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 Copyright © 2020 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

All rights reserved. Except as permitted by U.S.

copyright law, no part of this work may be
reproduced or distributed in any form or by any
means, or stored in a database or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publisher.

All third party trademarks referenced or depicted

herein are included solely for the purpose of
illustration and are the property of their respective
owners. Reference to these trademarks in no way
indicates any relationship with, or endorsement by,
the trademark owner.

SPSS is a registered trademark of International

Business Machines Corporation.
Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Wagner, William E. (William Edward), author.

Title: Using IBM SPSS statistics for research methods and social
science statistics / William E. Wagner, III, California State
University, Channel Islands.

Description: Seventh edition. | Los Angeles : SAGE, [2020] |

Includes bibliographical references and index

Identifiers: LCCN 2018050720 | ISBN 9781506389004 (pbk. : alk.

paper)

Identifiers: LCCN 2018050719 | ISBN 9781544302072 (hardcover

: alk. paper)

7
Subjects: LCSH: Social sciences—Statistical methods. | SPSS for
Windows.

Classification: LCC HA32 .W34 2020 | DDC 300.285/555—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018050720

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Acquisitions Editor: Jeff Lasser

Editorial Assistant: Tiara Beatty

Production Editor: Jane Martinez

Copy Editor: Christina West

Typesetter: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd.

Proofreader: Wendy Jo Dymond

Cover Designer: Anupama Krishnan

Marketing Manager: Will Walter

8
9
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1 • Overview
What’s the Difference Between SPSS
Statistics and PASW Statistics? None.
Statistical Software
About the GSS Data
SPSS/PASW Electronic Files
Opening Existing Data Files
Importing Data From Statistics File Formats
Other Than SPSS or PASW
Opening Previously Created Output Files
Saving Files
Creating New SPSS Statistics Data Files
Creating and Editing SPSS Statistics Output
Files
Preferences: Getting Started
Measurement of Variables Using SPSS
Statistics
References
Chapter 2 • Transforming Variables
Recoding and Computing Variables
Recoding Variables: Dichotomies and
Dummy Variables
Recoding Using Two or More Variables to
Create a New Variable
Computing Variables
Using the Count Function

10
 Computing an Index Using the Mean
Multiple Response
Chapter 3 • Selecting and Sampling Cases
Targeted Selection
Random Selection
Selecting Cases for Inclusion in a New Data
Set
Chapter 4 • Organization and Presentation of
Information
Measures of Central Tendency and
Variability
Frequency Distributions
Chapter 5 • Charts and Graphs
Boxplot
Legacy Options for Graphs (Boxplot
Example)
Scatterplot
Legacy Scatterplot
Histogram
Multivariate Histogram
Horizontal Histogram
Bar Graph
Multivariate Bar Graph
Pie Chart
Additional Graphic Capabilities in SPSS
Statistics
Chapter 6 • Testing Hypotheses Using Means
and Cross-Tabulation
Comparing Means
Comparing Means: Paired-Samples t Test

11
 Comparing Means: Independent-Samples t
Test
One-Sample t Test
Chi-Square (χ2)
Chi-Square (χ2) and Cross-Tabulation
Chapter 7 • Cross-Tabulation and Measures of
Association for Nominal and Ordinal Variables
Bivariate Analysis
Adding Another Variable or Dimension to
the Analysis
Measures of Association for Nominal and
Ordinal Variables
Lambda (λ)
Gamma (γ), Kendall’s Tau-b, and Somers’ d
References
Chapter 8 • Correlation and Regression
Analysis
Bivariate Regression
Correlation
Multiple Regression
Chapter 9 • Logistic Regression Analysis
Preparing Variables for Use in Logistic
Regression Analysis
Creating a Set of Dummy Variables to
Represent a Multicategory Nominal Variable
Logistic Regression Analysis
Logistic Regression Using a Categorical
Covariate Without Dummy Variables
Interpreting Odds Ratios
Step Models
Chapter 10 • Analysis of Variance

12
 One-Way ANOVA
ANOVA in Regression
Chapter 11 • Editing Output
Editing Basic Tables
Copying to Microsoft Word
Importing and Preparing Text Files for
Analysis by SPSS
Editing Charts and Graphs
Chapter 12 • Advanced Applications
Merging Data From Multiple Files
Opening Previously Created Syntax Files
Creating New SPSS Syntax Files
About the Author

13
14
Preface

This book was written for those learning

introductory statistics or with some basic statistics
knowledge who want to use IBM® SPSS®
Statistics∗ software to manage data and/or carry
out basic statistical analyses. It can also be a
useful tool to gain an understanding of how SPSS
Statistics software works before going on to more
complicated statistical procedures. This volume is
an ideal supplement for a statistics or research
methods course. Although it can be used with any
research methods or statistics book or materials,
this book was tailored to complement all editions of
Investigating the Social World, by Russell K.
Schutt, and Social Statistics for a Diverse Society,
by Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and Anna Leon-
Guerrero (latest editions published in 2018 and
2017, respectively). It can also be used as a guide
for those working with basic statistics on their own.
The book provides information for users about
some of the important mechanics of SPSS
Statistics operating procedures for simple data
management along with accessible introductory
instructions to statistical operations.

