I.

GRADING
Attendance – 20%
Midterm Exam – 20%
Recitation – 15%
Final Exam – 30%
Special Projects – 15%

Passing grade: 75%

1. Philosophy and the Law

“Jurisprudence”
Nature, purpose of the legal system
What law is, what it ought to be, how it functions in society
Framework for analyzing and interpreting the law

There are cases where the SC reverts back to the philosophy of law
They will return to the Congressional debate

What is morality?
What may be legal, may not be moral. What may not be moral, may be legal.

Moral but is illegal?

Example: Anti-Mendicancy Law

JURIDICAL SCIENCE: Public Law vs Private Law

Public
Constitutional
Penal
Administrative
International

Private

Socrates – Reason
Plato – Ideals
Aristotle – Law

Historical School
Friedrich Karl von Savigny (19th Century, Modern thought)
The being and character of people
Law is intrinsically tied to the spirit of the people
CANNOT be in a vacuum
custom, tradition & shared values
collective consciousness… VERY JUNGIAN :3

Preliminary Considerations
• Philosophy and the Law
• Nature of Philosophy
• Reason and Spirit of the Law
• Brief History of Law
• Structure of our Legal System
• The Executive
• The Legislative

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• The Judiciary
• Constitutional Commissions
• The Civil Service Commission
• The Commission on Elections
• The Commission on Audit
• Recommended Readings
Schools of Thought
• Classical Theories
• Natural Law
• Legal Positivism
• Positivism and the Separation Thesis
• Modern Theories
• Legal Realism
• The Path of Law
• Bad Man Theory
• Legal Interpretivism
• Pure Theory of Law
• Recommended Readings

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law:

Art. I Sec. 2 - The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Incorporation / Transformation
The doctrine of transformation refers to the process of incorporating customary
international law into domestic law through judicial lawmaking, while the doctrine
of incorporation suggests that customary international law is automatically part of
domestic law.

Divine Law – religious law

Moral Law – a personal, logical idea between “right” and “wrong”.
Positive Law – derived from the people, community, State.

By virtue of existing in a society, or a State, you are subject to the positive law, regardless
of your personal and Divine beliefs. It is the duty of the State -- the vested right given by
the people to the State to create a law – to protect individual principles, as well as the
State as a whole. Whatever the legislative will decide and passed by law, is the will of the
State through the people.

2. Nature of Philosophy
3. Reason and spirit of the Law
4. Brief History of Law
5. Structure of our Legal System
6. Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary
7. Constitutional Commission
8. CSC, COMELEC, CoA

Cases:

1. Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275

G.R. No. L-27524

Jul 31, 1970
Fernando, J.

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FACTS:
§ Jose C. Tecson was the Superintendent of Dredging at the Bureau of Public
Works.
§ On October 14, 1966, Executive Secretary Rafael Salas, under presidential
authority, issued a directive detailing Tecson to the Office of the President.
§ Tecson argued that this detail was effectively a removal from his position without
cause, which he claimed was unconstitutional.
§ The lower court, led by Judge Juan O. Reyes, dismissed Tecson's petition on
December 17, 1966, citing a lack of cause of action.
§ Respondents were represented by Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and
Solicitor Augusto M. Amores.
§ Tecson was represented by Salva, Carballo & Associates and Edmundo M.
Villanueva.
§ Tecson appealed the decision, asserting that his detail was a removal or transfer
without his consent, violating constitutional provisions.
ISSUE:
1. Does the detail of Jose C. Tecson to the Office of the President constitute a
removal from office without cause?
2. Does the President have the authority to order such a detail under his power of
control?

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the detail of Tecson to the Office of the President
does not constitute a removal from office without cause.
2. The Court affirmed that the President has the authority to order such a detail under
his power of control.

RATIO:
1. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's dismissal of Tecson's petition,
emphasizing the extensive executive powers granted to the President by the
Constitution.
2. The Court referred to the precedent set in Villena v. Secretary of Interior, which
established that executive and administrative functions are executed by and
through the executive departments, with the actions of department heads being
presumptively those of the President.
3. The President's power of control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices
is all-encompassing, allowing him to order details and transfers in the interest of
public service, provided there is no reduction in rank or salary.
4. The Court rejected Tecson's argument that the directive required approval from
the Civil Service Commission and the Commissioner of the Budget, stating
that such a requirement would undermine the concept of a single executive.

