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8. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn cited different tools used in
therapeutic assessment. Among those tools specifically listed by him were "performance-based
personality tests" such as
A. the MMPI.
B. situational stress tests.
C. the Rorschach.
D. All of these
9. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn described how tools of assessment
are selected for use in the process of therapeutic assessment. He said that
A. clients are tested on a standard battery first and then decisions are made.
B. the tools of assessment are selected after an initial session with clients.
C. the selection of tests is made in consultation with the therapist of the clients.
D. only specially developed Center for Therapeutic Assessment tests are used.
10. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn characterized psychological tests
as "empathy magnifiers." By this he meant that
A. test enlarge the "world of psychology" for clients.
B. test data can allow clients to feel less sympathy for themselves.
C. clients will typically be more revealing in writing.
D. tests allow evaluators to "get into their clients' shoes."
11. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn characterized clients as
A. "co-experimenters."
B. "co-therapists."
C. "co-assessment professionals."
D. All of these
12. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn described how a typical therapeutic
assessment ends. According to Dr. Finn, therapeutic assessment ends
A. with the termination of the client from therapy.
B. when the client has achieved a "modicum of insight."
C. with a discussion of test scores and "next steps."
D. All of these
13. The publication of which psychological test served as a catalyst for the early, international growth of the
field of psychological measurement?
A. the Binet Intelligence Test
B. the Rorschach Inkblot Test
C. the OSS assessment battery
D. the Mooney Problem Checklist
14. Perhaps the biggest boost to the new assessment enterprise in the United States arose from the need to
identify
A. school children who were underachieving in Paris, Texas.
B. competent recruits for the military during World War I.
C. entrepreneurial talent for the Industrial Revolution.
D. apprentice workers in the building and construction industry.
15. As used in your text, psychological assessment may include the use of
A. behavioral observation.
B. testing.
C. the case study.
D. All of these
16. Psychological tests share commonalities. For example, they all
A. include an analysis of a sample of behavior.
B. include a naturally occurring behavior.
C. include paper-and-pencil and oral responses.
D. All of these
17. Psychological tests may differ with respect to
A. content.
B. format.
C. administration.
D. All of these
18. A psychological test almost always involves an analysis of:
A. attitude and values.
B. motivation and interests.
C. a sample of behavior.
D. All of these
19. Psychological testing
A. is typically more lengthy than assessment.
B. may be one component of the process of assessment.
C. is characteristically broader in scope than assessment.
D. tends to be less accurate than assessment.
20. As used by your textbook authors, the term psychological assessment applies to
A. clinical settings only.
B. self-administered tests only.
C. employment, clinical, and educational settings only.
D. the use of tests and other tools of evaluation.
21. As used in your text, test can refer to:
A. a paper-and-pencil examination.
B. a task.
C. an interview with a client.
D. All of these
22. When it comes to the difference between the terms psychological testing and psychological
assessment,
A. ultimately, there is no difference between them.
B. the difference is clear and needs to be acknowledged
C. some ambiguity with regard to the difference persists
D. "psychological testing" subsumes "psychological assessment"
23. A key difference between psychological testing and psychological assessment has to do with:
A. the role of the test user in interpreting the results.
B. the number of hours it takes to proctor a test session.
C. whether or not the evaluation includes an oral test.
D. the utility of the test in a cost versus benefit analysis.
24. Testing is to assessment as is to .
A. blood test; physical exam
B. blood test; X-ray
C. mechanic; automobile
D. selection; placement
25. As used with reference to psychological tests, format refers to
A. the arrangement of test items.
B. whether it can be administered by computer.
C. the procedures used to obtain data.
D. All of these
26. A test is described as "paper-and-pencil." This is a reference to
A. the tools needed for the evaluation.
B. a blueprint for the assessment procedure.
C. the format of the test.
D. the test's item content.
27. Applying research on cut scores to how Olympic athletes may feel about their accomplishments at the
conclusion of an Olympic event, it may be assumed that
A. silver medalists are happier than gold medalists.
B. bronze medalists are happier than silver medalists.
C. bronze medalists are happier than gold medalists.
D. fifth-place finishers are happiest of all
28. Dynamic assessment
A. is used to describe the unconscious mechanisms that affect consumer spending.
B. can provide information about an assessee's ability to profit from intervention.
C. is no longer permitted if there is a third-party present during the consultation.
D. can be used as an alternative to dream analysis with patients who report no dreams.
29. The term psychometrics
A. was derived from the Latin for "to confuse and befuddle."
B. is used to refer collectively to test catalogues, manuals, and reports.
C. may be defined as the science of psychological measurement.
D. All of these
30. Psychometrics may BEST be defined as
A. the science of test development.
B. the science of psychological measurement.
C. the study and use of correlational techniques.
D. the study of psychic phenomena.
31. The United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) used an approach to personnel evaluation that today
would be characterized as
A. psychological testing.
B. collaborative psychological assessment.
C. dynamic psychological assessment.
D. an "assessment center" approach.
32. According to the American Psychological Association (APA), about how many tests are developed each
year?
A. 1,000
B. 15,000
C. 20,000
D. 95,000
33. What name is BEST associated with therapeutic assessment?
A. Alfred Binet
B. Oscar Krisen Buros
C. Victoria Husted Medvec
D. Stephen Finn
34. Which is an example of biofeedback instrumentation that can be used as a tool of psychological
assessment?
A. the neurodevelopment training ball
B. the adjustable light beam apparatus
C. the tilting room/tilting chair device
D. the penile plethysmograph
35. Examples of a wide array of tools of assessment are presented in your text. Which of the following is
NOT mentioned as a potential tool of psychological assessment?
A. a computer
B. a DVD
C. a smart phone
D. an interview
36. An individual being evaluated for employment as a police officer is asked to put himself in the place of
an arresting officer who has just been threatened by a suspect. This sort of evaluation is BEST described
as
A. role play.
B. portfolio analysis.
C. case history.
D. behavioral observation.
37. A psychologist plans to study posture-related aspects of the mating behavior of mosquitoes in a
Minnesota swamp. Which tool of assessment is this researcher MOST likely to employ?
A. naturalistic observation
B. alternate assessment
C. portfolio measurement
D. the Minnesota Mosquito Mating Posture Inventory (MMMPI)
38. Role play may be preferable to naturalistic observation as a tool of measurement in situations in
which
A. the assessor may only conduct evaluations on campus.
B. judges are readily available to score role play responses.
C. the costs of naturalistic observation would be prohibitive.
D. assessees have taken advanced coursework in acting or drama.
39. A researcher is using a series of psychological tests to explore levels of perceived stress and loneliness in
a retirement home for airline professionals. This research could best be described as a
A. behavioral observation study.
B. case study.
C. quality of life study.
D. senior pilot study.
40. A panel interview is an interview in which
A. more than one interviewee is interviewed by a single interviewer.
B. a video camera and microphone have been placed in a wall panel.
C. an interpreter assists in the interview process.
D. more than one interviewer interviews the interviewee.
41. A panel interview is a tool of assessment that is MOST likely to be employed by
A. clinical psychologists.
B. educators.
C. human resource professionals.
D. entry-level neuropsychologists.
42. Panel interviews are used sparingly due to issues of
A. reliability.
B. validity.
C. psychometric soundness.
D. utility.
43. An advantage of using a panel interview format is that
A. the effects of the biases of individual interviewers are minimized.
B. panel interviews generally take less time to complete.
C. panel interviews tend to reduce the possibility of repetition of questions
D. the interviewer is encouraged to evaluate the interviewee holistically.
44. Two tests purporting to measure personality may
A. contain entirely different kinds of items.
B. differ in terms of demands on the test-taker.
C. be based on entirely different definitions of "personality."
D. All of these
45. A psychological interview requires:
A. a face-to-face talk.
B. direct, reciprocal communication.
C. the assessment of nonverbal behavior.
D. meaningful eye contact
46. As a tool of assessment, the interview has been characterized as "a reciprocal affair." What this means is
that
A. there is reciprocity between all 50 states in terms of allowing interview-related testimony into
evidence.
B. the interviewee reacts to the interviewer, and the interviewer reacts to the interviewee.
C if Interviewer A is invited to view Interviewer B's interview, then Interviewer A is socially obliged to
. invite Interviewer B to observe Interview A interview
D. "what is good for the goose, is good for the gander."
47. In which setting is behavioral observation as a tool of psychological assessment LEAST likely to be
employed regularly and systematically?
A. school and related educational settings
B. hospital and clinic settings
C. private practice settings
D. institutional and organizational settings
48. Which of the following is TRUE of behavioral observation as a tool of assessment?
A. it is accomplished through live or video observation
B. it is typically time-intensive
C. it can yield qualitative as well as quantitative data
D. All of these
49. Observation of behavior in the setting in which the behavior typically occurs is referred to as
A. functional observation.
B. naturalistic observation.
C. temporal observation.
D. peeping tomism.
50. Which of the following is an example of role play used to assess the social skills of an elementary school
student?
A. observing a student on the playground interacting with peers
B. observing a student, in response to the group therapist's request, asking another group member to join a
simulated game
C. observing a student in the classroom, in response to a teacher's question, responding to the question in
a joking manner
D.observing a student in the playground hustling other students out of their lunch money by hosting a 3-
card-monte game.
51. A case study may include
A. data from past psychological evaluations.
B. family photographs and memorabilia.
C. records of videotape rentals.
D. All of these
52. A psychologist is preparing a journal article which reviews the high school progress of a student first
referred for evaluation in middle school. This article could BEST be characterized as a
A. portfolio evaluation.
B. case study.
C. behavioral observation study
D. psychometric review.
53. Groupthink is best defined as the tendency to
A. favor members of one's own group over that of members of another group
B. let others make decisions for the dominant person when in groups.
C. think of groups as possessing a personality, much like that of an individual.
D. make poor decisions when in collective decision-making situations.
54. Biofeedback equipment has been used in psychological measurement to assess
A. changes in blood level flowing to the brain.
B. changes in muscular tension.
C. changes in pancreatic secretions.
D. All of these
55. The Adjustable Light Beam Apparatus (ALBA)
A. is used to adjust illumination levels in light research.
B. is used to assess reactivity to light.
C. is used to measure body-image distortion.
D. was originally created to monitor Jessica Alba's mood states.
56. If there is common ground among of all of the varied approaches to psychological testing and assessment,
that common ground MOST has to do with the assessor's
A. use of a widely accepted intelligence test to measure intelligence.
B. reliance on widely accepted psychoanalytically-based principles.
C. strict adherence to ethical guidelines.
D. All of these
57. A clinician administers a computerized psychological test in her own office. Minutes after the examinee
has completed the test, the same computer used to administer the test now spews out a report of the
findings from that test. This is an example of
A. local processing.
B. central processing.
C. teleprocessing.
D. None of these
58. An interpretive report of psychological testing contains information relevant not only to the test-taker's
test scores, but recommendations for changes in the dosage of the medication the test-taker is currently
prescribed. This interpretive report is more specifically referred to as:
A. a medication report.
B. a descriptive report.
C. an integrative report.
D. an extended scoring report.
59. As compared to one-on-one and face-to-face assessments, a disadvantage of CAPA is that it typically
deprives the assessor of the opportunity to
A. make certain that test forms are kept secure.
B. observe the testtaker's test-taking behavior.
C. conduct a post-test interview with the testtaker
D. tailor the test's content to the responses.
60. Using CAPA, test users have the capability of has the capability of
A. creating virtual reality useful in role-play evaluations.
B. making quick and efficient score comparisons.
C. tailoring a test administration to testtaker's responses.
D. All of these
61. In everyday practice, responsibility for appropriate test administration, scoring, and interpretation lies
with:
A. test users.
B. test developers.
C. elected representatives.
D. test publishers.
62. As listed in your textbook, all of the following are parties to the assessment enterprise EXCEPT:
A. society at large.
B. the test developer.
C. the test user.
D. consumer advocates.
63. Based on the discussion in your textbook, which Who? question with regard to the assessment enterprise
is LEAST controversial?
A. Who is a test user?
B. Who is a testtaker?
C. Who should be allowed in the room during an assessment?
D. Who should be on a salt-free diet in a taste-test study?
64. Testtakers differ in their approach to an assessment situation to the extent that they
A. have received prior coaching.
B. view themselves as competent or incompetent.
C. experience stress and discomfort.
D. All of these
65. Of the following parties to the assessment enterprise, which group would be LEAST likely to have read
the Standards?
A. test developers
B. test users
C. testtakers
D. test publishers
66. In the context of psychological testing and assessment, social facilitation refers to the presence of a third
party and its effect
A. as a social influence process.
B. in facilitating an assessee's responses.
C. in inhibiting an assessee's responses.
D. All of these
67. Video cameras and one-way mirrors in a room where assessment is taking place will typically prompt
assessees to
A. be more concerned about their appearance than the task at hand.
B. wonder about who might have responsibility for the evaluation.
C. respond as if there is a third party present for the evaluation.
D. believe that they are part of a reality shown rather than an evaluation.
68. When a third-party observer is present while a psychological assessment is being conducted, it is good
practice to:
A. acquaint the observer with all of the test administration materials.
B. include in the assessment report mention of the third party observer.
C. ask the assessee to respond as if the observer is not really there.
D. arrange a catered, vegetarian luncheon for the observer.
69. A psychological autopsy typically includes which of the following?
A. a postmortem interview with the assessee
B. a review of archival records.
C. an interview with the coroner.
D. All of these
70. By federal law, which of the following types of tests may NOT be used in schools?
A. tests of intelligence
B. tests of achievement
C. minimal competency examinations
D. All of these may be used in schools.
71. A student taking a course entitled "Ancient History" is administered a history test. Years later, data from
this test is reviewed by assessment professionals who are preparing a case study on the testtaker. In their
report, the "Ancient History" test is referred to as
A. a school ability test.
B. a school aptitude test.
C. a school achievement test.
D. ancient history.
72. As distinguished from other settings, psychological tests are used in counseling settings to
A. obtain an estimate of occupational aptitude.
B. assess work productivity.
C. assist assessees with life choices.
D. assist assessors with differential diagnosis.
73. In personnel assessment, psychological tests are used primarily for the benefit of the
A. employee.
B. employer.
C. examiner.
D. consumer.
74. Engineering psychologists use psychological tests as an aid in the process of
A. designing products that can be used with optimal safety and efficiency.
B. predicting public receptivity to new products and services.
C. selecting the most qualified employees for positions.
D. All of these
75. Which type of psychologist designs effective and efficient products and environments for the home and
workplace?
A. an engineering psychologist
B. a consumer psychologist
C. a computer psychologist
D. a clinical psychologist
76. The ABAP Diplomate is conferred to recognize
A. expertise in the field of psychological testing and assessment.
B. the development of tests that further the cause of world peace.
C. nongovernmental, naturalistic observation that is ecofriendly.
D. singular psychometric contributions to psychological science.
77. The ABAP Diplomate
A. exemplifies the extent to which the government regulates testing.
B. is a symbol of recognition of accomplishment by a private organization.
C. entitles a psychologist to be able to administer any psychological test in any state.
D. travels from country to country as a representative of the testing industry.
78. Which of the following is the best way to establish rapport with a testtaker?
A. a few words of "small talk" on meeting
B. presenting the testtaker with a business card
C. hugging the testtaker on arrival to the facility
D. having a DVD of Jerry Springer Unscensored playing in the waiting area as an "ice-breaker."
79. A test is set into large type for a visually impaired testtaker. This is an example of
A. a physical environment modification.
B. an interpersonal environment modification.
C. a compromise.
D. an accommodation.
80. If an accommodation is made for the purpose of administering a test, then
A. the meaning of the test scores may not be clear.
B. a notation should be made on the test report.
C. a need for alternate assessment clearly existed.
D. All of these
81. As used in the vocabulary of assessment professionals, protocol typically refers to
A. the extent to which rapport has been established.
B. test forms.
C. how an assessor greets an assessee.
D. test fees.
82. In the language of psychological testing and assessment, scoring refers to assigning evaluative numbers,
codes or statements to performance on
A. tests.
B. tasks.
C. interviews.
D. All of these
83. Which of the following would serve as the BEST source of information about trends in psychological
testing and assessment?
A. test critiques
B. journal articles
C. test manuals
D. ask-the-TestDoctor.com
84. A researcher wishes to consult a reference work that provides descriptions of tests, and not reviews of
tests. Which reference source BEST suits this purpose?
A. The 20th Mental Measurements Yearbook
B. The Supplement to the 20th Mental Measurements Yearbook
C. The Supplement to the Supplement of the 20th Mental Measurements Yearbook
D. Tests in Print
85. Which of the following contains the most detailed and authoritative information on responsible test use
and test development?
A. the American Psychological Association's Ethical Standards
B. the National Association of School Psychologists' Ethical Standards
C. Ethical Standards for Social Work
D. Standards for Psychological and Educational Tests
86. A psychologist writing a journal article is looking for a critical review of an intelligence test that was
published 4 years ago. Which of the following sources would be BEST to consult?
A. The Mental Measurements Yearbook
B. Tests in
Print
C. Psychological Assessment
D. Men's Health
87. A psychologist seeks to measure color blindness in a sample of university students. Which source of
information about psychological tests would be the best place to start in search of a test to use for this
population?
A. Psychological Review
B. Psychological Assessment
C. Tests in
Print
D. Opthalmica
88. A psychologist employed as an assessor in a large corporation has been charged with the task of
identifying employees who have "executive potential." What publications would you recommend to this
psychologist for assistance in researching how to conduct such an assessment?
A. publications dealing with general approaches to leadership measurement
B. publications dealing with psychological studies of corporate leaders
C. publications that deal with cultural issues in leadership
D. All of these
89. The 19th Mental Measurements Yearbook contains:
A. sample personality tests.
B. sample mental ability tests.
C. reviews of psychological tests.
D. All of these
90. Which typically provides the most objective evaluation of a test?
A. a published review of the test in a journal
B. the publisher's test catalogue
C. the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests
D. a manual of use for the test itself
91. Detailed information regarding how a particular test was developed is typically found in:
A. a review of the test published in a journal.
B. the current test catalogue distributed by the test's publisher.
C. the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests.
D. the test manual.
92. A review of a new personality test is published in a journal. In that review, it would be reasonable to
expect to find information about:
A. the intelligence range of prospective test-takers.
B. the psychometric soundness of the test.
C. what prompted the publisher to publish this test.
D. All of these
93. Which online data base is operated by the American Psychological Association?
A. ERIC
B. PsycINFO
C. Mentalmeasurementsyearbook.com
D. None of these
94. A handheld, biofeedback device designed to promote relaxation and relieve stress called the
A. Stresseraser.
B. Relaxometer.
C. Biopsychometer.
D. Tensionreliever.
 1 Key
1. A committee makes a decision that is not as sound as the decision that would have been made had the
head of that committee acted alone. How would you characterize this phenomenon?
A. "groupspeak"
B. "central processing error"
C. "groupthink"
D. None of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #1
2. The term psychometric soundness refers to the
A. the general psychiatric health of an assessee.
B. mental status of an individual during assessment.
C. technical quality of a test or other tool of assessment.
D. competence of a defendant to stand trial.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #2
3. In the overview of testing and assessment provided in Chapter 1, examples of the use of different
tools of assessment to answer different research questions were provided. What tool of assessment
was cited as particularly useful in learning about the reaction of simulated juries to certain types of
evidence?
A. tests
B. case history data
C. portfolio assessment
D. behavioral observation
Cohen - Chapter 01 #3
4. A group-on-one interview wherein the interviewee is purposely made uncomfortable is called a
A. stress interview.
B. role-play interview.
C. naturalistic interview.
D. panel interview.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #4
5. Today, a group-on-one interview where the interviewee is purposely made to feel uncomfortable (as
illustrated in Chapter 1 of your text)
A. would be too unethical to conduct on a regular basis.
B. would be used only in research settings, not job interviews.
C. is only employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
D. is exclusively employed by the US Postal Service.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #5
6. A case history is also referred to as
A. a case study.
B. a role-play record.
C. a biographical account.
D. None of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #6
7. The loss of cognitive functioning that occurs as the result of damage or loss of brain cells is called
A. a psychological autopsy.
B. pseudodementia.
C. catastrophic.
D. None of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #7
8. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn cited different tools used in
therapeutic assessment. Among those tools specifically listed by him were "performance-based
personality tests" such as
A. the MMPI.
B. situational stress tests.
C. the Rorschach.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #8
9. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn described how tools of
assessment are selected for use in the process of therapeutic assessment. He said that
A. clients are tested on a standard battery first and then decisions are made.
B. the tools of assessment are selected after an initial session with clients.
C. the selection of tests is made in consultation with the therapist of the clients.
D. only specially developed Center for Therapeutic Assessment tests are used.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #9
10. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn characterized psychological tests
as "empathy magnifiers." By this he meant that
A. test enlarge the "world of psychology" for clients.
B. test data can allow clients to feel less sympathy for themselves.
C. clients will typically be more revealing in writing.
D. tests allow evaluators to "get into their clients' shoes."
Cohen - Chapter 01 #10
11. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn characterized clients as
A. "co-experimenters."
B. "co-therapists."
C. "co-assessment professionals."
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #11
12. In the Chapter 1 Meet an Assessment Professional, Dr. Stephen Finn described how a typical
therapeutic assessment ends. According to Dr. Finn, therapeutic assessment ends
A. with the termination of the client from therapy.
B. when the client has achieved a "modicum of insight."
C. with a discussion of test scores and "next steps."
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #12
13. The publication of which psychological test served as a catalyst for the early, international growth of
the field of psychological measurement?
A. the Binet Intelligence Test
B. the Rorschach Inkblot Test
C. the OSS assessment battery
D. the Mooney Problem Checklist
Cohen - Chapter 01 #13
14. Perhaps the biggest boost to the new assessment enterprise in the United States arose from the need to
identify
A. school children who were underachieving in Paris, Texas.
B. competent recruits for the military during World War I.
C. entrepreneurial talent for the Industrial Revolution.
D. apprentice workers in the building and construction industry.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #14

