Thunder Out of China-Theodore H White-Annalee Jacoby-1946-349pgs-POL
Thunder Out of China-Theodore H White-Annalee Jacoby-1946-349pgs-POL
Thunder Out of China-Theodore H White-Annalee Jacoby-1946-349pgs-POL
White and Annalee Jacoby constituted -the Chungking Bureau for Time during the war years . Mr. White was born in Boston in 1915 and won a newsboys' scholarship at Harvard . There he concentrated on the study of the Far East, took three years of Chinese, and graduated summa cum laude . He arrived in China in January, 1939, and in the ensuing seven years traveled 200,000 miles through the Orient . He covered the South Seas in 1940 when the Japanese were first probing its defenses, the Indian uprisings of 1942, the Honan famine, and the return of Sinkiang to China in 1943 . He flew with the 14th Air Force and the Hump Command, saw the relief of Stilwell, the last battles of the Burma Road, and its reopening in 1945 . He was standing on the deck of the U .S .S . Missouri when the Japanese signed the surrender . Annalee Jacoby was born in Utah, graduated from Stanford University in 1937 and for three years was a scenario writer for MGM . She is the widow of Melville Jacoby, one of the most popular and able of the Far Eastern correspondents . Following his death, she joined Time's bureau in Chungking where she covered Chungking and politics while Teddy White toured battlefronts .
THUNDER OUT OF
CIIIA l\
THEODORE H . WHITE
and
ANNALEE JACOBY
New York
WILLIAM SLOANE ASSOCIATES, INC .
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY KINGSPORT PRESS, INC ., KINGSPORT, TENNESSEE
TO DAVID H . WHITE
Contents
A Note To the Reader Introduction i . Chungking, a Point in Time 2 . The Peasant 3 . The Rise of the Kuomintang 4 . War 5 . Stalemate 6. Campaign in the South Seas 7. Government by Trustee 8. Chiang K'ai-shek-The People's Choice? 9. Doomed Men-The Chinese Army 10. Stilwell's War ix . The Honan Famine 12. Disaster in the East 13. The Chinese Communists 14. The Stilwell Crisis 15. Politics in Yenan 16 . Patrick J . Hurley 1 7. 1945-The Year of the Great Promise 18. Utopia Stillborn 19 . Victory and Civil War 20. China and the Future 21 . Tentatively, Then . . . Index Maps China Stilwell's Strategy East China Campaign ix xi 3 20 33 48 68 82 97 118 132 1 45 166 1 79 1 99
214
Introduction
O LAST shot was fired in this war ; there was no last stand, no last day dividing peace from strife . Half a dozen radio stations scattered about the face of the globe crackled sparks of electricity from capital to capital and into millions of humble homes ; peace came through the air and was simultaneous over all the face of the earth . The great ceremony on the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay was anticlimax, an obsolete rite performed with primitive ceremony for a peace that had not come and a war that had not ended. The greatest fleet in the world lay amidst the greatest ruins in the world under a dark and cheerless canopy of clouds . The U .S .S . Iowa was on one side of the Missouri, the U .S .S. South Dakota on the other. A tattered flag with thirty-one stars was hung on one of the turrets of the battleship-the flag of the infant republic, which Commodore Perry brought with him to the same bay almost a hundred years before. Above the mainmast fluttered the battle flag of the Union of today . The deck was crowded with the apostles of the American genius-the technicians . There were technicians of heavy bombardment, technicians of tactical bombardment, technicians of amphibious landings, technicians of carrier-borne war . These men were artists at the craft of slaughter, trained to perfection by four years of war . The ship itself was the apotheosis of all American skills, from the cobweb of radar at the foretop above to the gray slabs of armor, carefully compounded of secret and mysterious alloys, below . It was an American show. There were a Russian with a red band about his cap and a Tass newsreel man who insisted on crawling in among the main actors to get his shots ; there was a Canadian general
Xi
Introduction
who flubbed his part and signed on the wrong line ; there was a carefully tailored Chinese general who had spent the war in Chungking, where he disposed tired divisions on paper about a continental map . These too were technicians, but they were lost in the serried ranks of American khaki and white . The victory in the Pacific had been a severely technical victory, and, as befitted the world's greatest masters of technique, we overawed all others . The Japanese supplied the one touch of humanity . Half a dozen Japanese were piped over the side of the Missouri, but for the purposes of history and in every man's memory there were only twothe general, Umezu, and the statesman, Shigemitsu. Umezu was dressed in parade uniform, all his ribbons glistening, his eyes blank, but you could see the brown pockmarks on his cheeks swelling and falling in emotion . Shigemitsu was dressed in a tall silk hat and a formal morning coat as if he were attending a wedding or a funeral . He had a wooden leg, and he limped along the deck ; when he began to clamber to the veranda deck where the peace was to be signed, he clutched the ropes and struggled up with infinite pain and discomfort . With savage satisfaction everyone watched Shigemitsu struggling up the steps; no American offered a hand to help the crippled old man. Shigemitsu and Umezu were brought forward, and after a few carefully chosen words beautifully spoken by General MacArthur, they signed their names to a document marking an end to the Japanese Empire . Now Shigemitsu and Umezu were both technicians ; if anyone had asked them why they had lost, why they were being forced to sign an end to all their world, they would have advanced a dozen cogent reasons wrapped up in figures on tonnages, metals, guns, divisions, alliances, and ill-timed decisions . All their reasons would have been valid to specialists . Probably neither Shigemitsu nor Umezu ever entertained for a moment the thought that they might have lost because what they had conceived was so hideously wicked that it generated its own defeat . When they had signed, the generals and admirals of all the other nations put their signatures to the document, and peace, if peace it was, had come . This victory had been an American victory, one achieved by an
xii
Introduction
overwhelming weight of metal, guns, and superior technique, which had crushed Japan utterly and completely . But there was no indication at the moment of victory on the Missouri, or in the days of defeat before the victory, or in the days of exuberance after it, that America understood the war she had been fighting in the Pacific . We had been threatened out of the darkness of the Orient ; we had recognized the threat as something indescribably malevolent and had fashioned a steamroller that crushed it to extinction . But we had never stopped to inquire from what sources the threat had been generated . America's war had cut blindly across the course of the greatest revolution in the history of mankind, the revolution of Asia. We had temporarily lanced one of the pressure heads and released some of the tension by an enormous letting of blood. But the basic tensions and underlying pressures were still there, accumulating for new crises . Peace did not follow victory . All through Asia men continued to kill each other ; they continue to do so today and will be doing so for a long time to come . In Asia there are over a billion people who are tired of the world as it is ; they live literally in such terrible bondage that they have nothing to lose but their chains . They are so cramped by ignorance and poverty that to write down a description of their daily life would make an American reader disbelieve the printed word . In India a human being has an average life expectancy of twenty-seven years . In China half the people die before they reach the age of thirty . Everywhere in Asia life is infused with a few terrible certainties-hunger, indignity, and violence . In war and peace, in famine and in glut, a dead human body is a common sight on open highway or city street . In Shanghai collecting the lifeless bodies of child laborers at factory gates in the morning is a routine affair . The beating, whipping, torture, and humiliation of the villagers of Asia by officials and gendarmes is part of the substance of government authority . These people live by the sweat of their brow ; they live on what they can scratch out of exhausted soils by the most primitive methods with the most savage investment of their sinew and strength . When the weather turns against them, nothing can save them from death by hunger . Less than a thousand years ago Europe lived this way ; then Europe
x111
Introduction
revolted against the old system in a series of bloody wars that lifted it generation by generation to what we regard as civilization . The people of Asia are now going through the same process . History books devote too much of their attention to the study of successful revolutions. When huge masses of people erupt out of misery, in bloodshed and violence, to make their lives better, they are usually greeted by the horror and vituperation of contemporary historians. Only time makes such uprisings respectable . When uprisings fail and a superficial stability is re-established, the stability is regarded as something fine and gratifying . Beneath such stability, however, the miseries, tensions, pressures, and fears of the abortive revolution continue, growing inward in a tortured pattern of violence . The people's suppressed passions are seduced by false slogans and phrases, and they are easily led into disastrous adventures against the peace of the entire world . This is what happened in Japan . The war we fought against Japan was a war against the end result of a revolution that had failed . A hundred years ago the impact of the West on China and Japan started the wheels of revolution turning. For generations it was customary to think that Japan had made a successful transition into the modern world and that China had failed. That was wrong ; Japan's revolution failed within fifteen years of Perry's arrival in Tokyo Bay . It was seized by the feudal, reactionary-minded leaders of Japan's Middle Ages, and its energies were twisted into the structure of the Japanese Empire as we knew it in 194 1-a society that could not solve its own problems except by aggression against the world, an aggression in which it was doomed . Out of the misery latent in the villages of Japan and the regimentation of her workers, the leaders of Japan bred disaster for everyone . The very chaos that has persisted in China for a hundred years has proved that the revolutionary surge of the Chinese people against their ancient unhappiness is too strong for any group to control and distort. The war Japan fought against us was one in which the Japanese were beaten from the outset . They were led by military technicians who had only a jungle understanding of politics ; they were defeated by superior military technicians who had as little understanding of
xiv
Introduction politics but incomparably greater treasure in steel and science . By defeating Japan, however, we did not make peace . The same revolutionary forces that miscarried in Japan are still operating everywhere else in Asia . Throughout that continent men are still trying to free themselves from their past of hunger and suffering . The forces of change are working more critically and more explosively in China than anywhere else on the entire continent . The peace of Asia and our own future security depend on our understanding how powerful these forces are, what creates them, and what holds them back . Except for General Joseph Stilwell, no Allied military commander seems to have understood that this was the fundamental problem of the war in the Orient. Stilwell had no ideologybut he understood that in fighting the war we were outlining the peace at the same time . He understood that both victory and peace rested on the measure with which the strength of the people could be freed from feudal restraints . He arrived at his policy empirically by exposure to Chinese life in the field ; it was not supported by the American government, and he was relieved of command ; but his relief from command is a mark of greater glory than any he won on the field of battle . This book is a partial story of the China war ; only a Chinese can write the true history of his people . The story of the China war is the story of the tragedy of Chiang K'ai-shek, a man who misunderstood the war as badly as the Japanese or the Allied technicians of victory . Chiang could not understand the revolution whose creature he was except as something fearful and terrible that had to be crushed . He had every favoring grace on his side-the support of powerful allies, the cause of justice, and in the beginning the wholehearted and enthusiastic support of all his people. The people whom he led felt instinctively that this war against Japan was a war against the entire rotten fabric of time-worn misery . When Chiang tried to fight the Japanese and preserve the old fabric at the same time, he was not only unable to defeat the Japanese but powerless to preserve his own authority . His historic enemies, the Communists, grew from an army of 85,000 to an army of a million, from the governors of 1,500,000 peasants to the masters of go,ooo,ooo . The Communists used no magic ; xv
Introduction
they knew the changes the people wanted, and they sponsored these changes. Both parties lied, cheated, and broke agreements ; but the Communists had the people with them, and with the people they made their own new justice. When the might of American technique moved to support Chiang K'ai-shek in the final year of the war, not even America could recapture for him the power that had been his in the first glorious year of the war of national resistance .
