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Table of Contents
Expert Python Programming Second Edition
Credits
About the Authors
About the Reviewer
www.PacktPub.com
eBooks, discount offers, and more
Why subscribe?
Preface
What this book covers
What you need for this book
Who this book is for
Conventions
Reader feedback
Customer support
Downloading the example code
Errata
Piracy
Questions
1. Current Status of Python
Where are we now and where we are going?
Why and how does Python change?
Getting up to date with changes – PEP documents
Python 3 adoption at the time of writing this book
The main differences between Python 3 and Python 2
Why should I care?
The main syntax differences and common pitfalls
Syntax changes
Changes in the standard library
Changes in datatypes and collections
The popular tools and techniques used for maintaining cross-
version compatibility
Not only CPython
 Why should I care?
Stackless Python
Jython
IronPython
PyPy
Modern approaches to Python development
Application-level isolation of Python environments
Why isolation?
Popular solutions
virtualenv
venv
buildout
Which one to choose?
System-level environment isolation
Virtual development environments using Vagrant
Containerization versus virtualization
Popular productivity tools
Custom Python shells – IPython, bpython, ptpython, and so on
Setting up the PYTHONSTARTUP environment variable
IPython
bpython
ptpython
Interactive debuggers
Useful resources
Summary
2. Syntax Best Practices – below the Class Level
Python's built-in types
Strings and bytes
Implementation details
String concatenation
Collections
Lists and tuples
Implementation details
List comprehensions
Other idioms
Dictionaries
 Implementation details
Weaknesses and alternatives
Sets
Implementation details
Beyond basic collections – the collections module
Advanced syntax
Iterators
The yield statement
Decorators
General syntax and possible implementations
As a function
As a class
Parametrizing decorators
Introspection preserving decorators
Usage and useful examples
Argument checking
Caching
Proxy
Context provider
Context managers – the with statement
General syntax and possible implementations
As a class
As a function – the contextlib module
Other syntax elements you may not know yet
The for … else … statement
Function annotations
The general syntax
The possible uses
Summary
3. Syntax Best Practices – above the Class Level
Subclassing built-in types
Accessing methods from superclasses
Old-style classes and super in Python 2
Understanding Python's Method Resolution Order
super pitfalls
Mixing super and explicit class calls
 Heterogeneous arguments
Best practices
Advanced attribute access patterns
Descriptors
Real-life example – lazily evaluated attributes
Properties
Slots
Metaprogramming
Decorators – a method of metaprogramming
Class decorators
Using the __new__() method to override instance creation
process
Metaclasses
The general syntax
New Python 3 syntax for metaclasses
Metaclass usage
Metaclass pitfalls
Some tips on code generation
exec, eval, and compile
Abstract Syntax Tree
Import hooks
Projects using code generation patterns
Falcon's compiled router
Hy
Summary
4. Choosing Good Names
PEP 8 and naming best practices
Why and when to follow PEP 8?
Beyond PEP 8 – team-specific style guidelines
Naming styles
Variables
Constants
Naming and usage
Public and private variables
Functions and methods
The private controversy
 Special methods
Arguments
Properties
Classes
Modules and packages
The naming guide
Using the has or is prefix for Boolean elements
Using plurals for variables that are collections
Using explicit names for dictionaries
Avoiding generic names
Avoiding existing names
Best practices for arguments
Building arguments by iterative design
Trust the arguments and your tests
Using *args and **kwargs magic arguments carefully
Class names
Module and package names
Useful tools
Pylint
pep8 and flake8
Summary
5. Writing a Package
Creating a package
The confusing state of Python packaging tools
The current landscape of Python packaging thanks to PyPA
Tool recommendations
Project configuration
setup.py
setup.cfg
MANIFEST.in
Most important metadata
Trove classifiers
Common patterns
Automated inclusion of version string from package
README file
Managing dependencies
 The custom setup command
Working with packages during development
setup.py install
Uninstalling packages
setup.py develop or pip -e
Namespace packages
Why is it useful?
PEP 420 – implicit namespace packages
Namespace packages in previous Python versions
Uploading a package
PyPI – Python Package Index
Uploading to PyPI – or other package index
.pypirc
Source packages versus built packages
sdist
bdist and wheels
Standalone executables
When are standalone executables useful?
Popular tools
PyInstaller
cx_Freeze
py2exe and py2app
Security of Python code in executable packages
Making decompilation harder
Summary
6. Deploying Code
The Twelve-Factor App
Deployment automation using Fabric
Your own package index or index mirror
PyPI mirroring
Deployment using a package
Common conventions and practices
The filesystem hierarchy
Isolation
Using process supervision tools
Application code should be run in user space
 Using reverse HTTP proxies
Reloading processes gracefully
Code instrumentation and monitoring
Logging errors – sentry/raven
Monitoring system and application metrics
Dealing with application logs
Basic low-level log practices
Tools for log processing
Summary
7. Python Extensions in Other Languages
Different language means – C or C++
How do extensions in C or C++ work
Why you might want to use extensions
Improving performance in critical code sections
Integrating existing code written in different languages
Integrating third-party dynamic libraries
Creating custom datatypes
Writing extensions
Pure C extensions
A closer look at Python/C API
Calling and binding conventions
Exception handling
Releasing GIL
Reference counting
Cython
Cython as a source to source compiler
Cython as a language
Challenges
Additional complexity
Debugging
Interfacing with dynamic libraries without extensions
ctypes
Loading libraries
Calling C functions using ctypes
Passing Python functions as C callbacks
CFFI
 Summary
8. Managing Code
Version control systems
Centralized systems
Distributed systems
Distributed strategies
Centralized or distributed?
Use Git if you can
Git flow and GitHub flow
Continuous development processes
Continuous integration
Testing every commit
Merge testing through CI
Matrix testing
Continuous delivery
Continuous deployment
Popular tools for continuous integration
Jenkins
Buildbot
Travis CI
GitLab CI
Choosing the right tool and common pitfalls
Problem 1 – too complex build strategies
Problem 2 – too long building time
Problem 3 – external job definitions
Problem 4 – lack of isolation
Summary
9. Documenting Your Project
The seven rules of technical writing
Write in two steps
Target the readership
Use a simple style
Limit the scope of information
Use realistic code examples
Use a light but sufficient approach
Use templates
 A reStructuredText primer
Section structure
Lists
Inline markup
Literal block
Links
Building the documentation
Building the portfolio
Design
Usage
Recipe
Tutorial
Module helper
Operations
Making your own portfolio
Building the landscape
Producer's layout
Consumer's layout
Working on the index pages
Registering module helpers
Adding index markers
Cross-references
Documentation building and continuous integration
Summary
10. Test-Driven Development
I don't test
Test-driven development principles
Preventing software regression
Improving code quality
Providing the best developer documentation
Producing robust code faster
What kind of tests?
Acceptance tests
Unit tests
Functional tests
Integration tests
 Load and performance testing
Code quality testing
Python standard test tools
unittest
doctest
I do test
unittest pitfalls
unittest alternatives
nose
Test runner
Writing tests
Writing test fixtures
Integration with setuptools and a plug-in system
Wrap-up
py.test
Writing test fixtures
Disabling test functions and classes
Automated distributed tests
Wrap-up
Testing coverage
Fakes and mocks
Building a fake
Using mocks
Testing environment and dependency compatibility
Dependency matrix testing
Document-driven development
Writing a story
Summary
11. Optimization – General Principles and Profiling Techniques
The three rules of optimization
Make it work first
Work from the user's point of view
Keep the code readable and maintainable
Optimization strategy
Find another culprit
Scale the hardware
 Writing a speed test
Finding bottlenecks
Profiling CPU usage
Macro-profiling
Micro-profiling
Measuring Pystones
Profiling memory usage
How Python deals with memory
Profiling memory
objgraph
C code memory leaks
Profiling network usage
Summary
12. Optimization – Some Powerful Techniques
Reducing the complexity
Cyclomatic complexity
The big O notation
Simplifying
Searching in a list
Using a set instead of a list
Cut the external calls, reduce the workload
Using collections
deque
defaultdict
namedtuple
Using architectural trade-offs
Using heuristics and approximation algorithms
Using task queues and delayed processing
Using probabilistic data structures
Caching
Deterministic caching
Nondeterministic caching
Cache services
Memcached
Summary
13. Concurrency
 Why concurrency?
Multithreading
What is multithreading?
How Python deals with threads
When should threading be used?
Building responsive interfaces
Delegating work
Multiuser applications
An example of a threaded application
Using one thread per item
Using a thread pool
Using two-way queues
Dealing with errors and rate limiting
Multiprocessing
The built-in multiprocessing module
Using process pools
Using multiprocessing.dummy as a multithreading interface
Asynchronous programming
Cooperative multitasking and asynchronous I/O
Python async and await keywords
asyncio in older versions of Python
A practical example of asynchronous programming
Integrating nonasynchronous code with async using futures
Executors and futures
Using executors in an event loop
Summary
14. Useful Design Patterns
Creational patterns
Singleton
Structural patterns
Adapter
Interfaces
Using zope.interface
Using function annotations and abstract base classes
Using collections.abc
Proxy
 Facade
Behavioral patterns
Observer
Visitor
Template
