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Contents vii

10 Program Deployment (Capabilities Integration and Benefits

Appraisal) 235
10.1 Capabilities Integration 235
10.2 Benefits Appraisal 241
10.3 Transition to Next Cycle 247

11 Program Closure 253

11.1 Value Realization Assessment 254
11.2 Manage Program Completion 255
11.3 Lessons Learned Finalization 259
11.4 Closing the Loop and Preparing the Next Challenge 261

Conclusion263

References265
Index275
This page has been left blank intentionally
List of Figures

1.1 The program and its elements 18

1.2 The ambiguity-uncertainty context 21
1.3 Current program management context 23
2.1 Vertical and horizontal integration of strategies 35
2.2 Realizing business value 37
2.3 Traditional compartmentalized project organization 39
2.4 Value chain project organization 39
2.5 Agility in project organizations 44
3.1 Deliberate vs ad hoc programs 51
3.2 The program value chain 68
3.3 Maturity development process 76
4.1 The decision management cycle 84
4.2 The decision implementation process 87
4.3 Traditional control-based program governance structure 91
4.4 Integrated program governance structure 92
4.5 Integrated program governance structure 93
4.6 Tiered business case and governance process 95
4.7 Stakeholder engagement loop 97
4.8 Example of stakeholder map including contribution and
expectations 97
4.9 Main program stakeholders 98
4.10 Area of change covered by program management 107
4.11 Benefits map/benefits breakdown structure concept 113
5.1 Leadership skills vs role 126
6.1 The program life cycle 142
6.2 Taxonomy of program life cycle 144
7.1 Programme definition flowchart 146
7.2 Stakeholder mapping techniques 151
7.3 The value concept 152
7.4 Example of benefits breakdown structure (BBS) 157
7.5 Example of paired comparison 160
7.6a Example strategic roadmap 164
7.6b Example strategic roadmap 165
x Program Management

7.7 Evolution of value through life cycle 166

7.8 Assess alignment (contribution to CSFs) 170
7.9 Assess achievability (outline level) 170
7.10 Combined alignment/achievability assessment 172
7.11 Two options for use of alignment/achievability matrix 173
8.1 RACI matrix based on accountability for CSFs 181
8.2 Example of alignment scoring with weighted matrix 185
8.3 Example of project achievability assessment 186
8.4 Example of partial blueprint based on BBS 190
8.5 Pacing the change 193
8.6 Pacing for ultimate achievement of benefits 194
8.7 Program strategic roadmap 196
8.8 Program detailed cycle roadmap 197
8.9 Example of program level qualitative risk analysis 199
8.10 Program change decision loops 201
9.1 Program deployment stage flowchart 210
9.2 Resource loading plan 218
9.3 Risk responses and risk packages 221
9.4 Graphical representation of buffer penetration 223
10.1 Deployment Level Benefits Register 245
10.2 Typical responses to deviation 249
11.1 Program closure flowchart 253
List of Tables

1.1 Classification of programs and projects: Legend 23

2.1 Detailed comparison between projects, programs and portfolios 32
3.1 Comparison of project and program knowledge areas 59
3.2 Distinction between program and project 71
5.1 Main program stakeholders and their roles 118
5.2 Specific responsibilities of main program actors 120
6.1 Comparison between standardized life cycles 136
This page has been left blank intentionally
Preface

I was brought up in Canada where I started my professional life as an architect;

as such, I worked within a project environment from the beginning. Architects
traditionally represent their clients and are expected to act “in lieu” of the client
in their relationship with the authorities (planning department, construction
permit department, etc.) other professionals (engineers, urban planners,
landscape architects, interior designers, etc.) and contractors (suppliers,
building trades). So, as an architect, I have traditionally aimed to understand
the needs and expectations of my clients and translate them as best as I could to
achieve their dream home, corporate head office, marketable housing or office
development, historical building restoration or landmark city-regeneration.
Very early in my career, I realized that there was little integration between
the different players in the field and that mostly, the client’s needs were not
well understood, either because they were not able or willing to clarify them or
because those that were supposed to fulfil them did not make the effort to work
them out. After having worked in most areas of my profession, from urban
planning to architectural programming, design, specifications writing and site
supervising, I decided that it was time to integrate all this knowledge. So I
opened my own practice and started developing turnkey projects for my clients.
This meant that I needed to understand the clients’ needs and expectations
very well and be able to express them, not only in a drawing, but into and actual
building. It also meant that I needed to work in harmony with all the actors of
the project.
After a few years, I joined a larger firm that shared this philosophy and
became their Director of Development. That is when I started calling myself a
Project Manager. It was during that time that we developed some techniques
and methodologies that enabled us to be recognized for our expertise in fast-
track construction. Many of these techniques were concurrently developed in
IT/IS and are today known as “agile management”. As our expertise became
recognized, we got to work on large multi-phased construction projects and, by
still focusing on clients’ needs and expectations, started to develop a reputation
for pragmatic and effective long-term planning and development. Today, this
type of expertise would be called Program Management.
xiv Program Management

Since then, I have moved to the UK where I have worked as a trainer

and consultant in program management and related disciplines for the last
20 years of which 15 as the founder and managing partner of Valense Ltd.
an international network of consultants and trainers. As such, I have been
traveling extensively and worked with organizations in Asia Pacific, the Gulf
Region, North Africa, Turkey, Europe as well as North and South America.
I have endeavoured to bring this worldwide expertise of program
management at senior level into this book and hope it will appeal to a wide-
ranging audience.
Acknowledgements

This second edition of Program Management would not have been achievable
without the people who have trusted me to apply my expertise to their programs.
In the last 20 years, many of them have helped shape the methodology that
forms the backbone of this book. Let me acknowledge among these, Malcolm
Davis and Peter Czarnomski from Pfizer UK; Eric Miart from Eurocontrol,
Brussels; Rod Gozzard from NAB, Melbourne; Anna Massot from Bayer,
Germany; Sulaiman Mohammad Al Marzougi from Kuwait National Petroleum
and Bader Salman Alsalman and Saud Hamed Alsharari from ELM, Riyadh.
Following the publication of the first edition, I was privileged to be asked
by the Project Management Institute to be a contributor to the Third Edition
(2013) of their Standard for Program Management as well as being sought by the
Project Management Association of Japan to review the English version of the
Third Edition (2015) of P2M: A Guidebook of Program & Project Management
for Enterprise Innovation. This has enabled me to gain a broader perspective of
the discipline and of its evolution.
More specifically, I want to thank Alberto Brito from Brazil, Anne Boundford
from the UK, Mustafa Dülgerler from Abu Dhabi, Rick Heaslip from the US,
Bader Salman Alsalman from Saudi, Chris Stevens from Australia, who are all
extremely busy but took the time to read the final draft of this second edition
to provide their endorsement.
Finally, I would particularly like to recognise the contribution of Motoh
Shimitzu and Eric Norman. Motoh shared his thoughts in multiple face-to-
face and virtual discussions about the difference of program management
approaches in Japan and the Western world and enabled me to use some of
his ideas and concepts in this book. Eric and I have had numerous challenging
conversations on the purpose, philosophy and approach of program
management; he took the time to review the whole final draft and almost all
his comments made it into the final print.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Reviews for
Program Management

