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The World Hitler Never Made Alternate History and the
Memory of Nazism First Edition Gavriel D. Rosenfeld
Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Gavriel D. Rosenfeld
ISBN(s): 9780521847063, 0521847060
Edition: First
File Details: PDF, 30.43 MB
Year: 2005
Language: english
THE WORLD HITLER
NEVER MADE
Alternate History and the Memory ofNazism
GAVRIEL D. ROSENFELD
,. . :~,. . CAMBRIDGE
::: UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN-13 978-0-521-84706-3 hardback
ISBN-IO 0-521-84706-0 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy ofURLs for external or
third-party internet websites referred to in mis book, and does not guarantee that any content on such
websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
Acknowledgments IX
Introduction
Comparative overview 29
1. Great Britain defeated: between resistance and
collaboration 34
2. The United States and the dilemmas of military
intervention 95
3. Germany's wartime triumph: from dystopia to normalcy 161
4. Other nations: a dissenting view 187
v
II'! Contents
PART III HYPOTHETICAL HOLOCAUSTS
Conclusion 374
Notes 398
Bibliography 492
Appendix: Alternate histories by theme, era, nation, and medium 510
Index 519
List ofillustrations
1. Scene from the 1947 play Peace in Our Time. (Source: John
Knowles, the Noel Coward Society). 43
2. TV Times cover featuring the 1964 film The Other Man.
Used by permission of IPC tx Limited. 53
3. Still from the 1964 film It Happened Here. Used by permission
of Kevin Brownlow. . 56
4. Page from Britain Invaded (1990). Used by permission of The
Trustees of the Imperial War Museum, London (negative
number HU36121). 73
5. Cover of Fatherland by Robert Harris (© 1992 by Random House,
Inc.). Used by permission of Random House, Inc. 78
6. Illustration of Hitler in Washington D.C. from the 1940 novel
Lightning in the Night by Fred Allhoff. © Liberty Library
Corporation. 98
7. Cover of The Man in the High Castle by Philip K. Dick (© 1962
by Philip K. Dick). Used by permission ofG. P. Putnam's Sons,
a division of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 105
8. Cover of Justice League ofAmerica Nr. 107 © 1973 DC Comics.
All Rights Reserved. Used with permission. II4
Vll
Vlll List ofillustrations
I3. Cover of WennAdolfHitler den Krieg nicht gewonnen hiitte (I979)
by Helmut Heissenbiittel. Cover design by Heinz Edelmann.
Used by permission of Verlag Klett-Cotta. I67
I4. Page from Strange Adventures Nr. 3 © I950 DC Comics.
All Rights Reserved. Used with permission. 204
I5. Cover of T-Man, issue Nr. 34 (I956). 206
I6. Still from the television episode "The Master Plan of Dr. Fu
Manchu" (I956). Used by permission of Alpha Video. 2IO
I7. Still from the Twilight Zone episode "He's Alive!" (I963).
Courtesy of CBS Broadcasting Inc. 2I5
I8. Cover of Who Will Watch the Watchers? by Edwin]. Fadiman
(I970). Used by permission of Little, Brown. 222
I9. Cover of The Portage to San Cristobal ofA.H (I98I).
Reprinted with the permission of Simon & Schuster Adult
Publishing Group from THE PORTAGE TO SAN CRlSTOBAL OF A.H.
by George Steiner. Copyright © I98I by George Steiner. 228
20. Still from the I996 film The Empty Mirror. Used with
permission of Walden Woods Film Company. 255
2I. Page from the comic book Adolfdie Nazi-Sau (I998-99).
© Eichborn Verlag AG, Frankfurt am Main, Mai I998. 260
22. Cover of Elleander Morning (1984). 275
23. Cover of The Iron Dream (I972). 288
24. Cover of Making History by Stephen Fry (© I996 by Random
House, Inc.). Used by permission of Random House, Inc. 299
25. Still from the Twilight Zone episode "Cradle of Darkness"
(2002). 306
26. Cover of issue Nr. 292 of the comic book The Fantastic
Four (I986). 323
27. Cover of After Dachau by Daniel Quinn (2001). 337
28. Cover of Die Stimmen der Nacht by Thomas Ziegler (I984)· 347
Acknowledgments
One evening while nearing the completion of this study, I was finishing
dinner at a Chinese restaurant in midtown Manhattan when I opened a
fortune cookie and read the message: "It's not helpful to wonder what
might have been." Had I taken such an admonition to heart, I never would
have been able to finish this book. But I also never would have done so
without the assistance of numerous persons and institutions.
I would like to thank Fairfield University for a third-year sabbatical
grant, which provided me with a semester free of teaching that enabled me
to complete an important portion of my research and writing. Special
thanks go to my department chair, David McFadden, for steadfastly
supporting my research proposals, to Harold Forsythe for passing along
several tips on sources, and to Cecelia Bucki and Patricia Behre-Miskimin
for patiently indulging my own speculations in the department hallway.