15. As used in your text, psychological assessment may include the use of
A. behavioral observation.
B. testing.
C. the case study.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #15
16. Psychological tests share commonalities. For example, they all
A. include an analysis of a sample of behavior.
B. include a naturally occurring behavior.
C. include paper-and-pencil and oral responses.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #16
17. Psychological tests may differ with respect to
A. content.
B. format.
C. administration.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #17
18. A psychological test almost always involves an analysis of:
A. attitude and values.
B. motivation and interests.
C. a sample of behavior.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #18
19. Psychological testing
A. is typically more lengthy than assessment.
B. may be one component of the process of assessment.
C. is characteristically broader in scope than assessment.
D. tends to be less accurate than assessment.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #19
20. As used by your textbook authors, the term psychological assessment applies to
A. clinical settings only.
B. self-administered tests only.
C. employment, clinical, and educational settings only.
D. the use of tests and other tools of evaluation.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #20
21. As used in your text, test can refer to:
A. a paper-and-pencil examination.
B. a task.
C. an interview with a client.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #21
22. When it comes to the difference between the terms psychological testing and psychological
assessment,
A. ultimately, there is no difference between them.
B. the difference is clear and needs to be acknowledged
C. some ambiguity with regard to the difference persists
D. "psychological testing" subsumes "psychological assessment"
Cohen - Chapter 01 #22
23. A key difference between psychological testing and psychological assessment has to do with:
A. the role of the test user in interpreting the results.
B. the number of hours it takes to proctor a test session.
C. whether or not the evaluation includes an oral test.
D. the utility of the test in a cost versus benefit analysis.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #23
24. Testing is to assessment as is to .
A. blood test; physical exam
B. blood test; X-ray
C. mechanic; automobile
D. selection; placement

