Democracy Index 2024

Democracy Index 2024

What’s wrong with representative democracy?

What’s wrong with representative democracy?

1 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Contents
5 List of tables and charts
6 Overview
22 2024 highlights
27 What to watch in 2025
29 What’s wrong with representative democracy?
39 Democracy around the regions
84 Appendix
90 Further reading

4 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

List of tables and charts

Chart: Charting democracy’s ups and downs, 2006 to 2024
Table 1. Democracy Index 2024, by regime type
Chart: Democracy Index categories, 2008-24
Chart: Democracy Index 2024, global map by regime type
Table 2. Democracy Index 2024
Chart: Top ten upgrades and downgrades
Chart: Satisfaction with democracy
Chart: 2024: the biggest election year in history
Chart: Developed countries mired in government distrust
Chart: Party membership in Europe
Table 3. Democracy across the regions
Table 4. Western Europe 2024
Chart: Western Europe
Table 5. North America 2024
Chart: US & Canada
Table 6. Latin America 2024
Chart: Latin America
Table 7. Eastern Europe & Central Asia 2024
Chart: Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Table 8. Asia & Australasia 2024
Chart: Asia and Australasia
Table 9. Sub-Saharan Africa 2024
Chart: Sub-Saharan Africa
Table 10. Middle East 2024
Chart: Middle East and North Africa

5 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Overview
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s categories: electoral process and
Democracy Index provides a pluralism, functioning of government,
snapshot of the state of democracy political participation, political
in 165 independent states and two culture, and civil liberties. Based on
territories. This covers almost the its scores on a range of indicators
entire population of the world and within these categories, each
the vast majority of the world’s country is classified as one of four
states (microstates are excluded). types of regime: “full democracy”,
Scored on a 0-10 scale, the “flawed democracy”, “hybrid regime”
Democracy Index is based on five or “authoritarian regime”.

Democracy isn’t working

This edition of the Democracy populist backlash tells us that
Index examines the state of representative democracy has
global democracy in 2024. The not been working satisfactorily
focus of this year’s report is why for some time. Furthermore, the
representative democracy is not reaction of many mainstream parties
working for large numbers of and governments has been to do
citizens around the world. There everything in their power to keep
is a growing consensus that the the populists out and to present
democratic model developed over them as illegitimate or even a threat
the past century is in trouble, but to democracy. As a consequence,
there is less clarity about why the main problem confronting our
people are so disenchanted with democracies is often identified as
their democracies. In 2024, when one of populism, rather than the
countries inhabited by more than deficiencies of our “representative”
half of the global population went to systems. With notable exceptions,
the polls, popular disaffection with much of the discussion of
the performance of government democracy problematises populism
was expressed in an anti-incumbent rather than addressing the
backlash and rising support for underlying issues that have given
populist insurgents. rise to populist movements.

Some may argue that the success In our Democracy Index, we can see
at the polls of insurgent parties that there is a dichotomy between
and the ousting of mainstream the high scores recorded by many
parties proves that representative countries in the top half of the global
democracy is working well. This rankings—which possess the formal
is overall a positive phenomenon, institutions, processes and legal
but the longevity and scale of the prerequisites of democracy—and the

6 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

low esteem in which many citizens challenging the status quo, as long
hold their democratic systems. as they do so by democratic means.
This widespread disaffection with They may not appear to have all the
the functioning of democracy is answers to the pressing issues of our
evident in the survey data which time, but they are at least connecting
the index draws upon across with marginalised sections of the
several categories. Paying attention electorate and meeting a demand for
to the survey data is crucial for representation from citizens who feel
understanding the sources of that they do not have a voice.
popular dissatisfaction with the
state of democracy today. In our annual “Democracy in focus”
essay, we look in depth at the factors
It is clear that having formal that are causing people to lose faith
democratic institutions is not in representative democracy (see
enough to sustain public support, page 29). We try to go beyond merely
especially if those institutions have discussing the symptoms of this
been hollowed out and decision- long-standing democratic malaise, to
making is outsourced to non-elected identify and analyse the underlying
bodies. Governments and political drivers of public dissatisfaction with
parties in many democracies have the status quo. In this endeavour
become estranged from citizens we are revisiting a theme we first
and as a consequence are no longer addressed in our 2016 report,
responsive to their concerns. The “Revenge of the deplorables”, in
quality of a democracy can be which we presented a multi-faceted
measured by the degree to which explanation of the events of that year,
governments consult the public including the Brexit vote in the UK,
on the important issues of the day. the populist insurgency in Europe
However, in many of the advanced and the election of Donald Trump in
democracies, the established the US. We hope that, eight years
practice has been to exclude the later, we can build on that analysis to
public from having a role in debating provide a fuller understanding of the
these questions. Little wonder that drivers of discontent with democracy
large numbers of citizens do not think around the world.
that democracy, as it is currently
organised in many developed The problems we discuss are not
democracies, is working for them. new, but they have arguably reached
a tipping point, beyond which it
That democracy is not working well becomes more difficult to resolve
in many of the world’s democracies them. So our essay also discusses
has been clear for some time. The what needs to change to make our
rise of populist political alternatives political systems truly representative
over the past decade is an expression and restore public trust in democracy.
of a problem with the mainstream A failure to fix our democracies will
parties that have been in power for not only have negative domestic
the past 75 years and the political political consequences, it will also
systems they have developed. There embolden autocrats everywhere
is nothing undemocratic about and demoralise those fighting for
new, anti-establishment parties democracy around the globe.

7 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Charting democracy’s ups 5.60

and downs, 2006 to 2024
5.50
Global average Democracy Index
score out of 10 (10=best)
5.40

5.30

5.20

5.10
Source: EIU. 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

The 2024 index results

Four years after the start of the 167 covered by the index either
covid-19 pandemic, which led to worsened or made no improvement.
a rollback of freedoms around the
globe, the 2024 results point to a The number of countries classified
continuing democratic malaise. Only as democracies decreased by
a minority of countries (37) improved three compared with 2023, to 71,
their index score in 2024, and the and the overall index score fell
margin of improvement for most was to 5.17, down from 5.23 in 2023.
small and often from a low base. A This is a fairly small decline of
far larger number (83) registered 0.06 points, on the same scale as
a decline in their score, and some that recorded between 2022 and
of these deteriorations were 2023. The average score for the
substantial. The scores for the other 71 democracies remained the same,
47 countries stayed the same. That which was disappointing given that
means that the quality of democracy 2024 was a huge election year
in 130 countries of the total of which might have been expected

Table 1
Democracy Index 2024, by regime type
% of world
No. of countries % of countries
population
Full democracies 25 15.0 6.6
Flawed democracies 46 27.5 38.4
Hybrid regimes 36 21.6 15.7
Authoritarian regimes 60 35.9 39.2
Note. “World” population refers to the total population of the 167 geographies (165 countries and 2
territories) covered by the Index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire
estimated world population.

Source: EIU.

8 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

to deliver an improvement in the countries and territories covered by

overall index score. However, as the Democracy Index are classified
in 2023 it is important to note as democracies. This is six fewer
that the regression in the index in than in 2014. Of the remaining
2024 was not driven by the world’s 96 countries in our index, 36 are
democracies. The decline was the classified as “hybrid regimes”,
result of a further worsening in the combining elements of electoral
average score for the “authoritarian democracy with authoritarian
regimes”. This trend of recent behaviours.
years appears to confirm that
“authoritarian regimes” tend to In 2024, the good news was that the
become even more authoritarian number of “full democracies” (those
as time goes on. The inclination scoring at least 8.00 out of 10) rose
of autocratic rulers is not to meet by one to 25. However, the number
popular aspirations for change of “flawed democracies” fell by four,
by democratising aspects of their from 50 in 2023 to 46 in 2024. So
political systems, but to dig in and overall, three fewer countries were
crack down harder on any sign of classified as democracies in 2024
dissent. They also appear to be compared with 2023.
learning from each other about how
best to protect themselves and The Democracy Index is a “thick”
neutralise opposition. measure of democracy that
assesses each country across five
The entrenchment of authoritarian categories—electoral process and
rule around the world appears to pluralism, functioning of government,
be borne out by the results of the political participation, political
Democracy Index in recent years. culture, and civil liberties. The
According to our index, more than chart on page 10 shows what has
one-third (39.2%) of the world happened to the global average
population live under authoritarian score across these five categories
rule (see Table 1), a share that has of the index between 2008—before
been creeping up in recent years. the onset of the global financial
Sixty countries are now classified as crisis—and 2024.
“authoritarian regimes”, an increase
of one compared with the 2023 The categories that have recorded
index, and up from 52 a decade ago the biggest deteriorations since
in 2014. 2008 are civil liberties (-1.00 on a
0-10 scale) and electoral process
The advance of authoritarianism is and pluralism (-0.66), which are the
mirrored in the retreat of democracy. building blocks of democracy. The
Today less than half of the world’s scores for functioning of government
population live in a democracy of and political culture fell by 0.47 and
some sort (45%), compared with 0.48 respectively during this period.
48% in 2014. Only 6.6% reside The exception to the general rule of
in a “full democracy”, down from worsening scores is the performance
12.5% in 2014; since then, the of the political participation measure:
US and several other countries the global average score for this
have been downgraded to “flawed category improved by 0.74 between
democracies”. Today, 71 of the 167 2008 and 2024.

9 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

The improvement reflects an developing economies, providing a

upsurge of popular engagement in powerful counter-narrative to the
politics in developed democracies narrative of democratic decline.
and waves of political protests in

What were the main drivers

of decline in 2024?
In 2024, the two categories that rulers had to make way for political
registered the biggest declines insurgents. However, many elections
were functioning of government were not free and fair and other
and electoral process and pluralism. prerequisites of democracy, such as
The latter score declined by 0.08 freedom of speech and association,
compared with 2023, which was were absent. In some countries, the
especially disappointing given authorities cancelled scheduled
that so many countries went to elections without good cause. After
the polls in 2024. According to a mega election year, the score
our calculations, 75 countries held for electoral process and pluralism
elections that were national in declined in every region except
scope, including eight of the ten western Europe and North America.
most populous countries in the
world (Bangladesh, Brazil, India, The functioning of government
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia category registered a 0.13-point
and the US). In the section entitled decline in 2024. This is the lowest-
“What’s wrong with representative scoring category of the index
democracy” we discuss the results by some margin, with a global
of this election extravaganza, which average score of 4.53. This poor
delivered some positive outcomes performance is the result of core
amid an anti-incumbent backlash. weaknesses afflicting democratic
In many countries, voters ejected systems, developed and developing
governments that had not delivered, alike, which are captured by the
and long-ruling political parties and 14 indicators in this category of

Democracy Index categories, 6.5

2008-24
6.0
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Civil liberties
5.5
Electoral process and pluralism
Functioning of government
Political culture 5.0
Political participation
4.5

4.0
Source: EIU. 2008 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

10 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

the index. Gridlock, dysfunction, points in Sub-Saharan Africa; and

corruption, insufficient transparency by 0.06 points in the Middle East
and a lack of accountability have and North Africa. The deterioration
undermined public confidence in the political participation score
in governments, political parties since 2022 may turn out to be a
and politicians. In many countries, blip, but it may also herald a trend
powerful interest groups and the in some places of abstention and
wealthy exert significant influence. disengagement in response to rising
Governments outsource decision- disappointment with democracy.
making to non-elected bodies,
including central banks and courts. The political culture category,
Citizens increasingly feel that comprising eight indicators, mostly
they do not have control over their based on World Values Survey or
governments. As a result, popular other survey data and measuring
trust in democratic institutions has things such as the degree of
been in decline for many years and popular support for democracy, the
has reached the stage where many military or expert rule, registered
question whether democracy is a 0.01-point improvement in 2024
able to deliver good results. North compared with 2023. Improvements
America was the only region to avoid in this category in Europe, east
a further decline in its score in this and west, and to a lesser degree in
category in 2024. This partly reflects Sub-Saharan Africa, offset declines
the already low score of 6.43 for the of greater to lesser magnitudes in
US, which is the lowest-scoring of all Latin America and the Caribbean,
the developed democracies in this the Middle East and North Africa,
category. and Asia and Australasia. In some
regions, support for strong leaders
In 2024 the global average political is rooted in history and tradition. In
participation score declined by the others, frustration with dysfunctional
smallest possible margin of 0.01 political systems has led more
to 5.33. However, since 2022 the people to embrace non-democratic
category score has fallen from alternatives. This can take the
an all-time high of 5.44 in that form of support for technocratic
year, pointing to a hiatus in the governance or rule by strongmen.
general trend of increased political According to some surveys, there
participation since 2010. The 2024 is also increasing evidence of a
decline was not universal across generational divide, with younger
all regions: in eastern Europe and cohorts more open to contemplating
Central Asia and in Latin America non-democratic alternatives. The
and the Caribbean the regional weakening of popular attachment to
score in this category edged up. democracy is reflected in the decline
North America has a political in the average global score for the
participation score of 8.89, a rarely political culture category between
celebrated positive feature of US 2008 and 2024, from 5.73 to 5.25.
democracy, and this did not change
in 2024. The regional average score The global average score for the
in this category fell by a modest 0.02 civil liberties category declined by
points in both Asia and Australasia 0.04 points in 2024. There were
and in western Europe; by 0.03 significant declines in Asia (-0.16)

11 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

and in Latin America (-0.11) and global average score improved by

lesser ones in eastern Europe 0.08 points, a downward trend
(-0.05) and Sub-Saharan Africa has resumed. The category has
(-0.04). The category score has still 17 indicators, many of them related
not recovered from the precipitous to freedom of expression, an area in
decline recorded during the which there has been a significant
covid-19 pandemic of 2020-21, decline across all regions in
when governments responded to recent years. Infringement of free
the coronavirus threat with national speech and media freedoms, and
lockdowns and an unprecedented attempts to censor social media, are
withdrawal of liberties. After a among the most serious threats to
partial rebound in 2022, when the democracy.

What happened to democracy

around the regions in 2024?
The decline in the overall index points), and North America, whose
score was driven by reversals in score stayed the same. The other
every region of the world with the five regions registered a decline in
exceptions of western Europe, their average index score, with the
whose average index score improved biggest regressions occurring in
by the smallest margin possible (0.01 the Middle East and North Africa

DemocracyIndex
Democracy Index2024,
2024,global
globalmap
mapbybyregime
regimetype
type
Democracy Index 2024, global map by regime type

Hong
Hong Kong
Kong

Singapore
Singapore

Mauritius
Mauritius

Overall
Overall score
score
Scores 0-10
Scores 0-10 (10=best)
(10=best)
Full democracies
Full democracies Flawed
Flawed democracies
democracies Hybrid
Hybrid regimes
regimes Authoritarian
Authoritarian regimes
regimes
9.0
9.0 –– 10.0
10.0 8.0
8.0 –– 9.0
9.0 7.0 –– 8.0
7.0 8.0 6.0
6.0 –– 7.0
7.0 5.0 –– 6.0
5.0 6.0 4.0
4.0 –– 5.0
5.0 3.0 –– 4.0
3.0 4.0 2.0
2.0 –– 3.0
3.0 00 –– 2.0
2.0 No data
No data
Source:
Source: EIU.
EIU.

12 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

(-0.11) and Asia and Australasia his position became untenable.

(-0.10). The score for Latin America There were positive developments
and the Caribbean fell by 0.07, the in the US in 2024, not least the
ninth consecutive year of democratic high levels of political engagement
backsliding in the region. Eastern and the smooth running of the
Europe and Central Asia and election. However, the political
Sub-Saharan Africa registered and structural problems that
modest declines in their average caused the US to be downgraded
index scores, of -0.02 and -0.04 to a “flawed democracy” in 2016
points respectively, after positive (a downgrade that pre-dated the
developments in some countries inauguration of Donald Trump as
were more than offset by negative president in January 2017) persist.
events elsewhere. The regional These include low levels of trust in
results are presented briefly below, political institutions and the media;
and are discussed in greater detail institutional gridlock; excessive
later in the report (see page 39). influence of lobbyists, interest
groups and the mega-rich; sharp
Despite being the highest-ranking economic and social inequalities;
region in the world, and the only and an absence of social consensus
region whose average score has on core national values.
recovered to pre-pandemic levels,
western Europe is home to large The decline in the average index
swathes of discontented citizens score for Latin America and the
who are increasingly turning to anti- Caribbean in 2024 was less
mainstream parties. This was amply precipitous than in recent years.
demonstrated in the many elections However, the health of democracy
that took place across the continent in the region is in a parlous state.
in 2024, which were characterised Only five of the 24 countries covered
by a backlash against incumbents by the index improved their scores,
and rising support for anti- 17 suffered reversals and two
establishment and populist parties. stagnated. One of the most worrying
Only five of the 21 countries covered developments is increased popular
by the index managed to improve support for rule by strongmen despite
their overall score in 2024, while six their disregard for democratic
regressed and ten stagnated. norms and institutions. Support for
politicians such as Nayib Bukele in
Similar problems pertain in North El Salvador, who won re-election by a
America—comprising Canada and landslide in 2024, shows that voters
the US—where public disaffection are prepared to trade democratic
with the political status quo is standards for security. The region’s
pronounced. In 2024 the regional traditionally weak political culture,
score remained unchanged, having the index category for which it has
slumped in 2023 because of the worst score of any region (3.91),
developments in Canada, whose suggests that the experience of
score fell by 0.19 points in that year El Salvador could be repeated in
as trust in government plummeted. other countries whose functioning of
Canada’s increasingly unpopular government has been in steep decline
prime minister, Justin Trudeau, in recent years.
finally resigned in early 2025 when

13 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Eastern Europe and Central Asia expense of democratic renewal.

suffered the mildest regression of
any region, with its average index Sub-Saharan Africa suffered a minor
score declining by 0.02 points, to democratic reversal in 2024, with
5.35. The region has now overtaken the average regional score falling
Asia and Australasia (5.31) to by 0.04 points to 4.00. Overall, it
become the fourth most democratic was a year of decline and stasis for
region in the world. It was an much of the region. Almost half of
eventful year in the region, during its 44 countries recorded a decline
which 13 countries experienced a in their scores (20) and the scores
deterioration in their index score, for 17 stayed the same. Only seven
ten improved their scores and five countries improved their index
registered no change. Two countries scores. In a welcome change from
were upgraded from “flawed recent years, there were no coups
democracies” to “full democracies” in the region in 2024, but there
(the Czech Republic and Estonia), was a consolidation of military
but Romania was downgraded from power in several countries that
a “flawed democracy” to a “hybrid had experienced military takeovers
regime”, having been on a downward in recent years. In a big election
trajectory for some years. year, the ballot box delivered some
significant transfers of power,
Asia and Australasia’s average index including in Senegal, and some
score declined from 5.41 to 5.31 in examples of incumbents having
2024, marking a sixth consecutive to share power (South Africa).
year of decline or stasis. More than However, there were also plenty
half of the 28 countries in the region of cases of long-standing rulers
recorded a decline in their scores continuing to hold on to power,
(15), and only seven improved their often by anti-democratic means (for
scores. Bangladesh suffered the example, Mozambique).
biggest regression of any country
in the world—its score fell by 1.44 The index score for the lowest-
points to 4.44—and Pakistan and ranking region, the Middle East
South Korea were also among the and North Africa, sank to 3.12 in
top ten worst performers in the 2024, from 3.23 in 2023. Reversals
index in 2024, based on significant in Kuwait, Tunisia and Qatar were
downgrades in their index scores. the main drivers of this 0.11-point
It was a big election year in Asia, decline. Israel is an outlier in the
with some of the most populous region, classified as a “flawed
countries in the world—India, democracy”, the only one in the
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Japan, the region. A dozen of the 20 countries
Philippines and Thailand, accounting covered by the index recorded
for 2.5bn of the world population a deterioration in their scores in
of 8.2bn—going to the polls. In 2024 and five stagnated. Only
most cases, incumbents remained three countries—Jordan, Libya and
in power, despite facing a popular the UAE—improved their scores.
rebuke in some places, with some Experiments in representative
countries showing worrying signs of democracy are limited and few in
perpetuating dynastic power at the the region, and even some of these

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

went into reverse in 2024, with tentative signs of reconciliation

Kuwait and Qatar being cases in among the military factions. The fall
point. War and conflict continued of the Assad regime in Syria towards
to take a toll, especially in Sudan, the end of the year heralded the
whose score sank lower. There prospect of political change in that
were some positive developments beleaguered country, but for the
in Libya, with a reduction in militia moment there remains only a power
feuding, improved security and vacuum and political uncertainty.