Summary
Index
Expert Python Programming
Second Edition
 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
as readers are influenced far more by emotion than by close and exact
reason, the vast majority were carried away by the rush of feeling of
that mighty soul; and hence in the view of a philosophic monarchist
like Dumont, the publication of the “Reflections” was destined to be
“the salvation of Europe.” Certainly it was the first noteworthy effort of
a literary man to stem the tide of democracy; and if the writer had
advocated a practicable scheme for saving the French monarchy—say,
on the lines of that of Mirabeau—he would have rendered an
inestimable service. As it was, even the voice of a genius failed to
convince the French people that they must build their new fabric on
the lines laid down by Philip the Fair and Louis the Fourteenth.
While the “Reflections” caused little but irritation in France, they
also worked some harm in England. Readers by the thousand were
captivated by the glamour of Burke’s style, and became forthwith the
sworn foes of the persecutors of Marie Antoinette. The fall of that
erstwhile “morning star, full of life and splendour and joy,” involved in
one common gloom the emotions and the reason of Britons. “It is the
noblest, deepest, most animated and exalted work that I think I have
ever read.” So wrote Fanny Burney. The superlatives are significant.
Thenceforth events in France were viewed through the distorting
medium of a royalist romance. The change was fatal in every way.
England, which heretofore had guardedly sympathized with the French
reformers, now swung round to antagonism; and the French princes
who at Turin and Coblentz were striving to frame a Coalition against
their native land, saw in fancy John Bull as the paymaster of the
monarchist league, with Burke as the chief trumpeter.
In truth the great writer ran some risk of sinking to this level. He
became the unofficial representative of the French princes in this
country, while his son, Richard Burke, proceeded to Coblentz to work
on behalf of that clamorous clique. Memoir after memoir appeared
from the pen of Burke himself. Now it was a protest, purporting to
emanate from George III, against despoiling the French monarchy of
all its rights, and asserting that, if this caution were unheeded, our
903
ambassador would leave Paris. Now again it was a memorandum
of advice to the Queen of France, urging her to have nothing to do
with traitors (i.e., reformers), to maintain an attitude of silent disdain
of their offered help, and, above all, to induce her consort to refuse
904
the new democratic constitution. Fortunately neither of these
documents went beyond the doors of Burke’s study; but they survive
as curious proofs of his now distracted mood.
It was the misfortune of Burke at this time that majesty of diction
deserted him at Westminster, where his speeches and demeanour bore
the imprint of petulance and sourness. This appeared most painfully in
the famous scene which marked his severance from Fox. It occurred
during the debates on the Canada Bill in the spring of 1791. The
preoccupation of men’s minds with the French constitution, then slowly
taking shape, had been apparent in the course of the session. Fox had
often dragged in the subject to express his warm sympathy with the
democrats of Paris, and now desired to assimilate the Canada Bill
somewhat to the French model. To this Burke offered vehement
opposition, out-doing Fox in iteration. On 6th May, when the subject at
issue was Canada, he defied the rules of the House by speaking solely
on France. Six times he was called to order. Still he went on, in more
and more heated tones, until he crowned his diatribe with the
declaration that the difference between him and his friend involved an
end of their connection; for with his latest words he would exclaim:
“Fly from the French Constitution.” Fox here whispered to him: “There
is no loss of friends.” “Yes,” retorted Burke, “there is a loss of friends; I
know the price of my conduct; I have done my duty at the price of my
friend; our friendship is at an end.” A little later, when Fox rose to
905
reply, words failed him and tears trickled down his cheeks. No
scene in Parliament in that age produced so profound an emotion. It
deepened the affection felt for that generous statesman; while the
once inspiring figure of Burke now stood forth in the hard and
repellent outlines of a fanatic.
Far better would it have been had he confined himself to the
higher domains of literature, where he was at home. His “Appeal from
the New to the Old Whigs,” which appeared in July 1791, is a great
and moving production; and his less known “Thoughts on French
Affairs” (December 1791) is remarkable for its keen insight into the
causes that made for disruption or revolt in the European lands, not
906
even excluding Great Britain. In this one respect Burke excelled
Pitt, just as nervous apprehension will detect dangers ahead that are
hidden from the serene gaze of an optimist. Wilberforce judged Pitt to
907
be somewhat deficient in foresight; and we may ascribe this defect
to his intense hopefulness and his lack of close acquaintance with men
in this country and, still more, on the Continent. Burke found that both
the Prime Minister and Grenville had not the slightest fear of the effect
of revolutionary ideas in this Kingdom “either at present or at any time
908
to come.” Here Burke was the truer prophet. But how could Pitt sift
the wise from the unwise in the copious output of Burke’s mind? They
mingle so closely as to bewilder the closest observer even now, when
the mists of passion enveloping those controversies have partly cleared
away. Sentiment palpitated visibly in all Burke’s utterances; and the
teachings of the philosopher were lost amidst the diatribes of the
partisan.
In fact, it was difficult for a practical statesman to take the orator
seriously. In April 1791 he had furiously attacked Pitt’s Russian policy;
and, as we have seen, the differences between them were more than
political, they were temperamental. No characteristic of Pitt is more
remarkable than the balance of his faculties and the evenness of his
disposition. No defect in Burke’s nature is more patent than his lack of
self-control, to which, rather than to his poverty, I am inclined to
ascribe his exclusion from the Whig Cabinets. Irritability in small things
had long been his bane; and now to the solution of the greatest
problem in modern history he brought a fund of passion and prejudice
equal to that of any of the French émigrés who were pestering the
Courts of Europe to crush the new ideas by force.
Yet, however much Pitt mistrusted Burke the politician, he admired
him as a writer; so at least we gather from a somewhat enigmatical
reference in Wilberforce’s diary. “22nd November (1790): Went to
Wimbledon—Dundas, Lord Chatham, Pitt, Grenville, Ryder. Much talk
about Burke’s book. Lord Chatham, Pitt and I seemed to agree: contra,
909
Grenville and Ryder.” If this entry be correct, Wilberforce and
Grenville were destined soon to change their opinions. It may be that
Pitt and Wilberforce agreed with Burke owing to their dislike of the
iconoclastic methods of the French democrats, and that Grenville’s cold
nature was repelled by the sentimentalism of the book.
In their judgements on the French Revolution Pitt and Burke stood
not far apart. Pitt knew France no better than the great Irishman, and
he distrusted theorizers and rash innovators fully as much, especially
when their symmetrical notions were carried out by mobs. But the two
men differed sharply as to the remedy. Burke came to believe more
and more in armed intervention; Pitt saw in it ruin for French royalists
and turmoil throughout the Continent. Here again the difference was
in the main one of temperament. In Burke’s nature the eagerness and
impulsiveness of the Celt was degenerating into sheer fussiness, which
drew him toward the camp of the émigrés who strutted and plotted at
Turin and Coblentz. Pitt’s coolness and reserve bade him distrust those
loud-tongued fanatics, whose political rhapsodies awoke a sympathetic
chord in no ruler save Gustavus of Sweden. True, Catharine of Russia
shrilly bade them Godspeed; but, as we shall see, her distant blessings
were the outcome of Muscovite diplomacy rather than of royalist zeal.
Pitt and Grenville, who saw other things in life besides the woes of
Marie Antoinette and Jacobin outrages, were resolved not to lead the
van of the monarchical crusade. They might approve Burke’s sage
production, the “Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,” which won
the warm commendation of the King, as well as of Grenville, Camden,
and Dundas, but they were bent on maintaining strict neutrality on the
French Question. Pitt and his cousin met Burke more than once in the
summer and autumn of 1791; but they kept their thoughts veiled,
probably because Burke was working hard for the royalist league
which the French Princes hoped to form. The general impression
produced on Burke was that the Court of St. James would certainly not
act against the champions of monarchy, but would preserve a
benevolent neutrality. Other observers took a different view. The
Russian ambassador, Vorontzoff, declared that Pitt was a democrat at
heart, and kept up the naval armaments in order to intimidate the
royalists, while he sent Hugh Elliot to Paris to concert measures along
 910
with Barnave. These stories are of value merely because they
illustrate Pitt’s power of holding back his trump cards and thereby
rehabilitating the national prestige, which had recently suffered at the
hands of the Czarina. At such a crisis silence is often a potent weapon.
The Arab “Book of Wisdom” asserts that wisdom consists in nine parts
of silence; while the tenth part is brevity of utterance. If Burke had
realized this truth, his political career would not have ended in
comparative failure. By acting on it, Pitt disconcerted his interviewers
and exasperated his biographers; but he helped to keep peace on the
Continent for nearly a year longer; and he assured that boon to his
country for nearly two years. Had Burke been in power, the coalesced
monarchs would have attacked France in the late summer of 1791.
 CHAPTER XXV
THE DISPUTE WITH SPAIN