I would also like to thank the students in my upper-level seminar on
alternate history, all of whom contributed to my understanding of the
subject. lowe a special debt of gratitude to John Cayer, the director of
Fairfield's DiMenna-Nyselius Library's interlibrary loan office, who was
unfailingly helpful in securing obscure source material and always a joy to
chat with. And finally, I would like to thank Peter Sarawit at the media
center for helping me to produce digital images from VHS tapes for many
of the book's illustrations.
I am also grateful to scholars at other institutions. Particular thanks go to
Alon Confino, Saul Friedlander, Paul Miller, and Eugene Sheppard, who
read various portions of the manuscript and offered perceptive comments
that helped me refine my thoughts. I would especially like to thank my
father, Alvin Rosenfeld, for his careful copyediting and thoughtful stylistic
suggestions. Thanks also go to Volker Berghahn, Noel Cary, Marion
Deshmukh, Alexandra Garbarini, Jeffrey Herf, WulfKansteiner, Michael
Rothberg, Kristin Semmens, and Denise Youngblood, for participating in
conference panels at which selected chapters from the book were presented.
IX
x Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the American Historical Association, the German Studies
Association, and the Association for Jewish Studies, for permitting me to
present portions of my research at the organizations' annual conferences.
Thanks also to Vicki Caron and Cornell University, as well as Jonathan
Petropoulos, John Roth, and Claremont McKenna College for inviting
me to speak on my research. I would also like to thank Peter Baldwin,
Paula Hyman, Ned Lebow, Peter Mandler, Gary Kenneth Peading, Dirk
Rupnow, Jeffrey Weidlinger, and Jay Winter for providing answers to
questions that arose during the course of research and writing, and for
their general interest in my work.
In conducting the research for this book it was a real pleasure to
come into contact and exchange ideas with the producers of the sources
themselves. My most grateful thanks go to writers Jesse Bier, Michel
Choquette, Christian v. Ditfurth, David Dvorkin, AI Franken, Gary
Goss, Richard Grayson, Joseph Heywood, Brad Linaweaver, Arno
Lubos, E. M. Nathanson, Kamran Pasha, Hans Pleschinski, Craig Raine,
Arthur Rhodes, Leo Rutman, Norman Spinrad, Sabine Wedemeyer-
Schwiersch, Len Wein, and Thomas Ziegler for offering personal insights
into their own work. Thanks to playwright Robert Krakow for sending me
both video and print copies of his play, The False Witness, and to scholars
Adrian Gilbert, John Lukacs, Bruce Russett, Hugh Thomas, and Henry
Turner for responding w various questions of mine.
Writing this book has also been a gratifYing experience insofar as it has
confirmed the old adage about the "comfort of strangers." In the course of
my research I cast countless inquiries out into the heavily populated void of
cyberspace like so many digitized messages in a botde, hoping they would
be found and answered. I was extremely gratified that numerous individ-
uals, all unknown to me beforehand, responded with generosiry and
provided indispensable assistance by sending me copies of source material
and answering tough questions. They include: Bill Black and Mark Heike
of AC Comics for sending me a photocopy of the comic book T-Man,
Issue N r. 34 from 1956; Nick Cooper for sending me extremely rare tapes of
s
An Englishman Castle, as well as helpful information about Giles Cooper;
Sean Delaney at the British Film Institute for sending me hard-to-find
s
reviews of The Other Man, An Englishman Castle, and Night Conspirators;
Ida Heissenbiittel for faxing me reviews of her late husband's work; and
Mark Squirek for generously sending me a scan of the 1950 Strange
Adventures tale, "The Strange Fate of Adolph Hider." I received other
reviews from FrjthoffMiiller of the Siiddeutsche Zeitung, John Knowles of
the Nod Coward Society, Matthias Seeberg at Konkret magazine, Beate
Acknowledgments Xl
The streets on the way back into central Berlin seemed unnaturally
quiet, and when [detective Xavier] March reached Werdescher-
Markt, he discovered the reason. A large norice board in the foyer
announced there would be a government statement at 4:30 ... He
was just in time ...
How many of these events could March remember? ... In '38, he
had been called out of his classroom to hear that ... Ausuia had
returned to the Fatherland ...
He had been at sea for the next few broadcasts. Victory over Russia
in the spring of'43-- a triumph for the Fuhrer's strategic genius! ...
Peace with the British in '44 - a triumph for the Fuhrer's counter-
intelligence genius! ...