Table 2
Democracy Index 2024
Change in I Electoral
Overall II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
Rank rank from process and
score of government participation culture liberties
previous year pluralism
Full democracy
Norway 9.81 1 0 10.00 9.64 10.00 10.00 9.41
New Zealand 9.61 2 0 10.00 9.29 10.00 8.75 10.00
Sweden 9.39 3 1 9.58 9.64 8.33 10.00 9.41
Iceland 9.38 4 -1 10.00 8.93 8.89 9.38 9.71
Switzerland 9.32 5 3 9.58 9.29 8.33 10.00 9.41
Finland 9.30 6 -1 10.00 9.64 7.78 9.38 9.71
Denmark 9.28 7 -1 10.00 9.29 8.33 9.38 9.41
Ireland 9.19 8 -1 10.00 8.21 8.33 10.00 9.41
Netherlands 9.00 9 0 9.58 8.93 8.33 8.75 9.41
Luxembourg 8.88 10 1 10.00 9.29 6.67 8.75 9.71
Australia 8.85 11 3 10.00 8.57 7.22 8.75 9.71
Taiwan 8.78 12 -2 10.00 8.57 7.78 8.13 9.41
Germany 8.73 13 -1 9.58 8.21 8.33 8.13 9.41
Canada 8.69 14 -1 10.00 8.21 8.89 7.50 8.82
Uruguay 8.67 15 -1 10.00 9.29 7.78 6.88 9.41
Japan 8.48 16 0 9.58 8.93 6.67 8.13 9.12
United Kingdom 8.34 17 1 9.58 7.50 8.33 6.88 9.41
Costa Rica 8.29 18 -1 9.58 7.50 7.78 6.88 9.71
Austria 8.28 19 -1 9.58 7.50 8.89 6.88 8.53
Mauritius 8.23 20 0 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.75 8.82
Estonia 8.13 21= 6 10.00 8.57 6.67 6.88 8.53

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 2
Democracy Index 2024
Change in I Electoral
Overall II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
Rank rank from process and
score of government participation culture liberties
previous year pluralism
Spain 8.13 21= 2 9.58 7.50 7.22 7.50 8.82
Czech Republic 8.08 23= 3 9.58 6.43 7.78 7.50 9.12
Portugal 8.08 23= 8 9.58 7.14 6.11 8.75 8.82
Greece 8.07 25 -5 10.00 6.79 7.22 7.50 8.82
Flawed democracy
France 7.99 26 -3 9.58 7.50 7.78 6.88 8.24
Malta 7.93 27 1 9.17 7.14 6.67 8.13 8.53
United States of
7.85 28 1 9.17 6.43 8.89 6.25 8.53
America
Chile 7.83 29 -4 9.58 7.86 6.67 5.63 9.41
Slovenia 7.82 30 1 9.58 7.50 7.22 6.25 8.53
Israel 7.80 31 -1 9.58 7.50 9.44 6.88 5.59
South Korea 7.75 32 -10 9.58 7.50 7.22 5.63 8.82
Latvia 7.66 33 4 10.00 7.14 6.67 6.25 8.24
Belgium 7.64 34 2 9.58 8.21 5.00 6.88 8.53
Botswana 7.63 35 -2 9.58 6.43 6.11 7.50 8.53
Lithuania 7.59 36 3 10.00 7.14 6.67 5.63 8.53
Cabo Verde 7.58 37= -2 9.17 6.64 6.67 6.88 8.53
Italy 7.58 37= -3 9.58 7.14 7.22 6.88 7.06
Poland 7.40 39 2 10.00 6.43 6.67 6.25 7.65
Cyprus 7.38 40 -3 9.17 5.36 6.67 6.88 8.82
India 7.29 41 0 8.67 7.50 7.22 6.88 6.18
Slovakia 7.21 42 2 10.00 6.07 6.11 5.63 8.24
South Africa 7.16 43 4 9.17 6.79 7.78 5.00 7.06
Malaysia 7.11 44 -4 9.58 7.14 6.67 6.25 5.88
Trinidad and Tobago 7.09 45 -2 9.58 6.79 6.11 5.63 7.35
Timor-Leste 7.03 46 -1 9.58 6.07 5.56 6.88 7.06
Panama 6.84 47 1 9.58 5.71 7.22 3.75 7.94
Suriname 6.79 48 1 9.58 5.36 6.67 5.00 7.35

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 2
Democracy Index 2024
Change in I Electoral
Overall II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
Rank rank from process and
score of government participation culture liberties
previous year pluralism
Jamaica 6.74 49 -4 8.75 6.43 5.00 5.00 8.53
Montenegro 6.73 50 2 8.75 7.14 6.67 3.75 7.35
Philippines 6.63 51 2 8.75 4.64 8.33 4.38 7.06
Dominican Republic 6.62 52 9 9.17 5.00 7.22 4.38 7.35
Mongolia 6.53 53 6 8.75 5.71 6.67 5.63 5.88
Argentina 6.51 54= 0 9.17 5.00 6.11 3.75 8.53
Hungary 6.51 54= -4 8.75 5.71 4.44 6.88 6.76
Croatia 6.50 56 2 9.17 6.07 6.11 4.38 6.76
Brazil 6.49 57 -6 9.58 5.00 6.11 5.00 6.76
Namibia 6.48 58 -1 7.42 5.36 6.67 5.00 7.94
Indonesia 6.44 59 -3 7.92 6.79 7.22 5.00 5.29
Colombia 6.35 60 -5 9.17 5.71 6.11 3.13 7.65
Bulgaria 6.34 61 1 8.75 5.36 5.56 4.38 7.65
North Macedonia 6.28 62 10 8.75 6.07 6.11 3.13 7.35
Thailand 6.27 63 0 6.50 5.00 8.33 5.63 5.88
Serbia 6.26 64 0 7.83 5.71 6.67 3.75 7.35
Ghana 6.24 65 0 8.33 4.64 6.11 6.25 5.88
Albania 6.20 66 0 7.00 5.71 5.00 6.25 7.06
Sri Lanka 6.19 67 3 7.00 4.29 7.22 6.25 6.18
Singapore 6.18 68 1 5.33 7.14 4.44 7.50 6.47
Guyana 6.11 69 -2 6.92 6.07 6.11 5.00 6.47
Lesotho 6.06 70 1 9.17 3.79 5.56 5.63 6.18
Moldova 6.04 71 -3 6.50 5.36 7.22 4.38 6.76
Hybrid regime
Romania 5.99 72 -12 8.25 5.36 5.56 3.75 7.06
Papua New Guinea 5.97 73 -1 6.92 6.07 3.89 5.63 7.35
Senegal 5.93 74 9 7.42 5.36 4.44 6.25 6.18
Paraguay 5.92 75 -1 8.33 5.36 6.67 1.88 7.35

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 2
Democracy Index 2024
Change in I Electoral
Overall II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
Rank rank from process and
score of government participation culture liberties
previous year pluralism
Malawi 5.85 76 0 7.00 4.29 5.56 6.25 6.18
Zambia 5.73 77 1 7.92 3.29 5.00 6.88 5.59
Peru 5.69 78 -1 8.75 5.71 5.00 2.50 6.47
Bhutan 5.65 79 2 8.75 5.93 3.89 5.00 4.71
Liberia 5.57 80 -1 7.83 2.71 6.11 5.63 5.59
Fiji 5.39 81 -1 6.58 5.00 4.44 5.63 5.29
Armenia 5.35 82 2 7.92 4.29 6.11 3.13 5.29
Madagascar 5.33 83 4 6.58 3.93 6.11 5.63 4.41
Mexico 5.32 84 6 6.92 5.00 7.22 1.88 5.59
Ecuador 5.24 85 0 8.75 5.00 5.56 1.88 5.00
Tanzania 5.20 86 0 4.42 5.00 5.00 6.88 4.71
Hong Kong 5.09 87 1 2.75 4.00 3.89 6.88 7.94
Bosnia and
5.06 88 6 7.00 3.64 5.00 3.75 5.88
Hercegovina
Kenya 5.05 89 3 3.50 5.36 6.67 5.63 4.12
Honduras 4.98 90 5 8.75 3.93 4.44 2.50 5.29
Morocco 4.97 91 2 5.25 4.29 5.56 5.63 4.12
Ukraine 4.90 92 -1 5.17 2.71 7.22 5.00 4.41
Tunisia 4.71 93 -11 3.42 3.93 5.56 5.63 5.00
Georgia 4.70 94 -5 5.67 3.21 5.56 3.75 5.29
El Salvador 4.61 95 1 6.17 3.21 5.56 3.13 5.00
Nepal 4.60 96 2 4.83 5.36 5.00 2.50 5.29
Guatemala 4.55 97 3 6.08 3.93 5.00 1.88 5.88
Uganda 4.49 98 1 3.42 3.57 3.89 6.88 4.71
Gambia 4.47 99 1 4.42 4.29 3.89 5.63 4.12
Bangladesh 4.44 100= -25 6.08 2.57 5.00 5.00 3.53
Benin 4.44 100= -3 1.75 5.36 4.44 6.25 4.41
Sierra Leone 4.32 102 1 4.83 2.86 3.89 5.00 5.00
Bolivia 4.26 103= 3 4.33 3.93 5.56 1.88 5.59

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 2
Democracy Index 2024
Change in I Electoral
Overall II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
Rank rank from process and
score of government participation culture liberties
previous year pluralism
Turkey 4.26 103= -1 3.50 4.64 6.11 5.00 2.06
Côte d’Ivoire 4.22 105 0 4.33 2.86 4.44 5.63 3.82
Nigeria 4.16 106 -2 5.17 3.57 3.89 3.75 4.41
Angola 4.05 107 0 4.50 2.86 5.56 5.00 2.35
Authoritarian
Mauritania 3.96 108 0 3.50 3.21 5.56 3.13 4.41
Lebanon 3.56 109 3 3.08 0.79 6.67 3.13 4.12
Algeria 3.55 110 0 3.08 2.50 3.33 5.00 3.82
Kyrgyz Republic 3.52 111 -2 3.42 1.86 3.89 3.13 5.29
Palestine 3.44 112 3 1.58 0.00 8.33 3.75 3.53
Mozambique 3.38 113 0 1.67 1.43 5.56 5.00 3.24
Rwanda 3.34 114 3 1.42 4.29 3.33 5.00 2.65
Jordan 3.28 115 7 3.08 2.86 4.44 2.50 3.53
Ethiopia 3.24 116 0 0.42 2.86 6.11 5.63 1.18
Qatar 3.17 117 -6 0.00 3.93 2.78 5.63 3.53
Kazakhstan 3.08 118 2 0.50 3.21 5.00 3.75 2.94
United Arab
3.07 119 6 0.00 4.29 2.78 5.63 2.65
Emirates
Oman 3.05 120 -1 0.08 3.57 2.78 5.00 3.82
Togo 2.99 121 5 0.92 2.14 3.33 5.63 2.94
Zimbabwe 2.98 122 0 0.00 2.50 4.44 5.00 2.94
Cambodia 2.94 123 -2 0.00 2.36 5.00 5.00 2.35
Comoros 2.84 124= -2 0.83 2.21 3.89 3.75 3.53
Pakistan 2.84 124= -6 0.83 4.29 2.78 2.50 3.82
Azerbaijan 2.80 126= 4 0.50 2.50 3.33 5.00 2.65
Iraq 2.80 126= 2 4.83 0.00 6.11 1.88 1.18
Congo (Brazzaville) 2.79 128= 3 0.00 2.50 4.44 3.75 3.24
Egypt 2.79 128= -1 0.42 2.86 3.89 5.00 1.76
Kuwait 2.78 130 -16 0.92 3.21 2.78 3.75 3.24

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 2
Democracy Index 2024
Change in I Electoral
Overall II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
Rank rank from process and
score of government participation culture liberties
previous year pluralism
Haiti 2.74 131 -2 0.00 0.29 2.78 5.63 5.00
Djibouti 2.70 132 2 0.00 1.64 3.89 5.63 2.35
Vietnam 2.62 133 3 0.00 3.93 2.78 3.75 2.65
Eswatini 2.60 134 -2 0.00 1.64 2.78 5.63 2.94
Cuba 2.58 135 0 0.00 2.86 3.33 3.75 2.94
Cameroon 2.56 136 2 0.33 2.14 3.89 4.38 2.06
Burkina Faso 2.55 137 -4 0.00 2.14 3.33 3.75 3.53
Bahrain 2.45 138 1 0.42 2.36 3.33 4.38 1.76
Mali 2.40 139 -2 0.00 0.00 5.00 4.38 2.65
Libya 2.31 140 17 1.25 0.00 3.89 3.75 2.65
Niger 2.26 141 0 0.33 1.14 1.67 3.75 4.41
Venezuela 2.25 142 0 0.00 1.07 5.00 3.13 2.06
Gabon 2.18 143 3 0.83 1.14 2.22 3.75 2.94
Burundi 2.13 144 3 0.00 0.00 3.89 5.00 1.76
China 2.11 145 3 0.00 3.21 3.33 3.13 0.88
Uzbekistan 2.10 146 2 0.00 1.86 2.78 5.00 0.88
Nicaragua 2.09 147 -4 0.00 2.14 2.78 3.75 1.76
Saudi Arabia 2.08 148 2 0.00 3.57 2.22 3.13 1.47
Guinea 2.04 149 -4 0.00 0.43 3.33 4.38 2.06
Guinea-Bissau 2.03 150= -10 2.17 0.00 2.78 3.13 2.06
Russia 2.03 150= -6 0.00 2.14 2.22 3.75 2.06
Belarus 1.99 152 -1 0.00 0.79 3.33 4.38 1.47
Eritrea 1.97 153 -1 0.00 2.14 0.56 6.88 0.29
Iran 1.96 154 -1 0.00 2.50 3.33 2.50 1.47
Yemen 1.95 155 -1 0.00 0.00 3.89 5.00 0.88
Democratic
1.92 156= 4 2.08 0.43 2.78 3.13 1.18
Republic of Congo
Equatorial Guinea 1.92 156= 0 0.00 0.43 3.33 4.38 1.47
Chad 1.89 158 3 0.00 0.00 3.33 3.75 2.35

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 2
Democracy Index 2024
Change in I Electoral
Overall II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
Rank rank from process and
score of government participation culture liberties
previous year pluralism
Tajikistan 1.83 159 -4 0.00 2.21 1.67 4.38 0.88
Laos 1.71 160 -1 0.00 2.86 1.67 3.75 0.29
Turkmenistan 1.66 161 1 0.00 0.79 2.22 5.00 0.29
Sudan 1.46 162 -4 0.00 0.00 1.11 5.63 0.59
Syria 1.32 163 0 0.00 0.00 2.22 4.38 0.00
Central African
1.18 164 0 0.00 0.00 1.67 1.88 2.35
Republic
North Korea 1.08 165 0 0.00 2.50 1.67 1.25 0.00
Myanmar 0.96 166 0 0.00 0.00 1.67 3.13 0.00
Afghanistan 0.25 167 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.00
Source: EIU.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

2024 highlights
What’s wrong with representative
democracy?
Over the past decade, a consensus analysing this dramatic shift in
has formed that the world is the political landscape, some of
experiencing what US democracy which we reference in the Further
scholar Larry Diamond called a Reading section of the Appendix to
“democracy recession”, that began this report (page 84). The drivers
in around 2007 and has persisted of the democracy recession are
ever since. This impression is manifold—geopolitical, economic,
borne out by the results of the political, cultural and social and their
Democracy Index since its launch interaction is complex. In this year’s
in 2006. The overall index score Democracy Index essay, we discuss
has fallen from 5.52 (on a 0-10 the factors that have fuelled popular
scale) in 2006 to 5.17 in 2024. disaffection with political systems
The number of countries classified over the past two decades and have
by our model as democracies has led to the rise of anti-establishment
fallen by eight from 79 in 2006 parties in some countries and to a
to 71 today. Correspondingly, the more pronounced shift away from
number of “authoritarian regimes” democracy in others (see page
has risen from 55 in 2006 to 60; 29). The essay also considers
and the number of “hybrid regimes”, what needs to change to restore
which occupying a “grey zone” popular confidence in representative
between democracy and autocracy, democracy and bring an end to the
has risen from 33 in 2006 to 36 “democratic recession”.
in 2024. There is a rich literature

Regime changes: more than usual

It was an eventful political year and moved up from the “hybrid regime”
this was reflected in the index by classification into the very bottom of
nine changes in regime type, more the “flawed democracies” category
than has been the case for many in 2023, Papua New Guinea and
years. The Czech Republic, Estonia Paraguay, dropped back down in
and Portugal moved up the rankings 2024. They were joined by Romania,
to become “full democracies”. France which fell 12 places in the rankings
and South Korea, by contrast, were after controversially cancelling a
relegated to the “flawed democracy” presidential election, which just
classification. Two countries that edged the Balkan state into the

22 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

“hybrid regime” grouping with a authoritarians, after its score fell

score of 5.99. Finally, Mauritania from 4.14 to 3.96, following low
dropped out of the grey zone at turnout in the presidential election in
the bottom of the “hybrid regime” June 2024 and a downward revision
classification into the ranks of the of the country’s corruption score.

The biggest score changes:

more bad than good
There were more deteriorations movements in scores, as autocracies
than improvements in countries’ dig in and become more entrenched.
index scores in 2024 (see chart, The tendency among countries
Top ten upgrades and downgrades). occupying what we might call a
Unsurprisingly, the biggest changes “grey zone” between democracy
tend to occur in the bottom half and authoritarianism—the “hybrid
of the index rankings, among the regimes”—is to oscillate as they are
“hybrid regimes” and “authoritarian pulled in two directions between
regimes”. The recent trend among pressure to democratise and forces
the latter has been for downward pushing against this.

Top ten upgrades 2024 2023 Difference

and downgrades Libya 2.31 1.78 0.53
Senegal 5.93 5.48 0.45
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Portugal 8.08 7.75 0.34
Latvia 7.66 7.38 0.28
Lithuania 7.59 7.31 0.28
North Macedonia 6.28 6.03 0.25
Democratic Republic of Congo 1.92 1.68 0.24
Jordan 3.28 3.04 0.24
Chad 1.89 1.67 0.22
Poland 7.40 7.18 0.21
Jamaica 6.74 7.06 −0.32
South Korea 7.75 8.09 −0.34
Pakistan 2.84 3.25 −0.41
Guinea-Bissau 2.03 2.45 −0.43
Romania 5.99 6.45 −0.46
Qatar 3.17 3.65 −0.48
Georgia 4.70 5.20 −0.51
Kuwait 2.78 3.50 −0.72
Tunisia 4.71 5.51 −0.80
Source: EIU. Bangladesh 4.44 5.87 −1.44

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Bangladesh registered the biggest scores slumped in 2024 included

score change of any country in Kuwait, Georgia, Qatar, Romania,
2024, a negative 1.44 points on Pakistan and Guinea-Bissau.
the 0-10 index scale, following
a rigged election, the ousting of By contrast, improvements in
the prime minister and political country scores in 2024 compared
unrest. It dropped 25 places in the with 2023 were much more modest.
rankings to joint 100th out of 167. As inter-factional fighting receded
It remains a “hybrid regime” but is somewhat, Libya recorded the
much closer to the lower end of the biggest improvement, of 0.53 points,
classification now. Tunisia, once a but from a very low base. Opposition
democracy bright-spot in the Middle victories in parliamentary and
East and North Africa region in the presidential elections in Senegal led
wake of the Arab spring of 2010- to a 0.45-point improvement in the
12, registered the second-largest country’s index score, to 5.93, taking
deterioration in 2024. Its overall it closer to the threshold of 6.00
index score fell by 0.80 points, to to qualify as a “flawed democracy”.
4.71, and it dropped 11 places in the Score changes were more modest
global rankings and now sits closer among other improvers such as
to the bottom than the top of the Portugal, Latvia and Jordan, but
“hybrid regimes” classification. This were sufficient to move Portugal into
was the result of more democratic the “full democracy” classification.
backsliding under the presidency of Detailed analysis of country and
Kais Said, who effectively disbarred regional developments can be found
any genuine challengers to his rule in the section entitled “Democracy
in the October 2024 presidential around the regions” (page 39).
election. Other countries whose

Glass half full? What happened in

the 2024 “votequake”?
In 2024 countries inhabited by cancelled, including in Burkina Faso,
around 4.2bn people, more than Guinea-Bissau, Kuwait, Mali and
half the world’s population, held Romania, and there were dozens of
elections. With more than 70 examples of elections being unfree
countries going to the polls—among and unfair. There was no shortage of
them eight of the ten most populous ballot-rigging in countries that call
countries in the world (Bangladesh, themselves democracies but have
Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, all the hallmarks of autocracies. In
Pakistan, Russia and the US)—it many of these, including Azerbaijan,
was the biggest election year since Bangladesh, Belarus, Iran,
the advent of universal suffrage. Mozambique, Pakistan, Russia and
So did this election extravaganza Venezuela, authoritarian regimes
strike a blow for democracy globally? used every tool at their disposal to
About half a dozen elections were remain in power. However, there

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

were also dozens of elections that the performance of incumbents

showed the potential of electoral by voting for insurgent parties, the
democracy to bring about change ballot box is acting as a safety valve
according to the will of voters. and electoral democracy is surely
The most striking theme of this doing what it should be doing. The
mega election year was a voter real problems go much deeper and
backlash against incumbents. relate to the persistent failure of
Many incumbents were voted out the mainstream political parties in
of office or lost vote share, forcing many democratic countries to satisfy
them into coalitions. Some have their citizens on key issues of the
interpreted this in a negative economy, immigration, education,
light, especially because many health, infrastructure and more.
elections strengthened populist These issues are explored in more
and radical anti-establishment depth in the essay “What’s wrong
parties. However, insofar as voters with representative democracy?” on
expressed their dissatisfaction with page 29.