It is bad economy to tempt an attack, from a state of

weakness, and thus by a miserable saving ultimately incur the
hazard of a great expense.—Pitt, Speech of 9th February 1790.

O N 21st January 1790 there arrived at Whitehall news of an

outrage committed by a Spanish officer on the crew of a British
vessel trading on the dimly known coast which was destined to be
called Vancouver Island. The affair became infinitely more serious on
11th February when the Spanish ambassador in London, the Marquis
del Campo, forwarded to our Foreign Minister, the Duke of Leeds, an
official demand that the British Government should punish certain
interlopers who had ventured to trade and settle at Nootka Sound on
that coastline, which Spain then considered as part of her Californian
domain and for ever closed to outsiders. This demand produced a
state of tension between the two nations, and subsequent incidents
threatened to involve us in war, not only with Spain, but with her
ally, France. As the outcome of this Nootka Sound dispute was the
acquisition by Great Britain of a coastline of infinite value to Canada
and the Empire at large, it will be well briefly to describe its origin,
its settlement, and its bearing on the French Revolution.
Nootka Sound, a fine natural harbour on the western coast of
what is now called Vancouver Island, was explored and named by
Captain Cook in the course of his memorable voyage of the year
1778. He stayed there one month, and bought from the Indians a
number of furs which proved to be of great value in the eyes of the
Chinese. In the following years British and Spanish ships touched at
Nootka; but owing to the American War, or to the torpor of
mercantile enterprise in those days, nothing definite came of the
discovery until the year 1785. Certain merchants of the British East
India Company trading to China then resolved to open up trade
between that country and the west coast of America. The
commodities sought for the Chinese market were furs and ginseng, a
plant used as a drug by the celestials. In the following year two
small vessels, the “Sea Otter” and the “Nootka,” sailed to the
American coast, and though the former was wrecked, the latter
carried back to China a valuable cargo. The owners replaced her by
the “Felice” and “Iphigenia,” which in 1788 sailed to the same coast.
The senior captain, John Meares, a retired lieutenant of the royal
navy, bought a piece of land at Nootka from the Indian chief,
Maquilla, formed a small settlement, fortified it, and hoisted the
British flag. His vessels then traded along the coast as far as 60° and
45° 30´, that is, beyond the Columbia River on the south, and as far
as Mount St. Elias, in what is now the United States territory of
Alaska, but was then recognized as belonging to Russia’s sphere of
911
influence.
At Nootka the adventurous pioneers built a sloop of 40 tons, the
“North-West America,” and bought from Indian chiefs the right of
“free and exclusive” trade with their subjects. As autumn drew on
Meares sailed away to China in the “Felice,” and there persuaded
other merchants to combine in order to form an Associated
Company for developing this lucrative commerce. Accordingly, three
more ships, the “Prince of Wales,” “Princess Royal,” and “Argonaut,”
set sail for Nootka in the spring of 1789 under the command of
Captain Colnett, who was to reside at that settlement. It is curious to
note thus early the emergence of the yellow question, for he carried
with him seventy Chinamen who were to settle there under the
protection of the Associated Company—a proof that the occupation
of Nootka was to be permanent.
Strange to say, the Spanish Government, acting through its
Viceroy of Mexico, was then bent on the acquisition of this very
same district. By virtue of the Bull of Pope Alexander VI, and the
treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which speedily followed, Spain claimed
exclusive right over the Pacific Ocean and all the western coast of
America as far north as latitude 60°, beyond which were the Russian
settlements in Alaska. In the year 1774, that is, four years before
Cook’s enterprise, a Spanish captain, Perez, had sailed to Nootka
and as far north as latitude 55°. But no account of his voyage, or of
one made in the following year, had been given to the world. Neither
had the Spaniards made any attempt to trade at Nootka, nor to form
a settlement, until they heard of the efforts of the Russians and
English to open up trade with the natives. Then, indeed, they took
alarm; and the Viceroy of Mexico despatched two vessels, under the
command of Captain Martinez, with orders to warn off intruders,
and, in case of armed resistance, to use force in vindicating the
claims of Spain. The Viceroy and Martinez knew nothing concerning
the new developments at Nootka, and had in view the Russians
rather than the British.
Long before the arrival of Colnett, and while the “Iphigenia”
alone was at Nootka, there sailed in, on 5th May, a Spanish frigate,
the “Princesa.” Shortly after she was joined by a sloop. Meares had
previously provided Douglas, the captain of the “Iphigenia,” with
papers proving that she was a Portuguese ship, hailing from Macao,
the Portuguese settlement near Canton. In reality, however, she was
a British ship with a British cargo. Despite the arguments of Douglas,
Martinez soon divined the truth, and took possession of her as well
912
as the infant settlement of Nootka. A little later he seized the
“North-West America”; and when the “Argonaut” arrived from China,
she too fell into his hands by a treacherous ruse, so Colnett averred.
The “Princess Royal” was the next victim. Fortune certainly favoured
Martinez in having to deal with the British ships as they dropped in
singly; and he played his game with skill and success.
The truth respecting the subsequent occurrences cannot be
disentangled from the false or exaggerated accounts of the
disputants. Meares, Colnett, and Douglas asserted on oath that they
had been treacherously seized and barbarously treated. Martinez
declared that his behaviour throughout was humane and
considerate. His statements were backed by those of certain
American traders who were there present; but, as they for a time
made common cause with Martinez, their evidence is not convincing.
The assertions of Meares and Colnett on this point are antecedently
credible, it being the habit of Spain to treat interlopers as little better
than privateers. Martinez compelled his prisoners (so they asserted)
to assist in building a stockade, and subsequently treated Colnett
with so much indignity that he tried to commit suicide, and Hanson,
one of his petty officers, actually did so. The Spanish commander
then traded with the captured vessels, and finally collected skins
estimated by Meares to be worth about 7,500 Spanish dollars. The
British ships and crews were afterwards taken to the Spanish port of
San Blas, where the governor treated them with more consideration,
and, though regarding them virtually as privateers, released them
and submitted the fate of their ships to an official inquiry. The whole
truth of the Nootka incident will probably never be cleared up. What
concerns us here is the impression produced on Pitt by the
statements of Meares. They were set forth in a Memorial, dated
London, 30th April 1790. Meares laid stress on the perfidy and
cruelty of Martinez, and estimated his own losses at 500,000 Spanish
913
dollars, apart from the ruin of the trade along the Nootka coast.
Reports of these events filtered through to London very slowly.
Merry, British chargé d’affaires at Madrid, sent the first vague
rumours of them in a despatch which, as we have seen, reached
Whitehall on 21st January; but the situation became fraught with
danger on 11th February, when the Spanish envoy in London handed
in a despatch drawn up in terms no less haughty than misleading.
After presenting a distorted view of the Nootka incident, del Campo
asserted the right of Spain to absolute sovereignty in those districts
“which have been occupied and frequented by the Spaniards for so
many years.” He further requested the British Government to punish
such undertakings as those of Meares and Colnett, but closed with
the statement that the British prisoners had been liberated through
the consideration which the King of Spain had for His Britannic
Majesty.
Compliance with this demand was, of course, out of the
question, for it would have implied the closing of the north-west
coast of America to every flag but the red and yellow ensign of
Spain; and the request for the punishment of British seamen, whose
ships had admittedly been seized, added insult to injury. Pitt and his
colleagues as yet knew very little of the facts of the case. The
dimness of the notions then entertained about that region appears in
a phrase used by Robert Liston, our envoy at Stockholm, that the
waters behind Nootka Sound may be the opening to the long-sought
914
North-West Passage. In any case the demands of Spain carried
with them their own condemnation. Accordingly, on 26th February,
the Duke of Leeds replied to del Campo that the act of violence
committed by Martinez “makes it necessary henceforth to suspend
all discussion of the pretensions set forth in that letter until a just