Cohen - Chapter 01 #24

25. As used with reference to psychological tests, format refers to
A. the arrangement of test items.
B. whether it can be administered by computer.
C. the procedures used to obtain data.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #25

26. A test is described as "paper-and-pencil." This is a reference to
A. the tools needed for the evaluation.
B. a blueprint for the assessment procedure.
C. the format of the test.
D. the test's item content.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #26

27. Applying research on cut scores to how Olympic athletes may feel about their accomplishments at the
conclusion of an Olympic event, it may be assumed that
A. silver medalists are happier than gold medalists.
B. bronze medalists are happier than silver medalists.
C. bronze medalists are happier than gold medalists.
D. fifth-place finishers are happiest of all
Cohen - Chapter 01 #27
28. Dynamic assessment
A. is used to describe the unconscious mechanisms that affect consumer spending.
B. can provide information about an assessee's ability to profit from intervention.
C. is no longer permitted if there is a third-party present during the consultation.

D. can be used as an alternative to dream analysis with patients who report no dreams.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #28
29. The term psychometrics
A. was derived from the Latin for "to confuse and befuddle."
B. is used to refer collectively to test catalogues, manuals, and reports.
C. may be defined as the science of psychological measurement.
D. All of these

C. the
30. Psychometrics may BEST be defined as study and
A. the science of test development. use of
B. the science of psychological measurement. correlatio
nal
Cohen - Chapter 01 #30
techniques. D. the study of psychic phenomena. Cohen - Chapter 01 #29

Cohen - Chapter 01 #30

31. The United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) used an approach to personnel evaluation that
today would be characterized as
A. psychological testing.
B. collaborative psychological assessment.
C. dynamic psychological assessment.
D. an "assessment center" approach.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #31
32. According to the American Psychological Association (APA), about how many tests are developed
each year?
A. 1,000
B. 15,000
C. 20,000
D. 95,000
Cohen - Chapter 01 #32
33. What name is BEST associated with therapeutic assessment?
A. Alfred Binet
B. Oscar Krisen Buros
C. Victoria Husted Medvec
D. Stephen Finn

Cohen - Chapter 01 #33

34. Which is an example of biofeedback instrumentation that can be used as a tool of psychological
assessment?
A. the neurodevelopment training ball
B. the adjustable light beam apparatus
C. the tilting room/tilting chair device
D. the penile plethysmograph
Cohen - Chapter 01 #34
35. Examples of a wide array of tools of assessment are presented in your text. Which of the following is
NOT mentioned as a potential tool of psychological assessment?
A. a computer
B. a DVD
C. a smart phone
D. an interview
Cohen - Chapter 01 #35
36. An individual being evaluated for employment as a police officer is asked to put himself in the place
of an arresting officer who has just been threatened by a suspect. This sort of evaluation is BEST
described as
A. role play.
B. portfolio analysis.
C. case history.
D. behavioral observation.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #36
37. A psychologist plans to study posture-related aspects of the mating behavior of mosquitoes in a
Minnesota swamp. Which tool of assessment is this researcher MOST likely to employ?
A. naturalistic observation
B. alternate assessment
C. portfolio measurement
D. the Minnesota Mosquito Mating Posture Inventory (MMMPI)

Cohen - Chapter 01 #37

38. Role play may be preferable to naturalistic observation as a tool of measurement in situations in
which
A. the assessor may only conduct evaluations on campus.
B. judges are readily available to score role play responses.
C. the costs of naturalistic observation would be prohibitive.
D. assessees have taken advanced coursework in acting or drama.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #38
39. A researcher is using a series of psychological tests to explore levels of perceived stress and loneliness
in a retirement home for airline professionals. This research could best be described as a
A. behavioral observation study.
B. case study.
C. quality of life study.
D. senior pilot study.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #39
40. A panel interview is an interview in which
A. more than one interviewee is interviewed by a single interviewer.
B. a video camera and microphone have been placed in a wall panel.
C. an interpreter assists in the interview process.
D. more than one interviewer interviews the interviewee.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #40

41. A panel interview is a tool of assessment that is MOST likely to be employed by
A. clinical psychologists.
B. educators.
C. human resource professionals.
D. entry-level neuropsychologists.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #41

42. Panel interviews are used sparingly due to issues of
A. reliability.
B. validity.
C. psychometric soundness.
D. utility.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #42

43. An advantage of using a panel interview format is that
A. the effects of the biases of individual interviewers are minimized.
B. panel interviews generally take less time to complete.
C. panel interviews tend to reduce the possibility of repetition of questions
D. the interviewer is encouraged to evaluate the interviewee holistically.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #43

44. Two tests purporting to measure personality may
A. contain entirely different kinds of items.
B. differ in terms of demands on the test-taker.
C. be based on entirely different definitions of "personality."
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #44

45. A psychological interview requires:
A. a face-to-face talk.
B. direct, reciprocal communication.
C. the assessment of nonverbal behavior.
D. meaningful eye contact

Cohen - Chapter 01 #45

46. As a tool of assessment, the interview has been characterized as "a reciprocal affair." What this means
is that
A. there is reciprocity between all 50 states in terms of allowing interview-related testimony into
evidence.
B. the interviewee reacts to the interviewer, and the interviewer reacts to the interviewee.
C if Interviewer A is invited to view Interviewer B's interview, then Interviewer A is socially obliged
. to invite Interviewer B to observe Interview A interview
D. "what is good for the goose, is good for the gander."
Cohen - Chapter 01 #46
47. In which setting is behavioral observation as a tool of psychological assessment LEAST likely to be
employed regularly and systematically?
A. school and related educational settings
B. hospital and clinic settings
C. private practice settings
D. institutional and organizational settings
Cohen - Chapter 01 #47
48. Which of the following is TRUE of behavioral observation as a tool of assessment?
A. it is accomplished through live or video observation
B. it is typically time-intensive
C. it can yield qualitative as well as quantitative data
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #48

49. Observation of behavior in the setting in which the behavior typically occurs is referred to as
A. functional observation.
B. naturalistic observation.
C. temporal observation.
D. peeping tomism.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #49
50. Which of the following is an example of role play used to assess the social skills of an elementary
school student?
A. observing a student on the playground interacting with peers
B. observing a student, in response to the group therapist's request, asking another group member to
join a simulated game
C. observing a student in the classroom, in response to a teacher's question, responding to the question
in a joking manner
D. observing a student in the playground hustling other students out of their lunch money by hosting a
3-card-monte game.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #50
51. A case study may include
A. data from past psychological evaluations.
B. family photographs and memorabilia.
C. records of videotape rentals.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #51

52. A psychologist is preparing a journal article which reviews the high school progress of a student first
referred for evaluation in middle school. This article could BEST be characterized as a
A. portfolio evaluation.
B. case study.
C. behavioral observation study
D. psychometric review.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #52
53. Groupthink is best defined as the tendency to
A. favor members of one's own group over that of members of another group
B. let others make decisions for the dominant person when in groups.
C. think of groups as possessing a personality, much like that of an individual.
D. make poor decisions when in collective decision-making situations.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #53
54. Biofeedback equipment has been used in psychological measurement to assess
A. changes in blood level flowing to the brain.
B. changes in muscular tension.
C. changes in pancreatic secretions.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #54

55. The Adjustable Light Beam Apparatus (ALBA)
A. is used to adjust illumination levels in light research.
B. is used to assess reactivity to light.
C. is used to measure body-image distortion.
D. was originally created to monitor Jessica Alba's mood states.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #55