Nordics lead the field

The Nordic countries (Norway, pluralism, political culture, and
Iceland, Sweden, Finland and political participation. Countries
Denmark) continue to dominate in Europe account for nine of
the Democracy Index rankings, the top ten places in the global
taking five of the top seven spots, democracy rankings and 17 of the
with New Zealand claiming second 25 nations (68%) classified as “full
place and Switzerland moving up democracies”. Western Europe
to fifth. Norway remains the top- has the highest index score of any
ranked country in the Democracy region, at 8.38, and was the only one
Index, thanks to high scores across to improve its overall score in 2024,
all five categories of the index, albeit marginally.
especially electoral process and

After a decade-long drought,

eastern Europe gains two full
democracies
Not since the Czech Republic was Republic and Estonia moved up the
demoted to a “flawed democracy” rankings into the “full democracy”
in 2014 has eastern Europe and camp. Slovenia is the next closest
Central Asia had a “full democracy”. east European country in the
Now it has two, after the Czech global rankings, with a score of

25 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

7.82, putting it in 30th position, of western Europe, both regions

among the better-performing perform far less well in terms of
“flawed democracies”. The addition functioning of government and
of two of its countries to the “full political culture. These weaknesses
democracies” puts eastern Europe are difficult to address and have
on a par with Latin America, which tended to become more acute
also has only two countries in in recent years, preventing more
this grouping. These regions are, countries from these regions moving
respectively, the fourth- and third- up the rankings. The pattern often
best performers in the Democracy has been for countries to take
Index. Both are home to a large “one step forward” in one year, and
number of “flawed democracies” then “two steps back” the next,
(sometimes referred to as non- confirming that democratisation in
consolidated democracies): 13 and non-consolidated democracies is
ten respectively. Compared with seldom a linear process.
the better-performing democracies

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

What to watch in 2025

Positive watch
Argentina: Libertarian president address voter concerns on issues
Javier Milei will want to strengthen such as lacklustre growth, flagging
his government’s position in competitiveness, deindustrialisation,
Congress in the mid-term elections in immigration and terrorist attacks.
October. If he succeeds in delivering
on the economy and living standards, Senegal: A strong mandate for
public confidence in government may new president Bassirou Diomaye
improve, but risks abound. Faye improves the prospects for
political stability and institutional
Bangladesh: Interim government reform to reduce the power of the
under pressure to hold elections, president, strengthen the role of the
but first wants to pass reforms to government and parliament, and
restore democratic institutions, improve the independence of the
following the departure of long-time judiciary.
ruler Sheikh Hasina in 2024, which
may mean elections will be delayed Syria: Chance for a democratic
beyond 2025. transition if the country’s interim
rulers can reconcile Syria’s many
Canada: An election must be held ethnic, political and sectarian
by October, but will probably be held groups via a new constitution and
much earlier, with the opposition representative elections. Risk of
Conservative Party likely to return internal conflict and violence.
to power. Chance to reverse the
trend of plummeting public trust in US: Now that one party controls
government after a decade of Liberal the presidency and both chambers,
Party rule under Justin Trudeau. Congress may overcome recent
gridlock and be more effective.
Germany: Federal election in But the Republican majority in the
February; chance to replace the House of Representatives is thin
stuttering SPD-FDP-Green coalition and divisions in the Trump camp may
and elect a new government that can grow.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Negative watch
Central and west Africa: Of the in murky circumstances, the
elections in Cameroon, Central rescheduled election in May will
African Republic, Gabon, Guinea, come under close scrutiny. The
Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Seychelles, incoming government has already
Tanzania and Togo, many are been criticised for trying to manage
likely to be stage-managed to the threat of a vote against the
keep incumbents in power or give ruling parties by changing the rules
legitimacy to regimes that seized regarding diaspora voting and the
power in military coups, and some regulation of social media during an
will be subject to Russian influence election campaign.
campaigns. The election in Côte
d’Ivoire is likely to be more open. South Korea: Fallout from Yoon
Suk-Yeol’s attempt to impose
Ecuador: Suffering from high levels martial law in 2024 is likely to
of voter dissatisfaction and a weak persist in 2025, in the form of
political culture, the country will heightened polarisation and
hold legislative elections in February tension in parliament and among
(with a second round in April, if the population. The courts are
necessary). Potential for polarisation, increasingly politicised and the law
violence and emergence of strong- employed as a tool to attack political
arm leader. opponents. Public dissatisfaction
with South Korea’s democracy could
Moldova: Russian interference in increase.
the parliamentary elections, to be
held by July, is to be expected, in the US: Risk of the president seeking
form of a disinformation campaign, retribution, using the Department
vote-buying and encouragement of of Justice and the Federal Bureau
social unrest, putting further strain of Investigation to go after political
on a frontline country polarised enemies, which would also erode
between East and West. checks and balances. Civil liberties
of immigrants, migrants, other
Romania: With the presidential minorities and protesters also at
election cancelled in late 2024 risk.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

What’s wrong with representative

democracy?
Introduction
Public dissatisfaction with democracy institutions and contributed to rising
has been rising globally, despite populism, political disengagement
broad support for democratic values. and increasing political polarisation.
Surveys from polling institutions
such as the Pew Research Center We begin our investigation by
and Gallup indicate that while most examining the evidence from the
people prefer democracy as a system survey data and recent electoral
of government, they are increasingly trends. These confirm that citizens
frustrated with how it functions in are unhappy with the functioning
practice. This dissatisfaction, we of democracy. However, the more
believe, has three main causes: difficult task is to identify the causes
declining trust in government, the of popular disaffection. This essay
failure of politicians and political identifies several democratic deficits
parties to represent voters effectively, that are contributing to public
and a civic and representation dissatisfaction with governments and
deficit. These factors have led to political systems.
disillusionment with democratic

Satisfaction with democracy 70

across 12 high-income,
democratic countries is
down in recent years 60
Median % who are satisfied with
the way democracy is working in
their country
50
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Note: Percentages are medians across 12
advanced economies: Canada, France, Germany, 40
Greece, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
the United States. Starting in 2021, U.S. data is
from Pew Research Center's online American 30
Trends Panel; older data is from telephone surveys.
Source: Pew Research Center. 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

2024: the biggest election 5bn

year in history
4bn
Population of countries holding an
election that year
3bn

2bn

1bn

0
Source: EIU. 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020

Who says that them. A 2024 Pew survey found

that dissatisfaction with the state
democracy is of democracy had risen in recent
not working? years in high and middle-income
democracies (Richard Wike and
Janell Fetterolf, June 18th 2024).
Global attitude surveys such as The median of dissatisfied citizens
those conducted by the World in 12 high-income countries
Values Survey (WVS) tell us that (Canada, France, Germany, Greece,
democracy as a value retains Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South
widespread appeal. A large survey Korea, Spain, Sweden, the UK and
by the US-based Pew Research the US) rose from 49% of those
Center in 2017 showed that a surveyed in 2017 to 64% in 2024.
median of 78% of people across The sharpest declines in level of
the 38 countries polled said that satisfaction were in the UK, South
representative democracy was Korea and Canada. Among middle-
a good way to govern. A Gallup income countries, the median of
International survey published dissatisfied citizens was 66% in
in June 2024 found that 59% of Chile, 71% in South Africa, 77% in
people in 43 countries, representing Colombia and 89% in Peru, 71% in
half of the global population, agreed South Africa and 58% in Sri Lanka.
that democracy was the best form Citizens have a low opinion of their
of government. The Gallup survey country’s leaders, political parties
included many non-democracies, and the overall state of democracy,
such as China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi providing “a relatively grim picture of
Arabia, Kazakhstan and Pakistan, the political mood in many nations”,
where support for democratic according to Pew.
systems is low, which brought down
the average score. Similarly, a report published in
2020 by the Centre for the Future
However, a large number of citizens of Democracy at the Bennett
in countries that EIU ranks as Institute for Public Policy at the
“full democracies” or “flawed University of Cambridge found that
democracies” are also saying dissatisfaction with democracy had
that democracy is not working for risen significantly in recent decades

30 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

(Collins, R; Foa, RS; Klassen, A; found that since the mid-1990s

Rand, A; and Slade, M; 2020). The dissatisfaction with democracy
researchers used a new dataset had risen by about 10 percentage
combining more than 25 data points globally to 57.5% on average.
sources, 3,500 country surveys, The rise in dissatisfaction has
and 4m respondents between been especially sharp since 2005,
1973 and 2020 that asked citizens when the proportion of dissatisfied
whether they were satisfied or citizens was much lower, at 38.7%.
dissatisfied with democracy in their The authors noted that this increase
countries. Using a time series of 50 had been particularly pronounced in
years for western Europe and 25 developed democracies.
years for the rest of the world, they

Trust in government is falling

One of the primary reasons for are concerned not only with high
dissatisfaction with democracy inflation and economic stagnation,
is declining trust in government. but also with economic and social
Surveys show that citizens inequality, and with the prospects for
increasingly believe that their future generations. They believe that
governments favour elite interests the system is weighted in favour of
over those of ordinary people. the wealthy and the educated, who
Frustrations with the political system make up the professional, business
seem to dovetail with concerns and political classes.
about the state of the economy and,
in particular, widening economic These economic concerns, among
and social inequalities. According others, drove the anti-incumbency
to Pew’s Spring 2024 Global voting wave of 2024. In the biggest
Attitudes Survey, a median of 64% election year globally since mass
of respondents across 34 countries enfranchisement, with more than
said that the economic situation in 70 countries going to the polls,
their country was bad. Meanwhile, voters around the world expressed
a median of 54% of respondents their dissatisfaction with economic
across 31 countries said that they conditions, higher inflation and other
were dissatisfied with the way that perceived failings of governments
democracy was working in their by casting their ballots against
country. incumbents. It was the most
emphatic rebuke to incumbent
parties, governments and presidents
since voting records began. In
An equality deficit Botswana, Ghana, Panama, Portugal,
Senegal, the UK, Uruguay and the
Survey data show that many US, incumbents were ousted from
people perceive there to be a lack office. In numerous other elections,
of equality and fairness in both incumbents lost vote share, and in
economics and politics. Voters some cases their majorities; this

31 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

was the fate of the African National to make their voices heard and
Congress (ANC) in South Africa, who act to protect the interests
Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata of the few. When special interest
Party (BJP) in India and the Liberal groups exert undue influence over
Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan. the political process, they end up
undermining majority rule.
Higher consumer price inflation
in the post-pandemic period, Inequality is a major source of
which tends to disproportionately conflict and a natural issue for
affect lower-income households, parties to contest in the public
exacerbated dissatisfaction with realm. The smooth functioning
politicians in both developed and of democratic political systems
developing countries. Work by is probably not compatible with
two academics, Thomas Piketty extremes of social and economic
and Branko Milanovic, has shown inequality.
that income inequality has risen
significantly in democratic
countries in recent decades, led
by the growing returns on capital Corruption concerns
and the erosion of progressive
taxation. In turn, Messieurs Piketty It is hardly surprising that corruption
and Milanovic have argued, the is often mentioned by survey
concentration of wealth at the top respondents who are dissatisfied
of society leads to political systems with their democratic political
becoming more susceptible to systems. Corruption serves as
the influence of the wealthiest, a visible reminder to voters of
leading to policies that tend to economic inequality. Transparency
disproportionately benefit these International’s multi-year Corruption
same groups. Lobbyists are Perceptions Index has pointed to
dominated by the wealthy and by corruption remaining a persistent
businesses, who have the resources issue, even in stable democracies.

Developed countries mired 60

in government distrust 58
58
55
55
55 57
57 57
57
Percent who say I trust government 51
51 Post-pandemic
to do what is right 49
49 49
49 50
50 divergence leads to 50
all-time high trust gap
Developing countries 45
Developed countries 47
47 47
47 44
44
43
43 45
45 45
45
40
40 40
In developed countries,
39
39
40
40 government trust peaks 35
35
35 during pandemic, followed
by new declines 30
Source: 2024 Edelman Trust Barometer Special
Analysis: Trust and Government. 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Corruption scandals are not politicians indicted on corruption-

confined to developing countries; in related charges and one former
recent years there have been many senator, Robert Menendez, found
examples of bribery, corruption guilty of bribery and other offences
and insider dealing in developed in January 2025. The Gallup 2024
democracies including France, survey found that trust in the US
Germany and the UK. A spate Congress was at 35%, down from
of corruption cases mired US 75% in the 1970s.
politics in 2024, with several senior

Party membership 5m
Austria
Belgium 4m
Denmark
Finland
France 3m
Germany
Ireland
Italy 2m
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden 1m
Switzerland
United Kingdom
0
Source: Delwit, Pascal. (2011). Still in
Decline? Party Membership in Europe. 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006

Politicians are failing

Another major driver of democratic from and eventually lose touch with
dissatisfaction is the failure of their original social constituencies
politicians and political parties to was a gradual one. The dissociation
represent voters adequately and has been particularly striking
address their concerns. This failure for social democratic and labour
manifests in three key areas: the parties. Their relations with the
disconnection between parties and working class began to come under
their historical voter bases, the lack strain during the upsurge of labour
of genuine political choice, and a militancy that accompanied the end
deficit of new political ideas and of the post-war boom in the 1970s.
problem-solving capabilities.
Other factors played a part
too; the parties became more
professionalised and began to move
A party deficit closer to the state, from which they
derived their resources and status.
Until the 1980s, voters’ collective Party leaders came to depend less
identities and attachments to on their party base for support than
political parties were remarkably on external institutions that provided
stable. The process by which public office and the resources to go
political parties began to disconnect with it.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

In addition, the core social the foundations of representative

constituencies of the main parties government. Without such
began to decline and fragment. alternatives, the people cannot make
Economic, social and cultural choices and have less power to
change led to a decline in the influence government. Many citizens
relative weight of the traditional feel that mainstream parties have
working class. The weakening converged towards the political
appeal of organised religion also centre, offering little meaningful
affected the core constituencies of choice. The Pew Research
traditional conservative parties. This Center (2024) found that 42% of
resulted in the erosion of collective respondents said no political party
political identities and attachments, represented their views.
and increased voter fluidity. Parties
began to appeal to voters across Until the 1990s this had not been
the usual class and social lines, the case. The dividing lines between
reinforcing the trend towards non- the main political protagonists
partisanship. More recently, culture were clear. The existence of two
war issues such as identity politics, alternative political visions of how
history and national identity and free society should be organised defined
speech have also weakened voter the main cleavage in party politics
attachments to their old parties for much of the 20th century. In most
and contributed to the rise of the democratic countries, there was
populists. at least one party that represented
the interests of the conservative
Party politics is an essential business elites and middle
underpinning of representative classes (Christian democratic and
democratic systems. Without conservative parties) and one that
political parties, there is no claimed to represent the interests of
possibility of genuine popular the working class (social democratic
representation or representative and labour parties).
government. The role of
representative parties is to embed The ideologies of right and left, in
themselves in civil society, engage a watered-down form, continued to
with voters, learn from them and define the political landscape up
mobilise them. This type of political to the 1990s. However, in recent
organisation is not only capable decades a number of factors
of creating majorities to elect a have erased this dividing line and
government, but is likely to be more encouraged a political convergence
accountable to people for what it to the centre. These factors include
does in office. the collapse of communism, the
end of class contestation, the
discrediting of alternative models
and of the left, the growing influence
A choice deficit of theories of global governance,
the expansion of the EU project,
Dissatisfied citizens often say that and the enhanced role in national
political parties are “all the same”. policymaking of international
Competing political parties with organisations such as the World
clear policy alternatives provide Bank and the IMF.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

It should not be difficult for political of the old certainties and political
parties to develop policy alternatives identities, political parties seemed
that distinguish them from their to be on a mission to find “the next
political rivals. That is because big idea”. Having lost their close
public policy alternatives arise connections with their former
naturally out of conflict over specific electoral base, they turned to
issues. The job of representative focus groups in a bid to find policy
political parties is to define and inspiration. Eventually, enough
shape the alternatives on issues politicians realised that they could
of contention. However, today’s do without “the vision thing”. Some
mainstream centrist parties have at political leaders in some countries
times struggled to present coherent made a virtue out of having no big
alternatives to the electorate in ways ideas and being “apolitical”. This
that allow them to endorse or reject was in part a reaction to the highly
programmes and leaders. partisan and adversarial politics of
the 1970s and 1980s. Tony Blair’s
The exceptions have been in “New Labour” UK government
places where populist leaders (1997-2007) backed a “third way”
have challenged the traditional that was an explicit repudiation of a
parties, such as in the US, where traditional ideological approach.
there was a clear contrast in policy
and leadership in the three most The managerial trend has led
recent presidential elections. In not only to the depoliticisation
Latin America, clear ideological of the centre, but also to the
divergence has also opened up depoliticisation of government itself.
between the likes of the libertarian Independent central banks have
Argentinian president, Javier Milei, taken responsibility for inflation
and Brazil’s left-wing president, management and monetary policy
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. These are away from politicians and handed
signs that these developments could it to economists and technocrats.
preview future changes in politics in There were arguments for this,
Europe. including the policy mistakes
of the earlier era and because
politicisation makes the central
bank’s function as a check on fiscal
An ideas deficit excess less effective. However,
it nevertheless reduced areas of
As governments have become more direct responsibility from politicians.
technocratic, they have struggled This model has now extended into
to advance a meaningful vision of other policy areas, so that the body
the future for their citizens; instead, politic perceives that decisions on
it is usually a short-term vision, and health, government budgets, the
the policy emphasis is on combating welfare system and other matters
crisis rather than on economic and of public interest are often taken
social transformation. by unelected experts rather than
elected politicians. The backlash,
For a few years after the end of the rightly or wrongly, is dissatisfaction
cold war, confronted with the end with experts and politicians alike.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

A citizenship deficit The notion that participation

in politics requires some kind
of intellectual or educational
In surveys on attitudes towards qualification contradicts the
democracy, people not only demand principle of equality underpinning
more of their politicians, but would democracy. Democracy has a
also like more to be demanded of moral as well as an institutional
themselves. In other words, they dimension: it makes no distinctions
would like to be treated as citizens, based on title, wealth, gender, race,
not as stakeholders. As political life education or intelligence. Apart
has become less ideological, people from citizenship, no qualification is
have retreated from the public realm. necessary to vote or play a role in
the political life of a democracy. Nor
When politicians talk about a is any expert knowledge required
crisis of democracy, they are of citizens, who vote into power
more concerned with the status political representatives whose role
of political institutions than with it is to develop policies, present
the role of the public. For many them to the public and implement
advocates of liberal democracy, the them in government. Citizens need
priority is to defend their countries’ only acquaint themselves with the
institutions and the constitutional policies being propounded, so that
order, especially in the face of they can make an informed choice
populist demands for the balance to about which party or candidate to
be shifted in the direction of popular vote for at an election.
sovereignty. An alternative view
is that the quality of democracy is Yet citizens have in the past aspired
also defined by the character of its to play more of a role in political
citizens and the standard of their life than simply putting a cross on
participation in the democratic a ballot paper every four or five
life of the nation. Insofar as we years. Historically, the great political
define democracy operationally parties and movements emerged
as a set of governing institutions out of the struggles of ordinary men
and processes, its legitimacy and and women to shape their destinies.
effectiveness ultimately depends on Today, those historical parties, and
how representative of the nation’s the political systems in which they
citizens it really is. operate, can no longer be described
as properly representative. But
This citizen-centric conflict persists, dividing society
conceptualisation of democracy on the basis of competing interests,
is incorporated in our Democracy and this is what creates the need
Index, which measures not only for political representation. How
electoral process and pluralism, long such a need can be ignored
functioning of government and without creating a revolt on the part
civil liberties, but also political of citizens is not clear, but a citizen
participation and political culture. awakening is likely to come at some
That is because the substance or point—and it is likely that new
quality of a democracy is measured parties will emerge to give it a new
above all by the involvement of political identity.
citizens in the political process and
their attitudes towards it.