Chapter 1
I0
r4
them to each small room ; they slept on mattresses of one thin cotton quilt, which barely softened the springs of knotted cord . Most homes and offices were unheated ; officials shivered ih their overcoats all day and used them for bed coverings at night. Prices rose higher and higher daily, while salaries lagged further behind . The government saw to it that its servants got several sacks of rice each month ; it granted them a minimum amount of coarse cloth, cooking oil, salt, and fuel at fixed prices . These basic things guaranteed existence ; the paper-money salary grew more worthless each passing month, until an entire month's earnings could be spent on a single evening's party . The government gave a certain number of banquets, and these were gay occasions-a time to eat enough . No one who arrived in Chungking in 1938 or 1939 expected to stay there for more than a year or two. As time went on, the community grew together into the greatest mixing of provincial strains in the history of China . Men who left their wives behind in Shanghai and Canton either acquired concubines or brought their wives through the blockade lines to join them . Babies were born, and their parents bartered the last possessions they had carried with them for powdered milk and vitamin pills . Families who had formerly sent their children to the relatively efficient schools of the coast now watched their education in poorly heated, overcrowded rabbit warrens ; the children were growing up speaking the slurred, whining dialect of Szechwan, and the parents' ears winced . Railways and street cars became tales of magic . Normally the young people who had come with the government would have met their own kind in their own circles at the coast, or appropriate marriages would have been arranged by their parents . Now nature took its way . Men from Peking married girls of Szechwan ; daughters of Shanghai families married Cantonese . It was a curious mixing . At the war's end a lovely Cantonese girl who had married a Shanghai boy and who was being sent to Shanghai by her government department before her husband could leave said : "He's given me a letter of introduction to his mother . I hear she's old-fashioned ; we won't understand each other-I can't speak that dialect." All the hundreds of thousands who had followed the government I7
T9
Chapter 2
The Peasant
HE Chinese who fought this war were peasants born in the Middle Ages to die in the twentieth century . The strength of Chungking and its government came from the villages in which these peasants lived and from their ancient way of life-a way that Westerners cast off four or five hundred years ago in an age of violence almost as terrifying as the present . In our folk memories now we recall those times as a period of romance ; we have thrust away into the dark corners of our minds the barbarous substance that underlay the feudal tinsel . This civilization of our past, like the civilization of China in our own times, rested on the effective enslavement of the common man . He was chained to his land and ensnared in a net of social convention that made him prey to superstition, pestilence, and the mercy of his overlords . He shivered in winter, hungered in famine, often died of the simple hardship of his daily life before he reached maturity . On this base rested the thinnest conceivable superstructure of a leisure class that profited by the peasants' toil and preserved for posterity the learning and graces it had inherited from antiquity . The members of this class could bring themselves by no stretch of their imagination to picture the toiling brutes beneath them as men like themselves with inalienable human dignities and sensitiveness . When the Western world revolted against this system, it did so in a series of murderous wars that culminated in the French Revolution . We revere the memory of that revolution, but we regard such uprisings in our own time with horror and loathing . Nevertheless a revolution of this kind is
20
The Peasant
now seething in molten fury throughout Asia . And the very center of the upheaval lies in the villages of China . Eighty per cent of China's four hundred and more millions live in villages . Almost all of these people live by working the soil ; the most important single fact about China is that it is a land of peasants, a nation of toiling, weather-worn men and women who work in the fields each day from dawn to dusk, who hunger for the land and love the land, and for whom all the meaning of life lies in their relationship to the land. The great cities of China-linked by a web of modern communications to each other and the Western world-are excrescences only recently thrown up by the impact of the twentieth century . Their civilization is alien to China ; their inhabitants are drawn from the fields, their thoughts still conditioned by the village over which the skyscrapers and factories throw their shadow . The village is a cluster of adobe huts and shelters . If it is a large village, there is a wall of mud and rubble round it ; a small village consists of ten or twelve houses clustered close to each other for protection . In a prosperous village the walls of the adobe huts are whitewashed, and green trees shade the larger houses ; a poor villageand most of them are poor-is a mass of crumbling weathered yellows and browns . The homes have no ceilings but the raftered roofs ; they have no floors but the beaten earth . Their windows are made of greased paper, admitting so little light that the inner recesses are always dim . In his house the peasant stores his grain ; in it he keeps his animals at night ; in it is the ancestral shrine that he venerates . By day the street is empty of men-pigs wallow in it, chickens cackle in the alleyways, babies run bare-bottomed in the sun, mothers with full brown breasts suckle infants in doorways . At dusk the men return from the fields, and all over China at the same hour the villages are covered with a blue haze of smoke that curls from each homestead as the evening meal is cooked . At the same moment in every village, timed only to the setting of the sun, the same spiraling wisps of smoke go up from the houses to the sky . In the larger villages yellow light may gleam for a few hours from the doorways of the more comfortable, who can afford oil for illumination ; but in the
21
The Peasant
smaller villages the smoke fades away into the dark, and when night is come, the village sleeps, with no point of light to break its shadows . Men and women, come together in the village to produce children, till the land, and raise crops . The unity of man, village, and field is total and rigid . All the work is done by hand, from the sowing of the rice grains in early spring, through the laborious transplanting of the tufts in water-filled paddies in late spring, to the final harvesting by sickle in the fall. The Chinese farmer does not farm ; he gardens. He, his wife, and his children pluck out the weeds one by one . He hoards his family's night soil through all the months of the year ; in the spring he ladles out of mortar pits huge stinking buckets of dark green liquid offal, and carefully, without wasting a drop, he spreads the life-giving nitrogen among his vegetables and plants . When harvest time comes, the whole family goes out to the field to bring in the grain . The family helps him thresh his grain, either by monotonously beating it with a flail or by guiding animals that draw huge stone rollers round and round in a circle over the threshing floor. All life is attached to the soil ; the peasant works at it, eats of it, returns to it all that his body excretes, and is finally himself returned to the soil . Certain basic differences exist between the Chinese farmer and the farmer of America . The Chinese peasant's acres are pocket-handkerchief plots . The average Chinese farm, including those of the sparsely populated northwest, is less than 4 acres ; in some of the densely settled provinces of the south and west the average is between one and one and a half acres per farm . Even this meager morsel is poorly laid out, for it consists of scattered strips and bits here and there, and the farmer must walk from one of these to another to serve each in turn . The average farmer has few animals . He cannot spare precious grain for feeding pigs or beef cattle or precious meadow land for dairy products . He may have one or two pigs, but these, like his chickens, feed on kitchen scraps . If he is well off, he may have an ox or buffalo to pull his plow, but most farmers with their small holdings cannot afford even that . The farmer himself is uneducated . He is illiterate, and full of superstitions and habit ways that make it difficult to reach him
22
The Peasant
by print . His horizons are close drawn. Off the main highways transportation is as tedious as it was a thousand years ago ; the people he sees and talks to all live within a day's walk of his birthplace and think as he does . His techniques are primitive . He knows little of proper seed selection, and till recently his government has done little to improve seed strains ; he knows nothing about combating plant diseases ; his sickles, crude plows, flails, and stone rollers are like those his forefathers used . Frugality governs all his actions . He gathers every wisp of grass and twists it together for fuel. He sows. beans or vegetables on the narrow ridges that separate one paddy field from another, so that no square foot of growing land is lost . He weaves hats, baskets, and sandals out of rice straw ; out of the pig's bladder he makes a toy balloon for the children ; every piece of string, every scrap of paper, every rag is saved . Last and most important, the yield of his back-breaking labor is pitifully small . Although the yield per acre is fair-8o to 9o per cent of what the American farmer gets from the same amount of landthe yield is miserably small in terms of man-hours, in terms of mouths and human lives. One American farmer with his machines, draft animals, good seeds, and broad acres will produce 15 pounds of grain. each year while the Chinese farmer is producing one . This means that the Chinese farmer is constantly at war with starvation ; he and his family live in the shadow of hunger. The human pattern is the family . In a way that we no longer know except in rare instances, the family is a single personality . The common strength of the family upholds the individual through misfortune ; the insatiable demands of the family deny him the slightest human privacy . Chinese women bear babies constantly, but the infant death rate and disease cut down on the number of the living . The Chinese love. their children ; when they can, they pamper them outrageously . The poorest peasant tries to wrap his baby in scarlet silks and suffocate . him with parental care and affection . Partly this is tenderness such as animates all parents ; partly it is the result of social pressure, for children are the only form of old age insurance that exists in China_ 23
The Peasant
Parents live by labor till their muscles wither ; when they are old, they must starve unless the family cares for them . Childlessness is the greatest tragedy possible to any family . Contrary to general belief, Chinese peasants do not have large families . The patriarchal household, with grandfather, grandmother, and married children all living under one roof, is a minor phenomenon rather than the rule ; most peasant holdings are too small to support such a grouping . The average family group has only five members . If a peasant has only enough land to feed himself and his family, he can afford only one son ; if he has two, his land must be divided between them and will provide neither with enough to live . The land, too, underlies the preference for sons. Only sons can inherit ; a daughter can have no part of her father's land and must go away to share her husband's . So the farmer views the money spent on his daughter and the food she eats as a waste, a temporary investment that can bring small return . Weddings, celebrated everywhere with much the same glee and ceremony, are also determined largely by the land . A rigid social system outlines a series of gifts from the groom's family to the bride's and from the bride's to her new home . These must come from the land or be paid for by the land, and a family with little to offer will have difficulty in arranging a match . Weddings are arranged by parents, not lovers. They link the families by a tenuous but useful kinship, so that every member must be considered . Weddings provide joy for everyone . but the bride . Her father must give a dowry, but he is getting rid of a drain on his resources, and he perhaps has acquired a future source of credit . The groom receives household furniture and a degree of independence in his household . The mother-in-law gets another servant, to be trained and disciplined and used, who some day will provide a grandchild . Only the bride has little dignity and little standing . She is not really a member of the family till she produces a son ; if her husband displays affection, he may be ridiculed by his family until his behavior becomes properly distant . Funerals provoke the same mourning and long-drawn-out reverence everywhere. The funeral of a father is the son's prime responsibility. He must provide fine burial garments and feasts for friends .and relatives . The funeral, too, is closely related to the land . It may 24