Legal Positivism:
This philosophy asserts that law is a set of rules and commands issued by a sovereign
authority, which must be followed regardless of moral considerations. In this case, the
Supreme Court's ruling emphasizes the President's extensive powers as defined by the
Constitution. The Court upholds that the President's authority to order a detail or transfer
of a government official is valid as long as it complies with constitutional provisions,
focusing on the legality of the action rather than its moral implications.

2. Francisco vs Nagmamalasakit na mga Mananangol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, 415 Scra 44

November 10, 2003

Carpio-Morales, J.
General Policies on Construction

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SUMMARY: Former president Estrada filed the first impeachment of Justice Hilario
Davide and seven other associate justices for betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes. It was denied because it was deemed insufficient hence a second impeachment
was filed and signed by 1/3 of the members of the house of representatives. Various
actions were filed against the House of representatives most of which were contending
the constitutionality of the second impeachment as it violates the provision of Sec. 5 of
Art 11 of the Constitution stating that “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

DOCTRINE: General Policies on Construction

FACTS:
1. The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund
2. Former President Joseph Estrada filed the first impeachment case against
CJDavide and to seven other associate justices on the ground of betrayal of public
trust and other high crimes. Later on the case was endorsed to the House of
representatives which was referred to the committee on Justice which was said to
be sufficient in form. After that it was again dismissed due to its lack of substance.
3. The second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
4. Many petitions for various kinds of actions were filed against the House of
Representatives contending that the filing of the second impeachment is
unconstitutional because it violates the provision of Section 5 of Art. 11 of the
constitution that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."

ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article 11 of the Constitution. – YES
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)
ofArticle 11 of the Constitution. - YES

RULING:
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution. SO ORDERED.

RATIO:

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 1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power
to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute
rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
3. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.

Constitutional Principles:
1. Limitation on Congress's Power to Make Rules: The assertion that Congress's
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the Constitution
highlights the principle that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. All
branches of government, including the legislative, are bound by its provisions. This
reflects the idea that Congress cannot create rules that contravene the
Constitution, as such rules would be invalid. This principle ensures that no branch
of government can alter or bypass the fundamental law without proper
constitutional processes (e.g., amendment via referendum).
2. Impeachment Process and Its Limitations: The interpretation that the initiation
of impeachment occurs upon the filing of the complaint and its referral to the House
Committee on Justice reflects the careful design of the impeachment process. This
design prevents abuse of the impeachment power by setting limits on when and
how it can be exercised.
3. Constitutional Prohibition on Multiple Impeachment Complaints: The
principle that only one impeachment complaint can be initiated against the same
official within a one-year period (as per Article XI, Section 3(5)) serves as a check
on the legislative branch, preventing it from overwhelming the executive or
judiciary with constant impeachment attempts. This rule is a manifestation of the
checks and balances system, ensuring that impeachment remains a serious and
deliberate process rather than a tool for political harassment.

3. Estrada v. Desierto, 353 Scra 452

Facts:
• In the consolidated cases of "Estrada v. Desierto" (G.R. Nos. 146710-15 &
146738), Joseph E. Estrada challenged the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo's presidency and sought to prevent his prosecution for alleged crimes
during his tenure.

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 • Respondents included Ombudsman Aniano Desierto and various private
individuals and organizations.
• The case stemmed from corruption allegations against Estrada, leading to his
impeachment trial.
• The trial was halted when the Senate voted not to open a controversial envelope
containing evidence against Estrada.
• This led to mass protests, withdrawal of support from key officials, and Estrada's
departure from Malacañang Palace on January 20, 2001.
• Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Vice-President, took her oath as President on the
same day.
• Estrada contended he had not resigned and that his removal was unconstitutional.
• He argued that extensive media coverage prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
• Lower courts dismissed his petitions, leading to the appeal before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
1. Did Joseph E. Estrada resign as President of the Philippines on January 20, 2001?
2. Is the Angara Diary admissible as evidence?
3. Does reliance on newspaper accounts violate the hearsay rule?
4. Can Congress decide post facto on the President's inability to govern under
Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution?
5. Has prejudicial publicity affected Estrada's right to a fair trial?
6. Can Estrada be prosecuted without violating the double jeopardy clause?
7. Is Estrada entitled to absolute immunity from suit?