36 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Conclusion
This essay has highlighted evidence is not to throw out the baby with
that dissatisfaction with democracy the bathwater. The task is to renew
is being driven by a combination and reinvigorate it by bringing real
of declining trust in government to issues back into the arena of public
deliver economically and in other debate. It means having genuine
areas, the failure of politicians contestation over policy between
and political parties to offer clear competing parties. And it means (re)
choices and ideas, and growing building relations between parties
civic disengagement. Inequality and and the electorate. Democracy
corruption have eroded faith in the is hard work—it demands new
ability of democratic institutions to ideas, clear policies, engaging with
deliver for voters. Political parties voters, winning the arguments
have become disconnected from with them and mobilising them
voters, offering fewer meaningful to create a majority that can win
choices and failing to address major elections. Only such representative
societal challenges. At the same organisations based on the
time citizens feel excluded from grassroots are likely to be able to
decision-making processes. The rise carry through their programmes
of populist political movements is in government—because they will
one reaction to these trends. really be accountable to the people
who elected them—and capable of
The response to the challenges restoring trust in democracy.
faced by representative democracy

37 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2025

Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 3
Democracy across the regions
Democracy Full Flawed Authoritarian
No. of countries Hybrid regimes
index average democracies democracies regimes
North America
2024 2 8.27 1 1 0 0
2023 2 8.27 1 1 0 0
Western Europe
2024 21 8.38 15 5 1 0
2023 21 8.37 15 5 1 0
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
2024 28 5.35 2 13 5 8
2023 28 5.37 0 16 4 8
Latin America & the Caribbean
2024 24 5.61 2 10 8 4
2023 24 5.68 2 11 7 4
Asia & Australasia
2024 28 5.31 4 10 6 8
2023 28 5.41 5 10 5 8
Middle East & North Africa
2024 20 3.12 0 1 2 17
2023 20 3.23 0 1 2 17
Sub-Saharan Africa
2024 44 4.00 1 6 14 23
2023 44 4.04 1 6 15 22
Total
2024 167 5.17 25 46 36 60
2023 167 5.23 24 50 34 59
Source: EIU.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Democracy around the regions

Regression is the story of 2024 as countries among those classified
far as the headline Democracy Index as “full democracies” suggests that
score—5.17 out of 10, down from the level of economic development
5.23 in 2023—is concerned. With can be a significant, if not
the exception of western Europe, binding, constraint on democratic
which was also the only region to development. Other factors that
improve its score in 2023, every are important in determining the
other region registered a decline quality of democracy are a history
or, in the case of North America, of independent statehood and the
stagnated. In the following pages, quality of state institutions.
we look in detail at developments in
all of the regions in 2024, in order “Flawed democracies”, of which
from the highest ranking to the there are 46, are concentrated in
lowest. The accompanying charts developing economies of eastern
illustrate where each region stands Europe (13), Latin America (ten),
across key metrics in relation to the Asia (ten) and Sub-Saharan
global average, and compared with Africa (six). “Hybrid regimes” and
the previous year. “authoritarian regimes”, which
constitute 96 of the 167 countries
The developed countries of western and territories covered by the
Europe predominate among Democracy Index, are concentrated
the world’s “full democracies”, in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
accounting for 15 of the total of 25 Middle East and North Africa. They
in 2024. Canada is the sole “full comprise 37 of the 44 countries in
democracy” in North America, as Sub-Saharan Africa (84%) and 19
the US continues to languish as a of the 20 countries in the Middle
“flawed democracy”, a classification East and North Africa (95%). Asia
to which it was relegated in 2016. and Australasia has its fair share
of non-democratic regimes, which
The Asia and Australasia region has make up exactly half of the 28
four “full democracies” (Australia, countries in the region. “Hybrid”
Japan, New Zealand and Taiwan), and “authoritarian regimes” also
down from five in 2023 following constitute half the 24 countries in
South Korea’s downgrade to a Latin America and the Caribbean.
“flawed democracy”. Two Latin In eastern Europe, 13 of the region’s
American countries are classed 28 countries (46%) are classified in
as “full democracies” (Costa this way. They are concentrated in
Rica and Uruguay), as are two in the far east of the region, among the
eastern Europe (Czech Republic countries of the former Soviet Union.
and Estonia). There is one “full Typically, there is little change from
democracy” in Africa (Mauritius). year to year in the index scores for
The predominance of OECD “authoritarian regimes”.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Western Europe
Western Europe is the highest- France and Belgium.
scoring region in the world in the
2024 Democracy Index, remaining Of the 21 countries in the region
above North America for a second covered by the index, five
consecutive year. North America’s (Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,
score remained unchanged in 2024, Switzerland and the UK) improved
at 8.27, whereas that for western their score, ten retained the same
Europe increased slightly compared score as in 2023 and six (France,
with 2023, from 8.37 to 8.38. The Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy and
improvement is barely noticeable, Turkey) deteriorated. The change in
but it nevertheless makes the region regime classification is noteworthy
a positive outlier, given that every for two countries in western Europe,
other region recorded a decline or, France and Portugal. After a decade
in the case of North America, no in the political and economic
change. In a year characterised by wilderness following the crisis of
regression everywhere else, this 2009, and having improved its
was an achievement of sorts. It does score on several counts since the
not mean to say, however, that all covid-19 pandemic, Portugal was
is well with democracy even in the upgraded from a “flawed democracy”
highest-ranking countries in the to a “full democracy”. However,
region. There is considerable voter political instability led France
dissatisfaction with the workings to be downgraded to a “flawed
of democracy among the high- democracy” after its score fell to
performing Nordics as well as in 7.99 (below the threshold of 8.00).
lower-ranking countries such as

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 4
Western Europe 2024
I Electoral IV
Overall Global Regional II Functioning III Political V Civil
process and Political Regime type
score Rank rank of government participation liberties
pluralism culture
Full
Austria 8.28 19 12 9.58 7.50 8.89 6.88 8.53
democracy
Flawed
Belgium 7.64 34 18 9.58 8.21 5.00 6.88 8.53
democracy
Flawed
Cyprus 7.38 40 20 9.17 5.36 6.67 6.88 8.82
democracy
Full
Denmark 9.28 7 6 10.00 9.29 8.33 9.38 9.41
democracy
Full
Finland 9.30 6 5 10.00 9.64 7.78 9.38 9.71
democracy
Flawed
France 7.99 26 16 9.58 7.50 7.78 6.88 8.24
democracy
Full
Germany 8.73 13 10 9.58 8.21 8.33 8.13 9.41
democracy
Full
Greece 8.07 25 15 10.00 6.79 7.22 7.50 8.82
democracy
Full
Iceland 9.38 4 3 10.00 8.93 8.89 9.38 9.71
democracy
Flawed
Italy 7.58 37= 19 9.58 7.14 7.22 6.88 7.06
democracy
Full
Ireland 9.19 8 7 10.00 8.21 8.33 10.00 9.41
democracy
Full
Luxembourg 8.88 10 9 10.00 9.29 6.67 8.75 9.71
democracy
Flawed
Malta 7.93 27 17 9.17 7.14 6.67 8.13 8.53
democracy
Full
Netherlands 9.00 9 8 9.58 8.93 8.33 8.75 9.41
democracy
Full
Norway 9.81 1 1 10.00 9.64 10.00 10.00 9.41
democracy
Full
Portugal 8.08 23= 14 9.58 7.14 6.11 8.75 8.82
democracy
Full
Spain 8.13 21= 13 9.58 7.50 7.22 7.50 8.82
democracy
Full
Sweden 9.39 3 2 9.58 9.64 8.33 10.00 9.41
democracy
Full
Switzerland 9.32 5 4 9.58 9.29 8.33 10.00 9.41
democracy
Turkey 4.26 103= 21 3.50 4.64 6.11 5.00 2.06 Hybrid regime
Full
United Kingdom 8.34 17 11 9.58 7.50 8.33 6.88 9.41
democracy
Regional score 8.38 9.39 7.98 7.65 8.18 8.70

Source: EIU.

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Democracy Index 2024
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Western Europe boasts the largest Turkey, whose score fell slightly in
number of “full democracies” of 2024 to 4.26, from 4.33 in 2023.
any region (15 out of a total of 25 This score puts the country close
globally) and accounts for nine of to the bottom of the “hybrid regime”
the top ten ranked countries, with classification, and it is ranked 103rd
Luxembourg overtaking Australia out of 167.
in tenth position. The Nordics
continue to stand out as particularly The region registered an
high-scoring, occupying five of the improvement across two of the
top seven positions in the global five categories of the Democracy
rankings. Norway is in first place, Index in 2024—again bucking the
followed by New Zealand. Four of general trend of decline in most
the next five countries are Nordic regions—with the average scores
nations—Sweden, Iceland, Finland for political culture and civil liberties
and Denmark. These countries rising compared with 2023. The
boast high scores across all index regional score remained unchanged
categories, particularly electoral in the electoral process and pluralism
process and pluralism and civil category in what was a big election
liberties. The regional outlier is year in Europe. However, the average

Democracy index 2024 0 2 4 6 8 10

by category Electoral process 5.41
and pluralism 9.39
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Functioning of 4.53
Global average government 7.98
Western Europe
Political 5.33
participation 7.65

5.25
Political culture
8.18

5.35
Civil liberties
8.70

5.17
Overall score
8.38
Source: EIU.

Western Europe: change in 0 2 4 6 8 10

category scores 2023-24 Electoral process 9.39
and pluralism 9.39
Index score out of 10 (10 being best)
2024 Functioning of 7.98
government 8.01
2023
Political 7.65
participation 7.67

8.18
Political culture
8.10

8.70
Civil liberties
8.67

8.38
Overall score
8.37
Source: EIU.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

scores for functioning of government its state debt by 35 percentage

and political participation fell slightly, points of GDP since 2012, which has
owing to declining trust in political helped to improve financial stability
parties and governments and a lower and has allowed for increasing
election turnout in 2024. government spending. The tourism
sector has also been performing very
well, boosting Portugal’s economic
growth. Portugal is currently running
Portugal is upgraded a fiscal surplus (albeit a small
to a “full democracy” one). This has enabled it to avoid
the fractious political battles over
Portugal was upgraded to a “full budget cuts that have eroded public
democracy” in the 2024 Democracy support for governments in other
Index, moving eight places up countries.
the global rankings to joint 23rd
position. Portugal’s score improved Political stability remains fragile,
from 7.75 in 2023 to 8.08 in but the minority government, led
2024, driven by improvements by Luis Montenegro, managed to
in the functioning of government avoid another snap election while
and political culture categories. passing the 2025 budget. Portugal
The country was downgraded to is also respecting EU timelines
a “flawed democracy” in 2011 and and meeting targets to spend the
first recovered the status of a “full disbursements from the Resilience
democracy” in 2019. However, the and Recovery Facility (RRF).
limitations on personal freedom Portugal’s citizens demonstrated a
resulting from the covid-19 willingness to engage in protests
pandemic meant that Portugal was in 2024, to demand fairer housing
again downgraded to a “flawed conditions in September and against
democracy” in 2020. police violence in October. However,
WVS data reveal a low interest in
The indicator score assessing the politics, suggesting that political
degree to which Portugal’s citizens participation in Portugal is not as
believe democracy is good for the strong as it could be.
economy, based on World Values
Survey (WVS) data, improved
from 0.5 to 1 in 2024. The WVS
data suggest that a larger portion Political strife and
of the population now believes public disaffection are
that a strong democratic system
is also beneficial to economic the undoing of France
performance. Furthermore, support
for government, according to the France has been downgraded from
Eurobarometer survey for autumn a “full democracy” to a “flawed
2024, increased to 45%, above democracy”, as the domestic
the EU average of 33%. This ties political scene became increasingly
in well with the stronger economic fractious in 2024. France has long
performance that Portugal has been been on the cusp, sitting close to
experiencing in the past few years. the threshold score of 8.00 that
The country has managed to reduce separates “full democracies” from

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Democracy Index 2024
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“flawed democracies”. It has been parliament and hold snap elections

classified as a “flawed democracy” backfired. His Renaissance party
in the past (including in 2010-13, lost significant ground and no
2015-18 and 2020-21), during single party or bloc emerged with a
periods of political turbulence in legislative majority. It has been very
which the administration has faced difficult to form a government since
widespread social unrest and/or then: following several months of
internal divisions over policy, which talks, Mr Macron finally appointed a
undermined governance. new prime minister (Michel Barnier)
in September, but his minority
France’s downgrade reflects a government collapsed three months
deterioration in the score for later, after it failed to secure enough
confidence in government, which support to pass the 2025 budget.
has been sufficient to push its Growing public frustration with the
underlying score from 8.07 in 2023 government has boosted support
to 7.99 in 2024. The president, for political insurgents, particularly
Emmanuel Macron, has become an Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement
increasingly unpopular figure and his National (RN).
decision in June 2024 to dissolve

North America
North America, comprising the (13th previously), after recording
US and Canada, remains a top a significant decline in its score
performer in the Democracy Index. in 2023. The US continues to trail
The region’s overall score stands Canada, with a score of 7.85 in
at 8.27 in 2024, unchanged from 2024, unchanged from 2023. The
2023, putting it just behind western US rose one spot to 28th position
Europe at 8.38. Canada retained in our global ranking, reflecting
its overall score of 8.69 in 2024, changes in other countries, but it
maintaining its “full democracy” remains in the “flawed democracy”
classification and leaving its category, where it has stood since
placement in our global ranking 2016.
almost unchanged, at 14th position

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Democracy Index 2024
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Table 5
North America 2024
I Electoral II Functioning IV
Overall Global Regional III Political V Civil Regime
process and of Political
score Rank rank participation liberties type
pluralism government culture
Full
Canada 8.69 14 1 10.00 8.21 8.89 7.50 8.82
democracy
United
Flawed
States of 7.85 28 2 9.17 6.43 8.89 6.25 8.53
democracy
America
Regional
8.27 9.58 7.32 8.89 6.88 8.68
score
Source: EIU.

A tale of unpopular and Congress certified the results

with no disruptions. This contrasted
leaders sharply with the 2020 election,
which was marred by controversy,
North America continues to score baseless voter fraud claims and
most strongly in electoral process an attack on the US Capitol. The
and pluralism (9.58) and political subsequent smooth transition
participation (8.89). Both scores are between administrations of different
unchanged since 2022 and remain parties is a positive sign.
higher than in any other region. Voter
engagement has stayed strong in However, this is qualified by the
the latest national elections. Turnout fact that a different election result
at the US presidential election in may well have generated a more
November 2024 was 64%, the tumultuous outcome. Democratic
second-highest level in over a Party leaders have long stressed the
century; it was surpassed only by importance of a peaceful transfer
turnout in the 2020 presidential of power. By contrast, during
election (66%). The US midterm the campaign, the Republican
elections in 2022 also had one of the candidate, Donald Trump, insisted
highest turnout rates on record, with that he would accept only an
nearly half of eligible voters casting election victory; he and his affiliates
ballots. Turnout at Canada’s most readied more than 100 lawsuits in
recent general election, held in 2021, battleground states to challenge a
was slightly lower (62.3%) than in loss pre-emptively, citing unfounded
the previous poll, in 2019 (67.7%). claims, including over non-citizens
However, this remained at the high voting. The implication is that
end of the range (50-70%), meriting election denial has not fully exited
a score of 0.5 for this indicator. the US electoral system. The trend
could reappear at the midterm
US electoral institutions continue elections in 2026, halfway through
to exhibit considerable resilience. Mr Trump’s term, if Republicans
The 2024 presidential election underperform at these polls, as often
concluded without controversy, happens to the incumbent party.

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Democracy Index 2024
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One problem that could become to have bested him in their only
acute if it persists is the current matchup.
crop of unpopular leaders. This
could end up undermining North The Democratic primary was equally
America’s performance in the unconventional. No competitive
electoral process and pluralism and candidates challenged the
political participation categories, incumbent president, Joe Biden,
especially if cynicism towards the despite widespread misgivings
electoral process rises and voter about his advanced age and
participation wanes. Some of these suitability for office. When Mr Biden
dynamics were already visible in the belatedly withdrew his candidacy
2024 US election. Overall turnout on July 21st, he endorsed his vice-
approached record levels, but close president, Ms Harris, who was also
to 90m eligible voters did not cast unpopular, and the Democratic
their ballots, a 10% increase from Party quickly rallied behind her. This
the 2020 race. A key feature of closed off the option for an “open
the 2024 election was that both convention” to select Mr Biden’s
mainstream parties fielded highly replacement.
unpopular presidential candidates.
Democratic Party candidate Kamala Mr Biden’s late exit meant that
Harris had a 48% favourability Ms Harris had only three months to
rating and Mr Trump had a 50% campaign before election day. That
favourability rating, according to left her with little time to assemble
a 10-point favourability scale that and communicate a compelling
Gallup has used for presidential platform, which typically takes
nominees dating back to 1956, place over the course of at least
putting them close to the bottom of a year. Ms Harris also faced the
the scale historically. challenge of having to frame herself
as both a “continuity” and a “change”
Both parties also bypassed candidate, owing to polarised public
standard electoral norms during the attitudes about Mr Biden and his
candidate selection process and administration’s track record. The
the subsequent election campaign. result was a campaign that was light
Facing several Republican on details and often contradictory
challengers, Mr Trump refused to in its messaging. This made it more
participate in any primary debates, difficult for Ms Harris to connect
which normally function to inform with voters, and allowed Mr Trump
voters of their candidate choices. to set public perceptions about her
Given his popularity among candidacy.
Republican voters, Mr Trump was
always the front-runner despite Ms Harris wound up
the misgivings of many senior underperforming in what opinion
Republicans. Mr Trump became polls had suggested would be
the presumptive nominee in March an extremely close election,
and the official candidate in July, especially considering her
together with his vice-presidential opponent’s controversial public
running mate JD Vance. He declined profile. Mr Trump won the popular
subsequent presidential debates and electoral votes, swept all
after Ms Harris was widely agreed seven battleground states and his

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Democracy index 2024 0 2 4 6 8 10

by category Electoral process 5.41
and pluralism 9.58
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Global average Functioning of 4.53
government 7.32
Canada & US
Political 5.33
participation 8.89

5.25
Political culture
6.88

5.35
Civil liberties
8.68

5.17
Overall score
8.27
Source: EIU.

US & Canada: change in 0 2 4 6 8 10

category scores 2023-24 Electoral process 9.58
and pluralism 9.58
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Functioning of 7.32
2024 government 7.32
2023
Political 8.89
participation 8.89

6.88
Political culture
6.88

8.68
Civil liberties
8.68

8.27
Overall score
8.27
Source: EIU.

party took control of both houses within his Liberal Party to step aside.
of Congress. Disengagement by Mr Trudeau finally announced his
Democratic voters played a key resignation in January 2025 after
role in this result. Turnout among losing support from his cabinet and
Democrats was lower than in 2020. allies in parliament. However, this
Ms Harris also failed to win over has left his party with little time to
traditionally Democrat-voting, regroup, select a new leader and
strategically important voters, win over voters ahead of the next
including women and non-white general election, which must be
voters, particularly Hispanics, and called by October 2025 but now
key electoral constituencies in large seems inevitable by the spring. The
urban areas and the suburbs. opposition Conservatives have a
double-digit polling lead and appear
Similar trends have emerged in best placed to win the election. This
Canada’s political system. The in part reflects the success of the
prime minister, Justin Trudeau, Conservative leader, Pierre Poilievre,
held on to power despite years of at targeting public discontent over
plummeting approval ratings and issues such as high living costs and
encouragement from elements immigration, which voters accuse

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Democracy Index 2024
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Mr Trudeau of neglecting. Israel-Hamas war. These debates

have continued to extend beyond
Another consequence of the usual set of actors (such as
Mr Trudeau’s late resignation is that politicians and activists) and now
it has prevented the government encompass corporate executives,
from tackling urgent issues, librarians, school teachers and
including the future of US-Canada universities. These issues also
relations, which Mr Trump has featured prominently in the 2024
threatened to upend. Mr Trudeau elections, occasionally dividing the
suspended parliament until mainstream parties and often driving
March 2025 to accommodate his their attacks against one another.
party’s leadership election, and
the subsequent general election A highly politicised media, including
will further delay the moment popular TV channels and print
that parliament can resume usual publications, continue to foment
business. These events have put and amplify divisions across the US
additional pressure on Canada’s electorate. Non-traditional media,
performance in our functioning of such as independent podcasts,
government category, which we had have played an increasingly large
already downgraded in 2023 (to role. Self-reinforcing social media
8.21), although Canada still bests algorithms have contributed to a
the US’s much lower score (6.43). hardening of opinions, including
radical and misinformed ones.
According to the Pew Research
Center, more than half of
North America’s Republicans (62%) and Democrats
polarisation problem (54%) held “very unfavourable”
views of the other party in 2022.
Political culture remains the Little appears to have changed in
lowest-scoring category for North the subsequent two years. High-
America. At 6.88 in 2024, the profile acts of political violence have
score is unchanged from 2023 become more common, including
and remains well below that for two unsuccessful assassination
western Europe, which improved attempts on Mr Trump and the killing
slightly to 8.18 this year. North of a healthcare executive in 2024
America’s performance continues alone.
to be weighed down by intense
political and cultural polarisation Partisan rhetoric intensified during
in the US. Social cohesion and the 2024 election campaign, with
consensus have collapsed in Mr Trump and Ms Harris frequently
recent years as disagreements characterising one another as
over an expanding list of issues existential threats to the country.
have fuelled the country’s “culture According to an AP-NORC survey
wars”. Alongside the covid-19 conducted in December 2024, a
pandemic, election outcomes and month after Mr Trump’s election
racial equity issues, additional fault victory, Americans are sharply
lines have emerged and deepened, divided by party affiliation in their
including over LGBT+ rights, climate feelings about the future direction of
policy, reproductive health and the their country. Nearly three-quarters

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Democracy Index 2024
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(71%) of Republicans surveyed national pension system (which

expected “things to improve” in the Alberta has threatened to exit).
coming year, compared with only 7% Meanwhile, US-style “culture war”
of Democrats. This marked a near topics have become more prominent
reversal of the results in 2020, when in Canadian political discourse,
Democrats won the election. animating debates about individual
freedoms, including over previous
Polarisation has long compromised covid-19 restrictions, gun control
the functioning of government in the and, more recently, transgender
US, and the country’s score for this and parental rights. They also have
category remains at a low of 6.43 increasingly served as reference
in 2024, unchanged from 2023. points for inter-party conflicts at the
Competing alternatives are essential national level. Mr Poilievre frequently
for a functioning democracy, but accuses Mr Trudeau’s Liberals of
differences of opinion in the US have advancing a “woke” agenda, while
hardened into political sectarianism Mr Trudeau has alluded to Mr Trump
and almost permanent institutional in the US in an attempt to frame
gridlock. The previous Congress, Mr Poilievre as a far-right radical.
whose two-year term ended in The result has been an increasing
early January 2025, was the least divisiveness in Canadian political
productive since the 1980s in terms rhetoric, which could intensify ahead
of bills successfully passed into law. of the upcoming general election.
This in large part reflected the fact According to a September 2024
that power was divided; Democrats survey published by the Angus Reid
and Republicans each controlled Institute, more than a third (36%)
a chamber of Congress, and by of Canadians consider themselves
thin majorities, which presented “political orphans” and believe that
structural barriers to the legislative the country’s parties have become
process. The new Congress that “too extreme”. These dynamics had
has just taken office has a chance already prompted us to downgrade
to be more effective, as a single Canada’s performance in our political
party controls both chambers culture category in 2023. However,
and the presidency. However, the the score, which is unchanged at
Republican majority in the House of 7.50 in 2024, remains well above the
Representatives (the lower house) US score of 6.25.
is the slimmest in nearly a century,
and intra-party disagreements are
already emerging over how to pass
Mr Trump’s agenda. What impact will
Trump 2.0 have on US
Polarisation has become a growing
feature of Canadian politics, democracy?
including in relations between the
federal and provincial governments. North America’s score in our civil
Disagreements span an array of liberties category is unchanged
issues, ranging from the Trudeau at 8.68 in 2024. However, North
government’s environmental policies America loses its spot as the world’s
(which the oil-producing western highest-scoring region to western
provinces staunchly oppose) to the Europe, whose score in this category

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Democracy Index 2024
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improved slightly this year to 8.70. political enemies. If he does indeed

