Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Fielding, Ed.

Request for Comments: 9110 Adobe

STD: 97 M. Nottingham, Ed.
Obsoletes: 2818, 7230, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, Fastly
7538, 7615, 7694 J. Reschke, Ed.
Updates: 3864 greenbytes
Category: Standards Track June 2022
ISSN: 2070-1721

HTTP Semantics

Abstract

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-

level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information
systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP,
establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol
that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core
protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and
"https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.

This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232,
7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force

(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,

and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.

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 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
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than English.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose
1.2. History and Evolution
1.3. Core Semantics
1.4. Specifications Obsoleted by This Document
2. Conformance
2.1. Syntax Notation
2.2. Requirements Notation
2.3. Length Requirements
2.4. Error Handling
2.5. Protocol Version
3. Terminology and Core Concepts
3.1. Resources
3.2. Representations
3.3. Connections, Clients, and Servers
3.4. Messages
3.5. User Agents
3.6. Origin Server
3.7. Intermediaries
3.8. Caches
3.9. Example Message Exchange
4. Identifiers in HTTP
4.1. URI References
4.2. HTTP-Related URI Schemes
4.2.1. http URI Scheme
4.2.2. https URI Scheme
4.2.3. http(s) Normalization and Comparison
4.2.4. Deprecation of userinfo in http(s) URIs
4.2.5. http(s) References with Fragment Identifiers
4.3. Authoritative Access
4.3.1. URI Origin
4.3.2. http Origins
4.3.3. https Origins
4.3.4. https Certificate Verification
4.3.5. IP-ID Reference Identity
5. Fields
5.1. Field Names
5.2. Field Lines and Combined Field Value
5.3. Field Order
5.4. Field Limits
5.5. Field Values
5.6. Common Rules for Defining Field Values
5.6.1. Lists (#rule ABNF Extension)
5.6.1.1. Sender Requirements
5.6.1.2. Recipient Requirements
5.6.2. Tokens
 5.6.3. Whitespace
5.6.4. Quoted Strings
5.6.5. Comments
5.6.6. Parameters
5.6.7. Date/Time Formats
6. Message Abstraction
6.1. Framing and Completeness
6.2. Control Data
6.3. Header Fields
6.4. Content
6.4.1. Content Semantics
6.4.2. Identifying Content
6.5. Trailer Fields
6.5.1. Limitations on Use of Trailers
6.5.2. Processing Trailer Fields
6.6. Message Metadata
6.6.1. Date
6.6.2. Trailer
7. Routing HTTP Messages
7.1. Determining the Target Resource
7.2. Host and :authority
7.3. Routing Inbound Requests
7.3.1. To a Cache
7.3.2. To a Proxy
7.3.3. To the Origin
7.4. Rejecting Misdirected Requests
7.5. Response Correlation
7.6. Message Forwarding
7.6.1. Connection
7.6.2. Max-Forwards
7.6.3. Via
7.7. Message Transformations
7.8. Upgrade
8. Representation Data and Metadata
8.1. Representation Data
8.2. Representation Metadata
8.3. Content-Type
8.3.1. Media Type
8.3.2. Charset
8.3.3. Multipart Types
8.4. Content-Encoding
8.4.1. Content Codings
8.4.1.1. Compress Coding
8.4.1.2. Deflate Coding
8.4.1.3. Gzip Coding
8.5. Content-Language
8.5.1. Language Tags
8.6. Content-Length
8.7. Content-Location
8.8. Validator Fields
8.8.1. Weak versus Strong
8.8.2. Last-Modified
8.8.2.1. Generation
8.8.2.2. Comparison
8.8.3. ETag
8.8.3.1. Generation
8.8.3.2. Comparison
8.8.3.3. Example: Entity Tags Varying on Content-Negotiated
Resources
9. Methods
9.1. Overview
9.2. Common Method Properties
9.2.1. Safe Methods
9.2.2. Idempotent Methods
9.2.3. Methods and Caching
9.3. Method Definitions
9.3.1. GET
9.3.2. HEAD
9.3.3. POST
9.3.4. PUT
9.3.5. DELETE
9.3.6. CONNECT
9.3.7. OPTIONS
9.3.8. TRACE
10. Message Context
10.1. Request Context Fields
10.1.1. Expect
10.1.2. From
10.1.3. Referer
10.1.4. TE
10.1.5. User-Agent
10.2. Response Context Fields
10.2.1. Allow
10.2.2. Location
10.2.3. Retry-After
10.2.4. Server
11. HTTP Authentication
11.1. Authentication Scheme
11.2. Authentication Parameters
11.3. Challenge and Response
11.4. Credentials
11.5. Establishing a Protection Space (Realm)
11.6. Authenticating Users to Origin Servers
11.6.1. WWW-Authenticate
11.6.2. Authorization
11.6.3. Authentication-Info
11.7. Authenticating Clients to Proxies
11.7.1. Proxy-Authenticate
11.7.2. Proxy-Authorization
11.7.3. Proxy-Authentication-Info
12. Content Negotiation
12.1. Proactive Negotiation
12.2. Reactive Negotiation
12.3. Request Content Negotiation
12.4. Content Negotiation Field Features
12.4.1. Absence
12.4.2. Quality Values
12.4.3. Wildcard Values
12.5. Content Negotiation Fields
12.5.1. Accept
12.5.2. Accept-Charset
12.5.3. Accept-Encoding
12.5.4. Accept-Language
12.5.5. Vary
13. Conditional Requests
13.1. Preconditions
13.1.1. If-Match
13.1.2. If-None-Match
 13.1.3. If-Modified-Since
13.1.4. If-Unmodified-Since
13.1.5. If-Range
13.2. Evaluation of Preconditions
13.2.1. When to Evaluate
13.2.2. Precedence of Preconditions
14. Range Requests
14.1. Range Units
14.1.1. Range Specifiers
14.1.2. Byte Ranges
14.2. Range
14.3. Accept-Ranges
14.4. Content-Range
14.5. Partial PUT
14.6. Media Type multipart/byteranges
15. Status Codes
15.1. Overview of Status Codes
15.2. Informational 1xx
15.2.1. 100 Continue
15.2.2. 101 Switching Protocols
15.3. Successful 2xx
15.3.1. 200 OK
15.3.2. 201 Created
15.3.3. 202 Accepted
15.3.4. 203 Non-Authoritative Information
15.3.5. 204 No Content
15.3.6. 205 Reset Content
15.3.7. 206 Partial Content
15.3.7.1. Single Part
15.3.7.2. Multiple Parts
15.3.7.3. Combining Parts
15.4. Redirection 3xx
15.4.1. 300 Multiple Choices
15.4.2. 301 Moved Permanently
15.4.3. 302 Found
15.4.4. 303 See Other
15.4.5. 304 Not Modified
15.4.6. 305 Use Proxy
15.4.7. 306 (Unused)
15.4.8. 307 Temporary Redirect
15.4.9. 308 Permanent Redirect
15.5. Client Error 4xx
15.5.1. 400 Bad Request
15.5.2. 401 Unauthorized
15.5.3. 402 Payment Required
15.5.4. 403 Forbidden
15.5.5. 404 Not Found
15.5.6. 405 Method Not Allowed
15.5.7. 406 Not Acceptable
15.5.8. 407 Proxy Authentication Required
15.5.9. 408 Request Timeout
15.5.10. 409 Conflict
15.5.11. 410 Gone
15.5.12. 411 Length Required
15.5.13. 412 Precondition Failed
15.5.14. 413 Content Too Large
15.5.15. 414 URI Too Long
15.5.16. 415 Unsupported Media Type
15.5.17. 416 Range Not Satisfiable
 15.5.18. 417 Expectation Failed
15.5.19. 418 (Unused)
15.5.20. 421 Misdirected Request
15.5.21. 422 Unprocessable Content
15.5.22. 426 Upgrade Required
15.6. Server Error 5xx
15.6.1. 500 Internal Server Error
15.6.2. 501 Not Implemented
15.6.3. 502 Bad Gateway
15.6.4. 503 Service Unavailable
15.6.5. 504 Gateway Timeout
15.6.6. 505 HTTP Version Not Supported
16. Extending HTTP
16.1. Method Extensibility
16.1.1. Method Registry
16.1.2. Considerations for New Methods
16.2. Status Code Extensibility
16.2.1. Status Code Registry
16.2.2. Considerations for New Status Codes
16.3. Field Extensibility
16.3.1. Field Name Registry
16.3.2. Considerations for New Fields
16.3.2.1. Considerations for New Field Names
16.3.2.2. Considerations for New Field Values
16.4. Authentication Scheme Extensibility
16.4.1. Authentication Scheme Registry
16.4.2. Considerations for New Authentication Schemes
16.5. Range Unit Extensibility
16.5.1. Range Unit Registry
16.5.2. Considerations for New Range Units
16.6. Content Coding Extensibility
16.6.1. Content Coding Registry
16.6.2. Considerations for New Content Codings
16.7. Upgrade Token Registry
17. Security Considerations
17.1. Establishing Authority
17.2. Risks of Intermediaries
17.3. Attacks Based on File and Path Names
17.4. Attacks Based on Command, Code, or Query Injection
17.5. Attacks via Protocol Element Length
17.6. Attacks Using Shared-Dictionary Compression
17.7. Disclosure of Personal Information
17.8. Privacy of Server Log Information
17.9. Disclosure of Sensitive Information in URIs
17.10. Application Handling of Field Names
17.11. Disclosure of Fragment after Redirects
17.12. Disclosure of Product Information
17.13. Browser Fingerprinting
17.14. Validator Retention
17.15. Denial-of-Service Attacks Using Range
17.16. Authentication Considerations
17.16.1. Confidentiality of Credentials
17.16.2. Credentials and Idle Clients
17.16.3. Protection Spaces
17.16.4. Additional Response Fields
18. IANA Considerations
18.1. URI Scheme Registration
18.2. Method Registration
18.3. Status Code Registration
 18.4. Field Name Registration
18.5. Authentication Scheme Registration
18.6. Content Coding Registration
18.7. Range Unit Registration
18.8. Media Type Registration
18.9. Port Registration
18.10. Upgrade Token Registration
19. References
19.1. Normative References
19.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Collected ABNF
Appendix B. Changes from Previous RFCs
B.1. Changes from RFC 2818
B.2. Changes from RFC 7230
B.3. Changes from RFC 7231
B.4. Changes from RFC 7232
B.5. Changes from RFC 7233
B.6. Changes from RFC 7235
B.7. Changes from RFC 7538
B.8. Changes from RFC 7615
B.9. Changes from RFC 7694
Acknowledgements
Index
Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a family of stateless,

application-level, request/response protocols that share a generic
interface, extensible semantics, and self-descriptive messages to
enable flexible interaction with network-based hypertext information
systems.

HTTP hides the details of how a service is implemented by presenting

a uniform interface to clients that is independent of the types of
resources provided. Likewise, servers do not need to be aware of
each client's purpose: a request can be considered in isolation
rather than being associated with a specific type of client or a
predetermined sequence of application steps. This allows general-
purpose implementations to be used effectively in many different
contexts, reduces interaction complexity, and enables independent
evolution over time.

HTTP is also designed for use as an intermediation protocol, wherein

proxies and gateways can translate non-HTTP information systems into
a more generic interface.

One consequence of this flexibility is that the protocol cannot be

defined in terms of what occurs behind the interface. Instead, we
are limited to defining the syntax of communication, the intent of
received communication, and the expected behavior of recipients. If
the communication is considered in isolation, then successful actions
ought to be reflected in corresponding changes to the observable
interface provided by servers. However, since multiple clients might
act in parallel and perhaps at cross-purposes, we cannot require that
such changes be observable beyond the scope of a single response.
1.2. History and Evolution

HTTP has been the primary information transfer protocol for the World
Wide Web since its introduction in 1990. It began as a trivial
mechanism for low-latency requests, with a single method (GET) to
request transfer of a presumed hypertext document identified by a
given pathname. As the Web grew, HTTP was extended to enclose
requests and responses within messages, transfer arbitrary data
formats using MIME-like media types, and route requests through
intermediaries. These protocols were eventually defined as HTTP/0.9
and HTTP/1.0 (see [HTTP/1.0]).

HTTP/1.1 was designed to refine the protocol's features while

retaining compatibility with the existing text-based messaging
syntax, improving its interoperability, scalability, and robustness
across the Internet. This included length-based data delimiters for
both fixed and dynamic (chunked) content, a consistent framework for
content negotiation, opaque validators for conditional requests,
cache controls for better cache consistency, range requests for
partial updates, and default persistent connections. HTTP/1.1 was
introduced in 1995 and published on the Standards Track in 1997
[RFC2068], revised in 1999 [RFC2616], and revised again in 2014
([RFC7230] through [RFC7235]).

HTTP/2 ([HTTP/2]) introduced a multiplexed session layer on top of

the existing TLS and TCP protocols for exchanging concurrent HTTP
messages with efficient field compression and server push. HTTP/3
([HTTP/3]) provides greater independence for concurrent messages by
using QUIC as a secure multiplexed transport over UDP instead of TCP.

All three major versions of HTTP rely on the semantics defined by

this document. They have not obsoleted each other because each one
has specific benefits and limitations depending on the context of
use. Implementations are expected to choose the most appropriate
transport and messaging syntax for their particular context.

This revision of HTTP separates the definition of semantics (this

document) and caching ([CACHING]) from the current HTTP/1.1 messaging
syntax ([HTTP/1.1]) to allow each major protocol version to progress
independently while referring to the same core semantics.

1.3. Core Semantics

HTTP provides a uniform interface for interacting with a resource

(Section 3.1) -- regardless of its type, nature, or implementation --
by sending messages that manipulate or transfer representations
(Section 3.2).

Each message is either a request or a response. A client constructs

request messages that communicate its intentions and routes those
messages toward an identified origin server. A server listens for
requests, parses each message received, interprets the message
semantics in relation to the identified target resource, and responds
to that request with one or more response messages. The client
examines received responses to see if its intentions were carried
out, determining what to do next based on the status codes and
content received.

HTTP semantics include the intentions defined by each request method

 (Section 9), extensions to those semantics that might be described in
request header fields, status codes that describe the response
(Section 15), and other control data and resource metadata that might
be given in response fields.

Semantics also include representation metadata that describe how

content is intended to be interpreted by a recipient, request header
fields that might influence content selection, and the various
selection algorithms that are collectively referred to as "content
negotiation" (Section 12).

1.4. Specifications Obsoleted by This Document

+============================================+===========+=====+
| Title | Reference | See |
+============================================+===========+=====+
| HTTP Over TLS | [RFC2818] | B.1 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing [*] | [RFC7230] | B.2 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP/1.1 Semantics and Content | [RFC7231] | B.3 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP/1.1 Conditional Requests | [RFC7232] | B.4 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP/1.1 Range Requests | [RFC7233] | B.5 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP/1.1 Authentication | [RFC7235] | B.6 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP Status Code 308 (Permanent Redirect) | [RFC7538] | B.7 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP Authentication-Info and Proxy- | [RFC7615] | B.8 |
| Authentication-Info Response Header Fields | | |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+
| HTTP Client-Initiated Content-Encoding | [RFC7694] | B.9 |
+--------------------------------------------+-----------+-----+

Table 1

[*] This document only obsoletes the portions of RFC 7230 that are
independent of the HTTP/1.1 messaging syntax and connection
management; the remaining bits of RFC 7230 are obsoleted by
"HTTP/1.1" [HTTP/1.1].

2. Conformance

2.1. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)

notation of [RFC5234], extended with the notation for case-
sensitivity in strings defined in [RFC7405].

It also uses a list extension, defined in Section 5.6.1, that allows

for compact definition of comma-separated lists using a "#" operator
(similar to how the "*" operator indicates repetition). Appendix A
shows the collected grammar with all list operators expanded to
standard ABNF notation.

As a convention, ABNF rule names prefixed with "obs-" denote obsolete

grammar rules that appear for historical reasons.
 The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in
Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return),
CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double
quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF
(line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and
VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character).

Section 5.6 defines some generic syntactic components for field

values.

This specification uses the terms "character", "character encoding

scheme", "charset", and "protocol element" as they are defined in
[RFC6365].

2.2. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

This specification targets conformance criteria according to the role

of a participant in HTTP communication. Hence, requirements are
placed on senders, recipients, clients, servers, user agents,
intermediaries, origin servers, proxies, gateways, or caches,
depending on what behavior is being constrained by the requirement.
Additional requirements are placed on implementations, resource
owners, and protocol element registrations when they apply beyond the
scope of a single communication.

The verb "generate" is used instead of "send" where a requirement

applies only to implementations that create the protocol element,
rather than an implementation that forwards a received element
downstream.

An implementation is considered conformant if it complies with all of

the requirements associated with the roles it partakes in HTTP.

A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the
grammar defined by the corresponding ABNF rules. Within a given
message, a sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements or syntax
alternatives that are only allowed to be generated by participants in
other roles (i.e., a role that the sender does not have for that
message).

Conformance to HTTP includes both conformance to the particular

messaging syntax of the protocol version in use and conformance to
the semantics of protocol elements sent. For example, a client that
claims conformance to HTTP/1.1 but fails to recognize the features
required of HTTP/1.1 recipients will fail to interoperate with
servers that adjust their responses in accordance with those claims.
Features that reflect user choices, such as content negotiation and
user-selected extensions, can impact application behavior beyond the
protocol stream; sending protocol elements that inaccurately reflect
a user's choices will confuse the user and inhibit choice.

When an implementation fails semantic conformance, recipients of that

 implementation's messages will eventually develop workarounds to
adjust their behavior accordingly. A recipient MAY employ such
workarounds while remaining conformant to this protocol if the
workarounds are limited to the implementations at fault. For
example, servers often scan portions of the User-Agent field value,
and user agents often scan the Server field value, to adjust their
own behavior with respect to known bugs or poorly chosen defaults.

2.3. Length Requirements

A recipient SHOULD parse a received protocol element defensively,

with only marginal expectations that the element will conform to its
ABNF grammar and fit within a reasonable buffer size.

HTTP does not have specific length limitations for many of its
protocol elements because the lengths that might be appropriate will
vary widely, depending on the deployment context and purpose of the
implementation. Hence, interoperability between senders and
recipients depends on shared expectations regarding what is a
reasonable length for each protocol element. Furthermore, what is
commonly understood to be a reasonable length for some protocol
elements has changed over the course of the past three decades of
HTTP use and is expected to continue changing in the future.

At a minimum, a recipient MUST be able to parse and process protocol

element lengths that are at least as long as the values that it
generates for those same protocol elements in other messages. For
example, an origin server that publishes very long URI references to
its own resources needs to be able to parse and process those same
references when received as a target URI.

Many received protocol elements are only parsed to the extent

necessary to identify and forward that element downstream. For
example, an intermediary might parse a received field into its field
name and field value components, but then forward the field without
further parsing inside the field value.

2.4. Error Handling

A recipient MUST interpret a received protocol element according to

the semantics defined for it by this specification, including
extensions to this specification, unless the recipient has determined
(through experience or configuration) that the sender incorrectly
implements what is implied by those semantics. For example, an
origin server might disregard the contents of a received
Accept-Encoding header field if inspection of the User-Agent header
field indicates a specific implementation version that is known to
fail on receipt of certain content codings.

Unless noted otherwise, a recipient MAY attempt to recover a usable

protocol element from an invalid construct. HTTP does not define
specific error handling mechanisms except when they have a direct
impact on security, since different applications of the protocol
require different error handling strategies. For example, a Web
browser might wish to transparently recover from a response where the
Location header field doesn't parse according to the ABNF, whereas a
systems control client might consider any form of error recovery to
be dangerous.
 Some requests can be automatically retried by a client in the event
of an underlying connection failure, as described in Section 9.2.2.

2.5. Protocol Version

HTTP's version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a

"." (period or decimal point). The first digit (major version)
indicates the messaging syntax, whereas the second digit (minor
version) indicates the highest minor version within that major
version to which the sender is conformant (able to understand for
future communication).

While HTTP's core semantics don't change between protocol versions,

their expression "on the wire" can change, and so the HTTP version
number changes when incompatible changes are made to the wire format.
Additionally, HTTP allows incremental, backwards-compatible changes
to be made to the protocol without changing its version through the
use of defined extension points (Section 16).

The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance

with the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding
specification(s). For example, the version "HTTP/1.1" is defined by
the combined specifications of this document, "HTTP Caching"
[CACHING], and "HTTP/1.1" [HTTP/1.1].

HTTP's major version number is incremented when an incompatible

message syntax is introduced. The minor number is incremented when
changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message
semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender.

The minor version advertises the sender's communication capabilities

even when the sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of
the protocol, thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced
features can be used in response (by servers) or in future requests
(by clients).

When a major version of HTTP does not define any minor versions, the
minor version "0" is implied. The "0" is used when referring to that
protocol within elements that require a minor version identifier.

3. Terminology and Core Concepts

HTTP was created for the World Wide Web (WWW) architecture and has
evolved over time to support the scalability needs of a worldwide
hypertext system. Much of that architecture is reflected in the
terminology used to define HTTP.

3.1. Resources

The target of an HTTP request is called a "resource". HTTP does not

limit the nature of a resource; it merely defines an interface that
might be used to interact with resources. Most resources are
identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), as described in
Section 4.

One design goal of HTTP is to separate resource identification from

request semantics, which is made possible by vesting the request
semantics in the request method (Section 9) and a few request-
modifying header fields. A resource cannot treat a request in a
 manner inconsistent with the semantics of the method of the request.
For example, though the URI of a resource might imply semantics that
are not safe, a client can expect the resource to avoid actions that
are unsafe when processing a request with a safe method (see
Section 9.2.1).

HTTP relies upon the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) standard [URI]
to indicate the target resource (Section 7.1) and relationships
between resources.

3.2. Representations

A "representation" is information that is intended to reflect a past,

current, or desired state of a given resource, in a format that can
be readily communicated via the protocol. A representation consists
of a set of representation metadata and a potentially unbounded
stream of representation data (Section 8).

HTTP allows "information hiding" behind its uniform interface by

defining communication with respect to a transferable representation
of the resource state, rather than transferring the resource itself.
This allows the resource identified by a URI to be anything,
including temporal functions like "the current weather in Laguna
Beach", while potentially providing information that represents that
resource at the time a message is generated [REST].

The uniform interface is similar to a window through which one can

observe and act upon a thing only through the communication of
messages to an independent actor on the other side. A shared
abstraction is needed to represent ("take the place of") the current
or desired state of that thing in our communications. When a
representation is hypertext, it can provide both a representation of
the resource state and processing instructions that help guide the
recipient's future interactions.

A target resource might be provided with, or be capable of

generating, multiple representations that are each intended to
reflect the resource's current state. An algorithm, usually based on
content negotiation (Section 12), would be used to select one of
those representations as being most applicable to a given request.
This "selected representation" provides the data and metadata for
evaluating conditional requests (Section 13) and constructing the
content for 200 (OK), 206 (Partial Content), and 304 (Not Modified)
responses to GET (Section 9.3.1).

3.3. Connections, Clients, and Servers

HTTP is a client/server protocol that operates over a reliable

transport- or session-layer "connection".

An HTTP "client" is a program that establishes a connection to a

server for the purpose of sending one or more HTTP requests. An HTTP
"server" is a program that accepts connections in order to service
HTTP requests by sending HTTP responses.

The terms client and server refer only to the roles that these
programs perform for a particular connection. The same program might
act as a client on some connections and a server on others.
 HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request
message's semantics can be understood in isolation, and that the
relationship between connections and messages on them has no impact
on the interpretation of those messages. For example, a CONNECT
request (Section 9.3.6) or a request with the Upgrade header field
(Section 7.8) can occur at any time, not just in the first message on
a connection. Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design
in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance
requests across multiple servers.

As a result, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same
connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is
secured and specific to that agent. Some non-standard HTTP
extensions (e.g., [RFC4559]) have been known to violate this
requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems.

3.4. Messages

HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol for exchanging

"messages" across a connection. The terms "sender" and "recipient"
refer to any implementation that sends or receives a given message,
respectively.

A client sends requests to a server in the form of a "request"

message with a method (Section 9) and request target (Section 7.1).
The request might also contain header fields (Section 6.3) for
request modifiers, client information, and representation metadata,
content (Section 6.4) intended for processing in accordance with the
method, and trailer fields (Section 6.5) to communicate information
collected while sending the content.

A server responds to a client's request by sending one or more

"response" messages, each including a status code (Section 15). The
response might also contain header fields for server information,
resource metadata, and representation metadata, content to be
interpreted in accordance with the status code, and trailer fields to
communicate information collected while sending the content.

3.5. User Agents

The term "user agent" refers to any of the various client programs
that initiate a request.

The most familiar form of user agent is the general-purpose Web

browser, but that's only a small percentage of implementations.
Other common user agents include spiders (web-traversing robots),
command-line tools, billboard screens, household appliances, scales,
light bulbs, firmware update scripts, mobile apps, and communication
devices in a multitude of shapes and sizes.

Being a user agent does not imply that there is a human user directly
interacting with the software agent at the time of a request. In
many cases, a user agent is installed or configured to run in the
background and save its results for later inspection (or save only a
subset of those results that might be interesting or erroneous).
Spiders, for example, are typically given a start URI and configured
to follow certain behavior while crawling the Web as a hypertext
graph.
 Many user agents cannot, or choose not to, make interactive
suggestions to their user or provide adequate warning for security or
privacy concerns. In the few cases where this specification requires
reporting of errors to the user, it is acceptable for such reporting
to only be observable in an error console or log file. Likewise,
requirements that an automated action be confirmed by the user before
proceeding might be met via advance configuration choices, run-time
options, or simple avoidance of the unsafe action; confirmation does
not imply any specific user interface or interruption of normal
processing if the user has already made that choice.

3.6. Origin Server

The term "origin server" refers to a program that can originate

authoritative responses for a given target resource.

The most familiar form of origin server are large public websites.
However, like user agents being equated with browsers, it is easy to
be misled into thinking that all origin servers are alike. Common
origin servers also include home automation units, configurable
networking components, office machines, autonomous robots, news
feeds, traffic cameras, real-time ad selectors, and video-on-demand
platforms.

Most HTTP communication consists of a retrieval request (GET) for a

representation of some resource identified by a URI. In the simplest
case, this might be accomplished via a single bidirectional
connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin server
(O).

request >
UA ======================================= O
< response

Figure 1

3.7. Intermediaries

HTTP enables the use of intermediaries to satisfy requests through a

chain of connections. There are three common forms of HTTP
"intermediary": proxy, gateway, and tunnel. In some cases, a single
intermediary might act as an origin server, proxy, gateway, or
tunnel, switching behavior based on the nature of each request.

> > > >

UA =========== A =========== B =========== C =========== O
< < < <

Figure 2

The figure above shows three intermediaries (A, B, and C) between the
user agent and origin server. A request or response message that
travels the whole chain will pass through four separate connections.
Some HTTP communication options might apply only to the connection
with the nearest, non-tunnel neighbor, only to the endpoints of the
chain, or to all connections along the chain. Although the diagram
is linear, each participant might be engaged in multiple,
simultaneous communications. For example, B might be receiving
requests from many clients other than A, and/or forwarding requests
to servers other than C, at the same time that it is handling A's
request. Likewise, later requests might be sent through a different
path of connections, often based on dynamic configuration for load
balancing.

The terms "upstream" and "downstream" are used to describe

directional requirements in relation to the message flow: all
messages flow from upstream to downstream. The terms "inbound" and
"outbound" are used to describe directional requirements in relation
to the request route: inbound means "toward the origin server",
whereas outbound means "toward the user agent".

A "proxy" is a message-forwarding agent that is chosen by the client,

usually via local configuration rules, to receive requests for some
type(s) of absolute URI and attempt to satisfy those requests via
translation through the HTTP interface. Some translations are
minimal, such as for proxy requests for "http" URIs, whereas other
requests might require translation to and from entirely different
application-level protocols. Proxies are often used to group an
organization's HTTP requests through a common intermediary for the
sake of security services, annotation services, or shared caching.
Some proxies are designed to apply transformations to selected
messages or content while they are being forwarded, as described in
Section 7.7.

A "gateway" (a.k.a. "reverse proxy") is an intermediary that acts as

an origin server for the outbound connection but translates received
requests and forwards them inbound to another server or servers.
Gateways are often used to encapsulate legacy or untrusted
information services, to improve server performance through
"accelerator" caching, and to enable partitioning or load balancing
of HTTP services across multiple machines.

All HTTP requirements applicable to an origin server also apply to

the outbound communication of a gateway. A gateway communicates with
inbound servers using any protocol that it desires, including private
extensions to HTTP that are outside the scope of this specification.
However, an HTTP-to-HTTP gateway that wishes to interoperate with
third-party HTTP servers needs to conform to user agent requirements
on the gateway's inbound connection.

A "tunnel" acts as a blind relay between two connections without

changing the messages. Once active, a tunnel is not considered a
party to the HTTP communication, though the tunnel might have been
initiated by an HTTP request. A tunnel ceases to exist when both
ends of the relayed connection are closed. Tunnels are used to
extend a virtual connection through an intermediary, such as when
Transport Layer Security (TLS, [TLS13]) is used to establish
confidential communication through a shared firewall proxy.

The above categories for intermediary only consider those acting as

participants in the HTTP communication. There are also
intermediaries that can act on lower layers of the network protocol
stack, filtering or redirecting HTTP traffic without the knowledge or
permission of message senders. Network intermediaries are
indistinguishable (at a protocol level) from an on-path attacker,
often introducing security flaws or interoperability problems due to
mistakenly violating HTTP semantics.
 For example, an "interception proxy" [RFC3040] (also commonly known
as a "transparent proxy" [RFC1919]) differs from an HTTP proxy
because it is not chosen by the client. Instead, an interception
proxy filters or redirects outgoing TCP port 80 packets (and
occasionally other common port traffic). Interception proxies are
commonly found on public network access points, as a means of
enforcing account subscription prior to allowing use of non-local
Internet services, and within corporate firewalls to enforce network
usage policies.

3.8. Caches

A "cache" is a local store of previous response messages and the

subsystem that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion.
A cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response
time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent
requests. Any client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache
cannot be used while acting as a tunnel.

The effect of a cache is that the request/response chain is shortened

if one of the participants along the chain has a cached response
applicable to that request. The following illustrates the resulting
chain if B has a cached copy of an earlier response from O (via C)
for a request that has not been cached by UA or A.

> >
UA =========== A =========== B - - - - - - C - - - - - - O
< <

Figure 3

A response is "cacheable" if a cache is allowed to store a copy of

the response message for use in answering subsequent requests. Even
when a response is cacheable, there might be additional constraints
placed by the client or by the origin server on when that cached
response can be used for a particular request. HTTP requirements for
cache behavior and cacheable responses are defined in [CACHING].

There is a wide variety of architectures and configurations of caches

deployed across the World Wide Web and inside large organizations.
These include national hierarchies of proxy caches to save bandwidth
and reduce latency, content delivery networks that use gateway
caching to optimize regional and global distribution of popular
sites, collaborative systems that broadcast or multicast cache
entries, archives of pre-fetched cache entries for use in off-line or
high-latency environments, and so on.

3.9. Example Message Exchange

The following example illustrates a typical HTTP/1.1 message exchange

for a GET request (Section 9.3.1) on the URI "http://www.example.com/
hello.txt":

Client request:

GET /hello.txt HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: curl/7.64.1
Host: www.example.com
Accept-Language: en, mi
 Server response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 12:28:53 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Wed, 22 Jul 2009 19:15:56 GMT
ETag: "34aa387-d-1568eb00"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 51
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/plain

Hello World! My content includes a trailing CRLF.

4. Identifiers in HTTP

Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [URI] are used throughout HTTP as

the means for identifying resources (Section 3.1).

4.1. URI References

URI references are used to target requests, indicate redirects, and

define relationships.

The definitions of "URI-reference", "absolute-URI", "relative-part",

"authority", "port", "host", "path-abempty", "segment", and "query"
are adopted from the URI generic syntax. An "absolute-path" rule is
defined for protocol elements that can contain a non-empty path
component. (This rule differs slightly from the path-abempty rule of
RFC 3986, which allows for an empty path, and path-absolute rule,
which does not allow paths that begin with "//".) A "partial-URI"
rule is defined for protocol elements that can contain a relative URI
but not a fragment component.

URI-reference = <URI-reference, see [URI], Section 4.1>

absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, see [URI], Section 4.3>
relative-part = <relative-part, see [URI], Section 4.2>
authority = <authority, see [URI], Section 3.2>
uri-host = <host, see [URI], Section 3.2.2>
port = <port, see [URI], Section 3.2.3>
path-abempty = <path-abempty, see [URI], Section 3.3>
segment = <segment, see [URI], Section 3.3>
query = <query, see [URI], Section 3.4>

absolute-path = 1*( "/" segment )

partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]

Each protocol element in HTTP that allows a URI reference will

indicate in its ABNF production whether the element allows any form
of reference (URI-reference), only a URI in absolute form (absolute-
URI), only the path and optional query components (partial-URI), or
some combination of the above. Unless otherwise indicated, URI
references are parsed relative to the target URI (Section 7.1).

It is RECOMMENDED that all senders and recipients support, at a

minimum, URIs with lengths of 8000 octets in protocol elements. Note
that this implies some structures and on-wire representations (for
example, the request line in HTTP/1.1) will necessarily be larger in
 some cases.

4.2. HTTP-Related URI Schemes

IANA maintains the registry of URI Schemes [BCP35] at

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/>. Although requests
might target any URI scheme, the following schemes are inherent to
HTTP servers:

+============+====================================+=========+
| URI Scheme | Description | Section |
+============+====================================+=========+
| http | Hypertext Transfer Protocol | 4.2.1 |
+------------+------------------------------------+---------+
| https | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure | 4.2.2 |
+------------+------------------------------------+---------+

Table 2

Note that the presence of an "http" or "https" URI does not imply
that there is always an HTTP server at the identified origin
listening for connections. Anyone can mint a URI, whether or not a
server exists and whether or not that server currently maps that
identifier to a resource. The delegated nature of registered names
and IP addresses creates a federated namespace whether or not an HTTP
server is present.

4.2.1. http URI Scheme

The "http" URI scheme is hereby defined for minting identifiers

within the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin
server listening for TCP ([TCP]) connections on a given port.

http-URI = "http" "://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]

The origin server for an "http" URI is identified by the authority

component, which includes a host identifier ([URI], Section 3.2.2)
and optional port number ([URI], Section 3.2.3). If the port
subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 80 (the reserved port
for WWW services) is the default. The origin determines who has the
right to respond authoritatively to requests that target the
identified resource, as defined in Section 4.3.2.

A sender MUST NOT generate an "http" URI with an empty host

identifier. A recipient that processes such a URI reference MUST
reject it as invalid.

The hierarchical path component and optional query component identify

the target resource within that origin server's namespace.

4.2.2. https URI Scheme

The "https" URI scheme is hereby defined for minting identifiers

within the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential origin
server listening for TCP connections on a given port and capable of
establishing a TLS ([TLS13]) connection that has been secured for
HTTP communication. In this context, "secured" specifically means
that the server has been authenticated as acting on behalf of the
identified authority and all HTTP communication with that server has
 confidentiality and integrity protection that is acceptable to both
client and server.

https-URI = "https" "://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]

The origin server for an "https" URI is identified by the authority

component, which includes a host identifier ([URI], Section 3.2.2)
and optional port number ([URI], Section 3.2.3). If the port
subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 443 (the reserved port
for HTTP over TLS) is the default. The origin determines who has the
right to respond authoritatively to requests that target the
identified resource, as defined in Section 4.3.3.

A sender MUST NOT generate an "https" URI with an empty host

identifier. A recipient that processes such a URI reference MUST
reject it as invalid.

The hierarchical path component and optional query component identify

the target resource within that origin server's namespace.

A client MUST ensure that its HTTP requests for an "https" resource
are secured, prior to being communicated, and that it only accepts
secured responses to those requests. Note that the definition of
what cryptographic mechanisms are acceptable to client and server are
usually negotiated and can change over time.

Resources made available via the "https" scheme have no shared

identity with the "http" scheme. They are distinct origins with
separate namespaces. However, extensions to HTTP that are defined as
applying to all origins with the same host, such as the Cookie
protocol [COOKIE], allow information set by one service to impact
communication with other services within a matching group of host
domains. Such extensions ought to be designed with great care to
prevent information obtained from a secured connection being
inadvertently exchanged within an unsecured context.

4.2.3. http(s) Normalization and Comparison

URIs with an "http" or "https" scheme are normalized and compared

according to the methods defined in Section 6 of [URI], using the
defaults described above for each scheme.

HTTP does not require the use of a specific method for determining
equivalence. For example, a cache key might be compared as a simple
string, after syntax-based normalization, or after scheme-based
normalization.

Scheme-based normalization (Section 6.2.3 of [URI]) of "http" and

"https" URIs involves the following additional rules:

* If the port is equal to the default port for a scheme, the normal
form is to omit the port subcomponent.

* When not being used as the target of an OPTIONS request, an empty

path component is equivalent to an absolute path of "/", so the
normal form is to provide a path of "/" instead.

* The scheme and host are case-insensitive and normally provided in

lowercase; all other components are compared in a case-sensitive
 manner.

* Characters other than those in the "reserved" set are equivalent

to their percent-encoded octets: the normal form is to not encode
them (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of [URI]).

For example, the following three URIs are equivalent:

http://example.com:80/~smith/home.html
http://EXAMPLE.com/%7Esmith/home.html
http://EXAMPLE.com:/%7esmith/home.html

Two HTTP URIs that are equivalent after normalization (using any
method) can be assumed to identify the same resource, and any HTTP
component MAY perform normalization. As a result, distinct resources
SHOULD NOT be identified by HTTP URIs that are equivalent after
normalization (using any method defined in Section 6.2 of [URI]).

4.2.4. Deprecation of userinfo in http(s) URIs

The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a userinfo

subcomponent ([URI], Section 3.2.1) for including user authentication
information in the URI. In that subcomponent, the use of the format
"user:password" is deprecated.

Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal

configuration of authentication information, such as within command
invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even
though such usage might expose a user identifier or password.

A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its "@"
delimiter) when an "http" or "https" URI reference is generated
within a message as a target URI or field value.

Before making use of an "http" or "https" URI reference received from

an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat
its presence as an error; it is likely being used to obscure the
authority for the sake of phishing attacks.

4.2.5. http(s) References with Fragment Identifiers

Fragment identifiers allow for indirect identification of a secondary

resource, independent of the URI scheme, as defined in Section 3.5 of
[URI]. Some protocol elements that refer to a URI allow inclusion of
a fragment, while others do not. They are distinguished by use of
the ABNF rule for elements where fragment is allowed; otherwise, a
specific rule that excludes fragments is used.

| *Note:* The fragment identifier component is not part of the

| scheme definition for a URI scheme (see Section 4.3 of [URI]),
| thus does not appear in the ABNF definitions for the "http" and
| "https" URI schemes above.

4.3. Authoritative Access

Authoritative access refers to dereferencing a given identifier, for

the sake of access to the identified resource, in a way that the
client believes is authoritative (controlled by the resource owner).
The process for determining whether access is granted is defined by
 the URI scheme and often uses data within the URI components, such as
the authority component when the generic syntax is used. However,
authoritative access is not limited to the identified mechanism.

Section 4.3.1 defines the concept of an origin as an aid to such

uses, and the subsequent subsections explain how to establish that a
peer has the authority to represent an origin.

See Section 17.1 for security considerations related to establishing

authority.

4.3.1. URI Origin

The "origin" for a given URI is the triple of scheme, host, and port
after normalizing the scheme and host to lowercase and normalizing
the port to remove any leading zeros. If port is elided from the
URI, the default port for that scheme is used. For example, the URI

https://Example.Com/happy.js

would have the origin

{ "https", "example.com", "443" }

which can also be described as the normalized URI prefix with port
always present:

https://example.com:443

Each origin defines its own namespace and controls how identifiers
within that namespace are mapped to resources. In turn, how the
origin responds to valid requests, consistently over time, determines
the semantics that users will associate with a URI, and the
usefulness of those semantics is what ultimately transforms these
mechanisms into a resource for users to reference and access in the
future.

Two origins are distinct if they differ in scheme, host, or port.

Even when it can be verified that the same entity controls two
distinct origins, the two namespaces under those origins are distinct
unless explicitly aliased by a server authoritative for that origin.

Origin is also used within HTML and related Web protocols, beyond the
scope of this document, as described in [RFC6454].

4.3.2. http Origins

Although HTTP is independent of the transport protocol, the "http"

scheme (Section 4.2.1) is specific to associating authority with
whomever controls the origin server listening for TCP connections on
the indicated port of whatever host is identified within the
authority component. This is a very weak sense of authority because
it depends on both client-specific name resolution mechanisms and
communication that might not be secured from an on-path attacker.
Nevertheless, it is a sufficient minimum for binding "http"
identifiers to an origin server for consistent resolution within a
trusted environment.

If the host identifier is provided as an IP address, the origin

 server is the listener (if any) on the indicated TCP port at that IP
address. If host is a registered name, the registered name is an
indirect identifier for use with a name resolution service, such as
DNS, to find an address for an appropriate origin server.

When an "http" URI is used within a context that calls for access to
the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the
host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to
that address on the indicated port, and sending over that connection
an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the
client's target URI (Section 7.1).

If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP

response message, as described in Section 15, then that response is
considered an authoritative answer to the client's request.

Note, however, that the above is not the only means for obtaining an
authoritative response, nor does it imply that an authoritative
response is always necessary (see [CACHING]). For example, the Alt-
Svc header field [ALTSVC] allows an origin server to identify other
services that are also authoritative for that origin. Access to
"http" identified resources might also be provided by protocols
outside the scope of this document.

4.3.3. https Origins

The "https" scheme (Section 4.2.2) associates authority based on the

ability of a server to use the private key corresponding to a
certificate that the client considers to be trustworthy for the
identified origin server. The client usually relies upon a chain of
trust, conveyed from some prearranged or configured trust anchor, to
deem a certificate trustworthy (Section 4.3.4).

In HTTP/1.1 and earlier, a client will only attribute authority to a

server when they are communicating over a successfully established
and secured connection specifically to that URI origin's host. The
connection establishment and certificate verification are used as
proof of authority.

In HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, a client will attribute authority to a server

when they are communicating over a successfully established and
secured connection if the URI origin's host matches any of the hosts
present in the server's certificate and the client believes that it
could open a connection to that host for that URI. In practice, a
client will make a DNS query to check that the origin's host contains
the same server IP address as the established connection. This
restriction can be removed by the origin server sending an equivalent
ORIGIN frame [RFC8336].

The request target's host and port value are passed within each HTTP
request, identifying the origin and distinguishing it from other
namespaces that might be controlled by the same server (Section 7.2).
It is the origin's responsibility to ensure that any services
provided with control over its certificate's private key are equally
responsible for managing the corresponding "https" namespaces or at
least prepared to reject requests that appear to have been
misdirected (Section 7.4).

An origin server might be unwilling to process requests for certain

 target URIs even when they have the authority to do so. For example,
when a host operates distinct services on different ports (e.g., 443
and 8000), checking the target URI at the origin server is necessary
(even after the connection has been secured) because a network
attacker might cause connections for one port to be received at some
other port. Failing to check the target URI might allow such an
attacker to replace a response to one target URI (e.g.,
"https://example.com/foo") with a seemingly authoritative response
from the other port (e.g., "https://example.com:8000/foo").

Note that the "https" scheme does not rely on TCP and the connected
port number for associating authority, since both are outside the
secured communication and thus cannot be trusted as definitive.
Hence, the HTTP communication might take place over any channel that
has been secured, as defined in Section 4.2.2, including protocols
that don't use TCP.