56. If there is common ground among of all of the varied approaches to psychological testing and
assessment, that common ground MOST has to do with the assessor's
A. use of a widely accepted intelligence test to measure intelligence.
B. reliance on widely accepted psychoanalytically-based principles.
C. strict adherence to ethical guidelines.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #56
57. A clinician administers a computerized psychological test in her own office. Minutes after the
examinee has completed the test, the same computer used to administer the test now spews out a
report of the findings from that test. This is an example of
A. local processing.
B. central processing.
C. teleprocessing.
D. None of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #57
58. An interpretive report of psychological testing contains information relevant not only to the test-
taker's test scores, but recommendations for changes in the dosage of the medication the test-taker is
currently prescribed. This interpretive report is more specifically referred to as:
A. a medication report.
B. a descriptive report.
C. an integrative report.
D. an extended scoring report.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #58
59. As compared to one-on-one and face-to-face assessments, a disadvantage of CAPA is that it typically
deprives the assessor of the opportunity to
A. make certain that test forms are kept secure.
B. observe the testtaker's test-taking behavior.
C. conduct a post-test interview with the testtaker
D. tailor the test's content to the responses.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #59
60. Using CAPA, test users have the capability of has the capability of
A. creating virtual reality useful in role-play evaluations.
B. making quick and efficient score comparisons.
C. tailoring a test administration to testtaker's responses.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #60

61. In everyday practice, responsibility for appropriate test administration, scoring, and interpretation lies
with:
A. test users.
B. test developers.
C. elected representatives.
D. test publishers.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #61
62. As listed in your textbook, all of the following are parties to the assessment enterprise EXCEPT:
A. society at large.
B. the test developer.
C. the test user.
D. consumer advocates.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #62
63. Based on the discussion in your textbook, which Who? question with regard to the assessment
enterprise is LEAST controversial?
A. Who is a test user?
B. Who is a testtaker?
C. Who should be allowed in the room during an assessment?
D. Who should be on a salt-free diet in a taste-test study?
Cohen - Chapter 01 #63
64. Testtakers differ in their approach to an assessment situation to the extent that they
A. have received prior coaching.
B. view themselves as competent or incompetent.
C. experience stress and discomfort.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #64

65. Of the following parties to the assessment enterprise, which group would be LEAST likely to have
read the Standards?
A. test developers
B. test users
C. testtakers
D. test publishers
Cohen - Chapter 01 #65
66. In the context of psychological testing and assessment, social facilitation refers to the presence of a
third party and its effect
A. as a social influence process.
B. in facilitating an assessee's responses.
C. in inhibiting an assessee's responses.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #66
67. Video cameras and one-way mirrors in a room where assessment is taking place will typically prompt
assessees to
A. be more concerned about their appearance than the task at hand.
B. wonder about who might have responsibility for the evaluation.
C. respond as if there is a third party present for the evaluation.
D. believe that they are part of a reality shown rather than an evaluation.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #67
68. When a third-party observer is present while a psychological assessment is being conducted, it is good
practice to:
A. acquaint the observer with all of the test administration materials.
B. include in the assessment report mention of the third party observer.
C. ask the assessee to respond as if the observer is not really there.
D. arrange a catered, vegetarian luncheon for the observer.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #68

69. A psychological autopsy typically includes which of the following?
A. a postmortem interview with the assessee
B. a review of archival records.
C. an interview with the coroner.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #69
70. By federal law, which of the following types of tests may NOT be used in schools?
A. tests of intelligence
B. tests of achievement
C. minimal competency examinations
D. All of these may be used in schools.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #70

71. A student taking a course entitled "Ancient History" is administered a history test. Years later, data
from this test is reviewed by assessment professionals who are preparing a case study on the testtaker.
In their report, the "Ancient History" test is referred to as
A. a school ability test.
B. a school aptitude test.
C. a school achievement test.
D. ancient history.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #71
72. As distinguished from other settings, psychological tests are used in counseling settings to
A. obtain an estimate of occupational aptitude.
B. assess work productivity.
C. assist assessees with life choices.
D. assist assessors with differential diagnosis.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #72
73. In personnel assessment, psychological tests are used primarily for the benefit of the
A. employee.
B. employer.
C. examiner.
D. consumer.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #73
74. Engineering psychologists use psychological tests as an aid in the process of
A. designing products that can be used with optimal safety and efficiency.
B. predicting public receptivity to new products and services.
C. selecting the most qualified employees for positions.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #74

75. Which type of psychologist designs effective and efficient products and environments for the home
and workplace?
A. an engineering psychologist
B. a consumer psychologist
C. a computer psychologist
D. a clinical psychologist
Cohen - Chapter 01 #75
76. The ABAP Diplomate is conferred to recognize
A. expertise in the field of psychological testing and assessment.
B. the development of tests that further the cause of world peace.
C. nongovernmental, naturalistic observation that is ecofriendly.
D. singular psychometric contributions to psychological science.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #76

77. The ABAP Diplomate
A. exemplifies the extent to which the government regulates testing.
B. is a symbol of recognition of accomplishment by a private organization.
C. entitles a psychologist to be able to administer any psychological test in any state.
D. travels from country to country as a representative of the testing industry.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #77
78. Which of the following is the best way to establish rapport with a testtaker?
A. a few words of "small talk" on meeting
B. presenting the testtaker with a business card
C. hugging the testtaker on arrival to the facility

D. having a DVD of Jerry Springer Unscensored playing in the waiting area as an "ice-breaker."
Cohen - Chapter 01 #78
79. A test is set into large type for a visually impaired testtaker. This is an example of
A. a physical environment modification.
B. an interpersonal environment modification.
C. a compromise.
D. an accommodation.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #79

80. If an accommodation is made for the purpose of administering a test, then
A. the meaning of the test scores may not be clear.
B. a notation should be made on the test report.
C. a need for alternate assessment clearly existed.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #80

81. As used in the vocabulary of assessment professionals, protocol typically refers to
A. the extent to which rapport has been established.
B. test forms.
C. how an assessor greets an assessee.
D. test fees.

Cohen - Chapter 01 #81

82. In the language of psychological testing and assessment, scoring refers to assigning evaluative
numbers, codes or statements to performance on
A. tests.
B. tasks.
C. interviews.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #82
83. Which of the following would serve as the BEST source of information about trends in psychological
testing and assessment?
A. test critiques
B. journal articles
C. test manuals
D. ask-the-TestDoctor.com
Cohen - Chapter 01 #83
84. A researcher wishes to consult a reference work that provides descriptions of tests, and not reviews of
tests. Which reference source BEST suits this purpose?
A. The 20th Mental Measurements Yearbook
B. The Supplement to the 20th Mental Measurements Yearbook
C. The Supplement to the Supplement of the 20th Mental Measurements Yearbook
Cohen - Chapter 01 #84
D. Tests in Print

Cohen - Chapter 01 #84

85. Which of the following contains the most detailed and authoritative information on responsible test
use and test development?
A. the American Psychological Association's Ethical Standards
B. the National Association of School Psychologists' Ethical Standards
C. Ethical Standards for Social Work
D. Standards for Psychological and Educational Tests
Cohen - Chapter 01 #85
86. A psychologist writing a journal article is looking for a critical review of an intelligence test that was
published 4 years ago. Which of the following sources would be BEST to consult?
A. The Mental Measurements Yearbook
B. Tests in
Print
C. Psychological Assessment
D. Men's Health
Cohen - Chapter 01 #86
87. A psychologist seeks to measure color blindness in a sample of university students. Which source of
information about psychological tests would be the best place to start in search of a test to use for this
population?
A. Psychological Review
B. Psychological Assessment
C. Tests in
Print
D. Opthalmica
Cohen - Chapter 01 #87
88. A psychologist employed as an assessor in a large corporation has been charged with the task of
identifying employees who have "executive potential." What publications would you recommend to
this psychologist for assistance in researching how to conduct such an assessment?
A. publications dealing with general approaches to leadership measurement
B. publications dealing with psychological studies of corporate leaders
C. publications that deal with cultural issues in leadership
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #88
89. The 19th Mental Measurements Yearbook contains:
A. sample personality tests.
B. sample mental ability tests.
C. reviews of psychological tests.
D. All of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #89

90. Which typically provides the most objective evaluation of a test?
A. a published review of the test in a journal
B. the publisher's test catalogue
C. the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests
D. a manual of use for the test itself

Cohen - Chapter 01 #90

91. Detailed information regarding how a particular test was developed is typically found in:
A. a review of the test published in a journal.
B. the current test catalogue distributed by the test's publisher.
C. the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests.
D. the test manual.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #91
92. A review of a new personality test is published in a journal. In that review, it would be reasonable to
expect to find information about:
A. the intelligence range of prospective test-takers.
B. the psychometric soundness of the test.
C. what prompted the publisher to publish this test.
D. All of these
Cohen - Chapter 01 #92
93. Which online data base is operated by the American Psychological Association?
A. ERIC
B. PsycINFO
C. Mentalmeasurementsyearbook.com
D. None of these

Cohen - Chapter 01 #93

94. A handheld, biofeedback device designed to promote relaxation and relieve stress called the
A. Stresseraser.
B. Relaxometer.
C. Biopsychometer.
D. Tensionreliever.
Cohen - Chapter 01 #94
 1 Summary
Category # of Question
s
Cohen - Chapter 01 94
Other documents randomly have
different content
we have said, is not in the minimisation which forbids further
subdivision, but in the maximisation which includes the greatest
possible being in an inviolable unity. It is not, therefore, the intrusion
upon isolation, as such, that interferes with individuality; it is the
intrusion, upon a growing unity of consciousness, of a medium
hostile to its growth.

But we have seen that force, automatism, and suggestion, are in

some ways necessary to the support and maintenance of the human
consciousness, owing to its animal limitations. They are, indeed, as
is well known, the condition of its progress. Therefore, in promoting
the best life, these aids must be employed by society as exercising
absolute power—viz., by the State. And the problem presented by
their employment is not a question of the “interference of the State
with the Individual”—an antithesis which is strictly meaningless; but
it is a question how far and in what way the use of force and the like
by the State is a hindrance to the end for which the State itself
exists. In other words, it is to be ascertained how far the fullest self-
assertion of the social {184} universal in its differences—the best life
—can be promoted or is likely to be endangered by means which are
of a different order, and so in some circumstances opposed to it. The
point is not that I and some thousands more break in by force upon
you in particular and violate your isolation; but that such breaking in
by force, whoever does it and whoever suffers by it, and even if
through passion or obsession you do it to _your_self and I to
_my_self, is hostile prima facie to the living logic of the will, which
alone can create a unity and realise a best. How then, and under
what reservations, in the complicated conflict of the fuller and
narrower self, can this dangerous drug of violence be administered,
so to speak, as a counter-poison to tendencies which would
otherwise give no chance to the logical will? With this difficulty in our
minds, we will endeavour to determine the general principle on
which force and menace should be used by the State, and a routine
be mechanically maintained by it.