Some issues continue to weigh on seek retribution in this manner, the
the individual scores for the US effects would be highly polarising
(8.53) and Canada (8.82), but the and damaging. The politicisation of
overall category scores for both the legal system and intelligence
still far exceed the global average services over the past decade
(5.35). In the US, these issues is a deeply disturbing trend and
include the ambiguous status of one that threatens to undermine
abortion rights, following a 2022 the political order in the US. Both
ruling by the Supreme Court that parties are guilty on this count.
eliminated the federal constitutional Most egregiously, Mr Trump and his
right to an abortion. Meanwhile, supporters accused the Democrats
the marginalisation of Canada’s of “stealing” the 2020 election and
Indigenous population continues to tried to contest the result through
hold down Canada’s score, despite the courts. State and federal judges
the federal government’s efforts rejected more than 50 lawsuits
to prioritise Indigenous rights. brought by Mr Trump and his allies
Quebec’s ban on wearing religious based on these baseless allegations.
symbols in certain public-service But in bringing his lawsuits, Mr
jobs, which led to a downgrade in Trump had cast doubt on the
Canada’s score in 2021, has had a integrity of the election process
similar effect. and encouraged his supporters to
believe that he had been robbed of
The US score for civil liberties, the presidency. The mob attack on
as well as other categories, may the Capitol in January 2021, in an
come under considerable pressure attempt to prevent Congress from
during Mr Trump’s second term formalising the election of Mr Biden,
as US president. He and his team was a consequence.
have spoken openly of their plans to
expand the role of the military into Earlier, after Mr Trump had won
domestic law enforcement, including the Republican nomination to
to conduct mass deportations of stand in the 2016 presidential
undocumented migrants and to election, Democrats mobilised
quell protests. Mr Trump has also their supporters in the civil service
threatened to introduce “ideological to speak out against Mr Trump. In
screenings” of immigrants, such as a break with traditional norms of
on the basis of religion. Women’s behaviour of intelligence officers,
reproductive rights could come former and actual members of the
further under threat if Republicans CIA and other agencies attacked Mr
seek to enact a national abortion ban; Trump as being unfit for presidential
Mr Trump’s own position on the issue office. The FBI launched an
is ambiguous, given that he once investigation into alleged collusion
supported such restrictions but more between the Trump campaign and
recently stepped back from this. Russia. The various “Russiagate”
investigations of collusion, which
Mr Trump has threatened to continued through 2016-19, found
weaponise the Department of no evidence of any such collusion.
Justice and the Federal Bureau The attempt to smear Mr Trump by
of Investigation to go after his association with the Russian regime

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Democracy Index 2024
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of Vladimir Putin did not prevent him of federal agencies. Congress

from being elected in 2016, though must first approve these nominees,
it may have undermined popular but Mr Trump put pressure on
support for him. However, the ethic Republican lawmakers to rush
of apolitical public service was through the process. He has also
seriously undermined by intelligence rewarded large donors, including
officers adopting a political position family members, with appointments
on a candidate in a presidential in his administration. A prime
election (Gentry, 2023). example is billionaire Elon Musk,
who bankrolled the new president’s
Whatever the merits or defects of the campaign while using his ownership
many legal cases brought against Mr of the social media platform
Trump in recent years, the Democrats X (formerly Twitter) to amplify
may come to regret their “lawfare” Mr Trump’s public profile. Mr Musk’s
against him, not only because it role in the administration potentially
backfired by strengthening support presents a conflict of interests;
for him among his base. It may also he is set to manage an ill-defined
encourage Mr Trump to pursue his commission intended to shape the
political enemies through the courts functioning of government agencies
during his second administration. and rules that also regulate his
In a bid to pre-empt the retribution businesses. Similar issues concern
that Mr Trump has threatened, the recent rush of corporate
before leaving office Mr Biden not executives donating to Mr Trump’s
only granted a sweeping pardon to inauguration fund following his
his son for gun and tax convictions, election victory, presumably to curry
but also dispensed pre-emptive favour and avoid being targeted
pardons to numerous members of his by him. Some have even changed
wider family as well as his political their company policies to align
associates. with Mr Trump’s preferences on
issues such as climate change and
Mr Trump moved quickly to sustainability, diversity and inclusion,
install loyalists to key cabinet and information moderation.
positions, raising concerns that
some candidates with limited
qualifications could compromise
the independence and functioning

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Latin America and the Caribbean

The quality of democracy in Latin the result of a new law that curtails
America and the Caribbean declined the freedom of action for non-
for a ninth consecutive year in governmental organisations (NGOs).
2024. The average regional index Uruguay and Costa Rica remain the
score fell from 5.68 in 2023 to region’s only “full democracies”. Haiti,
5.61. The region remains the world’s Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua
third most democratic after North are all classified by the index as
America and western Europe. It “authoritarian regimes”.
ranks above eastern Europe, Asia
and Australasia, Sub-Saharan Africa, The decline in the quality of
and the Middle East and North democracy in the region is the result
Africa. Democracy in Latin America of both long-standing and novel
and the Caribbean has its strengths social and political challenges.
and weaknesses: the region The region’s income distribution is
performs above the global average the most unequal in the world, and
on electoral process and pluralism, anaemic economic growth in recent
political participation and civil years has led to public frustration
liberties, as well as for functioning with the political establishment and
of government (although its score has fuelled political polarisation.
in the latter category is quite low); Latin America and the Caribbean
However, it is the worst-performing is the most violent region in the
region for political culture. world. According to the IMF, the
region accounts for a third of global
Of the 24 countries in the region homicides and its homicide rate
covered by the Democracy Index, is three times the global average.
17 registered a decline in their Countries in the region are also
score in 2024, five improved their grappling with the effects of the
scores and two countries recorded widespread usage of social media
no change. Jamaica, Colombia and and some have reacted in a heavy-
Brazil experienced the biggest handed manner that threatens
reversals this year, while the freedom of expression. The region’s
Dominican Republic and Mexico weak political culture is often
made the biggest improvement. expressed in support for iron-
Paraguay was demoted to a “hybrid fisted leaders who promise simple
regime” after briefly entering the solutions to complex problems and,
“flawed democracy” classification in in the process, weaken institutional
2023. Paraguay’s downgrade was checks and balances.

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Table 6
Latin America 2024
I Electoral
II Functioning
Overall Global Regional process III Political IV Political V Civil
of Regime type
score Rank rank and participation culture liberties
government
pluralism
Flawed
Argentina 6.51 54= 9 9.17 5.00 6.11 3.75 8.53
democracy
Hybrid
Bolivia 4.26 103= 20 4.33 3.93 5.56 1.88 5.59
regime
Flawed
Brazil 6.49 57 10 9.58 5.00 6.11 5.00 6.76
democracy
Flawed
Chile 7.83 29 3 9.58 7.86 6.67 5.63 9.41
democracy
Flawed
Colombia 6.35 60 11 9.17 5.71 6.11 3.13 7.65
democracy
Full
Costa Rica 8.29 18 2 9.58 7.50 7.78 6.88 9.71
democracy
Cuba 2.58 135 22 0.00 2.86 3.33 3.75 2.94 Authoritarian
Dominican Flawed
6.62 52 8 9.17 5.00 7.22 4.38 7.35
Republic democracy
Hybrid
Ecuador 5.24 85 16 8.75 5.00 5.56 1.88 5.00
regime
Hybrid
El Salvador 4.61 95 18 6.17 3.21 5.56 3.13 5.00
regime
Hybrid
Guatemala 4.55 97 19 6.08 3.93 5.00 1.88 5.88
regime
Flawed
Guyana 6.11 69 12 6.92 6.07 6.11 5.00 6.47
democracy
Haiti 2.74 131 21 0.00 0.29 2.78 5.63 5.00 Authoritarian
Hybrid
Honduras 4.98 90 17 8.75 3.93 4.44 2.50 5.29
regime
Flawed
Jamaica 6.74 49 7 8.75 6.43 5.00 5.00 8.53
democracy
Hybrid
Mexico 5.32 84 15 6.92 5.00 7.22 1.88 5.59
regime
Nicaragua 2.09 147 24 0.00 2.14 2.78 3.75 1.76 Authoritarian
Flawed
Panama 6.84 47 5 9.58 5.71 7.22 3.75 7.94
democracy
Hybrid
Paraguay 5.92 75 13 8.33 5.36 6.67 1.88 7.35
regime
Hybrid
Peru 5.69 78 14 8.75 5.71 5.00 2.50 6.47
regime
Flawed
Suriname 6.79 48 6 9.58 5.36 6.67 5.00 7.35
democracy

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Table 6
Latin America 2024
I Electoral
II Functioning
Overall Global Regional process III Political IV Political V Civil
of Regime type
score Rank rank and participation culture liberties
government
pluralism
Trinidad and Flawed
7.09 45 4 9.58 6.79 6.11 5.63 7.35
Tobago democracy
Full
Uruguay 8.67 15 1 10.00 9.29 7.78 6.88 9.41
democracy
Venezuela 2.25 142 23 0.00 1.07 5.00 3.13 2.06 Authoritarian
Regional
5.61 7.03 4.92 5.74 3.91 6.43
score
Source: EIU.

Challenges to Obrador. However, the election was

marred by high levels of violence,
representative with 37 politicians murdered in the
democracy are on course of the campaign. By contrast,
elections in the Dominican Republic
the rise and Uruguay were free and fair.

Almost 85m votes were cast in The landslide victories of Mr Bukele

the five general elections held in and Ms Sheinbaum in 2024 seem
Latin America and the Caribbean to suggest that many voters in
in 2024. The most brazen example Latin America appear willing to
of anti-democratic behaviour trade the checks and balances of
occurred in Venezuela, where representative democracy in return
the authoritarian regime of the for tangible improvements in living
president, Nicolás Maduro, engaged standards and personal security
in blatant fraud to deny opposition delivered by strong-arm rulers.
candidate Edmundo González
the presidency. In El Salvador, Since Mr Bukele took office in 2019,
the incumbent president, Nayib El Salvador’s global ranking has fallen
Bukele, secured a landslide victory, 24 places to 95th, with a 1.54-point
winning almost 85% of the vote. decline in its index score during this
Mr Bukele is extremely popular and period. Since 2020, El Salvador has
he won a clear mandate, but his been classified as a “hybrid regime”
election was made possible by a rather than a “flawed democracy”.
politicised judiciary that overruled However, Mr Bukele is the most
constitutional term limits to allow popular elected president in the
him to stand for a second term. In world, having reduced the previously
Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum of the high homicide rate in the country to
governing left-wing Morena also unprecedented lows. Many voters
won decisively by riding on the have accepted the erosion of checks
coat-tails of the popular former and balances and civil liberties in
president, Andrés Manuel López return for greater basic security.

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Salvadoreans express a growing to the national council for the

sense of confidence and satisfaction evaluation of social development
with their democracy and their policy (Coneval). Looking ahead,
lives. An impressive 72% say that the outlook for the institutions of
their country is going in a positive Mexico’s democracy appears bleak:
direction (the regional average Mr López Obrador introduced
is 28%), according to the latest last-minute constitutional reforms
Latinobarómetro survey. When asked that will require the election of all
how democratic their country is, judges, which is likely to politicise
Salvadoreans give it a score of 7.1 out the judiciary in a manner favourable
of 10, behind only the full democracies to Morena.
of Costa Rica and Uruguay. And 62%
say that they are satisfied with how The cases of El Salvador and Mexico
their democracy functions, only just illustrate how voters’ attitudes
behind Uruguay (63%). towards their democracies are
becoming disconnected from the
The situation is similar in status of representative democratic
Mexico, where the institutional institutions. It appears that many
underpinnings of democracy have citizens are prepared to accept an
been weakened by Mr López erosion of institutional democracy at
Obrador. Under his watch, Mexico the hands of strong-arm leaders in
was also reclassified as a “hybrid return for higher incomes and less
regime”, having previously been a crime. These examples show the path
“flawed democracy”. The former that other countries in the region
president’s attacks on the media, with low levels of satisfaction with
efforts to subvert independent the functioning of democracy and a
electoral, judicial and watchdog weak political culture might take if
institutions and, most worryingly, they do not resolve their economic
his enabling of a greater role for problems and governance challenges
the armed forces all weighed on in a democratic fashion. Countries
Mexico’s score. Even so, his approval in the region that are most at risk of
rating hit 74% in September 2024, electing strong-arm leaders are those
according to local polling aggregator bedevilled by high levels of corruption,
Oraculus. Mexicans rate the quality organised crime and violence, such as
of their democracy at 6.5 out of Ecuador and Honduras, both of which
10, above the regional average of are classified as “hybrid regimes”.
6.1. Polling showing a relatively
high level of confidence in the
government was a factor behind Heightened
Mexico’s improved score this year.
polarisation threatens
Mr López Obrador’s popularity, in political stability
part, reflects his policies to boost
the incomes of the poorest. The Partisan divisions in many countries
real minimum wage nearly doubled in Latin America and the Caribbean
during his tenure; as a result, the have grown more intense in recent
poverty rate fell to 37.8% in the first years. This partly reflects the growing
half of 2023 compared to 40.4% reach of social media platforms
in the first half of 2018, according that tend to amplify polarisation

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Democracy Index 2024
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Democracy index 2024 0 2 4 6 8 10

by category Electoral process 5.41
and pluralism 7.03
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Global average Functioning of 4.53
government 4.92
Latin America and the Caribbean
Political 5.33
participation 5.74

5.25
Political culture
3.91

5.35
Civil liberties
6.43

5.17
Overall score
5.61
Source: EIU.

Latin America and the 0 2 4 6 8 10

Caribbean: change in Electoral process 7.03
category scores 2023-24 and pluralism 7.07

Index score out of 10 (10=best) Functioning of 4.92

government 5.04
2024
2023 Political 5.74
participation 5.72

3.91
Political culture
4.01

6.43
Civil liberties
6.54

5.61
Overall score
5.68
Source: EIU.

by using algorithms to reinforce polarisation and has had a chilling

biases and create echo chambers. effect on dissenting voices. Improved
Partisan and ideological divisions scores for respecting private property
intensified during the first year in and a higher level of confidence
office of Argentina’s libertarian in government have partly offset
president, Javier Milei. Mr Milei, a a decline in index scores related
political outsider whose influence to freedom of expression and the
was magnified by social media, media. The example of Brazil (see
was elected on a staunchly anti- below) shows the potentially negative
establishment platform. As president, consequences of heightened
he has continued to attack the media polarisation on political stability and
and opposition political figures, democratic institutions.
which has accentuated political

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Brazil’s democracy at risk

The negative impact of political polarisation is acute in the region’s

largest democracy, Brazil. Brazil’s score underwent a sharp decline
in 2024 and the country fell six places in the global ranking, to 57th.
Political polarisation has risen over the past decade, and today 80%
of Brazilians say that conflict between those who support different
political parties is either strong or very strong, according to a 2024
survey by Pew. Elevated levels of partisan polarisation have led to
the emergence of zero-sum politics, leading to the politicisation of
Brazilian institutions and the rise of political violence.

Managing the impact of social media platforms in Brazil’s democracy

has been problematic and in 2024 the country’s Supreme Court
overstepped the mark. Since 2019 the court has been conducting
controversial investigations into the propagation of alleged
misinformation attacking Brazil’s electoral and democratic institutions,
and into threats against Supreme Court justices, mostly by online far-
right activists as part of their political discourse.

Matters came to a head in August 2024 when the Supreme Court

ordered the blocking of access to US-based social media company X,
as the company had not complied with the court’s orders to shut down
accounts that it deemed to be spreading “massive dissemination of
Nazi, racist, fascist, hateful and anti-democratic” speech and had
withdrawn its representative from Brazil (which companies need to
have for legal reasons). The court argued that X posed a “direct threat
to the integrity of the democratic process” ahead of the nationwide
October 2024 local elections. The court also threatened to impose
hefty fines on those who used virtual private networks (VPNs) to
access X. It imposed fines on Starlink, a firm that is owned by X’s
owner, Elon Musk, but that is legally distinct. The ban on X lasted
two months and affected tens of millions of users’ access to one of
the most widely used social media sites in Brazil; it was lifted once X
appointed a representative, paid its fines and agreed to block certain
users.

Restricting access to a major social media platform in this way for

several weeks has no parallel among democratic countries. The
censorship of a group of users overstepped the bounds of what can be
considered reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech, especially
in the middle of an election campaign. Making certain speech illegal,
based on vague definitions, is an example of the politicisation of
the judiciary. The ruling not only has a chilling effect on freedom of
speech, but also sets a precedent for the courts to censor political
discourse, which could unduly influence political outcomes.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that when Brazilians are

asked if they believe that the freedom of speech is guaranteed in their
country, almost 64% say it is poorly or not at all guaranteed, according
to 2023 Latinobarómetro data. This is substantially higher than the
regional average of 45%. Moreover, 62% of Brazilians say that they
do not express their opinions about the problems facing the country,
according to the 2024 Latinobarómetro survey. This is second only to
El Salvador, and well above the regional average of 44%.

Brazil’s score was also negatively affected by new details of an

alleged attempted coup plot in 2022 against the then president-elect,
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores
(PT) and members of the Supreme Court. The case alleges that the
coup plotters sought to kill Lula and also Supreme Court justices.
Supposedly, the coup was organised by the far-right former president,
Jair Bolsonaro, as well as high-level members of the armed forces
(they all deny wrongdoing). The case suggests that Brazil’s military
continues to have a low opinion of civilian rule, some 40 years after
the end of the military dictatorship. The coup plot also suggests there
is a disturbing tolerance for political violence in Brazil that is absent
in more consolidated democracies. The growing threat of political
violence was illustrated by an attack by a far-right suicide bomber on
the Supreme Court in November 2024.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Eastern Europe and Central Asia’s Georgia and Ukraine). The number
average regional score edged down of “authoritarian regimes” remained
marginally for a second consecutive unchanged from 2023, at eight:
year, from 5.37 in 2023 to 5.35 in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the
2024. In an eventful, election-filled Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan,
year, there was significant change Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. There
in the region: the scores for only five were no improvements in the overall
countries stayed the same, but ten index scores for these regimes:
countries improved their scores and the scores for half of the countries
13 experienced a decline. declined and stayed the same for the
remainder.
At 7.43, the average index score
for the countries of central Europe
(Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Repression and war
Slovenia) and the Baltics (Estonia, continue to impact
Latvia and Lithuania) significantly
exceeded the overall regional Russia and Ukraine
average, which is weighed down
by the “authoritarian regimes” The Russia-Ukraine war continued
that predominate further east. for a third year in 2024, having
Two countries from these better- a further negative effect on the
performing sub-regions improved Democracy Index scores of both
their scores sufficiently to be countries, especially those of
upgraded to “full democracies”. Russia. State repression continued
The Czech Republic and Estonia unabated in Russia, where the
registered relatively small death of opposition activist Alexei
improvements to take their scores to Navalny in prison in suspicious
8.08 and 8.13 respectively, putting circumstances in February was
them at the lower end of the “full testament to the brutality meted
democracy” classification. out to opponents of the regime. In
2024, the most prosecuted crime
Among the region’s “flawed in the country became the catch-all
democracies” are eight EU member “justification of terrorism”, replacing
states and five EU candidate “discrediting the Russian army” as
countries; four of the aspiring EU the government’s weapon of choice
members are in the western Balkans in its campaign to stifle domestic
(Albania, Montenegro, North dissent and criticism of the war.
Macedonia and Serbia) and the The proportion of prison sentences
other is Moldova. Romania’s score handed down at trial continued to
fell by 0.46 points, to 5.99, putting tick up, from 50% in 2023 to 55%
it just within the threshold to qualify of all sentences, with the average
as a “flawed democracy”: it fell duration of the prison term in “anti-
12 places in the rankings to join the war” cases also rising slightly. The
region’s four other “hybrid regimes” presidential election in March, in
(Armenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, which Vladimir Putin was able to

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 7
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 2024
I Electoral II
IV
Overall Global Regional process Functioning III Political V Civil
Political Regime type
score Rank rank and of participation liberties
culture
pluralism government
Flawed
Albania 6.20 66 14 7.00 5.71 5.00 6.25 7.06
democracy
Armenia 5.35 82 17 7.92 4.29 6.11 3.13 5.29 Hybrid regime
Azerbaijan 2.80 126= 23 0.50 2.50 3.33 5.00 2.65 Authoritarian
Belarus 1.99 152 26 0.00 0.79 3.33 4.38 1.47 Authoritarian
Bosnia and
5.06 88 18 7.00 3.64 5.00 3.75 5.88 Hybrid regime
Hercegovina
Flawed
Bulgaria 6.34 61 11 8.75 5.36 5.56 4.38 7.65
democracy
Flawed
Croatia 6.50 56 10 9.17 6.07 6.11 4.38 6.76
democracy
Czech Full
8.08 23= 2 9.58 6.43 7.78 7.50 9.12
Republic democracy
Full
Estonia 8.13 21= 1 10.00 8.57 6.67 6.88 8.53
democracy
Georgia 4.70 94 20 5.67 3.21 5.56 3.75 5.29 Hybrid regime
Flawed
Hungary 6.51 54= 9 8.75 5.71 4.44 6.88 6.76
democracy
Kazakhstan 3.08 118 22 0.50 3.21 5.00 3.75 2.94 Authoritarian
Kyrgyz
3.52 111 21 3.42 1.86 3.89 3.13 5.29 Authoritarian
Republic
Flawed
Latvia 7.66 33 4 10.00 7.14 6.67 6.25 8.24
democracy
Flawed
Lithuania 7.59 36 5 10.00 7.14 6.67 5.63 8.53
democracy
Flawed
Moldova 6.04 71 15 6.50 5.36 7.22 4.38 6.76
democracy
Flawed
Montenegro 6.73 50 8 8.75 7.14 6.67 3.75 7.35
democracy
North Flawed
6.28 62 12 8.75 6.07 6.11 3.13 7.35
Macedonia democracy
Flawed
Poland 7.40 39 6 10.00 6.43 6.67 6.25 7.65
democracy
Romania 5.99 72 16 8.25 5.36 5.56 3.75 7.06 Hybrid regime
Russia 2.03 150= 25 0.00 2.14 2.22 3.75 2.06 Authoritarian
Flawed
Serbia 6.26 64 13 7.83 5.71 6.67 3.75 7.35
democracy

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Table 7
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 2024
I Electoral II
IV
Overall Global Regional process Functioning III Political V Civil
Political Regime type
score Rank rank and of participation liberties
culture
pluralism government
Flawed
Slovakia 7.21 42 7 10.00 6.07 6.11 5.63 8.24
democracy
Flawed
Slovenia 7.82 30 3 9.58 7.50 7.22 6.25 8.53
democracy
Tajikistan 1.83 159 27 0.00 2.21 1.67 4.38 0.88 Authoritarian
Turkmenistan 1.66 161 28 0.00 0.79 2.22 5.00 0.29 Authoritarian
Ukraine 4.90 92 19 5.17 2.71 7.22 5.00 4.41 Hybrid regime
Uzbekistan 2.10 146 24 0.00 1.86 2.78 5.00 0.88 Authoritarian
Regional score 5.35 6.18 4.68 5.34 4.82 5.72
Source: EIU.