15
References
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Leon-Guerrero, A.
(2017). Social statistics for a diverse society (8th
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Schutt, R. K. (2018). Investigating the social world:

The process and practice of research (9th ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

∗ IBM® SPSS® Statistics was formerly called

PASW® Statistics. SPSS is a registered trademark
of International Business Machines Corporation

16
17
Acknowledgments

The author and SAGE gratefully acknowledge the

contributions of the following reviewers:

James A. Bernauer, Robert Morris University

Adam Faight, Porter and Chester Institute
Martonia Gaskill, PhD, University of Nebraska
at Kearney
Robin Hernandez-Mekonnen, Stockton
University
Cheng-Hsien Lin, Lamar University
Kristen Linton, California State University,
Channel Islands
Randolph Merced, Rosemont College
Jingjing Niu, Idaho State University
Angela Taylor, Fayetteville State University
Kyle M. Woosnam, PhD, University of Georgia

18
19
20
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
of working up his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise;
to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for
acting and suffering, against the public enemy.
We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote, of
this debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly
prominent. But we know that neither of the two positive measures
which he recommends was carried into effect. The working
armament was not sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be
held in reserve for instant movement in case of emergency, ever got
ready. It was not until the following month of September (the
oration being delivered some time in the first half of 351 B. C.), that
any actual force was sent against Philip; and even then nothing
more was done than to send the mercenary chief Charidemus to the
Chersonese, with ten triremes, and five talents in money, but no
soldiers.[684] Nor is there any probability that Demosthenes even
obtained a favorable vote of the assembly; though strong votes
against Philip were often passed without being ever put in execution
afterwards.[685]
Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen
whose duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the
same propositions assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But
what ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There
existed at that time in Athens a certain party or section who
undervalued Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less
formidable than the Persian king.[686] The reports of Persian force
and preparation, prevalent two years before when Demosthenes
delivered his harangue on the Symmories, seem still to have
continued, and may partly explain the inaction again Philip. Such
reports would be magnified, or fabricated, by another Athenian party
much more dangerous; in communication with, and probably paid
by, Philip himself. To this party Demosthenes makes his earliest
allusion in the first Philippic,[687] and reverts to them on many
occasions afterwards. We may be very certain that there were
Athenian citizens serving as Philip’s secret agents, though we cannot
assign their names. It would be not less his interest to purchase
such auxiliaries, than to employ paid spies in his operations of war:
[688] while the prevalent political antipathies at Athens, coupled with
the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly
practicable to obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens,
but also at Amphipolis, Potidæa, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip
achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans
among the leaders of his enemies—is an assertion so intrinsically
probable, that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by
unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have
availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-
employed force and military genius.
 CHAPTER LXXXVIII.
EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.

