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Assignment Problem

The document presents a balanced assignment problem with a cost matrix for four persons across four job sites, leading to an optimal total cost of 21 units. It also discusses game theory, detailing both pure and mixed strategies, identifying a saddle point in a pure strategy game with a value of 45, and calculating probabilities for mixed strategies for players A and B. The final value of the game for player A's optimal strategy is calculated to be 8.

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Sharear Reza
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2 views4 pages

Assignment Problem

The document presents a balanced assignment problem with a cost matrix for four persons across four job sites, leading to an optimal total cost of 21 units. It also discusses game theory, detailing both pure and mixed strategies, identifying a saddle point in a pure strategy game with a value of 45, and calculating probabilities for mixed strategies for players A and B. The final value of the game for player A's optimal strategy is calculated to be 8.

Uploaded by

Sharear Reza
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Page |1

❖ Assignment Problem
Job Sites
Persons 1 2 3 4
A 1 4 6 3
B 9 7 10 3

C 4 5 11 7

D 8 7 8 5

Solutions: This is a balanced assignment problem.


Step-01: Row Reduction
Job Sites
Persons 1 2 3 4
A 0 3 5 2

B 2 0 3 2

C 0 1 7 3

D 3 2 3 0

Step-02: Column Reduction


Job Sites
Persons 1 2 3 4
A 0 3 2 2

B 2 0 0 2

C 0 1 4 3

D 3 2 0 0

Step-03:
Job Sites
Persons 1 2 3 4
A 0 2 1 1
B 3 0 0 2
C 0 0 3 2
D 4 2 0 0

Atiqur Rahman | ACCT 21026


Page |2

Now, we write the allotted table


Persons Jobs Casts
A 1 1
B 3 10
C 2 5
D 4 5
21

So, the total optimal costs: 21 units


❖ Game Theory
Pure Strategy: Find the optima strategies of the players in the following games.
Player B
Row minimum
1 2 3
25 20 35 20
A
50 45 55 45 Maximum
Player A B
58 40 42 40
C
58 45 55
Column Maximum
minimax

The maximum value is equal to minimax value. So, this game has a saddle point. So, the value of the
game is 45. Here, the game has a saddle point at the cell corresponding to row 2 and column B. So, the
game is pure strategy.

❖ Mixed Strategy:
Consider the following payoff matrix with respect to player A and solve it optimally player B
Player B

B1 B2 Row minimum
A1 9 7 7 maximum
Player A A2 5 11 5
9 11
Column Maximum minimax
There is no saddle point. Mix-up the strategies in a random selection.
Player A (when player B’s strategy is B1):
If strategy A1 is selected with a probability P
therefore, strategy A2 is selected with a probability (1 – P)
So, player A’s expected gain = 9p+5(1 – p) -------- (i)

Atiqur Rahman | ACCT 21026


Page |3

Player A (when player B’s strategy is B2):


If strategy A2 is selected probability P
Therefore, Strategy A2 is selected with a probability (1 – p)
So, player A’s strategy expected gain = 7p+11(1 – p) ---------- (ii)

The two equations of expected gains are set equal and solved for P as given below:
9p+5(1 – p) = 7p+11 (1 – p)
Or, 9p+5 – 5p = 7p+11 – 11p
Or, 4p+5 = 11 – 4p
Or, 4p+4p = 11 – 5
Or, 8p = 6
P= 0.75
Therefore, (1 – p) = 0.25
So, player A would select strategy A1 with a probability of 0.75.
And strategy A2 with a probability of 0.25.
Player B (when player A’s strategy is A1):
B1 is selected with a probability q
B2 is selected with a probability (1 – q)
So, player B’s expected gain= 9q+7(1 – q) ----------- (i)
Player B (when player A’s strategy is A2):
B1 is selected with a probability q
B2 is selected with a probability (1 – q) -------- (ii)
So, player B’s expected gain = 5q+11 (1 – q) ------- (iii)
Two equation of expected gains are set equal and solved for q as given below: 9q+7(1 – q) = 5q+11
(1 – q)
Or, 9q+7 – 7q = 5q+11 – 11q
Or, 2q+6q = 11 – 7
Or, q = 0.5
Therefore, (1 – p) = 1 – 0.5 = 0.5
Player B would select strategy B1 with a probability of 0.5
B2 with a probability of 0.5
Value of the game is calculated by substituting the value of p or q in any of the equation of expected
value.

Atiqur Rahman | ACCT 21026


Page |4

If the value of p is substituted in equation (i)


Value of the game = 9p + 5 (1 – p)
= 9 * .75 + 5 (1 – .75)
=8

Atiqur Rahman | ACCT 21026

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