Literary Hermeneutics

Literary Hermeneutics

From Methodology to Ontology

By

Tomasz Kalaga
Literary Hermeneutics: From Methodology to Ontology

By Tomasz Kalaga

This book first published 2015

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2015 by Tomasz Kalaga

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
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ISBN (10): 1-4438-7231-8

ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7231-7
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................. 1

Chapter One ................................................................................................. 7

The Abandonment of the Self
1. Understanding and Misunderstanding
2. Reason and Intuition
3. Language
4. The Infinite Task of Hermeneutics

Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 33

(In)valid Probability
1. Reproducibility, Determinacy, Sharability
2. Misleading Significance
3. Recoveries of Meaning
4. Validity in Interpretation?

Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 67

The Truth of the Ontological Mirror
1. Existential Fore-structure
2. Subject/Object
3. The Circle of Understanding
4. Dwelling in Truth
5. Truth and Awareness

Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 101

The Ontology of the Self
1. The Romantic Dichotomy
2. Understanding – Explanation – Structure
3. Writing and Appropriation
4. The Text and the Self
vi Table of Contents

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 127

References ............................................................................................... 137

Index ........................................................................................................ 143

 INTRODUCTION

Understanding is the existential Being of

Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it
is so in such a way that this Being discloses
in itself what its Being is capable of.
—Martin Heidegger, Being and Time.

Contemporary literary theory regards hermeneutics as a somewhat

obsolete realm of critical studies. A progenitor of deconstruction and post-
structuralist criticism, the art of understanding outlived its usefulness and
value. The name “hermeneutics” is often associated with the essentialist
treatment of interpretation, a hermetic methodology whose task is to
unveil the concealed message of the text through a laborious analysis of
symbolism and allegories. Confronted with pragmatism, reader-response
theory, or ideological criticisms, hermeneutics appears as depository of
outdated, archaic notions which promote hegemonic uniformity of reading
and a fundamentalist idea of one true interpretation.
These opinions are partly correct. It would be, however, a gross
overgeneralization to attribute these qualities to all theories to which the
common umbrella term of hermeneutics had been assigned. The
etymology of the name, its clear affinity with Hermes, the messenger of
the Greek pantheon, points to a venerable origin of this school of thought
and its long-standing philosophical career. Indeed, hermeneutics features
in the works of Aristotle, and flourishes in the writings of such
Renaissance scholars as Vives or Clericus. The Enlightenment witnesses a
revival of the hermeneutic tradition, manifest in the works of Christian
Wolff and Johann Martin Chladenius, to name but two of the most
prominent philosophers of interpretation. Contemporary hermeneutics,
however, truly begins with the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher and
Wilhelm Dilthey, who correlate the dissociated scriptural, judicial, and
philological hermeneutics into an “art of understanding,” which is to
become the foundation of modern humanties. From that moment, which is
also the point of departure for the present book, hermeneutics undergoes
numerous metamorphoses which pertain to the character of its
methodology and fundamental presuppositions. The result of these
2 Introduction

changes is a philosophy which bears little resemblance to its original

essentialist, conceptual ancestor.
The aim of this work is to present and analyse the most significant
aspects of this evolutionary process. At heart, hermeneutics is a study of
texts. Yet, the conception of what the text represents, and therefore, of
what is uncovered during the act of exegesis has significantly changed
throughout the development of the art of understanding. From intentio
auctoris, the intention and message of the author, to internal semiotic
structures of the text, the object of literary analysis undergoes a number of
important transitions. Thus, the concept of textual meaning will be the first
of the primary issues of this study. The gradual mutation of the idea of
meaning is consequently accompanied by a change in outlook as to the
shape of the hermeneutic methodology. If the essence of the text is stable
and definite, then the hermeneutic act will take form of a recovery. If, on
the other hand, meaning is perceived as an indeterminate entity then
interpretation will assume a different mode, far removed from a mere
reconstruction of an existent content. Therefore, the second focal point of
the present argument is the character of the hermeneutic processes which
are put into play in the act of interpretation. Understanding, explanation,
judgement, and appropriation are only a few examples of the changing
faces of the hermeneutic methodology. Finally, the different notions of
meaning and different ways of dealing with these meanings necessitate
various definitions of what constitutes a correct and valid interpretation.
The criteria for an assessment are thus grounded upon various foundations,
whose spectrum stretches from the notion of truth as correspondence to the
relevance of interpretation to the reader’s self. Consequently, the third key
notion of the forthcoming analysis is the idea of correctness or validity of
reading.
The detailed analysis of the combined issues of meaning, interpretation,
and validity ultimately leads to the primary aspect of the aim of this book:
a demonstration of a change in the mode and purpose of hermeneutics. I
will attempt to describe how the evolution of the aforementioned three
theoretical aspects of hermeneutics results in a correlative metamorphosis
of utmost significance: the art of understanding changes from being a
methodological discipline to becoming an ontological instrument for a
redescription of the interpreter’s self. Such understanding of hermeneutics
belies its supposedly anachronistic character, and through a permanent
departure from the essentialist views and categories finds its place on the
map of contemporary literary theory.
The evolution of hermeneutics is best seen on the example of theories
where the displacement of the character of the concepts of meaning,
 Literary Hermeneutics: From Methodology to Ontology 3