If even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of

Demosthenes, the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much
more serious had it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He
had gained them over, four years before, by transferring to them the
territory of Anthemus—and the still more important town of
Potidæa, captured by his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these
cessions, they had become his allies in his war with Athens, whom
they hated on every ground. But a material change had since taken
place. Since the loss of Methônê, Athens, expelled from the coast of
Thrace and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to
inspire alarm to the Olynthians; while the immense increase in the
power of Philip, combined with his ability and ambition alike
manifest, had overlaid their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of
fear for the future. It was but too clear that a prince who stretched
his encroaching arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and
to Thrace—would not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the
Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian
communities. Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of
Philip in Thessaly over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B. C.), the
Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance
with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and
manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be
thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before
November 352 B. C.[689]
Here was an important change of policy on the part of the
Olynthians. Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of
hostility against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to
themselves recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his
attack, it was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any
such distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of
Potidæa, he had purchased their coöperation against Athens, and
would treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable
relations.
A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic[690])
we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden
excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.
In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or
vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year
351 B. C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian
expedition, where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for
the time suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have
proposed to Olynthus a scheme of decided alliance against Philip.
[691] But the Olynthians had too much to fear from him, to become
themselves the aggressors. They still probably hoped that he might
find sufficient enemies and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians,
Illyrians, Pæonians, Arymbas and the Epirots, and Athenians;[692] at
any rate, they would not be the first to provoke a contest. This state
of reciprocal mistrust[693] continued for several months, until at
length Philip began serious operations against them; not very long
after his recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly
towards the middle of 350 B. C.;[694] a little before the beginning of
Olympiad 107, 3.
It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile
relations that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas
by another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They
came as his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their
brothers, and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight.
Whether they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath,
we are not informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the
Macedonian regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to
Philip, these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were
now favorably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that
in case of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To
that prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a
plausible pretence for war—which he doubtless would under all
circumstances have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to
have been so put forward in his public declarations.[695]
But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to
blend the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and
to divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such
insidious approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power
of that city consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a
numerous confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably
not all, of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidikê. Among
the different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less
of dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances
might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city
moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens
competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it
was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open
intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive
invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it inspired
alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and
jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing circumstances, he
either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities of
Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the
neighboring peninsula of Chalkidikê. Olynthus and the other cities
were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some
probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had given
to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war[696]) a
portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbê: Philip himself had given
to them the district of Anthemus. Possessed of so much neighboring
land, he had the means, with little loss to himself, of materially
favoring or enriching such individual citizens, of Olynthus or other
cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides direct bribes, where
that mode of proceeding was most effective, he could grant the right
of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds of one, and furnish
abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as he now was of
Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or close to them
the speculations of the gold mines of Mount Pangæus, for which
they had always hankered.[697] If his privateers harassed even the
powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection, much more
vexatious would they be to his neighbors in the Chalkidic peninsula,
which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on one side
to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt that
some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take
service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with
correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.
It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and
her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private
benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him
the coöperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such
minority of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its
purposes, among the standing political feuds of the place. These
means however were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword.
His seductions and presents commenced the work, but his excellent
generalship and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the
cavalry, all now brought into admirable training during the ten years
of his reign—completed it.
Though Demosthenes in one passage goes so far as to say that
Philip rated his established influence so high as to expect to
incorporate the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious
difficulty and without even real war[698]—there is ground for
believing that he encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by
unmeasured rigors after the victory. The two years and a half
between Midsummer 350 B. C., and the commencement of 347 B. C.
(the two last years of Olympiad 107 and the nine first months of
Olympiad 108), were productive of phænomena more terror-striking
than anything in the recent annals of Greece. No less than thirty-two
free Grecian cities in Chalkidikê were taken and destroyed, the
inhabitants being reduced to slavery, by Philip. Among them was
Olynthus, one of the most powerful, flourishing, and energetic
members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Apollonia, whose inhabitants
would now repent the untoward obstinacy of their fathers (thirty-two
years before) in repudiating a generous and equal confederacy with
Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to revive the falling power of
Philip’s father, Amyntas; and Stageira, the birth-place of Aristotle.
The destruction of thirty-two free Hellenic communities in two years
by a foreign prince, was a calamity the like of which had never
occurred since the suppression of the Ionic revolt and the invasion of
Xerxes. I have already recounted in a previous chapter[699] the
manifestation of wrath at the festival of the ninety-ninth Olympiad
(394 B. C.) against the envoys of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse,
who had captured and subverted five or six free Hellenic
communities in Italy and Sicily. Far more vehement would be the
sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war, against the
Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities. We shall find this
plainly indicated in the phænomena immediately succeeding. We
shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike dishonorable and
improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture to oppose;
we shall see Æschines passing out of a free spoken Athenian citizen
into a servile worshipper, if not a paid agent, of Philip: we shall
observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic freedom and
integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter
of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power
well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These were terrible times;
suitably illustrated in their cruel details by the gangs of enslaved
Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing even into
Peloponnesus[700] as the property of new grantees who extolled the
munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in by awful
celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the heavens to
the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.[701]
While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general
result of Philip’s Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into the
Grecian mind—we are not only left without information as to its
details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already
remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such
suspicions of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B. C., as to
induce them to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had
nevertheless, declined the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance,
not wishing to bring upon themselves decided hostility from so
powerful a neighbor, until his aggressions should become such as to
leave them no choice. We have no precise information as to Philip’s
movements after his operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351
B. C. But we know that it was not in his nature to remain inactive;
that he was incessantly pushing his conquests; and that no conquest
could be so important to him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic
peninsula. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find, that the
Olynthian and Chalkidian confederates became the object of his
direct hostility in 350 B. C. He raised pretences for attack against one
or other of these cities separately; avoiding to deal with the
confederacy as a whole, and disclaiming, by special envoys,[702] all
purposes injurious to Olynthus.
Probably the philippizing party in that city may have dwelt upon
this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances
about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschines hereafter
uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so
deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to
close with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to
Athens to propose alliance and invite coöperation against Philip.
Their first propositions were doubtless not couched in the language
of urgency and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger;
their power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value
abroad; moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally
overstate their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were
offering. Of course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to
Chalkidikê—since it was there that the war was being carried on; but
they would ask for aid in order to act energetically against the
common enemy, and repress the growth of his power—not to avert
immediate danger menacing Olynthus.
There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept
this alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they
willingly closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—
what indeed was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force
to coöperate against Philip in Chalkidikê. On this first recognition of
Olynthus as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before
circumstances had at all changed—Demosthenes delivered his
earliest Olynthiac harangue. Of the three memorable compositions
so denominated, the earliest is, in my judgment, that which stands
second in the edited order. Their true chronological order has long
been, and still is, matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I
can form, is that the first and the second are erroneously placed, but
that the third is really the latest;[703] all of them being delivered
during the six or seven last months of 350 B. C.
In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as
the second Olynthiac), Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous
contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the
blessing of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an
ally. He recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the
most prompt and effective aid will please him the best. But this
recommendation is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of
the speech; it is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically
insisted upon, nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of
aid to be sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of
Olynthus, nor to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still
less to ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might
carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On the
contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to
the situation of their territory, close on Philip’s flanks—to their fixed
resolution that they will never again enter into amity or compromise
with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will prove to
Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the war
against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought upon
her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is to
inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for the
prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the
Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger
scheme. “I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable
power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of
your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him
and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought
him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by
means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandized himself, partly
through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous
means—by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by
cheating successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other
allies. These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting
him; without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the
Macedonians themselves have no sympathy with his personal
ambition; they are fatigued with the labor imposed upon them by his
endless military movements, and impoverished by the closing of
their ports through the war. His vaunted officers are men of
worthless and dissolute habits; his personal companions are thieves,
vile ministers of amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good
fortune imparts to all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength;
and doubtless his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune
of Athens, and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still
greater—if only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are,
sitting still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his
friends to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that
Philip, always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for
himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who
merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary
would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had not been
the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who
in former days contended for Pan-hellenic freedom against the
Lacedæmonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandizement for
yourselves, fought in person and lavished your substance to protect
the rights of other Greeks—that you now shrink from personal
service and payment of money for the defence of your own
possessions. You, who have so often rescued others, can now sit still
after having lost so much of your own! I wonder you do not look
back to that conduct of yours which has brought your affairs into
this state of ruin, and ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while
such conduct remains unchanged. It was much easier at first to
preserve what we once had, than to recover it now that it is lost; we
have nothing now left to lose—we have everything to recover. This
must be done by ourselves, and at once; we must furnish money, we
must serve in person by turns; we must give our generals means to
do their work well, and then exact from them a severe account
afterwards—which we cannot do so long as we ourselves will neither
pay nor serve. We must correct that abuse which has grown up,
whereby particular symmories in the state combine to exempt
themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them all unjustly
upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously and
heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace
faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation.”
Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by
Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern
readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius,[704] there is an
unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings
must have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their
author as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts
to bear out such an impression. Demosthenes was still comparatively
a young man—thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his
speeches and his compositions written to be spoken by others;[705]
but as yet not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover
certain—to his honor—that he described and measured foreign
dangers before they were recognized by ordinary politicians; that he
advised a course, energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the
people to act upon, and disagreeable for recognized leaders to
propose; that these leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were
accordingly adverse to him. The tone of Demosthenes in these
speeches is that of one who feels that he is contending against
heavy odds—combating an habitual and deep-seated reluctance. He
is an earnest remonstrant—an opposition speaker—contributing to
raise up gradually a body of public sentiment and conviction which
ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus is the ministerial
spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man
not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative
routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary
precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property-tax, and the
general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theôric
expenditure.
The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They
accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to coöperate
with Olynthus in the war against Philip.[706] Such unhappily was their
usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no
witness to satisfy us, that he would not slacken in his attack—and
that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than
one of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces
also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by
their new allies; while the philippizing party among themselves
would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her
promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation
with the enemy.[707] Complaints would presently reach Athens,
brought by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from
the Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip’s arms.
They would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating
on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid more
urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip’s conquest
of Chalkidikê. It was in this advanced stage of the proceedings that
Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause, delivering that
speech which stands first in the printed order of the Olynthiacs.
Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is
no longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of
which Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the
prominent feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now
pronounced to be in danger and in pressing need of succor;
moreover its preservation is strenuously pressed upon the Athenians,
as essential to their own safety. While it stands with its confederacy
around it, the Athenians can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls,
there is nothing to prevent him from transferring the war into Attica,
and assailing them on their own soil.[708] Demosthenes is wound up
to a higher pitch of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of
his countrymen on a crisis which calls aloud for instant action.[709]
He again urges that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and
two armaments despatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve
to Olynthus her confederate cities—the other, to make a diversion by
simultaneous attack on Philip at home. Without such two-fold aid
(he says) the cities cannot be preserved.[710] Advice of aid generally
he had already given, though less emphatically, in his previous
harangue; but he now superadds a new suggestion—that Athenian
envoys shall be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of
the force, but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course
of events. For he is afraid, that unless such immediate
encouragement be sent, Philip may, even without the tedious
process of a siege, frighten or cajole the Olynthian confederacy into
submission; partly by reminding them that Athens had done nothing
for them, and by denouncing her as a treacherous and worthless
ally.[711] Philip would be glad to entrap them into some plausible
capitulation; and though they knew that they could have no security
for his keeping the terms of it afterwards, still he might succeed, if
Athens remained idle. Now, if ever, was the time for Athenians to
come forward and do their duty without default; to serve in person
and submit to the necessary amount of direct taxation. They had no
longer the smallest pretence for continued inaction; the very
conjuncture which they had so long desired, had turned up of itself
—war between Olynthus and Philip, and that too upon grounds
special to Olynthus—not at the instigation of Athens.[712] The
Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of Athens by the
peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair her numerous
past errors and short-comings. She ought to look well and deal
rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order to wipe off
the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus and suffer
Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him from
marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable,
his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her
careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace into
Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.[713]
“I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at
the present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their
confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that
express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops
and other triremes to act aggressively against Philip’s own coast. If
you neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will
fail. As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money
than any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that
money to soldiers on service, no need exists for farther provision—if
not, then need exists; but above all things, money must be found.
What then! I shall be asked—are you moving that the Theôric fund
shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express
my conviction, that soldiers must be equipped, and that receipt of
public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand
in hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any
such condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except
that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little, if
little will suffice. Money must be had; without it, not a single
essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways and
means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you
think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the
opportunity still lasts.”[714]
It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some
time after the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any
auxiliary force had been either sent to them or even positively
decreed—yet when such postponement of action had inspired them
with mistrust, threatening to throw them, even without resistance,
into the hands of Philip and their own philippizing party. We observe
in Demosthenes the same sagacious appreciation, both of the
present and the future, as we have already remarked in the first
Philippic—foresight of the terrible consequences of this Olynthian
war, while as yet distant and unobserved by others. We perceive the
same good sense and courage in invoking the right remedies;
though his propositions of personal military service, direct taxation,
or the diversion of the Theôric fund—were all of them the most
unpopular which could be made. The last of the three, indeed, he
does not embody in a substantive motion; nor could he move it
without positive illegality, which would have rendered him liable to
the indictment called Graphê Paranomon. But he approaches it near
enough to raise in the public mind the question as it really stood—
that money must be had; that there were only two ways of getting it
—direct taxation, and appropriation of the festival fund; and that the
latter of these ought to be restored as well as the former. We shall
find this question about the Theôric Fund coming forward again
more than once, and shall have presently to notice it more at large.
At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how
long after it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the
Athenians commissioned and sent a body of foreign mercenaries to
the aid of the Olynthians and Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of
these troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from
rich Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent;
nor was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The
expedition appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350
B. C., as far as we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the
obscure chronology of this period.[715] It presently gained some
victory over Philip or Philip’s generals, and was enabled to transmit
good news to Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led
the people to fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on
Philip for past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only