When an "https" URI is used within a context that calls for access to
the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the
host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to
that address on the indicated port, securing the connection end-to-
end by successfully initiating TLS over TCP with confidentiality and
integrity protection, and sending over that connection an HTTP
request message containing a request target that matches the client's
target URI (Section 7.1).

If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP

response message, as described in Section 15, then that response is
considered an authoritative answer to the client's request.

Note, however, that the above is not the only means for obtaining an
authoritative response, nor does it imply that an authoritative
response is always necessary (see [CACHING]).

4.3.4. https Certificate Verification

To establish a secured connection to dereference a URI, a client MUST

verify that the service's identity is an acceptable match for the
URI's origin server. Certificate verification is used to prevent
server impersonation by an on-path attacker or by an attacker that
controls name resolution. This process requires that a client be
configured with a set of trust anchors.

In general, a client MUST verify the service identity using the

verification process defined in Section 6 of [RFC6125]. The client
MUST construct a reference identity from the service's host: if the
host is a literal IP address (Section 4.3.5), the reference identity
is an IP-ID, otherwise the host is a name and the reference identity
is a DNS-ID.

A reference identity of type CN-ID MUST NOT be used by clients. As

noted in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC6125], a reference identity of type CN-
ID might be used by older clients.

A client might be specially configured to accept an alternative form

of server identity verification. For example, a client might be
connecting to a server whose address and hostname are dynamic, with
an expectation that the service will present a specific certificate
(or a certificate matching some externally defined reference
 identity) rather than one matching the target URI's origin.

In special cases, it might be appropriate for a client to simply

ignore the server's identity, but it must be understood that this
leaves a connection open to active attack.

If the certificate is not valid for the target URI's origin, a user
agent MUST either obtain confirmation from the user before proceeding
(see Section 3.5) or terminate the connection with a bad certificate
error. Automated clients MUST log the error to an appropriate audit
log (if available) and SHOULD terminate the connection (with a bad
certificate error). Automated clients MAY provide a configuration
setting that disables this check, but MUST provide a setting which
enables it.

4.3.5. IP-ID Reference Identity

A server that is identified using an IP address literal in the "host"

field of an "https" URI has a reference identity of type IP-ID. An
IP version 4 address uses the "IPv4address" ABNF rule, and an IP
version 6 address uses the "IP-literal" production with the
"IPv6address" option; see Section 3.2.2 of [URI]. A reference
identity of IP-ID contains the decoded bytes of the IP address.

An IP version 4 address is 4 octets, and an IP version 6 address is

16 octets. Use of IP-ID is not defined for any other IP version.
The iPAddress choice in the certificate subjectAltName extension does
not explicitly include the IP version and so relies on the length of
the address to distinguish versions; see Section 4.2.1.6 of
[RFC5280].

A reference identity of type IP-ID matches if the address is

identical to an iPAddress value of the subjectAltName extension of
the certificate.

5. Fields

HTTP uses "fields" to provide data in the form of extensible name/

value pairs with a registered key namespace. Fields are sent and
received within the header and trailer sections of messages
(Section 6).

5.1. Field Names

A field name labels the corresponding field value as having the

semantics defined by that name. For example, the Date header field
is defined in Section 6.6.1 as containing the origination timestamp
for the message in which it appears.

field-name = token

Field names are case-insensitive and ought to be registered within

the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry"; see
Section 16.3.1.

The interpretation of a field does not change between minor versions

of the same major HTTP version, though the default behavior of a
recipient in the absence of such a field can change. Unless
specified otherwise, fields are defined for all versions of HTTP. In
 particular, the Host and Connection fields ought to be recognized by
all HTTP implementations whether or not they advertise conformance
with HTTP/1.1.

New fields can be introduced without changing the protocol version if

their defined semantics allow them to be safely ignored by recipients
that do not recognize them; see Section 16.3.

A proxy MUST forward unrecognized header fields unless the field name
is listed in the Connection header field (Section 7.6.1) or the proxy
is specifically configured to block, or otherwise transform, such
fields. Other recipients SHOULD ignore unrecognized header and
trailer fields. Adhering to these requirements allows HTTP's
functionality to be extended without updating or removing deployed
intermediaries.

5.2. Field Lines and Combined Field Value

Field sections are composed of any number of "field lines", each with
a "field name" (see Section 5.1) identifying the field, and a "field
line value" that conveys data for that instance of the field.

When a field name is only present once in a section, the combined

"field value" for that field consists of the corresponding field line
value. When a field name is repeated within a section, its combined
field value consists of the list of corresponding field line values
within that section, concatenated in order, with each field line
value separated by a comma.

For example, this section:

Example-Field: Foo, Bar

Example-Field: Baz

contains two field lines, both with the field name "Example-Field".
The first field line has a field line value of "Foo, Bar", while the
second field line value is "Baz". The field value for "Example-
Field" is the list "Foo, Bar, Baz".

5.3. Field Order

A recipient MAY combine multiple field lines within a field section

that have the same field name into one field line, without changing
the semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field line
value to the initial field line value in order, separated by a comma
(",") and optional whitespace (OWS, defined in Section 5.6.3). For
consistency, use comma SP.

The order in which field lines with the same name are received is
therefore significant to the interpretation of the field value; a
proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field line values when
forwarding a message.

This means that, aside from the well-known exception noted below, a
sender MUST NOT generate multiple field lines with the same name in a
message (whether in the headers or trailers) or append a field line
when a field line of the same name already exists in the message,
unless that field's definition allows multiple field line values to
be recombined as a comma-separated list (i.e., at least one
 alternative of the field's definition allows a comma-separated list,
such as an ABNF rule of #(values) defined in Section 5.6.1).

| *Note:* In practice, the "Set-Cookie" header field ([COOKIE])

| often appears in a response message across multiple field lines
| and does not use the list syntax, violating the above
| requirements on multiple field lines with the same field name.
| Since it cannot be combined into a single field value,
| recipients ought to handle "Set-Cookie" as a special case while
| processing fields. (See Appendix A.2.3 of [Kri2001] for
| details.)

The order in which field lines with differing field names are
received in a section is not significant. However, it is good
practice to send header fields that contain additional control data
first, such as Host on requests and Date on responses, so that
implementations can decide when not to handle a message as early as
possible.

A server MUST NOT apply a request to the target resource until it

receives the entire request header section, since later header field
lines might include conditionals, authentication credentials, or
deliberately misleading duplicate header fields that could impact
request processing.

5.4. Field Limits

HTTP does not place a predefined limit on the length of each field
line, field value, or on the length of a header or trailer section as
a whole, as described in Section 2. Various ad hoc limitations on
individual lengths are found in practice, often depending on the
specific field's semantics.

A server that receives a request header field line, field value, or

set of fields larger than it wishes to process MUST respond with an
appropriate 4xx (Client Error) status code. Ignoring such header
fields would increase the server's vulnerability to request smuggling
attacks (Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).

A client MAY discard or truncate received field lines that are larger
than the client wishes to process if the field semantics are such
that the dropped value(s) can be safely ignored without changing the
message framing or response semantics.

5.5. Field Values

HTTP field values consist of a sequence of characters in a format

defined by the field's grammar. Each field's grammar is usually
defined using ABNF ([RFC5234]).

field-value = *field-content
field-content = field-vchar
[ 1*( SP / HTAB / field-vchar ) field-vchar ]
field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
obs-text = %x80-FF

A field value does not include leading or trailing whitespace. When

a specific version of HTTP allows such whitespace to appear in a
message, a field parsing implementation MUST exclude such whitespace
prior to evaluating the field value.

Field values are usually constrained to the range of US-ASCII

characters [USASCII]. Fields needing a greater range of characters
can use an encoding, such as the one defined in [RFC8187].
Historically, HTTP allowed field content with text in the ISO-8859-1
charset [ISO-8859-1], supporting other charsets only through use of
[RFC2047] encoding. Specifications for newly defined fields SHOULD
limit their values to visible US-ASCII octets (VCHAR), SP, and HTAB.
A recipient SHOULD treat other allowed octets in field content (i.e.,
obs-text) as opaque data.

Field values containing CR, LF, or NUL characters are invalid and
dangerous, due to the varying ways that implementations might parse
and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR, LF, or NUL within
a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those
characters with SP before further processing or forwarding of that
message. Field values containing other CTL characters are also
invalid; however, recipients MAY retain such characters for the sake
of robustness when they appear within a safe context (e.g., an
application-specific quoted string that will not be processed by any
downstream HTTP parser).

Fields that only anticipate a single member as the field value are
referred to as "singleton fields".

Fields that allow multiple members as the field value are referred to
as "list-based fields". The list operator extension of Section 5.6.1
is used as a common notation for defining field values that can
contain multiple members.

Because commas (",") are used as the delimiter between members, they
need to be treated with care if they are allowed as data within a
member. This is true for both list-based and singleton fields, since
a singleton field might be erroneously sent with multiple members and
detecting such errors improves interoperability. Fields that expect
to contain a comma within a member, such as within an HTTP-date or
URI-reference element, ought to be defined with delimiters around
that element to distinguish any comma within that data from potential
list separators.

For example, a textual date and a URI (either of which might contain
a comma) could be safely carried in list-based field values like
these:

Example-URIs: "http://example.com/a.html,foo",
"http://without-a-comma.example.com/"
Example-Dates: "Sat, 04 May 1996", "Wed, 14 Sep 2005"

Note that double-quote delimiters are almost always used with the
quoted-string production (Section 5.6.4); using a different syntax
inside double-quotes will likely cause unnecessary confusion.

Many fields (such as Content-Type, defined in Section 8.3) use a

common syntax for parameters that allows both unquoted (token) and
quoted (quoted-string) syntax for a parameter value (Section 5.6.6).
Use of common syntax allows recipients to reuse existing parser
components. When allowing both forms, the meaning of a parameter
value ought to be the same whether it was received as a token or a
 quoted string.

| *Note:* For defining field value syntax, this specification

| uses an ABNF rule named after the field name to define the
| allowed grammar for that field's value (after said value has
| been extracted from the underlying messaging syntax and
| multiple instances combined into a list).

5.6. Common Rules for Defining Field Values

5.6.1. Lists (#rule ABNF Extension)

A #rule extension to the ABNF rules of [RFC5234] is used to improve

readability in the definitions of some list-based field values.

A construct "#" is defined, similar to "*", for defining comma-

delimited lists of elements. The full form is "<n>#<m>element"
indicating at least <n> and at most <m> elements, each separated by a
single comma (",") and optional whitespace (OWS, defined in
Section 5.6.3).

5.6.1.1. Sender Requirements

In any production that uses the list construct, a sender MUST NOT
generate empty list elements. In other words, a sender has to
generate lists that satisfy the following syntax:

1#element => element *( OWS "," OWS element )

and:

#element => [ 1#element ]

and for n >= 1 and m > 1:

<n>#<m>element => element <n-1>*<m-1>( OWS "," OWS element )

Appendix A shows the collected ABNF for senders after the list
constructs have been expanded.

5.6.1.2. Recipient Requirements

Empty elements do not contribute to the count of elements present. A

recipient MUST parse and ignore a reasonable number of empty list
elements: enough to handle common mistakes by senders that merge
values, but not so much that they could be used as a denial-of-
service mechanism. In other words, a recipient MUST accept lists
that satisfy the following syntax:

#element => [ element ] *( OWS "," OWS [ element ] )

Note that because of the potential presence of empty list elements,

the RFC 5234 ABNF cannot enforce the cardinality of list elements,
and consequently all cases are mapped as if there was no cardinality
specified.

For example, given these ABNF productions:

example-list = 1#example-list-elmt
 example-list-elmt = token ; see Section 5.6.2

Then the following are valid values for example-list (not including
the double quotes, which are present for delimitation only):

"foo,bar"
"foo ,bar,"
"foo , ,bar,charlie"

In contrast, the following values would be invalid, since at least

one non-empty element is required by the example-list production:

""
","
", ,"

5.6.2. Tokens

Tokens are short textual identifiers that do not include whitespace

or delimiters.

token = 1*tchar

tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"

/ "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
/ DIGIT / ALPHA
; any VCHAR, except delimiters

Many HTTP field values are defined using common syntax components,
separated by whitespace or specific delimiting characters.
Delimiters are chosen from the set of US-ASCII visual characters not
allowed in a token (DQUOTE and "(),/:;<=>?@[\]{}").

5.6.3. Whitespace

This specification uses three rules to denote the use of linear

whitespace: OWS (optional whitespace), RWS (required whitespace), and
BWS ("bad" whitespace).

The OWS rule is used where zero or more linear whitespace octets
might appear. For protocol elements where optional whitespace is
preferred to improve readability, a sender SHOULD generate the
optional whitespace as a single SP; otherwise, a sender SHOULD NOT
generate optional whitespace except as needed to overwrite invalid or
unwanted protocol elements during in-place message filtering.

The RWS rule is used when at least one linear whitespace octet is
required to separate field tokens. A sender SHOULD generate RWS as a
single SP.

OWS and RWS have the same semantics as a single SP. Any content
known to be defined as OWS or RWS MAY be replaced with a single SP
before interpreting it or forwarding the message downstream.

The BWS rule is used where the grammar allows optional whitespace
only for historical reasons. A sender MUST NOT generate BWS in
messages. A recipient MUST parse for such bad whitespace and remove
it before interpreting the protocol element.
 BWS has no semantics. Any content known to be defined as BWS MAY be
removed before interpreting it or forwarding the message downstream.

OWS = *( SP / HTAB )
; optional whitespace
RWS = 1*( SP / HTAB )
; required whitespace
BWS = OWS
; "bad" whitespace

5.6.4. Quoted Strings

A string of text is parsed as a single value if it is quoted using

double-quote marks.

quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE

qdtext = HTAB / SP / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text

The backslash octet ("\") can be used as a single-octet quoting

mechanism within quoted-string and comment constructs. Recipients
that process the value of a quoted-string MUST handle a quoted-pair
as if it were replaced by the octet following the backslash.

quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )

A sender SHOULD NOT generate a quoted-pair in a quoted-string except

where necessary to quote DQUOTE and backslash octets occurring within
that string. A sender SHOULD NOT generate a quoted-pair in a comment
except where necessary to quote parentheses ["(" and ")"] and
backslash octets occurring within that comment.

5.6.5. Comments

Comments can be included in some HTTP fields by surrounding the

comment text with parentheses. Comments are only allowed in fields
containing "comment" as part of their field value definition.

comment = "(" *( ctext / quoted-pair / comment ) ")"

ctext = HTAB / SP / %x21-27 / %x2A-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text

5.6.6. Parameters

Parameters are instances of name/value pairs; they are often used in

field values as a common syntax for appending auxiliary information
to an item. Each parameter is usually delimited by an immediately
preceding semicolon.

parameters = *( OWS ";" OWS [ parameter ] )

parameter = parameter-name "=" parameter-value
parameter-name = token
parameter-value = ( token / quoted-string )

Parameter names are case-insensitive. Parameter values might or

might not be case-sensitive, depending on the semantics of the
parameter name. Examples of parameters and some equivalent forms can
be seen in media types (Section 8.3.1) and the Accept header field
(Section 12.5.1).

A parameter value that matches the token production can be

 transmitted either as a token or within a quoted-string. The quoted
and unquoted values are equivalent.

| *Note:* Parameters do not allow whitespace (not even "bad"

| whitespace) around the "=" character.

5.6.7. Date/Time Formats

Prior to 1995, there were three different formats commonly used by

servers to communicate timestamps. For compatibility with old
implementations, all three are defined here. The preferred format is
a fixed-length and single-zone subset of the date and time
specification used by the Internet Message Format [RFC5322].

HTTP-date = IMF-fixdate / obs-date

An example of the preferred format is

Sun, 06 Nov 1994 08:49:37 GMT ; IMF-fixdate

Examples of the two obsolete formats are

Sunday, 06-Nov-94 08:49:37 GMT ; obsolete RFC 850 format

Sun Nov 6 08:49:37 1994 ; ANSI C's asctime() format

A recipient that parses a timestamp value in an HTTP field MUST

accept all three HTTP-date formats. When a sender generates a field
that contains one or more timestamps defined as HTTP-date, the sender
MUST generate those timestamps in the IMF-fixdate format.

An HTTP-date value represents time as an instance of Coordinated

Universal Time (UTC). The first two formats indicate UTC by the
three-letter abbreviation for Greenwich Mean Time, "GMT", a
predecessor of the UTC name; values in the asctime format are assumed
to be in UTC.

A "clock" is an implementation capable of providing a reasonable

approximation of the current instant in UTC. A clock implementation
ought to use NTP ([RFC5905]), or some similar protocol, to
synchronize with UTC.

Preferred format:

IMF-fixdate = day-name "," SP date1 SP time-of-day SP GMT

; fixed length/zone/capitalization subset of the format
; see Section 3.3 of [RFC5322]

day-name = %s"Mon" / %s"Tue" / %s"Wed"

/ %s"Thu" / %s"Fri" / %s"Sat" / %s"Sun"

date1 = day SP month SP year

; e.g., 02 Jun 1982

day = 2DIGIT
month = %s"Jan" / %s"Feb" / %s"Mar" / %s"Apr"
/ %s"May" / %s"Jun" / %s"Jul" / %s"Aug"
/ %s"Sep" / %s"Oct" / %s"Nov" / %s"Dec"
year = 4DIGIT
 GMT = %s"GMT"

time-of-day = hour ":" minute ":" second

; 00:00:00 - 23:59:60 (leap second)

hour = 2DIGIT
minute = 2DIGIT
second = 2DIGIT

Obsolete formats:

obs-date = rfc850-date / asctime-date

rfc850-date = day-name-l "," SP date2 SP time-of-day SP GMT

date2 = day "-" month "-" 2DIGIT
; e.g., 02-Jun-82

day-name-l = %s"Monday" / %s"Tuesday" / %s"Wednesday"

/ %s"Thursday" / %s"Friday" / %s"Saturday"
/ %s"Sunday"

asctime-date = day-name SP date3 SP time-of-day SP year

date3 = month SP ( 2DIGIT / ( SP 1DIGIT ))
; e.g., Jun 2

HTTP-date is case sensitive. Note that Section 4.2 of [CACHING]

relaxes this for cache recipients.

A sender MUST NOT generate additional whitespace in an HTTP-date

beyond that specifically included as SP in the grammar. The
semantics of day-name, day, month, year, and time-of-day are the same
as those defined for the Internet Message Format constructs with the
corresponding name ([RFC5322], Section 3.3).

Recipients of a timestamp value in rfc850-date format, which uses a

two-digit year, MUST interpret a timestamp that appears to be more
than 50 years in the future as representing the most recent year in
the past that had the same last two digits.

Recipients of timestamp values are encouraged to be robust in parsing

timestamps unless otherwise restricted by the field definition. For
example, messages are occasionally forwarded over HTTP from a non-
HTTP source that might generate any of the date and time
specifications defined by the Internet Message Format.

| *Note:* HTTP requirements for timestamp formats apply only to

| their usage within the protocol stream. Implementations are
| not required to use these formats for user presentation,
| request logging, etc.

6. Message Abstraction

Each major version of HTTP defines its own syntax for communicating
messages. This section defines an abstract data type for HTTP
messages based on a generalization of those message characteristics,
common structure, and capacity for conveying semantics. This
abstraction is used to define requirements on senders and recipients
that are independent of the HTTP version, such that a message in one
version can be relayed through other versions without changing its
 meaning.

A "message" consists of the following:

* control data to describe and route the message,

* a headers lookup table of name/value pairs for extending that

control data and conveying additional information about the
sender, message, content, or context,

* a potentially unbounded stream of content, and

* a trailers lookup table of name/value pairs for communicating

information obtained while sending the content.

Framing and control data is sent first, followed by a header section

containing fields for the headers table. When a message includes
content, the content is sent after the header section, potentially
followed by a trailer section that might contain fields for the
trailers table.

Messages are expected to be processed as a stream, wherein the

purpose of that stream and its continued processing is revealed while
being read. Hence, control data describes what the recipient needs
to know immediately, header fields describe what needs to be known
before receiving content, the content (when present) presumably
contains what the recipient wants or needs to fulfill the message
semantics, and trailer fields provide optional metadata that was
unknown prior to sending the content.

Messages are intended to be "self-descriptive": everything a

recipient needs to know about the message can be determined by
looking at the message itself, after decoding or reconstituting parts
that have been compressed or elided in transit, without requiring an
understanding of the sender's current application state (established
via prior messages). However, a client MUST retain knowledge of the
request when parsing, interpreting, or caching a corresponding
response. For example, responses to the HEAD method look just like
the beginning of a response to GET but cannot be parsed in the same
manner.

Note that this message abstraction is a generalization across many

versions of HTTP, including features that might not be found in some
versions. For example, trailers were introduced within the HTTP/1.1
chunked transfer coding as a trailer section after the content. An
equivalent feature is present in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 within the header
block that terminates each stream.

6.1. Framing and Completeness

Message framing indicates how each message begins and ends, such that
each message can be distinguished from other messages or noise on the
same connection. Each major version of HTTP defines its own framing
mechanism.

HTTP/0.9 and early deployments of HTTP/1.0 used closure of the

underlying connection to end a response. For backwards
compatibility, this implicit framing is also allowed in HTTP/1.1.
However, implicit framing can fail to distinguish an incomplete
 response if the connection closes early. For that reason, almost all
modern implementations use explicit framing in the form of length-
delimited sequences of message data.

A message is considered "complete" when all of the octets indicated

by its framing are available. Note that, when no explicit framing is
used, a response message that is ended by the underlying connection's
close is considered complete even though it might be
indistinguishable from an incomplete response, unless a transport-
level error indicates that it is not complete.

6.2. Control Data

Messages start with control data that describe its primary purpose.
Request message control data includes a request method (Section 9),
request target (Section 7.1), and protocol version (Section 2.5).
Response message control data includes a status code (Section 15),
optional reason phrase, and protocol version.

In HTTP/1.1 ([HTTP/1.1]) and earlier, control data is sent as the

first line of a message. In HTTP/2 ([HTTP/2]) and HTTP/3 ([HTTP/3]),
control data is sent as pseudo-header fields with a reserved name
prefix (e.g., ":authority").

Every HTTP message has a protocol version. Depending on the version

in use, it might be identified within the message explicitly or
inferred by the connection over which the message is received.
Recipients use that version information to determine limitations or
potential for later communication with that sender.

When a message is forwarded by an intermediary, the protocol version

is updated to reflect the version used by that intermediary. The Via
header field (Section 7.6.3) is used to communicate upstream protocol
information within a forwarded message.

A client SHOULD send a request version equal to the highest version

to which the client is conformant and whose major version is no
higher than the highest version supported by the server, if this is
known. A client MUST NOT send a version to which it is not
conformant.

A client MAY send a lower request version if it is known that the

server incorrectly implements the HTTP specification, but only after
the client has attempted at least one normal request and determined
from the response status code or header fields (e.g., Server) that
the server improperly handles higher request versions.

A server SHOULD send a response version equal to the highest version

to which the server is conformant that has a major version less than
or equal to the one received in the request. A server MUST NOT send
a version to which it is not conformant. A server can send a 505
(HTTP Version Not Supported) response if it wishes, for any reason,
to refuse service of the client's major protocol version.

A recipient that receives a message with a major version number that

it implements and a minor version number higher than what it
implements SHOULD process the message as if it were in the highest
minor version within that major version to which the recipient is
conformant. A recipient can assume that a message with a higher
 minor version, when sent to a recipient that has not yet indicated
support for that higher version, is sufficiently backwards-compatible
to be safely processed by any implementation of the same major
version.

6.3. Header Fields

Fields (Section 5) that are sent or received before the content are
referred to as "header fields" (or just "headers", colloquially).

The "header section" of a message consists of a sequence of header

field lines. Each header field might modify or extend message
semantics, describe the sender, define the content, or provide
additional context.

| *Note:* We refer to named fields specifically as a "header

| field" when they are only allowed to be sent in the header
| section.

6.4. Content

HTTP messages often transfer a complete or partial representation as

the message "content": a stream of octets sent after the header
section, as delineated by the message framing.

This abstract definition of content reflects the data after it has

been extracted from the message framing. For example, an HTTP/1.1
message body (Section 6 of [HTTP/1.1]) might consist of a stream of
data encoded with the chunked transfer coding -- a sequence of data
chunks, one zero-length chunk, and a trailer section -- whereas the
content of that same message includes only the data stream after the
transfer coding has been decoded; it does not include the chunk
lengths, chunked framing syntax, nor the trailer fields
(Section 6.5).

| *Note:* Some field names have a "Content-" prefix. This is an

| informal convention; while some of these fields refer to the
| content of the message, as defined above, others are scoped to
| the selected representation (Section 3.2). See the individual
| field's definition to disambiguate.

6.4.1. Content Semantics

The purpose of content in a request is defined by the method

semantics (Section 9).

For example, a representation in the content of a PUT request

(Section 9.3.4) represents the desired state of the target resource
after the request is successfully applied, whereas a representation
in the content of a POST request (Section 9.3.3) represents
information to be processed by the target resource.

In a response, the content's purpose is defined by the request

method, response status code (Section 15), and response fields
describing that content. For example, the content of a 200 (OK)
response to GET (Section 9.3.1) represents the current state of the
target resource, as observed at the time of the message origination
date (Section 6.6.1), whereas the content of the same status code in
a response to POST might represent either the processing result or
 the new state of the target resource after applying the processing.

The content of a 206 (Partial Content) response to GET contains

either a single part of the selected representation or a multipart
message body containing multiple parts of that representation, as
described in Section 15.3.7.

Response messages with an error status code usually contain content

that represents the error condition, such that the content describes
the error state and what steps are suggested for resolving it.

Responses to the HEAD request method (Section 9.3.2) never include

content; the associated response header fields indicate only what
their values would have been if the request method had been GET
(Section 9.3.1).

2xx (Successful) responses to a CONNECT request method

(Section 9.3.6) switch the connection to tunnel mode instead of
having content.

All 1xx (Informational), 204 (No Content), and 304 (Not Modified)
responses do not include content.

All other responses do include content, although that content might

be of zero length.

6.4.2. Identifying Content

When a complete or partial representation is transferred as message

content, it is often desirable for the sender to supply, or the
recipient to determine, an identifier for a resource corresponding to
that specific representation. For example, a client making a GET
request on a resource for "the current weather report" might want an
identifier specific to the content returned (e.g., "weather report
for Laguna Beach at 20210720T1711"). This can be useful for sharing
or bookmarking content from resources that are expected to have
changing representations over time.

For a request message:

* If the request has a Content-Location header field, then the

sender asserts that the content is a representation of the
resource identified by the Content-Location field value. However,
such an assertion cannot be trusted unless it can be verified by
other means (not defined by this specification). The information
might still be useful for revision history links.

* Otherwise, the content is unidentified by HTTP, but a more

specific identifier might be supplied within the content itself.

For a response message, the following rules are applied in order

until a match is found:

1. If the request method is HEAD or the response status code is 204

(No Content) or 304 (Not Modified), there is no content in the
response.

2. If the request method is GET and the response status code is 200
(OK), the content is a representation of the target resource
 (Section 7.1).

3. If the request method is GET and the response status code is 203
(Non-Authoritative Information), the content is a potentially
modified or enhanced representation of the target resource as
provided by an intermediary.

4. If the request method is GET and the response status code is 206
(Partial Content), the content is one or more parts of a
representation of the target resource.

5. If the response has a Content-Location header field and its field

value is a reference to the same URI as the target URI, the
content is a representation of the target resource.

6. If the response has a Content-Location header field and its field

value is a reference to a URI different from the target URI, then
the sender asserts that the content is a representation of the
resource identified by the Content-Location field value.
However, such an assertion cannot be trusted unless it can be
verified by other means (not defined by this specification).

7. Otherwise, the content is unidentified by HTTP, but a more

specific identifier might be supplied within the content itself.

6.5. Trailer Fields

Fields (Section 5) that are located within a "trailer section" are

referred to as "trailer fields" (or just "trailers", colloquially).
Trailer fields can be useful for supplying message integrity checks,
digital signatures, delivery metrics, or post-processing status
information.

Trailer fields ought to be processed and stored separately from the

fields in the header section to avoid contradicting message semantics
known at the time the header section was complete. The presence or
absence of certain header fields might impact choices made for the
routing or processing of the message as a whole before the trailers
are received; those choices cannot be unmade by the later discovery
of trailer fields.

6.5.1. Limitations on Use of Trailers

A trailer section is only possible when supported by the version of

HTTP in use and enabled by an explicit framing mechanism. For
example, the chunked transfer coding in HTTP/1.1 allows a trailer
section to be sent after the content (Section 7.1.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).

Many fields cannot be processed outside the header section because

their evaluation is necessary prior to receiving the content, such as
those that describe message framing, routing, authentication, request
modifiers, response controls, or content format. A sender MUST NOT
generate a trailer field unless the sender knows the corresponding
header field name's definition permits the field to be sent in
trailers.

Trailer fields can be difficult to process by intermediaries that

forward messages from one protocol version to another. If the entire
message can be buffered in transit, some intermediaries could merge
 trailer fields into the header section (as appropriate) before it is
forwarded. However, in most cases, the trailers are simply
discarded. A recipient MUST NOT merge a trailer field into a header
section unless the recipient understands the corresponding header
field definition and that definition explicitly permits and defines
how trailer field values can be safely merged.

The presence of the keyword "trailers" in the TE header field

(Section 10.1.4) of a request indicates that the client is willing to
accept trailer fields, on behalf of itself and any downstream
clients. For requests from an intermediary, this implies that all
downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the
forwarded response. Note that the presence of "trailers" does not
mean that the client(s) will process any particular trailer field in
the response; only that the trailer section(s) will not be dropped by
any of the clients.

Because of the potential for trailer fields to be discarded in

transit, a server SHOULD NOT generate trailer fields that it believes
are necessary for the user agent to receive.

6.5.2. Processing Trailer Fields

The "Trailer" header field (Section 6.6.2) can be sent to indicate

fields likely to be sent in the trailer section, which allows
recipients to prepare for their receipt before processing the
content. For example, this could be useful if a field name indicates
that a dynamic checksum should be calculated as the content is
received and then immediately checked upon receipt of the trailer
field value.

Like header fields, trailer fields with the same name are processed
in the order received; multiple trailer field lines with the same
name have the equivalent semantics as appending the multiple values
as a list of members. Trailer fields that might be generated more
than once during a message MUST be defined as a list-based field even
if each member value is only processed once per field line received.

At the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the set of received

trailer fields as a data structure of name/value pairs, similar to
(but separate from) the header fields. Additional processing
expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification
for a field intended for use in trailers.

6.6. Message Metadata

Fields that describe the message itself, such as when and how the
message has been generated, can appear in both requests and
responses.

6.6.1. Date

The "Date" header field represents the date and time at which the
message was originated, having the same semantics as the Origination
Date Field (orig-date) defined in Section 3.6.1 of [RFC5322]. The
field value is an HTTP-date, as defined in Section 5.6.7.

Date = HTTP-date
 An example is

Date: Tue, 15 Nov 1994 08:12:31 GMT

A sender that generates a Date header field SHOULD generate its field
value as the best available approximation of the date and time of
message generation. In theory, the date ought to represent the
moment just before generating the message content. In practice, a
sender can generate the date value at any time during message
origination.

An origin server with a clock (as defined in Section 5.6.7) MUST

generate a Date header field in all 2xx (Successful), 3xx
(Redirection), and 4xx (Client Error) responses, and MAY generate a
Date header field in 1xx (Informational) and 5xx (Server Error)
responses.

An origin server without a clock MUST NOT generate a Date header

field.

A recipient with a clock that receives a response message without a

Date header field MUST record the time it was received and append a
corresponding Date header field to the message's header section if it
is cached or forwarded downstream.

A recipient with a clock that receives a response with an invalid

Date header field value MAY replace that value with the time that
response was received.

A user agent MAY send a Date header field in a request, though

generally will not do so unless it is believed to convey useful
information to the server. For example, custom applications of HTTP
might convey a Date if the server is expected to adjust its
interpretation of the user's request based on differences between the
user agent and server clocks.

6.6.2. Trailer

The "Trailer" header field provides a list of field names that the
sender anticipates sending as trailer fields within that message.
This allows a recipient to prepare for receipt of the indicated
metadata before it starts processing the content.

Trailer = #field-name

For example, a sender might indicate that a signature will be

computed as the content is being streamed and provide the final
signature as a trailer field. This allows a recipient to perform the
same check on the fly as it receives the content.

A sender that intends to generate one or more trailer fields in a

message SHOULD generate a Trailer header field in the header section
of that message to indicate which fields might be present in the
trailers.

If an intermediary discards the trailer section in transit, the

Trailer field could provide a hint of what metadata was lost, though
there is no guarantee that a sender of Trailer will always follow
through by sending the named fields.
7. Routing HTTP Messages

HTTP request message routing is determined by each client based on

the target resource, the client's proxy configuration, and
establishment or reuse of an inbound connection. The corresponding
response routing follows the same connection chain back to the
client.

7.1. Determining the Target Resource

Although HTTP is used in a wide variety of applications, most clients

rely on the same resource identification mechanism and configuration
techniques as general-purpose Web browsers. Even when communication
options are hard-coded in a client's configuration, we can think of
their combined effect as a URI reference (Section 4.1).

A URI reference is resolved to its absolute form in order to obtain

the "target URI". The target URI excludes the reference's fragment
component, if any, since fragment identifiers are reserved for
client-side processing ([URI], Section 3.5).

To perform an action on a "target resource", the client sends a

request message containing enough components of its parsed target URI
to enable recipients to identify that same resource. For historical
reasons, the parsed target URI components, collectively referred to
as the "request target", are sent within the message control data and
the Host header field (Section 7.2).

There are two unusual cases for which the request target components
are in a method-specific form:

* For CONNECT (Section 9.3.6), the request target is the host name
and port number of the tunnel destination, separated by a colon.

* For OPTIONS (Section 9.3.7), the request target can be a single

asterisk ("*").

See the respective method definitions for details. These forms MUST
NOT be used with other methods.

Upon receipt of a client's request, a server reconstructs the target

URI from the received components in accordance with their local
configuration and incoming connection context. This reconstruction
is specific to each major protocol version. For example, Section 3.3
of [HTTP/1.1] defines how a server determines the target URI of an
HTTP/1.1 request.

| *Note:* Previous specifications defined the recomposed target

| URI as a distinct concept, the "effective request URI".

7.2. Host and :authority

The "Host" header field in a request provides the host and port
information from the target URI, enabling the origin server to
distinguish among resources while servicing requests for multiple
host names.

In HTTP/2 [HTTP/2] and HTTP/3 [HTTP/3], the Host header field is, in
 some cases, supplanted by the ":authority" pseudo-header field of a
request's control data.

Host = uri-host [ ":" port ] ; Section 4

The target URI's authority information is critical for handling a

request. A user agent MUST generate a Host header field in a request
unless it sends that information as an ":authority" pseudo-header
field. A user agent that sends Host SHOULD send it as the first
field in the header section of a request.

For example, a GET request to the origin server for

<http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/> would begin with:

GET /pub/WWW/ HTTP/1.1

Host: www.example.org

Since the host and port information acts as an application-level

routing mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to
poison a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server.
An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on the
host and port information for redirecting requests to internal
servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without first
verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a valid IP
address for that host.

7.3. Routing Inbound Requests

Once the target URI and its origin are determined, a client decides
whether a network request is necessary to accomplish the desired
semantics and, if so, where that request is to be directed.

7.3.1. To a Cache

If the client has a cache [CACHING] and the request can be satisfied
by it, then the request is usually directed there first.

7.3.2. To a Proxy

If the request is not satisfied by a cache, then a typical client

will check its configuration to determine whether a proxy is to be
used to satisfy the request. Proxy configuration is implementation-
dependent, but is often based on URI prefix matching, selective
authority matching, or both, and the proxy itself is usually
identified by an "http" or "https" URI.

If an "http" or "https" proxy is applicable, the client connects

inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy and
then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target
that matches the client's target URI.

7.3.3. To the Origin

If no proxy is applicable, a typical client will invoke a handler

routine (specific to the target URI's scheme) to obtain access to the
identified resource. How that is accomplished is dependent on the
target URI scheme and defined by its associated specification.

Section 4.3.2 defines how to obtain access to an "http" resource by

 establishing (or reusing) an inbound connection to the identified
origin server and then sending it an HTTP request message containing
a request target that matches the client's target URI.

Section 4.3.3 defines how to obtain access to an "https" resource by

establishing (or reusing) an inbound secured connection to an origin
server that is authoritative for the identified origin and then
sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target that
matches the client's target URI.

7.4. Rejecting Misdirected Requests

Once a request is received by a server and parsed sufficiently to

determine its target URI, the server decides whether to process the
request itself, forward the request to another server, redirect the
client to a different resource, respond with an error, or drop the
connection. This decision can be influenced by anything about the
request or connection context, but is specifically directed at
whether the server has been configured to process requests for that
target URI and whether the connection context is appropriate for that
request.

For example, a request might have been misdirected, deliberately or

accidentally, such that the information within a received Host header
field differs from the connection's host or port. If the connection
is from a trusted gateway, such inconsistency might be expected;
otherwise, it might indicate an attempt to bypass security filters,
trick the server into delivering non-public content, or poison a
cache. See Section 17 for security considerations regarding message
routing.

Unless the connection is from a trusted gateway, an origin server

MUST reject a request if any scheme-specific requirements for the
target URI are not met. In particular, a request for an "https"
resource MUST be rejected unless it has been received over a
connection that has been secured via a certificate valid for that
target URI's origin, as defined by Section 4.2.2.

The 421 (Misdirected Request) status code in a response indicates

that the origin server has rejected the request because it appears to
have been misdirected (Section 15.5.20).

7.5. Response Correlation

A connection might be used for multiple request/response exchanges.

The mechanism used to correlate between request and response messages
is version dependent; some versions of HTTP use implicit ordering of
messages, while others use an explicit identifier.

All responses, regardless of the status code (including interim

responses) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even
if the request is not yet complete. A response can complete before
its corresponding request is complete (Section 6.1). Likewise,
clients are not expected to wait any specific amount of time for a
response. Clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request
if the response is not received within a reasonable period of time.

A client that receives a response while it is still sending the

associated request SHOULD continue sending that request unless it
 receives an explicit indication to the contrary (see, e.g.,
Section 9.5 of [HTTP/1.1] and Section 6.4 of [HTTP/2]).

7.6. Message Forwarding

As described in Section 3.7, intermediaries can serve a variety of

roles in the processing of HTTP requests and responses. Some
intermediaries are used to improve performance or availability.
Others are used for access control or to filter content. Since an
HTTP stream has characteristics similar to a pipe-and-filter
architecture, there are no inherent limits to the extent an
intermediary can enhance (or interfere) with either direction of the
stream.

Intermediaries are expected to forward messages even when protocol

elements are not recognized (e.g., new methods, status codes, or
field names) since that preserves extensibility for downstream
recipients.

An intermediary not acting as a tunnel MUST implement the Connection

header field, as specified in Section 7.6.1, and exclude fields from
being forwarded that are only intended for the incoming connection.

An intermediary MUST NOT forward a message to itself unless it is

protected from an infinite request loop. In general, an intermediary
ought to recognize its own server names, including any aliases, local
variations, or literal IP addresses, and respond to such requests
directly.

An HTTP message can be parsed as a stream for incremental processing

or forwarding downstream. However, senders and recipients cannot
rely on incremental delivery of partial messages, since some
implementations will buffer or delay message forwarding for the sake
of network efficiency, security checks, or content transformations.

7.6.1. Connection

The "Connection" header field allows the sender to list desired

control options for the current connection.

Connection = #connection-option
connection-option = token

Connection options are case-insensitive.

When a field aside from Connection is used to supply control

information for or about the current connection, the sender MUST list
the corresponding field name within the Connection header field.
Note that some versions of HTTP prohibit the use of fields for such
information, and therefore do not allow the Connection field.

Intermediaries MUST parse a received Connection header field before a

message is forwarded and, for each connection-option in this field,
remove any header or trailer field(s) from the message with the same
name as the connection-option, and then remove the Connection header
field itself (or replace it with the intermediary's own control
options for the forwarded message).

Hence, the Connection header field provides a declarative way of

 distinguishing fields that are only intended for the immediate
recipient ("hop-by-hop") from those fields that are intended for all
recipients on the chain ("end-to-end"), enabling the message to be
self-descriptive and allowing future connection-specific extensions
to be deployed without fear that they will be blindly forwarded by
older intermediaries.

Furthermore, intermediaries SHOULD remove or replace fields that are

known to require removal before forwarding, whether or not they
appear as a connection-option, after applying those fields'
semantics. This includes but is not limited to:

* Proxy-Connection (Appendix C.2.2 of [HTTP/1.1])

* Keep-Alive (Section 19.7.1 of [RFC2068])

* TE (Section 10.1.4)

* Transfer-Encoding (Section 6.1 of [HTTP/1.1])

* Upgrade (Section 7.8)

A sender MUST NOT send a connection option corresponding to a field

that is intended for all recipients of the content. For example,
Cache-Control is never appropriate as a connection option
(Section 5.2 of [CACHING]).

Connection options do not always correspond to a field present in the

message, since a connection-specific field might not be needed if
there are no parameters associated with a connection option. In
contrast, a connection-specific field received without a
corresponding connection option usually indicates that the field has
been improperly forwarded by an intermediary and ought to be ignored
by the recipient.

When defining a new connection option that does not correspond to a

field, specification authors ought to reserve the corresponding field
name anyway in order to avoid later collisions. Such reserved field
names are registered in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field
Name Registry" (Section 16.3.1).

7.6.2. Max-Forwards

The "Max-Forwards" header field provides a mechanism with the TRACE

(Section 9.3.8) and OPTIONS (Section 9.3.7) request methods to limit
the number of times that the request is forwarded by proxies. This
can be useful when the client is attempting to trace a request that
appears to be failing or looping mid-chain.

Max-Forwards = 1*DIGIT

The Max-Forwards value is a decimal integer indicating the remaining

number of times this request message can be forwarded.

Each intermediary that receives a TRACE or OPTIONS request containing

a Max-Forwards header field MUST check and update its value prior to
forwarding the request. If the received value is zero (0), the
intermediary MUST NOT forward the request; instead, the intermediary
MUST respond as the final recipient. If the received Max-Forwards
 value is greater than zero, the intermediary MUST generate an updated
Max-Forwards field in the forwarded message with a field value that
is the lesser of a) the received value decremented by one (1) or b)
the recipient's maximum supported value for Max-Forwards.

A recipient MAY ignore a Max-Forwards header field received with any

other request methods.

7.6.3. Via

The "Via" header field indicates the presence of intermediate

protocols and recipients between the user agent and the server (on
requests) or between the origin server and the client (on responses),
similar to the "Received" header field in email (Section 3.6.7 of
[RFC5322]). Via can be used for tracking message forwards, avoiding
request loops, and identifying the protocol capabilities of senders
along the request/response chain.

Via = #( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ] )

received-protocol = [ protocol-name "/" ] protocol-version

; see Section 7.8
received-by = pseudonym [ ":" port ]
pseudonym = token

Each member of the Via field value represents a proxy or gateway that
has forwarded the message. Each intermediary appends its own
information about how the message was received, such that the end
result is ordered according to the sequence of forwarding recipients.

A proxy MUST send an appropriate Via header field, as described

below, in each message that it forwards. An HTTP-to-HTTP gateway
MUST send an appropriate Via header field in each inbound request
message and MAY send a Via header field in forwarded response
messages.