Thiry’s revised landmark work embraces many important changes. He takes a broad and
in-depth view of multiple professional standards, explaining pragmatically the essence
of key focus areas, for executives, managers, and students alike, on how to lead, step-
by-step, successful program outcomes. This is essential reading for those moving from
narrow technical to broader leadership skills, critical to value-driven organisations under
pressure to deliver better strategies through program management.
Chris Stevens, Principal, Project Standards and Practice, NBN Co, Australia;
member of PMI’s Standards Members Advisory Group

Already a cornerstone in the library of important industry publications, the first edition of
Program Management by Dr Michel Thiry broke new ground in 2010 by providing a clearly
understandable and practical context for sifting through an assortment of conflicting
and sometimes competing views about the application of program management in
organizations. In many ways, the first edition was a catalyst for many of the advances
in program management practice we recognize and enjoy today. This second edition
reflects the deep understanding Dr Thiry has gained since the first publication through
careful observation, critical thinking, and the art and science of hard-won experience.
This latest update by one of the industry’s foremost thought leaders reveals an awareness
of the critically important role program management now plays in organizations large
and small for the delivery of key strategic benefits and real, measurable value in an
increasingly complex, fast-paced, unpredictable and continually evolving (shall we say
… “agile”) business environment. The second edition is destined to take its place as a
frequently referenced, often quoted, dog-eared and battle-worn guide for the serious
program manager. On my bookshelf, it stands next to its heavily marked-up and Post-
It-littered brother, the first edition. If the second edition of Program Management by Dr
Michel Thiry isn’t part of your library, it should be.
Eric S. Norman, practising program manager; Chair of PMI’s ‘The Standard for
Program Management Third Edition’ Core Committee

Programs are characterized by complexities, ambiguities and consequently significant

uncertainties. Each program management standard of North America, Europe and Japan
has a different approach to overcome such difficulties based on each business cultural
background. The author has made a thorough analysis of these diverse standards and
presents common and essential perspectives thanks to his long experience and deep
insights on the subject. The book gives a big picture of program management rather
than details of processes to provide a guiding principle for both researchers and expert
practitioners.
Motoh Shimizu, member, The Engineering Academy of Japan;
Nippon Institute of Technology, Japan

Michel’s book has created an important resource for researchers and practitioners in
the program management domain. It brings up a clear and rational alignment between
program components within an organizational context, which will help in executing
the strategies and realizing real value. Anyone involved in program management will
treasure this book!
Bader Alsalman, PMO Manager, ELM company, Saudi Arabia

Program Management provides new insights about the program manager’s critical role
in managing organizational decision making and change. Michel Thiry’s perspectives on
integrating the principles and practices of established program management standards
and guides provide a valuable contribution to the fields of both program and project
management. I found it to be full of valuable perspectives and contributions to the field,
and have very much enjoyed reading it.
Richard Heaslip, author of Managing Complex Projects and Programs;
Adviser to executives sponsoring complex programs

As a practitioner of programme management I live and breathe this world every day and
Michel does a great job at structuring and bringing programme management to life in
a constructive way. The book is very useful for me because it spans and links multiple
standards. I work with people who come from a PRINCE2 background and it can relate to
what they do. When in doubt or simply in need of inspiration this book provides you with
ideas on how to move forward. Overall, a great book.
Anne Boundford, PMP Programme Manager at Rolls Royce

We all know the decision making process; but most of us are not familiar with decision
management within the context of program management. This is one of the numerous
gaps in the practical application of program management that Michel has addressed in
his book, making it a must-read for program and project managers undertaking complex
initiatives.
Mustafa Dülgerler, Senior Enterprise Architect at National Bank of Abu Dhabi
This is a must read book! For strategy management scholars interested in the theme of
strategy execution, as it brings state-of-the-art discussion on the importance and use
of program management as a vehicle for implementing strategic changes; for senior
executives, as it provides the guidelines to establish the organization and governance
structure to achieve strategic goals; for program managers and program team members,
as it provides a roadmap to manage programs, through a concise program life cycle and
a set of management tools for each stage of the proposed life cycle. Finally, it is not a
book based on current standards, but a book that the review of program management
standards will be based on.
Alberto S. Brito, Founder and Managing Partner at CDA Tecnologia

Reviews of previous edition

Well organized with the ending of one chapter leading into the next. Very informative on
the subject matter, supported by references and tables …
Prize: ‘Award of Merit’ 2010, Canadian Project Management Book Awards,
run by the Project Management Association of Canada

I believe Program Management addresses a significant gap in program management

literature. Thiry ties many years of research and findings from Value Management
to Project Based Organization and relates it to Program Management. He explores
utilization of Program management in a multi-faceted approach, from organizational
aspects to benefit management, from program lifecycle to deployment of a strategy as a
program, from measurement to dissolution of the program.
Program Management provides an excellent bridge between PM theory and practical
ways to reach organizational goals using program management. This is truly brilliant!
Deniz A. Johnson, PMP, Vice President, Program Management,
Acadian Asset Management LLC, Boston

If you are interested in improving your delivery capability and effectiveness then Program
Management should be on your must read list. In my 15 years of project and program
management experience I have yet to find a book which has addressed the subject from
such a global perspective.
Chris Richards, PMP, Assistant Director Business Operations,
US-Based Technology Services Company
Program Management describes the practical considerations often overlooked when
translating ideas into real, value generating programs. The model marrying Programs to
Strategic Decision Management (Chapter 3) is alone worth the book.
Ron Sklaver, Enterprise Program Manager, Tate & Lyle, US-UK

Thiry provides an excellent example of his Benefit Breakdown Structure (BBS), showing
benefits at Level 1, followed by critical success factors, specific actions, and deliverables.
It is further detailed…with actions describing the current state and the proposed future
state, plus capabilities and dates required to achieve them. He presents an achievability
matrix for projects within the program and a discussion of risk packages. A program
manager could take the BBS plus these concepts and relate it to the program work
breakdown structure and have a powerful technique to apply.
Project Management Journal

I would recommend that program managers who want a simple and useful guide to get
hold of a copy of the book and keep it handy. Organizations should place a copy of the
book in their library along with books on strategy and strategy implementation. For
academics teaching a course in program management it would be a good as a textbook
or as a reference book from which relevant readings can be suggested to students.
Associate Professor Shankar Sankaran University of Technology,
Sydney for PPPM eJournal