and adequate satisfaction shall have been made for a proceeding so
915
injurious to Great Britain.”
The writing here was that of Leeds, but the resolve was the
resolve of Pitt. The original draft of this despatch is in the
handwriting of the Prime Minister. As at so many crises, he took the
conduct of affairs directly into his own hands; and Leeds, though he
doubtless agreed with him, was only his mouthpiece. George III and
Pitt were equally desirous of peace; but on this occasion their
determination was immutable. Satisfaction must be given for the
insult, or else war must ensue. In his despatch of the same date to
Merry at Madrid, the Duke stoutly contested the right of Spain to the
exclusive sovereignty, commerce, and navigation of the coasts north
of California, and asserted the determination of the Court of St.
James to protect its subjects trading in that part of the Pacific
916
Ocean.
When the facts stated on oath by Meares were known by
Ministers, they realized the extreme gravity of the case. Their
demand for satisfaction having been ignored by the Court of
917
Madrid, they determined, at a Cabinet Council held on the
evening of 30th April, to demand “immediate and adequate
satisfaction for the outrages committed by Mr. de Martinez,” and to
back up that demand by the equipment of several ships of the line.
George III agreed with his Ministers, though with some reluctance;
and the press-gang set to work on 4th May to man the new
squadron. The affair came as a bolt from the blue. Most of the
sailors in the Thames were seized; and the prospect of war caused
Consols to drop three per cent. Ministers, however, were justified in
taking this step. After the Spanish note of 20th April they saw that
Spain would not renounce her exclusive right to the Pacific Coast of
918
America save under pressure of force. The question of peace or
war turned on two things; the relative naval strength of the two
Powers, and the ability of the Court of Madrid to gain an ally,
presumably France.
Deferring for the present the question of the Franco-Spanish
Alliance, we notice that on sea Great Britain had a decided
superiority over Spain. Though the Spanish marine was far from
weak it could not cope with the imposing force which the care and
energy of Pitt had amassed at our dockyards. As has been pointed
out in Chapter IX, he frequently inspected the details of
construction, and held the Comptroller of the Navy personally
responsible to him for the due progress of new ships and the
efficiency of the fleet. Thanks to his close supervision, and the large
sums voted for the navy, there were at this time no fewer than
919
ninety-three sail of the line fit for active service.
This gratifying result cannot be ascribed to the First Lord of the
Admiralty. In July 1788, on the resignation of Lord Howe, Pitt raised
his brother, Lord Chatham, to that responsible post, Lord Hood being
added to the Admiralty Board. Chatham was personally popular but
proved to be indolent as an administrator, his unpunctuality earning
him the nickname of “the late Lord Chatham.” That excellent
administrator, Sir Charles Middleton (the future Lord Barham),
refused to serve under him after the reforms recommended by a
Commission of Inquiry were shelved, and in March 1790 resigned
office, pointing out, however, that the Navy and dockyards were
920
never better prepared for war.
Despite the formidable strength of the British navy, Spain might
have entered on a contest with some chance of success. We are apt
to forget that her period of swift decline under Charles IV had only
just begun. His predecessor, Charles III, who died in 1788, had
raised the credit and power of that land almost to the lofty heights
of ancient days. He had helped to humble the might of England in
the American war, and his army and navy were kept in a state of
efficiency which enabled Spain to rank as one of the Great Powers.
On his death there came an insidious change. In place of vigour and
even-handed justice there crept in all the evils linked with sloth and
favouritism. The statesman Count Floridablanca, who had done
much to promote the prosperity of Spain, saw his influence sapped
by the intrigues of the minions of the Queen, who was to be the evil
genius of the realm. But in the year 1790 the dry-rot had not
appreciably affected that imposing fabric. Outwardly Spain appeared
to be almost a match for the Island Power. Towards the end of July
1790, she had at sea thirty-four sail of the line and sixteen smaller
921
craft.
The pride of two of the most susceptible nations having been
touched to the quick, war seemed inevitable. On 10th May Pitt
moved for a vote of credit of a million sterling for the necessary
922
armament; this was at once agreed to. Parliament also supported
the Ministry by large majorities whenever the Opposition attempted
to censure their action on points of detail. Several pamphlets
appeared inveighing against the monstrous claims of Spain to the
control of the Pacific. There was a weak point in her armour, and at
this Pitt aimed a deadly shaft. Already the Spaniards of South and
Central America were restive under the galling yoke of their colonial
system, which was so contrived as to enrich officials and privileged
merchants in Spain at the expense of the new lands. The result was
that at Quito a pound of iron sold for 4s. 6d., and a pound of steel
923
for 6s. 9d. It is not surprising that the stoutest spirits longed to
break loose from a Government by comparison with which that of
England in the United States had been mildness and wisdom
personified.
The mouthpiece of the discontent of the land now called
Venezuela was a man of strongly marked personality, Miranda by
name. An exile from his native city of Caracas, he had spent several
years wandering about Europe, until the events at Paris drew him to
that focus of enthusiasm and effort. There he became acquainted
with Brissot and others who were interested in the emancipation of
subject peoples. But now the prospect of a war between England
and Spain attracted him to London. Pitt invited him to a first
interview on the evening of 9th May. The daring adventurer there
unfolded his plan of revolutionizing Spanish America; and, in case of
war, his commanding personality and intrepid spirit would have
stirred up a serious ferment. Here was a formidable weapon against
Spain; and Pitt in the course of several interviews with Miranda
prepared to use it with effect. Hopes ran high in London that Spain
would be crippled by the action of her own sons in the New World, a
fitting return to her for assisting the revolt of the English colonists a
decade before. Auckland, our envoy at The Hague, wrote on 29th
June 1790: “It is believed there are serious troubles in South
America; but that circumstance seems to afford the strongest reason
for avoiding a quarrel with England. It is wonderful to a cool
bystander to see with what infatuated alacrity several sovereigns are
running towards the embarrassments which have brought Louis XVI
and his dominions to the distracted and desperate state in which we
924
now see them.”
Meanwhile Pitt and Leeds had nailed their colours to the mast in
the despatch of 4th May, which dismissed the reply of the Spanish
Court, dated 20th April, as wholly inadmissible. By way of retort to
its claim of exclusive possession of the seas and coasts north of
California up to latitude 60°, the British Government asserted for its
subjects in those parts the “unquestioned right to a free and
undisturbed enjoyment of the benefits of commerce, navigation, and
fishery, and also to the possession of such establishments as they
may form, with the consent of the natives, in places unoccupied by
925
other European nations.” In this declaration lies the charter of
the future colony of British Columbia. Alleyne Fitzherbert, who had
already had a creditable record in diplomacy, now proceeded on a
special mission to Madrid to make good these claims, if possible by
peaceable means. Among the twenty-two “Instructions” is one
bidding him weaken the Family Compact of 1761, which bound
together the Kings of France and Spain in close alliance, and point
out to the Spanish Ministers the desirability of substituting for it a
friendly understanding with Great Britain both in political and
commercial affairs.
From the outset Pitt and his colleagues realized that the question
of peace or war depended largely on France. Had that Power been in
a condition to fight, the Bourbon States would certainly have
contested England’s claim, and in that case she might have been for
ever excluded from the Pacific Coast of America. Fitzherbert
therefore stayed a few days at Paris (an indisposition afforded a
pretext for delay) in order to fathom those turbid waters. The
foreign policy of France was still nominally in the hands of
Montmorin; but that Minister, never strong, had been almost cowed
by events. Fitzherbert found him most gracious, but he could not
explain away the recent order for equipping fourteen sail of the line
at Brest. The most threatening symptom, however, was the warlike
attitude of the royalist side of the National Assembly, which on 20th
May he thus described to the Duke of Leeds:

... I can plainly perceive that many other members of the

aristocratical faction are anxious to avail themselves of the
opportunity to bring on a war, in the hope that the general
distress and confusion which must almost inevitably follow,
might ultimately tend to the re-establishment of the royal
 authority upon its former footing. Many strong indications of this
design have appeared in the insidious language which they have
held of late, speaking of Great Britain both in the National
Assembly and without doors. However, their opponents begin to
be aware of their drift, and it seems to have been principally
with a view of guarding against such designs that the latter have
chosen the present time for carrying into execution their plan of
transferring the power of making War and Peace from the Crown
to the National Assembly. It also appears highly probable that,
when this question shall be disposed of, it will be followed up by
some motion tending to invalidate, if not entirely to annul, the
Family Compact.

How curiously the wheels of human action act and interact! The
outrage on British sailors on the dimly known coast of Vancouver
Island furnished French democrats with a potent motive for driving
another nail into the coffin of the old monarchy. In any case the
right of Louis XVI to declare war and make peace would have been
challenged—for how can Democracy allow a Sovereign wholly to
control its policy at the most important of all crises—but now the
need was overwhelming. If the old prerogative held good, the rusty
link that bound together the fortunes of France and Spain would
compel free Frenchmen to fight their English neighbours whenever a
Spanish captain thought fit to clap in irons British voyagers to the
Pacific.
The question aroused gusts of passion at Paris. Enormous
crowds waited outside the Tuileries while the deputies hard by were
debating this question (16th and 22nd May). To the surprise of the
people the royal prerogative was upheld by Mirabeau. The great
orator descanted forcibly on the need of energy and secrecy in the
diplomacy of a great nation, and reminded those who ascribed all
wars to the intrigues of Courts that popular assemblies had often
declared war in a fit of passion. He remarked that members had all
applauded a speaker who advocated war against England if she
attacked Spain, and the expenditure of their last man and their last
 926
crown in reducing London. Few of Mirabeau’s speeches were
more convincing. Nevertheless, on coming forth from the Chamber
he was threatened with violence; and a pamphlet, “Great Treason of
Count Mirabeau” was hawked about the streets. His reasoning,
however, ensured the carrying of a compromise on 22nd May. The
right of declaring war and making peace was vested in the King: and
war was to be decided only by a decree of the Legislature, on “the
formal and necessary proposition of the King, and afterwards
927
sanctioned by him.” The position was thus left far from clear; and
Camille Desmoulins, referring to the ups and downs of the debate,
summarized it thus: “The question was decided, firstly, in favour of
the nation, secondly, in favour of the King; thirdly, in favour of both.”
The royalists were highly displeased. Their best speaker, Cazalès,
declared that nothing was now left to the monarchy—an exclamation
which probably revealed his disgust at the passing away of the
opportunity of a war with England.
Meanwhile Pitt had worked hard to array his allies, Prussia and
Holland, against Spain. In this he succeeded. In particular, he
offered to the Dutch a considerable subsidy for arming a squadron
as if for war. To this topic he referred in a letter of 18th May 1790, to
Auckland. After informing him that the tellership of the Exchequer
would be reserved for him, or one of his sons, besides a pension of
£2,000 a year on retirement, he continued thus:

I cannot help adding how much satisfaction I have felt in

your account of everything at The Hague. You have done us a
most essential service in bringing the States into a disposition to
act at the present moment with a dispatch so unusual to them.
This messenger carries instructions to you to engage for the
expenses which you have stated to be likely to be incurred for
fitting out ten sail-of-the-line. You will, I am sure, take care that
the expense shall not be swelled beyond what is really
necessary; but, if even a greater sum should be really wanting,
we shall not scruple to give it; and, if you find that they can go
 on to prepare a still greater number of ships, it will be so much
the better. I can hardly form at present a conjecture of the event
of our preparations, as I can hardly conceive either that the
Spaniards will ultimately persist, or that they can have gone so
far without a determination not to recede. I hope we shall be
able to send an answer about the commercial treaty very
928
soon.