Ruling:
1. The Court ruled that Joseph E. Estrada had resigned as President before January
20, 2001.
2. The Angara Diary was deemed admissible as evidence.
3. The Court held that reliance on newspaper accounts did not violate the hearsay
rule.
4. Congress can decide post facto on the President's inability to govern.
5. The Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that prejudicial publicity had
affected Estrada's right to a fair trial.
6. Estrada can be prosecuted without violating the double jeopardy clause.
7. Estrada is not entitled to absolute immunity from suit.

Ratio:
1. Resignation:
• The Court used the "totality test" to conclude that Estrada had resigned.
• It analyzed events before, during, and after Arroyo's oath-taking, including
Estrada's actions and statements, which indicated his intent to resign.
• The Court found that the pressure on Estrada did not amount to duress that
would invalidate his resignation.
2. Angara Diary:
• The Court held that the Angara Diary, which contained statements from
Estrada and his Executive Secretary, was admissible.
• It was part of the pleadings and not an out-of-court statement.
• Even if considered hearsay, it fell under exceptions such as admissions by
a party and independently relevant statements.
3. Newspaper Accounts:
• The Court ruled that newspaper accounts were used to buttress well-
established facts and did not constitute hearsay.
• The facts cited were within judicial notice and were not disputed by Estrada.
4. Congress' Decision:
• The Court upheld that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the
President's inability to govern.

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 • The recognition of Arroyo as President by Congress was a political
judgment, not subject to judicial review.
5. Prejudicial Publicity:
• The Court found no evidence of actual prejudice against Estrada due to
media coverage.
• It reiterated that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial and that Estrada
failed to prove actual bias on the part of the investigators.
6. Double Jeopardy:
• The Court held that double jeopardy did not apply as Estrada was neither
convicted nor acquitted in the impeachment proceedings.
• The termination of the impeachment trial was due to his resignation, not a
dismissal without his consent.
7. Absolute Immunity:
• The Court ruled that Estrada, as a non-sitting President, is not entitled to
absolute immunity from suit.
• The 1987 Constitution's intent to hold public officials accountable negates
such immunity for acts committed while in office.

---o0o o0o---

Constitutional Principles:

1. Presidential Resignation and Succession (Article VII):

• Resignation: The Court applied the “totality test” to determine that Joseph
Estrada had effectively resigned from the presidency, even though he
claimed otherwise. This is related to Section 8 of Article VII of the
Constitution, which states that in the event of the President’s inability to
perform duties, the Vice President assumes the presidency. The Court’s
ruling underscored the constitutional mechanism of succession and the
process by which a president may be deemed to have vacated the office.
• Succession of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo: The Court’s decision affirmed
the constitutional principle that when a President resigns, the Vice President
steps in as the new President. This also reflects the power of Congress,
under Section 11 of Article VII, to determine the President’s incapacity:
“Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should
a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if
not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to

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 discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office.”

2. Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine:

• Congress’s Role and Political Question: The case touches on
the political question doctrine, where certain decisions, particularly those
related to the legitimacy of Arroyo’s presidency, are deemed outside the
purview of judicial review. The Court recognized that Congress, by
acknowledging Arroyo as President, made a political decision that the
judiciary cannot overturn. This principle underscores the separation of
powers and the limits of judicial authority.
• Judicial Review: While the Court recognized the political nature of certain
decisions (e.g., the recognition of the new President), it exercised its power
of judicial review to assess whether Estrada’s constitutional rights were
violated. This demonstrates the Court’s role in ensuring that all branches of
government, including the executive and legislative, act within constitutional
boundaries.