For each intermediary, the received-protocol indicates the protocol

and protocol version used by the upstream sender of the message.
Hence, the Via field value records the advertised protocol
capabilities of the request/response chain such that they remain
visible to downstream recipients; this can be useful for determining
what backwards-incompatible features might be safe to use in
response, or within a later request, as described in Section 2.5.
For brevity, the protocol-name is omitted when the received protocol
is HTTP.

The received-by portion is normally the host and optional port number
of a recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the
message. However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive
information, a sender MAY replace it with a pseudonym. If a port is
not provided, a recipient MAY interpret that as meaning it was
received on the default port, if any, for the received-protocol.

A sender MAY generate comments to identify the software of each

recipient, analogous to the User-Agent and Server header fields.
However, comments in Via are optional, and a recipient MAY remove
them prior to forwarding the message.

For example, a request message could be sent from an HTTP/1.0 user

 agent to an internal proxy code-named "fred", which uses HTTP/1.1 to
forward the request to a public proxy at p.example.net, which
completes the request by forwarding it to the origin server at
www.example.com. The request received by www.example.com would then
have the following Via header field:

Via: 1.0 fred, 1.1 p.example.net

An intermediary used as a portal through a network firewall SHOULD

NOT forward the names and ports of hosts within the firewall region
unless it is explicitly enabled to do so. If not enabled, such an
intermediary SHOULD replace each received-by host of any host behind
the firewall by an appropriate pseudonym for that host.

An intermediary MAY combine an ordered subsequence of Via header

field list members into a single member if the entries have identical
received-protocol values. For example,

Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 ethel, 1.1 fred, 1.0 lucy

could be collapsed to

Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 mertz, 1.0 lucy

A sender SHOULD NOT combine multiple list members unless they are all
under the same organizational control and the hosts have already been
replaced by pseudonyms. A sender MUST NOT combine members that have
different received-protocol values.

7.7. Message Transformations

Some intermediaries include features for transforming messages and

their content. A proxy might, for example, convert between image
formats in order to save cache space or to reduce the amount of
traffic on a slow link. However, operational problems might occur
when these transformations are applied to content intended for
critical applications, such as medical imaging or scientific data
analysis, particularly when integrity checks or digital signatures
are used to ensure that the content received is identical to the
original.

An HTTP-to-HTTP proxy is called a "transforming proxy" if it is

designed or configured to modify messages in a semantically
meaningful way (i.e., modifications, beyond those required by normal
HTTP processing, that change the message in a way that would be
significant to the original sender or potentially significant to
downstream recipients). For example, a transforming proxy might be
acting as a shared annotation server (modifying responses to include
references to a local annotation database), a malware filter, a
format transcoder, or a privacy filter. Such transformations are
presumed to be desired by whichever client (or client organization)
chose the proxy.

If a proxy receives a target URI with a host name that is not a fully
qualified domain name, it MAY add its own domain to the host name it
received when forwarding the request. A proxy MUST NOT change the
host name if the target URI contains a fully qualified domain name.

A proxy MUST NOT modify the "absolute-path" and "query" parts of the
 received target URI when forwarding it to the next inbound server
except as required by that forwarding protocol. For example, a proxy
forwarding a request to an origin server via HTTP/1.1 will replace an
empty path with "/" (Section 3.2.1 of [HTTP/1.1]) or "*"
(Section 3.2.4 of [HTTP/1.1]), depending on the request method.

A proxy MUST NOT transform the content (Section 6.4) of a response

message that contains a no-transform cache directive (Section 5.2.2.6
of [CACHING]). Note that this does not apply to message
transformations that do not change the content, such as the addition
or removal of transfer codings (Section 7 of [HTTP/1.1]).

A proxy MAY transform the content of a message that does not contain
a no-transform cache directive. A proxy that transforms the content
of a 200 (OK) response can inform downstream recipients that a
transformation has been applied by changing the response status code
to 203 (Non-Authoritative Information) (Section 15.3.4).

A proxy SHOULD NOT modify header fields that provide information

about the endpoints of the communication chain, the resource state,
or the selected representation (other than the content) unless the
field's definition specifically allows such modification or the
modification is deemed necessary for privacy or security.

7.8. Upgrade

The "Upgrade" header field is intended to provide a simple mechanism

for transitioning from HTTP/1.1 to some other protocol on the same
connection.

A client MAY send a list of protocol names in the Upgrade header

field of a request to invite the server to switch to one or more of
the named protocols, in order of descending preference, before
sending the final response. A server MAY ignore a received Upgrade
header field if it wishes to continue using the current protocol on
that connection. Upgrade cannot be used to insist on a protocol
change.

Upgrade = #protocol

protocol = protocol-name ["/" protocol-version]

protocol-name = token
protocol-version = token

Although protocol names are registered with a preferred case,

recipients SHOULD use case-insensitive comparison when matching each
protocol-name to supported protocols.

A server that sends a 101 (Switching Protocols) response MUST send an

Upgrade header field to indicate the new protocol(s) to which the
connection is being switched; if multiple protocol layers are being
switched, the sender MUST list the protocols in layer-ascending
order. A server MUST NOT switch to a protocol that was not indicated
by the client in the corresponding request's Upgrade header field. A
server MAY choose to ignore the order of preference indicated by the
client and select the new protocol(s) based on other factors, such as
the nature of the request or the current load on the server.

A server that sends a 426 (Upgrade Required) response MUST send an

Upgrade header field to indicate the acceptable protocols, in order
of descending preference.

A server MAY send an Upgrade header field in any other response to

advertise that it implements support for upgrading to the listed
protocols, in order of descending preference, when appropriate for a
future request.

The following is a hypothetical example sent by a client:

GET /hello HTTP/1.1

Host: www.example.com
Connection: upgrade
Upgrade: websocket, IRC/6.9, RTA/x11

The capabilities and nature of the application-level communication

after the protocol change is entirely dependent upon the new
protocol(s) chosen. However, immediately after sending the 101
(Switching Protocols) response, the server is expected to continue
responding to the original request as if it had received its
equivalent within the new protocol (i.e., the server still has an
outstanding request to satisfy after the protocol has been changed,
and is expected to do so without requiring the request to be
repeated).

For example, if the Upgrade header field is received in a GET request

and the server decides to switch protocols, it first responds with a
101 (Switching Protocols) message in HTTP/1.1 and then immediately
follows that with the new protocol's equivalent of a response to a
GET on the target resource. This allows a connection to be upgraded
to protocols with the same semantics as HTTP without the latency cost
of an additional round trip. A server MUST NOT switch protocols
unless the received message semantics can be honored by the new
protocol; an OPTIONS request can be honored by any protocol.

The following is an example response to the above hypothetical

request:

HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols

Connection: upgrade
Upgrade: websocket

[... data stream switches to websocket with an appropriate response

(as defined by new protocol) to the "GET /hello" request ...]

A sender of Upgrade MUST also send an "Upgrade" connection option in

the Connection header field (Section 7.6.1) to inform intermediaries
not to forward this field. A server that receives an Upgrade header
field in an HTTP/1.0 request MUST ignore that Upgrade field.

A client cannot begin using an upgraded protocol on the connection

until it has completely sent the request message (i.e., the client
can't change the protocol it is sending in the middle of a message).
If a server receives both an Upgrade and an Expect header field with
the "100-continue" expectation (Section 10.1.1), the server MUST send
a 100 (Continue) response before sending a 101 (Switching Protocols)
response.

The Upgrade header field only applies to switching protocols on top

 of the existing connection; it cannot be used to switch the
underlying connection (transport) protocol, nor to switch the
existing communication to a different connection. For those
purposes, it is more appropriate to use a 3xx (Redirection) response
(Section 15.4).

This specification only defines the protocol name "HTTP" for use by
the family of Hypertext Transfer Protocols, as defined by the HTTP
version rules of Section 2.5 and future updates to this
specification. Additional protocol names ought to be registered
using the registration procedure defined in Section 16.7.

8. Representation Data and Metadata

8.1. Representation Data

The representation data associated with an HTTP message is either

provided as the content of the message or referred to by the message
semantics and the target URI. The representation data is in a format
and encoding defined by the representation metadata header fields.

The data type of the representation data is determined via the header
fields Content-Type and Content-Encoding. These define a two-layer,
ordered encoding model:

representation-data := Content-Encoding( Content-Type( data ) )

8.2. Representation Metadata

Representation header fields provide metadata about the

representation. When a message includes content, the representation
header fields describe how to interpret that data. In a response to
a HEAD request, the representation header fields describe the
representation data that would have been enclosed in the content if
the same request had been a GET.

8.3. Content-Type

The "Content-Type" header field indicates the media type of the

associated representation: either the representation enclosed in the
message content or the selected representation, as determined by the
message semantics. The indicated media type defines both the data
format and how that data is intended to be processed by a recipient,
within the scope of the received message semantics, after any content
codings indicated by Content-Encoding are decoded.

Content-Type = media-type

Media types are defined in Section 8.3.1. An example of the field is

Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-4

A sender that generates a message containing content SHOULD generate

a Content-Type header field in that message unless the intended media
type of the enclosed representation is unknown to the sender. If a
Content-Type header field is not present, the recipient MAY either
assume a media type of "application/octet-stream" ([RFC2046],
Section 4.5.1) or examine the data to determine its type.
 In practice, resource owners do not always properly configure their
origin server to provide the correct Content-Type for a given
representation. Some user agents examine the content and, in certain
cases, override the received type (for example, see [Sniffing]).
This "MIME sniffing" risks drawing incorrect conclusions about the
data, which might expose the user to additional security risks (e.g.,
"privilege escalation"). Furthermore, distinct media types often
share a common data format, differing only in how the data is
intended to be processed, which is impossible to distinguish by
inspecting the data alone. When sniffing is implemented,
implementers are encouraged to provide a means for the user to
disable it.

Although Content-Type is defined as a singleton field, it is

sometimes incorrectly generated multiple times, resulting in a
combined field value that appears to be a list. Recipients often
attempt to handle this error by using the last syntactically valid
member of the list, leading to potential interoperability and
security issues if different implementations have different error
handling behaviors.

8.3.1. Media Type

HTTP uses media types [RFC2046] in the Content-Type (Section 8.3) and
Accept (Section 12.5.1) header fields in order to provide open and
extensible data typing and type negotiation. Media types define both
a data format and various processing models: how to process that data
in accordance with the message context.

media-type = type "/" subtype parameters

type = token
subtype = token

The type and subtype tokens are case-insensitive.

The type/subtype MAY be followed by semicolon-delimited parameters

(Section 5.6.6) in the form of name/value pairs. The presence or
absence of a parameter might be significant to the processing of a
media type, depending on its definition within the media type
registry. Parameter values might or might not be case-sensitive,
depending on the semantics of the parameter name.

For example, the following media types are equivalent in describing

HTML text data encoded in the UTF-8 character encoding scheme, but
the first is preferred for consistency (the "charset" parameter value
is defined as being case-insensitive in [RFC2046], Section 4.1.2):

text/html;charset=utf-8
Text/HTML;Charset="utf-8"
text/html; charset="utf-8"
text/html;charset=UTF-8

Media types ought to be registered with IANA according to the

procedures defined in [BCP13].

8.3.2. Charset

HTTP uses "charset" names to indicate or negotiate the character

encoding scheme ([RFC6365], Section 2) of a textual representation.
 In the fields defined by this document, charset names appear either
in parameters (Content-Type), or, for Accept-Encoding, in the form of
a plain token. In both cases, charset names are matched case-
insensitively.

Charset names ought to be registered in the IANA "Character Sets"

registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/character-sets>)
according to the procedures defined in Section 2 of [RFC2978].

| *Note:* In theory, charset names are defined by the "mime-

| charset" ABNF rule defined in Section 2.3 of [RFC2978] (as
| corrected in [Err1912]). That rule allows two characters that
| are not included in "token" ("{" and "}"), but no charset name
| registered at the time of this writing includes braces (see
| [Err5433]).

8.3.3. Multipart Types

MIME provides for a number of "multipart" types -- encapsulations of

one or more representations within a single message body. All
multipart types share a common syntax, as defined in Section 5.1.1 of
[RFC2046], and include a boundary parameter as part of the media type
value. The message body is itself a protocol element; a sender MUST
generate only CRLF to represent line breaks between body parts.

HTTP message framing does not use the multipart boundary as an

indicator of message body length, though it might be used by
implementations that generate or process the content. For example,
the "multipart/form-data" type is often used for carrying form data
in a request, as described in [RFC7578], and the "multipart/
byteranges" type is defined by this specification for use in some 206
(Partial Content) responses (see Section 15.3.7).

8.4. Content-Encoding

The "Content-Encoding" header field indicates what content codings

have been applied to the representation, beyond those inherent in the
media type, and thus what decoding mechanisms have to be applied in
order to obtain data in the media type referenced by the Content-Type
header field. Content-Encoding is primarily used to allow a
representation's data to be compressed without losing the identity of
its underlying media type.

Content-Encoding = #content-coding

An example of its use is

Content-Encoding: gzip

If one or more encodings have been applied to a representation, the

sender that applied the encodings MUST generate a Content-Encoding
header field that lists the content codings in the order in which
they were applied. Note that the coding named "identity" is reserved
for its special role in Accept-Encoding and thus SHOULD NOT be
included.

Additional information about the encoding parameters can be provided

by other header fields not defined by this specification.
 Unlike Transfer-Encoding (Section 6.1 of [HTTP/1.1]), the codings
listed in Content-Encoding are a characteristic of the
representation; the representation is defined in terms of the coded
form, and all other metadata about the representation is about the
coded form unless otherwise noted in the metadata definition.
Typically, the representation is only decoded just prior to rendering
or analogous usage.

If the media type includes an inherent encoding, such as a data

format that is always compressed, then that encoding would not be
restated in Content-Encoding even if it happens to be the same
algorithm as one of the content codings. Such a content coding would
only be listed if, for some bizarre reason, it is applied a second
time to form the representation. Likewise, an origin server might
choose to publish the same data as multiple representations that
differ only in whether the coding is defined as part of Content-Type
or Content-Encoding, since some user agents will behave differently
in their handling of each response (e.g., open a "Save as ..." dialog
instead of automatic decompression and rendering of content).

An origin server MAY respond with a status code of 415 (Unsupported

Media Type) if a representation in the request message has a content
coding that is not acceptable.

8.4.1. Content Codings

Content coding values indicate an encoding transformation that has

been or can be applied to a representation. Content codings are
primarily used to allow a representation to be compressed or
otherwise usefully transformed without losing the identity of its
underlying media type and without loss of information. Frequently,
the representation is stored in coded form, transmitted directly, and
only decoded by the final recipient.

content-coding = token

All content codings are case-insensitive and ought to be registered

within the "HTTP Content Coding Registry", as described in
Section 16.6

Content-coding values are used in the Accept-Encoding

(Section 12.5.3) and Content-Encoding (Section 8.4) header fields.

8.4.1.1. Compress Coding

The "compress" coding is an adaptive Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW) coding

[Welch] that is commonly produced by the UNIX file compression
program "compress". A recipient SHOULD consider "x-compress" to be
equivalent to "compress".

8.4.1.2. Deflate Coding

The "deflate" coding is a "zlib" data format [RFC1950] containing a

"deflate" compressed data stream [RFC1951] that uses a combination of
the Lempel-Ziv (LZ77) compression algorithm and Huffman coding.

| *Note:* Some non-conformant implementations send the "deflate"

| compressed data without the zlib wrapper.
8.4.1.3. Gzip Coding

The "gzip" coding is an LZ77 coding with a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy

Check (CRC) that is commonly produced by the gzip file compression
program [RFC1952]. A recipient SHOULD consider "x-gzip" to be
equivalent to "gzip".

8.5. Content-Language

The "Content-Language" header field describes the natural language(s)

of the intended audience for the representation. Note that this
might not be equivalent to all the languages used within the
representation.

Content-Language = #language-tag

Language tags are defined in Section 8.5.1. The primary purpose of

Content-Language is to allow a user to identify and differentiate
representations according to the users' own preferred language.
Thus, if the content is intended only for a Danish-literate audience,
the appropriate field is

Content-Language: da

If no Content-Language is specified, the default is that the content

is intended for all language audiences. This might mean that the
sender does not consider it to be specific to any natural language,
or that the sender does not know for which language it is intended.

Multiple languages MAY be listed for content that is intended for

multiple audiences. For example, a rendition of the "Treaty of
Waitangi", presented simultaneously in the original Maori and English
versions, would call for

Content-Language: mi, en

However, just because multiple languages are present within a

representation does not mean that it is intended for multiple
linguistic audiences. An example would be a beginner's language
primer, such as "A First Lesson in Latin", which is clearly intended
to be used by an English-literate audience. In this case, the
Content-Language would properly only include "en".

Content-Language MAY be applied to any media type -- it is not

limited to textual documents.

8.5.1. Language Tags

A language tag, as defined in [RFC5646], identifies a natural

language spoken, written, or otherwise conveyed by human beings for
communication of information to other human beings. Computer
languages are explicitly excluded.

HTTP uses language tags within the Accept-Language and

Content-Language header fields. Accept-Language uses the broader
language-range production defined in Section 12.5.4, whereas
Content-Language uses the language-tag production defined below.

language-tag = <Language-Tag, see [RFC5646], Section 2.1>

 A language tag is a sequence of one or more case-insensitive subtags,
each separated by a hyphen character ("-", %x2D). In most cases, a
language tag consists of a primary language subtag that identifies a
broad family of related languages (e.g., "en" = English), which is
optionally followed by a series of subtags that refine or narrow that
language's range (e.g., "en-CA" = the variety of English as
communicated in Canada). Whitespace is not allowed within a language
tag. Example tags include:

fr, en-US, es-419, az-Arab, x-pig-latin, man-Nkoo-GN

See [RFC5646] for further information.

8.6. Content-Length

The "Content-Length" header field indicates the associated

representation's data length as a decimal non-negative integer number
of octets. When transferring a representation as content, Content-
Length refers specifically to the amount of data enclosed so that it
can be used to delimit framing (e.g., Section 6.2 of [HTTP/1.1]). In
other cases, Content-Length indicates the selected representation's
current length, which can be used by recipients to estimate transfer
time or to compare with previously stored representations.

Content-Length = 1*DIGIT

An example is

Content-Length: 3495

A user agent SHOULD send Content-Length in a request when the method

defines a meaning for enclosed content and it is not sending
Transfer-Encoding. For example, a user agent normally sends Content-
Length in a POST request even when the value is 0 (indicating empty
content). A user agent SHOULD NOT send a Content-Length header field
when the request message does not contain content and the method
semantics do not anticipate such data.

A server MAY send a Content-Length header field in a response to a

HEAD request (Section 9.3.2); a server MUST NOT send Content-Length
in such a response unless its field value equals the decimal number
of octets that would have been sent in the content of a response if
the same request had used the GET method.

A server MAY send a Content-Length header field in a 304 (Not

Modified) response to a conditional GET request (Section 15.4.5); a
server MUST NOT send Content-Length in such a response unless its
field value equals the decimal number of octets that would have been
sent in the content of a 200 (OK) response to the same request.

A server MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any response

with a status code of 1xx (Informational) or 204 (No Content). A
server MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any 2xx
(Successful) response to a CONNECT request (Section 9.3.6).

Aside from the cases defined above, in the absence of Transfer-

Encoding, an origin server SHOULD send a Content-Length header field
when the content size is known prior to sending the complete header
 section. This will allow downstream recipients to measure transfer
progress, know when a received message is complete, and potentially
reuse the connection for additional requests.

Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to zero is

valid. Since there is no predefined limit to the length of content,
a recipient MUST anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and
prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows or
precision loss due to integer conversion (Section 17.5).

Because Content-Length is used for message delimitation in HTTP/1.1,

its field value can impact how the message is parsed by downstream
recipients even when the immediate connection is not using HTTP/1.1.
If the message is forwarded by a downstream intermediary, a Content-
Length field value that is inconsistent with the received message
framing might cause a security failure due to request smuggling or
response splitting.

As a result, a sender MUST NOT forward a message with a Content-

Length header field value that is known to be incorrect.

Likewise, a sender MUST NOT forward a message with a Content-Length

header field value that does not match the ABNF above, with one
exception: a recipient of a Content-Length header field value
consisting of the same decimal value repeated as a comma-separated
list (e.g, "Content-Length: 42, 42") MAY either reject the message as
invalid or replace that invalid field value with a single instance of
the decimal value, since this likely indicates that a duplicate was
generated or combined by an upstream message processor.

8.7. Content-Location

The "Content-Location" header field references a URI that can be used

as an identifier for a specific resource corresponding to the
representation in this message's content. In other words, if one
were to perform a GET request on this URI at the time of this
message's generation, then a 200 (OK) response would contain the same
representation that is enclosed as content in this message.

Content-Location = absolute-URI / partial-URI

The field value is either an absolute-URI or a partial-URI. In the

latter case (Section 4), the referenced URI is relative to the target
URI ([URI], Section 5).

The Content-Location value is not a replacement for the target URI

(Section 7.1). It is representation metadata. It has the same
syntax and semantics as the header field of the same name defined for
MIME body parts in Section 4 of [RFC2557]. However, its appearance
in an HTTP message has some special implications for HTTP recipients.

If Content-Location is included in a 2xx (Successful) response

message and its value refers (after conversion to absolute form) to a
URI that is the same as the target URI, then the recipient MAY
consider the content to be a current representation of that resource
at the time indicated by the message origination date. For a GET
(Section 9.3.1) or HEAD (Section 9.3.2) request, this is the same as
the default semantics when no Content-Location is provided by the
server. For a state-changing request like PUT (Section 9.3.4) or
 POST (Section 9.3.3), it implies that the server's response contains
the new representation of that resource, thereby distinguishing it
from representations that might only report about the action (e.g.,
"It worked!"). This allows authoring applications to update their
local copies without the need for a subsequent GET request.

If Content-Location is included in a 2xx (Successful) response

message and its field value refers to a URI that differs from the
target URI, then the origin server claims that the URI is an
identifier for a different resource corresponding to the enclosed
representation. Such a claim can only be trusted if both identifiers
share the same resource owner, which cannot be programmatically
determined via HTTP.

* For a response to a GET or HEAD request, this is an indication

that the target URI refers to a resource that is subject to
content negotiation and the Content-Location field value is a more
specific identifier for the selected representation.

* For a 201 (Created) response to a state-changing method, a

Content-Location field value that is identical to the Location
field value indicates that this content is a current
representation of the newly created resource.

* Otherwise, such a Content-Location indicates that this content is

a representation reporting on the requested action's status and
that the same report is available (for future access with GET) at
the given URI. For example, a purchase transaction made via a
POST request might include a receipt document as the content of
the 200 (OK) response; the Content-Location field value provides
an identifier for retrieving a copy of that same receipt in the
future.

A user agent that sends Content-Location in a request message is

stating that its value refers to where the user agent originally
obtained the content of the enclosed representation (prior to any
modifications made by that user agent). In other words, the user
agent is providing a back link to the source of the original
representation.

An origin server that receives a Content-Location field in a request

message MUST treat the information as transitory request context
rather than as metadata to be saved verbatim as part of the
representation. An origin server MAY use that context to guide in
processing the request or to save it for other uses, such as within
source links or versioning metadata. However, an origin server MUST
NOT use such context information to alter the request semantics.

For example, if a client makes a PUT request on a negotiated resource

and the origin server accepts that PUT (without redirection), then
the new state of that resource is expected to be consistent with the
one representation supplied in that PUT; the Content-Location cannot
be used as a form of reverse content selection identifier to update
only one of the negotiated representations. If the user agent had
wanted the latter semantics, it would have applied the PUT directly
to the Content-Location URI.

8.8. Validator Fields

 Resource metadata is referred to as a "validator" if it can be used
within a precondition (Section 13.1) to make a conditional request
(Section 13). Validator fields convey a current validator for the
selected representation (Section 3.2).

In responses to safe requests, validator fields describe the selected

representation chosen by the origin server while handling the
response. Note that, depending on the method and status code
semantics, the selected representation for a given response is not
necessarily the same as the representation enclosed as response
content.

In a successful response to a state-changing request, validator

fields describe the new representation that has replaced the prior
selected representation as a result of processing the request.

For example, an ETag field in a 201 (Created) response communicates

the entity tag of the newly created resource's representation, so
that the entity tag can be used as a validator in later conditional
requests to prevent the "lost update" problem.

This specification defines two forms of metadata that are commonly

used to observe resource state and test for preconditions:
modification dates (Section 8.8.2) and opaque entity tags
(Section 8.8.3). Additional metadata that reflects resource state
has been defined by various extensions of HTTP, such as Web
Distributed Authoring and Versioning [WEBDAV], that are beyond the
scope of this specification.

8.8.1. Weak versus Strong

Validators come in two flavors: strong or weak. Weak validators are

easy to generate but are far less useful for comparisons. Strong
validators are ideal for comparisons but can be very difficult (and
occasionally impossible) to generate efficiently. Rather than impose
that all forms of resource adhere to the same strength of validator,
HTTP exposes the type of validator in use and imposes restrictions on
when weak validators can be used as preconditions.

A "strong validator" is representation metadata that changes value

whenever a change occurs to the representation data that would be
observable in the content of a 200 (OK) response to GET.

A strong validator might change for reasons other than a change to

the representation data, such as when a semantically significant part
of the representation metadata is changed (e.g., Content-Type), but
it is in the best interests of the origin server to only change the
value when it is necessary to invalidate the stored responses held by
remote caches and authoring tools.

Cache entries might persist for arbitrarily long periods, regardless

of expiration times. Thus, a cache might attempt to validate an
entry using a validator that it obtained in the distant past. A
strong validator is unique across all versions of all representations
associated with a particular resource over time. However, there is
no implication of uniqueness across representations of different
resources (i.e., the same strong validator might be in use for
representations of multiple resources at the same time and does not
imply that those representations are equivalent).
 There are a variety of strong validators used in practice. The best
are based on strict revision control, wherein each change to a
representation always results in a unique node name and revision
identifier being assigned before the representation is made
accessible to GET. A collision-resistant hash function applied to
the representation data is also sufficient if the data is available
prior to the response header fields being sent and the digest does
not need to be recalculated every time a validation request is
received. However, if a resource has distinct representations that
differ only in their metadata, such as might occur with content
negotiation over media types that happen to share the same data
format, then the origin server needs to incorporate additional
information in the validator to distinguish those representations.

In contrast, a "weak validator" is representation metadata that might

not change for every change to the representation data. This
weakness might be due to limitations in how the value is calculated
(e.g., clock resolution), an inability to ensure uniqueness for all
possible representations of the resource, or a desire of the resource
owner to group representations by some self-determined set of
equivalency rather than unique sequences of data.

An origin server SHOULD change a weak entity tag whenever it

considers prior representations to be unacceptable as a substitute
for the current representation. In other words, a weak entity tag
ought to change whenever the origin server wants caches to invalidate
old responses.

For example, the representation of a weather report that changes in

content every second, based on dynamic measurements, might be grouped
into sets of equivalent representations (from the origin server's
perspective) with the same weak validator in order to allow cached
representations to be valid for a reasonable period of time (perhaps
adjusted dynamically based on server load or weather quality).
Likewise, a representation's modification time, if defined with only
one-second resolution, might be a weak validator if it is possible
for the representation to be modified twice during a single second
and retrieved between those modifications.

Likewise, a validator is weak if it is shared by two or more

representations of a given resource at the same time, unless those
representations have identical representation data. For example, if
the origin server sends the same validator for a representation with
a gzip content coding applied as it does for a representation with no
content coding, then that validator is weak. However, two
simultaneous representations might share the same strong validator if
they differ only in the representation metadata, such as when two
different media types are available for the same representation data.

Strong validators are usable for all conditional requests, including

cache validation, partial content ranges, and "lost update"
avoidance. Weak validators are only usable when the client does not
require exact equality with previously obtained representation data,
such as when validating a cache entry or limiting a web traversal to
recent changes.

8.8.2. Last-Modified
 The "Last-Modified" header field in a response provides a timestamp
indicating the date and time at which the origin server believes the
selected representation was last modified, as determined at the
conclusion of handling the request.

Last-Modified = HTTP-date

An example of its use is

Last-Modified: Tue, 15 Nov 1994 12:45:26 GMT

8.8.2.1. Generation

An origin server SHOULD send Last-Modified for any selected

representation for which a last modification date can be reasonably
and consistently determined, since its use in conditional requests
and evaluating cache freshness ([CACHING]) can substantially reduce
unnecessary transfers and significantly improve service availability
and scalability.

A representation is typically the sum of many parts behind the

resource interface. The last-modified time would usually be the most
recent time that any of those parts were changed. How that value is
determined for any given resource is an implementation detail beyond
the scope of this specification.

An origin server SHOULD obtain the Last-Modified value of the

representation as close as possible to the time that it generates the
Date field value for its response. This allows a recipient to make
an accurate assessment of the representation's modification time,
especially if the representation changes near the time that the
response is generated.

An origin server with a clock (as defined in Section 5.6.7) MUST NOT
generate a Last-Modified date that is later than the server's time of
message origination (Date, Section 6.6.1). If the last modification
time is derived from implementation-specific metadata that evaluates
to some time in the future, according to the origin server's clock,
then the origin server MUST replace that value with the message
origination date. This prevents a future modification date from
having an adverse impact on cache validation.

An origin server without a clock MUST NOT generate a Last-Modified

date for a response unless that date value was assigned to the
resource by some other system (presumably one with a clock).

8.8.2.2. Comparison

A Last-Modified time, when used as a validator in a request, is

implicitly weak unless it is possible to deduce that it is strong,
using the following rules:

* The validator is being compared by an origin server to the actual

current validator for the representation and,

* That origin server reliably knows that the associated

representation did not change twice during the second covered by
the presented validator;
 or

* The validator is about to be used by a client in an

If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified-Since, or If-Range header field,
because the client has a cache entry for the associated
representation, and

* That cache entry includes a Date value which is at least one

second after the Last-Modified value and the client has reason to
believe that they were generated by the same clock or that there
is enough difference between the Last-Modified and Date values to
make clock synchronization issues unlikely;

or

* The validator is being compared by an intermediate cache to the

validator stored in its cache entry for the representation, and

* That cache entry includes a Date value which is at least one

second after the Last-Modified value and the cache has reason to
believe that they were generated by the same clock or that there
is enough difference between the Last-Modified and Date values to
make clock synchronization issues unlikely.

This method relies on the fact that if two different responses were
sent by the origin server during the same second, but both had the
same Last-Modified time, then at least one of those responses would
have a Date value equal to its Last-Modified time.

8.8.3. ETag

The "ETag" field in a response provides the current entity tag for
the selected representation, as determined at the conclusion of
handling the request. An entity tag is an opaque validator for
differentiating between multiple representations of the same
resource, regardless of whether those multiple representations are
due to resource state changes over time, content negotiation
resulting in multiple representations being valid at the same time,
or both. An entity tag consists of an opaque quoted string, possibly
prefixed by a weakness indicator.

ETag = entity-tag

entity-tag = [ weak ] opaque-tag

weak = %s"W/"
opaque-tag = DQUOTE *etagc DQUOTE
etagc = %x21 / %x23-7E / obs-text
; VCHAR except double quotes, plus obs-text

| *Note:* Previously, opaque-tag was defined to be a quoted-

| string ([RFC2616], Section 3.11); thus, some recipients might
| perform backslash unescaping. Servers therefore ought to avoid
| backslash characters in entity tags.

An entity tag can be more reliable for validation than a modification

date in situations where it is inconvenient to store modification
dates, where the one-second resolution of HTTP-date values is not
sufficient, or where modification dates are not consistently
maintained.
 Examples:

ETag: "xyzzy"
ETag: W/"xyzzy"
ETag: ""

An entity tag can be either a weak or strong validator, with strong

being the default. If an origin server provides an entity tag for a
representation and the generation of that entity tag does not satisfy
all of the characteristics of a strong validator (Section 8.8.1),
then the origin server MUST mark the entity tag as weak by prefixing
its opaque value with "W/" (case-sensitive).

A sender MAY send the ETag field in a trailer section (see

Section 6.5). However, since trailers are often ignored, it is
preferable to send ETag as a header field unless the entity tag is
generated while sending the content.

8.8.3.1. Generation

The principle behind entity tags is that only the service author
knows the implementation of a resource well enough to select the most
accurate and efficient validation mechanism for that resource, and
that any such mechanism can be mapped to a simple sequence of octets
for easy comparison. Since the value is opaque, there is no need for
the client to be aware of how each entity tag is constructed.

For example, a resource that has implementation-specific versioning

applied to all changes might use an internal revision number, perhaps
combined with a variance identifier for content negotiation, to
accurately differentiate between representations. Other
implementations might use a collision-resistant hash of
representation content, a combination of various file attributes, or
a modification timestamp that has sub-second resolution.

An origin server SHOULD send an ETag for any selected representation

for which detection of changes can be reasonably and consistently
determined, since the entity tag's use in conditional requests and
evaluating cache freshness ([CACHING]) can substantially reduce
unnecessary transfers and significantly improve service availability,
scalability, and reliability.

8.8.3.2. Comparison

There are two entity tag comparison functions, depending on whether

or not the comparison context allows the use of weak validators:

"Strong comparison": two entity tags are equivalent if both are not
weak and their opaque-tags match character-by-character.

"Weak comparison": two entity tags are equivalent if their opaque-

tags match character-by-character, regardless of either or both
being tagged as "weak".

The example below shows the results for a set of entity tag pairs and
both the weak and strong comparison function results:

+========+========+===================+=================+
 | ETag 1 | ETag 2 | Strong Comparison | Weak Comparison |
+========+========+===================+=================+
| W/"1" | W/"1" | no match | match |
+--------+--------+-------------------+-----------------+
| W/"1" | W/"2" | no match | no match |
+--------+--------+-------------------+-----------------+
| W/"1" | "1" | no match | match |
+--------+--------+-------------------+-----------------+
| "1" | "1" | match | match |
+--------+--------+-------------------+-----------------+

Table 3

8.8.3.3. Example: Entity Tags Varying on Content-Negotiated Resources

Consider a resource that is subject to content negotiation

(Section 12), and where the representations sent in response to a GET
request vary based on the Accept-Encoding request header field
(Section 12.5.3):

>> Request:

GET /index HTTP/1.1

Host: www.example.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip

In this case, the response might or might not use the gzip content
coding. If it does not, the response might look like:

>> Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 00:05:00 GMT
ETag: "123-a"
Content-Length: 70
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/plain

Hello World!
Hello World!
Hello World!
Hello World!
Hello World!

An alternative representation that does use gzip content coding would

be:

>> Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 00:05:00 GMT
ETag: "123-b"
Content-Length: 43
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Encoding: gzip

...binary data...
 | *Note:* Content codings are a property of the representation
| data, so a strong entity tag for a content-encoded
| representation has to be distinct from the entity tag of an
| unencoded representation to prevent potential conflicts during
| cache updates and range requests. In contrast, transfer
| codings (Section 7 of [HTTP/1.1]) apply only during message
| transfer and do not result in distinct entity tags.

9. Methods

9.1. Overview

The request method token is the primary source of request semantics;

it indicates the purpose for which the client has made this request
and what is expected by the client as a successful result.

The request method's semantics might be further specialized by the

semantics of some header fields when present in a request if those
additional semantics do not conflict with the method. For example, a
client can send conditional request header fields (Section 13.1) to
make the requested action conditional on the current state of the
target resource.

HTTP is designed to be usable as an interface to distributed object

systems. The request method invokes an action to be applied to a
target resource in much the same way that a remote method invocation
can be sent to an identified object.

method = token

The method token is case-sensitive because it might be used as a

gateway to object-based systems with case-sensitive method names. By
convention, standardized methods are defined in all-uppercase US-
ASCII letters.

Unlike distributed objects, the standardized request methods in HTTP

are not resource-specific, since uniform interfaces provide for
better visibility and reuse in network-based systems [REST]. Once
defined, a standardized method ought to have the same semantics when
applied to any resource, though each resource determines for itself
whether those semantics are implemented or allowed.

This specification defines a number of standardized methods that are

commonly used in HTTP, as outlined by the following table.

+=========+============================================+=========+
| Method | Description | Section |
| Name | | |
+=========+============================================+=========+
| GET | Transfer a current representation of the | 9.3.1 |
| | target resource. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+
| HEAD | Same as GET, but do not transfer the | 9.3.2 |
| | response content. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+
| POST | Perform resource-specific processing on | 9.3.3 |
| | the request content. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+
| PUT | Replace all current representations of the | 9.3.4 |
 | | target resource with the request content. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+
| DELETE | Remove all current representations of the | 9.3.5 |
| | target resource. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+
| CONNECT | Establish a tunnel to the server | 9.3.6 |
| | identified by the target resource. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+
| OPTIONS | Describe the communication options for the | 9.3.7 |
| | target resource. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+
| TRACE | Perform a message loop-back test along the | 9.3.8 |
| | path to the target resource. | |
+---------+--------------------------------------------+---------+

Table 4

All general-purpose servers MUST support the methods GET and HEAD.
All other methods are OPTIONAL.

The set of methods allowed by a target resource can be listed in an

Allow header field (Section 10.2.1). However, the set of allowed
methods can change dynamically. An origin server that receives a
request method that is unrecognized or not implemented SHOULD respond
with the 501 (Not Implemented) status code. An origin server that
receives a request method that is recognized and implemented, but not
allowed for the target resource, SHOULD respond with the 405 (Method
Not Allowed) status code.

Additional methods, outside the scope of this specification, have

been specified for use in HTTP. All such methods ought to be
registered within the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Method
Registry", as described in Section 16.1.

9.2. Common Method Properties

9.2.1. Safe Methods

Request methods are considered "safe" if their defined semantics are

essentially read-only; i.e., the client does not request, and does
not expect, any state change on the origin server as a result of
applying a safe method to a target resource. Likewise, reasonable
use of a safe method is not expected to cause any harm, loss of
property, or unusual burden on the origin server.

This definition of safe methods does not prevent an implementation

from including behavior that is potentially harmful, that is not
entirely read-only, or that causes side effects while invoking a safe
method. What is important, however, is that the client did not
request that additional behavior and cannot be held accountable for
it. For example, most servers append request information to access
log files at the completion of every response, regardless of the
method, and that is considered safe even though the log storage might
become full and cause the server to fail. Likewise, a safe request
initiated by selecting an advertisement on the Web will often have
the side effect of charging an advertising account.

Of the request methods defined by this specification, the GET, HEAD,

OPTIONS, and TRACE methods are defined to be safe.
 The purpose of distinguishing between safe and unsafe methods is to
allow automated retrieval processes (spiders) and cache performance
optimization (pre-fetching) to work without fear of causing harm. In
addition, it allows a user agent to apply appropriate constraints on
the automated use of unsafe methods when processing potentially
untrusted content.

A user agent SHOULD distinguish between safe and unsafe methods when
presenting potential actions to a user, such that the user can be
made aware of an unsafe action before it is requested.

When a resource is constructed such that parameters within the target

URI have the effect of selecting an action, it is the resource
owner's responsibility to ensure that the action is consistent with
the request method semantics. For example, it is common for Web-
based content editing software to use actions within query
parameters, such as "page?do=delete". If the purpose of such a
resource is to perform an unsafe action, then the resource owner MUST
disable or disallow that action when it is accessed using a safe
request method. Failure to do so will result in unfortunate side
effects when automated processes perform a GET on every URI reference
for the sake of link maintenance, pre-fetching, building a search
index, etc.

9.2.2. Idempotent Methods

A request method is considered "idempotent" if the intended effect on

the server of multiple identical requests with that method is the
same as the effect for a single such request. Of the request methods
defined by this specification, PUT, DELETE, and safe request methods
are idempotent.

Like the definition of safe, the idempotent property only applies to

what has been requested by the user; a server is free to log each
request separately, retain a revision control history, or implement
other non-idempotent side effects for each idempotent request.

Idempotent methods are distinguished because the request can be

repeated automatically if a communication failure occurs before the
client is able to read the server's response. For example, if a
client sends a PUT request and the underlying connection is closed
before any response is received, then the client can establish a new
connection and retry the idempotent request. It knows that repeating
the request will have the same intended effect, even if the original
request succeeded, though the response might differ.

A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a request with a non-

idempotent method unless it has some means to know that the request
semantics are actually idempotent, regardless of the method, or some
means to detect that the original request was never applied.

For example, a user agent can repeat a POST request automatically if

it knows (through design or configuration) that the request is safe
for that resource. Likewise, a user agent designed specifically to
operate on a version control repository might be able to recover from
partial failure conditions by checking the target resource
revision(s) after a failed connection, reverting or fixing any
changes that were partially applied, and then automatically retrying
 the requests that failed.

Some clients take a riskier approach and attempt to guess when an

automatic retry is possible. For example, a client might
automatically retry a POST request if the underlying transport
connection closed before any part of a response is received,
particularly if an idle persistent connection was used.

A proxy MUST NOT automatically retry non-idempotent requests. A

client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a failed automatic retry.

9.2.3. Methods and Caching

For a cache to store and use a response, the associated method needs
to explicitly allow caching and to detail under what conditions a
response can be used to satisfy subsequent requests; a method
definition that does not do so cannot be cached. For additional
requirements see [CACHING].

This specification defines caching semantics for GET, HEAD, and POST,
although the overwhelming majority of cache implementations only
support GET and HEAD.

9.3. Method Definitions

9.3.1. GET

The GET method requests transfer of a current selected representation

for the target resource. A successful response reflects the quality
of "sameness" identified by the target URI (Section 1.2.2 of [URI]).
Hence, retrieving identifiable information via HTTP is usually
performed by making a GET request on an identifier associated with
the potential for providing that information in a 200 (OK) response.

GET is the primary mechanism of information retrieval and the focus

of almost all performance optimizations. Applications that produce a
URI for each important resource can benefit from those optimizations
while enabling their reuse by other applications, creating a network
effect that promotes further expansion of the Web.

It is tempting to think of resource identifiers as remote file system

pathnames and of representations as being a copy of the contents of
such files. In fact, that is how many resources are implemented (see
Section 17.3 for related security considerations). However, there
are no such limitations in practice.

The HTTP interface for a resource is just as likely to be implemented

as a tree of content objects, a programmatic view on various database
records, or a gateway to other information systems. Even when the
URI mapping mechanism is tied to a file system, an origin server
might be configured to execute the files with the request as input
and send the output as the representation rather than transfer the
files directly. Regardless, only the origin server needs to know how
each resource identifier corresponds to an implementation and how
that implementation manages to select and send a current
representation of the target resource.

A client can alter the semantics of GET to be a "range request",

requesting transfer of only some part(s) of the selected
 representation, by sending a Range header field in the request
(Section 14.2).

Although request message framing is independent of the method used,

content received in a GET request has no generally defined semantics,
cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead
some implementations to reject the request and close the connection
because of its potential as a request smuggling attack (Section 11.2
of [HTTP/1.1]). A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET
request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has
previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a
purpose and will be adequately supported. An origin server SHOULD
NOT rely on private agreements to receive content, since participants
in HTTP communication are often unaware of intermediaries along the
request chain.

The response to a GET request is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to

satisfy subsequent GET and HEAD requests unless otherwise indicated
by the Cache-Control header field (Section 5.2 of [CACHING]).

When information retrieval is performed with a mechanism that

constructs a target URI from user-provided information, such as the
query fields of a form using GET, potentially sensitive data might be
provided that would not be appropriate for disclosure within a URI
(see Section 17.9). In some cases, the data can be filtered or
transformed such that it would not reveal such information. In
others, particularly when there is no benefit from caching a
response, using the POST method (Section 9.3.3) instead of GET can
transmit such information in the request content rather than within
the target URI.

9.3.2. HEAD

The HEAD method is identical to GET except that the server MUST NOT
send content in the response. HEAD is used to obtain metadata about
the selected representation without transferring its representation
data, often for the sake of testing hypertext links or finding recent
modifications.