I would recommend this book and have in fact used it at work to help clarify governance
issues and solutions with colleagues. Definitely a book to add to your library.
ProjectManager.com, Australia

This is an informative book full of useful illustrations providing visual interpretations

of the text … The book is well structured into three parts: the programme content, the
programme components and the programme lifecycle, with a very useful conclusions
section at the end. This structure made it easy to go forward and backwards without
losing the thread. Although aimed at larger organisations, this book will prove valuable
for any project of programme manager.
Quality World Magazine, September 2012

I consult and teach in this area and welcome this book as a very useful contribution on
the topic … It is certainly the best book I have read on the specific subject of Program
Management, and represents considerable research, reflections on experience and new
thinking on a current prominent subject.
Harold Ainsworth on Amazon.com
Random documents with unrelated
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preparations made to move government offices and set up a
temporary capital in the southwest.
To the rescue came the Americans—the Second Division, which
included the Marines; and elements of the Third and Twenty-eighth
Divisions. "Move at 10 p. m. by bus to new area," was the order
received by the Fifth and Sixth Marine Regiments, and the Sixth
Machine-Gun Battalion. Seventy-five miles from the field, they had to
travel in camions, not even the officers knowing their ultimate
destination. But all were in happy mood, sure they were bound for
the front.
The roads were crowded with French, men, women and children
hurrying away from the battle lines, seeking safety. Only the
Americans rode ahead—always forward. They had no tanks, gas-
shells, or flame projectors. They were untried in open warfare and
they had to go up against Germany's best troops. The French
hesitated to risk all to them in the crisis.
"Let us fight in our own way," said General Harbord, "and we will
stop them."
Permission was granted. In their own way they fought and won.
Colonel (later Brigadier General) A. W. Catlin, who commanded the
Sixth Regiment, showed his officers the map, indicating the points to
be held, and the maps were passed around to the men so they
would have all the information available. "I hold," said he, "that men
like ours fight none the worse for knowing just what they are
fighting for." One secret of Marine efficiency in combat is the
comradeship between officers and men. "Theirs not to reason why"
has no place in their vocabulary.
When they arrived, June 1st, the Marines were told to "dig in." As
tools they used bayonets and the lids of their mess-gear. "Say, you'd
be surprised to know just how much digging you can do under those
circumstances," remarked Private Geiger afterwards as he lay
wounded in a hospital. "Bullets and shrapnel came from everywhere.
You'd work until it seemed you couldn't budge another inch, when a
shell would hit right close and then you'd start digging with as much
energy as if you had just begun."
At ten o'clock, on June 2nd, they were ordered to back up the
overtaxed French. It was the second battalion of the Fifth Marines,
and particularly the 55th Company, which bore the brunt of the
assault at Les Mares Ferme, the point where the Germans came
nearest Paris.
The 55th Company had orders to take position one and a half
kilometers northeast of Marigny. The French, a few kilometers
ahead, were reported falling back, and soon began filtering through.
The enemy attack was launched at 5 p. m. against the French who
had remained in front of Wise's battalion at Hill 165. The Germans
swept down the wide wheat fields. The French, pressed back, fought
as they retreated.
Neville's Fifth Marines opened up with a slashing barrage, mowing
down the Germans. Trained marksmen, sharp-shooters, they calmly
set their sights and aimed with the same precision they had shown
upon the rifle ranges at Parris Island and Quantico. The French said
they had never seen such marksmanship in the heat of battle.
Incessantly their rifles cracked, and with their fire came the support
of the artillery. The machine-guns, pouring forth a hail of bullets,
also began to make inroads in the advancing lines. Caught in a
seething wave of scattering shrapnel, machine-gun and rifle fire, the
Germans found further advance would be suicide. The lines
hesitated, then stopped. The enemy broke for cover, while the
Marines raked the woods and ravines in which they had taken
refuge.
Above, a French airplane was checking up on the artillery fire.
Surprised at seeing men set their sights, adjust their range, and fire
deliberately at an advancing foe, each man picking his target, not
firing merely in the direction of the enemy, the aviator signaled
"Bravo!" In the rear that word was echoed again and again. The
German drive on Paris had been stopped.
The next few days were devoted to pushing forth outposts and
testing the strength of the enemy. The fighting had changed.
Mystified at running against a stone wall of defense just when they
believed that their advance would be easiest, the Germans had
halted, amazed. Put on the defensive, they strove desperately to
hold their lines. Belleau Wood had been planted thickly with nest
after nest of machine-guns. In that jungle of trees, matted
underbrush, of rocks, of vines and heavy foliage, the Germans had
placed themselves in positions they believed impregnable. Unless
they could be routed and thrown back the breaking of the attack of
June 2 would mean nothing. There would come another drive and
another. The battle of Chateau-Thierry was not won and could not
be won until Belleau Wood had been cleared of the enemy.

LEADERS OF THE MARINES

Upper row: Major General John A. Lejeune, Brigadier Generals
Wendell C. Neville, and Logan Feland.
Lower row: Brigadier Generals Smedley D. Butler, A. W. Catlin, Harry
Lee.

THE MARINES IN BELLEAU WOOD

Reproduced by permission of the Ladies' Home Journal from the
painting by Frank E. Schoonover