Peace with the Americans in '46 - a triumph for the Fuhrer's
scientific genius! When America had defeated Japan by detonating
an atomic bomb, the Fuhrer had sent a V-3 rocket to explode in the
skies over New York to prove he could retaliate in kind if struck. After
that, the war had dwindled to ... a nuclear stalemate the diplomats
called (he cold war. I
1
2 Introduction
Hitler had escaped from Nazi Germany in 1945 and gone into hiding in the
jungles of South America? What if Hitler had been assassinated or had
never been born? What if the Holocaust had been completed or could
somehow be undone? Such counterfactual questions may initially strike us
as absurd, even pointless. But they have been posed by an astonishingly
varied range of people and appeared in a dizzying array of venues. Alternate
histories on the subject of Nazism have been produced by high-brow
writers like Philip Roth, prodigious mass-market novelists such as Harry
Turtledove, playwrights like Nod Coward, politicians such as Newt
Gingrich, filmmakers like Armin Mueller-Stahl, and historians such as
John Lukacs. "What if?" scenarios involving the Third Reich have been
featured in American television shows like The Twilight Zone, Saturday
Night Live, and Star Trek, satirical journals like National Lampoon and The
Onion, comic books like Strange Adventures and The Justice League oj
America, and innumerable internet web sites. The list is an eclectic one.
But it demonstrates a clear trend: speculating about alternate outcomes to
the Nazi era has become a notable phenomenon in Western popular
culture.
What explains the growing tendency to wonder how the history of the
Third Reich might have turned out differently? My interest in this question
dates back over a decade to the year 1993 when I - like millions of readers
around the same time - picked up a copy of Robert Harris's novel
Fatherland, in my case to bring along for "light" reading on a research
trip to Germany. I must confess that my encounter with Fatherland was
hardly a transformative experience. Reading it was entertaining, but the
novel hardly converted me into an avid fan of alternate history. In the early
1990S, as Europeans and Americans were fervently marking the fiftieth
anniversary of the pivotal events of World War II, my attention was largely
focused on how the Germans were coming to terms with the real historical
legacy of the Third Reich half a century after its collapse. Nevertheless, in
the ensuing years my interest in alternate history gradually, if impercept-
ibly, grew. Ironically enough, the reason was not so much my already
strong interest in the past as my increasing fascination with the present.
Outing the second half of the 1990S, the information revolution hit the
mainstream and I, like so many others, became more and more intrigued
with the internet and the new culture it was spawning. As I grappled with
the concept of" cyberspace" and became aware of the blurring boundaries
between the real and the imagined, I became reacquainted with the work of
Philip K. Dick, a writer who was being celebrated for having anticipated
the rise of a virtual world. 2 I had read Dick's classic novel depicting a Nazi
Introduction 3
victory in World War II, The Man in the High Cast/e, some years earlier,
but only now began to see it from a new perspective. Soon enough,
I recognized Dick's connection to Harris, and then to other counterfactual
texts I had read long before by such disparate figures as William Shirer,
Ralph Giordano, and George Steiner. Finally, thanks to the world wide
web, I learned that my nascent object of interest was shared by others and
that it had a name - alternate history.
As I immersed myself in the field of alternate history and learned of the
surprisingly large number of counterfactual narratives that had been pro-
duced on the subject of Nazism, I became convinced that it represented a
significant trend. I was especially encouraged in this belief after I realized
that the phenomenon of alternate history was hardly new, but rather a
relatively well-established genre. As far back as World War II, and then
throughout the postwar era, a wide range of Europeans and Americans had
been prompted to produce highly elaborate counterfactual narratives about
the Third Reich. This compulsion had intensified in the last generation,
I recognized, but it was hardly unprecedented. In reflecting upon these
facts, I became curious about a variety of related questions: What set of
motivations or concerns had led people over the years to wonder "what if?"
with respect to the Nazi era? How had they imagined that the world might
have been different? What explained the growth of such accounts in recent
years? Finally, and most importantly, what did alternate histories reveal
about the evolving place of the Nazi past in Western memory? My long-
time interest in the shifting status of the Nazi legacy in postwar conscious-
ness made this question the most intriguing of all. In setting out to write
this study, therefore, I decided to focus on the various ways in which
alternate history could help shed light upon the subject of historical
memory.
In the process of researching and writing this book, however, I was
surprised to encounter deep-seated resistance to alternate history as a genre
worthy of serious study. Scholars of alternate history commonly lament the
lack of respect for their subject. Yet the genre's growing prominence had
led me to assume that such opposition had waned. Personal experience
taught me otherwise. At conferences where I spoke about alternate history,
more than a few prominent scholars raised epistemological, methodological,
and even moral objections to it. Some argued that since history deals solely
with the description and interpretation of events that really happened,
exploring what might have happened but never did amounted to little more
than idle speculation based on sheer fancy or wishful thinking. Others
expressed skepticism about the value of examining works of popular
4 Introduction
culture, insisting that they were of inferior quality compared with works of
high culture, that they were of marginal relevance, and that they were
therefore unworthy of serious consideration. I suspect that the moralistic
undertones to these objections, finally, were due to the fact that the
particular alternate histories in question focused on the highly sensitive
subject of the Third Reich. Several scholars expressed qualms about giving
attention to narratives whose unconventional conclusions about the Nazi
past they regarded as impious, at best, and dangerously revisionist, at worst.