interpretation, and validity is either most radical or most substantial. Thus,

the first philosopher to be discussed is Friedrich Schleiermacher, the father
of the so-called Romantic tradition in hermeneutics. The choice of this
particular scholar over his equally influential disciples and followers such
as Dilthey, Boeckh, or Droysen is dictated by two reasons. First,
Schleiermacher laid the foundations for contemporary hermeneutics, and
the study of his thought is most beneficial for the understanding of the
future changes in the paradigm of this discipline. Secondly, philosophers
who developed his ideas into systems which, as one could argue, were
more advanced in terms of coherence, also failed to take into account the
full spectrum and depth of his arguments. For instance, as Kurt Mueller-
Vollmer argues (Mueller-Vollmer 1986), Dilthey distorted and reduced
Schleiermacher’s contribution to hermeneutic studies by ignoring his
theories on the relation between language and interpretation. The analysis
of Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics and Criticism and General Hermeneutics
is a return to the roots of the study of interpretation.
E. D. Hirsch, who, as Frank Lentricchia observers “stands pretty much
by himself in the landscape of contemporary critical theory” (quoted after
Lundin 1999, 37), is the second scholar analysed in this work. Lentricchia’s
remark is symptomatic of Hirsch’s resistance against relativist approaches
to interpretation and his theoretical battles with such scholars as Stanley
Fish or Gary Madison. Hirsch is the most widely recognised devoted
supporter of a traditionalist stance in hermeneutics, a critic whose
essentialist views are an epitome of its author-centred version. The citation
above is not entirely accurate, as Hirsch’s stance is vehemently
championed by P.D Juhl of Princeton University, whose Interpretation: an
Essay in the Philosophy of Literary Criticism was largely written as a
defence and development of Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation.
Nevertheless, it is Hirsch who presents the best-argued and most coherent
investigation, which is also the most controversial in the epoch of the
relativity of meaning and values. Hirsch’s views, while adopting some of
ideas of Schleiermacher and rejecting others, provide the distilled essence
of positivist hermeneutics, and at the same time, as I will try to
demonstrate, prove the argumentative failure of this school of thought.
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s impact on contemporary philosophy and
literary theory is difficult to overestimate. My analysis of his work will be
confined to Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode), which is, next to
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, the most influential text of the 20th
century hermeneutics. In this text, and in particular in “Part Two: the
extension of the question of truth to understanding in the human sciences,”
Gadamer performs a radical critique of the tradition of epistemology and
4 Introduction

hermeneutics and, inspired by Heidegger’s thought, institutes the

ontological perspective into the art of interpretation. Although preceding
Hirsch’s work by several years, the work is developed in a completely
different vein, which instead of amplifying and extending the Romantic
tradition in hermeneutics conducts its shattering critique. Thus, Gadamer’s
views stand as juxtaposition to Hirsch’s writings and represent a
revolutionary development in place of theoretical exhaustion.
Paul Ricoeur’s literary theory is primarily postulated through the
works Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning and
From Texts to Actions. His hermeneutics constitutes the final stage in the
evolutionary process: taking inspiration from Gadamer’s philosophy,
reaching into the tradition of Romantic hermeneutics and adopting modes
of analysis from semiotic and structuralist thought. Ricoeur’s theory at the
same time consolidates and revolutionises; the views presented therein
stand in a diametrical opposition to Schleiermacher’s vision of hermeneutics
but share its conceptual origin. Ricoeur draws upon traditional concepts
and redefines them so as to present the reader with a hermeneutic theory
which is above all else a theory of the development of the self.
Each chapter of the present book is devoted to one philosopher.
Chapter One initiates the discussion by an analysis of Schleiermacher’s
hermeneutic theory. It begins with an exposition of the idea of pervasive
misunderstanding and the resultant necessity for a dependable and
universal hermeneutic method. The discussion proceeds to an outline of
Schleiermacher’s complex and frequently misapprehended or simplified
taxonomy of tasks and methods. This is conducted with particular regard
to Schleiermacher’s treatment of the subject/object dichotomy and the
ensuing ideas of projection and abandonment of the self. The second part
of the chapter deals with the philosopher’s often ignored thoughts upon the
relationship between language and the authorial intention, and progresses
to conclusive remarks about the notions of meaning, understanding and
validity.
Chapter Two proceeds in a reverse order, and begins with an extended
analysis of Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and significance, the two
facets of textual essence. This dichotomy is criticised from several
perspectives and, as I try to show, ultimately artificial and false. The
conclusions reached through this argument also pertain to the doubtful
nature of the hermeneutic process advocated by Hirsch. These processes
are outlined in detail and argued to be inherently misleading and
insufficient. The discussion ends with a criticism of Hirsch’s essentialist
idea of validity of interpretation.
 Literary Hermeneutics: From Methodology to Ontology 5

Chapter Three signals the ontological turn in hermeneutics. To provide

sufficient background for the analysis of Gadamer’s Truth and Method,
this chapter begins with an exposition of Heidegger idea of Dasein’s fore-
structure of understanding. It proceeds to the analysis of Gadamer’s
version of hermeneutic circle and the concept of prejudices, crucial for his
theory. The question of meaning is discussed in the light of the notions of
temporal distance and the fusion of the horizons. The closing part of the
analysis concerns the ideas of true understanding and the treatment of
validity as an ontological awareness.
Chapter Four analyses the relation between Paul Ricoeur’s identification
of hermeneutic functions and the resultant ideas of meaning and validity. It
begins with an exposition of Ricoeur’s innovative reconstitution of
Dilthey’s dichotomy of understanding and explanation, and analyses its
consequences for the hermeneutic theory. This account is followed by a
reconstruction of the reasoning towards appropriation, the final stage in
Ricoeur’s process of interpretation. The chapter ends with a presentation
of the validity of appropriation as an ontological instrument of change.
The conclusion of the book summarises the analysis from the four
chapters, and presents a consolidated account of the evolution of the
concepts of meaning, interpretation, and validity. It addresses potential
criticism from relativist schools of thought, and comments upon the
intrinsic value of thus envisioned hermeneutics for theoretical studies.
 CHAPTER ONE

THE ABANDONMENT OF THE SELF

1. Understanding and Misunderstanding

The more strict practice assumes that misunderstanding results as a matter
of course and that understanding must be desired and sought at every point.
(Schleiermacher 1998, 22)

The quotation with which I open the present discussion may be viewed
as the foundational motto of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics and said to
postulate a purpose which guides the philosopher throughout his
investigations. The certainty of the authoritarian tone of Schleiermacher’s
sentence may strike one as unusual, considering in particular the fact that
it is possible for hermeneutics to encompass both the spoken and the
written word. In the context of historical or literary studies, some
plausibility may be immediately given to the thought of misunderstanding
by default, based on the experience of frequent interpretative difficulties,
but if set against the notion of ordinary conversation, the idea appears
outlandish. Its connotations seem to suggest that every discursive
encounter is predestined to become a communicative failure. Yet to accuse
Schleiermacher of such naivety would be precisely to actively and
willingly provide a blatant confirmation of the idea rendered by the very
statement in question. For either the motto is nonsensical or its
significance is prone to misreading, the latter perhaps because
Schleiermacher’s sense of ideas of understanding and misunderstanding is
different from its conventional, everyday usage. Naturally, if Schleiermacher
is to be given the benefit of doubt here, then the second option seems
worthy of further examination.
It is difficult to overestimate Schleiermacher’s role in the ascent of
interpretation studies. His postulate of the persistence of misunderstanding
elevates hermeneutics from its supplementary role of clarification of
possible obscurities, to a metascience whose application in all cases of
textual interpretation becomes not an option but a necessity. In the words
of Jean Grondin, Schleiermacher abandons the “loose,” supplementary
8 Chapter One