On June 6, the Americans began the assault on that wood and the
strategic positions adjacent, the towns of Torcy and Bouresches
being the objectives. At 5 p. m. the Marines attacked. It was a
desperate task. Before they started, their officers cheered them.
"Give 'em hell!" was the command Colonel Catlin is said to have
given. They gave it to them, but paid a heavy price in blood. As the
Marines advanced, the German artillery let loose a storm of fire. Men
on every hand were killed or injured. Brave Berry was struck in the
arm, but with the blood streaming from his sleeve, he kept on until
exhausted. Just as daring Sibley's men reached the edge of the
woods a sniper's bullet hit Colonel Catlin in the chest. Severely
wounded, he was relieved in command by Lieutenant Colonel Harry
Lee.
But the lines never halted or wavered. Fighting strictly according to
American methods, a rush, a halt, a rush again, in four-wave
formation, the rear waves taking over the work of those who had
fallen before them, the Marines moved ever forward. Passing over
the bodies of their dead comrades, they plunged ahead. They might
be torn to bits, but behind them were more waves, and the attack
went on.
"Men fell like flies," reported an officer writing from the field.
Companies that had entered the battle 250 strong dwindled to fifty
and sixty, with a sergeant in command; but the attack did not falter.
At 9:45 o'clock that night Bouresches was taken by Lieutenant
James F. Robertson and twenty-odd men of his platoon. They were
soon joined by reinforcements. The enemy made counter attacks,
but the Marines held the town. Leading his men through the
machine-gun fire, Captain Donald Duncan, of the 96th Company,
was killed.
In Belleau Wood the fighting had been literally from tree to tree,
stronghold to stronghold; and it was a fight which must last for
weeks before victory was complete. Every rocky formation was a
German machine-gun nest, almost impossible to reach by artillery or
grenades. There was only one way to wipe out these nests—by the
bayonet. And by this method were they wiped out, for United States
Marines, bare-chested, shouting their battle cry of "E-e-e-e-e y-a-a-
h-h-h yip!" charged straight into the murderous fire from those guns
and won! Out of those that charged, in more than one instance, only
one would reach the stronghold. There, with his bayonet as his only
weapon, he would kill or capture the defenders and then, swinging
the gun about, turn it against remaining German positions.
Fighting in that forest of horror for eighteen days, the Marines on
June 25 began the last rush for possession of the wood. Following a
tremendous barrage, the struggle started. The barrage literally tore
the woods to pieces, but could not wipe out all the nests. They had
to be taken by the bayonet. But in the day that followed every foot
of Belleau Wood was cleared of the enemy. On June 26th Major
Shearer sent the message: "Woods now U. S. Marine Corps entirely."
In the terrific fighting in that month, the Marine Corps lost 1,062
men killed, and 3,615 wounded. Hundreds of Germans were
captured. In the final assault, Major Shearer's command alone took
500 prisoners. General Pershing sent a telegram of commendation
on June 9, and, visiting division headquarters, sent his personal
greetings to the Marine Brigade, adding that Marshal Foch had
especially charged him to give the Brigade his love and
congratulations on its fine work.
Division General Degoutte, commanding the Sixth French Army, on
June 30 issued a general order that, henceforth, in all official papers,
Belleau Wood should be named, "Bois de la Brigade de Marine." It
was thereafter known as the "Wood of the Marines."
General Pershing in his final report said:

The Second Division then in reserve northwest of Paris and

preparing to relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted
to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, and, early on the
morning of June 1st, was deployed across the Chateau-
Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the
French line, where it stopped the German advance.

Praise and full credit are due the other troops in that sector—the
Third Division whose machine-gun battalion held the bridge-head at
the Marne, and whose Seventh Regiment fought for several days in
Belleau Wood; the artillery and engineers who supported every
advance; and all who were engaged in the Chateau-Thierry sector.
Though the principal honors went to the Second Division and the
Marines, all the Americans in that region fought well and nobly.
President Wilson said they "closed the gap the enemy had
succeeded in opening for their advance on Paris," and, driving back
the Germans, began "the rout that was to save Europe and the
world." Mayors of the Meaux district, who, as they stated, were eye-
witnesses of the American Army's deeds in stopping the enemy
advance, formally expressed their admiration and gratitude, and
Mayor Lugol, in transmitting the resolution, June 26th, wrote:

The civilian population of this part of the country will never

forget that the beginning of this month of June, when their
homes were threatened by the invader, the Second
American Division victoriously stepped forth and succeeded
in saving them from impending danger.

After personal investigation, and study of the area, Melville E. Stone,

manager of the Associated Press, declared that in spite of heavy
losses, the Americans engaged in the operations at and around
Chateau-Thierry did three things:

1. They saved Paris.

2. They seriously injured the morale of the best German
troops.
3. They set a standard for American troops that none
others dared to tarnish.

General Omar Bundy, commanding the Second Division, in General

Order No. 41, issued July 10, said:
 You stood like a stone wall against the enemy advance on
Paris.... You have engaged and defeated with great loss
three German divisions, and have occupied the important
strong-points of the Belleau Woods, Bouresches, and Vaux.
You have taken about 1,400 prisoners, many machine guns
and much other material.

General Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the

North and Northeast, issued a general order citing and commending
the Marines, mentioning by name Brigadier General James G.
Harbord, commanding the Fourth Brigade; Colonel Wendell C.
Neville, commanding the Fifth Regiment; Colonel A. W. Catlin,
commanding the Sixth Regiment, and Major Edward B. Cole,
commanding the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion. Colonel Neville
commanded the Fifth through all these operations, fighting with his
men in Belleau Wood. When Colonel Catlin was wounded, he was, as
I have stated, succeeded in command of the Sixth by Lieutenant
Colonel Harry Lee, who continued to command that regiment to the
end of the war. When, leading his machine-gunners, Major Edward
B. Cole fell, mortally wounded, on June 10th, Captain Harlan E.
Major took charge. A day or two later he was relieved by Captain
George H. Osterhout, and on June 21st Major Littleton W. T. Waller,
Jr., took command of the Sixth Machine-Gun Battalion.
The real beginning of the great series of offensives which finally
routed the German armies and brought complete victory to the
Allies, was when Marshal Foch, on July 18, with picked troops made
a vigorous thrust at the Germans near Soissons, with overwhelming
success. The First and Second U. S. Divisions and the French
Moroccan Division were employed as the spearhead of the main
attack.
At a single bound they broke through the enemy's infantry defenses,
overran his artillery, and cut the German communications. The
Second Division took Beaurepaire Farm and Vierzy in a rapid
advance, and at the end of the second day was in front of Tigny,
having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field-guns. "The story of
your achievements," said General Harbord, "will be told in millions of
homes in all Allied lands tonight."
"Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed by our First and
Second Divisions, the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the
Allies," said General Pershing. Soissons was relieved, and the
Germans began a general withdrawal from the Marne. General
Harbord was in command of the Second Division, Colonel Neville of
the Marine Brigade; Colonel Logan Feland of the Fifth Regiment,
Colonel Lee of the Sixth, and Major Waller of the Machine-Gun
Battalion in this operation, known as the "Aisne-Marne offensive."
General John A. Lejeune, U. S. Marine Corps, on July 29, assumed
command of the Second Division, which he commanded with marked
distinction to the end of hostilities, during its service with the Army
of Occupation in Germany, and until the Division, on its return to
America in August, 1919, was demobilized.
Of the six Allied offensives designated as major operations on the
Western Front in 1918, the Marines, with the other units of the
Second Division, took part in three. In the battle for the St. Mihiel
salient, the division on September 11th took up a line running from
Remenauville to Limey, and on the morning of the 12th attacked.
Overcoming the enemy resistance, they romped through to the Rupt
de Mad, a small river, crossed it on stone bridges, occupied
Thiaucourt, scaled the heights beyond and pushed on to a line
running from the Xammes-Jaulny ridges to Bonvaux Forest. Then
they rested, having occupied two days' objectives before 3 p. m. of
the first day. The Division's casualties were about 1,000 men, 134
killed. It had captured eighty German officers, 3,200 men, 120
cannon and a vast amount of stores.
The taking of Blanc Mont Ridge, the key to Rheims, was one of the
most effective blows struck by the Allies. Determined to break
through the powerful German defenses in the Champagne, Marshal
Foch asked for an American division. The Second was selected, and
General Lejeune, on September 27th, was summoned to French
headquarters.
Pointing to a large relief map of the battlefield, General Gouraud,
who directed the operations, said to General Lejeune: "General, this
position is the key of all the German defenses of this sector including
the whole Rheims Massif. If this ridge can be taken the Germans will
be obliged to retreat along the whole front 30 kilometers to the river
Aisne. Do you think your division could effect its capture?"
Studying the map closely, General Lejeune said with quiet assurance
that he was certain the Second Division could take it. He was
directed to propose a plan for the assault, which would be begun in
a few days. He did so. The battle of Blanc Mont Ridge was fought
and won by the Second Division as a part of the French Fourth Army,
and that signal victory was due largely to the military genius of
Lejeune.
Setting forth on October 1st, the Americans that night relieved
French troops in the front line near Somme-Py. Charging over
desolated white chalky ground, scarred and shell-pocked by years of
artillery fire—a maze of mine craters, deep trenches and concrete
fortifications, the Second Division cleaned up Essen Hook, and
captured Blanc Mont Ridge and St. Etienne—all in the days from
October 3 to 9. "This victory," the official report stated, "freed
Rheims and forced the entire German Army between that city and
the Argonne Forest to retreat to the Aisne."
Writing to Marshal Foch, General Gouraud proposed a special citation
of the Division, stating:

The Second Infantry Division, United States, brilliantly

commanded by General Lejeune, played a glorious part in
the operations of the Fourth Army in the Champaigne in
October, 1918. On the 3d of October this Division drove
forward and seized in a single assault the strongly
 entrenched German positions between Blanc Mont and
Medeah Ferme, and again pressing forward to the outskirts
of St. Etienne-a-Arnes, it made in the course of the day, an
advance of about six kilometers.
It captured several thousand prisoners, many cannon and
machine-guns, and a large quantity of other military
material. This attack, combined with that of the French
divisions on its left and right, resulted in the evacuation by
the enemy of his positions on both sides of the River
Suippe and his withdrawal from the Massif de Notre Dames
des Champs.

Ordered to participate in the Argonne-Meuse operation, the Second

Division marched ankle deep in mud more than a hundred
kilometers, four days with but one day of rest. On November 1st,
following a day of terrific barrage, the Division "jumped off" for its
final operation of the war, which did not end until the morning of the
armistice, when it was firmly established on the east bank of the
Meuse. "It was so placed in the battle line," said the General
Headquarters orders, "that its known ability might be used to
overcome the critical part of the enemy's defense." The salient
feature of the plan of attack was to drive a wedge through Landres-
et-St. Georges to the vicinity of Fosse. If successful, this would break
the backbone of the enemy and compel retreat beyond the Meuse.
The Second Division accomplished the desired result on the first
attack. "This decisive blow," said the official report, "broke the
enemy's defense and opened the way for the rapid advance of the
Army." The commander of the Fifth Army Corps wrote:

The Division's brilliant advance of more than nine

kilometers, destroying the last stronghold on the
Hindenburg line, capturing the Freya Stellung, and going
more than nine kilometers against not only the permanent
but the relieving forces in their front, may justly be
 regarded as one of the most remarkable achievements
made by any troops in this war.

During the night of November 3rd, in a heavy rain the division

passed forward through the forest eight kilometers in advance of
adjoining regiments, and within two days again advanced and threw
the enemy in its front across the Meuse. The next morning at 6
o'clock it attacked and seized the German defense position on the
ridge southeast of Vaux-en-Dieulet. On the night of November 10th
heroic deeds were done by heroic men. In the face of heavy artillery
and withering machine-gun fire, the Second Engineers threw two
bridges across the Meuse and the first and second battalions of the
Fifth Marines crossed unflinchingly to the east bank and carried out
their mission. "In the last battle of the war," said an order of the
Second Division, "as in all others, in which this division has
participated, it enforced its will on the enemy." Of this achievement
the commanding general of the Fifth Army Corps said: "This feat will
stand among the most memorable of the campaign."
"On the eleventh hour, the eleventh day of the eleventh month of
the year 1918," Brigadier General Neville, commanding the Marine
Brigade, in an order reviewing its great record closed with these
words: "Along the fronts of Verdun, the Marne, the Aisne, Lorraine,
Champagne, and the Argonne, the units of the Fourth Brigade
Marines have fought valiantly, bravely, decisively. It is a record of
which you may all be proud."
Shortly after the armistice, General Lejeune was ordered to proceed
to Germany. Stationed at Coblenz, for months his division was a part
of the Army of Occupation. I had the honor of reviewing the division
on the heights of Vallendar, near the junction of the Moselle and
Rhine rivers, and to note that its discharge of duty in Germany was
in keeping with the glorious record it had made in war. "Your brilliant
exploits in battle," said General Pershing in a general order to the
Second Division, "are paralleled by the splendid examples of soldierly
bearing and discipline set by your officers and men while a part of
the Army of Occupation."
The Marines and their comrades of the Second Division were
received with distinguished honor upon their return to the United
States, President Wilson reviewing the men as they passed the
White House to receive the heart-felt applause of a grateful people.
The Secretary of War in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, upon
their return, wrote: "The whole history of the Brigade in France is
one of conspicuous service. Throughout the long contest the
Marines, both by their valour and their tragic losses, heroically
sustained, added an imperishable chapter to the history of America's
participation in the World War."
This mere outline of the outstanding fighting history of the Marines
in France, tells only a small portion of what was done by the "Devil
Dogs," as these Soldiers of the Sea were called by the Germans.
Overseas the largest army concentration camp was Pontanezen at
Brest. It was placed under the command of Brigadier General
Smedley D. Butler, who organized, trained and carried over the
Thirteenth Regiment of Marines. Approximately 1,600,000 men
passed through that camp. It was one of the biggest jobs in France
and General Butler performed the difficult duty with ability and
satisfaction. The citation for an Army Distinguished Service Medal
said of him: "He has commanded with ability and energy Pontanezen
Camp at Brest during the time in which it has developed into the
largest embarkation camp in the world. Confronted with problems of
extraordinary magnitude in supervision, the reception,
entertainment, and departure of the large numbers of officers and
soldiers passing through this camp, he has solved all with
conspicuous success, performing services of the highest character
for the American Expeditionary Forces." After his return to America
General Butler was made commandant of the chief Marine training
camp at Quantico, Va.
Thirty thousand Marines were sent overseas to join the American
Expeditionary Forces. When, in May, 1917, I tendered the Marines
for service with the land forces abroad, there was objection on the
part of some high ranking officers of the Army. But Secretary Baker,
with the breadth that characterized him in the conduct of the war,
accepted the tender, and the Fifth Regiment, under command of
Colonel (afterwards Brigadier General) Charles A. Doyen, sailed on
June 14 with the first expedition sent to France. The Sixth Regiment
and Sixth Machine Gun Battalion followed later, and the Fourth
Brigade of Marines was organized in October, as a part of the
Second Division, which General Doyen commanded until relieved by
Major General Omar Bundy, on November 8. General Doyen
continued at the head of the brigade until ill health compelled him to
relinquish his command on May 9, 1918.
The fighting ability which distinguished the Marines in France was
the natural result of training and experience, the "spirit of the corps"
with which they were instilled. When war was declared there were
only 511 officers, commissioned and warrant, and 13,214 enlisted
men in the Marine Corps, which eventually contained 2,174
commissioned and 288 warrant officers, 65,666 enlisted regulars,
6,704 reserves and 269 female reservists—a total strength of
75,101.
Recruiting, training, equipment and supply of this large force was a
task without parallel in the history of the Corps. It was conducted
with an energy and ability that reflected the utmost credit upon
Marine Corps Headquarters—Major General George Barnett,
Commandant; the Assistant Commandants, first General John A.
Lejeune, afterwards Brigadier General Charles G. Long; Brigadier
General Charles H. Lauchheimer, Adjutant and Inspector; Brigadier
General George Richards, Paymaster; Brigadier General Charles L.
McCawley, Quartermaster; and others on duty at posts and in the
field.
What they did in France was only one phase of the operations of the
Marines. They were employed in practically every area in which the
Navy operated—on battleships in the North Sea, on cruisers in the
Asiatic; in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Cuba, and the isles of the
Pacific. In fact, they claim the honor of firing the first shot of the war
in the far distant island of Guam, where a Marine fired on a motor-
launch which was trying to get to the German ship Cormoran with
the news of the declaration of war before an American naval officer
could reach that vessel and demand its surrender. That was the only
German vessel in our territorial waters which we did not get. Her
crew blew her up, and a number of her officers and men went down
with the vessel.
Wherever they were, these Soldiers of the Sea, upon whom Uncle
Sam has called so often when he had a duty to perform anywhere in
the world—these men who, in many conflicts, have been the "first to
land and first to fight"—served well and added fresh laurels to those
so often won in the long history of the Corps. They may be
pardoned for singing with a will their marching song:

If the Army and the Navy ever look on Heaven's scenes,

They will find the streets are guarded by United States Marines.
 CHAPTER XIX
THE ANSWER TO THE 75-MILE GUN
GERMAN LONG-DISTANCE FREAK STOPPED BOMBARDING
PARIS WHEN NAVAL RAILWAY BATTERIES ARRIVED—
MANNED BY NAVY CREWS, HUGE 14-INCH GUNS
OPERATED WITH FRENCH AND AMERICAN ARMIES—
ADMIRAL PLUNKETT IN COMMAND—MOST POWERFUL
ARTILLERY USED BY ALLIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

"Paris bombarded!" was the news that shocked the world on March
23, 1918. Two days before the Germans had begun their great drive
for the Channel ports. Their armies to the north were breaking
through the Allied defenses, taking one position after another. But
their nearest lines were nearly seventy miles from Paris. No gun
known would shoot half that distance. How could they be shelling
the French capital?
That was what mystified the Parisians. Falling out of a clear sky, the
missiles fell, bursting in the streets. Aeroplane bombs, was the first
thought, for Paris was used to aerial raids. But these were
undeniably shells, not bombs, and there were no aeroplanes in sight.
And they continued to fall with painful regularity. Arriving at 15-
minute intervals, it was found that at least 21 shells had fallen that
day. They were not huge, weighing about 260 pounds, but they
were large enough to do considerable destruction, and to kill people
in streets, squares, and markets.
For a week they kept falling, and then occurred a tragedy that
shocked not only Paris but the whole Christian world. It was Good
Friday, and the cathedrals and churches were crowded with
worshipers. As the congregation—women and children, and men too
old to fight—prayed in the Church of St. Gervais, a shell crashed
through the roof of the building, and exploded. Seventy-five persons
were killed, of whom 54 were women—and five of these were
Americans. Ninety others were injured.
In all Christian lands people were aghast at this slaughter of the
defenseless. Indignation was stirred all the more by the knowledge
that this bombardment was wholly without military value. Its entire
object was to terrorize the civilian population. It was only another
example of German frightfulness.
After long search by aircraft it was discovered that shells were
coming from the forest of Gobain, near Laon, nearly 75 miles from
Paris. There, inside the German lines, was located this new
instrument of warfare, the latest surprise sprung by the Germans
and one of the most sensational of the whole war. Worst of all, the
Allies had no effective reply. Aeroplane bombing proved ineffective,
and the Allies had no guns which could reach it.
For five months Paris endured this menace. No one knew where the
shells would fall next, or who would be the victim. The city, however,
went about its business and kept up its courage. But here in America
there was being prepared the Nemesis of the Teuton terror.
The United States Navy was at that very time building long-range
guns that, while not capable of firing such great distances as the
German cannon, were far more powerful and effective in action.
Germany's gun was a freak, merely able to hurl comparatively small
shells seventy miles or more. Huge projectiles weighing 1,400
pounds were fired by our guns, and wherever they hit, everything in
the vicinity was smashed.
Elaborate emplacements were required for the German gun, taking
considerable time to construct. Their cannon could be fired from only
one point. The American guns were on railway mounts, and could be
rapidly moved from place to place, wherever they were needed. Only
a few hours were required to get them into position. In fact, if
necessary, they could fire from the rails.
Five of these immense naval railway batteries were built and sent to
France. When the first battery arrived, on its way to the front, the
Germans stopped shelling Paris. Their long-distance gun was hastily
withdrawn, and it never fired another shot.
What these batteries saved us from can be judged from Admiral
Sims' statement that, encouraged by the shelling of Paris, the
Germans were preparing to conduct long-distance bombardments at
various points along the front. They were taking large guns from
battle cruisers, to be mounted where they could bombard Dunkirk,
Chalons-sur-Marne, Nancy and other cities. Sixteen huge rifles, it
was reported, had left Kiel for this purpose. But, so far as known,
they never got into action. The Germans never carried out their plan
to scatter that terror to the cities of France.
These railway batteries, the largest ever placed on mobile mounts,
proved an effective answer to the Germans. They were distinguished
not only by what they prevented, but what they accomplished in
action. Engaged with the French and American armies from
September 6th until hostilities ceased, this was the most powerful
artillery used by the Allies on the western front.
The guns were of the largest type on our dreadnaughts—14-inch, 50
caliber, capable of throwing a 1,400-pound projectile 42,000 yards,
nearly 25 miles. In action, the firing was usually from 18 to 23 miles.
Operating at various points along the lines from Laon to Longuyon,
these batteries tore up enemy railways, cutting important lines of
communication; blew up ammunition dumps and bases, and
scattered destruction far in the rear of the German trenches.
Manned entirely by Navy personnel, the force was under command
of Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett.
Each battery comprised an entire train of 15 cars, made up as
follows:

1 Locomotive
1 Gun car
1 Construction car
1 Construction car with crane
1 Sand and log car
1 Fuel car
1 Battery kitchen car
2 Ammunition cars
3 Berthing cars
1 Battery headquarters car
1 Battery headquarters kitchen car
1 Workshop car

Thus each battery was self-sustaining, carrying not only its own
ammunition, fuel and food, but also machinery and mechanics for
making repairs. The total weight of the gun-car was about 535,000
pounds, the gun, breech mechanism, and yoke weighing 192,500
pounds. The five batteries, including the staff train of eight cars,
comprised 6 consolidation locomotives and tenders (tractive power
35,600 pounds), 5 gun-cars and 72 auxiliary cars.
The first mount, complete with its huge gun, rolled out of the shops
on April 25, 1918, less than a month from the time of the Good
Friday slaughter in the Paris church. Tested at Sandy Hook, N. J., five
days later, it proved a complete success, hurling its immense
projectiles more than twenty-five miles.
If our guns had been built in Paris we could have had them at the
front in three days. They were made to move by rail, and to be
ready for almost immediate action. But they had to get to France
first, and the difficulties of fighting a war 3,000 miles away were
impressed upon us by this necessity for transporting them. No ship
was big enough to carry one of them set up. Each had to be taken
to pieces before loading. The last of the mounts was completed May
25—a new record for quick construction. But getting a ship to take
them over was no easy task.
The first ship assigned was so badly battered up on the incoming
voyage that it had to go into dock for repairs. The second ship, the
Texel, was sunk by a U-boat near our coast. It was June 29 before
the first of the battery transports, the Newport News, heavily laden
with material, sailed for France, arriving at St. Nazaire July 9th.
Setting up these immense batteries was a trying job. Facilities at St.
Nazaire were very limited for the work of assembly. Lieutenant
Commander D. C. Buell, an officer of railroad experience, who as
inspector had watched the building of the mounts, was sent to
France. Admiral Plunkett and his force were on hand when the major
part of the material arrived. All set to work, and in a little more than
two weeks the first train was assembled.
Then arose another complication. When the French saw the size of
these mounts, they were afraid their immense weight would crush
the rails and probably break through or weaken bridges. The railroad
authorities were unwilling for them to move over their lines. For a
time it seemed as if they would never get to the front. But Admiral
Plunkett and his aids had more confidence than did the French. The
first train, which had been completed a week before, left St. Nazaire
August 17th. It proceeded slowly and all doubts were removed when
it rode the rails and passed over bridges without the slightest
trouble.
The news of its coming had somehow spread through France and its
progress toward Paris was like a triumphal procession. All along the
route crowds assembled, cheering the American naval gunners
"going to land," and girls decorated the gun with flowers. A second
battery was on the way before the first arrived. Camouflage was no
concealment. Everybody knew the big American cannon were on the
way. And the Germans must have learned it, too. For, when the
battery got near the front, the German long-distance gun was
hurried away.
These two batteries were to proceed to Helles-Mouchy, and from
there search out the hidden enemy in Gobain. But when the
batteries reached this position, it was found that the German terrifier
was gone, leaving only its emplacement to mark the spot at which it
had so long operated.
Battery No. 1 proceeded to the French proving ground at Nuisemont,
where firing tests were made with complete success. Battery No. 2
proceeded to Rethondes, in the forest of Compiegne, to fire upon an
ammunition dump at Tergnier, but after one shot, fired September 6,
ceased firing, as the French captured the village. Battery No. 1 was
taken to Soissons where, on September 11, position was taken near
St. Christopher Cemetery. No. 2 proceeded to Fontenoy-Ambleny.
While these two batteries were operating, work was continuing on
the remaining three. Trains No. 3 and 4 left St. Nazaire September
13, followed by No. 5 on the 14th. They arrived at the railroad
artillery base, Haussimont, on September 23rd, 24th and 26th,
respectively.
Weather conditions preventing observation by aeroplane or balloon,
it was decided to proceed without observation, so on September
14th Battery No. 2 fired ten rounds at an ammunition dump in
Besny-Loisy, just west of Laon. No. 1 on September 28th fired into
the German lines at Laon, putting over 47 rounds between 1 and
5:30 p. m., at a range of 34,000 yards. The target was the railroad
yards. One hundred and twelve rounds were fired against this
objective between September 28th and October 2nd. Battery No. 2
fired twelve rounds into Besny-Loisy on September 15th.
The Germans began retreating from Laon while this long-range
bombardment was in progress, leaving these targets in the hands of
the Allies. It was found that, though the batteries had only maps to
use in directing the firing and without aeroplane observation, the
shots in nearly all cases were effective hits. One 14-inch shell
wrecked a three-track railroad line, making a gap of 100 feet, tearing
up rails, shattering ties and blowing a crater in the road-bed.
Another projectile struck a moving picture theater during a
performance, killing 40 men outright and severely wounding sixty.
Two other shells struck this theatre, completely demolishing it and
several other surrounding buildings. A freight train on a siding had
been struck, and one of the cars was lifted from the tracks and
thrown a distance of thirty feet.
Time and again enemy aeroplanes bombed the vicinity of these
batteries. Shells were continually passing overhead. On October 5th,
at 4:30 p. m., a shell burst directly over Battery No. 1, followed by
three other high bursts. A succession of shells followed. One struck
only 16 feet from the gun, fragments hitting the sideplates and
breaking the casting of the gas engine support, but doing no further
damage.
Battery No. 2 was taken to Flavy-le-Martel, arriving October 8th. No.
1 remained at Soissons until October 24th, firing in all 199 rounds
from the same pit foundation. After the capture of Laon, the target
was, on October 2, shifted to a point northeast of that town, where
87 rounds were fired at ranges from 28,000 to 36,660 yards.
Having performed so satisfactorily in the vicinity of Soissons with the
Tenth French Army, Batteries No. 1 and No. 2 were ordered to join
the First American Army. They arrived at Nixeville, just south of
Verdun, October 28th. Batteries 3, 4 and 5, already in that region,
had fired several rounds at open fields in the German lines near the
targets selected, in order to obtain aviation photographs and correct
the range. On the 30th and 31st six rounds per gun were fired each
day, the two guns at Thierville firing at an aviation field south of
Longuyon and the two batteries at Charny firing at points near
Montmedy. Battery No. 2 bombarded the railroad yards at Montmedy
with 43 rounds on November 1st and 2nd.
As General Foch was preparing for a big offensive east of Metz, the
French requested that two of the naval batteries be assigned to take
part in this operation. Accordingly Nos. 1 and 2 were assigned to the
French, while the remaining three remained at Thierville and Charny
to keep up the bombardment of Montmedy and Longuyon. No. 1
proceeded via Champigneulles, arriving at its firing position, in the
forest of Velor, November 6th, its objective being Sarrebourg.
Leaving Charny November 3rd, Battery No. 2 reached Moncel-
Lunéville, in the forest of Mondon, November 9th, having orders to
fire on Bensdorf. Both targets were important German railroad
centers. But the signing of the armistice, on the 11th, put an end to
the French offensive for which huge preparations had been made.
Battery No. 3, which was shifted from Thierville to No. 2's position at
Charny, on November 1, fired at the Longuyon railway yards. No. 4
fired 23 rounds into Montmedy, and No. 5, 44 rounds at the
transportation centres of Longuyon. The next day Nos. 3 and 5 each
fired 25 rounds at Longuyon and No. 4, 20 rounds at the Montmedy
railroad. On account of the enemy's activities at Louppy and
Remoiville, No. 4 November 3, fired 25 rounds at a large ammunition
dump and at the lower railroad dump at Montmedy. On November 4,
Battery No. 4 again took up position at Thierville. No. 3 opened fire
on Louppy and Remoiville on the morning of November 4, firing 44
rounds at the two targets. Twelve rounds were also fired at
Montmedy.
The naval guns were last fired on November 11th, batteries 4 and 5
sending five shells each into Longuyon. The last shot was fired by
No. 4, from Charny, at 10:58:30 a. m., ninety seconds before
hostilities ceased.
While direct observations could not be obtained in the Verdun sector,
there was evidence from the enemy of the effectiveness of these
guns. On November 5, the southern part of Montmedy, which was
under bombardment, was reported on fire. Later a German prisoner
stated that the firing on Montmedy had caused a great deal of
damage, one shell which landed in the railway yards, killing all the
Germans in two coaches.