Pitt’s economy is here seen to be far removed from the

pennywise and pound-foolish kind. If necessary, he was prepared to
lavish subsidies on the Dutch, and on Prussia as well, in order to
overawe Spain. The Duke of Leeds and he were of one mind as to
the need of the most energetic measures. On 2nd June the Duke
wrote to him that the Spanish proposals were quite inadmissible,
and that Great Britain could not possibly accept “any measure short
of a direct and unqualified satisfaction for the insult.” Spain of course
would refuse, and therefore war must follow: it could not be avoided
929
without disgrace to one side or the other. This rigid attitude
prepares us for the part which the Duke played in the dispute with
Russia nine months later.
In this case Pitt agreed with him, apparently because the point
at issue concerned our interests and our honour far more nearly.
Indeed the tone of the Spanish replies left small hope of peace.
Count Floridablanca protested against the British demand that full
reparation must be made to the victims of Captain Martinez, before
the Spanish claims could be considered. “The Spanish Minister,”
wrote Merry from Madrid on 24th May, “is persuaded that we have
at all events taken the resolution of breaking with this country.... Our
tone of language to this Court he represents as insufferable, and
while on his part he still wishes to preserve peace, he seems to think
that Spain will unavoidably be driven to the necessity of defending
herself.” Spain, he adds, was arming twenty-five warships, and had
930
already two squadrons at sea.
 Her pretensions appear in the despatch of the Spanish Governor
of Mexico, dated Mexico, 11th May 1790. After stating that he had
released the “Argonaut” and “Princess Royal” in order to maintain
harmony with England, he remarked that Martinez had “acted
agreeably to the laws and royal ordinances, which not only
absolutely prohibit any kind of navigation, establishment, or
commerce of foreigners on our South Sea Coasts of both Americas,
but moreover strictly command they be looked upon as declared
enemies, without considering such treatment a breach of national
faith or contravention of the treaties of peace.” Whence it followed
that Martinez might with impunity have hanged Meares, Colnett, and
their crews on his yardarms. These claims were thus endorsed in the
Spanish circular note of 4th June, which based them on the Treaty of
Utrecht (1713):

It also appears that, in spite of the attempts of some

adventurers and pirates of various nations on the Spanish coasts
of the said South Sea and the adjacent islands, Spain has
continued her possession, recovering what has been
endeavoured to be usurped from her, and performing for this
purpose the necessary reconnoitres and voyages, by the means
of which and of repeated acts she has preserved her dominion,
of which she has always established and left signs, which reach
to places the nearest to the Russian establishments in that part
of the world.

The efforts which the Court of Madrid then put forth at St.
Petersburg and Vienna showed its resolve to concert a league
against England in which Denmark was to be included. This scheme,
as visionary as the grandiose dreams of Alberoni, caused our
Ministers some concern, until they found that their Allies, Prussia
and Holland, were resolved to support them. On 20th May Hertzberg
assured Ewart, that Prussia would fulfil her engagements, if Spain
931
pushed matters to extremes.
 Nevertheless, for a time everything portended war. Fitzherbert,
after reaching Aranjuez on 10th June, became convinced that
Floridablanca, for all his peaceful assurances, intended to force a
rupture at the first favourable opportunity. The Spanish Court
absolutely refused to grant satisfaction for the injury done to Meares
and Colnett, because that would imply the right of British subjects to
932
be at Nootka. For the very same reason the Pitt Cabinet pressed
its preliminary demand. It also brushed aside the Spanish
pretensions of sole sovereignty on the Nootka coasts, because
British and other seamen had for some little time traded there—an
933
assertion difficult to maintain.
The deadlock was therefore complete; and, if Spain could have
looked forward to help either from France, Russia, or Austria, war
would inevitably have ensued. It is of interest to observe that, as the
crisis became acute, Pitt adopted his usual habit of writing the drafts
of the most important despatches; and they were sent off without
alteration. He thus disposed of the suggestion of Floridablanca, that
the whole matter in dispute should be settled by arbitration. “Your
Excellency will not be surprised that they are such as cannot be
adopted. The idea of an arbitration upon a subject of this nature
must be entirely out of the question; and a reservation such as that
contained in the second proposal would render the satisfaction
nugatory, as it would refer to subsequent discussion the very ground
934
on which that satisfaction is demanded.”
The outlook was not brightened by the suggestion of
Floridablanca, that Spain should keep the whole of the coast from
California up to and including Nootka; that from that inlet
northwards to 61°, British and Spaniards should have conjointly the
right of trading and forming establishments; and that British sailors
should enjoy certain fishery rights in the South Sea on uninhabited
935
islands far removed from Spanish settlements. These proposals
seemed, as they doubtless were, a device to gain time until France,
Austria, or Russia could step forth and help Spain; and Pitt refused
to admit these “chimerical claims of exclusive sovereignty over the
American Continent and the seas adjacent,” which were to Spain
936
herself “rather matter of useless pride than of actual advantage.”
Towards the end of July more peaceful counsels prevailed at Madrid,
probably because the weak and luxurious King, Charles IV, disliked
war, and dreaded contact with Revolutionary France. Further it must
have transpired that Russia and Austria, owing to their war with
Turkey, were not likely to give more than good wishes to Spain.
Either for these reasons, or because he hoped that delay would tell
in favour of Spain, Floridablanca signed with Fitzherbert on 24th July
a Declaration that Spain would give satisfaction for the seizure of
British vessels and their cargoes at Nootka. On 5th August Grenville
937
informed the King of this auspicious turn of affairs.
But now, while the Court of Madrid abated its pretensions,
French patriots began to rattle the sword in the scabbard. For
reasons which are hard to fathom, the Spanish request for armed
assistance, which reached Paris on 16th June, was not presented to
the National Assembly until 2nd August. On that day Montmorin
informed the deputies of the continuance of naval preparations in
England, and declared that, unless French aid were accorded to
Spain, she would seek an ally elsewhere. The statement was well
calculated to awaken jealousy of England; and members came to the
conclusion that the islanders were seeking, in the temporary
weakness of France, to bully the Court of Madrid out of its just
rights. Consequently the whole matter was referred to the newly
appointed Diplomatic Committee which supervised the work of the
938
Foreign Office. As this body now practically controlled French
diplomacy, everything became uncertain; and it is not surprising that
Pitt and Leeds declined to disarm now that the question of peace or
war depended on an emotional Assembly and its delegates.
At the head of this new controlling body was Mirabeau. As
Reporter of the Committee he held a commanding position, which
was enhanced by his splendid eloquence, forceful personality, and
knowledge of the shady by-paths of diplomacy. The Report which he
presented to the Assembly on 25th August was, in effect, his. While
minimizing the importance of the Nootka dispute, scoffing at the old
diplomacy, and declaring that Europe would not need any diplomacy
when there were neither despots nor slaves, he yet proposed that,
pending the advent of that glorious age, France must not abrogate
her treaties but continue to respect them until they had been
subjected to revision. Further, in place of the Family Compact of the
Kings of France and Spain, he proposed to substitute a National
Compact, based on the needs of the two nations. On the following
day he continued his speech and moved that France and Spain
should form a national treaty in the interests of peace and
conformable to “the principles of justice which will ever form the
policy of the French.” What was far more significant, he himself
added a rider for the immediate armament of forty-five sail of the
line and a proportionate number of smaller vessels. This was carried
939
immediately.
Seeing that the Assembly passed this vote at the very time when
the terrible mutiny at Nancy was at its height, the feelings of the
deputies must have been of the bellicose order which Mirabeau had
previously deprecated. Despite the pressing need for peace, France
seemed to be heading straight for war. On ordinary grounds her
conduct is inexplicable. Everywhere her troops were clamouring for
arrears of pay; her sailors could scarcely be kept together; and the
virtual bankruptcy of the State was a week later to be quaintly
revealed by the flight of Necker to Switzerland. The King and his
Ministers disapproved the arming of so large a fleet; for Montmorin
confessed to Gower his surprise and regret, adding the comforting
assurance that it would be done as slowly as possible. The mystery
deepens when we know that Floridablanca continued to speak in
peaceful tones. On 19th August he admitted to Fitzherbert that he
desired help from Russia and Austria, but felt complete indifference
as to what France might do. Aid from her, he said, would lead to the
introduction of democratic principles, which he was determined to
keep out, if need arose, by a cordon along the frontier, as one would
940
exclude the plague.
Here probably we have the key to the enigma. The recent action
of Mirabeau (for the arming of the French naval force was his
proposal, not Montmorin’s) rested on the assumption that Spain did
not mean to draw the sword. His agents at the various Courts kept
him well abreast of events, and doubtless he foresaw that Charles
IV’s hatred of democracy would bar the way to an alliance of the two
peoples such as was now projected. Why, then, should Mirabeau
have threatened England with war? His reasons seem to have been
partly of a patriotic, partly of a private, nature. He desired to restore
the prestige of the French monarchy by throwing its sword into the
wavering balances of diplomacy. As to the expense, it was justifiable,
if it tended to revive the national spirit and to quell the mutinous
feelings of the sailors. Work, especially if directed against “the
natural enemy,” would be the best restorative of order at the
dockyards, and prevent the deterioration of the navy. But apart from
these motives Mirabeau may have been swayed by others of a lower
kind. His popularity had swiftly waned during the previous debates.
He might revive it by pandering to the dislike of England now widely
prevalent. Manufacturers who suffered by English competition and
Chauvinists who dreaded her supremacy at sea were joining in a hue
941
and cry against Pitt; and Mirabeau gained credit by posing as the
national champion. Further, by holding peace and war, as it were, in
the folds of his toga, he enhanced his value in the diplomatic
market. His corruptibility was notorious. Even the sums which he
drew from the King were far from meeting the yawning gulf of his
debts.
In the present case there was much to tempt him to political
auctioneering. There were present in Paris two political agents to
whom Pitt had confided the task of humouring the French democrats
and dissolving the Family Compact. These were William Augustus
Miles and Hugh Elliot. The former was a clever but opinionated man,
half statesman, half busy-body, capable of doing good work when
kept well in hand, but apt to take the bit into his teeth and bolt. He
had already looked into the affairs of Brabant, Liége, and Frankfurt
for Pitt; and as early as 4th March the Prime Minister summoned him
to Downing Street for the purpose of sending him to Paris; but not
till the middle of July did he finally entrust to him the task of
inducing French deputies to annul the Family Compact. That this was
to be done secretly appears from the order that he was to have no
942
dealings whatever with the British Embassy. Unfortunately the
letters which passed between Pitt and Miles at this time have all
943
been destroyed. But we know from other sources that Miles was
charged to prepare the way for an Anglo-French entente. He
certainly made overtures to Talleyrand, Mirabeau, and Lafayette; he
was also elected a member of the Jacobins Club, and worked hard to
remove the prejudices against England. These he found exceedingly
strong, all the troubles in the fleet being ascribed to her. By 11th
October he had fulfilled his mission, and informed George Rose that
Pitt might, if he chose, form a close working alliance with the French
nation. About the same time he conceived for Mirabeau the greatest
contempt, and asserted that it was “impossible to know him and not
944
to despise him.”
Elliot was a man of far higher stamp than Miles. As we have
seen, he had had a distinguished diplomatic career, and might be
termed the saviour of Gustavus III in the acute crisis of 1788. He
was brother of Sir Gilbert Elliot (first Earl of Minto), and of Lady
Auckland. In the summer of 1790 he was home on furlough. On 7th
August he wrote from Beckenham, Auckland’s residence,
congratulating Pitt on a favourable turn in the Spanish dispute.
When the outlook once more darkened he requested leave to go to
Paris in order to use his influence with his friend, Mirabeau, in the
interests of peace. Pitt must have referred the proposal to the King,
and received a very guarded reply, dated Windsor, 26th October.
George enjoined great caution, as we had hitherto held entirely aloof
from the French troubles, and must on no account be mixed up in
them. Yet, for the sake of peace, he did not object to this attempt,
so long as it was entirely unofficial; but he was “not sanguine that
Mr. H. Elliot and his French friend” would succeed where so much
945
caution and delicacy were necessary.
As this affair is wrapped in mystery, and concerns not only the
peace of the world, but also that most interesting personality,
Mirabeau, the draft of an undated letter of Pitt to the King must be
quoted in full:

Mr. P. takes the liberty of submitting to your Majesty’s

Perusal two private letters which he received to-day from Paris,
one from Lord Gower, and the other from Mr. H. Elliot. The latter
went thither a short time since, principally from curiosity, but
previous to his departure, mentioned to Mr. P. that he had
formerly happened to be in habits of much intimacy with M. de
Mirabeau, and might probably have an opportunity of learning
something from him respecting the views of the prevailing party
in France on the subject of the discussions with Spain. Mr. P.
recommends to him to be very cautious not to commit anybody
by his conversation, but to endeavour to find out whether there
was any chance of making them see in a just light the nature of
our disputes with Spain, and of thereby preventing or delaying
their taking a part in the war, if it should take place.
The suggestions in Mr. Elliot’s letter seem to furnish matter
for much consideration; possibly there may be found means of
improving this opening to some advantage with a view to
preserving or restoring peace, or to retarding the succours which
946
France might furnish to Spain.

This letter is undated. George III’s missive of 26th October

seems to be a reply to it or to one very like it. But Pitt’s letter implies
the receipt of Gower’s and Elliot’s despatches of 26th October. I have
found no other despatch from Gower enclosing one from Elliot
except of that date. Four days previously Gower had written to Pitt:
 Mr. Elliot’s communication with Mr. de Mirabeau has been
more successful than I imagined it was likely to be: it has
procured an easy means of maintaining a good understanding
between His Majesty’s Ministers and the prevailing party in the
National Assembly, if such a correspondence should be found
947
necessary.

In the letter of 26th October Gower informed Pitt:

Mr. Elliot has brought the prevailing party in this country to

act according to their true interest; and, if they meet with
proper encouragement from you, they seem ready to go any
lengths towards enforcing our claims with regard to Spain; and
they are, I believe, sincere in their desire to promote a real and
effectual good understanding between the two countries. I shall
be extremely happy to co-operate with Mr. Elliot in a negotiation
948
which appears to me so desirable.

The words “proper encouragement” donnent furieusement à

penser. Elliot in a long letter of 26th October, recounted his interview
with a deputation from the Diplomatic Committee, and his success in
winning it over to the British side. In the former of two paragraphs,
949
which are omitted by Earl Stanhope, Elliot describes the promise
given him by the Committee, that, even if Spain went to war, and
formally demanded the aid of France, such aid would not be
forthcoming until the British case had been fully investigated. The
second of the two passages deserves quotation in full. It occurs near
the end of the letter:

What has taken place in my more intimate conversations

with individuals cannot be committed to paper. But I have every
reason to believe that I am more master of the secret springs of
action here than anybody else could have been. Everything I
have either said or done has always been previously concerted
 and has ever answered my most sanguine expectations.... I am
inclined to believe that, after the disturbances at Brest are
known at Madrid, the Spaniards will make peace rather than
950
expose their fleets to any junction with French ships.