3. Due Process and Fair Trial (Article III, Bill of Rights):

• Prejudicial Publicity: Estrada argued that extensive media coverage
affected his right to a fair trial, a right protected under Section 14 of Article
III of the Constitution. The Court’s ruling that there was no evidence of actual
prejudice reflects the balance between free speech and press (protected
under Section 4 of Article III) and the right to a fair trial.
• Double Jeopardy: The decision also touches on Section 21 of Article III of
the Constitution, which protects against double jeopardy. The Court ruled
that Estrada’s prosecution did not violate this protection since the
impeachment process is distinct from criminal prosecution.
4. Public Accountability (Article XI):
• Accountability of Public Officials: Estrada’s assertion of absolute
immunity from suit was rejected by the Court, reflecting the constitutional
principle of public accountability under Article XI. The decision
emphasized that former public officials, including ex-presidents, can be held
liable for actions committed during their tenure, aligning with the
Constitution’s intent to hold public officials accountable for their actions.
5. Separation of Powers (Articles VI, VII, and VIII):
• Role of Congress and the Judiciary: The case demonstrates the
interaction between the different branches of government—Congress
recognized Arroyo’s presidency, while the judiciary reviewed the legality of
Estrada’s claims and his rights under the law. This illustrates the separation
of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches,
ensuring that no branch exceeds its constitutional mandate.
6. Rule of Law:
• Admissibility of Evidence and Fair Procedures: The rulings on the
admissibility of the Angara Diary and reliance on newspaper accounts reflect
the rule of law principle, ensuring that judicial decisions are made based on
proper legal procedures and evidence, in line with constitutional safeguards.

4. Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 72873

Background of the Case

§ The case of Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court involves the interpretation
and application of Article 1088 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
§ The case pertains to the right of redemption in the context of co-heirs selling
their hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition of an inherited property.

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 § Five siblings inherited a parcel of land in equal shares.
§ Two of the siblings, Celestino Padua and Eustaquia Padua, sold their
respective shares to the petitioners, Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo, in
1963 and 1964.
§ The petitioners occupied the portions of the land corresponding to their
purchases.

Tecla Padua's Complaint for Right of Redemption

§ In 1977, one of the co-heirs, Tecla Padua, filed a complaint seeking to exercise
her right of redemption over the portions sold to the petitioners.
§ The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the right of redemption had
lapsed because it was not exercised within thirty days from the notice of the
sales in 1963 and 1964.
§ The court held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law.

Intermediate Appellate Court's Reversal

§ The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision.
§ It stated that the notice required by Article 1088 should be in writing and that
actual notice would not suffice.
§ The court cited previous cases that emphasized the need for written notice.

Supreme Court's Decision

§ The Supreme Court deviated from the strict letter of the law and adopted an
exception to the general rule based on the peculiar circumstances of the case.
§ The court recognized that the co-heirs were undeniably informed of the sales,
even though no written notice was given to them.
§ It also noted that the 30-day period for redemption had begun and ended during
the 14 years between the sales and the filing of the complaint for redemption.
§ The court emphasized that the purpose of the law is to ensure that
redemptioners are duly notified and that justice should be rendered.
§ It interpreted and applied the law in a way that would achieve justice, even if it
deviated from the strict letter of the law.
§ The court concluded that the right of redemption had already been extinguished
by the time the complaint was filed in 1977.

Clarification and Exception to the General Rule

§ The court clarified that it was not abandoning previous doctrines on the
requirement of written notice for redemption.
§ Instead, it was adopting an exception to the general rule based on the specific
circumstances of the case.

Summary
§ The Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court case involves the interpretation and
application of the right of redemption in the context of co-heirs selling their
hereditary rights.
§ The Supreme Court deviated from the strict letter of the law and adopted an
exception to the general rule based on the peculiar circumstances of the case,
in order to achieve justice.

Presence of the Alonzo spouses in the property already constitutes a notice.

THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED WHEN IT RESULTS IN INJUSTICE.

Constitutional Principles:

1. Rule of Law:

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 • Consistency with Legal Principles: The Supreme Court's decision reflects the
principle of the rule of law by ensuring that legal principles are applied
consistently and fairly. While the Court deviated from the strict letter of the
law in this case, it did so in a way that aligns with the broader purpose of the
law—ensuring justice. This reflects the idea that the law should be interpreted
and applied not just mechanically, but in a way that achieves fairness and justice
in specific cases.
2. Justice and Equity:
• Balancing Legal Rigor with Justice: The Court’s decision to make an exception
to the general rule of requiring written notice highlights the principle that justice
must be the ultimate goal of the legal system. The Constitution enshrines the
principle of justice, particularly in the preamble, where it emphasizes the
establishment of a just and humane society. The decision in this case
demonstrates how courts can interpret laws flexibly to achieve equitable outcomes,
ensuring that legal formalities do not result in unjust consequences.