Such works, they insisted, should simply be ignored as the rantings of the
lunatic fringe.
As I hope to show in the pages that follow, however, all of these
objections fail to appreciate alternate history's significance as an important
cultural phenomenon and overlook its unique ability to provide insights
into the dynamics of remembrance. In writing The World Hitler Never
Made, I hope to convince readers of alternate history's legitimacy as a
subject of scholarly inquiry and persuade them that examining tales of what
never happened can help us understand the memory of what did.
therefore, that alternate histories typically come in the form of both fantasy
and nightmare scenarios. 46 Fantasy scenarios envision the alternate past as
superior to the real past and thereby typically express a sense of dissatisfac-
tion with the way thing~ are today. Nightmare scenarios, by contrast,
depict the alternate past as inferior to the real past and thus usually
articulate a sense of contentment with the contemporary status quo.
Allohistorical fantasies and nightmares, moreover, each have different
political implications. Fantasies tend to be liberal, for by imagining a better
alternate past, they see the present as wanting and thus implicitly support
changing it. Nightmares, by contrast, tend to be conservative, for by
portraying the alternate past in negative terms, they ratify the present as
the best of all possible worlds and thereby discourage the need for change.
To be sure, these particular psychological and political implications do not
stand in a necessary or deterministic relationship to the two scenarios.
Indeed, it is fitting that both nightmare and fantasy narratives can reflect
alternate psychological and political impulses. Nightmare scenarios, by
showing how the past could have easily been worse, can function as liberal
cautionary tales that challenge the conservative belief that the present-day
world was inevitable, that it continues to be virtuous, and that it is destined
to be permanent. Fantasy scenarios, meanwhile, can be used in conserva-
tive fashion to construct escapist alternatives to the present that evade the
liberal injunction to confront its problems head-on. The implications of all
allohistorical scenarios, in short, are complex. But, on the whole, they
explore the past instrumentally with an eye towards larger, present-day
agendas.
The presentist character of alternate history helps explain its special attrac-
tion to the subject of Nazism. Within the general field of alternate history,
the Third Reich has been explored more often than any other historical
theme. 47 The reason for the Nazi era's popularity is complicated, but it
likely is due to its enduring ability to attract and repel the contemporary
imagination. On the whole, alternate history as a genre tends to focus on
pivotal events of world historical importance that have squarely left their
mark on the world of today. These events, or "points of divergence,"
include the deaths of kings and politicians, decisive military victories or
defeats, the rise of grand cultural or religious movements, and even demo-
graphic trends, such as migrations or plagues. The fact that the Third Reich
is the most commonly explored subject in alternate history reflects Western
12 Introduction
society's enduring awareness of its creation as a pivotal event that has
shaped the contemporary world like few other events have. It is no wonder,
then, that it has become the most commonly explored topic in all of
alternate history. In short, the many speculative narratives of the Third
Reich reflect the enduring centrality of the Nazi past in Western memory.
What specifically, however, do alternate histories of the Nazi era reveal
about how the Third Reich has been remembered? Despite the intrinsic
interest of this question, there has up to now been little scholarly interest in
allohistorical representations of Nazism. 48 This neglect is surprising for
several reasons. For one thing, in recent years a great number of scholarly
works have examined the memory of Nazism in a wide range of cultural
fields -literature, film, architecture, art, theater, and photography, among
others.49 Scholars, indeed, seem to have examined nearly all aspects of
Western culture except alternate history. It is possible that alternate history
has been overlooked precisely because it spans many of these forms of
cultural expression and belongs to none in particular. But whatever the
reason, this omission is surprising, since alternate history possesses a
unique ability to illuminate the workings of historical memory.5 0 Oddly
enough, alternate histories lend themselves very well to being studied as
documents of memory for the same reason that most historians have
dismissed them as useless for the study of history - their fundamental
subjectivity. 51 Speculative accounts about the past are driven by many of
the same psychological forces that determine how the past takes shape in
remembrance, Biases, fears, wishes, the desire to avoid guilt, the quest for
vindication - these and other related sentiments all influence the ways in
which alternate histories represent how the past might have been, just as
they influence the ways in which people remember how the past "really"
was. The role of such forces in shaping the allohistorical reimagining of the
past clearly shows that they are fundamentally rooted in subjective specu-
lation. Yet while they are subjective, alternate histories hardly lack repre-
sentative value. Since 1945, alternate histories of Nazism have rarely
appeared in isolated fashion but usually have emerged in waves during
specific eras. In a word, they have illustrated collective speculative trends
that provide a revealing reflection of broader views of the past.