3. We have hitherto spoken of the State and Society as almost

convertible terms. [1] And in fact it is part of our argument that the
influences of Society differ only in degree from the powers of the
State, and that the explanation of both is ultimately the same. But
on the other hand, it is also part of our argument that the State as
such is a necessary factor in civilised life; and that no true ideal lies
in the direction of minimising its individuality or restricting its
absolute power. By the State, then, we mean Society as a unit,
recognised as rightly exercising control over its members {185}
through absolute physical power. The limits of the unit are, of
course, determined by what looks like historical accident; but there
is logic underneath the apparent accident, and the most tremendous
political questions turn upon the delimitation of political units. A
principle, so to speak, of political parsimony—entia non sunt
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, “two organisations will not
survive when one can do the work”—is always tending to expand the
political unit. The limits of the common experience necessary for
effective self-government are always operating to control this
expansion. We might therefore suggest, as a principle determining
the area of states, “the widest territorial area compatible with the
unity of experience which is demanded by effective self-
government.” But the State de facto (which is also de jure) is the
Society which is recognised as exercising compulsory power over its
members, and as presenting itself qua a single independent
corporation among other independent corporations. Without such
power, or where, if anywhere, it does not exist, there can be no
ultimate and effective adjustment of the claims of individuals, and of
the various social groups in which individuals are involved. It is the
need for this ultimate effective adjustment which constitutes the
need that every individual in civilised life should belong to one state,
and to one only. Otherwise his “real” will might have no working
representative at all, but all be sheer conflict. That Society, then, is a
State, which is habitually recognised as a unit lawfully exercising
force. We saw that the characteristics of Society pass gradually into
those of the State. It would not be true that {196} Society is a State
only as actually exercising force; but it would perhaps be true to say
that State action as such, though far from being limited to the
downright exercise of force, yet consists of all that side of social
action which depends on the character of ultimate arbiter and
regulator, maintainer of mechanical routine, and source of
authoritative suggestion, a character which is one with the right to
exercise force in the last resort.

[1] See, however, p. 150 ff.

The end of the State, then, is the end of Society and of the
Individual—the best life, as determined by the fundamental logic of
the will. The means at its disposal, qua State, always partake of the
nature of force, though this does not exclude their having other
aspects as well. Taxation may have the most reasonable and even
the most popular purpose, yet the generality and justice of its
incidence, and the certainty of its productiveness, can only be
secured by compulsion. No State could undertake its work on the
basis of voluntary contributions. A universal end, we might say, is
indeed not a mere general rule; but you cannot carry out a universal
end in a plurality of units—and a set of human individuals is always
in one aspect a plurality of units—without enforcing general rules.
 4. Here, then, we have our problem more closely determined than
in the previous chapters. There we saw, in general, that self-
government can have no meaning unless we can “really” will
something which we do not always “actually” will. And we were led
to look for a clue to our real or implied will in the social spirit as
incorporated in laws and institutions, that is to say in Society as a
{187} working whole reflected in the full system of the
consciousnesses which composed it.

We supposed ourselves prepared, then, it would seem, to do and

suffer anything which would promote the best life of the whole—that
maximisation of our being which, from the nature of our real will, we
saw to be imperative upon us—a demand implied in every volition
and from which we could never escape.

But now we are face to face with the question what we are called
upon to do or to suffer, as members of a State, in promotion of the
best life. We have here to renew, from another standpoint, the
discussions of chapter iii. The governing fact of the situation is that
the means of action at our disposal as members of a State are not,
on their distinctive side, in pari materia with the end. It is true that
the State, as an intelligent system, can appeal by reasoning and
persuasion to the logical will as such. It constantly does so in various
forms, and a State which did nothing of the kind either directly or
indirectly would not possess the recognition which is necessary to its
very existence. So far its work is in pari materia with the end, being
a direct element in the expansion of mind and character in their own
spiritual medium of thought and will. But this side of its work is not
distinctive of the State, and, therefore, is not that for which more
particularly it exists. Its distinctive attribute is to be ultimate arbiter
and regulator of claims, the guarantor of life as at least a workable
system in the bodily world. It is in its ultimateness de facto that the
differentia lies which separates it from the innumerable {188} other
groupings and associations which go to make up our complex life.
This is shown in the fact that each of us, as we have said, must
belong to a State, and can belong to one only. For an ultimate
authority must be single. Now, authority which is to be ultimate in a
sphere including the world of bodily action, must be an authority
which can use force. And it is for this reason that, as we said, force
is involved in the distinctive attributes of the State.

But force is not in pari materia with the expansion of mind and
character in their spiritual medium. And, thus, there at once appears
an inadequacy of means to end as between the distinctive modus
operandi of the State and the end in virtue of which it claims to
represent the “real” will.

What is the bearing of this inadequacy? What is the most that the
State, in its distinctive capacity, can do towards promoting a form of
life which it recognises as desirable? Its direct power is limited to
securing the performance of external [1] actions. This does not
mean merely the performance of outward bodily movements, such
as might be brought to pass by actual physical force. It is
remarkable that actual physical force plays a very small part in the
work of any decently ordered State. When we say that the State can
do no more than secure the performance of external actions, we do
not exclude from the action the intention to act in a certain way.
With out such an intention there is no action in the sense of human
action at all, but merely a muscular movement. It is necessary for
the State to attach {189} importance to intention, which is involved
in the idea of human action, and is the only medium through which
the muscular movements of human beings can be determined with
any degree of certainty. The State, then, through its authority,
backed ultimately by physical force, can produce, with a fair degree
of certainty, the intention to act in a certain way, and therefore the
actions themselves. Why do we call intentional actions, so produced,
external actions only?

[1] Green, Principles of Political Obligation, pp. 34, 35.

It is because the State is unable to determine that the action shall

be done from the ground or motive which alone would give it
immediate value or durable certainty as an element in the best life.
On the contrary, in so far as the doing of the action is due to the
distinctive mode of operation which belongs to the State, due, that is
to say, to the hope of reward or the fear of punishment, its value as
an element in the best life is ipso facto destroyed, except in so far as
its ulterior effects are concerned. An action performed in this sense
under compulsion is not a true part of the will. [1] It is an intention
adopted from submissiveness or selfishness, and lacks not only the
moral value, but what is partly the same thing, the reliable
constancy of principle, displayed in an action which arises out of the
permanent purposes of a life.

[1] The theory of punishment will modify this proposition in some

degree.

The State, then, as such, can only secure the performance of

external actions. That is to say, it can only enforce as much intention
[1] as is {190} necessary to ensure, on the whole, compliance with
requirements stated in terms of movements affecting the outer
world. So far from promoting the performance of actions which enter
into the best life, its operations, where effective, must directly
narrow the area of such actions by stimulating lower motives as
regards some portion of it.

[1] On this question vide Green’s very thorough discussion. It is

true, of course, that the law takes account of intention, and does
not, e.g., treat accidental homicide as murder, the difference
between them being a difference of intention. But it is obvious that,
in attempting to influence human action at all, so much account as
this must be taken of intention; for intention is necessary to
constitute a human action. An unintentional movement of the
muscles cannot be guarded against by laws and penalties; it is only
through the intention that deterrent or other motives can get at the
action, and a constant law-abiding disposition is the best security for
law-abiding action. On the importance of intention and disposition as
affording a certainty of action, Bentham, who wholly rejects
judgment according to moral motive, is as emphatic as possible.

5. The State, then, in its distinctive capacity, has no agency at its

command for influencing conduct, but such as may be used to
produce an external course of behaviour by the injunction or
prohibition of external acts, in enforcing which acts the State will
take note of intentions, so far as it can infer them, because it is only
through them that its influence can be exerted.

The relation of such a means to the imperative end, on which we

have seen that political obligation depends, must be in a certain
sense negative. The means is one which cannot directly promote the
end, and which even tends to narrow its sphere. What it can effect is
to remove obstacles, to destroy conditions hostile to the realisation
of the end. This brings us back to a principle laid down by Kant, [1]
and in its bare statement strongly resembling Mill’s contention. When
force is opposed to {191} freedom, a force that repels that force is
right. Here, of course, all depends upon what we mean by freedom,
and in what sense we think that force can hinder hindrances to it. If
freedom meant for us the empty hexagon [2] round each individual,
the principle would take us back to Mill’s Liberty. If, on the other
hand, we failed to grasp the discrepancy between force of any kind
and the positive nature of the common good which we take to be
freedom, the principle would lead us straight to a machine-made
Utopia. For its negative character cannot restrain it from some
degree of positive action. It is only through positive operation that a
negation or opposition can find reality in the world. And the limits of
its positive action must depend on the precise bearings of the
negation which it puts in force.

[1] W., ix. 34. Fichte remarked on the pregnancy of this principle.

[2] See p. 72, above.

Now, for us, after the explanations which have been given, the
negative nature of our principle is to be seriously pressed, although
its action has to take positive form. The State is in its right when it
forcibly hinders hindrance to the best life or common good. In
hindering such hindrances it will indeed do positive acts. It may try
to hinder illiteracy and intemperance by compelling education and by
municipalising the liquor traffic. Why not, it will be asked, hinder also
unemployment by universal employment, over-crowding by universal
house-building, and immorality by punishing immoral and rewarding
moral actions? Here comes the value of remembering that, according
to our principle, State action is negative in its immediate bearing,
though positive both in its {192} actual doings and its ultimate
purpose. On every problem the question must recur, “Is the
proposed measure bona fide confined to hindering a hindrance, or is
it attempting direct promotion of the common good by force?” For it
is to be borne in mind throughout that whatever acts are enforced
are, so far as the force operates, withdrawn from the higher life. The
promotion of morality by force, for instance, is an absolute self-
contradiction. [1] No general principle will tell us how in particular to
solve this subtle question, apart from common sense and special
experience. But there is perhaps more to be learned from this
principle, if approached with bona fides [2] than from most
generalities of philosophy on social or ethical topics. It is well, I
think, constantly to apply the idea of removing hindrances, in
criticism of our efforts to promote the best life by means involving
compulsion. We ought, as a rule, when we propose action involving
compulsion, to be able to show a definite tendency to growth, or a
definite reserve of capacity, which is frustrated by a known
impediment, the removal of which is a small matter compared to the
capacities to be set free. [3] For it should be remarked that {193}
every act done by the public power has one aspect of encroachment,
however slight, on the sphere of character and intelligence, if only
by using funds raised by taxation, or by introducing an automatic
arrangement into life. It can, therefore, only be justified if it liberates
resources of character and intelligence greater beyond all question
than the encroachment which it involves. This relation is altogether
perversely presented, as we saw above, if it is treated as an
encroachment of society upon individuals. All this is beside the mark.
The serious point is, that it is an interference, so far as compulsion
operates in it, of one type of action with another and higher type of
action; of automatism, so to speak, with intelligent volition. The
higher type of action, the embodiment of the common good in
logical growth, is so far from being merely individual as opposed to
social, that it is the whole end and purpose in the name of which
allegiance to society can be demanded from any individual. As in the
private so in the general life, every encroachment of automatism
must be justified by opening new possibilities to self-conscious
development, if it is not to mean degeneration and senility.