were the Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a
fair way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that
the success may really have been something considerable, such as
to check Philip’s progress for the time. Though victorious on the
whole, he must have experienced partial and temporary reverses,
otherwise he would have concluded the war before the early spring
of 347 B. C. Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian
general Chares over Philip’s general Adæus,[716] we cannot say.
But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and
frankness to proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the
war generally; worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to
fancy that they had carried their point.
To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to
combat that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily
found encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them
the conviction, that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards
their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security—is the
scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the
printed order, and third also, according to my judgment, in order of
time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B. C.[717] Like
Perikles, he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and
unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise
their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.[718]
“The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenes,
in substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case
teach us a very different lesson.[719] They bid us look well to our
own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we
preserve our allies. There was indeed a time—and that too within my
remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and
punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve
our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time to
think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious
deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed
three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you
passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him:
presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this
good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary,
and you let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved,
Philip would have been put down then, and would have given you no
further trouble.[720]
“Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I
advert to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar,
and I trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not
send aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play
Philip’s game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been
long anxious and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip.
This has now happened: what choice remains, except to aid them
heartily and vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do
not. But this is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you
also; for there is nothing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus,
from invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the
Thebans are your enemies.
“All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved
unanimously to succor Olynthus, and we will succor it. We only want
you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my answer.
Appoint Nomothetæ at once.[721] Do not submit to them any
propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but
only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present
juncture—I mean, those which regard the Theôric fund (I speak out
thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military service.
By the former, you hand over money, which ought to go to soldiers
on service, in Theôric distribution among those who stay at home.
By the latter, you let off without penalty those who evade service,
and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When you have
repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to proclaim
salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with a formal
motion such as you all know to be required. But until you do this,
expect not that any one will make these indispensable propositions
on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your hands. You will find
no such man; especially as he would only incur unjust punishment
for himself, without any benefit to the city—while his punishment
would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon that subject in
future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men who proposed
these laws should also take upon them to propose the repeal; for it
is not right that these men should continue to enjoy a popularity
which is working mischief to the whole city, while the unpopularity of
a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of the reforming
mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can neither tolerate
that any one among you shall be powerful enough to infringe a law
with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool enough to run
with his eyes open into punishment.”
I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre
abstract of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the
third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over
Philip being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy
that they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution
to assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so
on this—Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment
which he deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage,
wisdom, and dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of
Phokion—does he execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its
unpopularity!
Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in
consequence of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes, we cannot
determine. We have no ground for believing the affirmative; while
we are certain that the specific measure which he recommended—
the sending of an armament of citizens personally serving—was not
at that time (before the end of 350 B. C.) carried into effect. At or
before the commencement of 349 B. C., the foreign relations of
Athens began to be disturbed by another supervening
embarrassment—the revolt of Eubœa.
After the successful expedition of 358 B. C., whereby the
Athenians had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island
remained for some years in undisturbed connection with Athens.
Chalkis, Eretria, and Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a
member to the synod of allies holding session at Athens, and paid
their annual quota (seemingly five talents each) to the confederate
fund.[722] During the third quarter of 352 B. C., Menestratus the
despot or principal citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted
friend of Athens.[723] But this state of things changed shortly after
Philip conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the
Pagasæan Gulf (in 353 and the first half of 352 B. C.). His power was
then established immediately over against Oreus and the northern
coast of Eubœa, with which island his means of communication
became easy and frequent. Before the date of the first Philippic of
Demosthenes (seemingly towards the summer of 351 B. C.) Philip had
opened correspondences in Eubœa, and had despatched thither
various letters, some of which the orator reads in the course of that
speech to the Athenian assembly. The actual words of the letters are
not given; but from the criticism of the orator himself, we discern
that they were highly offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the
Eubœans probably to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of
Macedonian aid towards that object.[724] Philip’s naval warfare also
brought his cruisers to Geræstus in Eubœa, where they captured
several Athenian corn-ships;[725] insulting even the opposite coast of
Attica at Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among
her allies. Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were
soon formed aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the
support of Philip; while for the same purpose detachments of
mercenaries could also be procured across the western Eubœan
strait, out of the large numbers now under arms in Phokis.
About the beginning of 349 B. C.—while the war of Philip,
unknown to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians,
was still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent
by Athens—hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip,
broke out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do
not know what had become of Menestratus), with a certain number
of soldiers at his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more
powerful, professed to represent Athenian interests in his city, and
sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenes, suspecting this man to
be a traitor, dissuaded compliance with the application.[726] But
Plutarch had powerful friends at Athens, seemingly among the party
of Eubulus; one of whom, Meidias, a violent personal enemy of
Demosthenes, while advocating the grant of aid, tried even to get up
a charge against Demosthenes, of having himself fomented these
troubles in Eubœa against the reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch.[727]
The Athenian assembly determined to despatch a force under
Phokion; who accordingly crossed into the island, somewhat before