The server SHOULD send the same header fields in response to a HEAD
request as it would have sent if the request method had been GET.
However, a server MAY omit header fields for which a value is
determined only while generating the content. For example, some
servers buffer a dynamic response to GET until a minimum amount of
data is generated so that they can more efficiently delimit small
responses or make late decisions with regard to content selection.
Such a response to GET might contain Content-Length and Vary fields,
for example, that are not generated within a HEAD response. These
minor inconsistencies are considered preferable to generating and
discarding the content for a HEAD request, since HEAD is usually
requested for the sake of efficiency.

Although request message framing is independent of the method used,

content received in a HEAD request has no generally defined
semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and
might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the
connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack
(Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]). A client SHOULD NOT generate content
in a HEAD request unless it is made directly to an origin server that
 has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has
a purpose and will be adequately supported. An origin server SHOULD
NOT rely on private agreements to receive content, since participants
in HTTP communication are often unaware of intermediaries along the
request chain.

The response to a HEAD request is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to

satisfy subsequent HEAD requests unless otherwise indicated by the
Cache-Control header field (Section 5.2 of [CACHING]). A HEAD
response might also affect previously cached responses to GET; see
Section 4.3.5 of [CACHING].

9.3.3. POST

The POST method requests that the target resource process the
representation enclosed in the request according to the resource's
own specific semantics. For example, POST is used for the following
functions (among others):

* Providing a block of data, such as the fields entered into an HTML

form, to a data-handling process;

* Posting a message to a bulletin board, newsgroup, mailing list,

blog, or similar group of articles;

* Creating a new resource that has yet to be identified by the

origin server; and

* Appending data to a resource's existing representation(s).

An origin server indicates response semantics by choosing an

appropriate status code depending on the result of processing the
POST request; almost all of the status codes defined by this
specification could be received in a response to POST (the exceptions
being 206 (Partial Content), 304 (Not Modified), and 416 (Range Not
Satisfiable)).

If one or more resources has been created on the origin server as a

result of successfully processing a POST request, the origin server
SHOULD send a 201 (Created) response containing a Location header
field that provides an identifier for the primary resource created
(Section 10.2.2) and a representation that describes the status of
the request while referring to the new resource(s).

Responses to POST requests are only cacheable when they include

explicit freshness information (see Section 4.2.1 of [CACHING]) and a
Content-Location header field that has the same value as the POST's
target URI (Section 8.7). A cached POST response can be reused to
satisfy a later GET or HEAD request. In contrast, a POST request
cannot be satisfied by a cached POST response because POST is
potentially unsafe; see Section 4 of [CACHING].

If the result of processing a POST would be equivalent to a

representation of an existing resource, an origin server MAY redirect
the user agent to that resource by sending a 303 (See Other) response
with the existing resource's identifier in the Location field. This
has the benefits of providing the user agent a resource identifier
and transferring the representation via a method more amenable to
shared caching, though at the cost of an extra request if the user
 agent does not already have the representation cached.

9.3.4. PUT

The PUT method requests that the state of the target resource be
created or replaced with the state defined by the representation
enclosed in the request message content. A successful PUT of a given
representation would suggest that a subsequent GET on that same
target resource will result in an equivalent representation being
sent in a 200 (OK) response. However, there is no guarantee that
such a state change will be observable, since the target resource
might be acted upon by other user agents in parallel, or might be
subject to dynamic processing by the origin server, before any
subsequent GET is received. A successful response only implies that
the user agent's intent was achieved at the time of its processing by
the origin server.

If the target resource does not have a current representation and the
PUT successfully creates one, then the origin server MUST inform the
user agent by sending a 201 (Created) response. If the target
resource does have a current representation and that representation
is successfully modified in accordance with the state of the enclosed
representation, then the origin server MUST send either a 200 (OK) or
a 204 (No Content) response to indicate successful completion of the
request.

An origin server SHOULD verify that the PUT representation is

consistent with its configured constraints for the target resource.
For example, if an origin server determines a resource's
representation metadata based on the URI, then the origin server
needs to ensure that the content received in a successful PUT request
is consistent with that metadata. When a PUT representation is
inconsistent with the target resource, the origin server SHOULD
either make them consistent, by transforming the representation or
changing the resource configuration, or respond with an appropriate
error message containing sufficient information to explain why the
representation is unsuitable. The 409 (Conflict) or 415 (Unsupported
Media Type) status codes are suggested, with the latter being
specific to constraints on Content-Type values.

For example, if the target resource is configured to always have a

Content-Type of "text/html" and the representation being PUT has a
Content-Type of "image/jpeg", the origin server ought to do one of:

a. reconfigure the target resource to reflect the new media type;

b. transform the PUT representation to a format consistent with that

of the resource before saving it as the new resource state; or,

c. reject the request with a 415 (Unsupported Media Type) response

indicating that the target resource is limited to "text/html",
perhaps including a link to a different resource that would be a
suitable target for the new representation.

HTTP does not define exactly how a PUT method affects the state of an
origin server beyond what can be expressed by the intent of the user
agent request and the semantics of the origin server response. It
does not define what a resource might be, in any sense of that word,
beyond the interface provided via HTTP. It does not define how
resource state is "stored", nor how such storage might change as a
result of a change in resource state, nor how the origin server
translates resource state into representations. Generally speaking,
all implementation details behind the resource interface are
intentionally hidden by the server.

This extends to how header and trailer fields are stored; while
common header fields like Content-Type will typically be stored and
returned upon subsequent GET requests, header and trailer field
handling is specific to the resource that received the request. As a
result, an origin server SHOULD ignore unrecognized header and
trailer fields received in a PUT request (i.e., not save them as part
of the resource state).

An origin server MUST NOT send a validator field (Section 8.8), such
as an ETag or Last-Modified field, in a successful response to PUT
unless the request's representation data was saved without any
transformation applied to the content (i.e., the resource's new
representation data is identical to the content received in the PUT
request) and the validator field value reflects the new
representation. This requirement allows a user agent to know when
the representation it sent (and retains in memory) is the result of
the PUT, and thus it doesn't need to be retrieved again from the
origin server. The new validator(s) received in the response can be
used for future conditional requests in order to prevent accidental
overwrites (Section 13.1).

The fundamental difference between the POST and PUT methods is

highlighted by the different intent for the enclosed representation.
The target resource in a POST request is intended to handle the
enclosed representation according to the resource's own semantics,
whereas the enclosed representation in a PUT request is defined as
replacing the state of the target resource. Hence, the intent of PUT
is idempotent and visible to intermediaries, even though the exact
effect is only known by the origin server.

Proper interpretation of a PUT request presumes that the user agent

knows which target resource is desired. A service that selects a
proper URI on behalf of the client, after receiving a state-changing
request, SHOULD be implemented using the POST method rather than PUT.
If the origin server will not make the requested PUT state change to
the target resource and instead wishes to have it applied to a
different resource, such as when the resource has been moved to a
different URI, then the origin server MUST send an appropriate 3xx
(Redirection) response; the user agent MAY then make its own decision
regarding whether or not to redirect the request.

A PUT request applied to the target resource can have side effects on
other resources. For example, an article might have a URI for
identifying "the current version" (a resource) that is separate from
the URIs identifying each particular version (different resources
that at one point shared the same state as the current version
resource). A successful PUT request on "the current version" URI
might therefore create a new version resource in addition to changing
the state of the target resource, and might also cause links to be
added between the related resources.

Some origin servers support use of the Content-Range header field

(Section 14.4) as a request modifier to perform a partial PUT, as
 described in Section 14.5.

Responses to the PUT method are not cacheable. If a successful PUT

request passes through a cache that has one or more stored responses
for the target URI, those stored responses will be invalidated (see
Section 4.4 of [CACHING]).

9.3.5. DELETE

The DELETE method requests that the origin server remove the
association between the target resource and its current
functionality. In effect, this method is similar to the "rm" command
in UNIX: it expresses a deletion operation on the URI mapping of the
origin server rather than an expectation that the previously
associated information be deleted.

If the target resource has one or more current representations, they

might or might not be destroyed by the origin server, and the
associated storage might or might not be reclaimed, depending
entirely on the nature of the resource and its implementation by the
origin server (which are beyond the scope of this specification).
Likewise, other implementation aspects of a resource might need to be
deactivated or archived as a result of a DELETE, such as database or
gateway connections. In general, it is assumed that the origin
server will only allow DELETE on resources for which it has a
prescribed mechanism for accomplishing the deletion.

Relatively few resources allow the DELETE method -- its primary use
is for remote authoring environments, where the user has some
direction regarding its effect. For example, a resource that was
previously created using a PUT request, or identified via the
Location header field after a 201 (Created) response to a POST
request, might allow a corresponding DELETE request to undo those
actions. Similarly, custom user agent implementations that implement
an authoring function, such as revision control clients using HTTP
for remote operations, might use DELETE based on an assumption that
the server's URI space has been crafted to correspond to a version
repository.

If a DELETE method is successfully applied, the origin server SHOULD

send

* a 202 (Accepted) status code if the action will likely succeed but
has not yet been enacted,

* a 204 (No Content) status code if the action has been enacted and
no further information is to be supplied, or

* a 200 (OK) status code if the action has been enacted and the
response message includes a representation describing the status.

Although request message framing is independent of the method used,

content received in a DELETE request has no generally defined
semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and
might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the
connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack
(Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]). A client SHOULD NOT generate content
in a DELETE request unless it is made directly to an origin server
that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request
 has a purpose and will be adequately supported. An origin server
SHOULD NOT rely on private agreements to receive content, since
participants in HTTP communication are often unaware of
intermediaries along the request chain.

Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable. If a successful

DELETE request passes through a cache that has one or more stored
responses for the target URI, those stored responses will be
invalidated (see Section 4.4 of [CACHING]).

9.3.6. CONNECT

The CONNECT method requests that the recipient establish a tunnel to

the destination origin server identified by the request target and,
if successful, thereafter restrict its behavior to blind forwarding
of data, in both directions, until the tunnel is closed. Tunnels are
commonly used to create an end-to-end virtual connection, through one
or more proxies, which can then be secured using TLS (Transport Layer
Security, [TLS13]).

CONNECT uses a special form of request target, unique to this method,

consisting of only the host and port number of the tunnel
destination, separated by a colon. There is no default port; a
client MUST send the port number even if the CONNECT request is based
on a URI reference that contains an authority component with an
elided port (Section 4.1). For example,

CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1

Host: server.example.com

A server MUST reject a CONNECT request that targets an empty or

invalid port number, typically by responding with a 400 (Bad Request)
status code.

Because CONNECT changes the request/response nature of an HTTP

connection, specific HTTP versions might have different ways of
mapping its semantics into the protocol's wire format.

CONNECT is intended for use in requests to a proxy. The recipient

can establish a tunnel either by directly connecting to the server
identified by the request target or, if configured to use another
proxy, by forwarding the CONNECT request to the next inbound proxy.
An origin server MAY accept a CONNECT request, but most origin
servers do not implement CONNECT.

Any 2xx (Successful) response indicates that the sender (and all
inbound proxies) will switch to tunnel mode immediately after the
response header section; data received after that header section is
from the server identified by the request target. Any response other
than a successful response indicates that the tunnel has not yet been
formed.

A tunnel is closed when a tunnel intermediary detects that either

side has closed its connection: the intermediary MUST attempt to send
any outstanding data that came from the closed side to the other
side, close both connections, and then discard any remaining data
left undelivered.

Proxy authentication might be used to establish the authority to

 create a tunnel. For example,

CONNECT server.example.com:443 HTTP/1.1

Host: server.example.com:443
Proxy-Authorization: basic aGVsbG86d29ybGQ=

There are significant risks in establishing a tunnel to arbitrary

servers, particularly when the destination is a well-known or
reserved TCP port that is not intended for Web traffic. For example,
a CONNECT to "example.com:25" would suggest that the proxy connect to
the reserved port for SMTP traffic; if allowed, that could trick the
proxy into relaying spam email. Proxies that support CONNECT SHOULD
restrict its use to a limited set of known ports or a configurable
list of safe request targets.

A server MUST NOT send any Transfer-Encoding or Content-Length header

fields in a 2xx (Successful) response to CONNECT. A client MUST
ignore any Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received
in a successful response to CONNECT.

A CONNECT request message does not have content. The interpretation

of data sent after the header section of the CONNECT request message
is specific to the version of HTTP in use.

Responses to the CONNECT method are not cacheable.

9.3.7. OPTIONS

The OPTIONS method requests information about the communication

options available for the target resource, at either the origin
server or an intervening intermediary. This method allows a client
to determine the options and/or requirements associated with a
resource, or the capabilities of a server, without implying a
resource action.

An OPTIONS request with an asterisk ("*") as the request target

(Section 7.1) applies to the server in general rather than to a
specific resource. Since a server's communication options typically
depend on the resource, the "*" request is only useful as a "ping" or
"no-op" type of method; it does nothing beyond allowing the client to
test the capabilities of the server. For example, this can be used
to test a proxy for HTTP/1.1 conformance (or lack thereof).

If the request target is not an asterisk, the OPTIONS request applies

to the options that are available when communicating with the target
resource.

A server generating a successful response to OPTIONS SHOULD send any

header that might indicate optional features implemented by the
server and applicable to the target resource (e.g., Allow), including
potential extensions not defined by this specification. The response
content, if any, might also describe the communication options in a
machine or human-readable representation. A standard format for such
a representation is not defined by this specification, but might be
defined by future extensions to HTTP.

A client MAY send a Max-Forwards header field in an OPTIONS request

to target a specific recipient in the request chain (see
Section 7.6.2). A proxy MUST NOT generate a Max-Forwards header
 field while forwarding a request unless that request was received
with a Max-Forwards field.

A client that generates an OPTIONS request containing content MUST

send a valid Content-Type header field describing the representation
media type. Note that this specification does not define any use for
such content.

Responses to the OPTIONS method are not cacheable.

9.3.8. TRACE

The TRACE method requests a remote, application-level loop-back of

the request message. The final recipient of the request SHOULD
reflect the message received, excluding some fields described below,
back to the client as the content of a 200 (OK) response. The
"message/http" format (Section 10.1 of [HTTP/1.1]) is one way to do
so. The final recipient is either the origin server or the first
server to receive a Max-Forwards value of zero (0) in the request
(Section 7.6.2).

A client MUST NOT generate fields in a TRACE request containing

sensitive data that might be disclosed by the response. For example,
it would be foolish for a user agent to send stored user credentials
(Section 11) or cookies [COOKIE] in a TRACE request. The final
recipient of the request SHOULD exclude any request fields that are
likely to contain sensitive data when that recipient generates the
response content.

TRACE allows the client to see what is being received at the other
end of the request chain and use that data for testing or diagnostic
information. The value of the Via header field (Section 7.6.3) is of
particular interest, since it acts as a trace of the request chain.
Use of the Max-Forwards header field allows the client to limit the
length of the request chain, which is useful for testing a chain of
proxies forwarding messages in an infinite loop.

A client MUST NOT send content in a TRACE request.

Responses to the TRACE method are not cacheable.

10. Message Context

10.1. Request Context Fields

The request header fields below provide additional information about

the request context, including information about the user, user
agent, and resource behind the request.

10.1.1. Expect

The "Expect" header field in a request indicates a certain set of

behaviors (expectations) that need to be supported by the server in
order to properly handle this request.

Expect = #expectation
expectation = token [ "=" ( token / quoted-string ) parameters ]

The Expect field value is case-insensitive.

The only expectation defined by this specification is "100-continue"
(with no defined parameters).

A server that receives an Expect field value containing a member

other than 100-continue MAY respond with a 417 (Expectation Failed)
status code to indicate that the unexpected expectation cannot be
met.

A "100-continue" expectation informs recipients that the client is

about to send (presumably large) content in this request and wishes
to receive a 100 (Continue) interim response if the method, target
URI, and header fields are not sufficient to cause an immediate
success, redirect, or error response. This allows the client to wait
for an indication that it is worthwhile to send the content before
actually doing so, which can improve efficiency when the data is huge
or when the client anticipates that an error is likely (e.g., when
sending a state-changing method, for the first time, without
previously verified authentication credentials).

For example, a request that begins with

PUT /somewhere/fun HTTP/1.1

Host: origin.example.com
Content-Type: video/h264
Content-Length: 1234567890987
Expect: 100-continue

allows the origin server to immediately respond with an error

message, such as 401 (Unauthorized) or 405 (Method Not Allowed),
before the client starts filling the pipes with an unnecessary data
transfer.

Requirements for clients:

* A client MUST NOT generate a 100-continue expectation in a request

that does not include content.

* A client that will wait for a 100 (Continue) response before

sending the request content MUST send an Expect header field
containing a 100-continue expectation.

* A client that sends a 100-continue expectation is not required to

wait for any specific length of time; such a client MAY proceed to
send the content even if it has not yet received a response.
Furthermore, since 100 (Continue) responses cannot be sent through
an HTTP/1.0 intermediary, such a client SHOULD NOT wait for an
indefinite period before sending the content.

* A client that receives a 417 (Expectation Failed) status code in

response to a request containing a 100-continue expectation SHOULD
repeat that request without a 100-continue expectation, since the
417 response merely indicates that the response chain does not
support expectations (e.g., it passes through an HTTP/1.0 server).

Requirements for servers:

* A server that receives a 100-continue expectation in an HTTP/1.0

request MUST ignore that expectation.
 * A server MAY omit sending a 100 (Continue) response if it has
already received some or all of the content for the corresponding
request, or if the framing indicates that there is no content.

* A server that sends a 100 (Continue) response MUST ultimately send

a final status code, once it receives and processes the request
content, unless the connection is closed prematurely.

* A server that responds with a final status code before reading the
entire request content SHOULD indicate whether it intends to close
the connection (e.g., see Section 9.6 of [HTTP/1.1]) or continue
reading the request content.

Upon receiving an HTTP/1.1 (or later) request that has a method,

target URI, and complete header section that contains a 100-continue
expectation and an indication that request content will follow, an
origin server MUST send either:

* an immediate response with a final status code, if that status can

be determined by examining just the method, target URI, and header
fields, or

* an immediate 100 (Continue) response to encourage the client to

send the request content.

The origin server MUST NOT wait for the content before sending the
100 (Continue) response.

Upon receiving an HTTP/1.1 (or later) request that has a method,

target URI, and complete header section that contains a 100-continue
expectation and indicates a request content will follow, a proxy MUST
either:

* send an immediate response with a final status code, if that

status can be determined by examining just the method, target URI,
and header fields, or

* forward the request toward the origin server by sending a

corresponding request-line and header section to the next inbound
server.

If the proxy believes (from configuration or past interaction) that

the next inbound server only supports HTTP/1.0, the proxy MAY
generate an immediate 100 (Continue) response to encourage the client
to begin sending the content.

10.1.2. From

The "From" header field contains an Internet email address for a

human user who controls the requesting user agent. The address ought
to be machine-usable, as defined by "mailbox" in Section 3.4 of
[RFC5322]:

From = mailbox

mailbox = <mailbox, see [RFC5322], Section 3.4>

An example is:
 From: [email protected]

The From header field is rarely sent by non-robotic user agents. A

user agent SHOULD NOT send a From header field without explicit
configuration by the user, since that might conflict with the user's
privacy interests or their site's security policy.

A robotic user agent SHOULD send a valid From header field so that
the person responsible for running the robot can be contacted if
problems occur on servers, such as if the robot is sending excessive,
unwanted, or invalid requests.

A server SHOULD NOT use the From header field for access control or
authentication, since its value is expected to be visible to anyone
receiving or observing the request and is often recorded within
logfiles and error reports without any expectation of privacy.

10.1.3. Referer

The "Referer" [sic] header field allows the user agent to specify a
URI reference for the resource from which the target URI was obtained
(i.e., the "referrer", though the field name is misspelled). A user
agent MUST NOT include the fragment and userinfo components of the
URI reference [URI], if any, when generating the Referer field value.

Referer = absolute-URI / partial-URI

The field value is either an absolute-URI or a partial-URI. In the

latter case (Section 4), the referenced URI is relative to the target
URI ([URI], Section 5).

The Referer header field allows servers to generate back-links to

other resources for simple analytics, logging, optimized caching,
etc. It also allows obsolete or mistyped links to be found for
maintenance. Some servers use the Referer header field as a means of
denying links from other sites (so-called "deep linking") or
restricting cross-site request forgery (CSRF), but not all requests
contain it.

Example:

Referer: http://www.example.org/hypertext/Overview.html

If the target URI was obtained from a source that does not have its
own URI (e.g., input from the user keyboard, or an entry within the
user's bookmarks/favorites), the user agent MUST either exclude the
Referer header field or send it with a value of "about:blank".

The Referer header field value need not convey the full URI of the
referring resource; a user agent MAY truncate parts other than the
referring origin.

The Referer header field has the potential to reveal information

about the request context or browsing history of the user, which is a
privacy concern if the referring resource's identifier reveals
personal information (such as an account name) or a resource that is
supposed to be confidential (such as behind a firewall or internal to
a secured service). Most general-purpose user agents do not send the
 Referer header field when the referring resource is a local "file" or
"data" URI. A user agent SHOULD NOT send a Referer header field if
the referring resource was accessed with a secure protocol and the
request target has an origin differing from that of the referring
resource, unless the referring resource explicitly allows Referer to
be sent. A user agent MUST NOT send a Referer header field in an
unsecured HTTP request if the referring resource was accessed with a
secure protocol. See Section 17.9 for additional security
considerations.

Some intermediaries have been known to indiscriminately remove

Referer header fields from outgoing requests. This has the
unfortunate side effect of interfering with protection against CSRF
attacks, which can be far more harmful to their users.
Intermediaries and user agent extensions that wish to limit
information disclosure in Referer ought to restrict their changes to
specific edits, such as replacing internal domain names with
pseudonyms or truncating the query and/or path components. An
intermediary SHOULD NOT modify or delete the Referer header field
when the field value shares the same scheme and host as the target
URI.

10.1.4. TE

The "TE" header field describes capabilities of the client with

regard to transfer codings and trailer sections.

As described in Section 6.5, a TE field with a "trailers" member sent

in a request indicates that the client will not discard trailer
fields.

TE is also used within HTTP/1.1 to advise servers about which

transfer codings the client is able to accept in a response. As of
publication, only HTTP/1.1 uses transfer codings (see Section 7 of
[HTTP/1.1]).

The TE field value is a list of members, with each member (aside from
"trailers") consisting of a transfer coding name token with an
optional weight indicating the client's relative preference for that
transfer coding (Section 12.4.2) and optional parameters for that
transfer coding.

TE = #t-codings
t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-coding [ weight ] )
transfer-coding = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter )
transfer-parameter = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )

A sender of TE MUST also send a "TE" connection option within the

Connection header field (Section 7.6.1) to inform intermediaries not
to forward this field.

10.1.5. User-Agent

The "User-Agent" header field contains information about the user

agent originating the request, which is often used by servers to help
identify the scope of reported interoperability problems, to work
around or tailor responses to avoid particular user agent
limitations, and for analytics regarding browser or operating system
use. A user agent SHOULD send a User-Agent header field in each
 request unless specifically configured not to do so.

User-Agent = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

The User-Agent field value consists of one or more product

identifiers, each followed by zero or more comments (Section 5.6.5),
which together identify the user agent software and its significant
subproducts. By convention, the product identifiers are listed in
decreasing order of their significance for identifying the user agent
software. Each product identifier consists of a name and optional
version.

product = token ["/" product-version]

product-version = token

A sender SHOULD limit generated product identifiers to what is

necessary to identify the product; a sender MUST NOT generate
advertising or other nonessential information within the product
identifier. A sender SHOULD NOT generate information in
product-version that is not a version identifier (i.e., successive
versions of the same product name ought to differ only in the
product-version portion of the product identifier).

Example:

User-Agent: CERN-LineMode/2.15 libwww/2.17b3

A user agent SHOULD NOT generate a User-Agent header field containing

needlessly fine-grained detail and SHOULD limit the addition of
subproducts by third parties. Overly long and detailed User-Agent
field values increase request latency and the risk of a user being
identified against their wishes ("fingerprinting").

Likewise, implementations are encouraged not to use the product

tokens of other implementations in order to declare compatibility
with them, as this circumvents the purpose of the field. If a user
agent masquerades as a different user agent, recipients can assume
that the user intentionally desires to see responses tailored for
that identified user agent, even if they might not work as well for
the actual user agent being used.

10.2. Response Context Fields

The response header fields below provide additional information about

the response, beyond what is implied by the status code, including
information about the server, about the target resource, or about
related resources.

10.2.1. Allow

The "Allow" header field lists the set of methods advertised as

supported by the target resource. The purpose of this field is
strictly to inform the recipient of valid request methods associated
with the resource.

Allow = #method

Example of use:
 Allow: GET, HEAD, PUT

The actual set of allowed methods is defined by the origin server at

the time of each request. An origin server MUST generate an Allow
header field in a 405 (Method Not Allowed) response and MAY do so in
any other response. An empty Allow field value indicates that the
resource allows no methods, which might occur in a 405 response if
the resource has been temporarily disabled by configuration.

A proxy MUST NOT modify the Allow header field -- it does not need to
understand all of the indicated methods in order to handle them
according to the generic message handling rules.

10.2.2. Location

The "Location" header field is used in some responses to refer to a

specific resource in relation to the response. The type of
relationship is defined by the combination of request method and
status code semantics.

Location = URI-reference

The field value consists of a single URI-reference. When it has the

form of a relative reference ([URI], Section 4.2), the final value is
computed by resolving it against the target URI ([URI], Section 5).

For 201 (Created) responses, the Location value refers to the primary
resource created by the request. For 3xx (Redirection) responses,
the Location value refers to the preferred target resource for
automatically redirecting the request.

If the Location value provided in a 3xx (Redirection) response does

not have a fragment component, a user agent MUST process the
redirection as if the value inherits the fragment component of the
URI reference used to generate the target URI (i.e., the redirection
inherits the original reference's fragment, if any).

For example, a GET request generated for the URI reference

"http://www.example.org/~tim" might result in a 303 (See Other)
response containing the header field:

Location: /People.html#tim

which suggests that the user agent redirect to

"http://www.example.org/People.html#tim"

Likewise, a GET request generated for the URI reference

"http://www.example.org/index.html#larry" might result in a 301
(Moved Permanently) response containing the header field:

Location: http://www.example.net/index.html

which suggests that the user agent redirect to

"http://www.example.net/index.html#larry", preserving the original
fragment identifier.

There are circumstances in which a fragment identifier in a Location

value would not be appropriate. For example, the Location header
field in a 201 (Created) response is supposed to provide a URI that
 is specific to the created resource.

| *Note:* Some recipients attempt to recover from Location header

| fields that are not valid URI references. This specification
| does not mandate or define such processing, but does allow it
| for the sake of robustness. A Location field value cannot
| allow a list of members because the comma list separator is a
| valid data character within a URI-reference. If an invalid
| message is sent with multiple Location field lines, a recipient
| along the path might combine those field lines into one value.
| Recovery of a valid Location field value from that situation is
| difficult and not interoperable across implementations.

| *Note:* The Content-Location header field (Section 8.7) differs

| from Location in that the Content-Location refers to the most
| specific resource corresponding to the enclosed representation.
| It is therefore possible for a response to contain both the
| Location and Content-Location header fields.

10.2.3. Retry-After

Servers send the "Retry-After" header field to indicate how long the
user agent ought to wait before making a follow-up request. When
sent with a 503 (Service Unavailable) response, Retry-After indicates
how long the service is expected to be unavailable to the client.
When sent with any 3xx (Redirection) response, Retry-After indicates
the minimum time that the user agent is asked to wait before issuing
the redirected request.

The Retry-After field value can be either an HTTP-date or a number of

seconds to delay after receiving the response.

Retry-After = HTTP-date / delay-seconds

A delay-seconds value is a non-negative decimal integer, representing

time in seconds.

delay-seconds = 1*DIGIT

Two examples of its use are

Retry-After: Fri, 31 Dec 1999 23:59:59 GMT

Retry-After: 120

In the latter example, the delay is 2 minutes.

10.2.4. Server

The "Server" header field contains information about the software

used by the origin server to handle the request, which is often used
by clients to help identify the scope of reported interoperability
problems, to work around or tailor requests to avoid particular
server limitations, and for analytics regarding server or operating
system use. An origin server MAY generate a Server header field in
its responses.

Server = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

The Server header field value consists of one or more product

 identifiers, each followed by zero or more comments (Section 5.6.5),
which together identify the origin server software and its
significant subproducts. By convention, the product identifiers are
listed in decreasing order of their significance for identifying the
origin server software. Each product identifier consists of a name
and optional version, as defined in Section 10.1.5.

Example:

Server: CERN/3.0 libwww/2.17

An origin server SHOULD NOT generate a Server header field containing

needlessly fine-grained detail and SHOULD limit the addition of
subproducts by third parties. Overly long and detailed Server field
values increase response latency and potentially reveal internal
implementation details that might make it (slightly) easier for
attackers to find and exploit known security holes.

11. HTTP Authentication

11.1. Authentication Scheme

HTTP provides a general framework for access control and

authentication, via an extensible set of challenge-response
authentication schemes, which can be used by a server to challenge a
client request and by a client to provide authentication information.
It uses a case-insensitive token to identify the authentication
scheme:

auth-scheme = token

Aside from the general framework, this document does not specify any
authentication schemes. New and existing authentication schemes are
specified independently and ought to be registered within the
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry".
For example, the "basic" and "digest" authentication schemes are
defined by [RFC7617] and [RFC7616], respectively.

11.2. Authentication Parameters

The authentication scheme is followed by additional information

necessary for achieving authentication via that scheme as either a
comma-separated list of parameters or a single sequence of characters
capable of holding base64-encoded information.

token68 = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /

"-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" ) *"="

The token68 syntax allows the 66 unreserved URI characters ([URI]),

plus a few others, so that it can hold a base64, base64url (URL and
filename safe alphabet), base32, or base16 (hex) encoding, with or
without padding, but excluding whitespace ([RFC4648]).

Authentication parameters are name/value pairs, where the name token

is matched case-insensitively and each parameter name MUST only occur
once per challenge.

auth-param = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )

 Parameter values can be expressed either as "token" or as "quoted-
string" (Section 5.6). Authentication scheme definitions need to
accept both notations, both for senders and recipients, to allow
recipients to use generic parsing components regardless of the
authentication scheme.

For backwards compatibility, authentication scheme definitions can

restrict the format for senders to one of the two variants. This can
be important when it is known that deployed implementations will fail
when encountering one of the two formats.

11.3. Challenge and Response

A 401 (Unauthorized) response message is used by an origin server to

challenge the authorization of a user agent, including a
WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one challenge
applicable to the requested resource.

A 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response message is used by a

proxy to challenge the authorization of a client, including a
Proxy-Authenticate header field containing at least one challenge
applicable to the proxy for the requested resource.

challenge = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / #auth-param ) ]

| *Note:* Many clients fail to parse a challenge that contains an

| unknown scheme. A workaround for this problem is to list well-
| supported schemes (such as "basic") first.

A user agent that wishes to authenticate itself with an origin server

-- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized)
-- can do so by including an Authorization header field with the
request.

A client that wishes to authenticate itself with a proxy -- usually,

but not necessarily, after receiving a 407 (Proxy Authentication
Required) -- can do so by including a Proxy-Authorization header
field with the request.

11.4. Credentials

Both the Authorization field value and the Proxy-Authorization field

value contain the client's credentials for the realm of the resource
being requested, based upon a challenge received in a response
(possibly at some point in the past). When creating their values,
the user agent ought to do so by selecting the challenge with what it
considers to be the most secure auth-scheme that it understands,
obtaining credentials from the user as appropriate. Transmission of
credentials within header field values implies significant security
considerations regarding the confidentiality of the underlying
connection, as described in Section 17.16.1.

credentials = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / #auth-param ) ]

Upon receipt of a request for a protected resource that omits

credentials, contains invalid credentials (e.g., a bad password) or
partial credentials (e.g., when the authentication scheme requires
more than one round trip), an origin server SHOULD send a 401
(Unauthorized) response that contains a WWW-Authenticate header field
 with at least one (possibly new) challenge applicable to the
requested resource.

Likewise, upon receipt of a request that omits proxy credentials or

contains invalid or partial proxy credentials, a proxy that requires
authentication SHOULD generate a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required)
response that contains a Proxy-Authenticate header field with at
least one (possibly new) challenge applicable to the proxy.

A server that receives valid credentials that are not adequate to

gain access ought to respond with the 403 (Forbidden) status code
(Section 15.5.4).

HTTP does not restrict applications to this simple challenge-response

framework for access authentication. Additional mechanisms can be
used, such as authentication at the transport level or via message
encapsulation, and with additional header fields specifying
authentication information. However, such additional mechanisms are
not defined by this specification.

Note that various custom mechanisms for user authentication use the
Set-Cookie and Cookie header fields, defined in [COOKIE], for passing
tokens related to authentication.

11.5. Establishing a Protection Space (Realm)

The "realm" authentication parameter is reserved for use by

authentication schemes that wish to indicate a scope of protection.

A "protection space" is defined by the origin (see Section 4.3.1) of

the server being accessed, in combination with the realm value if
present. These realms allow the protected resources on a server to
be partitioned into a set of protection spaces, each with its own
authentication scheme and/or authorization database. The realm value
is a string, generally assigned by the origin server, that can have
additional semantics specific to the authentication scheme. Note
that a response can have multiple challenges with the same auth-
scheme but with different realms.

The protection space determines the domain over which credentials can
be automatically applied. If a prior request has been authorized,
the user agent MAY reuse the same credentials for all other requests
within that protection space for a period of time determined by the
authentication scheme, parameters, and/or user preferences (such as a
configurable inactivity timeout).

The extent of a protection space, and therefore the requests to which

credentials might be automatically applied, is not necessarily known
to clients without additional information. An authentication scheme
might define parameters that describe the extent of a protection
space. Unless specifically allowed by the authentication scheme, a
single protection space cannot extend outside the scope of its
server.

For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string

syntax. Recipients might have to support both token and quoted-
string syntax for maximum interoperability with existing clients that
have been accepting both notations for a long time.
11.6. Authenticating Users to Origin Servers

11.6.1. WWW-Authenticate

The "WWW-Authenticate" response header field indicates the

authentication scheme(s) and parameters applicable to the target
resource.

WWW-Authenticate = #challenge

A server generating a 401 (Unauthorized) response MUST send a WWW-

Authenticate header field containing at least one challenge. A
server MAY generate a WWW-Authenticate header field in other response
messages to indicate that supplying credentials (or different
credentials) might affect the response.

A proxy forwarding a response MUST NOT modify any WWW-Authenticate

header fields in that response.

User agents are advised to take special care in parsing the field
value, as it might contain more than one challenge, and each
challenge can contain a comma-separated list of authentication
parameters. Furthermore, the header field itself can occur multiple
times.

For instance:

WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="simple", Newauth realm="apps",

type=1, title="Login to \"apps\""

This header field contains two challenges, one for the "Basic" scheme
with a realm value of "simple" and another for the "Newauth" scheme
with a realm value of "apps". It also contains two additional
parameters, "type" and "title".

Some user agents do not recognize this form, however. As a result,

sending a WWW-Authenticate field value with more than one member on
the same field line might not be interoperable.

| *Note:* The challenge grammar production uses the list syntax

| as well. Therefore, a sequence of comma, whitespace, and comma
| can be considered either as applying to the preceding
| challenge, or to be an empty entry in the list of challenges.
| In practice, this ambiguity does not affect the semantics of
| the header field value and thus is harmless.

11.6.2. Authorization

The "Authorization" header field allows a user agent to authenticate

itself with an origin server -- usually, but not necessarily, after
receiving a 401 (Unauthorized) response. Its value consists of
credentials containing the authentication information of the user
agent for the realm of the resource being requested.

Authorization = credentials

If a request is authenticated and a realm specified, the same

credentials are presumed to be valid for all other requests within
this realm (assuming that the authentication scheme itself does not
 require otherwise, such as credentials that vary according to a
challenge value or using synchronized clocks).

A proxy forwarding a request MUST NOT modify any Authorization header

fields in that request. See Section 3.5 of [CACHING] for details of
and requirements pertaining to handling of the Authorization header
field by HTTP caches.

11.6.3. Authentication-Info

HTTP authentication schemes can use the "Authentication-Info"

response field to communicate information after the client's
authentication credentials have been accepted. This information can
include a finalization message from the server (e.g., it can contain
the server authentication).

The field value is a list of parameters (name/value pairs), using the

"auth-param" syntax defined in Section 11.3. This specification only
describes the generic format; authentication schemes using
Authentication-Info will define the individual parameters. The
"Digest" Authentication Scheme, for instance, defines multiple
parameters in Section 3.5 of [RFC7616].

Authentication-Info = #auth-param

The Authentication-Info field can be used in any HTTP response,

independently of request method and status code. Its semantics are
defined by the authentication scheme indicated by the Authorization
header field (Section 11.6.2) of the corresponding request.

A proxy forwarding a response is not allowed to modify the field

value in any way.

Authentication-Info can be sent as a trailer field (Section 6.5) when

the authentication scheme explicitly allows this.

11.7. Authenticating Clients to Proxies

11.7.1. Proxy-Authenticate

The "Proxy-Authenticate" header field consists of at least one

challenge that indicates the authentication scheme(s) and parameters
applicable to the proxy for this request. A proxy MUST send at least
one Proxy-Authenticate header field in each 407 (Proxy Authentication
Required) response that it generates.

Proxy-Authenticate = #challenge

Unlike WWW-Authenticate, the Proxy-Authenticate header field applies

only to the next outbound client on the response chain. This is
because only the client that chose a given proxy is likely to have
the credentials necessary for authentication. However, when multiple
proxies are used within the same administrative domain, such as
office and regional caching proxies within a large corporate network,
it is common for credentials to be generated by the user agent and
passed through the hierarchy until consumed. Hence, in such a
configuration, it will appear as if Proxy-Authenticate is being
forwarded because each proxy will send the same challenge set.
 Note that the parsing considerations for WWW-Authenticate apply to
this header field as well; see Section 11.6.1 for details.

11.7.2. Proxy-Authorization

The "Proxy-Authorization" header field allows the client to identify

itself (or its user) to a proxy that requires authentication. Its
value consists of credentials containing the authentication
information of the client for the proxy and/or realm of the resource
being requested.

Proxy-Authorization = credentials

Unlike Authorization, the Proxy-Authorization header field applies

only to the next inbound proxy that demanded authentication using the
Proxy-Authenticate header field. When multiple proxies are used in a
chain, the Proxy-Authorization header field is consumed by the first
inbound proxy that was expecting to receive credentials. A proxy MAY
relay the credentials from the client request to the next proxy if
that is the mechanism by which the proxies cooperatively authenticate
a given request.

11.7.3. Proxy-Authentication-Info

The "Proxy-Authentication-Info" response header field is equivalent

to Authentication-Info, except that it applies to proxy
authentication (Section 11.3) and its semantics are defined by the
authentication scheme indicated by the Proxy-Authorization header
field (Section 11.7.2) of the corresponding request:

Proxy-Authentication-Info = #auth-param

However, unlike Authentication-Info, the Proxy-Authentication-Info

header field applies only to the next outbound client on the response
chain. This is because only the client that chose a given proxy is
likely to have the credentials necessary for authentication.
However, when multiple proxies are used within the same
administrative domain, such as office and regional caching proxies
within a large corporate network, it is common for credentials to be
generated by the user agent and passed through the hierarchy until
consumed. Hence, in such a configuration, it will appear as if
Proxy-Authentication-Info is being forwarded because each proxy will
send the same field value.

Proxy-Authentication-Info can be sent as a trailer field

(Section 6.5) when the authentication scheme explicitly allows this.

12. Content Negotiation

When responses convey content, whether indicating a success or an

error, the origin server often has different ways of representing
that information; for example, in different formats, languages, or
encodings. Likewise, different users or user agents might have
differing capabilities, characteristics, or preferences that could
influence which representation, among those available, would be best
to deliver. For this reason, HTTP provides mechanisms for content
negotiation.

This specification defines three patterns of content negotiation that

 can be made visible within the protocol: "proactive" negotiation,
where the server selects the representation based upon the user
agent's stated preferences; "reactive" negotiation, where the server
provides a list of representations for the user agent to choose from;
and "request content" negotiation, where the user agent selects the
representation for a future request based upon the server's stated
preferences in past responses.

Other patterns of content negotiation include "conditional content",

where the representation consists of multiple parts that are
selectively rendered based on user agent parameters, "active
content", where the representation contains a script that makes
additional (more specific) requests based on the user agent
characteristics, and "Transparent Content Negotiation" ([RFC2295]),
where content selection is performed by an intermediary. These
patterns are not mutually exclusive, and each has trade-offs in
applicability and practicality.

Note that, in all cases, HTTP is not aware of the resource semantics.
The consistency with which an origin server responds to requests,
over time and over the varying dimensions of content negotiation, and
thus the "sameness" of a resource's observed representations over
time, is determined entirely by whatever entity or algorithm selects
or generates those responses.

12.1. Proactive Negotiation

When content negotiation preferences are sent by the user agent in a

request to encourage an algorithm located at the server to select the
preferred representation, it is called "proactive negotiation"
(a.k.a., "server-driven negotiation"). Selection is based on the
available representations for a response (the dimensions over which
it might vary, such as language, content coding, etc.) compared to
various information supplied in the request, including both the
explicit negotiation header fields below and implicit
characteristics, such as the client's network address or parts of the
User-Agent field.

Proactive negotiation is advantageous when the algorithm for

selecting from among the available representations is difficult to
describe to a user agent, or when the server desires to send its
"best guess" to the user agent along with the first response (when
that "best guess" is good enough for the user, this avoids the round-
trip delay of a subsequent request). In order to improve the
server's guess, a user agent MAY send request header fields that
describe its preferences.

Proactive negotiation has serious disadvantages:

* It is impossible for the server to accurately determine what might

be "best" for any given user, since that would require complete
knowledge of both the capabilities of the user agent and the
intended use for the response (e.g., does the user want to view it
on screen or print it on paper?);

* Having the user agent describe its capabilities in every request

can be both very inefficient (given that only a small percentage
of responses have multiple representations) and a potential risk
to the user's privacy;
 * It complicates the implementation of an origin server and the
algorithms for generating responses to a request; and,

* It limits the reusability of responses for shared caching.

A user agent cannot rely on proactive negotiation preferences being

consistently honored, since the origin server might not implement
proactive negotiation for the requested resource or might decide that
sending a response that doesn't conform to the user agent's
preferences is better than sending a 406 (Not Acceptable) response.

A Vary header field (Section 12.5.5) is often sent in a response

subject to proactive negotiation to indicate what parts of the
request information were used in the selection algorithm.

The request header fields Accept, Accept-Charset, Accept-Encoding,

and Accept-Language are defined below for a user agent to engage in
proactive negotiation of the response content. The preferences sent
in these fields apply to any content in the response, including
representations of the target resource, representations of error or
processing status, and potentially even the miscellaneous text
strings that might appear within the protocol.

12.2. Reactive Negotiation

With "reactive negotiation" (a.k.a., "agent-driven negotiation"),

selection of content (regardless of the status code) is performed by
the user agent after receiving an initial response. The mechanism
for reactive negotiation might be as simple as a list of references
to alternative representations.

If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response content,

it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative
resources to obtain a different representation. Selection of such
alternatives might be performed automatically (by the user agent) or
manually (e.g., by the user selecting from a hypertext menu).