The Peasant
be postponed if death comes in a bad crop year ; sometimes part of the land will be mortgaged or even sold to cover the expense . And if two sons dispute their inheritance, the one who manages to pay for the funeral has consolidated his claim . The dead does not leave the land ; it is his resting place, the home of his spirit, and it must not be sold except as a last resort, because generations past and gone still share in it. Chinese peasant culture, so far as Westerners know it, is little understood. The peasants share common superstitions such as the code of the wind and water, whereby diviners arrange the construction of a house so that it will be happily placed and catch good luck . They all share a common form of ancestor worship and a belief in local gods, at whose wayside shrines they burn incense sticks . The fortune teller is found all over the land, and women consult him everywhere. The great holidays of the year differ in observance from place to place, but the greatest of them, like New Year's Day, are much the same in all provinces . New Year's is fixed by the lunar calendar and, like our Easter, may fall on a different day each year . New Year's in China is a joyful time ; all bills are settled before then, the family rests from work, wives return to visit their parents, new clothes are worn, and pates are shaven smooth . It is a season of complete rest and feasting . The villagers are quite unaware that the Central Government has decreed that New Year's Day shall be January r and that what China has always regarded as New Year's shall be quaintly called Spring Festival . Besides these national characteristics each locality boasts some regional variation-a special superstition revolving about a holy mountain, a sacred cave, the propitiation of certain rivers and lakes . The local customs, woven together into the national tradition, give the provinces their special quality and mark every stranger, whether Chinese or Western, as a foreigner in the village streets . What binds all these people together is not so much their common culture, common language, or common traditions as it is their subjection to a poverty and ignorance that knows no counterpart in the Western world . It is their life in squalid huts, the close-cramped 25
The Peasant
rooms with earthen floors, the diseases of filth and malnutrition, the cold of winter, the monotonous food . Out of this searing crucible of want, the back bent by the stooping transplantation of rice, the loins broken by the constant bearing of children, comes the desperate struggle of all Chinese to live, to scratch up enough for an existence above the line of misery . You can see the entire tragedy in any village street in China . You see the ripe girls as they approach the age of marriage-cheeks abloom, dark hair glistening with health, sturdy bodies full of life ; you see also their sisters ten or twelve years older, their eyes tired, their bodies stooped, their breasts and bellies flaccid from exhaustion and childbearing-already old, for the life of China has consumed them . The brooding, underlying melancholy of the village is infused by two qualities in which foreigners find an intoxicating charm . One is the almost Puckish sense of humor that is so wonderfully ingrained in the Chinese national character. Any oddity, no matter how trivial, is the occasion for jest ; a meeting of people in the streets or at village teahouses ripples with rollicking laughter . They have a broad practical sense of fun that delights in the humiliation of pompous characters, the cut of foreigners' clothes, intricate plays on words . Even some of the most practical customs of the countryside are gravely explained in humorous terms-thus it is declared that a peasant driving a flock of ducks to market has the right to let his ducks glean fallen rice grains in the wayside paddies because the duck droppings more than enrich the soil in return. The second quality is gossip, which runs like quicksilver from hut to hut and whispering tongue to listening ear . No man's quarrel is a private affair, for the entire village must debate and judge it ; the cruelty of a father, the faithlessness of a son, the new concubine of the rich landlord, are village matters . And if, God forbid, some good housewife or maiden with advanced ideas should be persuaded to commit an indiscretion, then the village literally seethes and crackles with talk . This gossip covers the entire range of human affairs-from the crops and taxes to the ultimate dark distortions of war, peace, and world affairs . The substratum of this life is emotional starvation . Since most of the peasants are illiterate, they can enjoy neither books nor news26
The Peasant
papers. They have no moving pictures, no radios . Their lives are conditioned by rumor, and almost anything will serve to fill the great vacuum their boredom produces . The village fairs are as much social as economic institutions . During the idle season of the fields people gather at the booths and gossip, watch magicians, listen to story-tellers . Sometimes a touring troupe of actors will pass through a district to show an ancient classical drama ; the performance will be discussed and criticized for days afterward even by those who have not the remotest idea of what the archaic words meant or what the involved symbolism represented . The villagers will cluster about anyone and anything if it appears to be odd ; a mechanic fixing a faulty motor in a village performs before a huge audience, and a foreigner with a camera will find himself so quickly surrounded by cheerful, crowding citizens that he will be unable to take any pictures . Chinese village life cannot be painted entirely in somber colors, for it has great beauties . There are the beauties of hills and mountains and slopes covered with silver crescents of paddy field as far as the eye can reach. There are the beauties of meadows covered with yellow rapeseed flowers, of trees hung with red persimmons, of fields of tall yellow grain . In the larger villages the rich families foster all the ancient graces of China . There is no form of architecture more lovely than a spreading Chinese courtyard. Bridges arch across still pools where goldfish swim ; concentric rings of rooms pierced by moon gates make an inner world of serenity divided into quiet islands . Within such homes are preserved the classics, the embroidered silks, the lacquerware and porcelain, the arts and crafts, that all the world so admires. The peasant in his field hardly sees these graces, and when he does, he scarcely sees them in the same light as those who enjoy these things at the cost of his toil . The weight of ignorance and labor is only part of the burden the Chinese peasant bears ; there is also the weight of a social system as antique as his ideas and superstitions . The peasant's relation to the land is conditioned by those who control the land . It is characteristic of China's present social state that this, the most overwhelming of all her problems, should completely lack adequate statistics. Some 27
The Peasant
people estimate-but very roughly-that 30 per cent of China's peasants are part tenants and part freeholders, another 3 0 per cent are tenants or landless farm hands, and 40 per cent own the land they till . This analysis is very shaky . The pressure on the tenant and the small owner is far different from the pressure in American rural life . Chinese landlords rackrent their fields to the last possible grain . On good lands they demand from 50 to 6o per cent of the crops ; in some areas, including Chungking, they take up to 8o per cent of the cash crops . In districts where land ownership is highly concentrated, the great landlord may conduct himself as a baron with his own armed retainers, his ruthless rent-collecting agents, and his serfs -the tenant farmers . The small owner is frequently little better off than the tenant . Anyone may tax him and usually does. He must bear the heavy load of government exactions, the petty pilferings of all the local officials, and the demands of army officers who may be stationed in his district . Even the soldiers feel free to demand pigs, meat, and food of him when passing through his district . Every farmer needs credit at some time or other, and credit in China may reduce the farmer who nominally owns his land to the status of farm laborer for his creditor . A loan-for seeds, tools, family emergencies-enmeshes the farmer in the web of usury . Despite all government efforts to, break the system in the villages, credit still remains in the hands of the village pawnbrokers and loan sharks-often the same men who are the large landlords . Interest rates run from 30 to 6o per cent a year and higher . Once caught in the grip of the usurers, a man has little chance of getting out . Marketing is another process in which the small peasant usually loses . He sells his grain at low prices in the glut season of harvest ; what he buys back from the market he buys at high prices during the lean season . Transportation is so crude, roads are so few, that each district operates almost as an isolated entity . There is no national market that fixes prices, nor are there railways to equalize surplus and deficit areas. The landlord, the loan shark, and the merchant may be one and the same person in any village . Usually in a large town they are a compact social group of "better" families . Their landed wealth gives 28
The Peasant
them an aura of respectability and a veneer of civilization . When traditionalists speak of village democracy in China, they usually refer to the "elders" who make community decisions for the whole . Almost always the elders are members of the rich landed families or are their commercial allies. The few "literati" of China, those who can afford education, come from these families ; and the administrative government of the Chinese nation has always been drawn from these educated people . By its very origin the bureaucracy starts off with a feeling of loyalty and devotion to its own group, to the cultivated well-to-do families from which it sprang. In the village itself the unity of the landed families and the local government is obvious . The pao chang and the chia chang, as the local chiefs are called who are appointed by the government in each village to levy its taxes, conscript soldiers, and preserve public order, are almost invariably members of such families . To speak of these families as wealthy in the American sense would be ridiculous . The largest landholders in China proper usually possess no more than a few hundred acres . The total capital of a merchant in a large town rarely exceeds the equivalent of $50,000 U .S . But against the background of misery and savagery in the countryside such wealth is spectacular . All men struggle against misery, and out of their struggle come all of China's problems-for when the miserable struggle against nature, they usually end by struggling among themselves . Only a Chinese standing close to the peasant himself can understand for just how meager a handful of rice he can buy another Chinese-and just how great are the limits of tolerance to which he can push his fellow man. Only someone who is exposed to the wretchedness of work can fully savor the sweetness of indolence, and the fat-jowled merchant and loan shark of the market town loves his hot, rich foods the more because so few can enjoy them. Appeal by the peasant against the oligarchy that rules him is useless . The local government to which he must appeal against iniquitous taxes, usurious interest, common police brutality, is by its very constitution the guardian of the groups that crush him . Even before the war the few interested students of the problem of local govern29
The Peasant