Democracy index 2024 0 2 4 6 8 10

by category Electoral process 5.41
and pluralism 6.18
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Global average Functioning of 4.53
government 4.68
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Political 5.33
participation 5.34

5.25
Political culture
4.82

5.35
Civil liberties
5.72

5.17
Overall score
5.35
Source: EIU.

Eastern Europe and 0 2 4 6 8 10

Central Asia: change in Electoral process 6.18
category scores 2023-24 and pluralism 6.27

Index score out of 10 (10=best) Functioning of 4.68

government 4.73
2024
2023 Political 5.34
participation 5.30

4.82
Political culture
4.80

5.72
Civil liberties
5.77

5.35
Overall score
5.37
Source: EIU.

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Democracy Index 2024
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stand for a fifth term following the territory, inhabited by more than
constitutional change of 2020, was 3m Ukrainians, is under occupation
neither free nor fair. The incumbent by Russia; more than 6m Ukrainians
stood more or less unchallenged, are living as refugees in Europe; it is
after numerous potential opponents impossible to guarantee the security
were barred from standing, including of voters; and there would be no
Mr Navalny (who died a few weeks level playing field for all political
before the poll) and “anti-war” parties. However, surveys indicate
candidate Boris Nadezhdin. The that if a vote was held today, the
election was marred by the now president would lose.
familiar intimidation and widespread
fraud that accompany modern
Russian voting. Mr Putin was re-
elected with 88% of the vote, the Russia’s influence
highest percentage in post-Soviet on politics extends
Russia, in what was a foregone
conclusion. beyond its borders
Ukraine’s overall index score Russia’s influence loomed large
continued to deteriorate in 2024. over several elections in the region
The centralisation of power in the in 2024. Nowhere was this more
office of the president, Volodomyr evident than in Moldova, which
Zelenskyi, and the sidelining held a presidential election in
of government, parliament, the October 2024 and a constitutional
media and the opposition, has referendum in November. Allegations
been implemented alongside a of Russian interference included
robust interpretation of martial the dissemination of misinformation,
law, sparking criticism that the direct financial transfers to voters,
law is being used to insulate the and intimidation and threats against
presidency from political pressure those supporting the country’s EU
and extend the power of the office membership. Moldova’s overall index
of the president. Mobilisation efforts score fell from 6.23 in 2023 to 6.04
have run into problems as the death in 2024, and hence it just managed
count rises and demoralisation to retain its classification as a
creeps in, and the state has resorted “flawed democracy”. The main driver
to using roaming conscription of the deterioration in the country’s
gangs to drag men off the streets overall score was a sharp decline in
and into the army. Exhaustion and the electoral process and pluralism
frustration with progress in the war category, the score for which
have undermined public confidence declined from 7.42 in 2023 to 6.50.
in the state and in Mr Zelenskyi The European election monitoring
personally. Presidential elections organisation, the OSCE, assessed
which would normally have taken the polls themselves as well run,
place in March or April 2024 were while noting biased media coverage
suspended along with the legislative and legal deficiencies. However,
polls, according to martial law. the undisputable intervention
Organising free and fair elections of a foreign power in an attempt
in present circumstances would to influence the outcome led to
be impossible: 20% of Ukraine’s downgrades for several indicators.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Russian interference failed to the year ended with large

prevent either the re-election of street protests.
Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu,
or the passing of the constitutional
referendum, but the narrow margin of
victory, secured in large measure by Murky decisions
the votes of the Moldovan diaspora, lead to Romanian
underlines the deep divisions in the
country. These divisions are real, downgrade
based on disagreement over the
future orientation of the country Romanian citizens responded with
and dissatisfaction with economic a mixture of anger and relief to
conditions, and provide Russia with the decision of the Constitutional
fertile ground to try to influence Court to annul the results of the
voters. Moscow will no doubt seek to first round of the presidential
exploit these fractures as Moldova election on November 24th and to
heads into a legislative election cancel the second round due on
in 2025. December 8th. In a flimsy ruling,
without producing hard evidence
Russia also played a significant role to support its decision, the court
in Georgia’s politics in 2024, albeit alleged that a foreign influence
indirectly rather than through direct operation on social media had
intervention. Georgia recorded influenced the election outcome.
the steepest deterioration of any The first round had been won by two
country in the region in 2024: its anti-mainstream candidates, who
index score fell from 5.20 in 2023 edged out the candidates from the
to 4.70. The controversial passage ruling parties, which have become
of the transparency and foreign extremely unpopular. The court’s
influence bill, dubbed the “foreign decision to cancel the election,
agents’ law” by the opposition based on murky intelligence
after the Russian law of a similar reports of Russian election
name, prompted huge protests in interference, is an extraordinary
the spring. Legislative elections in measure, as the evidence was,
October became a contest between at best, questionable. The claim
two opposing views of Georgia’s that voters for right-wing outsider
future direction, either towards Calin Georgescu were widely
Russia or the EU, as represented influenced by a TikTok campaign
by contending political forces in the strains credibility, especially
government and opposition. The vote given the social composition of
itself was marred by abnormalities, Mr Georgescu’s supporters, many
including pressure on journalists and of whom are older rural voters who
NGOs and allegations of vote buying consume their news from television
and ballot stuffing. The opposition (which is dominated by the ruling
raised concerns about the influence parties). Evidence subsequently
of the governing Georgian Dream emerged that one of the ruling
party over bodies tasked with parties, the National Liberal Party
electoral oversight. The incumbent (PNL), provided funding for the
ruling party won the election, and social media campaign in support

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

of Mr Georgescu, in a tactical move Small gains for the

that backfired. The debacle will
only undermine further Romanian Baltic states and
citizens’ extremely low levels of trust central European
in government and political parties.
countries, mixed
Romania was ranked at the lower
end of the “flawed democracy”
results in the western
classification and so the decline Balkans
in its overall score of 0.46 points
(from 6.45 to 5.99) in 2024 was The reclassification of the Czech
enough to result in its downgrade Republic and Estonia as “full
to a “hybrid regime”. The election democracies” is a big step forward
annulment adversely affected the for the region, which had not had
country’s score for electoral process a top-ranked country since 2013,
and pluralism, but downgrades to as the Czech Republic lost its “full
other scores would have occurred democracy” status the following
even without the end-of-year year. Estonia has never previously
debacle. Survey data confirmed scored 8.00 or more in the
that public trust in political parties Democracy Index. An improvement
and government has fallen even in the political participation score
lower over the past year, resulting for the Czech Republic, following
in several downgrades for indicator government efforts to engage voters,
scores in the functioning of lifted its overall score from 7.97 to
government category. In line with 8.08. In Estonia, an improvement in
a global benchmarking exercise, the functioning of government score
Romania’s score for the prevalence was the result of consistently strong
of corruption was also downgraded. e-government initiatives, which have
There is a risk that Romania’s score improved transparency.
could fall further in 2025, depending
on how it handles the re-run of the Small adjustments of this sort were
presidential election, and on what repeated in most EU countries
else emerges about the original in the region, with only Bulgaria,
basis for cancelling the election. Hungary and Romania registering a
Moves by the government to change deterioration in their index scores.
the electoral rules governing In Hungary, a decline in public
the conduct of social media in confidence in government and
elections and by the ruling parties political parties and a downgrade
to stymie the chances of victory for in the country’s corruption score
an anti-establishment candidate resulted in a worsening of the
do not bode well for the health of functioning of government score
democracy in Romania. from 6.79 in 2023 to 5.71 in 2024.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Bulgaria’s corruption score also of government and overall index

worsened, resulting in a minor scores, keeping them close to the
decline in its overall score. bottom of the “flawed democracy”
The country continues to suffer classification.
from intense political fragmentation
and instability, but this was already
captured in the index in previous
years. Croatia had the distinction Entrenching
of being the only EU country in authoritarian rule in
central Europe to register no change
in its score. It continues to rank Central Asia
fairly low in the “flawed democracy”
classification, in 56th place in the The score for every country in
rankings with a score of 6.50. Its Central Asia either declined or
low scores for political culture, stayed the same. Turkmenistan
functioning of government, political remains the bottom-ranked county
participation and civil liberties in the region, in 161st place,
contrast with a high score for with a score of 1.66 that has not
electoral process and pluralism, and changed since 2020. Tajikistan’s
suggest that the substance or quality score slipped from 1.94 in 2023
of democracy leaves a lot to be to 1.83, after downgrades to the
desired, despite the existence of the score for political participation , as
formal institutions and processes. the president, Emomali Rahmon,
retains total control over the political
The index results for the EU sphere. Uzbekistan’s score also fell
candidate countries in the western in 2024, from 2.12 to 2.10, but it rose
Balkans were mixed in 2024. Among two places to 146th in the index
the improvers, North Macedonia’s ranking as a result of bigger negative
overall score rose from 6.03 to 6.28 movements in other countries.
following a generally free and fair
election which led to a change of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic
government in the second quarter. are ranked higher up the index, in
Montenegro’s pace of improvement 118th and 111th places respectively,
slowed following bigger gains in but they are far from being upgraded
previous years, but its index score from the “authoritarian regime”
still rose from 6.67 to 6.73 following grouping. Kazakhstan’s scores
a small increase in its civil liberties were unchanged, but the Kyrgyz
score. Bosnia and Hercegovina’s Republic’s score for electoral
score rose from 5.00 to 5.06, as an process and pluralism fell from
improvement in its political culture 4.33 to 3.42. The Kyrgyz regime
score was almost cancelled out also instigated a crackdown on the
by a lower score for functioning media in 2024, as the president,
of government. Downgrades to Sadyr Japarov, and the chairman of
their corruption scores meant that the State Committee for National
Albania and Serbia both lost 0.07 Security, Kamchybek Tashiev, moved
points, affecting their functioning to quash dissent.

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Asia and Australasia

The democratic landscape in in the region’s average index score
this region presents a complex falling below that of eastern Europe
picture. Although home to some and Central Asia. The region now
of the world’s most vibrant outperforms only Sub-Saharan
democracies, in recent years there Africa and the Middle East and
has been a gradual drift away North Africa.
from representative democracy.
This continued in 2024, when the The deterioration in the region’s
average index score for the Asia overall performance occurred
and Australasia region fell from across four of the five categories of
5.41 in 2023 to 5.31. Of the 28 the index in 2024, with the largest
countries in the region covered by decline coming in the functioning
the Democracy Index, only seven of government (-0.33) category.
improved their score in 2024, There were also notable declines
while 15 registered a deterioration. in the civil liberties (-0.16) and
Bangladesh, South Korea and electoral process and pluralism
Pakistan were the worst performers, (-0.12) categories. Previously one
falling in the global rankings by 25, of the relative strengths of the
ten and six places respectively. region, functioning of government
is now the weakest category,
The region now hosts fewer “full with an aggregate score of 5.19.
democracies” compared to previous The region also performs poorly
years, with the number falling to on political participation, with the
four from five in 2023, as a result aggregate score of 5.20, below the
of the problematic developments global average of 5.33. In 2024,
in South Korea, which resulted large-scale political unrest and
in the country’s demotion to the the increased role of the military
“flawed democracy” classification. badly dented some of these
Democratic backsliding has not category scores. The declaration of
been universal across the region, martial law in South Korea and the
however, as countries such as subsequent political stand-off led to
Australia, India and Japan improved downgrades in the country’s scores
their scores in 2024. Nevertheless, for functioning of government and for
the protracted nature of the decline political culture.
in democratic standards, now
spanning five years, has resulted

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Table 8
Asia & Australasia 2024
I Electoral
Overall Global Regional II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
process and Regime type
score Rank rank of government participation culture liberties
pluralism
Afghanistan 0.25 167 28 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.00 Authoritarian
Full
Australia 8.85 11 2 10.00 8.57 7.22 8.75 9.71
democracy
Hybrid
Bangladesh 4.44 100= 20 6.08 2.57 5.00 5.00 3.53
regime
Hybrid
Bhutan 5.65 79 16 8.75 5.93 3.89 5.00 4.71
regime
Cambodia 2.94 123 21 0.00 2.36 5.00 5.00 2.35 Authoritarian
China 2.11 145 24 0.00 3.21 3.33 3.13 0.88 Authoritarian
Hybrid
Fiji 5.39 81 17 6.58 5.00 4.44 5.63 5.29
regime
Hybrid
Hong Kong 5.09 87 18 2.75 4.00 3.89 6.88 7.94
regime
Flawed
India 7.29 41 6 8.67 7.50 7.22 6.88 6.18
democracy
Flawed
Indonesia 6.44 59 11 7.92 6.79 7.22 5.00 5.29
democracy
Full
Japan 8.48 16 4 9.58 8.93 6.67 8.13 9.12
democracy
Laos 1.71 160 25 0.00 2.86 1.67 3.75 0.29 Authoritarian
Flawed
Malaysia 7.11 44 7 9.58 7.14 6.67 6.25 5.88
democracy
Flawed
Mongolia 6.53 53 10 8.75 5.71 6.67 5.63 5.88
democracy
Myanmar 0.96 166 27 0.00 0.00 1.67 3.13 0.00 Authoritarian
Hybrid
Nepal 4.60 96 19 4.83 5.36 5.00 2.50 5.29
regime
New Full
9.61 2 1 10.00 9.29 10.00 8.75 10.00
Zealand democracy
North Korea 1.08 165 26 0.00 2.50 1.67 1.25 0.00 Authoritarian
Pakistan 2.84 124= 22 0.83 4.29 2.78 2.50 3.82 Authoritarian
Papua New Hybrid
5.97 73 15 6.92 6.07 3.89 5.63 7.35
Guinea regime
Flawed
Philippines 6.63 51 9 8.75 4.64 8.33 4.38 7.06
democracy
Flawed
Singapore 6.18 68 14 5.33 7.14 4.44 7.50 6.47
democracy
South Flawed
7.75 32 5 9.58 7.50 7.22 5.63 8.82
Korea democracy

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Democracy Index 2024
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Table 8
Asia & Australasia 2024
I Electoral
Overall Global Regional II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
process and Regime type
score Rank rank of government participation culture liberties
pluralism
Flawed
Sri Lanka 6.19 67 13 7.00 4.29 7.22 6.25 6.18
democracy
Full
Taiwan 8.78 12 3 10.00 8.57 7.78 8.13 9.41
democracy
Flawed
Thailand 6.27 63 12 6.50 5.00 8.33 5.63 5.88
democracy
Flawed
Timor-Leste 7.03 46 8 9.58 6.07 5.56 6.88 7.06
democracy
Vietnam 2.62 133 23 0.00 3.93 2.78 3.75 2.65 Authoritarian
Regional
5.31 5.64 5.19 5.20 5.29 5.25
score
Source: EIU.

Democracy index 2024

0 2 4 6 8 10
by category
Electoral process 5.41
Index score out of 10 (10=best) and pluralism 5.64
Global average Functioning of 4.53
Asia & Australasia government 5.19

Political 5.33
participation 5.20

5.25
Political culture
5.29

5.35
Civil liberties
5.25

5.17
Overall score
5.31
Source: EIU.

Asia & Australasia: change in 0 2 4 6 8 10

category scores 2023-24 Electoral process 5.64
and pluralism 5.76
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
2024 Functioning of 5.19
government 5.52
2023
Political 5.20
participation 5.22

5.29
Political culture
5.22

5.25
Civil liberties
5.32

5.31
Overall score
5.41
Source: EIU.

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Democracy Index 2024
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Dynastic politics limiting opportunities of entry for

new political leaders from different
and democratic backgrounds.
backsliding in
Such concentrations of political
Southeast Asia power among a few family dynasties
do not only lead to the accumulation
There were some troubling of immense personal wealth. These
developments in Southeast Asia dynasties exert enormous influence
in 2024. One cause for concern is over public institutions and limit
a trend towards dynastic politics broader democratic participation.
across the sub-region. The They also tend to be change-averse
emergence of descendants of former and stymie efforts to reform the
leaders as political players raises system. The quality of governance
concerns about the concentration suffers as dynastic politicians are
of power in the hands of a few more likely to engage in rent-seeking
prominent political-economic behaviour, working with special
families and the creation of interest groups and allocating public
patronage networks that undermine resources for personal gain rather
the functioning of democratic than the public good.
institutions.
Elsewhere in the sub-region in
This trend is particularly evident 2024, democratic backsliding
in Thailand, Indonesia and the undermined representative
Philippines, and could undermine democracy, weakened institutional
the electoral process and political accountability and strained social
pluralism if it becomes entrenched. cohesion. In Indonesia, a presidential
In Thailand, the enduring influence election brought to power Prabowo
of former prime minister Thaksin Subianto, a former military general
Shinawatra’s family illustrates the with a controversial past, who had
resilience of political dynasties. the tacit support of former president
Almost two decades after his Joko Widodo. Mr Prabowo’s alliance
ousting, his daughter, Paetongtarn with his predecessor has raised
Shinawatra, became the country’s fears about a centralisation of power
youngest prime minister in August and a lack of checks and balances.
2024. This example shows The appointment of Jokowi’s son,
how political families leverage Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as
historical political capital to play a vice-president—a move enabled
contemporary political role. by a controversial ruling from the
Constitutional Court—seemed to
It is a similar story in the Philippines, confirm suspicions that the past and
where prominent families continue present presidents were in cahoots
to dominate the political landscape. to their mutual benefit. A change
The son of former dictator Ferdinand in the Constitutional Court law in
Marcos and the daughter of former Indonesia has also undermined the
president Rodrigo Duterte have independence of the judiciary.
both secured positions of power.
This has the effect of reinforcing Thailand experienced similar
established power structures and democratic backsliding in 2024,

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Democracy Index 2024
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with the judiciary playing a role in and manipulating the election result.
influencing electoral outcomes. The Similarly, in Pakistan’s general
Constitutional Court banned the election in February, there were
Move Forward Party, a progressive allegations of political repression
party that had won the most seats in and interference by the authorities.
the 2023 general election but had Elections in India were generally
been unable to form a government. judged to be free and fair, but the
The court’s decision confirmed that ruling party’s dominant influence
the conservative establishment over news media allowed it to shape
is still able under the current the political narrative.
constitution to thwart democratic
aspirations by managing the In Sri Lanka, there was a major
electoral process and its outcomes. political shift in 2024, with the
These developments raise questions unexpected victory of the left-
about the future of representative leaning National People’s Power
governance and political stability in (NPP) in both the presidential
the region. and parliamentary elections. The
outcome was a rebuke to the
long-ruling political establishment,
reflecting strong public demand for
South Asia had a change and accountability. Similarly,
tumultuous year in India’s election resulted in an
important political change: the ruling
2024 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lost its
single-party parliamentary majority
A series of dramatic events in South for the first time since 2014. Voters
Asia in 2024 casts significant doubt prioritised economic concerns such
over the future democratic trajectory as unemployment and living costs
of the sub-region. Countries such over the BJP’s divisive religious
as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and rhetoric. Despite the rigging of the
Sri Lanka have faced significant election in Bangladesh, grassroots
challenges to their democratic movements emerged as agents
processes, including electoral for change. Youth-led initiatives
manipulation, divisive politics helped to foster a sense of agency
and political unrest. However, among younger generations who are
there are also signs of increased increasingly disillusioned with the
civic engagement and grassroots established political parties.
movements that point to the
potential for more democratisation. Despite these positive
developments, divisions based
Elections in South Asia in 2024 on religious and caste identities
were marred by fraud and violence. are used by ruling elites to shape
In Bangladesh, which held a general national political narratives and
election in January, there were sway voters. In Bangladesh, the
widespread allegations that the protests that ousted long-serving
ruling party suppressed dissent prime minister Sheikh Hasina
and curtailed media freedoms. revealed the intersection of political
The government was accused of unrest and sectarian violence.
intimidating opposition candidates The protests were not merely

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Democracy Index 2024
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directed against Sheikh Hasina’s declared martial law, accusing

autocratic governance, but also the opposition-led parliament
revealed a strong undercurrent of of “anti-state acts”. Martial law
anti-Hindu sentiment. Following the was lifted a few hours later, after
resignation of the prime minister parliament voted to revoke it with
in August 2024, violent communal the support of legislators from
attacks targeted individuals from across the political spectrum.
minorities and their properties. In Yoon Suk-Yeol was subsequently
India, the BJP has stoked religious stripped of presidential power as the
sectarianism and fostered an National Assembly (the unicameral
environment in which anti-Muslim parliament) passed an impeachment
sentiment is not only tolerated but motion with a constitutionally
often encouraged by political elites. required two-thirds majority
The increasing resort to identity amid public protests and strikes
politics by political actors looking to demanding the president’s removal.
build support is having a negative
impact on social cohesion. Although South Korea’s parliament
and the general public demonstrated
The prospects for democracy in the widespread respect for
South Asia remain uncertain. The democratic institutions in the
democratic reversal in Bangladesh country, the episode served as
in 2024 may prove temporary if a reminder of the comparatively
forthcoming elections are conducted short track record (37 years) and
freely and fairly. In Sri Lanka, relative frailty of democracy in South
the political landscape remains Korea. It refocused attention on the
unpredictable and democratic historical incidence of declarations
institutions are fragile. Further of martial law (17 since 1948).
democratisation will depend largely
on the ability of civil societies to The president’s attempt to impose
sustain pressure for reforms and the martial law exposed some of
willingness of political institutions the institutional and behavioural
to embrace greater pluralism and weaknesses of South Korea’s
inclusivity. political system. For example, the
president’s authority to declare
martial law (in a state of emergency)
is enshrined in the constitution.
South Korea’s The deep-rooted acrimony
democracy wobbles between political parties and an
unwillingness to compromise makes
South Korea’s overall index the political system more unstable
score declined in 2024 to 7.75, than it might first appear. Finally,
from 8.09 in 2023, resulting in the extreme political polarisation
its reclassification as a “flawed that characterises the country’s
democracy”. On December 3rd polity increases the risk of political
2024, South Korea’s conservative violence and social unrest.
president, Yoon Suk-Yeol,