NAVAL RAILWAY BATTERY FIRING FROM THIERVILLE UPON

LONGUYON
Insert: Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett, commanding the Naval
Railway Batteries in France.
 ON THE TURRET PLATFORM OF A BATTLESHIP
A naval airplane is mounted, on the turret platform, ready for the
call to the sea.

The batteries at Charny and Thierville were repeatedly shelled and

bombed. On October 30th, when the enemy was shelling crossroads
between No. 2 gun and its berthing cars, three American engineers
working on the track near by were killed, and the headquarters car
and one berthing car derailed. On the same day five soldiers were
killed and others wounded by shells which fell around Battery No. 4
at Charny. Three men of Battery 4 were wounded by shell fire on
October 28th, one of these, A. P. Sharpe, seaman first class, dying
the next day in the hospital at Glorieux.
One of the most important services rendered by the naval batteries
was the shelling of the railroad running through Longuyon and
Montmedy, the only line (except one running far to the north
through Belgium), by which the Germans could bring troops to
Sedan. Though some shots fell several hundred yards beyond the
ranges calculated from the range table, the railroad line and yards
were struck frequently, and traffic stopped completely, not only
during the actual firing, but from six to ten hours each day after the
firing ceased.
General Pershing, in his report of November 20, 1918, said:

Our large caliber guns were advanced, and were skilfully

brought into position to fire upon the important lines at
Montmedy, Longuyon, and Conflans. On the 6th a division
of the First Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite
Sedan, 25 miles from our lines of departure. The strategical
goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut
the enemy's main line of communications, and nothing but
surrender or an armistice could save his army from
complete disaster.

Though these batteries fired a total of 782 rounds and were under
enemy shell-fire repeatedly, there was no material damage to guns,
mounts or equipment, which met every condition imposed. The total
rounds fired per gun were: No. 1, 199; No. 2, 113; No. 3, 236; No.
4, 122; No. 5, 112.
In France the naval railway batteries operated as five separate and
independent units, all under command of Admiral Plunkett. His
principal assistants were Lieutenant Commanders G. L. Schuyler and
J. W. Bunkley. The commanders of the batteries were: No. 1,
Lieutenant J. A. Martin; No. 2, Lieutenant (junior grade) E. D.
Duckett; No. 3, Lieutenant W. G. Smith; No. 4, Lieutenant J. R.
Hayden; No. 5, Lieutenant J. L. Rodgers.
The use of these guns at the front was first proposed in November,
1917. Impressed by the Allies' lack of long-range artillery, the Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance pointed out that a number of 14-inch
guns at the Washington Navy Yard were available and suggested
that they might be mounted on the Belgian coast to reply to the
powerful artillery the Germans were using against Dunkirk. Upon
consideration, it was decided that it was practicable to place these
naval guns on railway mounts, though they were heavier than any
mobile artillery that had been built by any country. On November 26,
1917, I instructed the Bureau of Ordnance to proceed with the
building of five of these mounts, with complete train equipment.
Though many problems had to be solved, the naval gun factory
completed the designs within two months, and the 136 standard
drawings and 36 sketches required were ready to submit to bidders
on January 26, 1918.
With the numerous other war requirements, which taxed steel and
locomotive plants to their capacity, it seemed, at first, almost
impossible to secure the building of the mounts, locomotives and
cars required. But bids were secured, accepted on February 13,
1918, and the contractors pushed the work so energetically that the
first mount was completed 72 days from the award of the contract.
Scheduled for delivery on May 15, it was completed April 25. The
last mount, scheduled for June 15, was completed May 25. The first
gun and mount complete arrived April 27 at Sandy Hook, N. J.,
where it was subjected to severe firing tests. The locomotives and
auxiliary cars were completed June 1, and shipment overseas was
begun. Credit for this speedy construction is due contractors as well
as naval officers, and particularly Mr. Samuel M. Vauclain, president
of the Baldwin Locomotive Works, who took an intense personal
interest in the whole undertaking.
While construction was under way, the Navy had been selecting and
training the personnel, 30 officers and 500 men, required to man
and operate the batteries. Men were carefully chosen—some 20,000
volunteered for this detail—and were given an intensive course of
training.
The approximate cost of the five mounts, locomotives, cars, spare
parts and ammunition was $3,337,970.
As other artillery could accomplish with less expenditure of
ammunition and expense the results desired at the shorter ranges
the naval guns were used entirely for strategical purposes and were
fired at ranges between 30,000 and 40,000 yards, shelling objectives
that less powerful guns could not reach. The ammunition supply
which was gauged by the estimated "life" of the gun—that is, the
number of times it could fire with accuracy—consisted of 300 rounds
for each gun, and this quantity proved adequate. Battery No. 3
made a record for guns of this size in firing 236 rounds without
serious deterioration.
From beginning to end, this entire enterprise was so well planned
and carried out, that we may well consider it one of the most
successful operations in which the Navy ever engaged.