ment were shocking the conscience of China by detailed local studies of how the system worked ; they were producing dry little brochures that damned the system from paddy field to courtyard . In some places peasants who failed to keep up their interest rates were seized by local police and thrown into jail ; they were left to die of hunger unless their families brought them rice and water . Peasants were forced to work unpaid on the estates of some landlords as part of their feudal obligations . And every agent of government or landlord took his own particular percentage when levying his demands on the peasants' harvest . The ancient trinity of landlord, loan shark, and merchant is a symbol hated throughout Chinese history . It represents a system that has shackled China's development for five centuries . During the last century, however, the system has tightened about the Chinese peasant as never before because of the impact of the West, by commerce and violence, on its timeworn apparatus . Concentration of landholding had usually been stimulated in olden times by famine, flood, or disaster, when the peasant was forced to sell or mortgage his lands to meet his emergency needs . But the impact of Western commerce created new forms of liquid wealth in China and concentrated it in the hands of the relatively minute number of go-betweens of Western industry and the Chinese market. This new commercial wealth lacked the know-how, the courage, or the proper conditions to invest in industrial enterprises, as commercial wealth historically did everywhere else ; it found in land its safest and most profitable form of investment . Particularly in the vicinity of such cities as Shanghai and Canton, where the new wealth was created, it poured into the countryside ; land values shot upward, and the peasant was crushed by a process he could not understand. In the neighborhood of such cities 8o per cent of the peasants are bare-handed tenants . The increasing importance of land as an item of commercial speculation divorced the landlord from the personal obligations he had formerly borne . Absentee landlords living in urban comfort far from the villages sold and bought land at increasingly high prices ; they extracted the maximum possible revenue . By ancient custom in certain places the tenant formerly had an inalienable right to his tillage ; 30
The Peasant
the landlord's legal title gave him what was called "bottom" rights, but the tenant possessed "surface" rights, the right to farm the soil, and no landlord could sell the surface rights out from under the peasant or dispossess him of his means of livelihood . Such quaint customs, however, dissolved as the acid of modern speculation ate away into the ancient system of landholding . On the coast the impact of Western commerce was direct and clear ; in the interior it was more subtle and diffused . The peasants in the vast interior of China had employed themselves at cottage industries during the idle months . Between peak seasons of work in the fields the peasant turned out homespun cloth, straw baskets and hats, and raw silk, which he could sell at a small profit in local markets . His revenue from this industry was slight, but the margin of his existence was so narrow that in most cases it was absolutely vital to him. Western industry began to produce and pour into the interior, both from overseas and from its Shanghai outposts, new textiles, shiny gadgets, kerosene, and other materials so cheap and of such superior quality that the peasant crafts could not hope to compete. Peasant homes lack electricity or any other source of power but the animal energy of human beings ; no matter how cheaply they turned out goods, they could not match factory-made competing articles either in quality or in price . In some areas of China home industry was wiped out entirely, and the peasant was left with no useful occupation to fill his time and budget . Instead of creating an outlet for surplus farm labor by establishing itself in the interior, industry concentrated at the coast and siphoned off the depressed farm population to be consumed in mills, where it worked perhaps a fourteen-hour day for a pittance. Another grim factor for a generation past has been civil commotion . The war lords who tore the interior to pieces were most of them shrewd, brutal men who wished to crystallize permanently both their gains and their social position ; this could be done best by acquiring land . Peasants were beaten off their fields, or their ownership was taxed away . In one county near Chengtu, in western China, 70 per cent of the land is held by a single person, a former 3T
The Peasant
war lord . These war lords, even though their military fangs are now drawn, are still potent economic forces . Crushed by speculation, war lords, and Western commerce, straitjacketed by their ancient feudal relationships, the peasants of China have been gradually forced to the wall . Despite all the new railways and factories and the humane paper legislation of the Central Government, some scholars think that China is perhaps the only country in the world where the people eat less, live more bitterly, and are clothed worse than they were five hundred years ago . Many Western and Chinese students have looked at China through the eyes of her classics . Seeing it through such a medium, they have regarded China as "quaint" and found a timeless patina of age hanging over the villages and people . The biblical rhythm of the fields makes Chinese life seem an idyl, swinging from season to season, from sowing to harvest, from birth to death, in divinely appointed cadences . Chinese intellectuals, writing of their country and their people for foreign consumption, have stressed this piquant charm along with the limpid purity of the ancient philosophy . This composite picture of China is both false and vicious . Beneath the superficial routine of the crops and the village there is working a terrible ferment of change, which now, with ever-increasing frequency, is bursting into the main stream of Chinese politics . Those who see in the peasant's life an imaginary loveliness are the first to stand terrified at the barbarities his revolts bring about in the countryside when he is aroused . There is no brutality more ferocious than that of a mass of people who have the chance to work primitive justice on men who have oppressed them . The spectacle of loot and massacre, of temples in flames, of muddy sandals trampling over silken brocades, is awesome ; but there is scant mercy or discrimination in any revolution, large or small . The great question of China is whether any democratic form of government can ease these tensions by wise laws, peacefully, before the peasant takes the law into his own hands and sets the countryside to flame .
32
Chapter 3
to world peace and that such peace could be assured only by crushing the revolt of the Chinese peasantry. The suppression of the Taiping rebellion put the cap on fundamental change in China for some sixty years, and the pressure generated by this delay grew more intense with each decade . Eventually, when the lid was lifted, China came apart in a series of explosions ; like a string of firecrackers, each sputtering uprising generated another in a chain reaction of growing violence . Out of this chaos two distinct groups emerged, which had clear but diverging ideas about what to do to end the chaos . The collapse of the Manchu Empire in 1911 stripped China of her outward appearance of changelessness and stability . Within less than five years the first political lesson of government had been learned anew-that the state rests on force. That was the age of the war lords, and China broke up into a patchwork of blood and unhappiness . Each war lord had his own army, each army its district . The great war lords governed entire provinces ; their generals governed parts of provinces ; their captains governed counties, cities, towns. Three hundred men could keep a county in subjection, levy taxes on it, rape its women, carry off its sons, batten on its crops . All those who were accustomed to govern were gone, and the soldiers who took over found with astonishment that they were government . Their will was law ; paper they printed was money . Among themselves they fought as the whim took them ; coalitions formed and re-formed ; ambition, treachery, and foul play became the code of Chinese politics. And each evil deed was sanctified by its perpetrator, who proclaimed it done for the unity of China . The only enduring legacy left by the war lords was their belief in force ; the only conviction that Chiang K'ai-shek and the Communists have shared for twenty years is the conviction that armed strength is the only guarantee of security . The war lords were purely destructive ; in earlier ages such a period of anarchy might have lasted for generations before re-integration set in, but this was the twentieth century . All up and down the China coast and far up the rivers concessions had been wrung by foreign powers from the decadent Manchu government . On China's main 34
rivers were steamers of foreign ownership, which were protected by gunboats flying foreign flags . Railways owned and managed by foreigners sucked profit out of China to foreign investors . China's tariffs were set and collected by foreigners ; so was the most profitable of internal revenues, the salt tax. The foreigners who lived in China had enormous contempt for both the Manchus and the later war lords, but they could not exist in island communities in the vastness of China ; for their own purposes they had to create or convert to their use a body of Chinese who could act as a bridge between themselves and the nation they wished to plunder . Western businessmen created Chinese businessmen in their likeness . New Chinese banks were developed ; old ones learned to substitute double-entry bookkeeping for beaded counting-boards . The factories, steamships, mines, and railways that foreigners controlled needed a host of skilled Chinese to operate them ; their success caused Chinese businessmen to start similar projects, which needed the same kind of management and engineers. A new kind of Chinese began to appear, a naturalized citizen of the modern world ; a middle class was developing in a feudal country . No less forceful than the impact of Western armies and Western business was the impact of Western ideas. The new universities that were set up in China to teach the new sciences and skills created scholars and students of a new sort, who thought less of the Book of Odes and the millennial classics than they did of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Henry George . The adepts of the new learning smarted even more than the businessmen under the contempt, the brutality, and the indignity the imperial powers heaped on China ; they gave brilliant intellectual leadership to the discontent within the land . The ferment seemed like a great undisciplined anarchy, more froth and foam than substance . But it arose from one basic problem-the statelessness of China . The problem had one basic solution-internal unity and strength in China. The political instrument of the new merchant and educated class was the party known as the Kuomintang . The architect of the early Kuomintang, its very soul, was a sad-eyed dreamer called Sun Yat-sen . It is customary now in intellectual circles to sneer at the naivete with 35
which he attacked world problems, but Sun Yat-sen was the first man to formulate a program of action for all the complex problems of the Chinese people . It was as if some Western thinker had attempted to devise one neat solution for the problems of feudalism, the Renaissance and Reformation, the industrial revolution, and the social unrest of today . Sun Yat-sen was a Cantonese who had been educated in Hawaii ; he participated in almost every unsuccessful revolt against the Manchu dynasty in the last decade of its existence, and he had lived the life of a hunted exile in Japan, America, and Europe . Almost every war lord who verbally espoused unity adorned his ambition with quotations from Sun Yat-sen ; almost all ended by betraying him. The wretchedness of China, the burning eloquence of Sun Yat-sen's cause within him, the examples of Western civilization in the countries of his exile, were all finally synthesized in his book San Min Chu I, or Three Principles of the People. The San Min Chu I is not a perfect book, but its sanctity in presentday China, among both Communists and Kuomintang, makes it by all odds the major political theory in the land . The book was a long time in maturing ; it did not appear in print till shortly before Sun's death and then only as the transcript of a series of lectures he had given just before setting his party off on the greatest adventure in its history . The ideas of Sun Yat-sen, however, were current long before they were put into type. Sun's theory started by examining China . Why was she so humiliated in the family of nations? Why were her people so miserable? His answer was simple-China was weak, uneducated, and divided . To solve the problem, he advanced three principles . The first was the Principle of Nationalism . China must win back her sovereignty and unity. The foreigners must be forced out of their concessions ; they must be made to disgorge the spoils they had seized from the Manchus . China must have all the powers and dignities that any foreign nation had ; she must be disciplined and the war lords purged. The second was the Principle of People's Democracy . China must be a nation in which the government serves the people and is .responsible to them. The people must be taught how to read and write and eventually to vote . A system must be 36