Of course, there exist numerous challenges to studying alternate his-
tories of Nazism as documents of memory. The most apparent is the
quantity and diversity of the narratives themselves. Well over one hundred
allohistorical works have been produced on the Third Reich in the last half
century. 52 They have appeared in a wide range of cultural forms: highbrow
works of literature, pulp fiction novels, science fiction magazine short
Introduction 13
stories, independent and studio-based film productions, prime-time tele-
vision broadcasts, theatrical plays, historiographical essays and anthologies,
mass-market comic books, internet web sites, and role-playing video
games. These narratives, moreover, have featured a wide range of allohis-
torical premises and outcomes. Understandably enough, the scope and
diversity of alternate histories of the Third Reich make examining them a
daunting task. After immersing myself in the field, however, I gradually
came to see that analyzing them in comprehensive fashion provided the
best means of gauging their overall significance. I became especially con-
vinced of the merit of proceeding in this way once I recognized that among
the many themes portrayed by counterfactual tales of the Nazi past, four
recurred with striking frequency. These included tales in which: I) the
Nazis win World War II; 2) Hitler escapes death in 1945 and survives in
hiding well into the postwar era; 3) Hitler is removed from the world
historical stage either before or some time after becoming the Fiihrer; 4) the
Holocaust is completed, avenged, or undone altogether. The predom-
inance of these four themes is significant, for it not only suggests their
resonance within the Western imagination but enables us to impose some
conceptual order on what otherwise would be a bewilderingly diverse range
of works.
In structuring the present study, therefore, I have devoted separate
chapters to the themes of a Nazi wartime victoty, Hitler's survival, the
world without the Fiihrer, and the Holocaust. I examine each chapter's
respective theme from a variety of analytical perspectives. First, I classify
and analyze the various narratives either as nightmare or fantasy scenarios.
Some scenarios, such as the Nazis winning World War II, are clear
examples of the former. Others, such as Hitler's elimination from history,
exemplify the latter. Certain themes, meanwhile, bridge both categories. 53
Exploring whether alternate histories have more commonly expressed fears
or fantasies provides one index of Western views of Nazism. A second and
more significant method is provided by analyzing how works of alternate
history have actually answered their respective "what if" questions. 54 In
changing the historical record - say, by having Hitler captured and placed
on trial- have they projected alternate history turning out better or worse
than (or no different from) real history? Examining this question, further-
more, illustrates the function of alternate histories: that is, whether their
reimagining of the past has been intended to validate or criticize the
present. Third, studying the identities of the authors of alternate histories
and their motives for writing them clarifies their own relationship to the
Nazi past. Such factors as an author's national origins, generational identity,
14 Introduction
and political affiliation can illuminate their motives for speculating about the
past. Fourth, looking at how alternate histories of Nazism have been received
by critics and general readers reveals the extent to which their depictions of
the Nazi past reflect the views of the public at large. 55 Discovering whether a
given narrative was a critical success or failure, whether it was a commercial
hit or a flop, and whether it was ignored or caused controversy provides a
sense of its larger resonance. Finally, examining how the conclusions and
reception of allohistorical depictions of the Third Reich have changed over
time reveals whether Western views of the Third Reich have remained static
or have evolved. In short, a synchronic and diachronic method of analyzing
alternate histories provides the most thorough means of understanding their
significance as documents of memory.
Looking at alternate histcries of the Third Reich in this fashion can yield a
variety of unique insights into how the Nazi era has been remembered in
postwar Western society. First, analyzing alternate histories helps us better
understand the role of popular culture in shaping the memory of Nazism. 56
While scholars have long explored the representation of the Third Reich in
"high" culture, they have only recently begun to do the same thing in the
more "lowbrow" realm of popular culture. 57 Alternate histories, whether
appearing as novels, films, television broadcasts, or comic books, clearly
belong to this latter category of cultud production. Like all works of
popular culture, they have been intentionally made for a mass audience and
thus have pursued commercial aims as much as artistic ones. 58 This fact is
significant, for it alerts us to how commercial pressures can shape the
content of a historical narrative and possibly distort the general public's
broader understanding of history. 59 Arguably the most important thing to
recognize about popular cultural representations of history, however, is
their immense public reach. Given the millions of people who are exposed
to historical films, television broadcasts, and novels, it is highly likely that
mass-market historical narratives are shaping popular historical awareness
to a much greater extent than the histories produced by professional
historians. 60 Alternate histories of Nazism obey these same dynamics.
Whether in the form of bestselling novels, feature films, or prime-time
television programs, they have reached untold millions of readers and
viewers. Analyzing their broader messages, together with their reception,
provides an excellent means of extending our study of memory beyond the
Introduction 15
more limited realm of high culture and allows us to produce a more
representative portrait of the views of society at large.