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Sub-Saharan Africa
The Democracy Index score for registered by far the biggest decline
Sub-Saharan Africa declined for a of 0.11 points. This is a consequence
second consecutive year in 2024. of government inefficiency and a
The regional average score dropped growing lack of trust among citizens
from 4.04 in 2023 to a record low of in governments’ capacity to improve
4.00. The deterioration over the past living conditions. This remains the
decade, from a regional high of 4.38 in weakest category in Sub-Saharan
2015, is the result of several factors. A Africa, with a score of 2.98. On
significant contributor to this decline this metric, Mauritius is the best-
is the rise of military rule within the performing country, scoring 7.86,
region’s “coup belt”, stretching from while the five worst-performing
Guinea in the west to Sudan in the (Burundi, Central African Republic,
east. Additionally, authoritarian rulers Chad, Guinea-Bissau and Mali)
have maintained their grip on power score 0.00.
through elections that lack fairness
and transparency. Furthermore, The region also recorded slight
inadequate state capacity has led declines in the average scores for
to the emergence of armed militias electoral process and pluralism
that operate independently or in the (3.41), political participation (4.43)
service of specific political agendas. and civil liberties (4.02). Notably,
These governance failures have the score for electoral process and
fostered growing disillusionment with pluralism remains significantly below
governments across the continent, the global average of 5.41. The only
leading to increased political area that showed any improvement
instability and, at times, violent social was political culture, the score
unrest. for which increased marginally
by 0.02 points, owing to positive
changes in a few countries, including
Senegal.
A lack of state
capacity and Of the region’s 44 countries
covered by the Democracy Index,
government 20 registered a deterioration in
dysfunction are their score, with the sharpest drops
recorded in Guinea-Bissau (-0.43),
derailing democracy Benin (-0.24), Comoros (-0.20) and
Burkina Faso, Eswatini, Mali and
The decline in the region’s overall Mauritania (-0.18). The scores for
index score was driven by a broad- seven countries improved—albeit
based decline across four of the from a low base—with the biggest
five index categories. The score improvement in Senegal (+0.45).
for functioning of government

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Democracy Index 2024
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Table 9
Sub-Saharan Africa 2024
I Electoral IV
Overall Global Regional II Functioning III Political V Civil
process and Political Regime type
score Rank rank of government participation liberties
pluralism culture
Angola 4.05 107 21 4.50 2.86 5.56 5.00 2.35 Hybrid regime
Benin 4.44 100= 17 1.75 5.36 4.44 6.25 4.41 Hybrid regime
Flawed
Botswana 7.63 35 2 9.58 6.43 6.11 7.50 8.53
democracy
Burkina Faso 2.55 137 33 0.00 2.14 3.33 3.75 3.53 Authoritarian
Burundi 2.13 144 37 0.00 0.00 3.89 5.00 1.76 Authoritarian
Flawed
Cabo Verde 7.58 37= 3 9.17 6.64 6.67 6.88 8.53
democracy
Cameroon 2.56 136 32 0.33 2.14 3.89 4.38 2.06 Authoritarian
Central
African 1.18 164 44 0.00 0.00 1.67 1.88 2.35 Authoritarian
Republic
Chad 1.89 158 43 0.00 0.00 3.33 3.75 2.35 Authoritarian
Comoros 2.84 124= 28 0.83 2.21 3.89 3.75 3.53 Authoritarian
Congo
2.79 128= 29 0.00 2.50 4.44 3.75 3.24 Authoritarian
(Brazzaville)
Côte d’Ivoire 4.22 105 19 4.33 2.86 4.44 5.63 3.82 Hybrid regime
Democratic
Republic of 1.92 156= 42 2.08 0.43 2.78 3.13 1.18 Authoritarian
Congo
Djibouti 2.70 132 30 0.00 1.64 3.89 5.63 2.35 Authoritarian
Equatorial
1.92 156= 41 0.00 0.43 3.33 4.38 1.47 Authoritarian
Guinea
Eritrea 1.97 153 40 0.00 2.14 0.56 6.88 0.29 Authoritarian
Eswatini 2.60 134 31 0.00 1.64 2.78 5.63 2.94 Authoritarian
Ethiopia 3.24 116 25 0.42 2.86 6.11 5.63 1.18 Authoritarian
Gabon 2.18 143 36 0.83 1.14 2.22 3.75 2.94 Authoritarian
Gambia 4.47 99 16 4.42 4.29 3.89 5.63 4.12 Hybrid regime
Flawed
Ghana 6.24 65 6 8.33 4.64 6.11 6.25 5.88
democracy
Guinea 2.04 149 38 0.00 0.43 3.33 4.38 2.06 Authoritarian
Guinea-
2.03 150= 39 2.17 0.00 2.78 3.13 2.06 Authoritarian
Bissau
Kenya 5.05 89 14 3.50 5.36 6.67 5.63 4.12 Hybrid regime

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Democracy Index 2024
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Table 9
Sub-Saharan Africa 2024
I Electoral IV
Overall Global Regional II Functioning III Political V Civil
process and Political Regime type
score Rank rank of government participation liberties
pluralism culture
Flawed
Lesotho 6.06 70 7 9.17 3.79 5.56 5.63 6.18
democracy
Liberia 5.57 80 11 7.83 2.71 6.11 5.63 5.59 Hybrid regime
Madagascar 5.33 83 12 6.58 3.93 6.11 5.63 4.41 Hybrid regime
Malawi 5.85 76 9 7.00 4.29 5.56 6.25 6.18 Hybrid regime
Mali 2.40 139 34 0.00 0.00 5.00 4.38 2.65 Authoritarian
Mauritania 3.96 108 22 3.50 3.21 5.56 3.13 4.41 Authoritarian
Full
Mauritius 8.23 20 1 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.75 8.82
democracy
Mozambique 3.38 113 23 1.67 1.43 5.56 5.00 3.24 Authoritarian
Flawed
Namibia 6.48 58 5 7.42 5.36 6.67 5.00 7.94
democracy
Niger 2.26 141 35 0.33 1.14 1.67 3.75 4.41 Authoritarian
Nigeria 4.16 106 20 5.17 3.57 3.89 3.75 4.41 Hybrid regime
Rwanda 3.34 114 24 1.42 4.29 3.33 5.00 2.65 Authoritarian
Senegal 5.93 74 8 7.42 5.36 4.44 6.25 6.18 Hybrid regime
Sierra Leone 4.32 102 18 4.83 2.86 3.89 5.00 5.00 Hybrid regime
Flawed
South Africa 7.16 43 4 9.17 6.79 7.78 5.00 7.06
democracy
Tanzania 5.20 86 13 4.42 5.00 5.00 6.88 4.71 Hybrid regime
Togo 2.99 121 26 0.92 2.14 3.33 5.63 2.94 Authoritarian
Uganda 4.49 98 15 3.42 3.57 3.89 6.88 4.71 Hybrid regime
Zambia 5.73 77 10 7.92 3.29 5.00 6.88 5.59 Hybrid regime
Zimbabwe 2.98 122 27 0.00 2.50 4.44 5.00 2.94 Authoritarian
Regional
4.00 3.41 2.98 4.43 5.16 4.02
score
Source: EIU.

The continent has only one full 15 in 2023, owing to a downgrade

democracy (Mauritius) and six of Mauritania to an “authoritarian
“flawed democracies”, unchanged regime”. This was driven by a decline
from the 2023 index. The number in the voter turnout in the June
of countries classified as “hybrid 2024 presidential election and in
regimes” has decreased to 14, from the degree of political participation

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Democracy Index 2024
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Democracy index 2024 0 2 4 6 8 10

by category Electoral process 5.41
and pluralism 3.41
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Global average Functioning of 4.53
government 2.98
Sub-Saharan Africa
Political 5.33
participation 4.43

5.25
Political culture
5.16

5.35
Civil liberties
4.02

5.17
Overall score
4.00
Source: EIU.

Sub-Saharan Africa: change 0 2 4 6 8 10

in category scores 2023-24 Electoral process 3.41
and pluralism 3.44
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
2024 Functioning of 2.98
government 3.09
2023
Political 4.43
participation 4.46

5.16
Political culture
5.14

4.02
Civil liberties
4.06

4.00
Overall score
4.04
Source: EIU.

generally. As a result, the number of political turmoil and problematic

“authoritarian regimes” increased to electoral processes. Some ruling
23, making this the most prevalent parties maintained their hold on
form of government in Africa. power, including through fraudulent
and violent means, while in other
instances, incumbents were ousted
by opposition forces. The peaceful
A big election year transfer of power in Botswana,
delivered mixed Ghana, Mauritius and Senegal, and
the loss of the ruling party’s majority
results in South Africa, demonstrated the
strength of democratic institutions
More than a dozen elections took and citizens’ aspirations for political
place across the continent in 2024, change. Economic hardship and
highlighting the diversity of electoral corruption fuelled widespread
systems and political pluralism. dissatisfaction and anti-incumbent
Although some countries exhibited sentiment in many elections.
impressive resilience and managed In Senegal, citizens demanded
to facilitate peaceful transitions accountability and took to the
of power, others grappled with streets to express their frustrations,

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Democracy Index 2024
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and ultimately achieved a change high voter turnout of around 76%.

in government through the electoral Leading opposition candidates, from
process. In contrast, Mozambique’s the Parti socialiste sans frontières,
long-standing Frelimo regime proved were arrested in the run-up to the
resistant to change, resorting to a election and two members of the
violent crackdown on protesters. party were killed during a police
In the ensuing unrest, hundreds of operation at their offices.
civilians died at the hands of the
security forces.
Rigged elections keep
Entrenchment of authoritarian leaders
military rule continues in power
In 2024, there were no military Numerous countries in Sub-Saharan
coups, which provided a welcome Africa call themselves democracies,
relief after the region had suffered but are classified as “hybrid regimes”
seven coups since 2020. However, or “authoritarian regimes” in our
military authority became further index. They tend to have tightly
entrenched in various countries controlled electoral systems.
across west and central Africa. For instance, they may maintain
In the Sahel region, elections in multiparty systems that allow
Burkina Faso and Mali, originally opposition parties to participate
scheduled for July as part of their in elections. Nonetheless, these
respective political transitions, were regimes impose severe restrictions
indefinitely postponed, prolonging on the activities of opposition
military rule in these nations. As a groups, tightly control the electoral
result, Burkina Faso’s overall score process, and may resort to outright
fell from 2.73 to 2.55.The military election manipulation when they
junta in Niger has yet to announce deem it necessary. They exert
any plans for a transition since influence over critical institutions,
taking control in July 2023, aligning including the judiciary and the
itself with Mali and Burkina Faso. media, and dispense patronage
In July 2024, these three junta-led to secure loyalty and support. In
nations established an alliance countries such as Chad, Comoros
known as the Confederation of Sahel and Mozambique, ruling parties have
States, signalling their intention resorted to tactics such as voter
to work together to maintain their intimidation, suppression of dissent
grip on power. In Chad, Mahamat and blatant vote-rigging, which have
Idriss Déby Itno, who assumed the often led to violent unrest at election
country’s leadership in an internal time.
coup after his father’s death in April
2021, was declared the victor in the Mozambique’s Frelimo party has
May 2024 presidential election. maintained its grip on power since
However, the election was marred by the nation gained independence
the military’s control of the political from Portugal in 1975. In presidential
landscape, rendering it neither and legislative elections held in
free nor fair, despite a relatively October, the party’s new leader,

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Democracy Index 2024
What’s wrong with representative democracy?

Daniel Chapo, achieved a decisive and restrictions on political

victory amid significant competition. demonstrations as a means to
Meanwhile, the presidential election suppress dissent. This trend has
in Comoros in January had a driven a decline in the civil liberties
record-low voter turnout of 16.3%, category, the regional score for
a sharp drop from 53.8% in 2019. which fell to 4.02 in 2024, from
This record abstention points to 4.06 previously. In Mozambique,
growing disillusionment among after the general election on
the public about the prospects for October 9th, the authorities
achieving political change at the intermittently cut off internet access
ballot box. The opposition has raised across all mobile networks to curb
concerns over the re-election of the the flow of information related to
incumbent president, Colonel Azali anti-government protests. Other
Assoumani, who heads the ruling countries that experienced internet
party, Convention pour le renouveau shutdowns in 2024 included Chad,
des Comores, alleging widespread Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania.
electoral fraud. Consequently, Meanwhile, Angola enacted a new
Comoros’s political participation law in August 2024 that criminalises
score has fallen to 3.89, from 4.44 violent protests and the destruction
in 2023. of public property. Individuals
participating in protests that involve
In Guinea-Bissau, the president, any form of vandalism could face up
Umaro Sissoco Embaló, has to 25 years in prison if convicted.
postponed the parliamentary This legislation also prohibits the
election originally slated for filming or photographing of public
November,without providing a services, including documenting
new date. He cited insufficient actions against protesters, further
financial resources and technical eroding freedom of expression and
challenges faced by the electoral assembly.
commission as reasons for
the delay. This announcement
followed Mr Embaló’s controversial
dissolution of an opposition-led Elsewhere, the
parliament in December 2023, opposition took power
a move widely interpreted as an
effort to silence opposition voices through the ballot box
within the legislature. Additionally,
he has pushed the presidential Despite the challenges, the election
election back from December year 2024 ushered in notable
2024 to at least the first half of political transformations across
2025, extending his term beyond several countries in southern and
the official limits. As a result, west Africa, reflected by improved
the country’s overall index score index scores. In a significant
declined to 2.03 in 2024, from 2.45 event in South African politics,
in 2023. the long-ruling African National
Congress (ANC) retained power
Across the region, an increasing but lost its majority for the first
number of governments have time since the end of apartheid in
resorted to internet shutdowns 1994, demonstrating the reasonably

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Democracy Index 2024
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free and fair nature of the May election. His mandate was further
election as well as anti-incumbency solidified when Pastef secured
sentiment. The ANC’s historic loss of an absolute majority, with 130
its legislative majority prompted the out of 165 seats in the November
party to form national-level power- parliamentary election. This was
sharing agreements for the first achieved against a backdrop of
time. In an effort to enhance political widespread public unrest over
stability, the ANC established the attempts by the former president,
Government of National Unity Macky Sall, to extend his tenure
(GNU), which includes centrist by delaying the presidential poll
parties such as the Democratic (initially scheduled for February) and
Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha using intimidation tactics to exclude
Freedom Party (IFP). As a result, opposition candidates. Both Mr Faye
South Africa’s overall score improved and Ousmane Sonko, a popular
to 7.16, from 7.05 in 2023. Similarly, leader within Pastef, who was barred
Botswana experienced a momentous from running, were incarcerated
political change at the October just months before their electoral
election, when the opposition party success.
Umbrella for Democratic Change
(UDC), led by Duma Boko, ended In Mauritius, the opposition
nearly six decades of rule by the Alliance for Change, led by Navin
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Ramgoolam, won a landslide victory
The peaceful transfer of power in the November elections. The
affirmed Botswana’s commitment to smooth and peaceful transfer of
democratic principles, as it began a power illustrated the strength of the
new phase in its political history. democratic system in the country,
recognised as the region’s only “full
Several west African countries also democracy” and ranked 20th in
experienced significant political the index. This political shift was
shifts as opposition parties ousted driven by public dissatisfaction with
incumbents in elections. In Ghana, persistent corruption and economic
the opposition candidate, John challenges under the previous
Mahama, representing the National administration of Pravind Jugnauth.
Democratic Congress (NDC),
achieved a sweeping victory in The 2024 Democracy Index
the December presidential and presents a complex picture of
legislative elections, owing to Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the
widespread public frustration with overall trend is one of a decline in
the economic situation, including democracy across the region, the
a cost-of-living crisis and issues electoral successes in Botswana,
related to debt default. Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and
South Africa offer reasons for
In Senegal, anti-establishment optimism. Amid repression,
leader Bassirou Diomaye Faye, of particularly in areas under military
the opposition Patriotes africains rule, civil society movements and
pour le travail, l’éthique et la political opposition continue to
fraternité (Pastef) party, became organise, reflecting strong popular
Africa’s youngest president at the aspirations for political change and
age of 44 in the March presidential greater democracy.

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The Middle East and North Africa

It was another miserable year for The erosion of the few
democracy in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) in 2024. The examples of partially
regional score fell for the sixth representative
consecutive year, to 3.12 points,
from 3.23 in 2023. The MENA democracy
region remains at the bottom of
our regional rankings, with a score Representative democracy is
that is substantially below those of scarce in MENA, practised in
the other six, including the second- full only in Israel. Most regimes
lowest-ranking region, Sub-Saharan provide only limited elements of
Africa, which has an average score political representation in an effort
of 4.00. The MENA region is now the to appease popular demands for
only one without a “full democracy”, democratisation while maintaining
as two countries in eastern Europe heavily centralised control.
(the Czech Republic and Estonia) Examples of superficial democratic
were upgraded from “flawed facades include Iraq and Lebanon’s
democracies” in 2024. Indeed the rigid confessional systems, as
MENA region is even more of an well as Jordan and Morocco’s
outlier in having only one country constitutional monarchies, which
that is classified as a democracy: are heavily skewed in favour of
Israel, a “flawed democracy”, is the the palace, and rubber-stamp
only country in the MENA region to parliaments in republican and royal
rank in the top half of the Democracy autocracies elsewhere, including
Index. Israel has a score of 7.80 and in Egypt, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
is ranked 31st out of 167. Unsurprisingly, the region’s weakest
category score in the index is for
Of the 20 countries in the region electoral process and pluralism.
covered by the index, 12 registered
a decline in their overall score Nevertheless, developments in
in 2024 compared with 2023. 2024 led to a further deterioration
Tunisia (-0.80), Kuwait (-0.72) in this category, with the region’s
and Qatar (-0.48) recorded the average score declining from 2.16
biggest declines in 2024. Three in 2023 to 1.85 in 2024. Even the
countries improved their scores: highly undemocratic MENA region
the UAE (for a second consecutive is not immune to the erosion of
year), Jordan and Libya. The last of representative democracy that is
these made a substantial gain of occurring globally. The biggest fall
0.53 points, bringing its index score in this category was recorded by
to a still paltry 2.31, but nevertheless Tunisia, whose score for electoral
reflecting a tangible improvement process and pluralism fell by
in the country’s security outlook 2.75 points to 3.42. This was the
as militia infighting diminished result of intensified democratic
and the rival political authorities backsliding under the presidency of
took tentative steps towards Kais Said. Following in the footsteps
reconciliation. of fellow North African strongmen

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Table 10
Middle East 2024
I Electoral
Overall Global Regional II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil
process and Regime type
score Rank rank of government participation culture liberties
pluralism
Algeria 3.55 110 5 3.08 2.50 3.33 5.00 3.82 Authoritarian
Bahrain 2.45 138 14 0.42 2.36 3.33 4.38 1.76 Authoritarian
Egypt 2.79 128= 12 0.42 2.86 3.89 5.00 1.76 Authoritarian
Iran 1.96 154 17 0.00 2.50 3.33 2.50 1.47 Authoritarian
Iraq 2.80 126= 11 4.83 0.00 6.11 1.88 1.18 Authoritarian
Flawed
Israel 7.80 31 1 9.58 7.50 9.44 6.88 5.59
democracy
Jordan 3.28 115 7 3.08 2.86 4.44 2.50 3.53 Authoritarian
Kuwait 2.78 130 13 0.92 3.21 2.78 3.75 3.24 Authoritarian
Lebanon 3.56 109 4 3.08 0.79 6.67 3.13 4.12 Authoritarian
Libya 2.31 140 15 1.25 0.00 3.89 3.75 2.65 Authoritarian
Morocco 4.97 91 2 5.25 4.29 5.56 5.63 4.12 Hybrid regime
Oman 3.05 120 10 0.08 3.57 2.78 5.00 3.82 Authoritarian
Palestine 3.44 112 6 1.58 0.00 8.33 3.75 3.53 Authoritarian
Qatar 3.17 117 8 0.00 3.93 2.78 5.63 3.53 Authoritarian
Saudi
2.08 148 16 0.00 3.57 2.22 3.13 1.47 Authoritarian
Arabia
Sudan 1.46 162 19 0.00 0.00 1.11 5.63 0.59 Authoritarian
Syria 1.32 163 20 0.00 0.00 2.22 4.38 0.00 Authoritarian
Tunisia 4.71 93 3 3.42 3.93 5.56 5.63 5.00 Hybrid regime
United Arab
3.07 119 9 0.00 4.29 2.78 5.63 2.65 Authoritarian
Emirates
Yemen 1.95 155 18 0.00 0.00 3.89 5.00 0.88 Authoritarian
Regional
3.12 1.85 2.41 4.22 4.41 2.74
score
Source: EIU.

Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, president of arrested one contender on what are

Egypt, and Algeria’s Abdelmadjid widely considered to be fictitious
Tebboune, Mr Said effectively barred charges after the contest took place.
any genuine competition for his
position ahead of the October 2024 Jordan was a notable exception
presidential election. The regime to this trend, taking a modest

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Democracy index 2024 0 2 4 6 8 10

by category Electoral process 5.41
and pluralism 1.85
Index score out of 10 (10=best)
Global average Functioning of 4.53
government 2.41
Middle East and North Africa
Political 5.33
participation 4.22

5.25
Political culture
4.41

5.35
Civil liberties
2.74

5.17
Overall score
3.12
Source: EIU.

Middle East and North Africa: 0 2 4 6 8 10

change in category scores Electoral process 1.85
2023-24 and pluralism 2.16

Index score out of 10 (10=best) Functioning of 2.41

government 2.60
2024
2023 Political 4.22
participation 4.28

4.41
Political culture
4.44

2.74
Civil liberties
2.69

3.12
Overall score
3.23
Source: EIU.

step towards more representative Democratic

democracy in 2024. Ahead of the
September parliamentary election, institutions under
political parties were granted particular pressure in
additional freedoms to form,
campaign and compete, introducing the Gulf
greater plurality. Whether these
changes result in parties achieving Contributing heavily to the decline
tangible political influence remains in the region’s electoral process and
to be seen. There is reason to be pluralism score were developments
sceptical, given that King Abdullah II in two Gulf countries: Kuwait and
retains firm control over the Qatar. In Qatar, an experiment with
appointment of government, and the popular elections to select 30 of
post-election cabinet is dominated the 45 members of the Advisory
by pro-establishment figures and Council (Majlis al-Shura) was in
affiliates of the royal family. its infancy, with the first elections

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Democracy Index 2024
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having been held in 2021. However, Mixed fortunes in the

a constitutional referendum
in November 2024 returned a MENA war zones
strong majority of 90.6% (with a
voter turnout of 84%) in favour of Conflict continues to weigh heavily
cancelling popular elections and on index scores for a number of
returning the Advisory Council to a MENA countries. Insurgencies, civil
wholly appointed body. This decision wars and inter-state conflicts have
reflected voter concerns about long undermined territorial integrity
the upsurge of tribal and political and sovereignty, threatened the
divisions that rose to the surface security of citizens, disrupted free
during the 2021 contest. and fair elections and prevented
the growth of civic space. War-torn
By contrast, the cancellation in May Sudan remained on a downward
2024 of elections in Kuwait, and the trajectory in 2024, following a
dissolution of the National Assembly sharp fall in the 2023 Democracy
for a period of “up to four years”, Index, stemming from the outbreak
was a top-down initiative. The emir of its most recent, and deadliest,
has centralised political authority civil conflict. In 2024 the situation
and will rule by decree. The move deteriorated further, and the
marks a dramatic cessation of the intervention of an array of external
country’s long-standing democratic actors including Russia, Ukraine, the
tradition of relatively free and fair UAE and Egypt threatens to make
parliamentary elections, which the war increasingly intractable and
had made Kuwait an outlier in the bodes ill for Sudanese sovereignty
otherwise heavily autocratic Gulf. in the long term. The unravelling
The decision to revoke democratic of civil society and the indefinite
voting rights was met with a high suspension of democratic processes
degree of public support. Frustration led to Sudan’s index score falling
with perennial parliamentary by a further 0.30 points in 2024.
gridlock had been building for years Sudan fell four places in the global
as populist opposition MPs who democracy rankings, to 162nd out
dominated the Assembly repeatedly of 167.
blocked legislation deemed to be
critical to the country’s economic Elsewhere in the region, there
development. Opinion polls were glimmers of hope that
conducted after the change showed some long-running civil conflicts
high levels of public support for might be ebbing. Libya’s score
the suspension of elections and improved by 0.53 points, driven
of parliament, on the grounds that by improvements in the electoral
centralised political control would process and pluralism, political
catalyse policymaking. As a result, participation and civil liberties
Kuwait’s political culture score categories. The country held the
declined by 0.63 points, to 3.75. first round of municipal elections in

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late 2024; these were notable for an period of heightened uncertainty.

absence of political violence and a
rare level of co-ordination between Nevertheless, the fall of the 61-year
the rival governing authorities. In old Ba’athist regime presents a
a less febrile political and security rare opportunity for a democratic
environment, popular faith in political opening in the country. Hayat Tahrir
participation has strengthened, al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist group
according to opinion polls. There that spearheaded the overthrow of
is an increased willingness to the regime, is trying to shed its Salafi
engage with politics, including Islamist credentials in an effort to
through demonstrations and party unify the country. It has pledged
membership. The real test is likely to reconcile Syria’s myriad ethnic,
to come later at the national level: political and sectarian groups via a
moves to unify divided institutions new constitution and representative
and hold UN-sponsored elections elections. Should it succeed, Syria
will reveal whether Libya’s rival has the potential to become a rare
authorities will surrender control and regional success story, as was
cede the levers of government to a Tunisia in the wake of the 2011
civilian body. Arab spring. However, as in the
case of Tunisia, there is a risk that
Syria’s new authorities will prove
unable to sustain a path towards
Syria: a late contender democratisation.
for a democratic
After almost 14 years of civil war,
awakening? it is far from certain that HTS
can make good on its promise of
War-torn Syria has sat near the democratic inclusivity and equality
bottom of the global rankings for to all the country’s ethnic, religious
many years. Its score declined by and political groupings. The early
0.11 points in 2024, to 1.32, because signs are not reassuring: the group
of developments that occurred has filled interim government
before the rebel takeover and regime positions with old-guard personnel.
change at the end of the year. There Meanwhile, latent conflict
was a deterioration in the political continues, including an Islamic State
participation category after the July insurgency in Syria’s eastern deserts
elections returned only 9% of female and clashes between Kurdish and
parliamentary representatives. Turkish-backed factions in the
Furthermore, the toppling by north, threatening to destabilise the
jihadist-led rebels of longstanding state. External powers such as Iran
dictator Bashar al-Assad in and Russia will also be meddling
December meant that there was no in an attempt to recoup political
longer a national parliament. The fall influence lost with the fall of the
of the regime came too late to result Assad regime. With risks tilting to
in an improvement in any of the the downside, Syria’s future path
index scores, given that the country remains precarious.
now faces a power vacuum and a

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Appendix
Defining and measuring
democracy
There is no consensus on how to basic features is sufficient for a
measure democracy. Definitions of satisfactory concept of democracy.
democracy are contested, and there As discussed below, there is a
is a lively debate on the subject. question as to how far the definition
The issue is not only of academic may need to be widened.
interest. For example, although
democracy promotion is high on the Some insist that democracy is,
list of US foreign-policy priorities, necessarily, a dichotomous concept:
there is no consensus within the US a state is either democratic or not.
government as to what constitutes But most measures now appear to
a democracy. As one observer put adhere to a continuous concept, with
it: “The world’s only superpower is the possibility of varying degrees
rhetorically and militarily promoting of democracy. At present, the
a political system that remains best-known measure is produced
undefined—and it is staking its by the US-based Freedom House
credibility and treasure on that organisation. The average of its
pursuit,” (Horowitz, 2006, p. 114). indexes, on a 1 to 7 scale, of political
freedom (based on 10 indicators)
Although the terms “freedom” and of civil liberties (based on 15
and “democracy” are often used indicators) is often taken to be a
interchangeably, the two are not measure of democracy.
synonymous. Democracy can be
seen as a set of practices and The Freedom House measure is
principles that institutionalise, and available for all countries, and
thereby, ultimately, protect freedom. stretches back to the early 1970s. It
Even if a consensus on precise has been used heavily in empirical
definitions has proved elusive, most investigations of the relationship
observers today would agree that, between democracy and various
at a minimum, the fundamental economic and social variables. The
features of a democracy include so-called Polity Project provides,
government based on majority rule for a smaller number of countries,
and the consent of the governed; the measures of democracy and regime
existence of free and fair elections; types, based on rather minimalist
the protection of minority rights; definitions, stretching back to the
and respect for basic human rights. 19th century. These have also been
Democracy presupposes equality used in empirical work.
before the law, due process and
political pluralism. A question arises Freedom House also measures a
as to whether reference to these narrower concept, that of “electoral

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democracy”. Democracies in this measure covers the electoral

minimal sense share at least one process and political pluralism and,
common, essential characteristic. to a lesser extent, the functioning
Positions of political power are of government and a few aspects of
filled through regular, free and participation.
fair elections between competing
parties, and it is possible for an A key difference in measures
incumbent government to be turned is between “thin”, or minimalist,
out of office through elections. and “thick”, or wider, concepts of
Freedom House’s criteria for an democracy (Coppedge, 2005).
electoral democracy include: The thin concepts correspond
closely to an immensely influential
1. A competitive, multi-party academic definition of democracy,
political system. that of Dahl’s concept of polyarchy
(Dahl, 1970). Polyarchy has eight
2. Universal adult suffrage. components, or institutional
requirements: almost all adult
3. Regularly contested elections citizens have the right to vote;
conducted on the basis of almost all adult citizens are eligible
secret ballots, reasonable ballot for public office; political leaders
security and the absence of have the right to compete for
massive voter fraud. votes; elections are free and fair;
all citizens are free to form and
4. Significant public access of join political parties and other
major political parties to the organisations; all citizens are
electorate through the media and free to express themselves on all
through generally open political political issues; diverse sources
campaigning. of information about politics exist
and are protected by law; and
The Freedom House definition of government policies depend on
political freedom is more demanding votes and other expressions of
(although not much) than its criteria preference.
for electoral democracy—that
is, it classifies more countries as The Freedom House electoral
electoral democracies than as democracy measure is a thin
“free” (some “partly free” countries concept. Its measure of democracy
are also categorised as “electoral based on political rights and
democracies”). At the end of 2015, civil liberties is “thicker” than the
125 out of 193 states were classified measure of “electoral democracy”.
as “electoral democracies”; of these, Other definitions of democracy
on a more stringent criterion, 89 have broadened to include aspects
states were classified as “free”. The of society and political culture in
Freedom House political-freedom democratic societies.

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The Economist rights include freedom of speech,

expression and of the press; freedom
Intelligence Unit of religion; freedom of assembly and
measure association; and the right to due
judicial process. All democracies
are systems in which citizens freely
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s make political decisions by majority
index is based on the view that rule. But rule by the majority is
measures of democracy which not necessarily democratic. In a
reflect the state of political freedoms democracy, majority rule must
and civil liberties are not thick be combined with guarantees of
enough. They do not encompass individual human rights and the
sufficiently, or, in some cases, at rights of minorities. Most measures
all, the features that determine also include aspects of the minimum
how substantive democracy is. quality of functioning of government.
Freedom is an essential component If democratically-based decisions
of democracy, but not, in itself, cannot be or are not implemented,
sufficient. In existing measures, the then the concept of democracy is
elements of political participation not very meaningful.
and functioning of government are
taken into account only in a marginal Democracy is more than the sum
and formal way. of its institutions. A democratic
political culture is also crucial for
Our Democracy Index is based on the legitimacy, smooth functioning
five categories: electoral process and, ultimately, the sustainability of
and pluralism; civil liberties; the democracy. A culture of passivity
functioning of government; political and apathy—an obedient and docile
participation; and political culture. citizenry—is not consistent with
The five categories are interrelated democracy. The electoral process
and form a coherent conceptual periodically divides the population
whole. The condition of holding free into winners and losers. A successful
and fair competitive elections, and democratic political culture implies
satisfying related aspects of political that the losing parties and their
freedom, is clearly the sine qua non supporters accept the judgment of
of all definitions. the voters and allow for the peaceful
transfer of power.
All modern definitions, except the
most minimalist, also consider civil Participation is also a necessary
liberties to be a vital component component, as apathy and
of what is often called “liberal abstention are enemies of
democracy”. The principle of the democracy. Even measures that
protection of basic human rights focus predominantly on the
is widely accepted. It is embodied processes of representative,
in constitutions throughout the liberal democracy include (albeit
world, as well as in the UN Charter inadequately or insufficiently)
and international agreements some aspects of participation. In a
such as the Helsinki Final Act (the democracy, government is only one
Conference on Security and Co- element in a social fabric of many
operation in Europe). Basic human and varied institutions, political

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organisations and associations. The category indexes are based on

Citizens cannot be required to the sum of the indicator scores in
take part in the political process, the category, converted to a 0 to 10
and they are free to express their scale. Adjustments to the category
dissatisfaction by not participating. scores are made if countries do not
However, a healthy democracy score a 1 in the following critical
requires the active, freely chosen areas for democracy:
participation of citizens in public
life. Democracies flourish when 1. Whether national elections are
citizens are willing to participate in free and fair.
public debate, elect representatives
and join political parties. Without 2. The security of voters.
this broad, sustaining participation,
democracy begins to wither and 3. The influence of foreign powers
become the preserve of small, select on government.
groups.
4. The capability of the civil service
At the same time, even our thicker, to implement policies.
more inclusive and wider measure
of democracy does not include If the scores for the first three
other aspects—which some authors questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point
argue are also crucial components (0.5 point) is deducted from the
of democracy—such as levels of index in the relevant category (either
economic and social wellbeing. the electoral process and pluralism
Therefore, our Index respects the or the functioning of government).
dominant tradition that holds that If the score for 4 is 0, one point is
a variety of social and economic deducted from the functioning of
outcomes can be consistent with government category index.
political democracy, which is a
separate concept. The index values are used to place
countries within one of four types of
regime:
Methodology 1. Full democracies: scores greater
than 8
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s
index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 2. Flawed democracies: scores
scale, is based on the ratings for greater than 6, and less than 8
60 indicators, grouped into five
categories: electoral process 3. Hybrid regimes: scores greater
and pluralism; civil liberties; the than 4, and less than 6
functioning of government; political
participation; and political culture. 4. Authoritarian regimes: scores
Each category has a rating on a 0 to less than 4
10 scale, and the overall Index is the
simple average of the five category Full democracies: Countries
indexes. in which not only basic political
freedoms and civil liberties are

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respected, but which also tend Elections, if they do occur, are not
to be underpinned by a political free and fair. There is disregard
culture conducive to the flourishing for abuses and infringements of
of democracy. The functioning of civil liberties. Media are typically
government is satisfactory. Media state-owned or controlled by groups
are independent and diverse. There connected to the ruling regime.
is an effective system of checks There is repression of criticism
and balances. The judiciary is of the government and pervasive
independent and judicial decisions censorship. There is no independent
are enforced. There are only limited judiciary.
problems in the functioning of
democracies.

Flawed democracies: These The scoring system

countries also have free and fair
elections and, even if there are We use a combination of a
problems (such as infringements on dichotomous and a three-point
media freedom), basic civil liberties scoring system for the 60 indicators.
are respected. However, there are A dichotomous 1-0 scoring system
significant weaknesses in other (1 for a yes and 0 for a no answer)
aspects of democracy, including is not without problems, but it has
problems in governance, an several distinct advantages over
underdeveloped political culture and more refined scoring scales (such
low levels of political participation. as the often-used 1-5 or 1-7). For
many indicators, the possibility of a
Hybrid regimes: Elections have 0.5 score is introduced, to capture
substantial irregularities that “grey areas”, where a simple yes
often prevent them from being (1) or no (0) is problematic, with
both free and fair. Government guidelines as to when that should
pressure on opposition parties and be used. Consequently, for many
candidates may be common. Serious indicators there is a three-point
weaknesses are more prevalent than scoring system, which represents
in flawed democracies—in political a compromise between simple
culture, functioning of government dichotomous scoring and the use of
and political participation. finer scales.
Corruption tends to be widespread
and the rule of law is weak. Civil The problems of 1-5 or 1-7 scoring
society is weak. Typically, there scales are numerous. For most
is harassment of and pressure on indicators under such systems,
journalists, and the judiciary is not it is extremely difficult to define
independent. meaningful and comparable criteria
or guidelines for each score. This
Authoritarian regimes: In these can lead to arbitrary, spurious and
states, state political pluralism is non-comparable scorings. For
absent or heavily circumscribed. example, a score of 2 for one country
Many countries in this category are may be scored a 3 in another, and so
outright dictatorships. Some formal on. Alternatively, one expert might
institutions of democracy may exist, score an indicator for a particular
but these have little substance. country in a different way to another

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expert. This contravenes a basic appears more valid with a two- or

principle of measurement, that of three-point scale for each indicator
so-called reliability—the degree to (the dimensions being aggregated
which a measurement procedure are similar across indicators). By
produces the same measurements contrast, with a 1-5 system, the
every time, regardless of who is scores are more likely to mean
performing it. Two- and three-point different things across the indicators
systems do not guarantee reliability, (for example, a 2 for one indicator
but make it more likely. may be more comparable to a 3 or 4
for another indicator). The problems
Second, comparability between of a 1-5 or 1-7 system are magnified
indicator scores and aggregation when attempting to extend the index
into a multi-dimensional index to many regions and countries.

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Further reading
Applebaum, Anne (2024). Autocracy Inc: The Dictators Who Want to Run the
World. London: Allen Lane.

Bickerton, Christopher and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti (2021). Technopopulism:

The New Logic of Democratic Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bourke, Richard and Quentin Skinner, eds (2016). Popular Sovereignty in

Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burnham, P (2001), “New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation”. British

Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3 (2): 127-149.

Cartledge, Paul (2016). Democracy: A Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coppedge, Michael (2005). Defining and measuring democracy, Working

paper, International Political Science Association, April.

Crouch, Colin (2020). Post-Democracy After the Crises. Cambridge: Polity

Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven & London: Yale
University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1970). Polyarchy, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Diamond, Larry and Mark Plattner, eds (2016). Democracy in Decline?

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dunn, John (2005). Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy. London:
Atlantic Books.

Eatwell, Roger and Matthew Goodwin (2018). National Populism: The Revolt
Against Liberal Democracy. London: Pelican Books.

Fukuyama, Francis (2004). State-building: Governance and World Order in the

21st Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis (2011). The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times
to the French Revolution. London: Profile Books.

Fukuyama, Francis (2014). Political Order and Political Decay: From the
Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy. London: Profile Books.

Fuller, Roslyn (2019). In Defence of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Garton Ash, Timothy (2016). Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected
World. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Gentry, John A (2023). Neutering the CIA: Why US Intelligence Versus Trump
Has Long-Term Consequences. Colorado: Armin Lear Press.

Gray, John (2023). The New Leviathans: Thoughts After Liberalism. London:
Allen Lane.

Hoey, Joan (2005). “Eastern Europe’s Democratic Transition: The Stillbirth

of Politics”. Economies in Transition Regional Overview. The Economist
Intelligence Unit

Hoey, Joan (2015). Democracy on the Edge: Populism and Protest. Report by
The Economist Intelligence Unit for the BBC.

Holmes, Stephen and Ivan Krastev (2019). The Light that Failed: A Reckoning.
New York: Allen Lane.

Horowitz, Irving Louis (2006). The struggle for democracy, National Interest,
Spring, No 83.

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit,
and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Iverson, Torben and David Soskice (2019). Democracy and Prosperity:

Reinventing Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.

Journal of Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Published for

the National Endowment for Democracy. www.journalofdemocracy.org

Krastev, Ivan (2014). Democracy Disrupted: The Politics of Global Protest.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lasch, Christopher (1995). The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal Of
Democracy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). How Democracies Die: What
History Reveals About Our Future. New York: Penguin.

Lilla, Mark (2017). The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. New
York: Harper.

Lind, Michael (2020). The New Class War: Saving Democracy from The
Metropolitan Elite. London: Atlantic Books.

Luce, Edward (2017). The Retreat of Western Liberalism. London: Little, Brown.

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Mair, Peter (2013). Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy.
London: Verso.

Medvedev, Sergei (2020). The Return of the Russian Leviathan. Cambridge:

Polity Press.

Milanovic, Branko (2019). Capitalism Alone: The Future of the System That
Rules the World. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press.

Miller, David (2020). Is Self-Determination a Dangerous Illusion? Cambridge:

Polity Press. Muller, Jan- Werner (2017). What is Populism? London: Penguin
Books.

Pew Research Center, various, www.pewresearch.org.

Protzer, Eric and Paul Summerville (2022). Reclaiming Populism: How

Economic Fairness Can Win Back Disenchanted Voters. Cambridge: Polity
Press.

Przeworski, Adam (2019). Crises of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Przeworski, Adam (2010). Democracy and the Limits Of Self-Government.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reporters Without Borders. World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/

ranking

Rodrik, Dani (2011). The Globalisation Paradox: Why Global Markets, States,
and Democracy Can’t Coexist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.London: Verso.

Rose, Flemming (2014). The Tyranny of Silence. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.

Rose, Richard and Munro, Neil (2009). Parties and Elections in New European
Democracies. Colchester: ECPR Press. University of Essex.

Schattschneider, E.E. (1975). The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of

Democracy in America. Boston: Wasworth CENGAGE Learning.

Streeck, Wolfgang (2024). Taking Back Control? States and State Systems
After Globalism.

Van Biezen, Ingrid, ed (2014), On Parties, Party Systems and Democracy:

Selected Writings of Peter Mair. Colchester: ECPR Press. University of Essex.

Wolf, Martin (2023). The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Allen Lane.

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Youngs, Richard (2019). Civic Activism Unleashed: New Hope or False Dawn
for Democracy? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Youngs, Richard (2021). Rebuilding European Democracy: Resistance and

Renewal in an Illiberal Age. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Zielonka, Jan (2018). Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat. Oxford:

Oxford University Press

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Meet the EIU team

Joan Hoey is the Director and Editor Specialist subjects
of the Democracy Index. She was Democracy, Geopolitics,
involved in the project from the start Macroeconomics,
and has been the Editor since 2014. Political risk, Business
She is well known as a presenter environment, Post-
on democracy at the Council of communist transition
Europe, Wilton Park, the European
Joan Hoey parliament, Chatham House and Languages
other forums organised by business, English
Editor think tanks and universities. She is a
former Regional Director for Europe Location
at EIU, where she led the coverage London
of European political and economic
affairs, and managed a large team of
analysts producing market-leading
analysis and forecasts.

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