erected whereby their authority runs upward from the village to command the highest authority in the nation . The third was the Principle of People's Livelihood . The basic industries of China must be socialized ; the government alone should assume responsibility for vast industrialization and reconstruction . Concurrently with the erection of the superstructure of a modern economic system, the foundation had to be strengthened . The peasant's lot was to be alleviated ; those who tilled the soil should own it . The doctrine of Sun Yat-sen won instant acceptance throughout the country . Few accepted it in its entirety, but it was a broad program, and there was something in it to touch the emotional mainspring of almost every thinking Chinese . The new middle class took it to its bosom ; even the proud rural gentry could go along on the general thesis that the war lords' strife and the foreigners must go . The years of exile and failure had been years of education for Sun Yat-sen. He began as a dreamer and an intellectual ; but he learned, as all China did during the decade following the Manchu collapse, that dreams and theories alone were insufficient for the reorganization of the land. Thousands, perhaps millions, were willing to admit that his theories were right, even to join his party . But the party needed force-an armed tool to work its will . By the early 1920's history had conspired to give Sun the strength he needed . First, the Russians had succeeded in establishing their own revolution against feudalism and were interested in revolution everywhere ; they were willing to send to China not only political mentors to aid Sun Yat-sen, but battle-seasoned soldiers who could fashion an army for him. Secondly, the decade-long violence within China had by now produced young soldiers and officers who were interested in more than loot and plunder ; they were interested in their country as an end in itself, and they sought political leadership for their military skills . In 1923, Sun Yat-sen was permitted by the local war lord to set up a nominal government in Canton . He had made such agreements before with other war lords when they had sought inspiring facades for practical despotism ; each time he had been betrayed and cast out when he tried to exercise more than nominal authority . This time it was to be different . Within a year this new government of Sun 37
facture. It was staffed with Russian advisers ; some of its key armies were commanded by repentant war lords who had seen the light . Before it went the political agents, Communist and Kuomintang, organizing peasants and factory workers and preparing the people of the countryside for the dawn of a new day . The army swept north on the very crest of a wave of revolutionary enthusiasm and seized Hankow, whose workers had already been organized and begun to strike in late summer . From Hankow the armies turned east down the Yangtze Valley, swept through Nanking and on to Shanghai . The advance of the revolutionary armies sounded like the hammers of doom to the foreign concession of Shanghai . From the interior came stories of riots, bloodshed, and butchery, of strikes that closed down all foreign shipping and factories, of Chinese soldiers killing white men and raping white women . The tide reached Shanghai in the spring of 1927 . From within the city Communist agents organized the workers for a revolt, and on March 21, in a tremendous general strike, the entire city outside of the International Settlement closed down . The armed unions went on to make their strike one of the greatest of modern insurrections . They seized police stations, government buildings, and factories so rapidly that by the time Chiang's Kuomintang armies arrived at the suburbs, the workers were in complete control of the native city and turned it over to the revolutionary government . Three weeks after the climactic victory the alliance of Communists and Kuomintang came to an end . What happened during those three weeks is a matter of mystery . Overnight the racketeering gangs of the water front and the underworld materialized in Chiang's support. Trembling foreign businessmen were quickly apprised that Chiang was indeed a "sensible" leader, and foreign arms and assistance were supplied him . The revolutionary forces were weak and vacillating ; units of Chiang's own armies made overtures to the Communists, for they sensed an impending crisis . And then suddenly, without a word of warning, Chiang's deputies, assisted by cohorts from the underworld and blessed by foreign opinion, turned on the workers, disarmed them, executed their leaders, and forced the Communists underground by a purge that was to continue for years . 39
The Kuomintang itself was astounded by this breach of faith and split into two separate groups, one under Chiang K'ai-shek, the other under the left wing at Hankow . By 1928, however, the Kuomintang had knitted together again in a solid anti-Communist front and had achieved stability . The party was now completely respectable in the eyes of the foreign world and was recognized as the only legitimate government of China . It proceeded to transfer the seat of its power from Canton to the Yangtze Valley . In the cities it controlled, the wheels of industry began to turn . But in the countryside Sun Yat-sen's program of peasant reform died stillborn ; the old system, aggravated by continuing civil war and commercial speculation, still loomed over the peasantry . The revolution had miscarried . What had happened? To understand the tragedy of the great uprising it is necessary to return to Canton and establish the personality of the historic antagonist of Chiang K'ai-shek-the Communist Party of China . Like the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party was born of intellectual ferment . It appeared much later on the scene of Chinese history and took its analysis and solution of China's problems from the example of the Russian revolution . The Communists agreed completely with Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang that the foreigners must be thrown out, the war lords annihilated ; but they went a step further . They asked : For whose benefit should China be reorganized? They answered : For the Chinese peasant himself . To accomplish this it was necessary not only to achieve all the aims of the Kuomintang, but to go further, to smash in every village the shackles of feudalism that chained the peasant to the Middle Ages . In the cities the new industrial workers of the factories and mills were to be the constituents of the new era . The savage exploitation of labor by the coastal entrepreneurs would have to be ended before industry could be a blessing rather than a new curse to China . The Communists brought to their early alliance with the Kuomintang all the discipline and zealotry that are characteristic of their movement everywhere . In its early days the Chinese Communist Party was organically linked with Moscow . The Russian delegation attached to Sun Yat-sen controlled the party completely and, under 40
the strictest injunction from Moscow, committed it to unreserved subordination to the Kuomintang . Communist agents spearheaded the great organizing drives that led the triumphal Northern March of the revolutionary armies . They converted the areas of combat into quicksands for their war-lord enemies ; peasant and labor unions developed almost overnight as the masses rose to the first leadership they had ever known as their own . Chiang saw in the Communists a leadership as coldblooded and ruthless as his own . To his passionate nationalism their connection with Russia was wicked . His brief visit to Russia had given him an insight into the working of a dictatorial state along with a lasting dislike for the Russians . He saw the Communists as Russian agents, possessed of some magic formula that would tear the countryside apart in social upheaval-and he hated them . For the first three years of his alliance with the Communists he bided his time . He needed both Russian arms and peasant support ; he could not afford a break . His march to the Yangtze Valley, however, brought him into contact for the first time with the highest rungs of the new Chinese industrial and commercial aristocracy . These men, no less than the foreigners, were terrified of strikes and labor unions ; slogans of agrarian reform threatened to upset the entire system of rural commerce and landholding . Chiang suddenly found in the Shanghai business world a new base of support, a base powerful enough to maintain his party and his armies ; with these men and their money behind him, he was no longer dependent on Russian aid or agrarian revolution . When he makes up his mind, Chiang acts swiftly . Before the Communist leaders had any inkling of what was happening, their movement had been beheaded, and within a year of the Shanghai coup Communism was illegal from end to end of China . Chiang K'ai-shek was the chief architect of the new China that emerged . Occasionally, in fits of sulkiness, he would withdraw from the government for a few months to prove that only he could hold its diverse elements together ; he always returned with greater prestige and strength than before. The new Kuomintang government was a dictatorship. It glossed itself with the phrases of Sun Yat-sen 41
the village. Looking up at his government from below, the peasant could see no change . His taxes ran on as before ; his rent and interest rates were just as high as ever ; his court of appeal consisted of the same men who had always denied his demands. The revolution had brought him nothing . The Kuomintang, the party of the Nationalist Revolution, was now securely established in every village, with roots in local party cells of the well-born and well-to-do . The driving spirit of the government was Chiang K'ai-shek himself. He could safely leave the tasks of party organization, administration, and reconstruction to his subordinates ; with a minimum of guidance the pent-up talents of educated Chinese could direct the technical tasks of modernizing China . He devoted his own energies and interest to two great problems, the Communists and the Japanese. The alliance of Chiang K'ai-shek and the Communists against the war lords and imperialists had broken over the basic question of the peasant and his land . The Communists had tried-but too late-to bring the uprising to its appointed climax with redistribution of the land and reorganization of the whole system of feudal relationships in the village. In the turbulence that had accompanied the Northern March the peasants had time and again taken the law into their own hands and made their own judgments . You could hardly ask men to overthrow foreign imperialism and corrupt war lords and at the same time condone injustice and oppression in the village, where it struck nearest home . The Kuomintang wanted to limit the revolution to the accomplishment of a few specific aims such as the end of imperialism and war-lordism ; it promised to take care of rent, credit, and all other peasant problems after it had the government established . But the peasants did not want to wait . When Chiang forced the Communists underground, he cut them off from the workers of the city, but he could not break their contact with the agitated peasantry . South of the Yangtze the Communists found the memory of the revolution still green in the hearts of the villagers, and their troops proceeded to establish a miniature soviet republic . Chiang waged unceasing war against this soviet republic in southern China. With his government buttressed by loans from 44
America, his troops, German-armed and trained, tightened their blockade ring about Communist areas each succeeding year . The very war against the Communists drew war lords into alliance with Chiang for mutual protection . The struggle against the Communists was savage and relentless. Within the areas that Chiang controlled, his police butchered Communist leaders ; families of known Communist leaders were wiped out ; students were watched and spied on, and possession of Communist literature was made a crime punishable by death . In Communist areas it was the village landlord who fared worst, and the hatred of the poor for the rich was given full rein . By 1934 the pressure on the Communists had grown too great, and bursting out of Chiang's blockade line, they performed that spectacular feat known as the Long March . Men and women, with bag, baggage, and archives, the Communists marched from southern China to re-establish themselves in the northwest . The winding route of the main column of 30,000 was over 6ooo miles long . The Long March was a savage ordeal that stands out in Chinese Communist history as an emotional mountain peak . The sufferings endured and the iron determination with which they were mastered are beyond description . The countryside through which the march passed is still dotted with stone blockhouses built by the government to hem in the Communists . The ferocity of the fighting ravaged the peasants in hundreds on hundreds of villages ; in many districts in southern and central China the name of Communist is still hated for the destruction this march wreaked on the countryside . In certain other districts the Communists succeeded in creating a political loyalty among the poorer peasants that lingered for years. The Communists finally established themselves at the end of 1935 in the northwest, in the areas just north of Yenan in Shensi, which later became their chief base. The Communists' arrival in Yenan coincided with a turning point both in their own history and in the party line . By now they had become an independent organization ; their ties with Moscow were nominal. The Soviet Union had re-established friendly relations with Chiang K'ai-shek and left the Communist Party to fend for itself . From their new base the Communists raised a new call : Chinese 45