Biasca vs. Basalote:

When the law is clear, it should be applied. But when it is vague, it should bias
towards justice.

3. Due Process (Article III, Bill of Rights):

• Fair Notice and Opportunity: The case touches upon the concept of due
process, which is enshrined in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. The
Court recognized that the co-heirs were informed of the sales even though no
written notice was given, ensuring that they had fair notice and opportunity to
exercise their rights. This reflects the idea that due process is not just about
following procedures to the letter, but ensuring that the parties involved are treated
fairly and justly.
4. Protection of Property Rights:
• Ensuring Fair Treatment in Property Transactions: The Constitution,
under Article XIII, Section 1, emphasizes the protection of property rights. In this
case, the Court ensured that the rights of the co-heirs to redeem the property were
respected, but it also balanced this with the rights of the purchasers who had
occupied the land for a significant period. This balancing act reflects the
constitutional mandate to protect property rights while ensuring fairness in
transactions.
5. Judicial Discretion and Flexibility:
• Judicial Interpretation: The case highlights the judiciary’s role in interpreting laws
in a manner that serves justice, even if it means deviating from a strict
interpretation of the law. The Constitution grants the judiciary the authority to
interpret laws, and this case demonstrates how courts can use their discretion to
address unique circumstances, ensuring that justice is served in each specific
case.

5. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Comelec, GR No. 176951

Facts:
• The case "League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections" (G.R.
Nos. 176951, 177499 & 178056) was decided on December 21, 2009, by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
• Petitioners, represented by Jerry P. Treñas, Mayor of Iloilo City, along with other
city mayors, challenged the constitutionality of sixteen laws converting certain
municipalities into cities.
• The municipalities included Baybay (Leyte), Bogo (Cebu), Catbalogan (Western
Samar), Tandag (Surigao del Sur), Borongan (Eastern Samar), Tayabas
(Quezon), Lamitan (Basilan), Tabuk (Kalinga), Bayugan (Agusan del Sur), Batac

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 (Ilocos Norte), Mati (Davao Oriental), Guihulngan (Negros Oriental), Cabadbaran
(Agusan del Norte), Carcar (Cebu), and El Salvador (Misamis Oriental).
• Petitioners argued that these cityhood laws violated Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and the equal protection clause.
• The lower court had previously nullified these laws, leading to the appeal to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Do the cityhood laws violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution?
2. Do the cityhood laws violate the equal protection clause?

Article X.
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the cityhood laws do not violate Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that the cityhood laws do not violate the equal protection
clause.

Ratio:
• The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, reversing its
earlier decision.
• The Court emphasized that the power to create political subdivisions is essentially
legislative in character.
• The 1987 Constitution allows for the creation of local government units (LGUs) in
accordance with criteria established in the Local Government Code (LGC).
• Congress intended to exempt the municipalities covered by the cityhood laws from
the increased income requirement set by Republic Act No. 9009, which amended
the LGC to raise the income requirement for cityhood from PHP 20 million to PHP
100 million.
• The legislative intent was clear from the deliberations and the inclusion of
exemption clauses in the cityhood laws.
• Regarding the equal protection clause, the Court held that the classification made
by the cityhood laws was reasonable and based on substantial distinctions.
• The municipalities covered by the cityhood laws had pending cityhood bills before
the enactment of RA 9009 and had already met the previous income requirement.
• The exemption was germane to the purpose of the law, which was to address the
inequity caused by the sudden increase in the income requirement.
• The existence of the new cities and their functioning as such constituted an
operative fact, further justifying the upholding of the cityhood laws.
• The Court concluded that the petitioners failed to overturn the presumption of
constitutionality of the cityhood laws.
• The decision emphasized the principle that laws are presumed constitutional
unless proven otherwise beyond reasonable doubt.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW SHOULD NOT LEAD TO AN UNINTENDED

OUTCOME.