sense of hermeneutics, in favor of the “strict” sense, which metamorphoses

the art of interpretation into a general Künstlehre, whose absence or
neglect in communicative acts yield the danger of constant misunderstanding
(Grondin 1995, 5-6). This shift of perspective functions as an ominous (yet
certainly convenient from the point of view of hermeneutics itself)
reminder of the fact that every instance of communication is always
burdened with a potential risk of going awry, and, as such, theoretically
supported, practical measures must be undertaken to ensure its success.
Grondin’s commentary in The Sources of Hermeneutics seems to suggest
that all communication is hermeneutic by nature, a conclusion relatively
easy to accept, yet one which ultimately reduces the significance of
Schleiermacher’s methodology. What Grondin sees in Schleiermacher’s
postulate is a magnification or intensification of the commonsense action
of understanding – the shift is quantative rather than qualitative. The
pervasiveness of misunderstanding enforces such changes as the increase
in frequency, a stricter practice or a more detailed procedure; an extension
rather than a complete transformation of cognitive faculties. That the latter
is actually the case will hopefully become apparent in the course of this
chapter.
Turning towards the possible reasons of the pervasive misunderstanding,
Schleiermacher notes that

[m]isunderstanding is either a consequence of hastiness or of prejudice.

The former is an isolated moment. The latter is a mistake which lies
deeper. It is the onesided preference for what is close to the individual’s
circle of ideas and rejection of what lies outside it. In this way one explains
in or explains out what is not present in the author. (Schleiermacher 1998,
23)

By and large, a statement that postulates the predominance of

misunderstanding over naturally expected comprehension is radical enough
to demand persuasive justification, especially if it involves an equally
radical transformation of the character of hermeneutic procedures designed
to remedy the suggested situation. The one provided by Schleiermacher
distinguishes two responsible factors:

[m]isunderstanding is either a consequence of hastiness or of prejudice.

The former is an isolated moment. The latter is a mistake which lies
deeper. It is the onsided preference for what is close to the individual’s
circle of ideas and rejection of what lies outside it. In this way one explains
in or explains out what is not present in the author. (Schleiermacher 1998,
23)
 The Abandonment of the Self 9

Hastiness is an affair relatively easy to avoid and does not constitute an

error of methodology but should rather be attributed to an individual’s lack
of appropriate diligence, an issue rather immaterial for the present
analysis. The second reason, prejudice, constitutes, on the other hand, the
cornerstone of Schleiermacher’s theory; as I hope to demonstrate, his
methodology and its consequent implications are, in fact, ultimately
nothing but derivatives of this initial assumption. Paraphrasing the
quotation, the most disruptive factor in any exchange of thought is the
participants’ prior individualised conceptions that stand in the way of
seamless, smooth communication. If freed from this hindrance, the
idealised version of communication would apparently involve a successful
projection of oneself into another’s thought, so as to understand perfectly
the original sense and meaning behind the written or uttered words.
The above fragment is significant not only because it dictates the
direction in which Schleiermacher’s theory further develops, but also
because it distinctly illuminates the stark difference and extreme
presuppositional dissonance between hermeneutic paradigms of
Schleiermacher and of Gadamer. Though we are running a little ahead in
our discussion since the latter’s philosophy will come under closer
scrutiny in Chapter Three of this book, where the contrast and its
consequences will be discussed in detail, it is worthwhile to distinctly
mark this moment as a reference point for future analysis. The presently
discussed treatment of the prejudices and preconceptions by
Schleiermacher is an excellent contrastive illustration of the radicalism of
Gadamer’s project of Horizonverschmelzung, which entails a diametrically
opposite treatment of the notion of prejudice.
If, as Schleiermacher claims, misunderstanding, perceived in the
manner of an error caused by an imposition of one’s own judgement,
occurs “as a matter of course,” then understanding in its idealised state,
requires an act of will. It follows then, that this act of will should be
accompanied by certain awareness, and prompted by a conscious effort
directed towards a specific purpose. Such an effort we may term as an
opening of oneself towards another, an opening whose chance of success
is dependent solely upon a parallel and simultaneous act of abandoning,
sacrifice or withdrawal of one’s own preconceptions.1

1
It may be worthwhile to investigate just how much modern ethical
philosophy of Encounter and Otherness is indebted to this pre-Heideggerian
thought. For instance, Ewa Borkowska sees within the thought of Emanuel
Levinas a relation towards the Other which always precedes other relations and
obligations. The relation with the Other is [...] non-intentional, without an
objective, object-less. It is a communicative “contact” based on self-
10 Chapter One

It is thus a no mean task that Schleiermacher sets before the potential

interpreter. The interpreting subject must become ready to fulfil three
correlated prerequisites that can be described as opening, suspension and
abandonment. While designed with an epistemological aim in mind, those
states are, of course, beyond mere epistemology in implications. If, as
Schleiermacher suggests, misunderstanding takes place when the reader
fails to suspend to a necessary degree his/her preconceptions towards the
text and the author, then the particular way in which concept of
understanding is used means above all a non-intrusive analysis of a
discursive statement. Correct understanding may occur only from a
position of a listener who chooses to withdraw him/herself into an
improbable state of non-selfhood. What is thus required is, in fact, such an
augmentation of subjectivity that is, as I hope to demonstrate, an example
ontological impossibility brought about by the strain of cross-purpose
intentions. It remains a matter of speculations, however, to what extent
Schleiermacher realised the impossibility of such an undertaking and
posited misunderstanding not only as natural but, in fact, unavoidable.
This would naturally mean that understanding is a platonic ideal and, as
such, unreachable: this issue will also be addressed in the later parts of my
argument. So far, we can establish that understanding and misunderstanding
necessarily entail the ideas of openness and abandonment of the self on the
part of the interpreter. As Schleiermacher writes “if the task is indeed
completely to understand the thoughts of another as their product we must
free ourselves from ourselves” (Schleiermacher 1998, 135). The apparently
transcendental requirement already hints at the trace of the metaphysical
which we will later uncover in the philosopher’s methodology.
With the primary requirement in mind, we can now address the details
of Schleiermacher’s methodology. In relation to both spoken and written