A server might choose not to send an initial representation, other

than the list of alternatives, and thereby indicate that reactive
negotiation by the user agent is preferred. For example, the
alternatives listed in responses with the 300 (Multiple Choices) and
406 (Not Acceptable) status codes include information about available
representations so that the user or user agent can react by making a
selection.

Reactive negotiation is advantageous when the response would vary

over commonly used dimensions (such as type, language, or encoding),
when the origin server is unable to determine a user agent's
capabilities from examining the request, and generally when public
caches are used to distribute server load and reduce network usage.

Reactive negotiation suffers from the disadvantages of transmitting a

list of alternatives to the user agent, which degrades user-perceived
latency if transmitted in the header section, and needing a second
request to obtain an alternate representation. Furthermore, this
specification does not define a mechanism for supporting automatic
selection, though it does not prevent such a mechanism from being
developed.
12.3. Request Content Negotiation

When content negotiation preferences are sent in a server's response,

the listed preferences are called "request content negotiation"
because they intend to influence selection of an appropriate content
for subsequent requests to that resource. For example, the Accept
(Section 12.5.1) and Accept-Encoding (Section 12.5.3) header fields
can be sent in a response to indicate preferred media types and
content codings for subsequent requests to that resource.

Similarly, Section 3.1 of [RFC5789] defines the "Accept-Patch"

response header field, which allows discovery of which content types
are accepted in PATCH requests.

12.4. Content Negotiation Field Features

12.4.1. Absence

For each of the content negotiation fields, a request that does not
contain the field implies that the sender has no preference on that
dimension of negotiation.

If a content negotiation header field is present in a request and

none of the available representations for the response can be
considered acceptable according to it, the origin server can either
honor the header field by sending a 406 (Not Acceptable) response or
disregard the header field by treating the response as if it is not
subject to content negotiation for that request header field. This
does not imply, however, that the client will be able to use the
representation.

| *Note:* A user agent sending these header fields makes it

| easier for a server to identify an individual by virtue of the
| user agent's request characteristics (Section 17.13).

12.4.2. Quality Values

The content negotiation fields defined by this specification use a

common parameter, named "q" (case-insensitive), to assign a relative
"weight" to the preference for that associated kind of content. This
weight is referred to as a "quality value" (or "qvalue") because the
same parameter name is often used within server configurations to
assign a weight to the relative quality of the various
representations that can be selected for a resource.

The weight is normalized to a real number in the range 0 through 1,

where 0.001 is the least preferred and 1 is the most preferred; a
value of 0 means "not acceptable". If no "q" parameter is present,
the default weight is 1.

weight = OWS ";" OWS "q=" qvalue

qvalue = ( "0" [ "." 0*3DIGIT ] )
/ ( "1" [ "." 0*3("0") ] )

A sender of qvalue MUST NOT generate more than three digits after the
decimal point. User configuration of these values ought to be
limited in the same fashion.
12.4.3. Wildcard Values

Most of these header fields, where indicated, define a wildcard value

("*") to select unspecified values. If no wildcard is present,
values that are not explicitly mentioned in the field are considered
unacceptable. Within Vary, the wildcard value means that the
variance is unlimited.

| *Note:* In practice, using wildcards in content negotiation has

| limited practical value because it is seldom useful to say, for
| example, "I prefer image/* more or less than (some other
| specific value)". By sending Accept: */*;q=0, clients can
| explicitly request a 406 (Not Acceptable) response if a more
| preferred format is not available, but they still need to be
| able to handle a different response since the server is allowed
| to ignore their preference.

12.5. Content Negotiation Fields

12.5.1. Accept

The "Accept" header field can be used by user agents to specify their
preferences regarding response media types. For example, Accept
header fields can be used to indicate that the request is
specifically limited to a small set of desired types, as in the case
of a request for an in-line image.

When sent by a server in a response, Accept provides information

about which content types are preferred in the content of a
subsequent request to the same resource.

Accept = #( media-range [ weight ] )

media-range = ( "*/*"
/ ( type "/" "*" )
/ ( type "/" subtype )
) parameters

The asterisk "*" character is used to group media types into ranges,
with "*/*" indicating all media types and "type/*" indicating all
subtypes of that type. The media-range can include media type
parameters that are applicable to that range.

Each media-range might be followed by optional applicable media type

parameters (e.g., charset), followed by an optional "q" parameter for
indicating a relative weight (Section 12.4.2).

Previous specifications allowed additional extension parameters to

appear after the weight parameter. The accept extension grammar
(accept-params, accept-ext) has been removed because it had a
complicated definition, was not being used in practice, and is more
easily deployed through new header fields. Senders using weights
SHOULD send "q" last (after all media-range parameters). Recipients
SHOULD process any parameter named "q" as weight, regardless of
parameter ordering.

| *Note:* Use of the "q" parameter name to control content

| negotiation would interfere with any media type parameter
| having the same name. Hence, the media type registry disallows
 | parameters named "q".

The example

Accept: audio/*; q=0.2, audio/basic

is interpreted as "I prefer audio/basic, but send me any audio type

if it is the best available after an 80% markdown in quality".

A more elaborate example is

Accept: text/plain; q=0.5, text/html,

text/x-dvi; q=0.8, text/x-c

Verbally, this would be interpreted as "text/html and text/x-c are

the equally preferred media types, but if they do not exist, then
send the text/x-dvi representation, and if that does not exist, send
the text/plain representation".

Media ranges can be overridden by more specific media ranges or

specific media types. If more than one media range applies to a
given type, the most specific reference has precedence. For example,

Accept: text/*, text/plain, text/plain;format=flowed, */*

have the following precedence:

1. text/plain;format=flowed

2. text/plain

3. text/*

4. */*

The media type quality factor associated with a given type is

determined by finding the media range with the highest precedence
that matches the type. For example,

Accept: text/*;q=0.3, text/plain;q=0.7, text/plain;format=flowed,

text/plain;format=fixed;q=0.4, */*;q=0.5

would cause the following values to be associated:

+==========================+===============+
| Media Type | Quality Value |
+==========================+===============+
| text/plain;format=flowed | 1 |
+--------------------------+---------------+
| text/plain | 0.7 |
+--------------------------+---------------+
| text/html | 0.3 |
+--------------------------+---------------+
| image/jpeg | 0.5 |
+--------------------------+---------------+
| text/plain;format=fixed | 0.4 |
+--------------------------+---------------+
| text/html;level=3 | 0.7 |
+--------------------------+---------------+
 Table 5

| *Note:* A user agent might be provided with a default set of

| quality values for certain media ranges. However, unless the
| user agent is a closed system that cannot interact with other
| rendering agents, this default set ought to be configurable by
| the user.

12.5.2. Accept-Charset

The "Accept-Charset" header field can be sent by a user agent to

indicate its preferences for charsets in textual response content.
For example, this field allows user agents capable of understanding
more comprehensive or special-purpose charsets to signal that
capability to an origin server that is capable of representing
information in those charsets.

Accept-Charset = #( ( token / "*" ) [ weight ] )

Charset names are defined in Section 8.3.2. A user agent MAY

associate a quality value with each charset to indicate the user's
relative preference for that charset, as defined in Section 12.4.2.
An example is

Accept-Charset: iso-8859-5, unicode-1-1;q=0.8

The special value "*", if present in the Accept-Charset header field,

matches every charset that is not mentioned elsewhere in the field.

| *Note:* Accept-Charset is deprecated because UTF-8 has become

| nearly ubiquitous and sending a detailed list of user-preferred
| charsets wastes bandwidth, increases latency, and makes passive
| fingerprinting far too easy (Section 17.13). Most general-
| purpose user agents do not send Accept-Charset unless
| specifically configured to do so.

12.5.3. Accept-Encoding

The "Accept-Encoding" header field can be used to indicate

preferences regarding the use of content codings (Section 8.4.1).

When sent by a user agent in a request, Accept-Encoding indicates the

content codings acceptable in a response.

When sent by a server in a response, Accept-Encoding provides

information about which content codings are preferred in the content
of a subsequent request to the same resource.

An "identity" token is used as a synonym for "no encoding" in order

to communicate when no encoding is preferred.

Accept-Encoding = #( codings [ weight ] )

codings = content-coding / "identity" / "*"

Each codings value MAY be given an associated quality value (weight)

representing the preference for that encoding, as defined in
Section 12.4.2. The asterisk "*" symbol in an Accept-Encoding field
matches any available content coding not explicitly listed in the
field.

Examples:

Accept-Encoding: compress, gzip

Accept-Encoding:
Accept-Encoding: *
Accept-Encoding: compress;q=0.5, gzip;q=1.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0, identity; q=0.5, *;q=0

A server tests whether a content coding for a given representation is

acceptable using these rules:

1. If no Accept-Encoding header field is in the request, any content

coding is considered acceptable by the user agent.

2. If the representation has no content coding, then it is

acceptable by default unless specifically excluded by the Accept-
Encoding header field stating either "identity;q=0" or "*;q=0"
without a more specific entry for "identity".

3. If the representation's content coding is one of the content

codings listed in the Accept-Encoding field value, then it is
acceptable unless it is accompanied by a qvalue of 0. (As
defined in Section 12.4.2, a qvalue of 0 means "not acceptable".)

A representation could be encoded with multiple content codings.

However, most content codings are alternative ways to accomplish the
same purpose (e.g., data compression). When selecting between
multiple content codings that have the same purpose, the acceptable
content coding with the highest non-zero qvalue is preferred.

An Accept-Encoding header field with a field value that is empty

implies that the user agent does not want any content coding in
response. If a non-empty Accept-Encoding header field is present in
a request and none of the available representations for the response
have a content coding that is listed as acceptable, the origin server
SHOULD send a response without any content coding unless the identity
coding is indicated as unacceptable.

When the Accept-Encoding header field is present in a response, it

indicates what content codings the resource was willing to accept in
the associated request. The field value is evaluated the same way as
in a request.

Note that this information is specific to the associated request; the

set of supported encodings might be different for other resources on
the same server and could change over time or depend on other aspects
of the request (such as the request method).

Servers that fail a request due to an unsupported content coding

ought to respond with a 415 (Unsupported Media Type) status and
include an Accept-Encoding header field in that response, allowing
clients to distinguish between issues related to content codings and
media types. In order to avoid confusion with issues related to
media types, servers that fail a request with a 415 status for
reasons unrelated to content codings MUST NOT include the Accept-
Encoding header field.
 The most common use of Accept-Encoding is in responses with a 415
(Unsupported Media Type) status code, in response to optimistic use
of a content coding by clients. However, the header field can also
be used to indicate to clients that content codings are supported in
order to optimize future interactions. For example, a resource might
include it in a 2xx (Successful) response when the request content
was big enough to justify use of a compression coding but the client
failed do so.

12.5.4. Accept-Language

The "Accept-Language" header field can be used by user agents to

indicate the set of natural languages that are preferred in the
response. Language tags are defined in Section 8.5.1.

Accept-Language = #( language-range [ weight ] )

language-range =
<language-range, see [RFC4647], Section 2.1>

Each language-range can be given an associated quality value

representing an estimate of the user's preference for the languages
specified by that range, as defined in Section 12.4.2. For example,

Accept-Language: da, en-gb;q=0.8, en;q=0.7

would mean: "I prefer Danish, but will accept British English and
other types of English".

Note that some recipients treat the order in which language tags are
listed as an indication of descending priority, particularly for tags
that are assigned equal quality values (no value is the same as q=1).
However, this behavior cannot be relied upon. For consistency and to
maximize interoperability, many user agents assign each language tag
a unique quality value while also listing them in order of decreasing
quality. Additional discussion of language priority lists can be
found in Section 2.3 of [RFC4647].

For matching, Section 3 of [RFC4647] defines several matching

schemes. Implementations can offer the most appropriate matching
scheme for their requirements. The "Basic Filtering" scheme
([RFC4647], Section 3.3.1) is identical to the matching scheme that
was previously defined for HTTP in Section 14.4 of [RFC2616].

It might be contrary to the privacy expectations of the user to send

an Accept-Language header field with the complete linguistic
preferences of the user in every request (Section 17.13).

Since intelligibility is highly dependent on the individual user,

user agents need to allow user control over the linguistic preference
(either through configuration of the user agent itself or by
defaulting to a user controllable system setting). A user agent that
does not provide such control to the user MUST NOT send an Accept-
Language header field.

| *Note:* User agents ought to provide guidance to users when

| setting a preference, since users are rarely familiar with the
| details of language matching as described above. For example,
| users might assume that on selecting "en-gb", they will be
| served any kind of English document if British English is not
 | available. A user agent might suggest, in such a case, to add
| "en" to the list for better matching behavior.

12.5.5. Vary

The "Vary" header field in a response describes what parts of a

request message, aside from the method and target URI, might have
influenced the origin server's process for selecting the content of
this response.

Vary = #( "*" / field-name )

A Vary field value is either the wildcard member "*" or a list of

request field names, known as the selecting header fields, that might
have had a role in selecting the representation for this response.
Potential selecting header fields are not limited to fields defined
by this specification.

A list containing the member "*" signals that other aspects of the
request might have played a role in selecting the response
representation, possibly including aspects outside the message syntax
(e.g., the client's network address). A recipient will not be able
to determine whether this response is appropriate for a later request
without forwarding the request to the origin server. A proxy MUST
NOT generate "*" in a Vary field value.

For example, a response that contains

Vary: accept-encoding, accept-language

indicates that the origin server might have used the request's
Accept-Encoding and Accept-Language header fields (or lack thereof)
as determining factors while choosing the content for this response.

A Vary field containing a list of field names has two purposes:

1. To inform cache recipients that they MUST NOT use this response
to satisfy a later request unless the later request has the same
values for the listed header fields as the original request
(Section 4.1 of [CACHING]) or reuse of the response has been
validated by the origin server. In other words, Vary expands the
cache key required to match a new request to the stored cache
entry.

2. To inform user agent recipients that this response was subject to

content negotiation (Section 12) and a different representation
might be sent in a subsequent request if other values are
provided in the listed header fields (proactive negotiation).

An origin server SHOULD generate a Vary header field on a cacheable

response when it wishes that response to be selectively reused for
subsequent requests. Generally, that is the case when the response
content has been tailored to better fit the preferences expressed by
those selecting header fields, such as when an origin server has
selected the response's language based on the request's
Accept-Language header field.

Vary might be elided when an origin server considers variance in

content selection to be less significant than Vary's performance
 impact on caching, particularly when reuse is already limited by
cache response directives (Section 5.2 of [CACHING]).

There is no need to send the Authorization field name in Vary because

reuse of that response for a different user is prohibited by the
field definition (Section 11.6.2). Likewise, if the response content
has been selected or influenced by network region, but the origin
server wants the cached response to be reused even if recipients move
from one region to another, then there is no need for the origin
server to indicate such variance in Vary.

13. Conditional Requests

A conditional request is an HTTP request with one or more request

header fields that indicate a precondition to be tested before
applying the request method to the target resource. Section 13.2
defines when to evaluate preconditions and their order of precedence
when more than one precondition is present.

Conditional GET requests are the most efficient mechanism for HTTP
cache updates [CACHING]. Conditionals can also be applied to state-
changing methods, such as PUT and DELETE, to prevent the "lost
update" problem: one client accidentally overwriting the work of
another client that has been acting in parallel.

13.1. Preconditions

Preconditions are usually defined with respect to a state of the

target resource as a whole (its current value set) or the state as
observed in a previously obtained representation (one value in that
set). If a resource has multiple current representations, each with
its own observable state, a precondition will assume that the mapping
of each request to a selected representation (Section 3.2) is
consistent over time. Regardless, if the mapping is inconsistent or
the server is unable to select an appropriate representation, then no
harm will result when the precondition evaluates to false.

Each precondition defined below consists of a comparison between a

set of validators obtained from prior representations of the target
resource to the current state of validators for the selected
representation (Section 8.8). Hence, these preconditions evaluate
whether the state of the target resource has changed since a given
state known by the client. The effect of such an evaluation depends
on the method semantics and choice of conditional, as defined in
Section 13.2.

Other preconditions, defined by other specifications as extension

fields, might place conditions on all recipients, on the state of the
target resource in general, or on a group of resources. For
instance, the "If" header field in WebDAV can make a request
conditional on various aspects of multiple resources, such as locks,
if the recipient understands and implements that field ([WEBDAV],
Section 10.4).

Extensibility of preconditions is only possible when the precondition

can be safely ignored if unknown (like If-Modified-Since), when
deployment can be assumed for a given use case, or when
implementation is signaled by some other property of the target
resource. This encourages a focus on mutually agreed deployment of
 common standards.

13.1.1. If-Match

The "If-Match" header field makes the request method conditional on

the recipient origin server either having at least one current
representation of the target resource, when the field value is "*",
or having a current representation of the target resource that has an
entity tag matching a member of the list of entity tags provided in
the field value.

An origin server MUST use the strong comparison function when

comparing entity tags for If-Match (Section 8.8.3.2), since the
client intends this precondition to prevent the method from being
applied if there have been any changes to the representation data.

If-Match = "*" / #entity-tag

Examples:

If-Match: "xyzzy"
If-Match: "xyzzy", "r2d2xxxx", "c3piozzzz"
If-Match: *

If-Match is most often used with state-changing methods (e.g., POST,

PUT, DELETE) to prevent accidental overwrites when multiple user
agents might be acting in parallel on the same resource (i.e., to
prevent the "lost update" problem). In general, it can be used with
any method that involves the selection or modification of a
representation to abort the request if the selected representation's
current entity tag is not a member within the If-Match field value.

When an origin server receives a request that selects a

representation and that request includes an If-Match header field,
the origin server MUST evaluate the If-Match condition per
Section 13.2 prior to performing the method.

To evaluate a received If-Match header field:

1. If the field value is "*", the condition is true if the origin

server has a current representation for the target resource.

2. If the field value is a list of entity tags, the condition is

true if any of the listed tags match the entity tag of the
selected representation.

3. Otherwise, the condition is false.

An origin server that evaluates an If-Match condition MUST NOT

perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false.
Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request
failed by responding with a 412 (Precondition Failed) status code.
Alternatively, if the request is a state-changing operation that
appears to have already been applied to the selected representation,
the origin server MAY respond with a 2xx (Successful) status code
(i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded,
but the user agent might not be aware of it, perhaps because the
prior response was lost or an equivalent change was made by some
other user agent).
 Allowing an origin server to send a success response when a change
request appears to have already been applied is more efficient for
many authoring use cases, but comes with some risk if multiple user
agents are making change requests that are very similar but not
cooperative. For example, multiple user agents writing to a common
resource as a semaphore (e.g., a nonatomic increment) are likely to
collide and potentially lose important state transitions. For those
kinds of resources, an origin server is better off being stringent in
sending 412 for every failed precondition on an unsafe method. In
other cases, excluding the ETag field from a success response might
encourage the user agent to perform a GET as its next request to
eliminate confusion about the resource's current state.

A client MAY send an If-Match header field in a GET request to

indicate that it would prefer a 412 (Precondition Failed) response if
the selected representation does not match. However, this is only
useful in range requests (Section 14) for completing a previously
received partial representation when there is no desire for a new
representation. If-Range (Section 13.1.5) is better suited for range
requests when the client prefers to receive a new representation.

A cache or intermediary MAY ignore If-Match because its

interoperability features are only necessary for an origin server.

Note that an If-Match header field with a list value containing "*"
and other values (including other instances of "*") is syntactically
invalid (therefore not allowed to be generated) and furthermore is
unlikely to be interoperable.

13.1.2. If-None-Match

The "If-None-Match" header field makes the request method conditional

on a recipient cache or origin server either not having any current
representation of the target resource, when the field value is "*",
or having a selected representation with an entity tag that does not
match any of those listed in the field value.

A recipient MUST use the weak comparison function when comparing

entity tags for If-None-Match (Section 8.8.3.2), since weak entity
tags can be used for cache validation even if there have been changes
to the representation data.

If-None-Match = "*" / #entity-tag

Examples:

If-None-Match: "xyzzy"
If-None-Match: W/"xyzzy"
If-None-Match: "xyzzy", "r2d2xxxx", "c3piozzzz"
If-None-Match: W/"xyzzy", W/"r2d2xxxx", W/"c3piozzzz"
If-None-Match: *

If-None-Match is primarily used in conditional GET requests to enable

efficient updates of cached information with a minimum amount of
transaction overhead. When a client desires to update one or more
stored responses that have entity tags, the client SHOULD generate an
If-None-Match header field containing a list of those entity tags
when making a GET request; this allows recipient servers to send a
 304 (Not Modified) response to indicate when one of those stored
responses matches the selected representation.

If-None-Match can also be used with a value of "*" to prevent an

unsafe request method (e.g., PUT) from inadvertently modifying an
existing representation of the target resource when the client
believes that the resource does not have a current representation
(Section 9.2.1). This is a variation on the "lost update" problem
that might arise if more than one client attempts to create an
initial representation for the target resource.

When an origin server receives a request that selects a

representation and that request includes an If-None-Match header
field, the origin server MUST evaluate the If-None-Match condition
per Section 13.2 prior to performing the method.

To evaluate a received If-None-Match header field:

1. If the field value is "*", the condition is false if the origin

server has a current representation for the target resource.

2. If the field value is a list of entity tags, the condition is

false if one of the listed tags matches the entity tag of the
selected representation.

3. Otherwise, the condition is true.

An origin server that evaluates an If-None-Match condition MUST NOT

perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false;
instead, the origin server MUST respond with either a) the 304 (Not
Modified) status code if the request method is GET or HEAD or b) the
412 (Precondition Failed) status code for all other request methods.

Requirements on cache handling of a received If-None-Match header

field are defined in Section 4.3.2 of [CACHING].

Note that an If-None-Match header field with a list value containing

"*" and other values (including other instances of "*") is
syntactically invalid (therefore not allowed to be generated) and
furthermore is unlikely to be interoperable.

13.1.3. If-Modified-Since

The "If-Modified-Since" header field makes a GET or HEAD request

method conditional on the selected representation's modification date
being more recent than the date provided in the field value.
Transfer of the selected representation's data is avoided if that
data has not changed.

If-Modified-Since = HTTP-date

An example of the field is:

If-Modified-Since: Sat, 29 Oct 1994 19:43:31 GMT

A recipient MUST ignore If-Modified-Since if the request contains an

If-None-Match header field; the condition in If-None-Match is
considered to be a more accurate replacement for the condition in If-
Modified-Since, and the two are only combined for the sake of
interoperating with older intermediaries that might not implement
If-None-Match.

A recipient MUST ignore the If-Modified-Since header field if the

received field value is not a valid HTTP-date, the field value has
more than one member, or if the request method is neither GET nor
HEAD.

A recipient MUST ignore the If-Modified-Since header field if the

resource does not have a modification date available.

A recipient MUST interpret an If-Modified-Since field value's

timestamp in terms of the origin server's clock.

If-Modified-Since is typically used for two distinct purposes: 1) to

allow efficient updates of a cached representation that does not have
an entity tag and 2) to limit the scope of a web traversal to
resources that have recently changed.

When used for cache updates, a cache will typically use the value of
the cached message's Last-Modified header field to generate the field
value of If-Modified-Since. This behavior is most interoperable for
cases where clocks are poorly synchronized or when the server has
chosen to only honor exact timestamp matches (due to a problem with
Last-Modified dates that appear to go "back in time" when the origin
server's clock is corrected or a representation is restored from an
archived backup). However, caches occasionally generate the field
value based on other data, such as the Date header field of the
cached message or the clock time at which the message was received,
particularly when the cached message does not contain a Last-Modified
header field.

When used for limiting the scope of retrieval to a recent time

window, a user agent will generate an If-Modified-Since field value
based on either its own clock or a Date header field received from
the server in a prior response. Origin servers that choose an exact
timestamp match based on the selected representation's Last-Modified
header field will not be able to help the user agent limit its data
transfers to only those changed during the specified window.

When an origin server receives a request that selects a

representation and that request includes an If-Modified-Since header
field without an If-None-Match header field, the origin server SHOULD
evaluate the If-Modified-Since condition per Section 13.2 prior to
performing the method.

To evaluate a received If-Modified-Since header field:

1. If the selected representation's last modification date is

earlier or equal to the date provided in the field value, the
condition is false.

2. Otherwise, the condition is true.

An origin server that evaluates an If-Modified-Since condition SHOULD

NOT perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false;
instead, the origin server SHOULD generate a 304 (Not Modified)
response, including only those metadata that are useful for
identifying or updating a previously cached response.
 Requirements on cache handling of a received If-Modified-Since header
field are defined in Section 4.3.2 of [CACHING].

13.1.4. If-Unmodified-Since

The "If-Unmodified-Since" header field makes the request method

conditional on the selected representation's last modification date
being earlier than or equal to the date provided in the field value.
This field accomplishes the same purpose as If-Match for cases where
the user agent does not have an entity tag for the representation.

If-Unmodified-Since = HTTP-date

An example of the field is:

If-Unmodified-Since: Sat, 29 Oct 1994 19:43:31 GMT

A recipient MUST ignore If-Unmodified-Since if the request contains

an If-Match header field; the condition in If-Match is considered to
be a more accurate replacement for the condition in If-Unmodified-
Since, and the two are only combined for the sake of interoperating
with older intermediaries that might not implement If-Match.

A recipient MUST ignore the If-Unmodified-Since header field if the

received field value is not a valid HTTP-date (including when the
field value appears to be a list of dates).

A recipient MUST ignore the If-Unmodified-Since header field if the

resource does not have a modification date available.

A recipient MUST interpret an If-Unmodified-Since field value's

timestamp in terms of the origin server's clock.

If-Unmodified-Since is most often used with state-changing methods

(e.g., POST, PUT, DELETE) to prevent accidental overwrites when
multiple user agents might be acting in parallel on a resource that
does not supply entity tags with its representations (i.e., to
prevent the "lost update" problem). In general, it can be used with
any method that involves the selection or modification of a
representation to abort the request if the selected representation's
last modification date has changed since the date provided in the If-
Unmodified-Since field value.

When an origin server receives a request that selects a

representation and that request includes an If-Unmodified-Since
header field without an If-Match header field, the origin server MUST
evaluate the If-Unmodified-Since condition per Section 13.2 prior to
performing the method.

To evaluate a received If-Unmodified-Since header field:

1. If the selected representation's last modification date is

earlier than or equal to the date provided in the field value,
the condition is true.

2. Otherwise, the condition is false.

An origin server that evaluates an If-Unmodified-Since condition MUST

 NOT perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false.
Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request
failed by responding with a 412 (Precondition Failed) status code.
Alternatively, if the request is a state-changing operation that
appears to have already been applied to the selected representation,
the origin server MAY respond with a 2xx (Successful) status code
(i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded,
but the user agent might not be aware of it, perhaps because the
prior response was lost or an equivalent change was made by some
other user agent).

Allowing an origin server to send a success response when a change

request appears to have already been applied is more efficient for
many authoring use cases, but comes with some risk if multiple user
agents are making change requests that are very similar but not
cooperative. In those cases, an origin server is better off being
stringent in sending 412 for every failed precondition on an unsafe
method.

A client MAY send an If-Unmodified-Since header field in a GET

request to indicate that it would prefer a 412 (Precondition Failed)
response if the selected representation has been modified. However,
this is only useful in range requests (Section 14) for completing a
previously received partial representation when there is no desire
for a new representation. If-Range (Section 13.1.5) is better suited
for range requests when the client prefers to receive a new
representation.

A cache or intermediary MAY ignore If-Unmodified-Since because its

interoperability features are only necessary for an origin server.

13.1.5. If-Range

The "If-Range" header field provides a special conditional request

mechanism that is similar to the If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since
header fields but that instructs the recipient to ignore the Range
header field if the validator doesn't match, resulting in transfer of
the new selected representation instead of a 412 (Precondition
Failed) response.

If a client has a partial copy of a representation and wishes to have

an up-to-date copy of the entire representation, it could use the
Range header field with a conditional GET (using either or both of
If-Unmodified-Since and If-Match.) However, if the precondition
fails because the representation has been modified, the client would
then have to make a second request to obtain the entire current
representation.

The "If-Range" header field allows a client to "short-circuit" the

second request. Informally, its meaning is as follows: if the
representation is unchanged, send me the part(s) that I am requesting
in Range; otherwise, send me the entire representation.

If-Range = entity-tag / HTTP-date

A valid entity-tag can be distinguished from a valid HTTP-date by

examining the first three characters for a DQUOTE.

A client MUST NOT generate an If-Range header field in a request that

 does not contain a Range header field. A server MUST ignore an If-
Range header field received in a request that does not contain a
Range header field. An origin server MUST ignore an If-Range header
field received in a request for a target resource that does not
support Range requests.

A client MUST NOT generate an If-Range header field containing an

entity tag that is marked as weak. A client MUST NOT generate an If-
Range header field containing an HTTP-date unless the client has no
entity tag for the corresponding representation and the date is a
strong validator in the sense defined by Section 8.8.2.2.

A server that receives an If-Range header field on a Range request

MUST evaluate the condition per Section 13.2 prior to performing the
method.

To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an HTTP-date:

1. If the HTTP-date validator provided is not a strong validator in

the sense defined by Section 8.8.2.2, the condition is false.

2. If the HTTP-date validator provided exactly matches the

Last-Modified field value for the selected representation, the
condition is true.

3. Otherwise, the condition is false.

To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an

entity-tag:

1. If the entity-tag validator provided exactly matches the ETag

field value for the selected representation using the strong
comparison function (Section 8.8.3.2), the condition is true.

2. Otherwise, the condition is false.

A recipient of an If-Range header field MUST ignore the Range header

field if the If-Range condition evaluates to false. Otherwise, the
recipient SHOULD process the Range header field as requested.

Note that the If-Range comparison is by exact match, including when

the validator is an HTTP-date, and so it differs from the "earlier
than or equal to" comparison used when evaluating an
If-Unmodified-Since conditional.

13.2. Evaluation of Preconditions

13.2.1. When to Evaluate

Except when excluded below, a recipient cache or origin server MUST

evaluate received request preconditions after it has successfully
performed its normal request checks and just before it would process
the request content (if any) or perform the action associated with
the request method. A server MUST ignore all received preconditions
if its response to the same request without those conditions, prior
to processing the request content, would have been a status code
other than a 2xx (Successful) or 412 (Precondition Failed). In other
words, redirects and failures that can be detected before significant
processing occurs take precedence over the evaluation of
 preconditions.

A server that is not the origin server for the target resource and
cannot act as a cache for requests on the target resource MUST NOT
evaluate the conditional request header fields defined by this
specification, and it MUST forward them if the request is forwarded,
since the generating client intends that they be evaluated by a
server that can provide a current representation. Likewise, a server
MUST ignore the conditional request header fields defined by this
specification when received with a request method that does not
involve the selection or modification of a selected representation,
such as CONNECT, OPTIONS, or TRACE.

Note that protocol extensions can modify the conditions under which
preconditions are evaluated or the consequences of their evaluation.
For example, the immutable cache directive (defined by [RFC8246])
instructs caches to forgo forwarding conditional requests when they
hold a fresh response.

Although conditional request header fields are defined as being

usable with the HEAD method (to keep HEAD's semantics consistent with
those of GET), there is no point in sending a conditional HEAD
because a successful response is around the same size as a 304 (Not
Modified) response and more useful than a 412 (Precondition Failed)
response.

13.2.2. Precedence of Preconditions

When more than one conditional request header field is present in a

request, the order in which the fields are evaluated becomes
important. In practice, the fields defined in this document are
consistently implemented in a single, logical order, since "lost
update" preconditions have more strict requirements than cache
validation, a validated cache is more efficient than a partial
response, and entity tags are presumed to be more accurate than date
validators.

A recipient cache or origin server MUST evaluate the request

preconditions defined by this specification in the following order:

1. When recipient is the origin server and If-Match is present,

evaluate the If-Match precondition:

* if true, continue to step 3

* if false, respond 412 (Precondition Failed) unless it can be

determined that the state-changing request has already
succeeded (see Section 13.1.1)

2. When recipient is the origin server, If-Match is not present, and

If-Unmodified-Since is present, evaluate the If-Unmodified-Since
precondition:

* if true, continue to step 3

* if false, respond 412 (Precondition Failed) unless it can be

determined that the state-changing request has already
succeeded (see Section 13.1.4)
 3. When If-None-Match is present, evaluate the If-None-Match
precondition:

* if true, continue to step 5

* if false for GET/HEAD, respond 304 (Not Modified)

* if false for other methods, respond 412 (Precondition Failed)

4. When the method is GET or HEAD, If-None-Match is not present, and

If-Modified-Since is present, evaluate the If-Modified-Since
precondition:

* if true, continue to step 5

* if false, respond 304 (Not Modified)

5. When the method is GET and both Range and If-Range are present,
evaluate the If-Range precondition:

* if true and the Range is applicable to the selected

representation, respond 206 (Partial Content)

* otherwise, ignore the Range header field and respond 200 (OK)

6. Otherwise,

* perform the requested method and respond according to its

success or failure.

Any extension to HTTP that defines additional conditional request

header fields ought to define the order for evaluating such fields in
relation to those defined in this document and other conditionals
that might be found in practice.

14. Range Requests

Clients often encounter interrupted data transfers as a result of

canceled requests or dropped connections. When a client has stored a
partial representation, it is desirable to request the remainder of
that representation in a subsequent request rather than transfer the
entire representation. Likewise, devices with limited local storage
might benefit from being able to request only a subset of a larger
representation, such as a single page of a very large document, or
the dimensions of an embedded image.

Range requests are an OPTIONAL feature of HTTP, designed so that

recipients not implementing this feature (or not supporting it for
the target resource) can respond as if it is a normal GET request
without impacting interoperability. Partial responses are indicated
by a distinct status code to not be mistaken for full responses by
caches that might not implement the feature.

14.1. Range Units

Representation data can be partitioned into subranges when there are

addressable structural units inherent to that data's content coding
or media type. For example, octet (a.k.a. byte) boundaries are a
structural unit common to all representation data, allowing
 partitions of the data to be identified as a range of bytes at some
offset from the start or end of that data.

This general notion of a "range unit" is used in the Accept-Ranges

(Section 14.3) response header field to advertise support for range
requests, the Range (Section 14.2) request header field to delineate
the parts of a representation that are requested, and the
Content-Range (Section 14.4) header field to describe which part of a
representation is being transferred.

range-unit = token

All range unit names are case-insensitive and ought to be registered

within the "HTTP Range Unit Registry", as defined in Section 16.5.1.

Range units are intended to be extensible, as described in

Section 16.5.

14.1.1. Range Specifiers

Ranges are expressed in terms of a range unit paired with a set of

range specifiers. The range unit name determines what kinds of
range-spec are applicable to its own specifiers. Hence, the
following grammar is generic: each range unit is expected to specify
requirements on when int-range, suffix-range, and other-range are
allowed.

A range request can specify a single range or a set of ranges within

a single representation.

ranges-specifier = range-unit "=" range-set

range-set = 1#range-spec
range-spec = int-range
/ suffix-range
/ other-range

An int-range is a range expressed as two non-negative integers or as

one non-negative integer through to the end of the representation
data. The range unit specifies what the integers mean (e.g., they
might indicate unit offsets from the beginning, inclusive numbered
parts, etc.).

int-range = first-pos "-" [ last-pos ]

first-pos = 1*DIGIT
last-pos = 1*DIGIT

An int-range is invalid if the last-pos value is present and less

than the first-pos.

A suffix-range is a range expressed as a suffix of the representation

data with the provided non-negative integer maximum length (in range
units). In other words, the last N units of the representation data.

suffix-range = "-" suffix-length

suffix-length = 1*DIGIT

To provide for extensibility, the other-range rule is a mostly

unconstrained grammar that allows application-specific or future
range units to define additional range specifiers.
 other-range = 1*( %x21-2B / %x2D-7E )
; 1*(VCHAR excluding comma)

A ranges-specifier is invalid if it contains any range-spec that is

invalid or undefined for the indicated range-unit.

A valid ranges-specifier is "satisfiable" if it contains at least one

range-spec that is satisfiable, as defined by the indicated
range-unit. Otherwise, the ranges-specifier is "unsatisfiable".

14.1.2. Byte Ranges

The "bytes" range unit is used to express subranges of a

representation data's octet sequence. Each byte range is expressed
as an integer range at some offset, relative to either the beginning
(int-range) or end (suffix-range) of the representation data. Byte
ranges do not use the other-range specifier.

The first-pos value in a bytes int-range gives the offset of the

first byte in a range. The last-pos value gives the offset of the
last byte in the range; that is, the byte positions specified are
inclusive. Byte offsets start at zero.

If the representation data has a content coding applied, each byte

range is calculated with respect to the encoded sequence of bytes,
not the sequence of underlying bytes that would be obtained after
decoding.

Examples of bytes range specifiers:

* The first 500 bytes (byte offsets 0-499, inclusive):

bytes=0-499

* The second 500 bytes (byte offsets 500-999, inclusive):

bytes=500-999

A client can limit the number of bytes requested without knowing the
size of the selected representation. If the last-pos value is
absent, or if the value is greater than or equal to the current
length of the representation data, the byte range is interpreted as
the remainder of the representation (i.e., the server replaces the
value of last-pos with a value that is one less than the current
length of the selected representation).

A client can refer to the last N bytes (N > 0) of the selected

representation using a suffix-range. If the selected representation
is shorter than the specified suffix-length, the entire
representation is used.

Additional examples, assuming a representation of length 10000:

* The final 500 bytes (byte offsets 9500-9999, inclusive):

bytes=-500

Or:
 bytes=9500-

* The first and last bytes only (bytes 0 and 9999):

bytes=0-0,-1

* The first, middle, and last 1000 bytes:

bytes= 0-999, 4500-5499, -1000

* Other valid (but not canonical) specifications of the second 500

bytes (byte offsets 500-999, inclusive):

bytes=500-600,601-999
bytes=500-700,601-999

For a GET request, a valid bytes range-spec is satisfiable if it is

either:

* an int-range with a first-pos that is less than the current length

of the selected representation or

* a suffix-range with a non-zero suffix-length.

When a selected representation has zero length, the only satisfiable

form of range-spec in a GET request is a suffix-range with a non-zero
suffix-length.

In the byte-range syntax, first-pos, last-pos, and suffix-length are

expressed as decimal number of octets. Since there is no predefined
limit to the length of content, recipients MUST anticipate
potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to
integer conversion overflows.

14.2. Range

The "Range" header field on a GET request modifies the method

semantics to request transfer of only one or more subranges of the
selected representation data (Section 8.1), rather than the entire
selected representation.

Range = ranges-specifier

A server MAY ignore the Range header field. However, origin servers
and intermediate caches ought to support byte ranges when possible,
since they support efficient recovery from partially failed transfers
and partial retrieval of large representations.

A server MUST ignore a Range header field received with a request

method that is unrecognized or for which range handling is not
defined. For this specification, GET is the only method for which
range handling is defined.

An origin server MUST ignore a Range header field that contains a

range unit it does not understand. A proxy MAY discard a Range
header field that contains a range unit it does not understand.

A server that supports range requests MAY ignore or reject a Range

 header field that contains an invalid ranges-specifier
(Section 14.1.1), a ranges-specifier with more than two overlapping
ranges, or a set of many small ranges that are not listed in
ascending order, since these are indications of either a broken
client or a deliberate denial-of-service attack (Section 17.15). A
client SHOULD NOT request multiple ranges that are inherently less
efficient to process and transfer than a single range that
encompasses the same data.

A server that supports range requests MAY ignore a Range header field
when the selected representation has no content (i.e., the selected
representation's data is of zero length).

A client that is requesting multiple ranges SHOULD list those ranges

in ascending order (the order in which they would typically be
received in a complete representation) unless there is a specific
need to request a later part earlier. For example, a user agent
processing a large representation with an internal catalog of parts
might need to request later parts first, particularly if the
representation consists of pages stored in reverse order and the user
agent wishes to transfer one page at a time.

The Range header field is evaluated after evaluating the precondition

header fields defined in Section 13.1, and only if the result in
absence of the Range header field would be a 200 (OK) response. In
other words, Range is ignored when a conditional GET would result in
a 304 (Not Modified) response.

The If-Range header field (Section 13.1.5) can be used as a

precondition to applying the Range header field.

If all of the preconditions are true, the server supports the Range
header field for the target resource, the received Range field-value
contains a valid ranges-specifier with a range-unit supported for
that target resource, and that ranges-specifier is satisfiable with
respect to the selected representation, the server SHOULD send a 206
(Partial Content) response with content containing one or more
partial representations that correspond to the satisfiable
range-spec(s) requested.

The above does not imply that a server will send all requested
ranges. In some cases, it may only be possible (or efficient) to
send a portion of the requested ranges first, while expecting the
client to re-request the remaining portions later if they are still
desired (see Section 15.3.7).

If all of the preconditions are true, the server supports the Range
header field for the target resource, the received Range field-value
contains a valid ranges-specifier, and either the range-unit is not
supported for that target resource or the ranges-specifier is
unsatisfiable with respect to the selected representation, the server
SHOULD send a 416 (Range Not Satisfiable) response.

14.3. Accept-Ranges

The "Accept-Ranges" field in a response indicates whether an upstream

server supports range requests for the target resource.

Accept-Ranges = acceptable-ranges
 acceptable-ranges = 1#range-unit

For example, a server that supports byte-range requests

(Section 14.1.2) can send the field

Accept-Ranges: bytes

to indicate that it supports byte range requests for that target

resource, thereby encouraging its use by the client for future
partial requests on the same request path. Range units are defined
in Section 14.1.

A client MAY generate range requests regardless of having received an

Accept-Ranges field. The information only provides advice for the
sake of improving performance and reducing unnecessary network
transfers.

Conversely, a client MUST NOT assume that receiving an Accept-Ranges

field means that future range requests will return partial responses.
The content might change, the server might only support range
requests at certain times or under certain conditions, or a different
intermediary might process the next request.

A server that does not support any kind of range request for the
target resource MAY send

Accept-Ranges: none

to advise the client not to attempt a range request on the same

request path. The range unit "none" is reserved for this purpose.

The Accept-Ranges field MAY be sent in a trailer section, but is

preferred to be sent as a header field because the information is
particularly useful for restarting large information transfers that
have failed in mid-content (before the trailer section is received).

14.4. Content-Range

The "Content-Range" header field is sent in a single part 206

(Partial Content) response to indicate the partial range of the
selected representation enclosed as the message content, sent in each
part of a multipart 206 response to indicate the range enclosed
within each body part (Section 14.6), and sent in 416 (Range Not
Satisfiable) responses to provide information about the selected
representation.

Content-Range = range-unit SP
( range-resp / unsatisfied-range )

range-resp = incl-range "/" ( complete-length / "*" )

incl-range = first-pos "-" last-pos
unsatisfied-range = "*/" complete-length

complete-length = 1*DIGIT

If a 206 (Partial Content) response contains a Content-Range header

field with a range unit (Section 14.1) that the recipient does not
understand, the recipient MUST NOT attempt to recombine it with a
stored representation. A proxy that receives such a message SHOULD
forward it downstream.

Content-Range might also be sent as a request modifier to request a

partial PUT, as described in Section 14.5, based on private
agreements between client and origin server. A server MUST ignore a
Content-Range header field received in a request with a method for
which Content-Range support is not defined.

For byte ranges, a sender SHOULD indicate the complete length of the
representation from which the range has been extracted, unless the
complete length is unknown or difficult to determine. An asterisk
character ("*") in place of the complete-length indicates that the
representation length was unknown when the header field was
generated.

The following example illustrates when the complete length of the

selected representation is known by the sender to be 1234 bytes:

Content-Range: bytes 42-1233/1234

and this second example illustrates when the complete length is

unknown:

Content-Range: bytes 42-1233/*

A Content-Range field value is invalid if it contains a range-resp

that has a last-pos value less than its first-pos value, or a
complete-length value less than or equal to its last-pos value. The
recipient of an invalid Content-Range MUST NOT attempt to recombine
the received content with a stored representation.