the time of the festival Anthesteria (February) with a body of
hoplites.[728] The cost of fitting out triremes for this transport, was in
part defrayed by voluntary contributions from rich Athenians; several
of whom, Nikêratus, Euktêmon, Euthydemus, contributed each the
outfit of one vessel.[729] A certain proportion of the horsemen of the
city were sent also; yet the entire force was not very large, as it was
supposed that the partisans there to be found would make up the
deficiency.
This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently
friendly reception and a certain stay at or near Eretria, Phokion
found himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of Chalkis,
collected as much Eubœan force as he could, declared openly
against Athens, and called in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip’s
commanders in the neighboring Pagasæan Gulf); while his brother
Taurosthenes hired a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis.[730]
The anti-Athenian force thus became more formidable than Phokion
could fairly cope with; while the support yielded to him in the island
was less than he expected. Crossing the eminence named
Kotylæum, he took a position near the town and hippodrome of
Tamynæ, on high ground bordered by a ravine; Plutarch still
professing friendship, and encamping with his mercenaries along
with him. Phokion’s position was strong; yet the Athenians were
outnumbered and beleaguered so as to occasion great alarm.[731]
Many of the slack and disorderly soldiers deserted; a loss which
Phokion affected to despise—though he at the same time sent to
Athens to make known his difficulties and press for reinforcement.
Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his camp, which the enemy
marched up to attack. Disregarding his order, and acting with a
deliberate treason which was accounted at Athens unparalleled—
Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them; but
presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse, who
had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was
now in the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were
plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But
his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so
much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he
repelled the assailants with loss, and gained a complete victory.
Thallus and Kineas distinguished themselves by his side; Kleophanes
also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while
Æschines the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented
for his bravery, and sent to Athens to carry the first news of the
victory.[732] Phokion pursued his success, expelled Plutarch from
Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zaretra, near the narrowest
part of the island. He released all his Greek captives, fearing that the
Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should resolve upon
treating them with extreme harshness.[733] Kallias seems to have left
the island and found shelter with Philip.[734]
The news brought by Æschines (before the Dionysiac festival) of
the victory of Tamynæ, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety.
On the former despatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to
send to Eubœa another armament, including the remaining half of
the cavalry, a reinforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of
triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense[735] with any
immediate reinforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival
with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual
notoriety. Demosthenes, serving in it as chorêgus for his tribe the
Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theatre and amid the full
pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias; who,
besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on the
head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this
time held the high office of Hipparch, or one of the commanders of
the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public
assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special
purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about
matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special
assembly Demosthenes preferred a complaint against Meidias for the
unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among
the people, who passed a unanimous vote of censure. This
procedure (called Probolê), did not by itself carry any punishment,
but served as a sort of præjudicium, or finding of a true bill;
enabling Demosthenes to quote the public as a witness to the main
fact of insult, and encouraging him to pursue Meidias before the
regular tribunals; which he did a few months afterwards, but was
induced to accept from Meidias the self-imposed fine of thirty minæ
before the final passing of sentence by the Dikasts.[736]
From the despatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of
Eretria had become manifest; so that Demosthenes gained credit for
his previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament;
while the friends of Plutarch—Hegesilaus and others of the party of
Eubulus—incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were
afterwards tried.[737] But he was reproached by his enemies for
having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ; and a citizen named
Euktêmon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment
against him for desertion of his post. Whether Demosthenes had
actually gone over to Eubœa as a hoplite in the army of Phokion,
and obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia—or
whether he did not go at all—we are unable to say. In either case,
his duties as chorêgus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so
that Euktêmon, though he formally hung up before the statues of
the Eponymous Heroes public proclamation of his intended
indictment, never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing
it to actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non-
performance of his engagement.[738] Nevertheless the opprobrious
and undeserved epithet of deserter was ever afterwards applied to
Demosthenes by Æschines and his other enemies; and Meidias even
heaped the like vituperation upon most of those who took part in
that assembly[739] wherein the Probolê or vote of censure against
him had been passed. Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however,
it was found necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and
hoplites, to Eubœa; probably to relieve either some or all of those
already serving there. Demosthenes on this occasion put on his
armor and served as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to
Argura in Eubœa, as commander of the horsemen: yet, when the
horsemen were summoned to join the Athenian army, he did not join
along with them, but remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of
which he had himself defrayed.[740] How long the army stayed in
Eubœa, we do not know. It appears that Demosthenes had returned
to Athens by the time when the annual Senate was chosen in the
last month of the Attic year (Skirrophorion—June); having probably
by that time been relieved. He was named (by the lot) among the
Five Hundred Senators for the coming Attic year (beginning
Midsummer 349 B. C. = Olymp. 107, 4);[741] his old enemy Meidias in
vain impugning his qualification as he passed through the Dokimasy
or preliminary examination previous to entering office.
What the Athenian army did farther in Eubœa, we cannot make
out. Phokion was recalled—we do not know when—and replaced by
a general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war
very unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself
by the enemy.[742] The hostile parties in the island, sided by Philip,
were not subdued, nor was it until the summer of 348 B. C. that they
applied for peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so
that the Eubœans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace
with Philip in 346 B. C.
But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of
Eubœa, they found it necessary to undertake more effective
measures for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their
hands at the same time the burthen of two wars. We know that they
had to provide force for both Eubœa and Olynthus at once;[743] and
that the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was
one of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and
communications made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce
Athens to do, what Demosthenes in his three Olynthiacs had vainly
insisted on during the preceding summer and autumn—to send
thither a force of native Athenians, in the first half of 349 B. C. Of the
horsemen who had gone from Athens to Eubœa, under Meidias, to
serve under Phokion, either all, or a part, crossed by sea from
Eubœa to Olynthus, during that half-year.[744] Meidias did not cross
with them, but came back as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now
the Athenian horsemen were not merely citizens, but citizens of
wealth and consequence; moreover the transport of them by sea
was troublesome as well as costly. The sending of such troops
implies a strenuous effort and sense of urgency on the part of
Athens. We may farther conclude that a more numerous body of
hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the same time; for
horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent across sea
alone; moreover Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary hoplites,
since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and peltasts.
[745]