unity against the Japanesel The response throughout China was instant, for the most profound emotion was touched . Japan had seized Manchuria in 1931, had pressed on down past the Great Wall, was pouring opium into northern China, was flagrantly abusing every international standard of decency . China was being humiliated by the Japanese army in a way never experienced before ; nothing, it seemed, would satisfy Japan_ except control over the whole vast country . As for Chiang, he hated the Japanese with the stubborn fury that is his greatest strength and his greatest fault . His armies, he felt, were unable to stop the Japanese army ; China's industry could not match the modernized power of Japan's industry ; China was disunited. He wanted to wipe out the Communists first, establish unity, and then face Japan . The new Communist slogan forced him into an intolerable position. Its logic was irrefutable ; why should Chinese kill each other when a foreign enemy was seeking to kill all Chinese? The Kuomintang explained in whispers that it was only biding its time against the Japanese-that when it was ready it would turn and defend China . At the same time students were arrested and jailed for anti-Japanese parades and demonstrations . Chinese journalists and intellectuals stood aghast at what they saw. The threat of national annihilation from without became graver with every passing day ; within, the government spent its resources not on resistance to Japan but on a Communist witch-hunt . Gradually the call for unity began to penetrate the army . In the north, where the civil war against the Communists was still being pushed, the campaign began to flag and finally came to a dead stop . Chiang, flying to Sian to revive it, flew directly into a conspiracy and was kidnapped-not by Communists but by war lords who refused to fight against Communists any more when they might be fighting against the Japanese . During his two weeks' internment Chiang met the Communists personally for the first time since 1927 . No one has ever recorded in full what actually happened during Chiang's kidnapping and at his meeting with the Communists, but the results were electric ; the civil war came to an abrupt end . Chiang recognized the right of the Communists to govern their own areas in 46
the north within the loose framework of the Central Government . Their armies were to be incorporated into the national armies. The Communists were to give up their program of revolution in the countryside. The government was to institute immediate democratic reforms, and Sun Yat-sen's program as set forth in Three Principles of the People was to be the code of the land . This news came to the Japanese like an alarm in the night . Ever since China's Nationalist Revolution, Japan had been haunted by two prospects ; one was the unity of China ; the other, Communism in China. Japan knew that a united, resurgent China would ultimately be the leader of all Asia . Japan feared Communism, too . Her own empire was based on thin, rocky islands poor in every material resource except manpower . Her armed might rested on the unthinking obedience of civilians and soldiers ; any system that challenged them to thought was a menace to Japan . Thus, no matter which side won in China, Chiang K'ai-shek or Communism, Japan would lose. And to keep China permanently weak, disunited, and subordinate, Japan's continental armies had been constantly pressing down from the north, dabbling in war-lord politics, poisoning China with thousands of agents . The new accord between Chiang and the Communists meant that now there was the possibility not only of a united China but of a united China in which Communism was tolerated and condoned . There was no time to be lost . On the night of July 7, 1937, at the Marco Polo Bridge outside of Peking, Japanese garrison troops were engaged in field maneuvers . Someone fired a shot ; the Japanese claimed they had been assaulted -the war had begun .
47
Chapter 4
War
UT of the turbulence of thirty years the Chinese people had drawn a bitter but lasting education . The surging revolutionary tides that had swept the land had finally produced leaders who held themselves responsible for the nation in the eyes of history . Beyond all the hatred that the warring parties bore each other, they had come to share a conviction in China's unity and destiny . All Japan's plans were to be shattered on the rocks of this conviction . The first volleys of the war against Japan cut across all the discontent within China-across the slogans, the treachery and intrigue, the partisan zealotry . Even the imponderable working of the revolution itself within the depths of Chinese society was suspended for a time while the nation turned to face the threat of the Japanese . There could be no China at all, neither Communist nor Nationalist, in submission to Japan ; there could be no dignity whatever, either for rich or for poor. The Japanese planned their 1937 operations on the mainland on two planes, the military and the political . For five years they had been biting into China above the Great Wall, section by section, while the Chinese stewed in their internal wars and protested to the League of Nations . This time the Japanese expected to wrench away the five provinces that lie below the Great Wall, within the bend of the Yellow River. Having seized the north, they hoped to persuade Chiang to yield them far-reaching concessions and special privileges in what remained of the land . Eventually the Japanese planned to tighten their economic-military-political grip till it clutched all China and the Chinese government had been reduced to the status of a subordinate 48
War
colonial administration . If the Japanese had struck five years earlier, they might have succeeded, but in 1937 they were too late . Their operations in the north proceeded according to plan almost to the split second . Their columns opened out from Peking and Tientsin, struck northwest through the famous Nankow Pass, breached the Great Wall from the south, then wheeled around to come down through it again from the north on the passes that guard the northern flank of the iron-rich, coal-producing province of Shansi . They struck south down the railway that leads from Tientsin to Nanking and within a few months stood on the banks of the Yellow River . The resistance that met the Japanese in northern China was a combination of the very old and very new . The war lords, surprising everyone, chose to fight it out in alignment with the Central Government, rather than yield to Japanese threats or promises . Their armies, however, were ragamuffin hordes. They had no common body of military tactics and skills, no mutual confidence, no modern organization . They broke like a wall of dust before the impact of Japan's steel-tipped legion . It was summer, and the tank-led columns of the Japanese darted almost at will across the yellow plains of northern China . Their air force ruled the skies ; it strafed what little movement there was on Chinese highways . Japanese military intelligence in northern China was superb . The first phases of the campaign ran like drillground maneuvers ; the Japanese columns cut down the railways and highways to occupy successive objectives on schedule. By all calculations the occupation of the key rail and road junctions should have finished the job . These were the centers where political agitation had bothered the Japanese ; these were the military keys to the land. And yet somehow, though no Japanese could quite tell why, the war went on .From the villages and mountains came rifle fire. The Japanese sacked and looted; they raped the women of the north till their lust was worn ; they branded the centers they held with terror . And yet about them, picking at them, bleeding them, grew a conspiracy of resistance that seemed to nourish itself from the earth alone . This was the resistance of partisan China . Partisan China was the domain of the Reds . By agreement with Chiang K'ai-shek they were to leave positional warfare to him and 49
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wage guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines . In the fall of 1937, starting from their small base in the barren sandlands of northern Shensi, the former Red troops, now restyled the Eighth Route Army of the Central Government, began in the fall of 1937 one of the most amazing adventures in arms of all times . It was to lift Communist military strength from 85,000 men in 1937 to over a million by the end of the war, Communist political control from 1,500,000 to an estimated 90,ooo,ooo . In the early months of resistance Communist expansion raced over the hills . Their divisional and frontal units dissolved into regiments, the regiments into battalions and companies ; and they trickled off through the Japanese lines into the countryside . Within four months after the outbreak of the war Communist troops were standing on the shores of the ocean, 700 miles from their starting point, and organizing a new war behind the enemy lines . The wells of hatred and terror that the Japanese had opened by their ferocity were ready to be tapped, and the Communists tapped them . The soldiers of war-lord armies who had fled the Japanese columns on the perilous highways had taken refuge in the hills ; they were disorganized, lawless bands-but they had guns . Some were incorporated into Communist cadres of resistance . The weapons the others abandoned or sold were soon being used to arm a grassroots peasant resistance . The students of the northern universities had clamored for war against Japan ; now that the war had arrived and was surpassing in barbarism anything they had conceived in their study halls, they too wanted to take part in it . They abandoned their classes, crossed the lines, and joined the resistance . Communist leadership was the rallying point for the entire movement north of the Yellow River, and every resource of human energy and intelligence, Communist, Kuomintang, and nonpartisan, was swiftly geared into a program of social reorganization that provided a stable base for continuing warfare . Relations between the Communists and the government were good . Some of the early campaigns were exemplars of co-ordination ; the only major check the Japanese army received in the north came at the magnificent battle of Hsinkou . There in the mountain passes government troops held a frontal position long 50
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enough to let the Communists filter across the enemy communication lines and cut an entire division almost to pieces from the rear . As the war in the north wore on, the Japanese columns closed down the channels of communication and supply till frontal warfare became futile and impossible. By early 1938 the Red army abandoned all standard army framework ; the divisions were now dissolved into a shifting net of marauding bands, depending on the people for support . The government of Chiang K'ai-shek, realizing the strength the Communists had generated, grateful for the demands partisan resistance was making on enemy strength, recognized the new system and authorized the creation of an autonomous partisan base beyond the Yellow River, deep in the enemy's rear. At a town called Fuping in western Hupeh, a few days' march from Peking, the first guerrilla government was established in January 1938 ; it included Communists, Kuomintang members, and nonpartisan officials in a regime sanctified by the blessing of the Central Government. Japanese calculations, which had been upset in northern China by partisan resistance, were even more thoroughly upset by what happened in the lower Yangtze Valley . Long before the Communists rooted themselves in the north, the attention of the Japanese staff and the interest of the entire world had concentrated on the battle that was suffusing the entire Shanghai delta in flame and blood . This was Chiang K'ai-shek's war. Chiang watched the preliminary moves of the Japanese in northern China with indecision . For a month he seesawed back and forth between the decision to fight and the knowledge of China's weakness . When he did decide to resist, he struck in a way that wrecked the smooth political-military structure of Japan's ambitions . The Japanese had hoped to fight in the north and to negotiate in the south . Chiang chose to precipitate a war of the entire people against the enemy by throwing down the gage of battle in his own bailiwick of the lower Yangtze, closest to his own internal bases, where his best troops were marshaled and ready. On August 13, 1937, he flung the best units of his German-trained army into action against the Japanese marine garrison in Shanghai . For a few days Chinese flesh and numbers com 51