A server generating a 416 (Range Not Satisfiable) response to a byte-

range request SHOULD send a Content-Range header field with an
unsatisfied-range value, as in the following example:

Content-Range: bytes */1234

The complete-length in a 416 response indicates the current length of

the selected representation.

The Content-Range header field has no meaning for status codes that
do not explicitly describe its semantic. For this specification,
only the 206 (Partial Content) and 416 (Range Not Satisfiable) status
codes describe a meaning for Content-Range.

The following are examples of Content-Range values in which the

selected representation contains a total of 1234 bytes:

* The first 500 bytes:

Content-Range: bytes 0-499/1234

* The second 500 bytes:

Content-Range: bytes 500-999/1234

* All except for the first 500 bytes:

Content-Range: bytes 500-1233/1234

 * The last 500 bytes:

Content-Range: bytes 734-1233/1234

14.5. Partial PUT

Some origin servers support PUT of a partial representation when the

user agent sends a Content-Range header field (Section 14.4) in the
request, though such support is inconsistent and depends on private
agreements with user agents. In general, it requests that the state
of the target resource be partly replaced with the enclosed content
at an offset and length indicated by the Content-Range value, where
the offset is relative to the current selected representation.

An origin server SHOULD respond with a 400 (Bad Request) status code
if it receives Content-Range on a PUT for a target resource that does
not support partial PUT requests.

Partial PUT is not backwards compatible with the original definition

of PUT. It may result in the content being written as a complete
replacement for the current representation.

Partial resource updates are also possible by targeting a separately

identified resource with state that overlaps or extends a portion of
the larger resource, or by using a different method that has been
specifically defined for partial updates (for example, the PATCH
method defined in [RFC5789]).

14.6. Media Type multipart/byteranges

When a 206 (Partial Content) response message includes the content of

multiple ranges, they are transmitted as body parts in a multipart
message body ([RFC2046], Section 5.1) with the media type of
"multipart/byteranges".

The "multipart/byteranges" media type includes one or more body

parts, each with its own Content-Type and Content-Range fields. The
required boundary parameter specifies the boundary string used to
separate each body part.

Implementation Notes:

1. Additional CRLFs might precede the first boundary string in the

body.

2. Although [RFC2046] permits the boundary string to be quoted, some

existing implementations handle a quoted boundary string
incorrectly.

3. A number of clients and servers were coded to an early draft of

the byteranges specification that used a media type of
"multipart/x-byteranges", which is almost (but not quite)
compatible with this type.

Despite the name, the "multipart/byteranges" media type is not

limited to byte ranges. The following example uses an "exampleunit"
range unit:
HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Tue, 14 July 04:58:08 GMT
Content-Length: 2331785
Content-Type: multipart/byteranges; boundary=THIS_STRING_SEPARATES

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: video/example
Content-Range: exampleunit 1.2-4.3/25

...the first range...

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: video/example
Content-Range: exampleunit 11.2-14.3/25

...the second range

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES--

The following information serves as the registration form for the

"multipart/byteranges" media type.

Type name: multipart

Subtype name: byteranges

Required parameters: boundary

Optional parameters: N/A

Encoding considerations: only "7bit", "8bit", or "binary" are

permitted

Security considerations: see Section 17

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: RFC 9110 (see Section 14.6)

Applications that use this media type: HTTP components supporting

multiple ranges in a single request

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information: Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

Magic number(s): N/A

File extension(s): N/A

Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person and email address to contact for further information: See Aut
hors' Addresses section.

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: See Authors' Addresses section.

 Change controller: IESG

15. Status Codes

The status code of a response is a three-digit integer code that

describes the result of the request and the semantics of the
response, including whether the request was successful and what
content is enclosed (if any). All valid status codes are within the
range of 100 to 599, inclusive.

The first digit of the status code defines the class of response.
The last two digits do not have any categorization role. There are
five values for the first digit:

* 1xx (Informational): The request was received, continuing process

* 2xx (Successful): The request was successfully received,

understood, and accepted

* 3xx (Redirection): Further action needs to be taken in order to

complete the request

* 4xx (Client Error): The request contains bad syntax or cannot be

fulfilled

* 5xx (Server Error): The server failed to fulfill an apparently

valid request

HTTP status codes are extensible. A client is not required to

understand the meaning of all registered status codes, though such
understanding is obviously desirable. However, a client MUST
understand the class of any status code, as indicated by the first
digit, and treat an unrecognized status code as being equivalent to
the x00 status code of that class.

For example, if a client receives an unrecognized status code of 471,

it can see from the first digit that there was something wrong with
its request and treat the response as if it had received a 400 (Bad
Request) status code. The response message will usually contain a
representation that explains the status.

Values outside the range 100..599 are invalid. Implementations often

use three-digit integer values outside of that range (i.e., 600..999)
for internal communication of non-HTTP status (e.g., library errors).
A client that receives a response with an invalid status code SHOULD
process the response as if it had a 5xx (Server Error) status code.

A single request can have multiple associated responses: zero or more

"interim" (non-final) responses with status codes in the
"informational" (1xx) range, followed by exactly one "final" response
with a status code in one of the other ranges.

15.1. Overview of Status Codes

The status codes listed below are defined in this specification. The
reason phrases listed here are only recommendations -- they can be
replaced by local equivalents or left out altogether without
affecting the protocol.
 Responses with status codes that are defined as heuristically
cacheable (e.g., 200, 203, 204, 206, 300, 301, 308, 404, 405, 410,
414, and 501 in this specification) can be reused by a cache with
heuristic expiration unless otherwise indicated by the method
definition or explicit cache controls [CACHING]; all other status
codes are not heuristically cacheable.

Additional status codes, outside the scope of this specification,

have been specified for use in HTTP. All such status codes ought to
be registered within the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status
Code Registry", as described in Section 16.2.

15.2. Informational 1xx

The 1xx (Informational) class of status code indicates an interim

response for communicating connection status or request progress
prior to completing the requested action and sending a final
response. Since HTTP/1.0 did not define any 1xx status codes, a
server MUST NOT send a 1xx response to an HTTP/1.0 client.

A 1xx response is terminated by the end of the header section; it

cannot contain content or trailers.

A client MUST be able to parse one or more 1xx responses received

prior to a final response, even if the client does not expect one. A
user agent MAY ignore unexpected 1xx responses.

A proxy MUST forward 1xx responses unless the proxy itself requested
the generation of the 1xx response. For example, if a proxy adds an
"Expect: 100-continue" header field when it forwards a request, then
it need not forward the corresponding 100 (Continue) response(s).

15.2.1. 100 Continue

The 100 (Continue) status code indicates that the initial part of a
request has been received and has not yet been rejected by the
server. The server intends to send a final response after the
request has been fully received and acted upon.

When the request contains an Expect header field that includes a

100-continue expectation, the 100 response indicates that the server
wishes to receive the request content, as described in
Section 10.1.1. The client ought to continue sending the request and
discard the 100 response.

If the request did not contain an Expect header field containing the
100-continue expectation, the client can simply discard this interim
response.

15.2.2. 101 Switching Protocols

The 101 (Switching Protocols) status code indicates that the server
understands and is willing to comply with the client's request, via
the Upgrade header field (Section 7.8), for a change in the
application protocol being used on this connection. The server MUST
generate an Upgrade header field in the response that indicates which
protocol(s) will be in effect after this response.
 It is assumed that the server will only agree to switch protocols
when it is advantageous to do so. For example, switching to a newer
version of HTTP might be advantageous over older versions, and
switching to a real-time, synchronous protocol might be advantageous
when delivering resources that use such features.

15.3. Successful 2xx

The 2xx (Successful) class of status code indicates that the client's
request was successfully received, understood, and accepted.

15.3.1. 200 OK

The 200 (OK) status code indicates that the request has succeeded.
The content sent in a 200 response depends on the request method.
For the methods defined by this specification, the intended meaning
of the content can be summarized as:

+================+============================================+
| Request Method | Response content is a representation of: |
+================+============================================+
| GET | the target resource |
+----------------+--------------------------------------------+
| HEAD | the target resource, like GET, but without |
| | transferring the representation data |
+----------------+--------------------------------------------+
| POST | the status of, or results obtained from, |
| | the action |
+----------------+--------------------------------------------+
| PUT, DELETE | the status of the action |
+----------------+--------------------------------------------+
| OPTIONS | communication options for the target |
| | resource |
+----------------+--------------------------------------------+
| TRACE | the request message as received by the |
| | server returning the trace |
+----------------+--------------------------------------------+

Table 6

Aside from responses to CONNECT, a 200 response is expected to

contain message content unless the message framing explicitly
indicates that the content has zero length. If some aspect of the
request indicates a preference for no content upon success, the
origin server ought to send a 204 (No Content) response instead. For
CONNECT, there is no content because the successful result is a
tunnel, which begins immediately after the 200 response header
section.

A 200 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

In 200 responses to GET or HEAD, an origin server SHOULD send any

available validator fields (Section 8.8) for the selected
representation, with both a strong entity tag and a Last-Modified
date being preferred.

In 200 responses to state-changing methods, any validator fields

 (Section 8.8) sent in the response convey the current validators for
the new representation formed as a result of successfully applying
the request semantics. Note that the PUT method (Section 9.3.4) has
additional requirements that might preclude sending such validators.

15.3.2. 201 Created

The 201 (Created) status code indicates that the request has been
fulfilled and has resulted in one or more new resources being
created. The primary resource created by the request is identified
by either a Location header field in the response or, if no Location
header field is received, by the target URI.

The 201 response content typically describes and links to the

resource(s) created. Any validator fields (Section 8.8) sent in the
response convey the current validators for a new representation
created by the request. Note that the PUT method (Section 9.3.4) has
additional requirements that might preclude sending such validators.

15.3.3. 202 Accepted

The 202 (Accepted) status code indicates that the request has been
accepted for processing, but the processing has not been completed.
The request might or might not eventually be acted upon, as it might
be disallowed when processing actually takes place. There is no
facility in HTTP for re-sending a status code from an asynchronous
operation.

The 202 response is intentionally noncommittal. Its purpose is to

allow a server to accept a request for some other process (perhaps a
batch-oriented process that is only run once per day) without
requiring that the user agent's connection to the server persist
until the process is completed. The representation sent with this
response ought to describe the request's current status and point to
(or embed) a status monitor that can provide the user with an
estimate of when the request will be fulfilled.

15.3.4. 203 Non-Authoritative Information

The 203 (Non-Authoritative Information) status code indicates that

the request was successful but the enclosed content has been modified
from that of the origin server's 200 (OK) response by a transforming
proxy (Section 7.7). This status code allows the proxy to notify
recipients when a transformation has been applied, since that
knowledge might impact later decisions regarding the content. For
example, future cache validation requests for the content might only
be applicable along the same request path (through the same proxies).

A 203 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

15.3.5. 204 No Content

The 204 (No Content) status code indicates that the server has
successfully fulfilled the request and that there is no additional
content to send in the response content. Metadata in the response
header fields refer to the target resource and its selected
representation after the requested action was applied.
 For example, if a 204 status code is received in response to a PUT
request and the response contains an ETag field, then the PUT was
successful and the ETag field value contains the entity tag for the
new representation of that target resource.

The 204 response allows a server to indicate that the action has been
successfully applied to the target resource, while implying that the
user agent does not need to traverse away from its current "document
view" (if any). The server assumes that the user agent will provide
some indication of the success to its user, in accord with its own
interface, and apply any new or updated metadata in the response to
its active representation.

For example, a 204 status code is commonly used with document editing
interfaces corresponding to a "save" action, such that the document
being saved remains available to the user for editing. It is also
frequently used with interfaces that expect automated data transfers
to be prevalent, such as within distributed version control systems.

A 204 response is terminated by the end of the header section; it

cannot contain content or trailers.

A 204 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

15.3.6. 205 Reset Content

The 205 (Reset Content) status code indicates that the server has
fulfilled the request and desires that the user agent reset the
"document view", which caused the request to be sent, to its original
state as received from the origin server.

This response is intended to support a common data entry use case

where the user receives content that supports data entry (a form,
notepad, canvas, etc.), enters or manipulates data in that space,
causes the entered data to be submitted in a request, and then the
data entry mechanism is reset for the next entry so that the user can
easily initiate another input action.

Since the 205 status code implies that no additional content will be
provided, a server MUST NOT generate content in a 205 response.

15.3.7. 206 Partial Content

The 206 (Partial Content) status code indicates that the server is
successfully fulfilling a range request for the target resource by
transferring one or more parts of the selected representation.

A server that supports range requests (Section 14) will usually

attempt to satisfy all of the requested ranges, since sending less
data will likely result in another client request for the remainder.
However, a server might want to send only a subset of the data
requested for reasons of its own, such as temporary unavailability,
cache efficiency, load balancing, etc. Since a 206 response is self-
descriptive, the client can still understand a response that only
partially satisfies its range request.
 A client MUST inspect a 206 response's Content-Type and Content-Range
field(s) to determine what parts are enclosed and whether additional
requests are needed.

A server that generates a 206 response MUST generate the following

header fields, in addition to those required in the subsections
below, if the field would have been sent in a 200 (OK) response to
the same request: Date, Cache-Control, ETag, Expires,
Content-Location, and Vary.

A Content-Length header field present in a 206 response indicates the

number of octets in the content of this message, which is usually not
the complete length of the selected representation. Each
Content-Range header field includes information about the selected
representation's complete length.

A sender that generates a 206 response to a request with an If-Range

header field SHOULD NOT generate other representation header fields
beyond those required because the client already has a prior response
containing those header fields. Otherwise, a sender MUST generate
all of the representation header fields that would have been sent in
a 200 (OK) response to the same request.

A 206 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of
[CACHING]).

15.3.7.1. Single Part

If a single part is being transferred, the server generating the 206

response MUST generate a Content-Range header field, describing what
range of the selected representation is enclosed, and a content
consisting of the range. For example:

HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content

Date: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 04:58:08 GMT
Content-Range: bytes 21010-47021/47022
Content-Length: 26012
Content-Type: image/gif

... 26012 bytes of partial image data ...

15.3.7.2. Multiple Parts

If multiple parts are being transferred, the server generating the

206 response MUST generate "multipart/byteranges" content, as defined
in Section 14.6, and a Content-Type header field containing the
"multipart/byteranges" media type and its required boundary
parameter. To avoid confusion with single-part responses, a server
MUST NOT generate a Content-Range header field in the HTTP header
section of a multiple part response (this field will be sent in each
part instead).

Within the header area of each body part in the multipart content,
the server MUST generate a Content-Range header field corresponding
to the range being enclosed in that body part. If the selected
representation would have had a Content-Type header field in a 200
(OK) response, the server SHOULD generate that same Content-Type
 header field in the header area of each body part. For example:

HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content

Date: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 04:58:08 GMT
Content-Length: 1741
Content-Type: multipart/byteranges; boundary=THIS_STRING_SEPARATES

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: application/pdf
Content-Range: bytes 500-999/8000

...the first range...

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: application/pdf
Content-Range: bytes 7000-7999/8000

...the second range

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES--

When multiple ranges are requested, a server MAY coalesce any of the
ranges that overlap, or that are separated by a gap that is smaller
than the overhead of sending multiple parts, regardless of the order
in which the corresponding range-spec appeared in the received Range
header field. Since the typical overhead between each part of a
"multipart/byteranges" is around 80 bytes, depending on the selected
representation's media type and the chosen boundary parameter length,
it can be less efficient to transfer many small disjoint parts than
it is to transfer the entire selected representation.

A server MUST NOT generate a multipart response to a request for a

single range, since a client that does not request multiple parts
might not support multipart responses. However, a server MAY
generate a "multipart/byteranges" response with only a single body
part if multiple ranges were requested and only one range was found
to be satisfiable or only one range remained after coalescing. A
client that cannot process a "multipart/byteranges" response MUST NOT
generate a request that asks for multiple ranges.

A server that generates a multipart response SHOULD send the parts in

the same order that the corresponding range-spec appeared in the
received Range header field, excluding those ranges that were deemed
unsatisfiable or that were coalesced into other ranges. A client
that receives a multipart response MUST inspect the Content-Range
header field present in each body part in order to determine which
range is contained in that body part; a client cannot rely on
receiving the same ranges that it requested, nor the same order that
it requested.

15.3.7.3. Combining Parts

A response might transfer only a subrange of a representation if the

connection closed prematurely or if the request used one or more
Range specifications. After several such transfers, a client might
have received several ranges of the same representation. These
ranges can only be safely combined if they all have in common the
same strong validator (Section 8.8.1).

A client that has received multiple partial responses to GET requests

 on a target resource MAY combine those responses into a larger
continuous range if they share the same strong validator.

If the most recent response is an incomplete 200 (OK) response, then

the header fields of that response are used for any combined response
and replace those of the matching stored responses.

If the most recent response is a 206 (Partial Content) response and

at least one of the matching stored responses is a 200 (OK), then the
combined response header fields consist of the most recent 200
response's header fields. If all of the matching stored responses
are 206 responses, then the stored response with the most recent
header fields is used as the source of header fields for the combined
response, except that the client MUST use other header fields
provided in the new response, aside from Content-Range, to replace
all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored
response.

The combined response content consists of the union of partial

content ranges within the new response and all of the matching stored
responses. If the union consists of the entire range of the
representation, then the client MUST process the combined response as
if it were a complete 200 (OK) response, including a Content-Length
header field that reflects the complete length. Otherwise, the
client MUST process the set of continuous ranges as one of the
following: an incomplete 200 (OK) response if the combined response
is a prefix of the representation, a single 206 (Partial Content)
response containing "multipart/byteranges" content, or multiple 206
(Partial Content) responses, each with one continuous range that is
indicated by a Content-Range header field.

15.4. Redirection 3xx

The 3xx (Redirection) class of status code indicates that further

action needs to be taken by the user agent in order to fulfill the
request. There are several types of redirects:

1. Redirects that indicate this resource might be available at a

different URI, as provided by the Location header field, as in
the status codes 301 (Moved Permanently), 302 (Found), 307
(Temporary Redirect), and 308 (Permanent Redirect).

2. Redirection that offers a choice among matching resources capable

of representing this resource, as in the 300 (Multiple Choices)
status code.

3. Redirection to a different resource, identified by the Location

header field, that can represent an indirect response to the
request, as in the 303 (See Other) status code.

4. Redirection to a previously stored result, as in the 304 (Not

Modified) status code.

| *Note:* In HTTP/1.0, the status codes 301 (Moved Permanently)

| and 302 (Found) were originally defined as method-preserving
| ([HTTP/1.0], Section 9.3) to match their implementation at
| CERN; 303 (See Other) was defined for a redirection that
| changed its method to GET. However, early user agents split on
| whether to redirect POST requests as POST (according to then-
 | current specification) or as GET (the safer alternative when
| redirected to a different site). Prevailing practice
| eventually converged on changing the method to GET. 307
| (Temporary Redirect) and 308 (Permanent Redirect) [RFC7538]
| were later added to unambiguously indicate method-preserving
| redirects, and status codes 301 and 302 have been adjusted to
| allow a POST request to be redirected as GET.

If a Location header field (Section 10.2.2) is provided, the user

agent MAY automatically redirect its request to the URI referenced by
the Location field value, even if the specific status code is not
understood. Automatic redirection needs to be done with care for
methods not known to be safe, as defined in Section 9.2.1, since the
user might not wish to redirect an unsafe request.

When automatically following a redirected request, the user agent

SHOULD resend the original request message with the following
modifications:

1. Replace the target URI with the URI referenced by the redirection
response's Location header field value after resolving it
relative to the original request's target URI.

2. Remove header fields that were automatically generated by the

implementation, replacing them with updated values as appropriate
to the new request. This includes:

1. Connection-specific header fields (see Section 7.6.1),

2. Header fields specific to the client's proxy configuration,

including (but not limited to) Proxy-Authorization,

3. Origin-specific header fields (if any), including (but not

limited to) Host,

4. Validating header fields that were added by the

implementation's cache (e.g., If-None-Match,
If-Modified-Since), and

5. Resource-specific header fields, including (but not limited

to) Referer, Origin, Authorization, and Cookie.

3. Consider removing header fields that were not automatically

generated by the implementation (i.e., those present in the
request because they were added by the calling context) where
there are security implications; this includes but is not limited
to Authorization and Cookie.

4. Change the request method according to the redirecting status

code's semantics, if applicable.

5. If the request method has been changed to GET or HEAD, remove

content-specific header fields, including (but not limited to)
Content-Encoding, Content-Language, Content-Location,
Content-Type, Content-Length, Digest, Last-Modified.

A client SHOULD detect and intervene in cyclical redirections (i.e.,

"infinite" redirection loops).
 | *Note:* An earlier version of this specification recommended a
| maximum of five redirections ([RFC2068], Section 10.3).
| Content developers need to be aware that some clients might
| implement such a fixed limitation.

15.4.1. 300 Multiple Choices

The 300 (Multiple Choices) status code indicates that the target
resource has more than one representation, each with its own more
specific identifier, and information about the alternatives is being
provided so that the user (or user agent) can select a preferred
representation by redirecting its request to one or more of those
identifiers. In other words, the server desires that the user agent
engage in reactive negotiation to select the most appropriate
representation(s) for its needs (Section 12).

If the server has a preferred choice, the server SHOULD generate a

Location header field containing a preferred choice's URI reference.
The user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic
redirection.

For request methods other than HEAD, the server SHOULD generate
content in the 300 response containing a list of representation
metadata and URI reference(s) from which the user or user agent can
choose the one most preferred. The user agent MAY make a selection
from that list automatically if it understands the provided media
type. A specific format for automatic selection is not defined by
this specification because HTTP tries to remain orthogonal to the
definition of its content. In practice, the representation is
provided in some easily parsed format believed to be acceptable to
the user agent, as determined by shared design or content
negotiation, or in some commonly accepted hypertext format.

A 300 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

| *Note:* The original proposal for the 300 status code defined
| the URI header field as providing a list of alternative
| representations, such that it would be usable for 200, 300, and
| 406 responses and be transferred in responses to the HEAD
| method. However, lack of deployment and disagreement over
| syntax led to both URI and Alternates (a subsequent proposal)
| being dropped from this specification. It is possible to
| communicate the list as a Link header field value [RFC8288]
| whose members have a relationship of "alternate", though
| deployment is a chicken-and-egg problem.

15.4.2. 301 Moved Permanently

The 301 (Moved Permanently) status code indicates that the target
resource has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future
references to this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs.
The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing
capability can permanently replace references to the target URI with
one of the new references sent by the server. However, this
suggestion is usually ignored unless the user agent is actively
editing references (e.g., engaged in authoring content), the
connection is secured, and the origin server is a trusted authority
 for the content being edited.

The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the response

containing a preferred URI reference for the new permanent URI. The
user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic
redirection. The server's response content usually contains a short
hypertext note with a hyperlink to the new URI(s).

| *Note:* For historical reasons, a user agent MAY change the

| request method from POST to GET for the subsequent request. If
| this behavior is undesired, the 308 (Permanent Redirect) status
| code can be used instead.

A 301 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

15.4.3. 302 Found

The 302 (Found) status code indicates that the target resource
resides temporarily under a different URI. Since the redirection
might be altered on occasion, the client ought to continue to use the
target URI for future requests.

The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the response

containing a URI reference for the different URI. The user agent MAY
use the Location field value for automatic redirection. The server's
response content usually contains a short hypertext note with a
hyperlink to the different URI(s).

| *Note:* For historical reasons, a user agent MAY change the

| request method from POST to GET for the subsequent request. If
| this behavior is undesired, the 307 (Temporary Redirect) status
| code can be used instead.

15.4.4. 303 See Other

The 303 (See Other) status code indicates that the server is
redirecting the user agent to a different resource, as indicated by a
URI in the Location header field, which is intended to provide an
indirect response to the original request. A user agent can perform
a retrieval request targeting that URI (a GET or HEAD request if
using HTTP), which might also be redirected, and present the eventual
result as an answer to the original request. Note that the new URI
in the Location header field is not considered equivalent to the
target URI.

This status code is applicable to any HTTP method. It is primarily

used to allow the output of a POST action to redirect the user agent
to a different resource, since doing so provides the information
corresponding to the POST response as a resource that can be
separately identified, bookmarked, and cached.

A 303 response to a GET request indicates that the origin server does
not have a representation of the target resource that can be
transferred by the server over HTTP. However, the Location field
value refers to a resource that is descriptive of the target
resource, such that making a retrieval request on that other resource
might result in a representation that is useful to recipients without
 implying that it represents the original target resource. Note that
answers to the questions of what can be represented, what
representations are adequate, and what might be a useful description
are outside the scope of HTTP.

Except for responses to a HEAD request, the representation of a 303

response ought to contain a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to
the same URI reference provided in the Location header field.

15.4.5. 304 Not Modified

The 304 (Not Modified) status code indicates that a conditional GET
or HEAD request has been received and would have resulted in a 200
(OK) response if it were not for the fact that the condition
evaluated to false. In other words, there is no need for the server
to transfer a representation of the target resource because the
request indicates that the client, which made the request
conditional, already has a valid representation; the server is
therefore redirecting the client to make use of that stored
representation as if it were the content of a 200 (OK) response.

The server generating a 304 response MUST generate any of the

following header fields that would have been sent in a 200 (OK)
response to the same request:

* Content-Location, Date, ETag, and Vary

* Cache-Control and Expires (see [CACHING])

Since the goal of a 304 response is to minimize information transfer

when the recipient already has one or more cached representations, a
sender SHOULD NOT generate representation metadata other than the
above listed fields unless said metadata exists for the purpose of
guiding cache updates (e.g., Last-Modified might be useful if the
response does not have an ETag field).

Requirements on a cache that receives a 304 response are defined in

Section 4.3.4 of [CACHING]. If the conditional request originated
with an outbound client, such as a user agent with its own cache
sending a conditional GET to a shared proxy, then the proxy SHOULD
forward the 304 response to that client.

A 304 response is terminated by the end of the header section; it

cannot contain content or trailers.

15.4.6. 305 Use Proxy

The 305 (Use Proxy) status code was defined in a previous version of
this specification and is now deprecated (Appendix B of [RFC7231]).

15.4.7. 306 (Unused)

The 306 status code was defined in a previous version of this

specification, is no longer used, and the code is reserved.

15.4.8. 307 Temporary Redirect

The 307 (Temporary Redirect) status code indicates that the target
resource resides temporarily under a different URI and the user agent
 MUST NOT change the request method if it performs an automatic
redirection to that URI. Since the redirection can change over time,
the client ought to continue using the original target URI for future
requests.

The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the response

containing a URI reference for the different URI. The user agent MAY
use the Location field value for automatic redirection. The server's
response content usually contains a short hypertext note with a
hyperlink to the different URI(s).

15.4.9. 308 Permanent Redirect

The 308 (Permanent Redirect) status code indicates that the target
resource has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future
references to this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs.
The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing
capability can permanently replace references to the target URI with
one of the new references sent by the server. However, this
suggestion is usually ignored unless the user agent is actively
editing references (e.g., engaged in authoring content), the
connection is secured, and the origin server is a trusted authority
for the content being edited.

The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the response

containing a preferred URI reference for the new permanent URI. The
user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic
redirection. The server's response content usually contains a short
hypertext note with a hyperlink to the new URI(s).

A 308 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

| *Note:* This status code is much younger (June 2014) than its
| sibling codes and thus might not be recognized everywhere. See
| Section 4 of [RFC7538] for deployment considerations.

15.5. Client Error 4xx

The 4xx (Client Error) class of status code indicates that the client
seems to have erred. Except when responding to a HEAD request, the
server SHOULD send a representation containing an explanation of the
error situation, and whether it is a temporary or permanent
condition. These status codes are applicable to any request method.
User agents SHOULD display any included representation to the user.

15.5.1. 400 Bad Request

The 400 (Bad Request) status code indicates that the server cannot or
will not process the request due to something that is perceived to be
a client error (e.g., malformed request syntax, invalid request
message framing, or deceptive request routing).

15.5.2. 401 Unauthorized

The 401 (Unauthorized) status code indicates that the request has not
been applied because it lacks valid authentication credentials for
the target resource. The server generating a 401 response MUST send
 a WWW-Authenticate header field (Section 11.6.1) containing at least
one challenge applicable to the target resource.

If the request included authentication credentials, then the 401

response indicates that authorization has been refused for those
credentials. The user agent MAY repeat the request with a new or
replaced Authorization header field (Section 11.6.2). If the 401
response contains the same challenge as the prior response, and the
user agent has already attempted authentication at least once, then
the user agent SHOULD present the enclosed representation to the
user, since it usually contains relevant diagnostic information.

15.5.3. 402 Payment Required

The 402 (Payment Required) status code is reserved for future use.

15.5.4. 403 Forbidden

The 403 (Forbidden) status code indicates that the server understood
the request but refuses to fulfill it. A server that wishes to make
public why the request has been forbidden can describe that reason in
the response content (if any).

If authentication credentials were provided in the request, the

server considers them insufficient to grant access. The client
SHOULD NOT automatically repeat the request with the same
credentials. The client MAY repeat the request with new or different
credentials. However, a request might be forbidden for reasons
unrelated to the credentials.

An origin server that wishes to "hide" the current existence of a

forbidden target resource MAY instead respond with a status code of
404 (Not Found).

15.5.5. 404 Not Found

The 404 (Not Found) status code indicates that the origin server did
not find a current representation for the target resource or is not
willing to disclose that one exists. A 404 status code does not
indicate whether this lack of representation is temporary or
permanent; the 410 (Gone) status code is preferred over 404 if the
origin server knows, presumably through some configurable means, that
the condition is likely to be permanent.

A 404 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

15.5.6. 405 Method Not Allowed

The 405 (Method Not Allowed) status code indicates that the method
received in the request-line is known by the origin server but not
supported by the target resource. The origin server MUST generate an
Allow header field in a 405 response containing a list of the target
resource's currently supported methods.

A 405 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).
15.5.7. 406 Not Acceptable

The 406 (Not Acceptable) status code indicates that the target
resource does not have a current representation that would be
acceptable to the user agent, according to the proactive negotiation
header fields received in the request (Section 12.1), and the server
is unwilling to supply a default representation.

The server SHOULD generate content containing a list of available

representation characteristics and corresponding resource identifiers
from which the user or user agent can choose the one most
appropriate. A user agent MAY automatically select the most
appropriate choice from that list. However, this specification does
not define any standard for such automatic selection, as described in
Section 15.4.1.

15.5.8. 407 Proxy Authentication Required

The 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) status code is similar to 401

(Unauthorized), but it indicates that the client needs to
authenticate itself in order to use a proxy for this request. The
proxy MUST send a Proxy-Authenticate header field (Section 11.7.1)
containing a challenge applicable to that proxy for the request. The
client MAY repeat the request with a new or replaced
Proxy-Authorization header field (Section 11.7.2).

15.5.9. 408 Request Timeout

The 408 (Request Timeout) status code indicates that the server did
not receive a complete request message within the time that it was
prepared to wait.

If the client has an outstanding request in transit, it MAY repeat

that request. If the current connection is not usable (e.g., as it
would be in HTTP/1.1 because request delimitation is lost), a new
connection will be used.

15.5.10. 409 Conflict

The 409 (Conflict) status code indicates that the request could not
be completed due to a conflict with the current state of the target
resource. This code is used in situations where the user might be
able to resolve the conflict and resubmit the request. The server
SHOULD generate content that includes enough information for a user
to recognize the source of the conflict.

Conflicts are most likely to occur in response to a PUT request. For

example, if versioning were being used and the representation being
PUT included changes to a resource that conflict with those made by
an earlier (third-party) request, the origin server might use a 409
response to indicate that it can't complete the request. In this
case, the response representation would likely contain information
useful for merging the differences based on the revision history.

15.5.11. 410 Gone

The 410 (Gone) status code indicates that access to the target
resource is no longer available at the origin server and that this
 condition is likely to be permanent. If the origin server does not
know, or has no facility to determine, whether or not the condition
is permanent, the status code 404 (Not Found) ought to be used
instead.

The 410 response is primarily intended to assist the task of web

maintenance by notifying the recipient that the resource is
intentionally unavailable and that the server owners desire that
remote links to that resource be removed. Such an event is common
for limited-time, promotional services and for resources belonging to
individuals no longer associated with the origin server's site. It
is not necessary to mark all permanently unavailable resources as
"gone" or to keep the mark for any length of time -- that is left to
the discretion of the server owner.

A 410 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

15.5.12. 411 Length Required

The 411 (Length Required) status code indicates that the server
refuses to accept the request without a defined Content-Length
(Section 8.6). The client MAY repeat the request if it adds a valid
Content-Length header field containing the length of the request
content.

15.5.13. 412 Precondition Failed

The 412 (Precondition Failed) status code indicates that one or more
conditions given in the request header fields evaluated to false when
tested on the server (Section 13). This response status code allows
the client to place preconditions on the current resource state (its
current representations and metadata) and, thus, prevent the request
method from being applied if the target resource is in an unexpected
state.

15.5.14. 413 Content Too Large

The 413 (Content Too Large) status code indicates that the server is
refusing to process a request because the request content is larger
than the server is willing or able to process. The server MAY
terminate the request, if the protocol version in use allows it;
otherwise, the server MAY close the connection.

If the condition is temporary, the server SHOULD generate a

Retry-After header field to indicate that it is temporary and after
what time the client MAY try again.

15.5.15. 414 URI Too Long

The 414 (URI Too Long) status code indicates that the server is
refusing to service the request because the target URI is longer than
the server is willing to interpret. This rare condition is only
likely to occur when a client has improperly converted a POST request
to a GET request with long query information, when the client has
descended into an infinite loop of redirection (e.g., a redirected
URI prefix that points to a suffix of itself) or when the server is
under attack by a client attempting to exploit potential security
 holes.

A 414 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

15.5.16. 415 Unsupported Media Type

The 415 (Unsupported Media Type) status code indicates that the
origin server is refusing to service the request because the content
is in a format not supported by this method on the target resource.

The format problem might be due to the request's indicated

Content-Type or Content-Encoding, or as a result of inspecting the
data directly.

If the problem was caused by an unsupported content coding, the

Accept-Encoding response header field (Section 12.5.3) ought to be
used to indicate which (if any) content codings would have been
accepted in the request.

On the other hand, if the cause was an unsupported media type, the
Accept response header field (Section 12.5.1) can be used to indicate
which media types would have been accepted in the request.

15.5.17. 416 Range Not Satisfiable

The 416 (Range Not Satisfiable) status code indicates that the set of
ranges in the request's Range header field (Section 14.2) has been
rejected either because none of the requested ranges are satisfiable
or because the client has requested an excessive number of small or
overlapping ranges (a potential denial of service attack).

Each range unit defines what is required for its own range sets to be
satisfiable. For example, Section 14.1.2 defines what makes a bytes
range set satisfiable.

A server that generates a 416 response to a byte-range request SHOULD

generate a Content-Range header field specifying the current length
of the selected representation (Section 14.4).

For example:

HTTP/1.1 416 Range Not Satisfiable

Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2012 15:41:54 GMT
Content-Range: bytes */47022

| *Note:* Because servers are free to ignore Range, many

| implementations will respond with the entire selected
| representation in a 200 (OK) response. That is partly because
| most clients are prepared to receive a 200 (OK) to complete the
| task (albeit less efficiently) and partly because clients might
| not stop making an invalid range request until they have
| received a complete representation. Thus, clients cannot
| depend on receiving a 416 (Range Not Satisfiable) response even
| when it is most appropriate.

15.5.18. 417 Expectation Failed

 The 417 (Expectation Failed) status code indicates that the
expectation given in the request's Expect header field
(Section 10.1.1) could not be met by at least one of the inbound
servers.

15.5.19. 418 (Unused)

[RFC2324] was an April 1 RFC that lampooned the various ways HTTP was
abused; one such abuse was the definition of an application-specific
418 status code, which has been deployed as a joke often enough for
the code to be unusable for any future use.

Therefore, the 418 status code is reserved in the IANA HTTP Status
Code Registry. This indicates that the status code cannot be
assigned to other applications currently. If future circumstances
require its use (e.g., exhaustion of 4NN status codes), it can be re-
assigned to another use.

15.5.20. 421 Misdirected Request

The 421 (Misdirected Request) status code indicates that the request
was directed at a server that is unable or unwilling to produce an
authoritative response for the target URI. An origin server (or
gateway acting on behalf of the origin server) sends 421 to reject a
target URI that does not match an origin for which the server has
been configured (Section 4.3.1) or does not match the connection
context over which the request was received (Section 7.4).

A client that receives a 421 (Misdirected Request) response MAY retry

the request, whether or not the request method is idempotent, over a
different connection, such as a fresh connection specific to the
target resource's origin, or via an alternative service [ALTSVC].

A proxy MUST NOT generate a 421 response.

15.5.21. 422 Unprocessable Content

The 422 (Unprocessable Content) status code indicates that the server
understands the content type of the request content (hence a 415
(Unsupported Media Type) status code is inappropriate), and the
syntax of the request content is correct, but it was unable to
process the contained instructions. For example, this status code
can be sent if an XML request content contains well-formed (i.e.,
syntactically correct), but semantically erroneous XML instructions.

15.5.22. 426 Upgrade Required

The 426 (Upgrade Required) status code indicates that the server
refuses to perform the request using the current protocol but might
be willing to do so after the client upgrades to a different
protocol. The server MUST send an Upgrade header field in a 426
response to indicate the required protocol(s) (Section 7.8).

Example:

HTTP/1.1 426 Upgrade Required

Upgrade: HTTP/3.0
Connection: Upgrade
Content-Length: 53
 Content-Type: text/plain

This service requires use of the HTTP/3.0 protocol.

15.6. Server Error 5xx

The 5xx (Server Error) class of status code indicates that the server
is aware that it has erred or is incapable of performing the
requested method. Except when responding to a HEAD request, the
server SHOULD send a representation containing an explanation of the
error situation, and whether it is a temporary or permanent
condition. A user agent SHOULD display any included representation
to the user. These status codes are applicable to any request
method.

15.6.1. 500 Internal Server Error

The 500 (Internal Server Error) status code indicates that the server
encountered an unexpected condition that prevented it from fulfilling
the request.

15.6.2. 501 Not Implemented

The 501 (Not Implemented) status code indicates that the server does
not support the functionality required to fulfill the request. This
is the appropriate response when the server does not recognize the
request method and is not capable of supporting it for any resource.

A 501 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise

indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see
Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).

15.6.3. 502 Bad Gateway

The 502 (Bad Gateway) status code indicates that the server, while
acting as a gateway or proxy, received an invalid response from an
inbound server it accessed while attempting to fulfill the request.

15.6.4. 503 Service Unavailable

The 503 (Service Unavailable) status code indicates that the server
is currently unable to handle the request due to a temporary overload
or scheduled maintenance, which will likely be alleviated after some
delay. The server MAY send a Retry-After header field
(Section 10.2.3) to suggest an appropriate amount of time for the
client to wait before retrying the request.

| *Note:* The existence of the 503 status code does not imply
| that a server has to use it when becoming overloaded. Some
| servers might simply refuse the connection.

15.6.5. 504 Gateway Timeout

The 504 (Gateway Timeout) status code indicates that the server,
while acting as a gateway or proxy, did not receive a timely response
from an upstream server it needed to access in order to complete the
request.

15.6.6. 505 HTTP Version Not Supported

 The 505 (HTTP Version Not Supported) status code indicates that the
server does not support, or refuses to support, the major version of
HTTP that was used in the request message. The server is indicating
that it is unable or unwilling to complete the request using the same
major version as the client, as described in Section 2.5, other than
with this error message. The server SHOULD generate a representation
for the 505 response that describes why that version is not supported
and what other protocols are supported by that server.

16. Extending HTTP

HTTP defines a number of generic extension points that can be used to

introduce capabilities to the protocol without introducing a new
version, including methods, status codes, field names, and further
extensibility points within defined fields, such as authentication
schemes and cache directives (see Cache-Control extensions in
Section 5.2.3 of [CACHING]). Because the semantics of HTTP are not
versioned, these extension points are persistent; the version of the
protocol in use does not affect their semantics.

Version-independent extensions are discouraged from depending on or

interacting with the specific version of the protocol in use. When
this is unavoidable, careful consideration needs to be given to how
the extension can interoperate across versions.

Additionally, specific versions of HTTP might have their own

extensibility points, such as transfer codings in HTTP/1.1
(Section 6.1 of [HTTP/1.1]) and HTTP/2 SETTINGS or frame types
([HTTP/2]). These extension points are specific to the version of
the protocol they occur within.

Version-specific extensions cannot override or modify the semantics

of a version-independent mechanism or extension point (like a method
or header field) without explicitly being allowed by that protocol
element. For example, the CONNECT method (Section 9.3.6) allows
this.

These guidelines assure that the protocol operates correctly and

predictably, even when parts of the path implement different versions
of HTTP.

16.1. Method Extensibility

16.1.1. Method Registry

The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Method Registry", maintained

by IANA at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-methods>, registers
method names.

HTTP method registrations MUST include the following fields:

* Method Name (see Section 9)

* Safe ("yes" or "no", see Section 9.2.1)

* Idempotent ("yes" or "no", see Section 9.2.2)

* Pointer to specification text

 Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see
[RFC8126], Section 4.8).

16.1.2. Considerations for New Methods

Standardized methods are generic; that is, they are potentially

applicable to any resource, not just one particular media type, kind
of resource, or application. As such, it is preferred that new
methods be registered in a document that isn't specific to a single
application or data format, since orthogonal technologies deserve
orthogonal specification.

Since message parsing (Section 6) needs to be independent of method

semantics (aside from responses to HEAD), definitions of new methods
cannot change the parsing algorithm or prohibit the presence of
content on either the request or the response message. Definitions
of new methods can specify that only a zero-length content is allowed
by requiring a Content-Length header field with a value of "0".

Likewise, new methods cannot use the special host:port and asterisk
forms of request target that are allowed for CONNECT and OPTIONS,
respectively (Section 7.1). A full URI in absolute form is needed
for the target URI, which means either the request target needs to be
sent in absolute form or the target URI will be reconstructed from
the request context in the same way it is for other methods.

A new method definition needs to indicate whether it is safe

(Section 9.2.1), idempotent (Section 9.2.2), cacheable
(Section 9.2.3), what semantics are to be associated with the request
content (if any), and what refinements the method makes to header
field or status code semantics. If the new method is cacheable, its
definition ought to describe how, and under what conditions, a cache
can store a response and use it to satisfy a subsequent request. The
new method ought to describe whether it can be made conditional
(Section 13.1) and, if so, how a server responds when the condition
is false. Likewise, if the new method might have some use for
partial response semantics (Section 14.2), it ought to document this,
too.

| *Note:* Avoid defining a method name that starts with "M-",

| since that prefix might be misinterpreted as having the
| semantics assigned to it by [RFC2774].

16.2. Status Code Extensibility

16.2.1. Status Code Registry

The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code Registry",

maintained by IANA at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-
codes>, registers status code numbers.

A registration MUST include the following fields:

* Status Code (3 digits)

* Short Description

* Pointer to specification text

 Values to be added to the HTTP status code namespace require IETF
Review (see [RFC8126], Section 4.8).

16.2.2. Considerations for New Status Codes

When it is necessary to express semantics for a response that are not

defined by current status codes, a new status code can be registered.
Status codes are generic; they are potentially applicable to any
resource, not just one particular media type, kind of resource, or
application of HTTP. As such, it is preferred that new status codes
be registered in a document that isn't specific to a single
application.

New status codes are required to fall under one of the categories
defined in Section 15. To allow existing parsers to process the
response message, new status codes cannot disallow content, although
they can mandate a zero-length content.