A focus on alternate histories of the Third Reich also allows us to
examine memory in comparative fashion. While most scholars have exam-
ined the shifting consciousness of the Nazi era within individual national
contexts, this book aims for a broader perspective. 61 Allohistorical accounts
of the Third Reich have appeared in nations all over the world, spanning
the continents of Europe, North America, South America, and Asia. The
vast majority, however, have aPEeared in three countries: Great Britain, the
United States, and Germany. 2 Of these three, Britain and the United
States far and away have produced the most - 80 percent. 63 Explaining the
significance of this trend is difficult, as we still lack comprehensive studies
of the place of the Nazi past in postwar British and American historical
consciousness. 64 At first glance, however, the Anglo-American origin of
most alternate histories suggests that the impulse to produce them has been
especially strong among those nations that were on the winning side of
World War II. Similarly, the fact that alternate history is a variety of
popular culture and thus a form of entertainment also helps to explain
why the war's primary loser, Germany, has generated such a small number
of accounts - around 15 percent. Audiences within World War II's victor
nations have been able to read and enjoy alternate histories of Nazism as
works of entertainment, but Germans have not been able to enjoy the
luxury of embracing such a playful relationship to the past. Given that the
Nazi era brought unprecedented misery to their country, Germans under-
standably have been reluctant to confront the Nazi experience through a
genre of narrative representation whose chief characteristics and underlying
motives may easily be dismissed as shallow and merely commercial. This is
probably the same reason few alternate histories of Nazism have appeared
in France and Russia, two nations that were ostensibly among the war's
winners but that experienced the war's horrors much more directly than
Britons and Americans. Whatever the case may be, the predominance of
British, American, and German authors in producing alternate histories of
Nazism allows us to compare and contrast how the three nations have
remembered the years of the Third Reich and World War II.
historical legacy no different from any other and can thus be seen as part of
a larger attempt to reduce its prominence in current consciousness, if not to
render it forgotten altogether.
The Third Reich is one historical era that has long resisted normal-
ization. For many reasons, the Nazi period has been viewed as different
from other periods of history. It has cast a long shadow not merely across
German history but also across European history, Jewish history, and the
history of modern Western civilization at large. The most obvious reason
for the Nazi era's disproportionately prominent status in current con-
sciousness is its notorious degree of criminality. In unleashing World
War II and perpetrating the Holocaust, among many other misdeeds, the
Nazis committed crimes that were so extreme as to be epochal in nature.
Beyond being suffused with a unique degree of criminality, moreover, the
Third Reich also lies in the very recent past. To a far greater degree than
more distant historical eras, the Nazi experience survives within living
"communicative" memory. For these reasons, historians and others have
insisted for many years on seeing and assessing the Nazi era from a
manifestly moral perspective. Non-fictional as well as fictional accounts
of the Nazi period since 1945 have long been defined by a shared belief in
Nazism's absolute evil?' They have been characterized by a commitment
to judging the perpetrators for their crimes and granting appropriate
respect and sympathy to the victims. The main reason for this practice
has been the perceived necessity of transmitting moral lessons to posterity,
chief among them George Santayana's oft-quoted admonition, "Those
who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it." This injunc-
tion has remained widely accepted up to our present day. The continuing
effort to bring Nazi war criminals to justice, the ongoing attempts to
financially compensate Holocaust victims, and the enduring vitality of
the general culture of commemoration in Europe and the United States
clearly demonstrate the enduring belief in the necessity of memory:·
And yet, over the course of the last generation, the perceived obligation to
depict the Third Reich in moral terms has been steadily challenged by the
emergence of a more normalized counter-perspective. The normalization of
the Nazi past has reflected different motives and assumed different forms.
But their differences notwithstanding, the numerous varieties of normal-
ization have all worked to break down the moral framework that has
surrounded the history of the Third Reich since its collapse in 1945.
The normalizing trend first became noticed a generation ago with the
increasing aestheticization of the Nazi era in European and American high
and popular culture. Beginning in the early 19705 and lasting through
Introduction 19
the 1980s, a wide range of cultural works - Liliana Cavani's film The Night
Porter(1973), D. M. Thomas's novel The White Hotel (1981), Leon Krier's
rehabilitation of Nazi architecture in his 1985 treatise Albert Speer:
Architecture, I93 2 - I94 2 , and Anselm Kiefer's paintings of Hider salutes
and Nazi buildings (spanning the late 1960s to the early 1980s) - shifted
their narrative focus away from the Nazi regime's barbarous crimes
toward an aesthetic interest in its bombastic style and a prurient interest in
its lurid projections of sex and violence/ 2 For various scholars and cultural
critics at the time, this "new discourse" on Nazism was of great concern.
Coinciding as it did with the "Hider Wave" of the 1970S - a period of
intense attention to, and fascination with, the person of Adolf Hitler
himself - the aestheticization of the Nazi era seemed to reflect a growing
attraction to the world of the perpetrators and a diminished attentiveness
to the suffering of the victims. 73 In the process, it seemed to signal a
growing tendency to forget precisely those aspects of the past that most
needed to be remembered in order to prevent their recurrence. This
aestheticizing trend has continued in recent years, albeit in new form.