deprivation, selflessness and opening beyond the boundaries of cognition. It is

ethics of betrayal, exile and anxiety, ethics of sacrifice of the subject to the
Other, of givenness to responsibility without the possibility of the return to the
Self. [trans. mine] (Borkowska 2001, 153)
Levinas’ philosophy is clearly permeated with the concept of opening of
oneself towards the Other. Levinas’ “radical passivity,” to use a term coined by
Thomas Carl Wall (Wall 1999), entails an abandonment of selfhood in the face of
the Other, a relation which is primarily ethical. Discussing Wall’s work,
Borkowska notes that the perception of art is not based on participation but
primarily on distancing. The question of distance towards the object, though
treated here largely in ethical terms, becomes also fundamental for the
approximation of the status of the reader as an interpreter in Schleiermacher’s
work.
 The Abandonment of the Self 11

texts, the scope and the goal of understanding is clearly explained by the
philosopher in the following frequently quoted passage:

The task is also to be expressed as follows, to understand the utterance at

first just as well and then better than its author. For because we have no
immediate knowledge of what is in him, we must seek to bring much to
consciousness that can remain unconscious to him, except to the extent to
which he himself reflectively becomes his own reader. (Schleiermacher
1998, 23)

The above quotation reveals the target of interpretation, and as such also
the source of meaning in the text. But this issue is not without a certain
ambiguity. It seems initially, and this is in fact the most commonly held
opinion of Schleiermacher’s philosophy, that since understanding is
directed at the author of the utterance, then the text’s meaning will be
primarily instituted by intentio auctoris, the authorial intention. While we
are as yet unprepared to extrapolate in precise categories the notion of
meaning, we may, however, note that the attribution to Schleiermacher of
intentio auctoris as the only source of textual signification would not give
the full justice to his philosophy. It appears true that the author is the
central figure in meaning production (although this too may prove to be a
simplification, as I will later try to show), but it would be a mistake to
correlate the causal factor purely with the author’s intentionality. Since
Schleiermacher distinctly states that one must attain understanding of the
author on a level higher than the creator’s own, it becomes obvious that
meaning extends beyond the conscious intention. Let us therefore
emphatically reiterate that although the author becomes the focus of an
interpretative objective, intentio auctoris understood as a conscious
placement of meaning into the text is neither the prime nor the only facet
of this objective.
Instead, the task of interpretation is essentially holistic in its telos as it
encompasses both the conscious intention of the author and his/her
unrealised meaning. It thus follows that to understand the author better
than he does him/herself is to supply an interpretation broader, more
complex and as such inherently different to the one supposedly attributed
to intentio auctoris. By contrast, Hirsch, the main protagonist of the next
chapter of this book, reduces the notion of understanding the author to the
painfully literate conscious intention represented by what he calls “verbal
meaning.” That this cannot be the case with Schleiermacher is obvious
from both the above quotation and the intricacies of his interpretative
method. If the reader’s understanding is to exceed the author’s then one
cannot by any means equate intentio auctoris with the meaning of the text.
12 Chapter One

This of course does not exclude it from the scope of meaning; such a
perspective perceives mens auctoris merely as a constituent, a component
which, while perhaps dominant, is not at all a solitary one.
Such a perspective on the hermeneutic tasks seems to complicate the
status of the reader if considered in the light of the previously discussed
requirement of the abandonment of the self. It could seem that this demand
of the dispossession or withdrawal of selfhood may, at least in the
practical sense, equal the internal metamorphosis into the author. Yet this
sort of transmutation would represent a naive intentionalist perspective
and would essentially strip the reading subject of his interpretative
faculties. To examine closely the reader’s role in Schleiermacher’s
writings, let us focus on another fragment from the section of his
introductory remarks.

Before the application of the art one must put oneself in the place of the
author on the objective and the subjective side.
On the objective side, then, via knowledge of the language as he
possessed it, which is therefore more determinate than putting oneself in
the place of the original readers, who themselves must first put themselves
in his place. On the subjective side in the knowledge of his inner and outer
life. (Schleiermacher 1998, 24)

The above quotation helpfully reduces (at least temporarily) the quasi-
mystical notion of the abandonment of the self, to coherent
methodological guidelines for the interpreter. This does not, however,
prevent a certain tension from emerging as a result of the juxtaposition of
these two demands: what we have earlier termed as an opening towards
the text must also be accompanied by a full extension of investigative
faculties. What may appear a paradox in Schleiermacher’s writings can be
categorised from a perspective characteristic of our epoch of self-
conscious criticism as an absence of awareness of the difficulties raised by
the dichotomy objective/subjective. Tracing the elements of the rational
Cartesian legacy in Romantic hermeneutics, Roger Lundin writes:

Romantic hermeneutics in particular drew upon its resources in rationalism

and intuitionism and became, as a result, an odd amalgam of
methodological study and creative illumination, as the romantic theorists
employed procedural means to suggestive, intuitive ends. (Lundin 1999, 22)

Rationalism and intuitionism are not necessarily mutually exclusive: an

 The Abandonment of the Self 13

intuitively gained insight may be rationalised logically.2 A greater

inconsistency on the part of Schleiermacher is, however, the exclusion of
the scientific, objective reason from the paradigm of prejudices, which one
must abandon in interpretation. The evidently superior position of Reason
within conceptual hierarchy will once again become apparent in the
description of hermeneutic methodology. Lundin further remarks that

Hermeneutics is the “art of avoiding misunderstanding” but it must be

practised with both the rigor of science and the subtlety of an art. This is so
because of the isolation inherent to the condition of the post-Cartesian self.
That self is isolated within its own consciousness so dramatically that all
communication appears to be a case of translation fraught with peril and
difficulty. (Lundin 1999, 23)

Consequently, in Schleiermacher we find the tension brought about

through the desire for methodological objectivity set against the mystical
projection of intuitive faculties. Schleiermacher’s implicit intention seems
to be to establish the interpreter as a subject in the spirit of
Naturwissenschaften based on the transparent dichotomy of
objective/subjective. The absence of direct remarks on this idea induces an
impression that the philosopher automatically assumes a certain implicit
premise, an ideal character which the role of the reader is supposed to
have. The subjective element embodies the “prejudices” which impede
proper interpretation, being responsible for misunderstanding. Objective,
on the other hand, is the intellectual faculty which recovers, researches and
assimilates the knowledge of the language, the author, and the epoch.
Since the objective element is what must become dominant in exegesis, a
theoretical perspective demands that the reader be treated as a being of an
epistemological focus, where epistemology equals the traditional,
scientific recovery of factual truth. We will deal with this dilemma in the
following section.