[1] “You will admit,” it was once said, “that compulsory religion is
better than no religion.” “I fail to see the distinction” was the reply.

[2] Among true students bona fides is presupposed. The range

opened to sophistry by a principle of this kind, which commends
positive action with a negative bearing for a positive end, is, of
course, immeasurable. Practically, I believe that bona fides is about
the first and last necessity for the application of political ideas.

[3] Perhaps I may adduce an instance of real interest. It has been

argued that ship-masters should be induced by a premium to ship
boys as apprentices to the trade of seamanship, and that training for
this trade should be fostered by local authorities like any other form
of technical education. The argument which really told in the
discussion, consisted of statistics which seemed to prove a wide-
spread eagerness on the part of boys and their parents that they
should enter a maritime life, and the existence of a hindrance simply
in the absence of adequate training for a few years during boyhood.

It is the same principle in other words which Green lays down

when he says in effect [1] that only such acts (or omissions) should
be enforced by the public power as it is better should take place
{194} from any motive whatever than not take place at all. When,
that is, we enforce an act (or omission) by law, we should be
prepared to say, “granting that this act, which might conceivably
have come to be done from a sense of duty, now may come to be
done for the most part from a fear of punishment, or from a
mechanical tendency to submit to external rules (attended by the
practical inconveniences of insensibility, half-heartedness, and
evasion which attach to acts so enforced), still so much depends, for
the higher life of the people, upon the external conditions at stake,
that we think it worth while to enforce the act (or omission) though
our eyes are fully open to the risk of extended automatism.”

[1] Principles of Political Obligation, p. 38.

Here we may have to meet our own arguments against Mill. “You
said it was a contradiction,” we shall be told, “to admit coercion as a
means to liberty. But here you are advocating coercion as a means
to something as incompatible with it, in so far as it is operative, as
our ‘liberty,’ viz., a certain state of mind and will. If the area of
coercion is necessarily subtracted from the area of liberty, as you
argued above, is not the area of coercion necessarily subtracted
from that to be occupied by the desired growth of will and
character?”

The answer depends, as we indicated in ch. iii., on the difference

between bare liberty and a determinate growth. If your liberty is
wholly indeterminate, then every restraint is a reduction of it. You
cannot increase a quantity which is all of one kind by taking away a
part of it. And, in fact, the idea that there was or could have {195}
been a previous general liberty, of which a part was given up in
exchange for more, is a mere illusion. Liberty has grown up within
the positive determinations of life, as they have expanded and come
to fit mankind better.

But if the quantity to be increased is a determinate growth, of a

type whose general character is known, the problem is transformed.
It is the commonest of experiences that hindrances can be removed
and favourable conditions maintained, if this has to be done, not
with a view to every conceivable and inconceivable development, but
for a growth the general line of which is known. In this case, as the
whole expands, the restraints and the liberty, the room for action,
may even increase together. [1] This is not only true in universal
theory, but much more important than is always remembered in
special theory or practice. The possibility of promoting freedom or
well-being by compulsion depends very greatly indeed on the unity
of habit and experience which binds together a single community.
The more the life has in common, the more definite and automatic
arrangements you may safely make in promotion of it. The rules of
my household, which inconvenience its members no more than their
clothes do, would produce a rebellion if they were enforced by law
even throughout our village.

[1] See the author’s essay, “Liberty and Legislation,” in Civilisation

of Christendom (Sonnenschein).

Thus, then, we may maintain our principle of the limits of

distinctive State action. The peculiarity of it is that it allows of
positive acts and interferences, motived by an ultimate positive
{196} purpose, but with a bearing on that purpose which is primarily
negative or indirect. However positive, as actual facts, are the
conditions which it may become advisable to maintain, they may
always, on the side which is distinctively due to State compulsion, be
regarded as the hindrance of hindrances. And the bona-fide
application of this principle will really be, when aided by special
experience, in some degree a valuable clue to what ought to be
done. It is only putting in other words the rule of action followed by
all practical men in matters of which they have genuine experience.
We may think, for instance, of the problem involved in State
maintenance of universities. It is easy to vote money, to build
buildings, and to pass statutes. But none of these things will secure
the objects of a university. Money and buildings and statutes may
throw open an arena, so to speak, for the work of willing minds in
learning and education. But the work itself is in a different medium
from anything which can be produced by compulsion, and is so far
less vital as it is conditioned by the operation of force upon minds
which demand no work of the kind.

But here we meet a difficulty of principle. Do we say that no

external conditions are more than hindrances of hindrances to the
best life? Do we deny that the best life can be positively promoted
by external conditions; or if we admit this, do we still deny that it
can be positively promoted by the work of the State? The answer
has already been implied, but may be explicitly restated. We refused
[1] to separate mind from its embodiment in {197} material things,
and so to be drawn into a purely inward theory of morality, It would
be exaggeration to call such external conditions as, e.g., first-rate
educational apparatus, [2] mere negative conditions of the best life.
But then, we are now asked, cannot the State supply such external
conditions by expenditure compulsorily provided for, and if so, is not
our principle destroyed, viz., the limitation of State action to the
hindrance of hindrances?

[1] Page 31.

[2] See Thring on the importance of this, in Parkin’s life of him.

Note, however, also the modification of his view by the adventure of
Uppingham on the Sea.
 The difficulty springs from the fact, that the State, as using
compulsion, is only one side of Society, and its action is only one
side of social action. If first-rate educational apparatus is called into
existence by a State endowment, the first-rateness of the apparatus
is not due to the compulsion applied to taxpayers, which rather, so
far, negatives the action of intelligent will as such. But it must be
due, in one way or another, to the fact that first-rate ability in the
way of devising apparatus was somewhere pressing for an outlet,
which, by a stroke of the pickaxe, so to speak, the public power was
able to provide for it. We must not confuse the element of
compulsion, which is the side of social action distinctly belonging to
State interference, with the whole of the material results which
liberated intelligence produces. When we say, then, that the State as
such can do nothing for the best life but hinder hindrances to it, the
principle applies in the strictest sense only to the compulsory or
automatic side of State action, which {198} must, so to speak, be
reckoned against it [1] in comparing its products with those which
are spontaneous social growths throughout.

[1] Subject to what will be said on the theory of rights and

punishment.

But it is further true that material conditions which come close to

life, such as houses, wages, educational apparatus, do not wholly
escape our principle. They occupy a very interesting middle region
between mere hindrances of hindrances and the actual stimulation
of mind and will. On the one side they are charged with mind and
character, and so far are actual elements in the best life. On the
other side they depend on external actions, and therefore seem
accessible to State compulsion, which extends to all external doings
and omissions. But what we have to observe is, and it is in practice
most important, that, as charged with mind and will, these material
facts may not be accessible to State compulsion, while, as accessible
to State compulsion pure and simple, they may forfeit their character
of being charged with mind and will. This shows itself in two ways.
First, just because they are facts of a kind which come so close to
life (in other words depend so greatly upon being charged with mind
and will), State compulsion cannot with certainty secure even their
apparent existence. They fail bodily, like human beings, if there is no
spirit to keep them alive. The relation of wages to the standard of
life illustrates this point. Secondly, supposing that for a time, by
herculean efforts of compulsion, which must call active intelligence
to its aid, such facts are made to present a satisfactory appearance
of existence, none the less, {199} so far as they are characterised
by compulsion, they may lose their character as elements in the best
life. That is to say, they may fail to benefit those whom they are
meant to benefit. The fact may fail to be absorbed in the life.

The principle of the hindrance of hindrances is most valuable and

luminous when rightly grasped, just in these middle cases. A pretty
and healthy house, which its inhabitant is fond of, is an element in
the best life. Who could doubt it who knows what home-life is? But
in order that putting a family out of a bad house into a good one
should give rise to such an element of the best life, it is strictly and
precisely necessary that the case or policy should come under our
principle. That is to say, unless there was a better life struggling to
utter itself, and the deadlift of interference just removed an obstacle
which bound it down, the good house will not be an element in a
better life, and the encroachment on the ground of volition will have
been made with out compensation—a fact which may show itself in
many fatal ways. If, on the other hand, the struggling tendency to a
better life has power [1] to effect the change without the deadlift
from outside, then the result is certain and wholly to the good.

[1] Many forms of social co-operation, it must be remembered,

need no deadlift from the State as such. We are not setting self-help
against co-operation, but will against automatism.

Thus we may say that every law and institution, every external
fact maintained by the public power, must be judged by the degree
in which it sets at liberty a growth of mind and spirit. It is a {200}
problem partly of removing obstacles to growth, and partly of the
division of labour between consciousness and automatism.

It ought to occur to the reader that the ground here assigned for
the limitation of State action—that is, of social action through the
public power—is not prima facie in harmony with the account of
political obligation, according to which laws and institutions
represented a real self or general will, recognised by individuals as
implied in the common good which was imperative upon them. We
spoke, for example, of being forced to be free, and of the system of
law and order as representing the higher self. And yet we are now
saying that, in as far as force is operative through compulsion and
authoritative suggestion, it is a means which can only reach its end
through a negation.

But this prima-facie contradiction is really a proof of the vitality of

our principle. It follows from the fact that we accept self-government
in the full strength of both its factors, and can deal with it on this
basis. The social system under which we live, taking it as one which
does not demand immediate revolution, represents the general will
and higher self as a whole to the community as a whole, and can
only stand by virtue of that representation being recognised. Our
loyalty to it makes us men and citizens, and is the main spiritualising
force of our lives. But something in all of us, and much in some of
us, is recalcitrant through rebellion, indolence, incompetence, or
ignorance. And it is only on these elements that the public power
operates as power, through compulsion {201} or authoritative
suggestion. Thus, the general will when it meets us as force, and
authority resting on force, and not as a social obligation which we
spontaneously rise to accept, comes to us ex hypothesi as
something which claims to be ourself, but which, for the moment,
we more or less fail to recognise. And, according to the adjustment
between it and our complex and largely unintelligent self, it may
abandon us to automatism, or stir in us rebellion or recognition, and
so may hinder the fuller life in us or remove hindrances to it. It
seems worth while to distinguish two main cases of the relation
between the ordinary self and the general will. One of these cases
covers the whole of our every-day law-abiding life, in its grades of
active loyalty, acceptance of suggestion, and automatic
acquiescence; and consists of the relation of our ordinary self to the
general system of rights maintained by the State as ultimate
regulator and arbiter. The other is confined to more exceptional
situations, and has to do with collision between the particular and
the general will, as treated in the theory of punishment. The subject
of reward may be mentioned at the same time, if only to show why
it is almost an empty heading in political theory. We will end this
chapter, therefore, with a general account of the system of rights
and of reward and punishment.