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pressed the Japanese into a narrow strip by the banks of the Whangpoo River . The Japanese realized that they were confronted not with an isolated incident in northern China but with a war against the Chinese people . To win this war would require full mobilization of Japan's resources . The Japanese moved their fleet to offshore anchorages, marshaled their air force at Formosa, and proceeded to pump steel at the massed Chinese troops in overwhelming tonnages . Not even today is there any accurate estimate of the carnage at Shanghai ; Chinese casualties mounted to the hundreds of thousands as the blood and courage of the soldiers absorbed the shock of Japan's barrages . Chiang's decision to hold at Shanghai is now, as it was then, one of the most bitterly debated episodes of the entire war . It was symbolic, almost with the symbolism of caricature, of the personality of the man . There was no hope of success in matching Chinese flesh against Japanese metal ; a withdrawal might have salvaged some of the good units of the Chinese army for later operations in the hinterland, where they could meet the Japanese on more nearly even terms. These, however, were factual considerations, and Chiang's stubbornness refused to submit to them . The soldiers standing in the wet trenches and fed endlessly into the slaughter were a projection of an inflexible will to resist . Since Chiang had accepted war with Japan, he meant to fight it out his own way-yielding no foot of ground that was not taken from him by force . The resistance at Shanghai was futile in a military sense ; in a political sense it was one of the great demonstrations of the war . It astounded the most world-weary of old China hands, and it proved beyond further question in the record of history how much suffering and heroism the Chinese people could display in the face of hopeless odds . The demonstration at Shanghai was even more valuable internally. The tale of the battle, carried into the interior by word of mouth, kindled a spreading bonfire of patriotic fervor . The line at the Yangtze gave time to mobilize the nation . For two months the Japanese battered at Shanghai . Then, by a clever outflanking movement to the south, they unpinned the Chinese line and swept it away in utter confusion to Nanking . 5
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Nanking, Chiang K'ai-shek's capital, fell on December 12, 1937, and an historic orgy of several weeks of rape, lust, and wanton murder followed. The disaster all but unhinged Chinese resistance . The broken Chinese armies were so scattered and disorganized that some even advertised the whereabouts of their detachments in newspapers so that stragglers might rejoin their units . If the Japanese had struck inland immediately, they might have met no resistance more formidable than the hills and mountains ; instead they waited . They felt that the loss of China's capital and great metropolis had eviscerated the nation's resistance and that Chiang would be willing to talk peace . . The winter of '37-'38 worked a miracle in China . The seat of government was transferred to the upriver port of Hankow, 8oo miles from the sea, and the most complete unity of spirit and motive that China had ever known existed there for a few months . The Hankow spirit could never be quite precisely defined by those who experienced. it there and then . All China was on the move-drifting back from the coast into the interior and swirling in confusion about the temporary capital. War-lord armies from the south and southwest were marching to join the battle . The Communists were speeding their partisans deeper into the tangled communications that supported Japan's front . In Hankow the government and the Communists sat in common council, made common plans for the prosecution of the war . The government authorized the creation of a second Communist army-the New Fourth-on the lower Yangtze behind the Japanese lines ; the Communists participated in the meetings of the Military Council . The elite of China's writers, engineers, and journalists converged on Hankow to sew together the frayed strands of resistance. By spring of 1938, when the Japanese resumed the campaign, with Hankow as their ultimate objective, the new armies and the new spirit had crystallized . In April 1938, for the first time in the history of Japan,, her armies suffered a frontal defeat at the battle of Taierchwang . The setback was only temporary . Moving in two great arms, the Japanese forces closed on Hankow from the north and the east to pinch it off in the following fall . Almost simultaneously their landing 53
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parties seized Canton, the great port city of the south, and the Japanese rested on their arms a second time . On paper the Japanese strategy was perfect. China falls into a simple geographical pattern . Western China is a rocky, mountainous land ; &astern China is flat and alluvial, with scarcely a hill to break the paddies for miles on end . Both western and eastern China are drained by three great rivers that flow down from the mountains across the flatlands to the Pacific Ocean . The Japanese army now controlled the entire coast and all the centers of industry . It also controlled the outlets of the three great rivers . In the north it held the PekingTientsin area and the outlet of the Yellow River . In central China it garrisoned both banks of the Yangtze, from Shanghai through Nanking to Hankow. In southern China it held Canton and dominated the West River. With the cities, railways, and rivers under control, the Japanese felt that they could wait until a paralysis of all ,economic and transport functions brought Chinese resistance to a halt, and they waited . They were still waiting seven years later, when the Japanese army surrendered a ruined homeland to the Allies . The Japanese blundered in China . Why they blundered was best ,explained later by one of the shrewder statesmen of the Chungking government, General Wu Te-chen, who said, "The Japanese think they know China too much ." Japanese political and military intelligence in China was far and away the finest in the world, but it had concentrated on schisms and rifts, on personalities and feuds, on guns and factories . Its dossiers on each province, each general, each army, contained so much of the wickedness and corruption of China that the accumulated knowledge was blinding . The one fact that was obscure to them was that China was a nation . They had seen a revolution proceeding in China for thirteen years, but only its scum, its .abortions, its internal tensions ; they had not measured its results . They were fighting more than a coalition of armies ; they were fighting an entire people . They had watched the infant growth of Chinese industries on the coast, had marked the new railways on the map . But the strength of the Chinese was not in their cities ; it was in the hearts of the people . China was primitive, so primitive that the destruction of her industries and cities, her railways and machinery, 54
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did not upset her as similar disaster disrupted Europe in later days . China was rooted in the soil . As long as the rain fell and the sun shone, the crops would grow ; no blockade of the Japanese navy could interpose itself between the peasant and his land . China had just emerged from chaos, but she was still so close to it that the disruption of war could be fitted into the normal routine of her life ; if, for example, it was necessary to move government, industry, people, and army into the interior, it could be done . There was an enormous elasticity in the system that Japan meant to wreck-when it was struck, it yielded, but it did not break . Through the long months of 1938, as the Chinese armies were pressed slowly back toward the interior, they found their way clogged by moving people. The breathing space of winter had given hundreds of thousands time to make their decision, and China was on the move in one of the greatest mass migrations in human history . It is curious that such a spectacle has not been adequately recorded by any Chinese writer or novelist . Certainly the long files of gaunt people who moved west across the roads and mountains must have presented a sight unmatched since the days of nomad hordes ; yet no record tells how many made the trek, where they came from, where they settled anew . The government and the journals of China have recorded mainly those things that were important to the war, the movement of the armies, the officials, the universities, and the factories. The government began evacuation of factories and industry almost immediately on the outbreak of the war . The entire operation was in the hands of one of the most brilliant and lovable men in China -her Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr . Wong Wen-hao. Wong was a tiny man, a scholarly doodler . He had a deep cleft in his forehead that made him oddly attractive, and his smile was unfailing . Through all the later years of the war he was one of the few senior officials in the cabinet who were never accused of corruption by anyone-his shining integrity lifted him above ordinary politics . China's prewar industry was a lopsided growth ; it was concentrated at the coast and in a few great river cities . Chinese private capital had invested over55
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whelmingly in textiles and consumer goods. Heavy industry, dominated by the government, was a diminutive tail attached to the body of the economy ; steel production was never more than ioo,ooo tons annually . The swiftness of the war in the north and the ferocity of the fighting at Shanghai threatened to consume almost overnight all the industry there was. Government records show now that in all some 400 factories, with something over aoo,ooo tons of equipment, were moved in the retreat . These seem modest figures in the light of Russia's later accomplishments ; only by breaking them down can their significance be exposed . Wong abandoned almost all China's textile mills and consumer industries to the enemy and concentrated on moving heavy industries and arsenals inland. China salvaged less than io per cent of her textile capacity, with perhaps 40 per cent of her machine shops and heavy industry, but she saved more than 8o per cent of the capacity of her eleven obsolescent arsenals . This meant that the Chinese would be threadbare during the following years, but that the army's minimum needs might be met . The early stages of the industrial hegira carried little glory . The removal from Shanghai started late ; businessmen were reluctant to let their plants be moved ; the government was slow in making its decisions . The first plant to go, the Shanghai Machine Works, one of the finest mechanical shops in the country, did not start up Soochow Creek till two weeks after the fighting began . Soochow Creek runs through the heart of Shanghai and skirted the battlefront . The machinery was loaded in rowboats, covered with leaves and branches for camouflage, and poled slowly upriver to the Yangtze ; when air raids threatened, the rowboats sheltered in reeds by the side of the river . It was followed by other shops till the Japanese drive cut the city off from the Yangtze in early December . Because it was delayed too long, the Shanghai evacuation succeeded in moving only 14,000 tons of equipment before the enemy advance ended it . Shanghai, however, had proved the thing could be done, and by the spring of 1938 dozens of movable plants in northern and central China were being taken down, repacked, and transshipped to the far interior . A major engineering operation was being performed while the national organism continued to function and resist . From 56