1. Legislative Power and the Creation of LGUs:

• Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that "No province,
city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,

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 or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code." This provision acknowledges the
legislative authority of Congress to create LGUs, provided it adheres to the criteria
set by law.
• The Supreme Court upheld this principle by affirming that the creation of LGUs is
fundamentally a legislative function. Congress has the discretion to set and amend
the criteria for cityhood, as long as it is consistent with the Constitution and laws
like the Local Government Code (LGC).
2. Local Autonomy:
• Article X of the Constitution emphasizes local autonomy, ensuring that local
governments have the power to govern themselves within the framework of the
law. The creation of new cities, in this case, reflects Congress's attempt to balance
local autonomy by providing certain municipalities the opportunity for cityhood,
which allows for greater local control and resources.
3. Equal Protection Clause (Article III, Section 1):
• The equal protection clause mandates that all persons or entities similarly situated
should be treated alike under the law. The petitioners argued that the cityhood laws
violated this clause by giving special treatment to certain municipalities.
• However, the Court ruled that the classification made by the cityhood laws was
reasonable. It recognized that the municipalities affected had already met the
previous income requirements and were in the process of cityhood before the
enactment of the higher income threshold by Republic Act No. 9009. Thus, the
exemption was found to be based on a valid distinction and relevant to the law's
purpose, which aligns with the equal protection principle.
4. Operative Fact Doctrine:
• The Court applied the doctrine of operative fact, which recognizes that even if a
law is later declared unconstitutional, acts performed under that law while it was in
effect remain valid. In this case, the newly created cities had already been
functioning as such, which contributed to the decision to uphold the cityhood laws.
This doctrine ensures stability and continuity in government actions and reflects
the balance between legality and practicality in constitutional law.
5. Presumption of Constitutionality:
• The decision reaffirms the principle that all laws are presumed constitutional unless
proven otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that
petitioners failed to meet the burden of proving that the cityhood laws violated the
Constitution. This underscores the judiciary's respect for legislative enactments
and the high threshold required to overturn them.

6. Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative vs. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, GR No. 182722

Background and Parties Involved

• The case involves Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
• DCCCO is a credit cooperative registered with and regulated by the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA).
• The issue revolves around whether DCCCO is liable to pay deficiency withholding
taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of its members.
DCCCO's Arguments
• DCCCO argues that cooperatives are exempt from withholding taxes on interest
under the law.
• DCCCO's objective is to increase the income and purchasing power of its
members, encourage savings and thrift, and provide loans for provident and
productive purposes.
• DCCCO has the power to issue financial instruments and secure them with real
and personal properties.

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BIR's Actions
• The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Letters of Authority to examine
DCCCO's books of accounts for the taxable years 1999 and 2000.
• DCCCO received Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding taxes, which
it protested.
• DCCCO agreed to pay the deficiency withholding taxes for certain expenses but
disputed the taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of its members.
• The BIR issued Letters of Demand ordering DCCCO to pay the deficiency
withholding taxes.
CIR's Inaction and DCCCO's Petition
• The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) failed to act on DCCCO's protest
within the prescribed period.
• DCCCO filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
CTA First Division's Decision
• The CTA First Division partially granted the petition, canceling the assessments
for deficiency withholding taxes on certain expenses but affirming the assessments
for deficiency withholding taxes on interests.
• DCCCO filed a motion for partial reconsideration, which was denied by the CTA
First Division.
DCCCO's Petition to CTA En Banc
• DCCCO filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc, arguing that it is not
liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time
deposits of its members.
CTA En Banc's Decision
• The CTA En Banc denied the petition, ruling that DCCCO is liable to pay the
deficiency withholding taxes.
• The CTA En Banc disregarded a BIR ruling stating that cooperatives are not
required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their
members.
Supreme Court's Decision
• The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CTA En Banc and ruled in favor
of DCCCO.
• The Court held that the BIR ruling, which exempts cooperatives from withholding
taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their members, is applicable.
• The Court emphasized that cooperatives deserve preferential tax treatment due to
their important role in economic development and social justice.
• The Court interpreted the law in line with the spirit and intent of the legislature,
which is to provide tax exemptions to cooperatives and their members.
• Therefore, DCCCO is not liable to pay the assessed deficiency withholding taxes
on interest from the savings and time deposits of its members.

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