6. The idea of individual rights comes down to us from the

doctrine of natural right, and has generally been discussed with
reference to it. We need not now go back upon the illusions
connected with the notion of natural right. It is enough if we bear in
mind that we inherit from it the important {202} idea of a positive
law which is what it ought to be. A right, [1] then, has both a legal
and a moral reference. It is a claim which can be enforced at law,
which no moral imperative can be; but it is also recognised to be a
claim which ought to be capable of enforcement at law, and thus it
has a moral aspect. The case in which positive enactment and the
moral “ought” appear to diverge will be considered below. But a
typical “right” unites the two sides. It both is, and ought to be,
capable of being enforced at law.

[1] This is a right in the fullest sense. The nature of a merely legal
or merely moral right will be illustrated below.

Its peculiar position follows from what we have seen to be the end
of the State, and the means at its disposal. The end of the State is a
moral purpose, imperative on its members. But its distinctive action
is restricted to removing hindrances to the end, that is, to lending its
force to overcome—both in mind and in externals essential to mind
—obstacles which otherwise would obstruct the realisation of the
end. The whole of the conditions thus enforced is the whole of
“rights” attaching to the selves, who, standing in definite relations,
constitute the community. For it is in these selves that the end of the
State is real, and it is by maintaining and regulating their claims to
the removal of obstructions that the State is able to promote the end
for which it exists. Rights then are claims recognised by the State,
i.e. by Society acting as ultimate authority, to the maintenance of
conditions favourable to the best life. And if we ask in general for a
definition and limitation of State action as such, the answer is, in a
simple {203} phrase, that State action is coincident with the
maintenance of rights.
 The system of rights which the State maintains may be regarded
from different points of view.

First, (a) from the point of view of the whole community, that is,
as the general result in the promotion of good life obtained by the
working of a free Society, as a statesman or outside critic might
regard it. Thus looked at, the system of rights may be described as
“the organic whole of the outward conditions necessary to the
rational life,” or “that which is really necessary to the maintenance of
material conditions essential to the existence and perfection of
human personality.” [1] This point of view is essential as a full
contradiction of that uncritical conception by which rights are
regarded as something with which the individual is invested in his
aspect of isolation, and independently of his relation to the end. It
forces us away from this false particularisation, and compels us to
consider the whole State-maintained order in its connectedness as a
single expression of a common good or will, in so far as such a good
can find utterance in a system of external acts and habits. And it
enables us to weigh the value which belongs to the maintenance of
any tolerable social order, simply because it is an order, and so far
enables life to be lived, and a determinate, if limited, common good
to be realised. From other points of view we are apt to neglect this
characteristic, and to forget {204} how great is the effect, for the
possibilities of life throughout, of the mere fact that a social order
exists. Hegel observes that a man thinks it a matter of course that
he goes back to his house after night-fall in security. He does not
reflect to what he owes it. Yet this very naturalness, so to speak, of
living in a social order is perhaps the most important foundation
which the State can furnish to the better life. “Si monumentum
quaeris, circumspice” If we ask how it affects our will, the answer is
that it forms our world. Speaking broadly, the members of a civilised
community have seen nothing but order in their lives, and could not
accommodate their action to anything else.

[1] Krause and Henrici, cit. by Green, Principles of Political

Obligation, p. 35. Cp. “The system of right is the realm of realised
freedom, the world of the mind produced by the mind as a second
nature” (Hegel, Philosophie d. Rechts, sect. 4).

It should be mentioned as a danger of this point of view that,

fascinated by the spectacle of the social fabric as a whole, we may
fail to distinguish what in it is the mere maintenance of rights, and
what is the growth which such maintenance can promote but cannot
constitute. Thus we may lose all idea of the true limits of State
action.

(b) We may regard this complex of rights from the standpoint of

the selves or persons who compose the community. It is in these
selves, as we have seen, that the social good is actual, and it is to
their differentiated functions, [1] which constitute their life and the
end of the community, that the sub-groupings of rights, or
conditions of good life, have to be adjusted each to each like suits of
clothes. The rights are, from this point of view, primarily the external
incidents, so far as maintained by law—the authoritative vesture as it
were—of a {205} person’s position in the world of his community.
And we shall do well to regard the nature of rights, as attaching to
selves or persons, from this point of view of a place or position in
the order determined by law. It has been argued, I do not know with
what justice, that, in considering the relations of particles in space,
the proper course would be to regard their positions or distances
from each other as the primary fact, and to treat attributions of
attractive and repulsive forces as modes of expressing the
maintenance of the necessary positions rather than as descriptive of
real causes which bring it about. At least, it appears to me, such a
conception may well be applied to the relative ideas of right and
obligation. What comes first, we may say, is the position, the place
or places, function or functions, determined by the nature of the
best life as displayed in a certain community, and the capacity of the
individual self for a unique contribution to that best life. Such places
and functions are imperative; they are the fuller self in the particular
person, and make up the particular person as he passes into the
fuller self. His hold on this is his true will, in other words, his
apprehension of the general will. Such a way of speaking may seem
unreally simplified when we look at the myriad relations of modern
life and the sort of abstraction by which the individual is apt to
become a rolling stone with no assignable place—indeed “gathering
no moss”—and to pass through his positions and relations as if they
were stations on a railway journey. But in truth it is only simplified
and not falsified. If we look with care we shall see that it, or nothing,
is true of all lives.

[1] I do not say merely social functions, i.e. functions dealing

directly with “others” as such.

{206} The Position, then, is the real fact—the vocation, place or

function, which is simply one reading of the person’s actual self and
relations in the world in which he lives. Having thoroughly grasped
this primary fact, we can readily deal with the points of view which
present the position or its incidents in the partial aspects of rights or
obligations.

(i.) A right, we said, is a claim recognised by society and enforced

by the State. My place or position, then, and its incidents, so far as
sanctioned by the State, constitute my rights, when thought of as
something which I claim, or regard as powers instrumental to my
purposes. A right thus regarded is not anything primary. It is a way
of looking at certain conditions, which, by reason of their relation to
the end of the whole as manifested in me, are imperative alike for
me and for others. It is, further, the particular way of looking at
these conditions which is in question when I claim them or am
presumed to claim them, as powers secured to me with a view to an
end which I accept as mine. I have the rights no less in virtue of my
presumed capacity for the end, if I am in fact indifferent to the end.
But, in this case, though attributed ab extra as rights, they tend to
pass into obligations.

(ii.) If rights are an imperative “position” or function, when looked

at as a group of State-secured powers claimed by a person for a
certain end, obligations are the opposite aspect of such a position or
group of powers. That is to say, the conditions of a “position” are
regarded as obligations in as far as they are thought of as {207}
requiring enforcement, and therefore, primarily, from the point of
view of persons not directly identified with the “position” or end to
which they are instrumental. Rights are claimed, obligations are
owed. And prima-facie rights are claimed by a person, and
obligations are owed to a person, being his rights as regarded by
those against whom they are enforceable.

Thus, the distinction of self and others, which we refused to take

as the basis of society, makes itself prominent in the region of
compulsion. The reason is that compulsion is confined to hindering
or producing external acts, and is excluded from producing an act in
its relation to a moral end, that is, the exercise of a right in its true
sense; though it can enforce an act which in fact favours the
possibility of acting towards a moral end that is, an obligation. This
is the same thing as saying that normally a right is what I claim, and
the obligation relative to it is what you owe; as an obligation is that
which can be enforced, and that is an act or omission apart from the
willing of an end; and a right involves what cannot be enforced, viz.,
the relation of an act to an end in a person’s will. But even here the
distinction of self and others is hardly ultimate. The obligation on me
to maintain my parents becomes almost a right [1] if I claim the task
as {208} a privilege. And many rights of my position may actually be
erected into, or more commonly may give rise to, obligations
incumbent on me for the sake of my position or function. If the
exercise of the franchise were made compulsory that would be a
right treated also as an obligation; but it might be urged that qua
obligation it was held due to the position of others, and only qua
right to my own “position.” But if the law interferes with my
poisoning myself [2] either by drains or with alcohol, that, I
presume, is the enforcement of an obligation arising out of my own
position and function as a man and a citizen, which makes
reasonable care for my life imperative upon me.

[1] I do not know that I can compel my parents to be maintained

by me, and therefore it is not my legal right to maintain them; but at
least the obligation, if I claim it, ceases to depend on force. An East-
End Londoner will say, “He had a right to maintain his father,”
meaning that he was bound to do so; and Jeannie Deans says, “I
have no right to have stories told about my family without my
consent,” representing her own claim as an obligation on herself as
well as on others. She represents the thought, “I have a right that
you should not tell stories, etc.,” in a form which puts it as a case of
the thought, “You have no right to tell stories,” disregarding the
distinction between herself and others as accidental.
 [2] The law used to interfere with bad sanitation only as a
“nuisance,” i.e. as an annoyance to “others.” It now interferes with
any state of things dangerous to life as such, which probably means
that a change of theory has unconsciously set in. Legislation for
dangerous trades almost proves the point, though here it is possible
to urge that the employer is put under obligation for the sake of his
workers, and not the workers for their own sake. But the distinction
is hardly real.

(c) It is commonly said that every right implies a duty. This has
two meanings, which should be distinguished.

In the one case, (i.) for “duty” should be read “obligation,” i.e. a
demand enforceable by law. This simply means that every “position”
may be regarded as involving either powers secured or conditions
enforced, which are one and the same thing differently looked at.
Roughly speaking, they are the same thing as differently looked at
by one person, and by other persons. My right {209} to walk along
the high road involves an obligation upon all other persons not to
obstruct me, and in the last resort the State will send horse, foot
and artillery rather than let me be causelessly obstructed in walking
along the high road.

It is also true that every position which can be the source of

obligations enforceable in favour of my rights is likewise a link with
obligations enforceable on me in favour of the rights of others. By
claiming a right in virtue of my position I recognise and testify to the
general system of law according to which I am reciprocally under
obligation to respect the rights, or rather the function and position,
of others. My rights then imply obligations both in others, and
perhaps in myself, correlative to these rights, and in me correlative
to the rights of others. But it cannot strictly be said that the
obligations are the source of the rights, or the rights of the
obligations. Both are the varied external conditions of “positions” as
regarded from different points of view.

But (ii.) there is a different sense in which every right implies a

duty. And this, the true meaning of the phrase, is involved in what
we have said of the nature of a “position.” All rights, as claims which
both are and ought to be enforceable by law, derive their imperative
authority from their relation to an end which enters into the better
life. All rights, then, are powers instrumental to making the best of
human capacities, and can only be recognised or exercised upon this
ground.