Proposals for new status codes that are not yet widely deployed ought
to avoid allocating a specific number for the code until there is
clear consensus that it will be registered; instead, early drafts can
use a notation such as "4NN", or "3N0" .. "3N9", to indicate the
class of the proposed status code(s) without consuming a number
prematurely.

The definition of a new status code ought to explain the request

conditions that would cause a response containing that status code
(e.g., combinations of request header fields and/or method(s)) along
with any dependencies on response header fields (e.g., what fields
are required, what fields can modify the semantics, and what field
semantics are further refined when used with the new status code).

By default, a status code applies only to the request corresponding

to the response it occurs within. If a status code applies to a
larger scope of applicability -- for example, all requests to the
resource in question or all requests to a server -- this must be
explicitly specified. When doing so, it should be noted that not all
clients can be expected to consistently apply a larger scope because
they might not understand the new status code.

The definition of a new final status code ought to specify whether or

not it is heuristically cacheable. Note that any response with a
final status code can be cached if the response has explicit
freshness information. A status code defined as heuristically
cacheable is allowed to be cached without explicit freshness
information. Likewise, the definition of a status code can place
constraints upon cache behavior if the must-understand cache
directive is used. See [CACHING] for more information.

Finally, the definition of a new status code ought to indicate

whether the content has any implied association with an identified
resource (Section 6.4.2).

16.3. Field Extensibility

HTTP's most widely used extensibility point is the definition of new

header and trailer fields.
 New fields can be defined such that, when they are understood by a
recipient, they override or enhance the interpretation of previously
defined fields, define preconditions on request evaluation, or refine
the meaning of responses.

However, defining a field doesn't guarantee its deployment or

recognition by recipients. Most fields are designed with the
expectation that a recipient can safely ignore (but forward
downstream) any field not recognized. In other cases, the sender's
ability to understand a given field might be indicated by its prior
communication, perhaps in the protocol version or fields that it sent
in prior messages, or its use of a specific media type. Likewise,
direct inspection of support might be possible through an OPTIONS
request or by interacting with a defined well-known URI [RFC8615] if
such inspection is defined along with the field being introduced.

16.3.1. Field Name Registry

The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" defines

the namespace for HTTP field names.

Any party can request registration of an HTTP field. See

Section 16.3.2 for considerations to take into account when creating
a new HTTP field.

The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" is

located at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields/>.
Registration requests can be made by following the instructions
located there or by sending an email to the "[email protected]"
mailing list.

Field names are registered on the advice of a designated expert

(appointed by the IESG or their delegate). Fields with the status
'permanent' are Specification Required ([RFC8126], Section 4.6).

Registration requests consist of the following information:

Field name:
The requested field name. It MUST conform to the field-name
syntax defined in Section 5.1, and it SHOULD be restricted to just
letters, digits, and hyphen ('-') characters, with the first
character being a letter.

Status:
"permanent", "provisional", "deprecated", or "obsoleted".

Specification document(s):
Reference to the document that specifies the field, preferably
including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of the
document. Optional but encouraged for provisional registrations.
An indication of the relevant section(s) can also be included, but
is not required.

And optionally:

Comments: Additional information, such as about reserved entries.

The expert(s) can define additional fields to be collected in the

registry, in consultation with the community.
 Standards-defined names have a status of "permanent". Other names
can also be registered as permanent if the expert(s) finds that they
are in use, in consultation with the community. Other names should
be registered as "provisional".

Provisional entries can be removed by the expert(s) if -- in

consultation with the community -- the expert(s) find that they are
not in use. The expert(s) can change a provisional entry's status to
permanent at any time.

Note that names can be registered by third parties (including the

expert(s)) if the expert(s) determines that an unregistered name is
widely deployed and not likely to be registered in a timely manner
otherwise.

16.3.2. Considerations for New Fields

HTTP header and trailer fields are a widely used extension point for
the protocol. While they can be used in an ad hoc fashion, fields
that are intended for wider use need to be carefully documented to
ensure interoperability.

In particular, authors of specifications defining new fields are

advised to consider and, where appropriate, document the following
aspects:

* Under what conditions the field can be used; e.g., only in

responses or requests, in all messages, only on responses to a
particular request method, etc.

* Whether the field semantics are further refined by their context,

such as their use with certain request methods or status codes.

* The scope of applicability for the information conveyed. By

default, fields apply only to the message they are associated
with, but some response fields are designed to apply to all
representations of a resource, the resource itself, or an even
broader scope. Specifications that expand the scope of a response
field will need to carefully consider issues such as content
negotiation, the time period of applicability, and (in some cases)
multi-tenant server deployments.

* Under what conditions intermediaries are allowed to insert,

delete, or modify the field's value.

* If the field is allowable in trailers; by default, it will not be

(see Section 6.5.1).

* Whether it is appropriate or even required to list the field name

in the Connection header field (i.e., if the field is to be hop-
by-hop; see Section 7.6.1).

* Whether the field introduces any additional security

considerations, such as disclosure of privacy-related data.

Request header fields have additional considerations that need to be

documented if the default behavior is not appropriate:
 * If it is appropriate to list the field name in a Vary response
header field (e.g., when the request header field is used by an
origin server's content selection algorithm; see Section 12.5.5).

* If the field is intended to be stored when received in a PUT

request (see Section 9.3.4).

* If the field ought to be removed when automatically redirecting a

request due to security concerns (see Section 15.4).

16.3.2.1. Considerations for New Field Names

Authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to choose a

short but descriptive field name. Short names avoid needless data
transmission; descriptive names avoid confusion and "squatting" on
names that might have broader uses.

To that end, limited-use fields (such as a header confined to a

single application or use case) are encouraged to use a name that
includes that use (or an abbreviation) as a prefix; for example, if
the Foo Application needs a Description field, it might use "Foo-
Desc"; "Description" is too generic, and "Foo-Description" is
needlessly long.

While the field-name syntax is defined to allow any token character,

in practice some implementations place limits on the characters they
accept in field-names. To be interoperable, new field names SHOULD
constrain themselves to alphanumeric characters, "-", and ".", and
SHOULD begin with a letter. For example, the underscore ("_")
character can be problematic when passed through non-HTTP gateway
interfaces (see Section 17.10).

Field names ought not be prefixed with "X-"; see [BCP178] for further
information.

Other prefixes are sometimes used in HTTP field names; for example,
"Accept-" is used in many content negotiation headers, and "Content-"
is used as explained in Section 6.4. These prefixes are only an aid
to recognizing the purpose of a field and do not trigger automatic
processing.

16.3.2.2. Considerations for New Field Values

A major task in the definition of a new HTTP field is the

specification of the field value syntax: what senders should
generate, and how recipients should infer semantics from what is
received.

Authors are encouraged (but not required) to use either the ABNF
rules in this specification or those in [RFC8941] to define the
syntax of new field values.

Authors are advised to carefully consider how the combination of

multiple field lines will impact them (see Section 5.3). Because
senders might erroneously send multiple values, and both
intermediaries and HTTP libraries can perform combination
automatically, this applies to all field values -- even when only a
single value is anticipated.
 Therefore, authors are advised to delimit or encode values that
contain commas (e.g., with the quoted-string rule of Section 5.6.4,
the String data type of [RFC8941], or a field-specific encoding).
This ensures that commas within field data are not confused with the
commas that delimit a list value.

For example, the Content-Type field value only allows commas inside
quoted strings, which can be reliably parsed even when multiple
values are present. The Location field value provides a counter-
example that should not be emulated: because URIs can include commas,
it is not possible to reliably distinguish between a single value
that includes a comma from two values.

Authors of fields with a singleton value (see Section 5.5) are

additionally advised to document how to treat messages where the
multiple members are present (a sensible default would be to ignore
the field, but this might not always be the right choice).

16.4. Authentication Scheme Extensibility

16.4.1. Authentication Scheme Registry

The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme

Registry" defines the namespace for the authentication schemes in
challenges and credentials. It is maintained at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.

Registrations MUST include the following fields:

* Authentication Scheme Name

* Pointer to specification text

* Notes (optional)

Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see

[RFC8126], Section 4.8).

16.4.2. Considerations for New Authentication Schemes

There are certain aspects of the HTTP Authentication framework that

put constraints on how new authentication schemes can work:

* HTTP authentication is presumed to be stateless: all of the

information necessary to authenticate a request MUST be provided
in the request, rather than be dependent on the server remembering
prior requests. Authentication based on, or bound to, the
underlying connection is outside the scope of this specification
and inherently flawed unless steps are taken to ensure that the
connection cannot be used by any party other than the
authenticated user (see Section 3.3).

* The authentication parameter "realm" is reserved for defining

protection spaces as described in Section 11.5. New schemes MUST
NOT use it in a way incompatible with that definition.

* The "token68" notation was introduced for compatibility with

existing authentication schemes and can only be used once per
challenge or credential. Thus, new schemes ought to use the auth-
 param syntax instead, because otherwise future extensions will be
impossible.

* The parsing of challenges and credentials is defined by this

specification and cannot be modified by new authentication
schemes. When the auth-param syntax is used, all parameters ought
to support both token and quoted-string syntax, and syntactical
constraints ought to be defined on the field value after parsing
(i.e., quoted-string processing). This is necessary so that
recipients can use a generic parser that applies to all
authentication schemes.

*Note:* The fact that the value syntax for the "realm" parameter
is restricted to quoted-string was a bad design choice not to be
repeated for new parameters.

* Definitions of new schemes ought to define the treatment of

unknown extension parameters. In general, a "must-ignore" rule is
preferable to a "must-understand" rule, because otherwise it will
be hard to introduce new parameters in the presence of legacy
recipients. Furthermore, it's good to describe the policy for
defining new parameters (such as "update the specification" or
"use this registry").

* Authentication schemes need to document whether they are usable in

origin-server authentication (i.e., using WWW-Authenticate), and/
or proxy authentication (i.e., using Proxy-Authenticate).

* The credentials carried in an Authorization header field are

specific to the user agent and, therefore, have the same effect on
HTTP caches as the "private" cache response directive
(Section 5.2.2.7 of [CACHING]), within the scope of the request in
which they appear.

Therefore, new authentication schemes that choose not to carry

credentials in the Authorization header field (e.g., using a newly
defined header field) will need to explicitly disallow caching, by
mandating the use of cache response directives (e.g., "private").

* Schemes using Authentication-Info, Proxy-Authentication-Info, or

any other authentication related response header field need to
consider and document the related security considerations (see
Section 17.16.4).

16.5. Range Unit Extensibility

16.5.1. Range Unit Registry

The "HTTP Range Unit Registry" defines the namespace for the range
unit names and refers to their corresponding specifications. It is
maintained at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters>.

Registration of an HTTP Range Unit MUST include the following fields:

* Name

* Description

* Pointer to specification text

 Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see
[RFC8126], Section 4.8).

16.5.2. Considerations for New Range Units

Other range units, such as format-specific boundaries like pages,

sections, records, rows, or time, are potentially usable in HTTP for
application-specific purposes, but are not commonly used in practice.
Implementors of alternative range units ought to consider how they
would work with content codings and general-purpose intermediaries.

16.6. Content Coding Extensibility

16.6.1. Content Coding Registry

The "HTTP Content Coding Registry", maintained by IANA at

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters/>, registers
content-coding names.

Content coding registrations MUST include the following fields:

* Name

* Description

* Pointer to specification text

Names of content codings MUST NOT overlap with names of transfer

codings (per the "HTTP Transfer Coding Registry" located at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters/>) unless the
encoding transformation is identical (as is the case for the
compression codings defined in Section 8.4.1).

Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see

Section 4.8 of [RFC8126]) and MUST conform to the purpose of content
coding defined in Section 8.4.1.

16.6.2. Considerations for New Content Codings

New content codings ought to be self-descriptive whenever possible,

with optional parameters discoverable within the coding format
itself, rather than rely on external metadata that might be lost
during transit.

16.7. Upgrade Token Registry

The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry"

defines the namespace for protocol-name tokens used to identify
protocols in the Upgrade header field. The registry is maintained at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-upgrade-tokens>.

Each registered protocol name is associated with contact information

and an optional set of specifications that details how the connection
will be processed after it has been upgraded.

Registrations happen on a "First Come First Served" basis (see

Section 4.4 of [RFC8126]) and are subject to the following rules:
 1. A protocol-name token, once registered, stays registered forever.

2. A protocol-name token is case-insensitive and registered with the

preferred case to be generated by senders.

3. The registration MUST name a responsible party for the

registration.

4. The registration MUST name a point of contact.

5. The registration MAY name a set of specifications associated with

that token. Such specifications need not be publicly available.

6. The registration SHOULD name a set of expected "protocol-version"

tokens associated with that token at the time of registration.

7. The responsible party MAY change the registration at any time.

The IANA will keep a record of all such changes, and make them
available upon request.

8. The IESG MAY reassign responsibility for a protocol token. This

will normally only be used in the case when a responsible party
cannot be contacted.

17. Security Considerations

This section is meant to inform developers, information providers,

and users of known security concerns relevant to HTTP semantics and
its use for transferring information over the Internet.
Considerations related to caching are discussed in Section 7 of
[CACHING], and considerations related to HTTP/1.1 message syntax and
parsing are discussed in Section 11 of [HTTP/1.1].

The list of considerations below is not exhaustive. Most security

concerns related to HTTP semantics are about securing server-side
applications (code behind the HTTP interface), securing user agent
processing of content received via HTTP, or secure use of the
Internet in general, rather than security of the protocol. The
security considerations for URIs, which are fundamental to HTTP
operation, are discussed in Section 7 of [URI]. Various
organizations maintain topical information and links to current
research on Web application security (e.g., [OWASP]).

17.1. Establishing Authority

HTTP relies on the notion of an "authoritative response": a response

that has been determined by (or at the direction of) the origin
server identified within the target URI to be the most appropriate
response for that request given the state of the target resource at
the time of response message origination.

When a registered name is used in the authority component, the "http"

URI scheme (Section 4.2.1) relies on the user's local name resolution
service to determine where it can find authoritative responses. This
means that any attack on a user's network host table, cached names,
or name resolution libraries becomes an avenue for attack on
establishing authority for "http" URIs. Likewise, the user's choice
of server for Domain Name Service (DNS), and the hierarchy of servers
from which it obtains resolution results, could impact the
 authenticity of address mappings; DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC,
[RFC4033]) are one way to improve authenticity, as are the various
mechanisms for making DNS requests over more secure transfer
protocols.

Furthermore, after an IP address is obtained, establishing authority

for an "http" URI is vulnerable to attacks on Internet Protocol
routing.

The "https" scheme (Section 4.2.2) is intended to prevent (or at

least reveal) many of these potential attacks on establishing
authority, provided that the negotiated connection is secured and the
client properly verifies that the communicating server's identity
matches the target URI's authority component (Section 4.3.4).
Correctly implementing such verification can be difficult (see
[Georgiev]).

Authority for a given origin server can be delegated through protocol

extensions; for example, [ALTSVC]. Likewise, the set of servers for
which a connection is considered authoritative can be changed with a
protocol extension like [RFC8336].

Providing a response from a non-authoritative source, such as a

shared proxy cache, is often useful to improve performance and
availability, but only to the extent that the source can be trusted
or the distrusted response can be safely used.

Unfortunately, communicating authority to users can be difficult.

For example, "phishing" is an attack on the user's perception of
authority, where that perception can be misled by presenting similar
branding in hypertext, possibly aided by userinfo obfuscating the
authority component (see Section 4.2.1). User agents can reduce the
impact of phishing attacks by enabling users to easily inspect a
target URI prior to making an action, by prominently distinguishing
(or rejecting) userinfo when present, and by not sending stored
credentials and cookies when the referring document is from an
unknown or untrusted source.

17.2. Risks of Intermediaries

HTTP intermediaries are inherently situated for on-path attacks.

Compromise of the systems on which the intermediaries run can result
in serious security and privacy problems. Intermediaries might have
access to security-related information, personal information about
individual users and organizations, and proprietary information
belonging to users and content providers. A compromised
intermediary, or an intermediary implemented or configured without
regard to security and privacy considerations, might be used in the
commission of a wide range of potential attacks.

Intermediaries that contain a shared cache are especially vulnerable

to cache poisoning attacks, as described in Section 7 of [CACHING].

Implementers need to consider the privacy and security implications

of their design and coding decisions, and of the configuration
options they provide to operators (especially the default
configuration).

Intermediaries are no more trustworthy than the people and policies

 under which they operate; HTTP cannot solve this problem.

17.3. Attacks Based on File and Path Names

Origin servers frequently make use of their local file system to

manage the mapping from target URI to resource representations. Most
file systems are not designed to protect against malicious file or
path names. Therefore, an origin server needs to avoid accessing
names that have a special significance to the system when mapping the
target resource to files, folders, or directories.

For example, UNIX, Microsoft Windows, and other operating systems use
".." as a path component to indicate a directory level above the
current one, and they use specially named paths or file names to send
data to system devices. Similar naming conventions might exist
within other types of storage systems. Likewise, local storage
systems have an annoying tendency to prefer user-friendliness over
security when handling invalid or unexpected characters,
recomposition of decomposed characters, and case-normalization of
case-insensitive names.

Attacks based on such special names tend to focus on either denial-

of-service (e.g., telling the server to read from a COM port) or
disclosure of configuration and source files that are not meant to be
served.

17.4. Attacks Based on Command, Code, or Query Injection

Origin servers often use parameters within the URI as a means of

identifying system services, selecting database entries, or choosing
a data source. However, data received in a request cannot be
trusted. An attacker could construct any of the request data
elements (method, target URI, header fields, or content) to contain
data that might be misinterpreted as a command, code, or query when
passed through a command invocation, language interpreter, or
database interface.

For example, SQL injection is a common attack wherein additional

query language is inserted within some part of the target URI or
header fields (e.g., Host, Referer, etc.). If the received data is
used directly within a SELECT statement, the query language might be
interpreted as a database command instead of a simple string value.
This type of implementation vulnerability is extremely common, in
spite of being easy to prevent.

In general, resource implementations ought to avoid use of request

data in contexts that are processed or interpreted as instructions.
Parameters ought to be compared to fixed strings and acted upon as a
result of that comparison, rather than passed through an interface
that is not prepared for untrusted data. Received data that isn't
based on fixed parameters ought to be carefully filtered or encoded
to avoid being misinterpreted.

Similar considerations apply to request data when it is stored and

later processed, such as within log files, monitoring tools, or when
included within a data format that allows embedded scripts.

17.5. Attacks via Protocol Element Length

 Because HTTP uses mostly textual, character-delimited fields, parsers
are often vulnerable to attacks based on sending very long (or very
slow) streams of data, particularly where an implementation is
expecting a protocol element with no predefined length (Section 2.3).

To promote interoperability, specific recommendations are made for

minimum size limits on fields (Section 5.4). These are minimum
recommendations, chosen to be supportable even by implementations
with limited resources; it is expected that most implementations will
choose substantially higher limits.

A server can reject a message that has a target URI that is too long
(Section 15.5.15) or request content that is too large
(Section 15.5.14). Additional status codes related to capacity
limits have been defined by extensions to HTTP [RFC6585].

Recipients ought to carefully limit the extent to which they process

other protocol elements, including (but not limited to) request
methods, response status phrases, field names, numeric values, and
chunk lengths. Failure to limit such processing can result in
arbitrary code execution due to buffer or arithmetic overflows, and
increased vulnerability to denial-of-service attacks.

17.6. Attacks Using Shared-Dictionary Compression

Some attacks on encrypted protocols use the differences in size

created by dynamic compression to reveal confidential information;
for example, [BREACH]. These attacks rely on creating a redundancy
between attacker-controlled content and the confidential information,
such that a dynamic compression algorithm using the same dictionary
for both content will compress more efficiently when the attacker-
controlled content matches parts of the confidential content.

HTTP messages can be compressed in a number of ways, including using

TLS compression, content codings, transfer codings, and other
extension or version-specific mechanisms.

The most effective mitigation for this risk is to disable compression

on sensitive data, or to strictly separate sensitive data from
attacker-controlled data so that they cannot share the same
compression dictionary. With careful design, a compression scheme
can be designed in a way that is not considered exploitable in
limited use cases, such as HPACK ([HPACK]).

17.7. Disclosure of Personal Information

Clients are often privy to large amounts of personal information,

including both information provided by the user to interact with
resources (e.g., the user's name, location, mail address, passwords,
encryption keys, etc.) and information about the user's browsing
activity over time (e.g., history, bookmarks, etc.). Implementations
need to prevent unintentional disclosure of personal information.

17.8. Privacy of Server Log Information

A server is in the position to save personal data about a user's

requests over time, which might identify their reading patterns or
subjects of interest. In particular, log information gathered at an
intermediary often contains a history of user agent interaction,
 across a multitude of sites, that can be traced to individual users.

HTTP log information is confidential in nature; its handling is often

constrained by laws and regulations. Log information needs to be
securely stored and appropriate guidelines followed for its analysis.
Anonymization of personal information within individual entries
helps, but it is generally not sufficient to prevent real log traces
from being re-identified based on correlation with other access
characteristics. As such, access traces that are keyed to a specific
client are unsafe to publish even if the key is pseudonymous.

To minimize the risk of theft or accidental publication, log

information ought to be purged of personally identifiable
information, including user identifiers, IP addresses, and user-
provided query parameters, as soon as that information is no longer
necessary to support operational needs for security, auditing, or
fraud control.

17.9. Disclosure of Sensitive Information in URIs

URIs are intended to be shared, not secured, even when they identify
secure resources. URIs are often shown on displays, added to
templates when a page is printed, and stored in a variety of
unprotected bookmark lists. Many servers, proxies, and user agents
log or display the target URI in places where it might be visible to
third parties. It is therefore unwise to include information within
a URI that is sensitive, personally identifiable, or a risk to
disclose.

When an application uses client-side mechanisms to construct a target

URI out of user-provided information, such as the query fields of a
form using GET, potentially sensitive data might be provided that
would not be appropriate for disclosure within a URI. POST is often
preferred in such cases because it usually doesn't construct a URI;
instead, POST of a form transmits the potentially sensitive data in
the request content. However, this hinders caching and uses an
unsafe method for what would otherwise be a safe request.
Alternative workarounds include transforming the user-provided data
prior to constructing the URI or filtering the data to only include
common values that are not sensitive. Likewise, redirecting the
result of a query to a different (server-generated) URI can remove
potentially sensitive data from later links and provide a cacheable
response for later reuse.

Since the Referer header field tells a target site about the context
that resulted in a request, it has the potential to reveal
information about the user's immediate browsing history and any
personal information that might be found in the referring resource's
URI. Limitations on the Referer header field are described in
Section 10.1.3 to address some of its security considerations.

17.10. Application Handling of Field Names

Servers often use non-HTTP gateway interfaces and frameworks to

process a received request and produce content for the response. For
historical reasons, such interfaces often pass received field names
as external variable names, using a name mapping suitable for
environment variables.
 For example, the Common Gateway Interface (CGI) mapping of protocol-
specific meta-variables, defined by Section 4.1.18 of [RFC3875], is
applied to received header fields that do not correspond to one of
CGI's standard variables; the mapping consists of prepending "HTTP_"
to each name and changing all instances of hyphen ("-") to underscore
("_"). This same mapping has been inherited by many other
application frameworks in order to simplify moving applications from
one platform to the next.

In CGI, a received Content-Length field would be passed as the meta-

variable "CONTENT_LENGTH" with a string value matching the received
field's value. In contrast, a received "Content_Length" header field
would be passed as the protocol-specific meta-variable
"HTTP_CONTENT_LENGTH", which might lead to some confusion if an
application mistakenly reads the protocol-specific meta-variable
instead of the default one. (This historical practice is why
Section 16.3.2.1 discourages the creation of new field names that
contain an underscore.)

Unfortunately, mapping field names to different interface names can

lead to security vulnerabilities if the mapping is incomplete or
ambiguous. For example, if an attacker were to send a field named
"Transfer_Encoding", a naive interface might map that to the same
variable name as the "Transfer-Encoding" field, resulting in a
potential request smuggling vulnerability (Section 11.2 of
[HTTP/1.1]).

To mitigate the associated risks, implementations that perform such

mappings are advised to make the mapping unambiguous and complete for
the full range of potential octets received as a name (including
those that are discouraged or forbidden by the HTTP grammar). For
example, a field with an unusual name character might result in the
request being blocked, the specific field being removed, or the name
being passed with a different prefix to distinguish it from other
fields.

17.11. Disclosure of Fragment after Redirects

Although fragment identifiers used within URI references are not sent
in requests, implementers ought to be aware that they will be visible
to the user agent and any extensions or scripts running as a result
of the response. In particular, when a redirect occurs and the
original request's fragment identifier is inherited by the new
reference in Location (Section 10.2.2), this might have the effect of
disclosing one site's fragment to another site. If the first site
uses personal information in fragments, it ought to ensure that
redirects to other sites include a (possibly empty) fragment
component in order to block that inheritance.

17.12. Disclosure of Product Information

The User-Agent (Section 10.1.5), Via (Section 7.6.3), and Server

(Section 10.2.4) header fields often reveal information about the
respective sender's software systems. In theory, this can make it
easier for an attacker to exploit known security holes; in practice,
attackers tend to try all potential holes regardless of the apparent
software versions being used.

Proxies that serve as a portal through a network firewall ought to

 take special precautions regarding the transfer of header information
that might identify hosts behind the firewall. The Via header field
allows intermediaries to replace sensitive machine names with
pseudonyms.

17.13. Browser Fingerprinting

Browser fingerprinting is a set of techniques for identifying a

specific user agent over time through its unique set of
characteristics. These characteristics might include information
related to how it uses the underlying transport protocol, feature
capabilities, and scripting environment, though of particular
interest here is the set of unique characteristics that might be
communicated via HTTP. Fingerprinting is considered a privacy
concern because it enables tracking of a user agent's behavior over
time ([Bujlow]) without the corresponding controls that the user
might have over other forms of data collection (e.g., cookies). Many
general-purpose user agents (i.e., Web browsers) have taken steps to
reduce their fingerprints.

There are a number of request header fields that might reveal

information to servers that is sufficiently unique to enable
fingerprinting. The From header field is the most obvious, though it
is expected that From will only be sent when self-identification is
desired by the user. Likewise, Cookie header fields are deliberately
designed to enable re-identification, so fingerprinting concerns only
apply to situations where cookies are disabled or restricted by the
user agent's configuration.

The User-Agent header field might contain enough information to

uniquely identify a specific device, usually when combined with other
characteristics, particularly if the user agent sends excessive
details about the user's system or extensions. However, the source
of unique information that is least expected by users is proactive
negotiation (Section 12.1), including the Accept, Accept-Charset,
Accept-Encoding, and Accept-Language header fields.

In addition to the fingerprinting concern, detailed use of the

Accept-Language header field can reveal information the user might
consider to be of a private nature. For example, understanding a
given language set might be strongly correlated to membership in a
particular ethnic group. An approach that limits such loss of
privacy would be for a user agent to omit the sending of Accept-
Language except for sites that have been explicitly permitted,
perhaps via interaction after detecting a Vary header field that
indicates language negotiation might be useful.

In environments where proxies are used to enhance privacy, user

agents ought to be conservative in sending proactive negotiation
header fields. General-purpose user agents that provide a high
degree of header field configurability ought to inform users about
the loss of privacy that might result if too much detail is provided.
As an extreme privacy measure, proxies could filter the proactive
negotiation header fields in relayed requests.

17.14. Validator Retention

The validators defined by this specification are not intended to

ensure the validity of a representation, guard against malicious
 changes, or detect on-path attacks. At best, they enable more
efficient cache updates and optimistic concurrent writes when all
participants are behaving nicely. At worst, the conditions will fail
and the client will receive a response that is no more harmful than
an HTTP exchange without conditional requests.

An entity tag can be abused in ways that create privacy risks. For
example, a site might deliberately construct a semantically invalid
entity tag that is unique to the user or user agent, send it in a
cacheable response with a long freshness time, and then read that
entity tag in later conditional requests as a means of re-identifying
that user or user agent. Such an identifying tag would become a
persistent identifier for as long as the user agent retained the
original cache entry. User agents that cache representations ought
to ensure that the cache is cleared or replaced whenever the user
performs privacy-maintaining actions, such as clearing stored cookies
or changing to a private browsing mode.

17.15. Denial-of-Service Attacks Using Range

Unconstrained multiple range requests are susceptible to denial-of-

service attacks because the effort required to request many
overlapping ranges of the same data is tiny compared to the time,
memory, and bandwidth consumed by attempting to serve the requested
data in many parts. Servers ought to ignore, coalesce, or reject
egregious range requests, such as requests for more than two
overlapping ranges or for many small ranges in a single set,
particularly when the ranges are requested out of order for no
apparent reason. Multipart range requests are not designed to
support random access.

17.16. Authentication Considerations

Everything about the topic of HTTP authentication is a security

consideration, so the list of considerations below is not exhaustive.
Furthermore, it is limited to security considerations regarding the
authentication framework, in general, rather than discussing all of
the potential considerations for specific authentication schemes
(which ought to be documented in the specifications that define those
schemes). Various organizations maintain topical information and
links to current research on Web application security (e.g.,
[OWASP]), including common pitfalls for implementing and using the
authentication schemes found in practice.

17.16.1. Confidentiality of Credentials

The HTTP authentication framework does not define a single mechanism

for maintaining the confidentiality of credentials; instead, each
authentication scheme defines how the credentials are encoded prior
to transmission. While this provides flexibility for the development
of future authentication schemes, it is inadequate for the protection
of existing schemes that provide no confidentiality on their own, or
that do not sufficiently protect against replay attacks.
Furthermore, if the server expects credentials that are specific to
each individual user, the exchange of those credentials will have the
effect of identifying that user even if the content within
credentials remains confidential.

HTTP depends on the security properties of the underlying transport-

 or session-level connection to provide confidential transmission of
fields. Services that depend on individual user authentication
require a secured connection prior to exchanging credentials
(Section 4.2.2).

17.16.2. Credentials and Idle Clients

Existing HTTP clients and user agents typically retain authentication

information indefinitely. HTTP does not provide a mechanism for the
origin server to direct clients to discard these cached credentials,
since the protocol has no awareness of how credentials are obtained
or managed by the user agent. The mechanisms for expiring or
revoking credentials can be specified as part of an authentication
scheme definition.

Circumstances under which credential caching can interfere with the

application's security model include but are not limited to:

* Clients that have been idle for an extended period, following

which the server might wish to cause the client to re-prompt the
user for credentials.

* Applications that include a session termination indication (such

as a "logout" or "commit" button on a page) after which the server
side of the application "knows" that there is no further reason
for the client to retain the credentials.

User agents that cache credentials are encouraged to provide a

readily accessible mechanism for discarding cached credentials under
user control.

17.16.3. Protection Spaces

Authentication schemes that solely rely on the "realm" mechanism for

establishing a protection space will expose credentials to all
resources on an origin server. Clients that have successfully made
authenticated requests with a resource can use the same
authentication credentials for other resources on the same origin
server. This makes it possible for a different resource to harvest
authentication credentials for other resources.

This is of particular concern when an origin server hosts resources

for multiple parties under the same origin (Section 11.5). Possible
mitigation strategies include restricting direct access to
authentication credentials (i.e., not making the content of the
Authorization request header field available), and separating
protection spaces by using a different host name (or port number) for
each party.

17.16.4. Additional Response Fields

Adding information to responses that are sent over an unencrypted

channel can affect security and privacy. The presence of the
Authentication-Info and Proxy-Authentication-Info header fields alone
indicates that HTTP authentication is in use. Additional information
could be exposed by the contents of the authentication-scheme
specific parameters; this will have to be considered in the
definitions of these schemes.
18. IANA Considerations

The change controller for the following registrations is: "IETF

([email protected]) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

18.1. URI Scheme Registration

IANA has updated the "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes"

registry [BCP35] at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/>
with the permanent schemes listed in Table 2 in Section 4.2.

18.2. Method Registration

IANA has updated the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Method

Registry" at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-methods> with the
registration procedure of Section 16.1.1 and the method names
summarized in the following table.

+=========+======+============+=========+
| Method | Safe | Idempotent | Section |
+=========+======+============+=========+
| CONNECT | no | no | 9.3.6 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| DELETE | no | yes | 9.3.5 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| GET | yes | yes | 9.3.1 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| HEAD | yes | yes | 9.3.2 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| OPTIONS | yes | yes | 9.3.7 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| POST | no | no | 9.3.3 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| PUT | no | yes | 9.3.4 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| TRACE | yes | yes | 9.3.8 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+
| * | no | no | 18.2 |
+---------+------+------------+---------+

Table 7

The method name "*" is reserved because using "*" as a method name
would conflict with its usage as a wildcard in some fields (e.g.,
"Access-Control-Request-Method").

18.3. Status Code Registration

IANA has updated the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code
Registry" at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes>
with the registration procedure of Section 16.2.1 and the status code
values summarized in the following table.

+=======+===============================+=========+
| Value | Description | Section |
+=======+===============================+=========+
| 100 | Continue | 15.2.1 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 101 | Switching Protocols | 15.2.2 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 200 | OK | 15.3.1 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 201 | Created | 15.3.2 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 202 | Accepted | 15.3.3 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 203 | Non-Authoritative Information | 15.3.4 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 204 | No Content | 15.3.5 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 205 | Reset Content | 15.3.6 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 206 | Partial Content | 15.3.7 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 300 | Multiple Choices | 15.4.1 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 301 | Moved Permanently | 15.4.2 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 302 | Found | 15.4.3 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 303 | See Other | 15.4.4 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 304 | Not Modified | 15.4.5 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 305 | Use Proxy | 15.4.6 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 306 | (Unused) | 15.4.7 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 307 | Temporary Redirect | 15.4.8 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 308 | Permanent Redirect | 15.4.9 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 400 | Bad Request | 15.5.1 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 401 | Unauthorized | 15.5.2 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 402 | Payment Required | 15.5.3 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 403 | Forbidden | 15.5.4 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 404 | Not Found | 15.5.5 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 405 | Method Not Allowed | 15.5.6 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 406 | Not Acceptable | 15.5.7 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 407 | Proxy Authentication Required | 15.5.8 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 408 | Request Timeout | 15.5.9 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 409 | Conflict | 15.5.10 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 410 | Gone | 15.5.11 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 411 | Length Required | 15.5.12 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 412 | Precondition Failed | 15.5.13 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
 | 413 | Content Too Large | 15.5.14 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 414 | URI Too Long | 15.5.15 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 415 | Unsupported Media Type | 15.5.16 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 416 | Range Not Satisfiable | 15.5.17 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 417 | Expectation Failed | 15.5.18 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 418 | (Unused) | 15.5.19 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 421 | Misdirected Request | 15.5.20 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 422 | Unprocessable Content | 15.5.21 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 426 | Upgrade Required | 15.5.22 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 500 | Internal Server Error | 15.6.1 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 501 | Not Implemented | 15.6.2 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 502 | Bad Gateway | 15.6.3 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 503 | Service Unavailable | 15.6.4 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 504 | Gateway Timeout | 15.6.5 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+
| 505 | HTTP Version Not Supported | 15.6.6 |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------+

Table 8

18.4. Field Name Registration

This specification updates the HTTP-related aspects of the existing

registration procedures for message header fields defined in
[RFC3864]. It replaces the old procedures as they relate to HTTP by
defining a new registration procedure and moving HTTP field
definitions into a separate registry.

IANA has created a new registry titled "Hypertext Transfer Protocol

(HTTP) Field Name Registry" as outlined in Section 16.3.1.

IANA has moved all entries in the "Permanent Message Header Field
Names" and "Provisional Message Header Field Names" registries (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/>) with the
protocol 'http' to this registry and has applied the following
changes:

1. The 'Applicable Protocol' field has been omitted.

2. Entries that had a status of 'standard', 'experimental',

'reserved', or 'informational' have been made to have a status of
'permanent'.

3. Provisional entries without a status have been made to have a

status of 'provisional'.
4. Permanent entries without a status (after confirmation that the
registration document did not define one) have been made to have
a status of 'provisional'. The expert(s) can choose to update
the entries' status if there is evidence that another is more
appropriate.

IANA has annotated the "Permanent Message Header Field Names" and
"Provisional Message Header Field Names" registries with the
following note to indicate that HTTP field name registrations have
moved:

| *Note*
|
| HTTP field name registrations have been moved to
| [https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields] per [RFC9110].

IANA has updated the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name
Registry" with the field names listed in the following table.

+===========================+============+=========+============+
| Field Name | Status | Section | Comments |
+===========================+============+=========+============+
| Accept | permanent | 12.5.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Accept-Charset | deprecated | 12.5.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Accept-Encoding | permanent | 12.5.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Accept-Language | permanent | 12.5.4 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Accept-Ranges | permanent | 14.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Allow | permanent | 10.2.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Authentication-Info | permanent | 11.6.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Authorization | permanent | 11.6.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Connection | permanent | 7.6.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Content-Encoding | permanent | 8.4 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Content-Language | permanent | 8.5 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Content-Length | permanent | 8.6 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Content-Location | permanent | 8.7 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Content-Range | permanent | 14.4 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Content-Type | permanent | 8.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Date | permanent | 6.6.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| ETag | permanent | 8.8.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Expect | permanent | 10.1.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| From | permanent | 10.1.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Host | permanent | 7.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| If-Match | permanent | 13.1.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| If-Modified-Since | permanent | 13.1.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| If-None-Match | permanent | 13.1.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| If-Range | permanent | 13.1.5 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| If-Unmodified-Since | permanent | 13.1.4 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Last-Modified | permanent | 8.8.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Location | permanent | 10.2.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Max-Forwards | permanent | 7.6.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Proxy-Authenticate | permanent | 11.7.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Proxy-Authentication-Info | permanent | 11.7.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Proxy-Authorization | permanent | 11.7.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Range | permanent | 14.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Referer | permanent | 10.1.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Retry-After | permanent | 10.2.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Server | permanent | 10.2.4 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| TE | permanent | 10.1.4 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Trailer | permanent | 6.6.2 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Upgrade | permanent | 7.8 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| User-Agent | permanent | 10.1.5 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Vary | permanent | 12.5.5 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| Via | permanent | 7.6.3 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| WWW-Authenticate | permanent | 11.6.1 | |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+
| * | permanent | 12.5.5 | (reserved) |
+---------------------------+------------+---------+------------+

Table 9

The field name "*" is reserved because using that name as an HTTP
header field might conflict with its special semantics in the Vary
header field (Section 12.5.5).

IANA has updated the "Content-MD5" entry in the new registry to have
a status of 'obsoleted' with references to Section 14.15 of [RFC2616]
(for the definition of the header field) and Appendix B of [RFC7231]
 (which removed the field definition from the updated specification).

18.5. Authentication Scheme Registration

IANA has updated the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)

Authentication Scheme Registry" at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
http-authschemes> with the registration procedure of Section 16.4.1.
No authentication schemes are defined in this document.

18.6. Content Coding Registration

IANA has updated the "HTTP Content Coding Registry" at

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters/> with the
registration procedure of Section 16.6.1 and the content coding names
summarized in the table below.

+============+===========================================+=========+
| Name | Description | Section |
+============+===========================================+=========+
| compress | UNIX "compress" data format [Welch] | 8.4.1.1 |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+---------+
| deflate | "deflate" compressed data ([RFC1951]) | 8.4.1.2 |
| | inside the "zlib" data format ([RFC1950]) | |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+---------+
| gzip | GZIP file format [RFC1952] | 8.4.1.3 |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+---------+
| identity | Reserved | 12.5.3 |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+---------+
| x-compress | Deprecated (alias for compress) | 8.4.1.1 |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+---------+
| x-gzip | Deprecated (alias for gzip) | 8.4.1.3 |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+---------+

Table 10

18.7. Range Unit Registration

IANA has updated the "HTTP Range Unit Registry" at

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters/> with the
registration procedure of Section 16.5.1 and the range unit names
summarized in the table below.

+=================+==================================+=========+
| Range Unit Name | Description | Section |
+=================+==================================+=========+
| bytes | a range of octets | 14.1.2 |
+-----------------+----------------------------------+---------+
| none | reserved as keyword to indicate | 14.3 |
| | range requests are not supported | |
+-----------------+----------------------------------+---------+

Table 11

18.8. Media Type Registration

IANA has updated the "Media Types" registry at

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types> with the registration
information in Section 14.6 for the media type "multipart/
byteranges".
 IANA has updated the registry note about "q" parameters with a link
to Section 12.5.1 of this document.

18.9. Port Registration

IANA has updated the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number
Registry" at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-
numbers/> for the services on ports 80 and 443 that use UDP or TCP
to:

1. use this document as "Reference", and

2. when currently unspecified, set "Assignee" to "IESG" and

"Contact" to "IETF_Chair".

18.10. Upgrade Token Registration

IANA has updated the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade

Token Registry" at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-upgrade-
tokens> with the registration procedure described in Section 16.7 and
the upgrade token names summarized in the following table.

+======+===================+=========================+=========+
| Name | Description | Expected Version Tokens | Section |
+======+===================+=========================+=========+
| HTTP | Hypertext | any DIGIT.DIGIT (e.g., | 2.5 |
| | Transfer Protocol | "2.0") | |
+------+-------------------+-------------------------+---------+

Table 12

19. References

19.1. Normative References

[CACHING] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,

Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9111>.

[RFC1950] Deutsch, P. and J-L. Gailly, "ZLIB Compressed Data Format

Specification version 3.3", RFC 1950,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1950, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1950>.

[RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification

version 1.3", RFC 1951, DOI 10.17487/RFC1951, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1951>.

[RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version 4.3",

RFC 1952, DOI 10.17487/RFC1952, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1952>.

[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail

Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC4647] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Matching of Language

Tags", BCP 47, RFC 4647, DOI 10.17487/RFC4647, September
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4647>.

[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data

Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,

Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

[RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,

DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.

[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.

[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and

Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

[RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in

Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.

[RFC7405] Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF",

RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7405>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC

2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

[TCP] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,

RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

[TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol

Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
 [URI] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

[USASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character

Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.

[Welch] Welch, T., "A Technique for High-Performance Data

Compression", IEEE Computer 17(6),
DOI 10.1109/MC.1984.1659158, June 1984,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1659158/>.

19.2. Informative References

[ALTSVC] Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP

Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.

[BCP13] Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Multipurpose Internet Mail

Extensions (MIME) Part Four: Registration Procedures",
BCP 13, RFC 4289, December 2005.

Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type

Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, January 2013.

<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp13>

[BCP178] Saint-Andre, P., Crocker, D., and M. Nottingham,

"Deprecating the "X-" Prefix and Similar Constructs in
Application Protocols", BCP 178, RFC 6648, June 2012.

<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp178>

[BCP35] Thaler, D., Ed., Hansen, T., and T. Hardie, "Guidelines

and Registration Procedures for URI Schemes", BCP 35,
RFC 7595, June 2015.

<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp35>

[BREACH] Gluck, Y., Harris, N., and A. Prado, "BREACH: Reviving the
CRIME Attack", July 2013,
<http://breachattack.com/resources/
BREACH%20-%20SSL,%20gone%20in%2030%20seconds.pdf>.

[Bujlow] Bujlow, T., Carela-Español, V., Solé-Pareta, J., and P.

Barlet-Ros, "A Survey on Web Tracking: Mechanisms,
Implications, and Defenses", In Proceedings of the IEEE
105(8), DOI 10.1109/JPROC.2016.2637878, August 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2016.2637878>.

[COOKIE] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,

DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.

[Err1912] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 1912, RFC 2978,

 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid1912>.

[Err5433] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5433, RFC 2978,

<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5433>.