Since the 1990S, narratives of the Nazi era have been defined less by
prurience and aesthetic delight than humor. As seen in a wide range of
films, plays, books, and television programs - Roberto Benigni's film Life is
Beautifol (1997), Mel Brooks's theatrical revival of The Producers (2002),
Achim Greser's book of satirical cartoons Der Fuhrer privat(2000), and the
recurring appearance of the character "gay Hider" on Saturday Night Live-
the Nazi era has ceased to serve the ends of titillation and begun to serve the
ends of comic relief. 74 Whatever the manner of representation - gratuitous
horror or offbeat humor - the abandonment of a moralistic emphasis has
continued to define the ongoing aestheticization of the Third Reich.
The normalization of the Nazi era has also been pursued by efforts to
relativize its criminal features. This strategy has been the most visible in
Germany since the early 1980s, where politicians - mostly on the conser-
vative end of the political spectrum - attempted to relativize Nazi crimes in
order for Germans to regain a healthy or "normal" sense of national
identity/5 Following Chancellor Helmut Kohl's assumption of power in
1982, his conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government
actively strove to remove German history from the shadow of Nazism.
Kohl's staging of the 1984 Bitburg "reconciliation" ceremonies and fre-
quent comments by leading conservative politicians like Alfred Dregger
and Franz Josef Strauss about the need for Germany finally to become
a "normal" nation testified to an impatience with the enduring stigma left
by the Nazi experience upon postwar German national identity. The
20 Introduction
as well, namely by striving to explain the Nazi era from a distinctly non-
judgmental perspective. In the 1980s, the German historian Martin Broszat
famously argued that overtly moral analyses of the Third Reich suffered
from their embrace of a "black-and-white" perspective that drew too rigid a
dichotomy between perpetrators and victims, obscured the era's gray
complexity, bracketed off the Third Reich from "normal" modes of
historical analysis (such as an empathetic perspective towards the historical
actors themselves), and prevented it from being integrated into the larger
sweep of German history.J9 Significantly, when historians in the late 1980s
and early 1990S heeded Broszat's call to assume a more objective perspective
towards the Nazi era, they historicized it with yet another generalizing
theory - that of "modernity" - that ended up universalizing it still
further. 80 To be sure, the universalization of the Nazi era does not inevi-
tably imply the absence of an ethical perspective. Indeed, many scholars
have condemned Nazi crimes in the process of explaining them with
generalizing theories. But by viewing the Third Reich as the result of larger
universal forces, most scholars have de-emphasized its unique German
dimensions and diminished its historic specificity.
Finally, beyond the deliberate strategies of aestheticization, relativiza-
tion, and universalization, the normalization of the Nazi past has pro-
ceeded organically through the natural passage of time. Over the course of
the postwar era, the social composition of the nations that were affected by
the Nazi experience - especially Germany, Great Britain, and the United
States - has dramatically changed, the eyewitnesses to the past getting older
and gradually being replaced by members of younger generations who
never experienced it personally. There is no automatic relationship, of
course, between generational identity and memory, but it seems clear
that for both Europeans and Americans, the passage of time has helped
determine whether they have chosen to view the Nazi past from a moral
perspective or have attempted to normalize it in one way or another. In
Germany, for example, the generations that lived through the Third Reich
were notoriously silent about it after 1945; twenty years later, however, the
so-called 1968 generation born immediately after the war felt sufficiently
unencumbered by personal ties to the Nazi era to confront it head on. The
passage of time within German society, in this instance, essentially enabled
a turn to moralism. The very same passage of time, however, ironically also
promoted a kind of normalization, for as new postwar problems arose
(such as the Vietnam War, economic recession, and so forth) they
gradually began to overshadow the Nazi era in the minds of the ethic-
ally committed younger generation, which increasingly viewed it in
22 Introduction
We cut off the [Henry Hudson] Drive onto the Goethe Parkway ...
I still didn't know why we were heading out to Westchester, and to
tell the truth I didn't care much ...
'That's Croton-on-Hudson up ahead,' Kohler said. 'It's not far now.'
You could read the sign from 500 yards, a huge billboard draped
with swastika bunting and crested by an Imperial Eagle with the globe
clutched in its talons: 'Welcome to Croton-on-Hudson. Home of the
Final Solution. Visit the Frederick Barbarossa Death Camp, I mile
ahead, First Right. Admission 35 marks, children Free. No Dogs
Allowed. Picnic area" adjacent ... '
We drove along the road at fifteen or twenty miles an hour ... and
I looked out at the Barbarossa Camp without any great interest. There
wasn't really much to see, just a lot of old barracks and endless coils of
rusty barbed wire plus a string of road signs from the local Elks and
Rotarians greeting visitors: 'Croton-on-Hudson, where Four Million
Enemies of the Reich perished.' I remember reading that Croton was
second only to Auschwitz in its kill ratio, so I guess they had reason for
pride, but I didn't care for the commercialization. One big sign
was decorated with a blown-up color photograph of an emaciated
Jew ... [his] drowned eyes luminous with hunger. It was captioned
in huge red letters, 'If Bread and Water Isn't Enough For You, Visit
Schaumberger's Steak House, Rt. I, 250 yards from the Wesley
Overpass."