The evidence derived from the speech against Neæra being thus
corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against
Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first half
of the year 349 B. C. was one in which Athens was driven to great
public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for the
support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Eubœa. What
the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these
expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have
no information. But we may reasonably presume—though Philip
during this year 349 B. C., probably conquered a certain number of
the thirty-two Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian,
Chalkidic and Athenian, contended against him with no
inconsiderable effect, and threw back his conquest of Chalkidikê into
the following year. After a summer’s campaign in that peninsula, the
Athenian citizens would probably come home. We learn that the
Olynthians made prisoner a Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with
other Macedonians attached to him.[746]
 So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the
Athenians in the first half of 349 B. C.—to recover Eubœa and to
protect Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of
financial embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the
fact, that for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the
Dikasteries, which accordingly sat little; so that few causes were
tried for some time—for how long we do not know.[747]
To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a
courageous effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved
a decree in the Senate, that it should be submitted to the vote of the
public assembly, whether the surplus of revenue, over and above the
ordinary and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be
paid to the Theôric Fund for the various religious festivals—or should
be devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual
war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus, and adopted a
(probouleuma) preliminary resolution authorizing him to submit it to
the public assembly. Under such authority, Apollodorus made the
motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The
assembly (without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a
decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual
pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers.
Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named
Stephanus impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of
illegality, under the Graphê Paranomon. Apollodorus was brought
before the Dikastery, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his
friend and relative the prosecutor of Neæra) through suborned
witnesses and false allegations foreign to the substance of the
impeachment. When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced,
Stephanus as accuser assessed the measure of punishment at the
large fine of fifteen talents, refusing to listen to any supplications
from the friends of Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a
lower sum. The Dikasts however, more lenient than Stephanus, were
satisfied to adopt the measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon
himself—one talent—which he actually paid.[748]
 There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and
poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people
passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for
doubting. But the additional statement—that there was not a single
dissentient, and that every one, both at the time and afterwards,
always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one[749]—
is probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be imagined that the
powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from
the Theôric Fund to war purposes, should have been wholly silent or
actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been
outvoted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be
made without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover
liable to those penal consequences which afterwards actually fell
upon him. Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly,
should have overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently
remarkable how strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.
The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before
Midsummer 349 B. C., would probably return after a campaign of two
or three months, and after having rendered some service against the
Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip against the
Chalkidians and Olynthians were noway relaxed. He pressed the
Chalkidians more and more closely throughout all the ensuing
eighteen months (from Midsummer 349 B. C. to the early spring of
347 B. C.). During the year Olymp. 407, 4, if the citation from
Philochorus[750] is to be trusted, the Athenians despatched to their
aid three expeditions; one, at the request of the Olynthians, who
sent envoys to pray for it—consisting of two thousand peltasts under
Chares, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A second
under Charidemus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering
Chalkidians; consisting of eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts
and one hundred and fifty horsemen. Charidemus, in conjunction
with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiæa and the peninsula of
Pallênê, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any
important success, we do not know. Respecting both Chares and
Charidemus, the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence,
extortion, and amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits.
[751] It is clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything
effectual against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible
progress in Chalkidikê. So grievously did the strength of the
Olynthians fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal
to Athens; imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin, but
to send them a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries
already there. The Athenians complied, despatching thither
seventeen triremes, two thousand hoplites, and three hundred
horsemen, all under the command of Chares.
To make out anything of the successive steps of this important
war is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of
the Olynthian war, the efforts made by Athens were considerable.
Demosthenes (in a speech six years afterwards) affirms that the
Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus four thousand citizens, ten
thousand mercenaries, and fifty triremes.[752] He represents the
Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to Philip by
corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was achieved
greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but the orator’s
language carries no accurate information. Mekyberna and Torônê are
said to have been among the towns betrayed without resistance.[753]
After Philip had captured the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, he marched
against Olynthus itself, with its confederate neighbors,—the Thracian
Methônê and Apollonia. In forcing the passage of the river Sardon,
he encountered such resistance that his troops were at first
repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety by swimming
back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the eye by an
Olynthian archer, named Aster, and lost the sight of that eye
completely, notwithstanding the skill of his Greek surgeon,
Kritobulus.[754] On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus, he sent
to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that either
they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia.[755]
Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the
last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament
was still in the town to aid in the defence;[756] so that the Olynthians
might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every nerve to
guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes were
disappointed. How long the siege lasted,—or whether there was time
for Athens to send farther reinforcement, we cannot say. The
Olynthians are said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with
loss; but according to Demosthenes, the philippizing party, headed
by the venal Euthykrates and Lasthenes, brought about the
banishment of their chief opponent Apollonides, nullified all
measures for energetic defence, and treasonably surrendered the
city. Two defeats were sustained near its walls, and one of the
generals of this party, having five hundred cavalry under his
command, betrayed them designedly into the hands of the invader.
[757] Olynthus, with all its inhabitants and property, at length fell into
the hands of Philip. His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus
became complete towards the end of winter, 348-347 B. C.
Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula.
The persons of the Olynthians,—men, women and children,—were
sold into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of
recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself he is
said to have destroyed, together with Apollonia, Methônê, Stageira,
etc.,—in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenes, speaking about
five years afterwards, says that they were so thoroughly and cruelly
ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely discernible.[758] Making
every allowance for exaggeration, we may fairly believe that they
were dismantled, and bereft of all citizen proprietors; that the
buildings and visible marks of Hellenic city-life were broken up or left
to decay; that the remaining houses, as well as the villages around,
were tenanted by dependent cultivators or slaves,—now working for
the benefit of new Macedonian proprietors, in great part
nonresident, and probably of favored Grecian grantees also.[759]
Though various Greeks thus received their recompense for services
rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenes affirms that Euthykrates and
Lasthenes, the traitors who had sold Olynthus, were not among the
number; or at least that, not long afterwards, they were dismissed
with dishonor and contempt.[760]
 In this Olynthian war,—ruinous to the Chalkidic Greeks, terrific to
all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip,—Athens too must
have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely,
that in her entire war against Philip,—from the time of his capture of
Amphipolis in 358-357 B. C. down to the peace of 346 B. C. or shortly
afterwards,—she had expended not less than fifteen hundred
talents.[761] On these computations no great stress is to be laid; but
we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite of all
reluctance, she was obliged to do something; what she did was both
too little, and too intermittent,—done behind time so as to produce
no satisfactory result; but nevertheless, the aggregate cost, in a
series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of the
Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have
made efforts, though she had done little in the beginning. We may
presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by
a direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an
end to the proposition of taking from the Theôric Fund.[762] Means
may also have been found of economizing from the other expenses
of the state.
Though the appropriation of the Theôric Fund to other purposes
continued to be thus interdicted to any formal motion, yet, in the
way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time glanced
at by Demosthenes, and others;—and whenever money was wanted
for war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or
from direct property-tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation of
the Theôric Fund, however, remained unchanged until the very eve
of the battle of Chæroneia. Just before that Dies Iræ, when Philip
was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to war-
purposes; the views of Demosthenes were realized,—twelve years
after he had begun to enforce them.
This question about the Theôric expenditure is rarely presented
by modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian
mind. It has been sometimes treated as a sort of almsgiving to the
poor,—and sometimes as an expenditure by the Athenians upon their
pleasures. Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view
of the case; each only brings out a part of the truth.
Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures
of the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined
and imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to
history; pleasures essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the
citizens to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community
of enjoyment.
But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary
idea or predominant purpose of the Theôric expenditure. That
expenditure was essentially religious in its character, incurred only
for various festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honor of the
gods. The ancient religion, not simply at Athens, but throughout
Greece and the contemporary world,—very different in this respect
from the modern,—included within itself and its manifestations
nearly the whole range of social pleasures.[763] Now the Theôric
Fund was essentially the Church-Fund at Athens; that upon which
were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals
and the worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli
to each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure; given in
order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of
attending the festival, and doing honor to the god; never given to
any one who was out of Attica because, of course, he could not
attend;[764] but given to all alike within the country, rich or poor.[765]
It was essential to that universal communion which formed a
prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the god, than
in regard to the city;[766] but it was only one portion of the total
disbursements covered by the Theôric Fund. To this general religious
fund it was provided by law that the surplus of ordinary revenue
should be paid over, after all the cost of the peace establishment had
been defrayed. There was no appropriation more thoroughly coming
home to the common sentiment, more conducive as a binding force
to the unity of the city, or more productive of satisfaction to each
individual citizen.