Draft Report of Cybersecurity Audit-InfoSec-1
Draft Report of Cybersecurity Audit-InfoSec-1
Issu Findings / Observations Risk & Risk Recommendatio Auditee’s Responsible Status
e Implications Rating n Response Officer /
No Due
Date
6. Cybersecurity Awareness lack of specific Medium InfoSec team The bank’s Zachariah Close
in the Bank was not Job cybersecurity should provide Cybersecurity was Akinpelu d
Specific but Generic awareness customized\ job not generic as
training for specific claimed by Audit.
The bank’s cybersecurity We have different
employees with cybersecurity
awareness program was level of training for
privileged awareness
generic. Therefore, the bank different level of
access/permissi training for
was unable to demonstrate staff. The evidence
ons can lead to employees based
that employees with was shared with
increased cyber on their specific
privileged Audit team.
risks and roles and
access/permissions such as
potential responsibilities.
database administrators,
negative
software developers, tellers,
consequences,
treasury operations staff etc.
including cyber-
received additional
attacks, insider
cybersecurity awareness
threats,
training commensurate with
regulatory non-
their levels of responsibilities
compliance, and
and their particular business
loss of customer
risks.
trust.
8. Lack of Without prompt Medium There should be There is Zachariah
intercommunication collaboration provision for intercommunicati Akinpelu
between critical trends of intercommunicati on between
department handling cybersecurity on between Information
cybersecurity issues. related fraud Information Security team and
and exploitation security team and other Critical Unit
Information sharing between including IS
could not be other critical unit
strategic business units Control that
easily handling cyber
(SBUs) and the information manages the
identifying and security fraud
Security Team should be Fraud Desk. The
investigated. and investigation.
harnessed for improved constitution of
Forensic audit
security. For instance, the ICSS Steering
and could also
SBU in charge of the bank’s committee
be difficult.
Fraud & Forgery and comprises all the
Suspicious Transaction stakeholders
Reporting should collaborate
with the Information Security
team to address the root
cause of all fraud and
cybersecurity-related cases.
9. Unsupported Network Older Devices High All the devices This is CIO CIO
Devices and ATMs and operating that has reached functions
Operating System. system is more end of life should
vulnerable to be discarded for
Most the bank’s network
exploitation, an upgrade while
devices (routers and
cyber-attack the ATM machine
switches) and ATM
since it doesn't operating system
Operating Systems(Win 7)
receive critical should be
had reached End of Life patches and in upgraded to the
(EOL); hence, their turn may current or
manufacturers no longer becomes a supported
supported them. The lack of magnet for premium version.
security fixes or critical bug cyberattacks.
resolution for these devices,
made the bank’s system
vulnerable to cyber-attack.
10. No Tool/Solution for Without Medium Bank should We need more Zachariah
Monitoring Confidentiality monitoring, it implement clarification on Akinpelu
of Customer’s Data. becomes appropriate this as this
There was no technology challenging to measures and ambigous
solution to ensure the detect data solutions to
confidentiality of customers' breaches, and protect
data in the bank. For
attackers may customers’ data
instance, the continuous use
exploit the and comply with
of production data in non-
production environments security regulatory
(test and development loopholes to requirements
servers) exposes customers' access where necessary
personal and financial confidential
information to unintended customer data.
users, privilege abuse and This puts the
fraud. the risks associated customer's
with not having a tool or information at
solution for monitoring the risk of theft or
confidentiality of customer unauthorized
data can be severe. access, leading
to potential
financial losses
or reputational
damage for the
organization.
11. BYOD: Process and There could be Medium Bank should have Zachariah
Procedure for exposure to a documented Akinpelu
Data leakage, process and
Installing and Deleting
Malware procedure in
Data not in Place. infections, place to install
Audit observed that bank and delete data
Non-compliance,
did not have a process on mobile
and procedure in place to Loss of control, devices.
Encryption model
install and delete data on leading to
to be used for
mobile devices remotely dissatisfaction
encrypting
in the event of theft or and reduced
confidential data
productivity.
misplacement. install on Mobile
devices should be
stablished.
Also, Mobile devices were
not encrypted when used
to store confidential data.
12. Data Flow Diagram There is a risk Medium Threat modelling CRO
Showing Information that sensitive for bank digital
Flow to Third Party not information products and
could be services should
Evidenced:
exposed or be conducted
The bank did not conduct misused. it with evidence
threat modeling for its could also result showing data
digital product and to a violation of flow diagram to
services. Consequently, privacy external parties
there was no documented regulations or involved.
contractual
data flow diagrams
agreements.
showing information flow
to external parties for
proper cyber risk
management.
13. The Critical Business This could Medium It is essential for We need more Zachariah
Processes that are increase the the Bank to map clarification on Akinpelu
Dependent on External likelihood of a their critical this as this
Connectivity are not cybersecurity processes to ambigous
Identified. incident or third-party
breach. Third- connections and
Critical business processes
party allocate
were not mapped to
connections can appropriate
supporting external
create cybersecurity
connections for efficient
vulnerabilities in resources to
allocation of cybersecurity
a company's mitigate the
resources geared toward
network, and associated risks.
mitigating risks associated
without proper
with third-party connections.
mapping and
allocation of
resources, these
vulnerabilities
may go
unnoticed or
unaddressed.
14. Risk profile of Third Failing to High it is crucial for Risk Management is
Parties Vendor not maintain and the Bank to have taken care of by
maintained and Measured measure the risk a comprehensive Enterprise Risk Chris
profile of third- third-party risk Management team Nwambu
The bank did not maintain a
party vendors management
risk profile of its vendors in
can result in program in place
accordance with the
several risks for that includes
criticality and sensitivity of
an Bank, regular
services offered, or
including but assessments and
information that the vendors
not limited to monitoring of
have access to.
cybersecurity vendors' risk
Thus, periodic on-site risk, compliance profiles.
assessments of high-risk risk, reputation
vendors were not conducted risk, operational
to ensure appropriate risk, and supply
security controls were in chain risk.
place to mitigate their
inherent risks.
__________________________ ____________________________
Prepared by Concurred by
Oluwasoji Adeyehun Olusegun Famoriyo
Head, IT & eChannels Audit Chief Audit Executive
_________________________
Approved By
Managing Director/CEO