2. Reason and Intuition

The argument presented so far gives an indication of Schleiermacher’s
engagement with the Romantic tradition, which occurs against a
background of a significant shift, a restructuring of balance extant in the

2
For example, intuitive insight is said to be one of the most important ways in
which great discoveries of modern science are made. For Charles S. Peirce, a
certain form of intuition, which he called “abduction” was an instance of
inferential reasoning.
14 Chapter One

predominance of the three “tasks” of hermeneutics: subtilitas intelligendi,

subtilitas explicandi, and subtilitas applicandi. The connection between
these processes, present in hermeneutics since the writings of Johann
August Ernesti in the 18th century, is based on what may be termed a
thematic correspondence: the subject matter as well as their difference of
purpose. The episteme of subtilitas intelligendi is a dormant, silent,
internalised knowledge of understanding related to the sphere of
consciousness. The techne, both subtilitas explicandi (the task of
explanation) and applicandi (the task of application) are a methodological
experience of externalisation of this knowledge, directed expressly at the
outside world. For Schleiermacher, however, as Richard Palmer writes,

[t]he art of explanation, which had constituted a large part of hermeneutic

theory, was held [...] to fall outside of hermeneutics [...] Explication
imperceptibly becomes the art of rhetorical formulation instead of the art of
“understanding.” In the conditions of dialogue, it is one thing to formulate
something and bring it to speech; it is quite another and distinct operation
to understand what is spoken. Hermeneutics, Schleiermacher contended,
deals with the latter. (Palmer 1969, 85-86)

Kurt Mueller-Vollmer agrees with Palmer with respect to the

specifications of the definition of Scheleiermacher’s vision of the art of
exegesis:

Schleiermacher viewed hermeneutics as the “art of understanding” where

understanding is elevated to the art of a scholarly discipline. He thought
hermeneutics should not, however, concern itself with the specific body of
rules found in the hermeneutic treatise of the theologians or jurists. Nor
should it include the presentation of what one has understood to others.
The latter was relegated to the sister discipline of rhetoric. Schleiermacher
argued that presentation amounted to producing another text which itself
would become an object of hermeneutic concern – but which was not a part
of hermeneutics. (Mueller-Vollmer 1986, 12)

The task of hermeneutics thus becomes synonymous only with subtilitas

intelligendi. The semantic sphere of the concept of interpretation
(Auslegung) is reduced to understanding (Verstehen). Significant is the
fact that Schleiermacher, as Mueller-Vollmer notes, treats these two
concepts synonymously (Mueller-Vollmer 1986, 12). Such an approach
from his perspective is completely justified. Since hermeneutics is the art
of interpretation and ought to consist purely of understanding, then the two
terms may be used interchangeably. In the following chapters, we will
witness those two concepts separate, albeit not always in a constant and
 The Abandonment of the Self 15

regular manner. As this eventual split will considerably contribute to the

evolutionary theme of this book, hence the present need for a clear
verbalisation of the observation that for Schleiermacher, to interpret
(auslegen) and to understand (verstehen) remain a couple of mutually
substitutable concepts.
Most sources categorise Schleiermacher’s methodology as consisting
of two main types of interpretation: grammatical and psychological
(technical). While not overtly inappropriate, this division is first of all not
entirely accurate, and secondly, through a definite caesura between the two
tasks, it diverts one’s attention away from the emphasis that Schleiermacher
places on the interdependence of those two types. This may consequently
lead to ignoring the fact that any hierarchical ordering between them is,
strictly speaking, absent. Richard Palmer attributes this division to the
mature period of Schleiermacher’s thought. According to him, the
separation occurs

[i]n Schleiermacher’s later thinking [where] there is an increasing tendency

to separate the sphere of language from the sphere of thought. The former
is the province of “grammatical” interpretation, while the latter
Schleiermacher first called “technical” (technische) and then later
“psychological.” (Palmer 1969, 88)

I largely disagree with Palmer on the issue of chronology of this tendency,

which supposedly occurred after Schleiermacher had outlined the most
prominent features of his theory. As it will hopefully become clear at the
end of this section, some of the most illuminative remarks concerning the
relation language/thought were written by this philosopher after the
detailed methodology of the psychological interpretation had already been
constructed. Thus if such split has occurred at all, it was clearly prior to
the development of the specifics of his theory, even though the
terminology assumed by the philosopher in his famous dichotomy of
psychological and grammatical may be semantically misleading. For the
present, however, let us focus on what is suggested by Palmer, and, in fact,
generally recognised to be the most important of Schleiermacher’s
contributions to hermeneutics – the psychological interpretation.
Rarely is full justice given to the subtleties of the taxonomy of this
particular section of his work. For instance, Josef Bleicher writes that
Schleiermacher “complemented grammatical exegesis with psychological
interpretation, which he referred to as ‘divinatory’” (Bleicher 1980, 15).
Even Palmer, a scholar of a well-deserved reputation for scrutiny and
conscientiousness, unfortunately overgeneralises in the already quoted
sentence “[the task] first called ‘technical’ (technische) and then later
16 Chapter One

‘psychological’.” To clarify this confusion, let us clearly distinguish the

individual items in this conundrum of terminology. Firstly,
Schleiermacher designates two basic tasks or types of interpretation:
grammatical and psychological. Within the psychological task, there exists
a separate division into the purely psychological and the technical. These
concepts should be differentiated from what Schleiermacher discusses as
two methods: the comparative, applicable both to the grammatical and
psychological tasks, and divinatory, applicable to the psychological task
only. In order to arrive at a coherent vision of Scheleiermacher’s concepts
of meaning and the act of interpretation, it is necessary to closely
scrutinize each of these elements in turn.
Since we will discuss the psychological task first, it is essential that we
elaborate upon the two methods according to which this aspect of
interpretation is meant to occur. Schleiermacher characterises his
methodological couplet in the following way:

The divinatory method is the one in which one, so to speak, transforms

oneself into the other person and tries to understand the individual element
directly. The comparative method first of all posits the person to be
understood as something universal and then finds the individual aspect by
comparison with other things included in the same universal [...] Both refer
back to each other, for the first initially depends on the fact that every
person, beside being an individual themselves, has a receptivity for all
other people. But this itself seems only to rest on the fact that everyone
carries a minimum of everyone else within themselves, and divination is
consequently excited by comparison with oneself [...] Both may not be
separated from each other. For divination only receives its certainty via
confirmatory comparison, because without this it can always be incredible.
But the comparative method does not provide any unity. The universal and
the particular must penetrate each other and this always only happens via
divination. (Schleiermacher 1998, 92-93)

The above passage reiterates two ideas which have been discussed so far:
the opening of oneself towards another (the author), and the paradoxical
feat of balance on the line of the subjective/objective dichotomy,
envisioned by Lundin as a concoction of Cartesian rationality and
“divinatory” intuitivism. It must be duly noted that Schleiermacher
perceives the two methods not as separate, independent exercises, but as
actions in a constant interplay with one another. The interpretative task is
carried out as a ceaseless movement of abandonment of oneself, projection
into another and a backward referral to oneself as a point of reference. It
appears difficult to reconcile one’s own prejudices, which, in fact, means
 The Abandonment of the Self 17

one’s own personality as an interpreter, with the suggested fluidity of

interpretation.
This concept of projection requires to be clarified on two primary
points. Firstly, one must address the matter of the implicit logical
premises. Acknowledged must be what surely lacks credibility from our
contemporary perspective: the objectification of the inquiring subject, or to
phrase this in accordance with the terminology used so far, the ability to
precisely separate the harmful, intrusive, and procrastinating individual
prejudices from the “scientific,” inquiring faculties of the interpreter’s
mind. Some aspects of this treatment of the subjective/objective
dichotomy are rather peculiar. It appears that the faculties of reason are
responsible for objective, universal observations which lead to an
establishment of equally universal and objective truths. As potential means
of acquiring these truths, the logical faculties are consequently excluded
from the paradigm of the ‘”prejudices,” and as such from the sphere of the
self. Thus when one speaks of the abandonment of the self, this
withdrawal of selfhood is not inclusive of those faculties which one is
supposed to smoothly separate from individual harmful prejudices.
On the other hand, Schleiermacher distinguishes a certain array of
universal qualities, independent of an individual experience; a set of
features which he believes to be a foundation for a general structure of
human existence. This notion is, unlike in the case of Wilhelm Dilthey and
Erlebnis, the lived experience, rather implied than overtly elaborated upon.
As Hans-Georg Gadamer comments on this underlying principle: “it
depends on a pre-existing bond between all individuals” (quoted after
Lundin 1999, 24). The belief in the universality of human experience is of
course hardly unexpected of Schleiermacher and perfectly in line with the
Romantic tradition of hermeneutic Auslegung. The common human
denominator is given priority in the divinatory act of exegesis as a ground
upon which interpretation occurs. Due to the presence of this denominator,
Schleiermacher is able to distinguish a category of intuition, to
complement that of methodological reason. It would seem that this faculty
belongs neither to the realm of the subjective prejudices nor to the
objective investigation, but is composed of, and owes its existence to both
spheres. In terms of its essence, origin and character, it is affiliated with
the individual subjective element and the common human denominator. In
terms of its employment, it is to be extended forth, not unlike the force of
reason in a scientific inquiry. The greatest weakness of this presumption is
the necessity of a conscious segregation of the individual prejudices from
legitimate intuitive insights. It is, at the same time, precisely what is most
difficult to accept by a modern reader, who is well-versed in the manifold
18 Chapter One

aspects of the 20th century critique of a self-knowing, self-containing and

self-critical human subject. Some manifestations of this critique, will, in
fact, become the cornerstones for the treatment of the theme of the relation
between meaning and understanding presented in this text.
Nevertheless, the reciprocal relationship between the divinatory and
the comparative methods may be regarded as advantageous and theoretically
quite alluring, since from the perspective of the reconstruction of meaning,
it constitutes an internally complete and legitimate system of verificative
procedures of interpretation. This assumes, of course, the acceptance of
the aforementioned premises. The divinatory and comparative methods are
in a constant state of flux, seeking confirmation in one another. Of the
comparative method Schleiermacher writes:

Looked at from the point of view of the hermeneutic task it is not possible
to consider the object in isolation. The object must first be considered in
the total domain of the literary life of the people and of the age, then in the
domain of the manner of composition, and finally in the total domain of the
peculiarities of the individual writer. This is the comparative procedure.
(Schleiermacher 1998, 144)

But as we have seen in one of the earlier quotations, the results of the
comparative method on its own lack the unity necessary for a complete
and coherent interpretation. That is why the ideas reached through the
comparative procedure are verified through the divinatory and vice versa.
One encounters here a far more complex and far better grounded system of
interpretative verification than the ones present in the methodologies of
Hirsch or Madison, for instance. Those theories (both addressed in Chapter
Two of this book) base interpretation upon meaning understood as purely
intentio auctoris and as such, as will be demonstrated later, deprive
themselves of any concrete validation reference. In case of Schleiermacher
it is perhaps difficult to speak of any amount of verificative certainty;
nevertheless, the fluctuating movement of the comparative and divinatory
procedures bears a strong resemblance to the classic notion of the
hermeneutic circle, but one which has been doubled. In case of the
conventional hermeneutic circle, confirmation is sought within the already
acquired knowledge. A part is a reference to whole and vice versa. In this
particular instance, one could imagine the movement of divinatory and
comparative procedures as a rotation of two overlapping circles. They are
both affixed within the studied text, yet one considers it from a textual
angle (comparative), the other from the “reader’s perspective” (divinatory).
This circular duality of the hermeneutic movement brings us to the
third point to be clarified; this verificative procedure is naturally linked
 The Abandonment of the Self 19