New York City detective Bill Halder's blase depiction of the Nazis'
extermination of American Jewry in Eric Norden's 1973 detective thriller
The Ultimate Solution provides a particularly chilling answer to the ques-
tion that has dominated much of the allohistoricalliterature on the Third
Reich: what would have happened had the Nazis won W orId War II? This
nightmare scenario has been the dominant theme of all the alternate
histories on the Third Reich produced since 1945. 2 In Great Britain, the
United States, Germany, and scattered other nations, the premise of the
Nazis winning World War II has been explored time and again in a wide
29
30 The Nazis win World War II
range of novels, films, television programs, plays, comic books, and histor-
ical essays. These accounts have varied considerably in explaining the reasons
for the Nazis' wartime triumph. But they have all focused squarely upon its
consequences for the subsequent history of the world. Interestingly enough,
the narratives that have appeared since World War II have diverged sharply
in their approach to this question over time. For the first two decades of
the postwar era, up until the mid-1960s, most narratives moralistically
depicted a Nazi wartime victory as bringing about a terrifYing hell on earth.
Accounts since then, however, have diminished the scenario's sense of
horror and portrayed it in far more nuanced terms as a relatively tolerable,
if not benign, event.
This shift in the allohistorical representation of a Nazi wartime triumph
points to the existence of a normalizing trend in the Western memory of the
Nazi past. This trend has been visible in the particular ways in which British,
American, and German narratives have depicted a Nazi victory. Overall,
each nation's tales have focused on separate aspects of the scenario unique to
its own wartime experience. British accounts have speculated as to whether
the British people would have resisted or collaborated with the Germans
after being conquered by-them. American narratives have explored the extent
to which a Nazi triumph depended on the United States' decision either to
intervene or remain neutral in the war. Finally, German alternate histories
have largely focused on how the Nazis' conquest of Europe would have
affected Germany itself. Over time, the manner in which these themes have
been depicted has changed considerably. Early postwar narratives in Britain,
for example, portrayed the Nazis as demonic oppressors and the British as
heroic resisters, but later accounts blurred the distinctions between the two
by imagining the Germans as reasonable occupiers and the British as
opportunistic collaborators. Similarly, early postwar tales in the United
States depicted the Germans as ideological fanatics who needed to be
stopped by military intervention, while later narratives projected the Nazis
as much more moderate foes against whom America could safely remain
neutral. Finally, most postwar German narratives consistently represented a
victorious Third Reich as an unmitigated disaster for Germany, while more
recent ones have portrayed it as not such a bad event after all.
The changing representation of a Nazi wartime victory reflects a broader
shift in the scenario's allohistorical function. Initially, the vision of a Nazi
triumph in World War II was conceived as a nightmare scenario. As such, it
partly reflected the lingering trauma of the Nazi experience in popular
consciousness after 1945. But it largely functioned - like many nightmare
scenarios - as a negative foil that helped to validate the virtues of the
Comparative overview 31
present-day world. Early postwar narratives in Britain, for instance, depicted
a Nazi victory in frightful terms in order to triumphalistically affirm the
belief that the British people's real historical resistance against the Germans
constituted what Winston Churchill called their "finest hour." American
accounts from the same era portrayed a victory of the Nazis in similarly
horrifying fashion in order to justify the United States government's decision
to intervene in the war against them. German tales, by contrast, were some-
what more complex in motivation, depicting a Nazi triumph in bleak terms
partly to condemn the bygone Third Reich, but also to celebrate the Federal
Republic's superiority to it. Midway through the postwar era, however, the
self-congratulatory purpose of alternate histories began to give way to a more
self-critical orientation. This change was particularly apparent in British and
American alternate histories. As Great Britain and the United States began to
experience periods of crisis after the mid-196os, the producers of alternate
histories reduced the horror of a Nazi military victory in order to criticize
their nations' progressive decline. This self-critical impulse began to fade
somewhat with the ebbing of the era's crises and the restoration of stability
by the late 1980s, but from this point on, alternate histories just as frequently
functioned to criticize the present as to validate it. The exception to this rule
was provided by German accounts, which moved in the opposite direction.
While the dystopian narratives of the early postwar period had exhibited a
self-critical dimension from the very beginning, the normalized accounts of
more recent years have expressed a more triumphalistic sensibility, reflecting
the new self-confidence produced by reunification.
In the end, the extent to which postwar allohistorical representations of a
Nazi wartime triumph truly reflect a normalizing trend in the Western
memory of the Third Reich is revealed by their popular reception. Not
surprisingly, the postwar responses to alternate histories of a Nazi victory in
World War II have varied by nation and era. But on the whole, as the
narratives have become more normalized, the reactions to them have
become more divided. British, American, and German audiences have
hailed some accounts enthusiastically, while they have criticized others
severely. These diverse responses are significant, for if the positive ones
suggest the dawning of a less moralistic view of the Nazi era, the more
critical ones indicate an enduring desire to preserve it intact.
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