The hints here given imply that Mirabeau, and probably other
patriots as well, accepted British money, but both our envoys were
discreet enough to give few details in writing. It is quite probable
that Mirabeau first accepted Spanish gold for procuring the vote for
the arming of forty-five French sail of the line, and then accepted an
equivalent sum from Miles or Elliot for the decree which rendered
that step innocuous. His control over the Assembly was scarcely less
951
than Montmorin’s; and that nervous Minister would certainly
welcome a course of action which enhanced the prestige of France,
and yet averted all risk of war. Nevertheless, Pitt did not set much
store by the help of Mirabeau. He decided to bring the whole dispute
to an immediate issue, without waiting for the issue of the golden
proposals of Elliot and Miles. Possibly he heard from other sources
that France would do no more than rattle the sword in the scabbard;
or else he was emboldened by the marked success and zeal
attending the British naval preparations, the mutinies in the French
fleet, the readiness of our Allies to play their part, and the
unreadiness of Spain. A brief survey of these considerations will
reveal the grounds of his confidence.
The chance of hostilities with the two Bourbon Courts was
threatening enough to call forth all the energies of the race. Through
the months of August, September, and October naval preparations
went on with the utmost vigour. Officers and men vied with one
another in zeal to equip and man the ships with all possible speed
and thoroughness. Sir John Jervis afterwards assured the House of
Commons that he had seen captains paying out their own money by
hundreds of pounds in order to expedite the equipment; others
sailed their ships down Channel with mere skeleton crews in order to
hasten the rally at Plymouth; and by dint of drills from sunrise to
 952
sunset the crews were hardened to their work. In truth, the
dominant fact of the situation was England’s overwhelming
supremacy at sea over Spain, and possibly over Spain and France
together.
The Triple Alliance also proved to be a reality. The prospect of a
war with Spain was, of course, distasteful both at Berlin and The
Hague; but our Allies admitted that Spain was the aggressor, and
signified their readiness to support us. This should be noted, for it
imposed on Pitt a debt of honour to support Prussia when her
summons for help against the Czarina arrived at Whitehall in the
month of March following.
Further, the ambitions of the Czarina already threatened the
equilibrium of Europe; and in this fact we find the last, and perhaps
the most cogent, of the reasons why Pitt and his colleague resolved
to have done with the Spanish dispute before the Eastern Question
came to a crisis. This appears very clearly in Leeds’ despatch of 2nd
October to our ambassador at Madrid, which was in effect an
ultimatum to that Court. He warned Fitzherbert that the Spanish
proposals were quite inadmissible, and that “neither the
circumstances of the negotiation, nor the relative situation of the
two countries and of other Powers in Europe can allow of any further
delay”; he therefore pressed for the immediate acceptance of the
British demands. An explanatory note accompanied the ultimatum,
stating that Spain ought to desire the preservation of the existing
system in Europe, which was threatened solely by the Empress
Catharine, who spurned the counsels of moderation offered by the
953
Allies.
It appears, then, that the threatening aspect of affairs in the
East in part accounts for Pitt’s sudden and imperious demand. He
resolved to finish with Spain so as to have his hands free for the
Eastern Question. As appeared in an earlier chapter, the Czarina,
Catharine II, had recently concluded peace with Sweden; and,
despite the promised negotiations of the Viennese Court for peace
with the Turks, she seemed determined to press them hard, and to
wring from them a district then deemed necessary to the defence of
the Ottoman Power. Her dalliance with Spain was far from serious;
but she might, if allowed time, concert a formidable league against
England. The voice of prudence, therefore, counselled the immediate
coercion of Spain, while Russia was entangled in a still doubtful
strife. Machiavelli shrewdly remarked that “the Romans never
swallowed an injury to put off a war; for they knew that war was not
avoided but only deferred thereby, and commonly with advantage to
954
the enemy.”
But Pitt needed not to go to Machiavelli. Facts spoke more
convincingly than words to a nature like his; and the news from Paris
and Madrid called aloud for a display of energy. The insubordination
at the French dockyards and the news from Paris had told on the
nervous and pedantic King of Spain. On 16th September Fitzherbert
wrote to the Duke of Leeds that that monarch had very decidedly
expressed his resolve never to have an alliance with France on the
basis of a National Compact as proposed by Mirabeau. It appears,
then, that the great orator had a decisive effect in working on the
fears and scruples of His Catholic Majesty, and thus assuring the
isolation of Spain. If Mirabeau received British money from Miles and
Elliot a month or so later, he might claim it as payment for valuable
services already rendered. However that may be, it is certain that
Pitt, on receiving the glad news from Fitzherbert on 27th September,
decided to take vigorous action. Fitzherbert advised tact and
patience in dealing with that proud Court; but Pitt and Leeds waived
aside the advice and resolved to thrust their adversary into a corner.
In view of the more complaisant attitude of the Spanish
Government, their action was unchivalrous; but it was justified by
the tidings which had arrived of cruelties perpetrated by a Spanish
warship on the captain of a English merchantman in the Gulf of
955
Florida, who was set in the bilboes in the blazing sun. Public
opinion would certainly have supported Pitt in case of a rupture with
an enemy whose claims and customs were still those of the fifteenth
century; and he was resolved to end the dominion of Spain in the
North Pacific with as little ceremony as Cromwell had shown in his
expedition against Jamaica in 1654.
Now there was little fear of war. The pride of Charles IV centred
in trophies of the chase; and his weak and slothful nature revolted at
the thought of an alliance with France on Mirabeau’s terms.
Moreover, Russia and Austria had paid little heed to the recent
appeals of Floridablanca, and there was war with the Moors outside
Tangier. Was not this enough? For a few days the Council of
Ministers breathed threats of war. Floridablanca struggled hard
against the relentless grip which had closed around him. But he was
helpless, and he knew it. Therefore on Sunday, 24th October, the
Spanish Minister, after much angry remonstrance, gave way, and
agreed to the British terms.
Meanwhile, Pitt had allowed Fitzherbert to recede slightly on
some of the conditions, and urged that Spain should be invited to
frame an alliance with us, both political and commercial. As usual, in
affairs of great moment, he himself wrote the draft of this despatch,
956
which was sent off without alteration. This skilful angling was of
no avail. Spanish pride was too deeply wounded to admit of any
possibility of alliance, whether political or commercial, for many
years to come. In other respects Pitt gained his point; and the
following letter to Bishop Pretyman (Tomline) shows his relief at the
end to the long strain:

957
Thursday, Nov. 4, 1790.
Dear Bishop,
The decisive answer arrived this morning and is
perfectly satisfactory. The Spanish Minister at last agreed, on the
24th of October, to a projet of a Convention containing all we
wish, and it was settled that it should be actually signed in three
days from that time. The terms will be found to secure all that
we could demand in justice, or had any reason to desire.
 Accordingly, on 28th October 1790 (after four days, not three),
the Court of Madrid signed the Convention which opened up a new
future for the North Pacific. By it Spain agreed to restore the
buildings and lands at Nootka to the British subjects whom Martinez
had dispossessed. Reparation was also to be made for any outrages
committed by the subjects of either Power against those of the other
958
since April 1789. Britons and Spaniards were to have full liberty
to trade in North-West America, that is, to the north of the Spanish
settlements; but of course all the coasts to the south of them were
to remain closed as heretofore. Spain, however, conceded entire
freedom of navigation and fishery in the Pacific Ocean and the South
Seas, except that, in order to preclude all intercourse with her
colonies, British ships were forbidden to approach within a limit of
ten maritime leagues.
The British public greeted this happy issue of events with
characteristic reserve. As Spain stood for commercial monopoly and
political reaction, the rebuff dealt to her ought to have pleased the
Whigs. But party rancour increased in proportion to Pitt’s success.
Hope deferred made the hearts of his opponents sick; and to this
cause we may attribute curiously acrid verdicts like that of
Auckland’s correspondent, Storer, who exclaimed on 22nd October,
with the jauntiness of ignorance: “Here we are, going to war, and for
what? A place, the name of which I can scarcely pronounce, never
heard of till lately, and which did not exist till t’other day. Pitt is tired
of peace. He bullied France so effectually three years ago that he is
determined to try the same thing with Spain.” Storer also says that
our officers were in high spirits at the idea of a voyage to Mexico,
and were buying Ulloa’s “Voyage” so as to study the South Sea
959
coasts. Whence it would appear that geography was not a strong
point with Storer, and that in his eyes wars were worth waging only
on behalf of well-known names. How curiously parochial is this habit
of mind. Yet Pitt was destined soon to find out its self-assertiveness
and tenacity in the case of another un-euphonious and dimly-known
place—Oczakoff.