with and accordingly augments the role of the reader in the process of
interpretation. This role, previously determined through the opening
towards another, accompanied by a paradoxical requirement of objectivity,
is now endowed with a new kind of responsibility. Due to the play of the
comparative and divinatory methods, the reader acts not only through the
recovery of meaning, but also, due to his link with the author on the
grounds of the common human denominator, he becomes one of the two
factors (next to the general context) which partake in the action of
meaning verification. This action entails more than just ordinary,
expectable decision making. Rather, something which we may call a
“reader’s paradigm” is inscribed into the process of interpretation. The
paradigm excludes from its scope the individual prejudices, but contains a
combination of the ground of the common human experience and intuition
based upon that experience. Schleiermacher does not give an indication as
to where we should draw the line between prejudice and the suggested
paradigm itself. Nevertheless, one can find more clues as to the nature of
the reader’s involvement in the previously indicated subdivision of
psychological interpretation into purely psychological and technical.
In order to discuss this categorisation, we must circle back to our initial
point of departure and recall the essence of Schleiermacher’s idea of
understanding: “[...] every understanding is the inversion of a speech-act,
during which the thought which was the basis of the speech must become
conscious” (Schleiermacher 1998, 7). Since, according to the philosopher,
understanding is a process based primarily on reversal, the final object of
hermeneutic analysis is found entangled in the actions responsible for its
production in the first place. Hence, Schleiermacher attempts an analysis
of the creative process itself, analysis whose result is a taxonomy that
allows for an attribution of specific hermeneutic tasks:

[...] we must draw attention to another difference, namely to the difference

between the indeterminate, fluid train of thoughts and the completed
structure of thoughts. In the first is, as in a river, an indeterminate
transition from one thought to another, without necessary connection. In
the second, in complete utterance, there is a determinate aim to which
everything relates, one thought determines the other with necessity, and if
the aim is achieved the sequence has an end. In the first case the individual,
the purely psychological predominates, in the second the consciousness of
a specific progress towards a goal predominates, the result is intentional,
methodical, technical. The hermeneutic task accordingly splits on this side
into the purely psychological and the technical. (Schleiermacher 1998,
102)
20 Chapter One

The genesis is hidden [...] the former is the method of meditation, the latter
the method of composition [...] so the hermeneutic task is therefore
precisely to understand both acts in their difference. (Schleiermacher 1998,
103-105)

Speaking of the creative process, Schleiermacher describes the functioning

of the author’s mind in a methodologically productive manner. One could
say that what is therefore subdivided into the indeterminate and the
purposeful is the thought itself. The hermeneutic tasks attributed to this
twofold mental taxonomy are, correspondingly, the purely psychological
and the technical. For the sake of clarity we may turn to yet another of
Schleiermacher’s explanations:

The difference lies in the fact that the technical is the understanding of the
meditation and of the composition, the psychological is the understanding
of the ideas, among which the basic thoughts are also to be included, from
which the whole sequences develop, and is the understanding of the
secondary thoughts. (Schleiermacher 1998, 104)

In several places, Schleiermacher remarks that the tasks complement one

another and are conducted in a state of virtual simultaneity. The purely
psychological task is perhaps the most familiar to any scholar of literature
and theory, since it is still widely manifest in some school and university
curricula in various parts of the world. It is no more no less than a detailed
study of the author’s biography in relation to the text in question. This
approach, now often regarded as traditionalist or essentialist, explores the
potential links between events, historical background, readings,
associations and friendships, studies and journeys, etc. of the lifetime of
the author with the ideas behind the produced works. Schleiermacher
conscientiously delineates the precautions to be taken in such an analysis
and presents a comprehensive set of guidelines, which focus in particular
on such elements of the relation of life to work as unity of thought, choice
making, relationship between the inner, psychological and the outer,
worldly life. The knowledge acquired in these areas will provide the
interpreter with clues as to the impulses and motivations behind the text
itself (Schleiermacher 1998, 107-110).
The connection between the technical task and what Schleiermacher
calls meditation and composition is all too frequently circumvented in the
majority of the discussions of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. To reiterate
the early quotation, the creative process depends on a transgression from
thinking in the “loose” sense to purposeful thinking whose goal is the final
act of creation of a literary work itself. It is essential to recognise that
 The Abandonment of the Self 21

although Schleiermacher works upon this division and attributes to it once

again a separate hermeneutic task, the technical task is not focused as
much on the state of authorial meditation as on the instance of
transformation of meditation into composition. The state of thinking is for
Schleiermacher

in and for itself a moment, and thus transitory. But on the other hand such a
state leaves something persistent behind, deposits something, and the
repeatability of the original moment depends on that. If this were not the
case every idea would disappear in the moment itself and our whole being
would disappear every time in each moment. In the state of meditation the
momentary disappears, we retain what became at one moment in another,
and thence the whole thing is at the same time an act and this belonging
together, which lies in the continuing decision, overcomes the momentary
disappearing and should really completely overcome it. (Schleiermacher
1998, 125)

The meditative is therefore, and quite obviously, elusive to a degree that

forbids direct analysis. Yet, as Schleiermacher writes, it deposits behind
itself a trace and the repeatability of this trace, its persistent recurrence
eventually leads to the act of composition. The task of penetrating
another’s thoughts appears rather naive in its metaphysical objectives. As
a matter of fact, not only does it seem impossible to perform but also lacks
any clear criteria according to which its success or failure may be verified.
For this reason, it is more fruitful to understand Schleiermacher’s
meditation on mediation not as an objective in itself, i.e. an interpretation
whose final task is to understand the mind of the author, but rather as a
circular route which begins at the text, meanders through the analysis of
the psychological act of creation and leaden with a new cargo of
awareness returns to the text. Although the technical task, similarly to the
purely psychological one, has as its main object of study the author of the
text, within the moment of the analysis of the transition from meditation to
composition, the previously highlighted role of the reader as a verificative
power becomes more pronounced. One’s own self stands for the
interpreter as the only accessible reference in sight. We read in
Schleiermacher:

But in order to achieve the hermeneutic task in this sense one must above
all seek to recognise the relationship between the meditation and
composition of the writer. We begin with the general overview. But how
can we understand the inner process of the writer from this? By
observation. But this is based on self-observation. One must oneself be
versed in meditation and composition in order to understand another’s
22 Chapter One

meditation and composition. On this side one’s own composing is so

essential in practice for higher studies in literary gymnastics.
(Schleiermacher 1998, 135)

