMS USE OF CELLPHONES FROM INSIDE THE MASJIDAIN

8.1 As part of the investigation into the individual’s actions Police spent significant
time exploring and obtaining cell phone footage captured by victims from in the
masjidain. Worshippers had both taken film recordings or, in some cases,
called loved ones to warn and advise them of the terrorist attacks.

8.2 The Masjid an-Nur CCTV footage shows victims talking on their cell phones
while receiving medical treatment and while being removed from the masjid.

8.3 In one case a victim who had escaped the individual’s initial attack was talking
to loved ones when they were shot.48

8.4 There is one example of cell phone connectivity to loved ones outside the
masjid during and following the attack, where investigations have shown the
victim was in fact deceased at the time of that connectivity. Police
investigations have shown that this is explained by an anomaly in the cellular
phone and/or connectivity on the day.49

8.5 An expert pathologist’s opinion is that having inevitably fatal injuries does not
mean a person necessarily becomes unconscious or is unable to function
immediately. In some cases a person’s organs can continue to function for
minutes before they die, and with some injuries people can perform tasks or
move about for seconds or minutes. These things do not change the inevitably
fatal nature of victims’ injuries.50

9 FURTHER INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL VICTIMS

9.1 In addition to the information provided in this Overview, Police are able to
provide further specific information relevant to each of the deceased victims.

9.2 For reasons of privacy and out of respect to next-of-kin, Police will only provide
this information to registered next-of-kin of each victim should they want to
receive it.

47
Statement of Martin Sage dated 29 December 2020.
48
Document 2606.
49
Document 6389 and 6448.
50
Statement of Martin Sage dated 29 December 2020.
 9.3 The information available in respect of each deceased victim may vary from
case to case depending on circumstances and some of the content could be
distressing. Further information that can be made available upon request
includes;

• A summary of known circumstances relating to each victim

• CCTV image of the victim entering the mosque, if available
• Overview map depicting the approximate location that the victim was
located
• Verification of Death
• Coroner’s Certificate and Release of Body documentation
• Post Mortem Report
• Disaster Victim Identification Report

C Farrant
Detective Senior Sergeant
Canterbury CIB

DOCUMENT PRODUCTION
AUTHOR CFC985, Detective Senior Sergeant Craig Farrant
REVIEWED BY GM8230, Detective Inspector Gregory Murton
RELEASED BY DLG012, Detective Superintendent David Lynch
 Operation Deans

Evidential Overview - Appendix A

 Christchurch Mosque Shootings: Timeline of events 15 March 2019

Email is forwarded to the Security Team

at Parliament. A 74-page manifesto is
attached along with links to web pages
where content can be downloaded.

Parliament calls Police

Communications. The caller scans
the manifesto and relays
information to Comms. The call
duration is approx. 12 minutes.
POLICE COMMS

Police Comms receive the first call A total of 12 firearms A description of the offending Police Comms report over the A call to Police Comms
from a member of the public. events have been received vehicle and its registration are radio, a vehicle description indicates shots are being
Additional calls describe people by Comms at this time. shared over the radio by matching the alleged offenders fired in the area of Linwood
running away from Masjid Al Noor and Police Comms. is sighted on Bealey Ave Avenue and Hargood Street.
gunshots that sound like a semi- heading towards Fitzgerald
automatic weapon. Avenue.

Shots fired at Christchurch Hospital

Emergency Department are reported over
Police Comms report over the Police radio. It was later confirmed at
radio priority one firearms 1406hrs that no shots had been fired at
event of machine gun fire at Armed Offender
hospital.
the mosque on Deans Ave. Squad members,
who are responding
to the firearms A Police pursuit is initiated along
Police responders Brougham Street with intersection of
event, arrive at A further Armed Offender including an Armed Waltham Road. Confirmed over radio.
intersection of Squad contact team Offender Squad
Deans Avenue and leave the Police station. member indicate they
Riccarton Road.
POLICE RESPONDERS

are on their way to

Bealey Avenue.
A local Police unit in the area is
flagged down by a member of the
Armed Offender Squad members public reporting shots fired in Linwood.
Multiple units respond
confirm over the radio they are
and indicate they are on First Police Officer
making an approach on Deans The pursuit of the offending vehicle ends
their way to Deans arrives at gate of
Avenue. on Brougham Street near intersection with
Avenue. Masjid Al Noor.
Strickland Street and the alleged offender
One Armed Offender is apprehended.
New Zealand
Squad member stops
Police first
to administer first aid to New Zealand Police first
responders
a gunshot victim. responders arrive outside
arrive outside
Masjid Al Noor. Linwood Masjid.

13:40 13:41 13:42 13:43 13:44 13:45 13:46 13:47 13:48 13:49 13:50 13:51 13:52 13:53 13:54 13:55 13:56 13:57 13:58 13:59 14:00 14:01

13:57:49
13:56:25
13:40:44

13:46:58

13:47:18

13:48:28

13:49:55

13:56:09

13:59:25
OFFENDER

Shots fired into the entry The alleged offender The alleged offender departs
of Masjid Al Noor. As the alleged offender leaves the area arrives at Linwood Masjid. Linwood Masjid in his vehicle.
the vehicle is obscured from Police view
by a bus. At the time there was no
vehicle description, no information an
offender had left the Mosque or how
many shooters there were.

Version 2 Release Date 13/10/2020

 Operation Deans

Evidential Overview - Appendix B

 1351hrs Comms share
over radio, vehicle
sighted by public and
reported
First Police arrive and
make an approach
1346 hrs

First 111 call Shots reported being 1352 – 1355 hrs

received fired at Christchurch Shots fired at
1341 hrs Public Hospital Linwood Mosque
1356 hrs

Shots fired
1339 – 1345 hrs at Al 1357hrs
Noor Mosque 111 call reports
Shots reported at
Linwood Mosque

1359 hrs 1357 hrs

Pursuit ends Pursuit initiated
 Operation Deans

Evidential Overview - Appendix C

 CROWN SUMMARY OF FACTS
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