In this sense, the duty is the purpose with a view to which the
right is secured, and not merely {210} a corresponding obligation
equally derived from a common ground; and the right and duty are
not distinguished as something claimed by self and something owed
to others, but the duty as an imperative purpose, and the right as a
power secured because instrumental to it.

(d) We have treated rights throughout as claims, the enforcement

of which by the State is merely the climax of their recognition by
society. Why do we thus demand recognition for rights? If we deny
that there can be unrecognised rights, do we not surrender human
freedom to despotism or to popular caprice?

(i.) In dealing with the general question why recognition is

demanded as an essential of rights, we must remember what we
took to be the nature of society and the source of obligation. We
conceived a society to be a structure of intelligences so related as to
co-operate with and to imply one another. We took the source of
obligation to lie in the fact that the logic of the whole is operative in
every part, and consequently that every part has a reality which
goes beyond its average self, and identifies it with the whole, making
demands upon it in doing so.

Now, we are said to “recognise” anything when it comes to us

with a consciousness of familiarity, as something in which we feel at
home. And this is our general attitude to the demands which the
logic of the whole, implied in our every act, is continuously making
upon us. It is involved in the interdependence of minds, which has
been explained to constitute the mind of which the visible
community is the body. A teacher’s {211} behaviour towards his
pupils, for example, implies a certain special kind of interdependence
between their minds. What he can do for them is conditioned by
what they expect of him and are ready to do for him, and vice versa.
The relation of each to the other is a special form of “recognition.”
That is to say, the mind of each has a definite and positive attitude
towards that of the other, which is based on, or rather, so far as it
goes, simply is, the relation of their “positions” to each other. Thus,
social positions or vocations actually have their being in the medium
of recognition. They are the attitudes of minds towards one another,
through which their several distinct characteristics are instrumental
to a common good.

Thus, then, a right, being a power secured in order to fill a

position, is simply a part of the fact that such a position is
recognised as instrumental to the common good. It is impossible to
argue that the position may exist, and not be recognised. For we are
speaking of a relation of minds, and, in so far as minds are united
into a single system by their attitudes towards each other, their
“positions” and the recognition of them are one and the same thing.
Their attitude, receptive, co-operative, tolerant, and the like, is so far
a recognition, though not necessarily a reflective recognition.
Probably this is what is intended by those who speak of imitation or
other analogous principles as the ultimate social fact. They do not
mean the repetition of another person’s conduct, though that may
enter in part into the relation of interdependence. They mean the
{212} conscious adoption [1] of an attitude towards others,
embodying the relations between the “positions” which social logic
assigns to each.

[1] To call this imitation is something like calling fine art imitation.
Really, in both cases, we find a re-arrangement and modification of
material, incident to a new expression. The process, if we must
name it, is “relative suggestion” rather than imitation.

(ii.) But then the question of page 210 presses upon us “If we
deny that there can be unrecognised rights, do we not surrender
human freedom to despotism or to popular caprice?”

The sting of this suggestion is taken out when we thoroughly

grasp the idea that recognition is a matter of logic, working on and
through experience, and not of choice or fancy. If my mind has no
attitude to yours, there is no interdependence and I cannot be a
party to securing you rights. You are not, for me, a sharer in a
capacity for a common good, which each of us inevitably respects. A
dog or a tree may be an instrument to the good life, and it may
therefore be right to treat it in a certain way, but it cannot be a
subject of rights. If my mind has an attitude to yours, then there is
certainly a recognition between us, and the nature of that
recognition and what it involves are matters for reasoning and for
the appeal to experience. It is idle for me, for instance, to
communicate with you by language or to buy and sell with you,
perhaps even idle to go to war with you, [1] and still to say that I
recognise no capacity in you for a common good. My behaviour is
then inconsistent with itself, and the question takes the form what
rights are involved {213} in the recognition of you which experience
demonstrates. No person and no society is consistent with itself, and
the proof and amendment of their inconsistency is always possible.
And, one inconsistency being amended, the path is opened to
progress by the emergence of another. If slaves come to be
recognised as free but not as citizens, this of itself opens a road by
which the new freeman may make good his claim that it is an
inconsistency not to recognise him as a citizen.

[1] As distinct from hunting. We do not go to war with lions and

tigers.

But no right can be founded on my mere desire to do what I like.

[1] The wish for this is the sting of the claim to unrecognised rights,
and this wish is to be met, as the fear that our view might lead to
despotism was met. The matter is one of fact and logic, not of
fancies and wishes. If I desire to assert an unrecognised right, I
must show what “position” involves it, and how that position asserts
itself in the system of recognitions which is the social mind, and my
point can only be established universally with regard to a certain
type of position, and not merely for myself as a particular A or B. In
other words, I must show that the alleged right is a requirement of
the realisation of capacities for good, and, further, that it does not
demand a sacrifice of capacities now being realised, out of
proportion to the capacities which it would enable to assert
themselves. I must show, in short, that in so far as the claim in
question is not secured by the State, Society is inconsistent with
itself, and falls short of being what it professes to be, an organ of
good life. And all my showing gives no right, till it has {214}
modified the law. To maintain a right against the State by force or
disobedience is rebellion, and, in considering the duty of rebellion,
we have to set the whole value of the existence of social order
against the importance of the matter in which we think Society
defective. There can hardly be a duty to rebellion in a State in which
law can be altered by constitutional process.

[1] Green, Principles of Political Obligation, p. 149.

The State-maintained system of rights, then, in its relation to the

normal self and will of ordinary citizens with their varying moods of
enthusiasm and indolence, may be compared to the automatic
action of a human body. Automatic actions are such as we perform
in walking, eating, dressing, playing the piano or riding the bicycle.
They have been formed by consciousness, and are of a character
subservient to its purposes, and obedient to its signals. As a rule,
they demand no effort of attention, and in this way attention is
economised and enabled to devote itself to problems which demand
its intenser efforts. They are relegated to automatism because they
are uniform, necessary, and external—“external” in the sense
explained above, that the way in which they are required makes it
enough if they are done, whatever their motives, or with no motives
at all.

By far the greater bulk of the system of rights is related in this

way to normal consciousness. We may pay taxes, abstain from fraud
and assault, use the roads and the post-office, and enjoy our general
security, without knowing that we are doing or enjoying anything
that demands special attention. Partly, of course, attention is being
given by other consciousnesses to maintaining the securities and
{215} facilities of our life. Even so, the arrangement is automatic in
so far as there is no reason for arousing the general attention in
respect to it; but to a varying extent it is automatic throughout, and
engrained in the system and habits of the whole people. We are all
supposed to know the whole law. Not even a judge has it all in his
knowledge at any one time; but the meaning is that it roughly
expresses our habits, and we live according to it without great
difficulty, and expect each other to do so. This automatism is not
harmful, but absolutely right and necessary, so long as we relegate
to it only “external” matters; i.e. such as are necessary to be done,
motive or no motive, in some way which can be generally laid down.
Thus used, it is an indispensable condition of progress. It represents
the ground won and settled by our civilisation, and leaves us free to
think and will such matters as have their value in and through being
thought and willed rightly. If we try to relegate these to automatism,
then moral and intellectual death has set in.

But if the system of rights is automatic, how can it rest on

recognition? Automatic actions, we must remember, are still of a
texture, so to speak, continuous with consciousness. “Recognition”
expresses very fairly our habitual attitude towards them in ourselves
and others. We might think, for example, of the system of habits
and expectations which forms our household routine. We go through
it for the most part automatically, while “recognising” the “position”
of those who share it with us, and respecting the life which is its
end. At points here and there in which it {216} affects the deeper
possibilities of our being, our attention becomes active, and we
assert our position with enthusiasm and conscientiousness. Our
attitude to the social system of rights is something like this. The
whole order has our habitual recognition; we are aware of and
respect more or less the imperative end on which it rests—the claim
of a common good upon us all. Within the framework of this order
there is room for all degrees of laxity and conscientiousness; but, in
any case, it is only at certain points, which either concern our special
capacity or demand readjustment in the general interest, that
intense active attention is possible or desirable.

The view here taken of automatism and attention in the social

whole impairs neither the unity of intelligence throughout society nor
the individual’s recognition of this unity as a self liable to be opposed
to his usual self. As to the former point, every individual mind shows
exactly the same phenomena, of a continuum largely automatic, and
thoroughly alive only in certain regions, connected, but not
thoroughly coherent. As to the latter point, permeation of the
individual by the habits of social automatism does not prevent, but
rather gives material for, his tendency to abstract himself from the
whole, and to frame an attitude for himself inconsistent with his true
“position,” against which tendency the imperative recognition of his
true self has constantly to be exerted.

7. We have finally to deal with the actual application by the State

of its ultimate resource for the maintenance of rights, viz., force.
Superior force may be exercised upon human nature both {217} by
rewards and by punishments. In both respects its exercise by the
State would fall generally within the lines of automatism; that is to
say, it would be a case of the promotion of an end by means other
than the influence of an idea of that end upon the will. But, owing to
the subtle continuity of human nature throughout all its phases, we
shall find that there is something more than this to be said, and that
the idea of the end is operative in a peculiar way just where the
agencies that promote it appear to be most alien and mechanical. In
so far as this is the case, the general theory of the negative
character of State action has to be modified, as we foresaw, [1] by
the theory of punishment. Prima facie, however, it is true that
reward and punishment belong to the automatic element of social
life. They arise in no direct relation of the will to the end. They are a
reaction of the automatic system, instrumental to the end, against a
friction or obstacle which intrudes upon it, or (in the case of
rewards) upon the opposite of a friction or obstacle. There is no
object in pressing a comparison into every detail; but perhaps, as
social and individual automatism do really bear the same kind of
relation to consciousness, it may be pointed out that reward and
punishment correspond in some degree to the pleasures and pains
of a high-class secondary automatism, say of riding or of reading,
i.e. of something specially conducive to enhanced life. Such activities
bring pleasure when unimpeded, and pain when sharply interrupted
by a start or blunder which jars upon us. Putting this latter case in
language which {218} carries out the analogy to punishment, we
might say that the formed habit of action, unconsciously or semi-
consciously relevant to the end or fuller life, is obstructed by some
partial start of mind, and their conflict is accompanied with
recognition, pain, and vexation. “What a fool I was,” we exclaim, “to
ride carelessly at that corner,” or “to let that plan for a holiday
interrupt me in my morning’s reading.”

[1] P. 189.

It may seem remarkable that reward plays a small and apparently

decreasing part in the self-management of society by the public
power. To the naïve Athenian, [1] it seemed a natural instrument for
the encouragement of public spirit, probably rather by a want of
discrimination between motives than by a real belief in political