The divinatory method or at least a method similar in character permeates

the gist of the technical interpretation. In trying to understand the process
of creation, the reader inevitably turns to his/her own experience as a
scholar/writer. The above passage evokes a very important observation:
not only is the individual act of interpretation different for every reader but
this difference is primarily qualitative.
When postulating differences between various interpretations made
possible by Schleiermacher’s philosophy, I will not go as far as to suggest
a mirroring of the potentiality and instability of meaning found at the
foundations of the reader-response theories of, for instance, Wolfgang Iser
or Stanley Fish. 3 That this is not the case is strongly reinforced every time
Schleiermacher invokes the authorial figure as the prime source of
meaning. In spite of this, there are some implications in the above
quotation which suggest that Schleiermacher’s methodology attributes
more importance to the reader’s role than the philosopher himself would
have cared to admit. Schleiermacher explicitly states that a necessary
degree of proficiency is required for a correct interpretation; this naturally
means that depending on the skill of the reader, an interpretation may be
shallow or profound, good or bad. A reader well versed in meditation and
composition will be in possession of better faculties than a less skilful or
knowledgeable one, and as such his interpretation will be superior. This
fact is significant for two primary reasons. First, from the methodological
point of view it clearly sets out the criteria for an exegesis valid from a
hermeneutic perspective: one which is performed by a sufficiently
competent scholar. Secondly, it is strongly reminiscent of a far more
modern concept, a term which has comfortably settled into the modern
literary theory: the “model reader.” An abstract projection by the text of a
virtual existence of a model reader, a concept used for example by
Wolfgang Iser in The Act of Reading or Umberto Eco in Lector in Fabula,
an improbable entity which would conceive a perfect and complete
interpretation, is in fact a pure analogy of Schleiermacher’s model
interpreter, whose skill (and a method of meditation) would correspond to
the author’s so completely as to produce a reversal of the act of creation of
a literary work.
The notion of competence thus becomes of paramount significance in
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. Interpretation is not an egalitarian task:

3
With the full awareness of the differences between those two theories, of course.
 The Abandonment of the Self 23

some readers are more aware of the process of creativity and of the content
of the common ground of experience than others. What is particularly
discordant, however, is that this awareness must be maintained in the
action of opening towards the text and its author. One’s skills as a writer
and therefore as an interpreter are essentially placed outside the paradigm
of prejudices and into the sphere of the investigative faculties constituted
by reason and logic. Once again the paradoxical nature of Schleiermacher’s
request becomes apparent; somehow a clear separation must be conducted
within oneself in order to productively separate the harmful, intrusive
selfhood from its objective, logical counterpart. The hazards of this
problem will be fully addressed in the discussion of Gadamer’s Truth and
Method in Chapter Three of this book. For Schleiermacher, the difficulties
of the demand “to free ourselves from ourselves” remain unsolvable. On
the one hand, it is necessary to reject one’s own preconceptions in order to
empathise with the mind of the author. On the other, this action must be
conducted not only from a remote, distanced point of view, which within
the scheme of this hermeneutics is not part of the interpreter’s subjectivity,
but also with a highlighted awareness of the participation in common
human experience. Yet, according to Schleiermacher, the only place where
one can confirm the unity of experience is the interpreter’s own way of
being, thus ultimately the understanding of one’s own selfhood.
It would appear then, that Schleiermacher’s methodology is, at heart,
an impossible interplay of processes which involve both the subjectivity of
the author and of the reader. Though the task of projection and opening is
the primary mode of understanding, the verification of what has been
understood occurs against the background of the self which one has been
earlier asked to abandon. Reader’s competence is defined against a
criterion which combines objective reason and human experience whose
exact correspondence to the spheres of either objectivity or subjectivity
cannot be precisely established. The persistence of these paradoxical
relations poses difficulties in terms of an unambiguous definition of both
meaning and textuality in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. The category of
meaning is certainly characterised by its essentially recoverable quality.
For Schleiermacher, understanding is a reconstructive process, focused on
meaning as a product of the authorial mind. Yet, as we have established, it
cannot be merely truncated to the authorial intention, as the telos of
interpretation is to “understand the utterance at first just as well and then
better than its author.” Meaning therefore transcends intentio auctoris in
the sense that it encompasses content which extends beyond the author’s
awareness. This content cannot, however, be reduced to exposed relations
between the author and his/her contextual world, as the process which is
24 Chapter One

responsible for the recovery of meaning and its subsequent verification is

nested in the figure of the interpreter. Still, such an approach excludes the
individualistic, self-dependent sphere of the reader’s consciousness, as this
is precisely what must be abandoned in the act of opening which
constitutes the most decisive manoeuvre in understanding.
Nevertheless, one cannot deny the importance that Schleiermacher
attaches to the readerly competence. The qualitative difference in
interpretation, dependent upon the faculties of an individual reader,
without doubt influences the overall outcome of interpretation. The
criterion does not seem to be merely that of correctness or of scope. If, as
the philosopher writes, the elucidation of the relation between meditation
and composition in the author’s work is based on self-observation on the
part of the reader, then certainly those aspects of this relation will be
brought out which are considered important and productive for the reader
him/herself. Even if one maintains the feasibility of the idealistic objective
approach postulated by Schleiermacher, the hierarchical approach cannot
remain unacknowledged. The recovered textual meaning will therefore
consist of content to which a given reader gave priority based on
individual experience. The less significant content will be undervalued or
even passed over. The positioning of the reader as one of the elements in
the verificative procedure results in an occurrence of value judgements
which establish individual preferences, if not as criteria of correctness then
at least as standards according to which the importance is assessed. The
opening combined with an abandonment of the self can only be taken so
far, because in the advanced movement of the hermeneutic circle
Schleiermacher’s methodology necessitates a return to the previously
disregarded selfhood.

3. Language
As the discussion so far focused on the psychological aspect of
interpretation, it may misleadingly appear to the reader that this particular
type of exegesis should be given priority over the grammatical one. The
impression may be reinforced by the fact that Schleiermacher’s heritage
lies primarily in the development of the humanistic science precisely from
the angle of the psychological task. The intricacies of the grammatical
interpretation, which focuses largely upon the linguistic and stylistic
aspects of the studied text, are of lesser interest in terms of the thematic
scope of this book. As a matter of fact, the grammatical interpretation
receives very little attention from the contemporary scholars. In his
hermeneutic analysis Hans-Georg Gadamer writes: “we shall pass over