[Georgiev] Georgiev, M., Iyengar, S., Jana, S., Anubhai, R., Boneh,
D., and V. Shmatikov, "The Most Dangerous Code in the
World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser
Software", In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS '12), pp. 38-49,
DOI 10.1145/2382196.2382204, October 2012,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382204>.

[HPACK] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for

HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.

[HTTP/1.0] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and H. Frystyk, "Hypertext

Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1945, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1945>.

[HTTP/1.1] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,

Ed., "HTTP/1.1", STD 99, RFC 9112, DOI 10.17487/RFC9112,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9112>.

[HTTP/2] Thomson, M., Ed. and C. Benfield, Ed., "HTTP/2", RFC 9113,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9113, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9113>.

[HTTP/3] Bishop, M., Ed., "HTTP/3", RFC 9114, DOI 10.17487/RFC9114,

June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9114>.

[ISO-8859-1]
International Organization for Standardization,
"Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded graphic
character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No. 1", ISO/
IEC 8859-1:1998, 1998.

[Kri2001] Kristol, D., "HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and

Politics", ACM Transactions on Internet Technology 1(2),
November 2001, <http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.SE/0105018>.

[OWASP] The Open Web Application Security Project,

<https://www.owasp.org/>.

[REST] Fielding, R.T., "Architectural Styles and the Design of

Network-based Software Architectures", Doctoral
Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, September
2000, <https://roy.gbiv.com/pubs/dissertation/top.htm>.

[RFC1919] Chatel, M., "Classical versus Transparent IP Proxies",

RFC 1919, DOI 10.17487/RFC1919, March 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1919>.

[RFC2047] Moore, K., "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)

Part Three: Message Header Extensions for Non-ASCII Text",
RFC 2047, DOI 10.17487/RFC2047, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2047>.
[RFC2068] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., and T.
Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1",
RFC 2068, DOI 10.17487/RFC2068, January 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2068>.

[RFC2145] Mogul, J. C., Fielding, R., Gettys, J., and H. Frystyk,

"Use and Interpretation of HTTP Version Numbers",
RFC 2145, DOI 10.17487/RFC2145, May 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2145>.

[RFC2295] Holtman, K. and A. Mutz, "Transparent Content Negotiation

in HTTP", RFC 2295, DOI 10.17487/RFC2295, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2295>.

[RFC2324] Masinter, L., "Hyper Text Coffee Pot Control Protocol

(HTCPCP/1.0)", RFC 2324, DOI 10.17487/RFC2324, 1 April
1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2324>.

[RFC2557] Palme, J., Hopmann, A., and N. Shelness, "MIME

Encapsulation of Aggregate Documents, such as HTML
(MHTML)", RFC 2557, DOI 10.17487/RFC2557, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2557>.

[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,

Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2616, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2616>.

[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,

Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, DOI 10.17487/RFC2617, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2617>.

[RFC2774] Nielsen, H., Leach, P., and S. Lawrence, "An HTTP

Extension Framework", RFC 2774, DOI 10.17487/RFC2774,
February 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2774>.

[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,

DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

[RFC2978] Freed, N. and J. Postel, "IANA Charset Registration

Procedures", BCP 19, RFC 2978, DOI 10.17487/RFC2978,
October 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2978>.

[RFC3040] Cooper, I., Melve, I., and G. Tomlinson, "Internet Web

Replication and Caching Taxonomy", RFC 3040,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3040, January 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3040>.

[RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration

Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.

[RFC3875] Robinson, D. and K. Coar, "The Common Gateway Interface

 (CGI) Version 1.1", RFC 3875, DOI 10.17487/RFC3875,
October 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3875>.

[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

[RFC4559] Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and J. Brezak, "SPNEGO-based

Kerberos and NTLM HTTP Authentication in Microsoft
Windows", RFC 4559, DOI 10.17487/RFC4559, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4559>.

[RFC5789] Dusseault, L. and J. Snell, "PATCH Method for HTTP",

RFC 5789, DOI 10.17487/RFC5789, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5789>.

[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.

[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,

DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.

[RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status

Codes", RFC 6585, DOI 10.17487/RFC6585, April 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6585>.

[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer

Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer

Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.

[RFC7232] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer

Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests", RFC 7232,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7232, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7232>.

[RFC7233] Fielding, R., Ed., Lafon, Y., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed.,
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Range Requests",
RFC 7233, DOI 10.17487/RFC7233, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7233>.

[RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,

Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.

[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer

Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7538] Reschke, J., "The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Status Code
308 (Permanent Redirect)", RFC 7538, DOI 10.17487/RFC7538,
April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7538>.

[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext

Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

[RFC7578] Masinter, L., "Returning Values from Forms: multipart/

form-data", RFC 7578, DOI 10.17487/RFC7578, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7578>.

[RFC7615] Reschke, J., "HTTP Authentication-Info and Proxy-

Authentication-Info Response Header Fields", RFC 7615,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7615, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7615>.

[RFC7616] Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP

Digest Access Authentication", RFC 7616,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7616, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616>.

[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",

RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.

[RFC7694] Reschke, J., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Client-

Initiated Content-Encoding", RFC 7694,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7694, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7694>.

[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for

Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

[RFC8187] Reschke, J., "Indicating Character Encoding and Language

for HTTP Header Field Parameters", RFC 8187,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8187, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8187>.

[RFC8246] McManus, P., "HTTP Immutable Responses", RFC 8246,

DOI 10.17487/RFC8246, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8246>.

[RFC8288] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 8288,

DOI 10.17487/RFC8288, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8288>.

[RFC8336] Nottingham, M. and E. Nygren, "The ORIGIN HTTP/2 Frame",

RFC 8336, DOI 10.17487/RFC8336, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8336>.

[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers

(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
 [RFC8941] Nottingham, M. and P-H. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
HTTP", RFC 8941, DOI 10.17487/RFC8941, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8941>.

[Sniffing] WHATWG, "MIME Sniffing",

<https://mimesniff.spec.whatwg.org>.

[WEBDAV] Dusseault, L., Ed., "HTTP Extensions for Web Distributed

Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV)", RFC 4918,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4918, June 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4918>.

Appendix A. Collected ABNF

In the collected ABNF below, list rules are expanded per

Section 5.6.1.

Accept = [ ( media-range [ weight ] ) *( OWS "," OWS ( media-range [

weight ] ) ) ]
Accept-Charset = [ ( ( token / "*" ) [ weight ] ) *( OWS "," OWS ( (
token / "*" ) [ weight ] ) ) ]
Accept-Encoding = [ ( codings [ weight ] ) *( OWS "," OWS ( codings [
weight ] ) ) ]
Accept-Language = [ ( language-range [ weight ] ) *( OWS "," OWS (
language-range [ weight ] ) ) ]
Accept-Ranges = acceptable-ranges
Allow = [ method *( OWS "," OWS method ) ]
Authentication-Info = [ auth-param *( OWS "," OWS auth-param ) ]
Authorization = credentials

BWS = OWS

Connection = [ connection-option *( OWS "," OWS connection-option )

]
Content-Encoding = [ content-coding *( OWS "," OWS content-coding )
]
Content-Language = [ language-tag *( OWS "," OWS language-tag ) ]
Content-Length = 1*DIGIT
Content-Location = absolute-URI / partial-URI
Content-Range = range-unit SP ( range-resp / unsatisfied-range )
Content-Type = media-type

Date = HTTP-date

ETag = entity-tag
Expect = [ expectation *( OWS "," OWS expectation ) ]

From = mailbox

GMT = %x47.4D.54 ; GMT

HTTP-date = IMF-fixdate / obs-date

Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]

IMF-fixdate = day-name "," SP date1 SP time-of-day SP GMT

If-Match = "*" / [ entity-tag *( OWS "," OWS entity-tag ) ]
If-Modified-Since = HTTP-date
If-None-Match = "*" / [ entity-tag *( OWS "," OWS entity-tag ) ]
If-Range = entity-tag / HTTP-date
If-Unmodified-Since = HTTP-date

Last-Modified = HTTP-date
Location = URI-reference

Max-Forwards = 1*DIGIT

OWS = *( SP / HTAB )

Proxy-Authenticate = [ challenge *( OWS "," OWS challenge ) ]

Proxy-Authentication-Info = [ auth-param *( OWS "," OWS auth-param )
]
Proxy-Authorization = credentials

RWS = 1*( SP / HTAB )

Range = ranges-specifier
Referer = absolute-URI / partial-URI
Retry-After = HTTP-date / delay-seconds

Server = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

TE = [ t-codings *( OWS "," OWS t-codings ) ]

Trailer = [ field-name *( OWS "," OWS field-name ) ]

URI-reference = <URI-reference, see [URI], Section 4.1>

Upgrade = [ protocol *( OWS "," OWS protocol ) ]
User-Agent = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

Vary = [ ( "*" / field-name ) *( OWS "," OWS ( "*" / field-name ) )

]
Via = [ ( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ] ) *( OWS
"," OWS ( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ] ) ) ]

WWW-Authenticate = [ challenge *( OWS "," OWS challenge ) ]

absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, see [URI], Section 4.3>

absolute-path = 1*( "/" segment )
acceptable-ranges = range-unit *( OWS "," OWS range-unit )
asctime-date = day-name SP date3 SP time-of-day SP year
auth-param = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
auth-scheme = token
authority = <authority, see [URI], Section 3.2>

challenge = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / [ auth-param *( OWS ","

OWS auth-param ) ] ) ]
codings = content-coding / "identity" / "*"
comment = "(" *( ctext / quoted-pair / comment ) ")"
complete-length = 1*DIGIT
connection-option = token
content-coding = token
credentials = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / [ auth-param *( OWS ","
OWS auth-param ) ] ) ]
ctext = HTAB / SP / %x21-27 ; '!'-'''
/ %x2A-5B ; '*'-'['
/ %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
/ obs-text

date1 = day SP month SP year

date2 = day "-" month "-" 2DIGIT
date3 = month SP ( 2DIGIT / ( SP DIGIT ) )
day = 2DIGIT
day-name = %x4D.6F.6E ; Mon
/ %x54.75.65 ; Tue
/ %x57.65.64 ; Wed
/ %x54.68.75 ; Thu
/ %x46.72.69 ; Fri
/ %x53.61.74 ; Sat
/ %x53.75.6E ; Sun
day-name-l = %x4D.6F.6E.64.61.79 ; Monday
/ %x54.75.65.73.64.61.79 ; Tuesday
/ %x57.65.64.6E.65.73.64.61.79 ; Wednesday
/ %x54.68.75.72.73.64.61.79 ; Thursday
/ %x46.72.69.64.61.79 ; Friday
/ %x53.61.74.75.72.64.61.79 ; Saturday
/ %x53.75.6E.64.61.79 ; Sunday
delay-seconds = 1*DIGIT

entity-tag = [ weak ] opaque-tag

etagc = "!" / %x23-7E ; '#'-'~'
/ obs-text
expectation = token [ "=" ( token / quoted-string ) parameters ]

field-content = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB / field-vchar )

field-vchar ]
field-name = token
field-value = *field-content
field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
first-pos = 1*DIGIT

hour = 2DIGIT
http-URI = "http://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
https-URI = "https://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]

incl-range = first-pos "-" last-pos

int-range = first-pos "-" [ last-pos ]

language-range = <language-range, see [RFC4647], Section 2.1>

language-tag = <Language-Tag, see [RFC5646], Section 2.1>
last-pos = 1*DIGIT

mailbox = <mailbox, see [RFC5322], Section 3.4>

media-range = ( "*/*" / ( type "/*" ) / ( type "/" subtype ) )
parameters
media-type = type "/" subtype parameters
method = token
minute = 2DIGIT
month = %x4A.61.6E ; Jan
/ %x46.65.62 ; Feb
/ %x4D.61.72 ; Mar
/ %x41.70.72 ; Apr
/ %x4D.61.79 ; May
/ %x4A.75.6E ; Jun
/ %x4A.75.6C ; Jul
/ %x41.75.67 ; Aug
/ %x53.65.70 ; Sep
/ %x4F.63.74 ; Oct
/ %x4E.6F.76 ; Nov
/ %x44.65.63 ; Dec
obs-date = rfc850-date / asctime-date
obs-text = %x80-FF
opaque-tag = DQUOTE *etagc DQUOTE
other-range = 1*( %x21-2B ; '!'-'+'
/ %x2D-7E ; '-'-'~'
)

parameter = parameter-name "=" parameter-value

parameter-name = token
parameter-value = ( token / quoted-string )
parameters = *( OWS ";" OWS [ parameter ] )
partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]
path-abempty = <path-abempty, see [URI], Section 3.3>
port = <port, see [URI], Section 3.2.3>
product = token [ "/" product-version ]
product-version = token
protocol = protocol-name [ "/" protocol-version ]
protocol-name = token
protocol-version = token
pseudonym = token

qdtext = HTAB / SP / "!" / %x23-5B ; '#'-'['

/ %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
/ obs-text
query = <query, see [URI], Section 3.4>
quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
qvalue = ( "0" [ "." *3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." *3"0" ] )

range-resp = incl-range "/" ( complete-length / "*" )

range-set = range-spec *( OWS "," OWS range-spec )
range-spec = int-range / suffix-range / other-range
range-unit = token
ranges-specifier = range-unit "=" range-set
received-by = pseudonym [ ":" port ]
received-protocol = [ protocol-name "/" ] protocol-version
relative-part = <relative-part, see [URI], Section 4.2>
rfc850-date = day-name-l "," SP date2 SP time-of-day SP GMT

second = 2DIGIT
segment = <segment, see [URI], Section 3.3>
subtype = token
suffix-length = 1*DIGIT
suffix-range = "-" suffix-length

t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-coding [ weight ] )

tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
"^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
time-of-day = hour ":" minute ":" second
token = 1*tchar
token68 = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" )
*"="
transfer-coding = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter )
transfer-parameter = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
type = token

unsatisfied-range = "*/" complete-length

uri-host = <host, see [URI], Section 3.2.2>
 weak = %x57.2F ; W/
weight = OWS ";" OWS "q=" qvalue

year = 4DIGIT

Appendix B. Changes from Previous RFCs

B.1. Changes from RFC 2818

None.

B.2. Changes from RFC 7230

The sections introducing HTTP's design goals, history, architecture,

conformance criteria, protocol versioning, URIs, message routing, and
header fields have been moved here.

The requirement on semantic conformance has been replaced with

permission to ignore or work around implementation-specific failures.
(Section 2.2)

The description of an origin and authoritative access to origin

servers has been extended for both "http" and "https" URIs to account
for alternative services and secured connections that are not
necessarily based on TCP. (Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 7.3.3)

Explicit requirements have been added to check the target URI

scheme's semantics and reject requests that don't meet any associated
requirements. (Section 7.4)

Parameters in media type, media range, and expectation can be empty

via one or more trailing semicolons. (Section 5.6.6)

"Field value" now refers to the value after multiple field lines are
combined with commas -- by far the most common use. To refer to a
single header line's value, use "field line value". (Section 6.3)

Trailer field semantics now transcend the specifics of chunked

transfer coding. The use of trailer fields has been further limited
to allow generation as a trailer field only when the sender knows the
field defines that usage and to allow merging into the header section
only if the recipient knows the corresponding field definition
permits and defines how to merge. In all other cases,
implementations are encouraged either to store the trailer fields
separately or to discard them instead of merging. (Section 6.5.1)

The priority of the absolute form of the request URI over the Host
header field by origin servers has been made explicit to align with
proxy handling. (Section 7.2)

The grammar definition for the Via field's "received-by" was expanded
in RFC 7230 due to changes in the URI grammar for host [URI] that are
not desirable for Via. For simplicity, we have removed uri-host from
the received-by production because it can be encompassed by the
existing grammar for pseudonym. In particular, this change removed
comma from the allowed set of characters for a host name in received-
by. (Section 7.6.3)
B.3. Changes from RFC 7231

Minimum URI lengths to be supported by implementations are now

recommended. (Section 4.1)

The following have been clarified: CR and NUL in field values are to
be rejected or mapped to SP, and leading and trailing whitespace
needs to be stripped from field values before they are consumed.
(Section 5.5)

Parameters in media type, media range, and expectation can be empty

via one or more trailing semicolons. (Section 5.6.6)

An abstract data type for HTTP messages has been introduced to define
the components of a message and their semantics as an abstraction
across multiple HTTP versions, rather than in terms of the specific
syntax form of HTTP/1.1 in [HTTP/1.1], and reflect the contents after
the message is parsed. This makes it easier to distinguish between
requirements on the content (what is conveyed) versus requirements on
the messaging syntax (how it is conveyed) and avoids baking
limitations of early protocol versions into the future of HTTP.
(Section 6)

The terms "payload" and "payload body" have been replaced with
"content", to better align with its usage elsewhere (e.g., in field
names) and to avoid confusion with frame payloads in HTTP/2 and
HTTP/3. (Section 6.4)

The term "effective request URI" has been replaced with "target URI".
(Section 7.1)

Restrictions on client retries have been loosened to reflect

implementation behavior. (Section 9.2.2)

The fact that request bodies on GET, HEAD, and DELETE are not
interoperable has been clarified. (Sections 9.3.1, 9.3.2, and 9.3.5)

The use of the Content-Range header field (Section 14.4) as a request

modifier on PUT is allowed. (Section 9.3.4)

A superfluous requirement about setting Content-Length has been

removed from the description of the OPTIONS method. (Section 9.3.7)

The normative requirement to use the "message/http" media type in

TRACE responses has been removed. (Section 9.3.8)

List-based grammar for Expect has been restored for compatibility

with RFC 2616. (Section 10.1.1)

Accept and Accept-Encoding are allowed in response messages; the

latter was introduced by [RFC7694]. (Section 12.3)

"Accept Parameters" (accept-params and accept-ext ABNF production)

have been removed from the definition of the Accept field.
(Section 12.5.1)

The Accept-Charset field is now deprecated. (Section 12.5.2)

The semantics of "*" in the Vary header field when other values are
 present was clarified. (Section 12.5.5)

Range units are compared in a case-insensitive fashion.

(Section 14.1)

The use of the Accept-Ranges field is not restricted to origin

servers. (Section 14.3)

The process of creating a redirected request has been clarified.

(Section 15.4)

Status code 308 (previously defined in [RFC7538]) has been added so

that it's defined closer to status codes 301, 302, and 307.
(Section 15.4.9)

Status code 421 (previously defined in Section 9.1.2 of [RFC7540])

has been added because of its general applicability. 421 is no longer
defined as heuristically cacheable since the response is specific to
the connection (not the target resource). (Section 15.5.20)

Status code 422 (previously defined in Section 11.2 of [WEBDAV]) has

been added because of its general applicability. (Section 15.5.21)

B.4. Changes from RFC 7232

Previous revisions of HTTP imposed an arbitrary 60-second limit on

the determination of whether Last-Modified was a strong validator to
guard against the possibility that the Date and Last-Modified values
are generated from different clocks or at somewhat different times
during the preparation of the response. This specification has
relaxed that to allow reasonable discretion. (Section 8.8.2.2)

An edge-case requirement on If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since has been

removed that required a validator not to be sent in a 2xx response if
validation fails because the change request has already been applied.
(Sections 13.1.1 and 13.1.4)

The fact that If-Unmodified-Since does not apply to a resource

without a concept of modification time has been clarified.
(Section 13.1.4)

Preconditions can now be evaluated before the request content is

processed rather than waiting until the response would otherwise be
successful. (Section 13.2)

B.5. Changes from RFC 7233

Refactored the range-unit and ranges-specifier grammars to simplify

and reduce artificial distinctions between bytes and other
(extension) range units, removing the overlapping grammar of other-
range-unit by defining range units generically as a token and placing
extensions within the scope of a range-spec (other-range). This
disambiguates the role of list syntax (commas) in all range sets,
including extension range units, for indicating a range-set of more
than one range. Moving the extension grammar into range specifiers
also allows protocol specific to byte ranges to be specified
separately.

It is now possible to define Range handling on extension methods.

 (Section 14.2)

Described use of the Content-Range header field (Section 14.4) as a

request modifier to perform a partial PUT. (Section 14.5)

B.6. Changes from RFC 7235

None.

B.7. Changes from RFC 7538

None.

B.8. Changes from RFC 7615

None.

B.9. Changes from RFC 7694

This specification includes the extension defined in [RFC7694] but

leaves out examples and deployment considerations.

Acknowledgements

Aside from the current editors, the following individuals deserve

special recognition for their contributions to early aspects of HTTP
and its core specifications: Marc Andreessen, Tim Berners-Lee, Robert
Cailliau, Daniel W. Connolly, Bob Denny, John Franks, Jim Gettys,
Jean-François Groff, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker, Koen Holtman, Jeffery
L. Hostetler, Shel Kaphan, Dave Kristol, Yves Lafon, Scott
D. Lawrence, Paul J. Leach, Håkon W. Lie, Ari Luotonen, Larry
Masinter, Rob McCool, Jeffrey C. Mogul, Lou Montulli, David Morris,
Henrik Frystyk Nielsen, Dave Raggett, Eric Rescorla, Tony Sanders,
Lawrence C. Stewart, Marc VanHeyningen, and Steve Zilles.

This document builds on the many contributions that went into past
specifications of HTTP, including [HTTP/1.0], [RFC2068], [RFC2145],
[RFC2616], [RFC2617], [RFC2818], [RFC7230], [RFC7231], [RFC7232],
[RFC7233], [RFC7234], and [RFC7235]. The acknowledgements within
those documents still apply.

Since 2014, the following contributors have helped improve this

specification by reporting bugs, asking smart questions, drafting or
reviewing text, and evaluating issues:

Alan Egerton, Alex Rousskov, Amichai Rothman, Amos Jeffries, Anders

Kaseorg, Andreas Gebhardt, Anne van Kesteren, Armin Abfalterer, Aron
Duby, Asanka Herath, Asbjørn Ulsberg, Asta Olofsson, Attila Gulyas,
Austin Wright, Barry Pollard, Ben Burkert, Benjamin Kaduk, Björn
Höhrmann, Brad Fitzpatrick, Chris Pacejo, Colin Bendell, Cory
Benfield, Cory Nelson, Daisuke Miyakawa, Dale Worley, Daniel
Stenberg, Danil Suits, David Benjamin, David Matson, David Schinazi,
Дилян Палаузов (Dilyan Palauzov), Eric Anderson, Eric Rescorla, Éric
Vyncke, Erik Kline, Erwin Pe, Etan Kissling, Evert Pot, Evgeny
Vrublevsky, Florian Best, Francesca Palombini, Igor Lubashev, James
Callahan, James Peach, Jeffrey Yasskin, Kalin Gyokov, Kannan Goundan,
奥 一穂 (Kazuho Oku), Ken Murchison, Krzysztof Maczyński, Lars Eggert,
Lucas Pardue, Martin Duke, Martin Dürst, Martin Thomson, Martynas
Jusevičius, Matt Menke, Matthias Pigulla, Mattias Grenfeldt, Michael
 Osipov, Mike Bishop, Mike Pennisi, Mike Taylor, Mike West, Mohit
Sethi, Murray Kucherawy, Nathaniel J. Smith, Nicholas Hurley, Nikita
Prokhorov, Patrick McManus, Piotr Sikora, Poul-Henning Kamp, Rick van
Rein, Robert Wilton, Roberto Polli, Roman Danyliw, Samuel Williams,
Semyon Kholodnov, Simon Pieters, Simon Schüppel, Stefan Eissing,
Taylor Hunt, Todd Greer, Tommy Pauly, Vasiliy Faronov, Vladimir
Lashchev, Wenbo Zhu, William A. Rowe Jr., Willy Tarreau, Xingwei Liu,
Yishuai Li, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker.

Index

1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E F G H I L M N O P R S T U V W X

100 Continue (status code) *_Section 15.2.1_*

100-continue (expect value) *_Section 10.1.1_*
101 Switching Protocols (status code) *_Section 15.2.2_*
1xx Informational (status code class) *_Section 15.2_*

200 OK (status code) *_Section 15.3.1_*

201 Created (status code) *_Section 15.3.2_*
202 Accepted (status code) *_Section 15.3.3_*
203 Non-Authoritative Information (status code) *_Section 15.3
.4_*
204 No Content (status code) *_Section 15.3.5_*
205 Reset Content (status code) *_Section 15.3.6_*
206 Partial Content (status code) *_Section 15.3.7_*
2xx Successful (status code class) *_Section 15.3_*

300 Multiple Choices (status code) *_Section 15.4.1_*

301 Moved Permanently (status code) *_Section 15.4.2_*
302 Found (status code) *_Section 15.4.3_*
303 See Other (status code) *_Section 15.4.4_*
304 Not Modified (status code) *_Section 15.4.5_*
305 Use Proxy (status code) *_Section 15.4.6_*
306 (Unused) (status code) *_Section 15.4.7_*
307 Temporary Redirect (status code) *_Section 15.4.8_*
308 Permanent Redirect (status code) *_Section 15.4.9_*
3xx Redirection (status code class) *_Section 15.4_*

400 Bad Request (status code) *_Section 15.5.1_*

401 Unauthorized (status code) *_Section 15.5.2_*
402 Payment Required (status code) *_Section 15.5.3_*
403 Forbidden (status code) *_Section 15.5.4_*
404 Not Found (status code) *_Section 15.5.5_*
405 Method Not Allowed (status code) *_Section 15.5.6_*
406 Not Acceptable (status code) *_Section 15.5.7_*
407 Proxy Authentication Required (status code) *_Section 15.5
.8_*
408 Request Timeout (status code) *_Section 15.5.9_*
409 Conflict (status code) *_Section 15.5.10_*
410 Gone (status code) *_Section 15.5.11_*
 411 Length Required (status code) *_Section 15.5.12_*
412 Precondition Failed (status code) *_Section 15.5.13_*
413 Content Too Large (status code) *_Section 15.5.14_*
414 URI Too Long (status code) *_Section 15.5.15_*
415 Unsupported Media Type (status code) *_Section 15.5.16_*
416 Range Not Satisfiable (status code) *_Section 15.5.17_*
417 Expectation Failed (status code) *_Section 15.5.18_*
418 (Unused) (status code) *_Section 15.5.19_*
421 Misdirected Request (status code) *_Section 15.5.20_*
422 Unprocessable Content (status code) *_Section 15.5.21_*
426 Upgrade Required (status code) *_Section 15.5.22_*
4xx Client Error (status code class) *_Section 15.5_*

500 Internal Server Error (status code) *_Section 15.6.1_*

501 Not Implemented (status code) *_Section 15.6.2_*
502 Bad Gateway (status code) *_Section 15.6.3_*
503 Service Unavailable (status code) *_Section 15.6.4_*
504 Gateway Timeout (status code) *_Section 15.6.5_*
505 HTTP Version Not Supported (status code) *_Section 15.6.6_
*
5xx Server Error (status code class) *_Section 15.6_*

accelerator *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 6_*

Accept header field *_Section 12.5.1_*
Accept-Charset header field *_Section 12.5.2_*
Accept-Encoding header field *_Section 12.5.3_*
Accept-Language header field *_Section 12.5.4_*
Accept-Ranges header field *_Section 14.3_*
Allow header field *_Section 10.2.1_*
Authentication-Info header field *_Section 11.6.3_*
authoritative response *_Section 17.1_*
Authorization header field *_Section 11.6.2_*

browser *_Section 3.5_*

cache *_Section 3.8_*

cacheable *_Section 3.8, Paragraph 4_*
client *_Section 3.3_*
clock *_Section 5.6.7_*
complete *_Section 6.1_*
compress (Coding Format) Section 8.4.1.1
compress (content coding) *_Section 8.4.1_*
conditional request *_Section 13_*
CONNECT method *_Section 9.3.6_*
connection *_Section 3.3_*
Connection header field *_Section 7.6.1_*
content Section 6.4
content coding *_Section 8.4.1_*
content negotiation Section 1.3, Paragraph 4
Content-Encoding header field *_Section 8.4_*
Content-Language header field *_Section 8.5_*
 Content-Length header field *_Section 8.6_*
Content-Location header field *_Section 8.7_*
Content-MD5 header field *_Section 18.4, Paragraph 10_*
Content-Range header field *_Section 14.4_*; Section 14.5
Content-Type header field *_Section 8.3_*
control data *_Section 6.2_*

Date header field *_Section 6.6.1_*

deflate (Coding Format) Section 8.4.1.2
deflate (content coding) *_Section 8.4.1_*
DELETE method *_Section 9.3.5_*
Delimiters Section 5.6.2, Paragraph 3
downstream *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 4_*

effective request URI *_Section 7.1, Paragraph 8.1_*

ETag field *_Section 8.8.3_*
Expect header field *_Section 10.1.1_*

field *_Section 5_*; Section 6.3

field line Section 5.2, Paragraph 1
field line value Section 5.2, Paragraph 1
field name Section 5.2, Paragraph 1
field value Section 5.2, Paragraph 2
Fields
* *_Section 18.4, Paragraph 9_*
Accept *_Section 12.5.1_*
Accept-Charset *_Section 12.5.2_*
Accept-Encoding *_Section 12.5.3_*
Accept-Language *_Section 12.5.4_*
Accept-Ranges *_Section 14.3_*
Allow *_Section 10.2.1_*
Authentication-Info *_Section 11.6.3_*
Authorization *_Section 11.6.2_*
Connection *_Section 7.6.1_*
Content-Encoding *_Section 8.4_*
Content-Language *_Section 8.5_*
Content-Length *_Section 8.6_*
Content-Location *_Section 8.7_*
Content-MD5 *_Section 18.4, Paragraph 10_*
Content-Range *_Section 14.4_*; Section 14.5
Content-Type *_Section 8.3_*
Date *_Section 6.6.1_*
ETag *_Section 8.8.3_*
Expect *_Section 10.1.1_*
From *_Section 10.1.2_*
Host *_Section 7.2_*
If-Match *_Section 13.1.1_*
If-Modified-Since *_Section 13.1.3_*
If-None-Match *_Section 13.1.2_*
If-Range *_Section 13.1.5_*
If-Unmodified-Since *_Section 13.1.4_*
Last-Modified *_Section 8.8.2_*
Location *_Section 10.2.2_*
 Max-Forwards *_Section 7.6.2_*
Proxy-Authenticate *_Section 11.7.1_*
Proxy-Authentication-Info *_Section 11.7.3_*
Proxy-Authorization *_Section 11.7.2_*
Range *_Section 14.2_*
Referer *_Section 10.1.3_*
Retry-After *_Section 10.2.3_*
Server *_Section 10.2.4_*
TE *_Section 10.1.4_*
Trailer *_Section 6.6.2_*
Upgrade *_Section 7.8_*
User-Agent *_Section 10.1.5_*
Vary *_Section 12.5.5_*
Via *_Section 7.6.3_*
WWW-Authenticate *_Section 11.6.1_*
Fragment Identifiers Section 4.2.5
From header field *_Section 10.1.2_*

gateway *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 6_*

GET method *_Section 9.3.1_*
Grammar
ALPHA *_Section 2.1_*
Accept *_Section 12.5.1_*
Accept-Charset *_Section 12.5.2_*
Accept-Encoding *_Section 12.5.3_*
Accept-Language *_Section 12.5.4_*
Accept-Ranges *_Section 14.3_*
Allow *_Section 10.2.1_*
Authentication-Info *_Section 11.6.3_*
Authorization *_Section 11.6.2_*
BWS *_Section 5.6.3_*
CR *_Section 2.1_*
CRLF *_Section 2.1_*
CTL *_Section 2.1_*
Connection *_Section 7.6.1_*
Content-Encoding *_Section 8.4_*
Content-Language *_Section 8.5_*
Content-Length *_Section 8.6_*
Content-Location *_Section 8.7_*
Content-Range *_Section 14.4_*
Content-Type *_Section 8.3_*
DIGIT *_Section 2.1_*
DQUOTE *_Section 2.1_*
Date *_Section 6.6.1_*
ETag *_Section 8.8.3_*
Expect *_Section 10.1.1_*
From *_Section 10.1.2_*
GMT *_Section 5.6.7_*
HEXDIG *_Section 2.1_*
HTAB *_Section 2.1_*
HTTP-date *_Section 5.6.7_*
Host *_Section 7.2_*
IMF-fixdate *_Section 5.6.7_*
If-Match *_Section 13.1.1_*
If-Modified-Since *_Section 13.1.3_*
If-None-Match *_Section 13.1.2_*
If-Range *_Section 13.1.5_*
If-Unmodified-Since *_Section 13.1.4_*
LF *_Section 2.1_*
Last-Modified *_Section 8.8.2_*
Location *_Section 10.2.2_*
Max-Forwards *_Section 7.6.2_*
OCTET *_Section 2.1_*
OWS *_Section 5.6.3_*
Proxy-Authenticate *_Section 11.7.1_*
Proxy-Authentication-Info *_Section 11.7.3_*
Proxy-Authorization *_Section 11.7.2_*
RWS *_Section 5.6.3_*
Range *_Section 14.2_*
Referer *_Section 10.1.3_*
Retry-After *_Section 10.2.3_*
SP *_Section 2.1_*
Server *_Section 10.2.4_*
TE *_Section 10.1.4_*
Trailer *_Section 6.6.2_*
URI-reference *_Section 4.1_*
Upgrade *_Section 7.8_*
User-Agent *_Section 10.1.5_*
VCHAR *_Section 2.1_*
Vary *_Section 12.5.5_*
Via *_Section 7.6.3_*
WWW-Authenticate *_Section 11.6.1_*
absolute-URI *_Section 4.1_*
absolute-path *_Section 4.1_*
acceptable-ranges *_Section 14.3_*
asctime-date *_Section 5.6.7_*
auth-param *_Section 11.2_*
auth-scheme *_Section 11.1_*
authority *_Section 4.1_*
challenge *_Section 11.3_*
codings *_Section 12.5.3_*
comment *_Section 5.6.5_*
complete-length *_Section 14.4_*
connection-option *_Section 7.6.1_*
content-coding *_Section 8.4.1_*
credentials *_Section 11.4_*
ctext *_Section 5.6.5_*
date1 *_Section 5.6.7_*
day *_Section 5.6.7_*
day-name *_Section 5.6.7_*
day-name-l *_Section 5.6.7_*
delay-seconds *_Section 10.2.3_*
entity-tag *_Section 8.8.3_*
etagc *_Section 8.8.3_*
field-content *_Section 5.5_*
field-name *_Section 5.1_*; Section 6.6.2
field-value *_Section 5.5_*
field-vchar *_Section 5.5_*
first-pos *_Section 14.1.1_*; Section 14.4
hour *_Section 5.6.7_*
http-URI *_Section 4.2.1_*
https-URI *_Section 4.2.2_*
incl-range *_Section 14.4_*
int-range *_Section 14.1.1_*
language-range *_Section 12.5.4_*
language-tag *_Section 8.5.1_*
 last-pos *_Section 14.1.1_*; Section 14.4
media-range *_Section 12.5.1_*
media-type *_Section 8.3.1_*
method *_Section 9.1_*
minute *_Section 5.6.7_*
month *_Section 5.6.7_*
obs-date *_Section 5.6.7_*
obs-text *_Section 5.5_*
opaque-tag *_Section 8.8.3_*
other-range *_Section 14.1.1_*
parameter *_Section 5.6.6_*
parameter-name *_Section 5.6.6_*
parameter-value *_Section 5.6.6_*
parameters *_Section 5.6.6_*
partial-URI *_Section 4.1_*
port *_Section 4.1_*
product *_Section 10.1.5_*
product-version *_Section 10.1.5_*
protocol-name *_Section 7.6.3_*
protocol-version *_Section 7.6.3_*
pseudonym *_Section 7.6.3_*
qdtext *_Section 5.6.4_*
query *_Section 4.1_*
quoted-pair *_Section 5.6.4_*
quoted-string *_Section 5.6.4_*
qvalue *_Section 12.4.2_*
range-resp *_Section 14.4_*
range-set *_Section 14.1.1_*
range-spec *_Section 14.1.1_*
range-unit *_Section 14.1_*
ranges-specifier *_Section 14.1.1_*
received-by *_Section 7.6.3_*
received-protocol *_Section 7.6.3_*
rfc850-date *_Section 5.6.7_*
second *_Section 5.6.7_*
segment *_Section 4.1_*
subtype *_Section 8.3.1_*
suffix-length *_Section 14.1.1_*
suffix-range *_Section 14.1.1_*
t-codings *_Section 10.1.4_*
tchar *_Section 5.6.2_*
time-of-day *_Section 5.6.7_*
token *_Section 5.6.2_*
token68 *_Section 11.2_*
transfer-coding *_Section 10.1.4_*
transfer-parameter *_Section 10.1.4_*
type *_Section 8.3.1_*
unsatisfied-range *_Section 14.4_*
uri-host *_Section 4.1_*
weak *_Section 8.8.3_*
weight *_Section 12.4.2_*
year *_Section 5.6.7_*
gzip (Coding Format) Section 8.4.1.3
gzip (content coding) *_Section 8.4.1_*

HEAD method *_Section 9.3.2_*

Header Fields
 Accept *_Section 12.5.1_*
Accept-Charset *_Section 12.5.2_*
Accept-Encoding *_Section 12.5.3_*
Accept-Language *_Section 12.5.4_*
Accept-Ranges *_Section 14.3_*
Allow *_Section 10.2.1_*
Authentication-Info *_Section 11.6.3_*
Authorization *_Section 11.6.2_*
Connection *_Section 7.6.1_*
Content-Encoding *_Section 8.4_*
Content-Language *_Section 8.5_*
Content-Length *_Section 8.6_*
Content-Location *_Section 8.7_*
Content-MD5 *_Section 18.4, Paragraph 10_*
Content-Range *_Section 14.4_*; Section 14.5
Content-Type *_Section 8.3_*
Date *_Section 6.6.1_*
ETag *_Section 8.8.3_*
Expect *_Section 10.1.1_*
From *_Section 10.1.2_*
Host *_Section 7.2_*
If-Match *_Section 13.1.1_*
If-Modified-Since *_Section 13.1.3_*
If-None-Match *_Section 13.1.2_*
If-Range *_Section 13.1.5_*
If-Unmodified-Since *_Section 13.1.4_*
Last-Modified *_Section 8.8.2_*
Location *_Section 10.2.2_*
Max-Forwards *_Section 7.6.2_*
Proxy-Authenticate *_Section 11.7.1_*
Proxy-Authentication-Info *_Section 11.7.3_*
Proxy-Authorization *_Section 11.7.2_*
Range *_Section 14.2_*
Referer *_Section 10.1.3_*
Retry-After *_Section 10.2.3_*
Server *_Section 10.2.4_*
TE *_Section 10.1.4_*
Trailer *_Section 6.6.2_*
Upgrade *_Section 7.8_*
User-Agent *_Section 10.1.5_*
Vary *_Section 12.5.5_*
Via *_Section 7.6.3_*
WWW-Authenticate *_Section 11.6.1_*
header section *_Section 6.3_*
Host header field *_Section 7.2_*
http URI scheme *_Section 4.2.1_*
https URI scheme *_Section 4.2.2_*

idempotent *_Section 9.2.2_*

If-Match header field *_Section 13.1.1_*
If-Modified-Since header field *_Section 13.1.3_*
If-None-Match header field *_Section 13.1.2_*
If-Range header field *_Section 13.1.5_*
If-Unmodified-Since header field *_Section 13.1.4_*
inbound *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 4_*
incomplete *_Section 6.1_*
interception proxy *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 10_*
 intermediary *_Section 3.7_*

Last-Modified header field *_Section 8.8.2_*

list-based field Section 5.5, Paragraph 7
Location header field *_Section 10.2.2_*

Max-Forwards header field *_Section 7.6.2_*

Media Type
multipart/byteranges *_Section 14.6_*
multipart/x-byteranges Section 14.6, Paragraph 4, Item 3
message Section 3.4; *_Section 6_*
message abstraction *_Section 6_*
messages *_Section 3.4_*
metadata *_Section 8.8_*
Method
* *_Section 18.2, Paragraph 3_*
CONNECT *_Section 9.3.6_*
DELETE *_Section 9.3.5_*
GET *_Section 9.3.1_*
HEAD *_Section 9.3.2_*
OPTIONS *_Section 9.3.7_*
POST *_Section 9.3.3_*
PUT *_Section 9.3.4_*
TRACE *_Section 9.3.8_*
multipart/byteranges Media Type *_Section 14.6_*
multipart/x-byteranges Media Type Section 14.6, Paragraph 4,
Item 3

non-transforming proxy *_Section 7.7_*

OPTIONS method *_Section 9.3.7_*

origin *_Section 4.3.1_*; Section 11.5
origin server *_Section 3.6_*
outbound *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 4_*

phishing *_Section 17.1_*

POST method *_Section 9.3.3_*
Protection Space Section 11.5
proxy *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 5_*
Proxy-Authenticate header field *_Section 11.7.1_*
Proxy-Authentication-Info header field *_Section 11.7.3_*
Proxy-Authorization header field *_Section 11.7.2_*
PUT method *_Section 9.3.4_*

Range header field *_Section 14.2_*

Realm Section 11.5
recipient *_Section 3.4_*
 Referer header field *_Section 10.1.3_*
representation *_Section 3.2_*
request *_Section 3.4_*
request target *_Section 7.1_*
resource *_Section 3.1_*; Section 4
response *_Section 3.4_*
Retry-After header field *_Section 10.2.3_*
reverse proxy *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 6_*

safe *_Section 9.2.1_*

satisfiable range *_Section 14.1.1_*
secured *_Section 4.2.2_*
selected representation *_Section 3.2, Paragraph 4_*;
Section 8.8; Section 13.1
self-descriptive *_Section 6_*
sender *_Section 3.4_*
server *_Section 3.3_*
Server header field *_Section 10.2.4_*
singleton field Section 5.5, Paragraph 6
spider *_Section 3.5_*
Status Code Section 15
Status Codes
Final Section 15, Paragraph 7
Informational Section 15, Paragraph 7
Interim Section 15, Paragraph 7
Status Codes Classes
1xx Informational *_Section 15.2_*
2xx Successful *_Section 15.3_*
3xx Redirection *_Section 15.4_*
4xx Client Error *_Section 15.5_*
5xx Server Error *_Section 15.6_*

target resource *_Section 7.1_*

target URI *_Section 7.1_*
TE header field *_Section 10.1.4_*
TRACE method *_Section 9.3.8_*
Trailer Fields *_Section 6.5_*
ETag *_Section 8.8.3_*
Trailer header field *_Section 6.6.2_*
trailer section *_Section 6.5_*
trailers *_Section 6.5_*
transforming proxy *_Section 7.7_*
transparent proxy *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 10_*
tunnel *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 8_*

unsatisfiable range *_Section 14.1.1_*

Upgrade header field *_Section 7.8_*
upstream *_Section 3.7, Paragraph 4_*
URI *_Section 4_*
origin *_Section 4.3.1_*
URI reference *_Section 4.1_*
URI scheme
http *_Section 4.2.1_*
 https *_Section 4.2.2_*
user agent *_Section 3.5_*
User-Agent header field *_Section 10.1.5_*

validator *_Section 8.8_*

strong *_Section 8.8.1_*
weak *_Section 8.8.1_*
Vary header field *_Section 12.5.5_*
Via header field *_Section 7.6.3_*

WWW-Authenticate header field *_Section 11.6.1_*

x-compress (content coding) *_Section 8.4.1_*

x-gzip (content coding) *_Section 8.4.1_*

Authors' Addresses

Roy T. Fielding (editor)

Adobe
345 Park Ave
San Jose, CA 95110
United States of America
Email: [email protected]
URI: https://roy.gbiv.com/

Mark Nottingham (editor)

Fastly
Prahran
Australia
Email: [email protected]
URI: https://www.mnot.net/

Julian Reschke (editor)

greenbytes GmbH
Hafenweg 16
48155 Münster
Germany
Email: [email protected]
URI: https://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/