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the Yellow River one of the greatest textile mills in China, the Yufeng, set out on its trek to Szechwan, a province iooo miles away and without a single railway . In February it packed its 8ooo tons of machinery and bundled them off down the railway to Hankow . In May it kissed the railhead good-bye and set off by steamer upriver to the gorge mouth. In August it was repackaged again to fit on some 38o native junks, which took it up the tumbling gorges to Szechwan ; 120 of the boats sank in the gorges, but the junkmen raised all but 21 and carried on . The convoy arrived in Chungking in April 1939 ; a patch of hilly ground had been cleared for its arrival, and by spring the company was busily training timid Szechwanese peasant women to tend the rusting spindles. An industrial wilderness stretched from Hankow on into the west. Whatever went inland had to be moved by hand . Coolies by hundreds and thousands hauled at blocks of steel weighing up to 2o tons . By the last week of Hankow's resistance removals had hit a stupendous pace . The Hankow power plant had been operating up to the very last days, for it was essential to the functions of life, but it was impossible to leave behind in Hankow the enormous 18-ton turbine, which would be irreplaceable after retreat to Szechwan . The dismantling process reached the power plant early in October, but the turbine could not be inched aboard a steamer until October 23, just two days before the Japanese entered the city . The removal of such massive machinery presented problems that the tiny river steamers could not handle ; no steamer that could thread the gorges had a crane capable of lifting more than 16 tons . The Chinese settled the problem by lashing heavy machinery to pontoons, floating the pontoons, tying the pontoons to the steamers, and sending the whole through the rapids in tow . The new industries, resettled in Szechwan, were a Rube Goldberg paradise . Steel factories were built with bamboo beams ; blast furnaces were supplied with coal carried in hand baskets . Copper refineries consumed copper coins collected from the peasantry, converted them into pure copper by the most modern electrolytic methods, then shipped the metal to arsenals buried deep in caves . 57
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The migration of China's universities paralleled almost precisely the movement of her industries. Like industry China's system of higher education had grown in thirty years of chaos ; it too had concentrated along the coast and in the great cities, and it too was one of the elements of the new China that Japan most feared . Every major turning point in modern Chinese history has been signalized by student uprisings and intellectual discontent . Students had generated the anti-Manchu uprisings . Their riots and demonstrations touched off the national uproar of i9rg, when even corrupt war lords were forced to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles . Student-led riots struck some of the most important notes in the rising crescendo of revolution of the i92o's . Finally, the students and their professors were the most enthusiastic and vociferous demonstrators against Japan, outside of the Communist Party. The four great universities of northern China-Peking National, Tsinghua, Yenching, and Nankai-were particularly loathed by the Japanese. They singled out Tsinghua, which had been built with American money, for special treatment . They smashed its laboratories or removed its equipment to Japan and used the student gymnasium to stable Japanese horses . Nankai University was almost completely destroyed . In the basement of Peking University, the seat of China's intellectual renaissance, Japanese special police set up examination headquarters for their political and military inquisition . When the Japanese attacked in the summer of 1937, most of the students were away on summer vacation . The Ministry of Education sent out a call for them to appear at two rendezvous . One was to be at Sian in the north, on the inner bank of the Yellow River, the other at Changsha, south of the Yangtze. From Sian the students of two colleges were told to move to southern Shensi . When they arrived at the end of the railway, they set out on the tail end of their journey for a 18o-mile march over the rugged Tsingling mountain range . The deans of the university were the general staff of the march, and they divided their 150o-odd men and women into sections of 500 each . Each unit was preceded by a police section, a foraging squad, and a communications squad ; its rear was brought up by pack animals carrying rice and wheat cakes and by a few wheezing trucks 58
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crawling over unimproved roads . The foraging squads descended on villages, bought all the fresh vegetables they could find, and had enough greens on hand to start a meal when the rest of the students arrived with their cooking pots . The road they followed runs over some of the most primitive terrain in China . Local authorities quartered students in stables and farmhouses . Engineering students set up receiving stations to catch the evening broadcasts ; next morning they hung up posters as news bulletins for the students farther back to read. For the villagers these bulletins were a first exposure to the phenomenon of current news . As the Japanese drove farther inland, university after university packed up and moved away . Some evacuated their campuses within a few days of the Japanese entry ; the students of Sun Yat-sen University were still poling boats bearing the college library out of the northern suburbs of Canton when the Japanese entered from the south . The agriculture department of National Central University decided that its prize herd of blooded cattle was too valuable to leave behind, and all through the summer of 1938 the cattle grazed their way inland just a few weeks ahead of the Japanese spearheads ; not till the summer of 1939 did they finally reach the quiet interior, where the bulls settled down to bring joy to the scrawny, inbred cows of Szechwan . Of China's 1o8 institutions of higher learning, 94 were either forced to move inland or close down entirely . And yet the entire educational system had been re-established by the fall of 1939, and 40,000 students were enrolled in the refugee colleges, as against 32,000 who had been registered in the last academic year before the war . The transferred institutions of learning clustered mainly in three centers . One was near Chungking, another near Chengtu in western China, the third at Kunming, capital of Yunnan . Each of these centers differed in texture and quality . The universities in the Chungking suburbs, under strict government control, were always infected by the capital's prevailing mood . The universities about Chengtu took refuge on the beautiful campus of the missionary West China Union University, where they were sheltered in relatively adequate quarters and, under the protection of Canadian and American mis59
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sionaries, preserved their academic integrity almost inviolate ; their scholastic standards remained consistently the highest throughout the war . The most important universities of northern China, however, all trekked on to the far southwest, where they combined at Kunming for the duration of the war as the National Southwest University. The northern universities had been noted before the war for their brilliant intellectual life, their advanced and sparkling political alertness ; arriving in Kunming, they established themselves in squalor. The students were camped four, six, and eight to a room, some of them domiciled in a rat-ridden, cobwebbed abandoned theater; they ate rice and vegetables and not enough of these . The government, always suspicious of the advanced political views of the northern universities, watched these refugee institutions like a hawk, tightening the net of surveillance closer about them with each passing year . In the beginning it did not matter-the universities were too happy at having escaped the Japanese to care . If the students lived hard, they knew that all China, too, was suffering . As the years wore on and teachers hungered, as budgets were made a mockery by inflation, the National Southwest University began to re-assert itself politically and by the close of the war had become the principal seat of political discontent in southern China . The migrations of factories and universities were the most spectacular. How many more millions of peasants and city folk were set adrift by the Japanese invasion no one can guess-estimates run all the way from three to twenty-five million . The peasants fled from the Japanese ; they fled from the great flood of the Yellow River, whose dikes had been opened to halt the Japanese armies ; they fled out of fear of the unknown . The workers who accompanied the factories numbered perhaps no more than io,ooo ; they came because without them the machines would be useless . The restaurant keepers, singsong girls, adventurers, the little merchants who packed their cartons of cigarettes or folded their bolts of cloth to come on the march, probably numbered hundreds of thousands . The little people who accompanied the great organized movements traveled by foot, sampan, junk, railway, and ricksha . Thousands crusted the junks moving through the gorges ; hundreds of thousands strung out over
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the mountain roads like files of ants winding endlessly westward . There is no estimate of the number who died of disease, exposure, or hunger on the way ; their bones are still whitening on the routes of march . The war in China had settled into new molds by the summer of 1939 . The trek was over ; the wheels of what little industry had been salvaged were turning again in new homes ; the universities were drawing up their fall curricula . The shattered armies were digging in on the hill lines . The front now ran in squiggly lines along the foothills of the west and along the rims of all the great river valleys . In the north the Communists began to dig deeper and deeper into the sleepy consciousness of the villagers ; cut off from Chungking, they fashioned new tools of government and grew wiser and stronger each year . In central and southern China the loose federation of the Central Government and the war lords began to run in familiar ruts ; only in Chungking, where the bombs fell from spring to autumn, the old spirit persisted for a few more years . China did not realize for some time longer that it had arrived at a dead end. Meanwhile the Japanese hailed each of their new campaigns as a climactic thrust at Chungking, and the Chinese armies fought desperately to ward them off . These campaigns were small but bitter, part of a new pattern of war that the Japanese high command had settled on . The new pattern was to keep the fronts in a constant state of imbalance; new divisions and cadres were blooded in combat, then removed to reserve areas for use in future campaigns . The Japanese erected new industries along the coast in their rear and tied what remained of the Chinese economy into Japan's conveyor system. The trouble with almost all the writing that war correspondents did in China was that it was built on press conferences and communiques . We used phrases the world understood to describe a war that was incomprehensible to the West . Chinese communiques, written by obscure men who had never smelled gunpowder or heard a shot fired in anger, spoke of thousands of men engaged, of bloody operations, of desperate attacks and counterattacks . The Chinese put 6z
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out such communiques for years, in the beginning because they themselves believed that the Japanese were still intent on smashing through the mountains to the heartland beyond . Long after they had ceased to believe their own statements, Chinese wordsmiths were still glossing the grimy, squalid contests at the front with the polished rhetoric of earlier days . There were no real fronts, no barrages, no breakthroughs, anywhere on the China front, but men wrote of themof supply trains, logistics, encirciements . The Chinese newspapers themselves did not believe the reported claims of thousands on thousands of Japanese being trapped or encircled, but they printed them just the same . The foreign press became cynical . Sometimes the exaggerations were too difficult to take straight . Once American Army intelligence found there were only 30,000 Japanese engaged in an action ; the Chinese military spokesman reported 8o,ooo in action, but the communiques recorded enemy casualties totaling 120,000 . The campaigns the Japanese fought between 1938 and 1944 were foraging expeditions rather than battles . They had no greater strategic objective than to keep the countryside in terror, to sack the fields and towns, to keep the Chinese troops at the front off balance, and to train their own green recruits under fire . Most of them were known as rice-bowl campaigns, because they occurred most frequently in central China, the rice bowl of the land . The Japanese would concentrate several divisions, plunge deep into the front, ravage the countryside, and then turn back . The Chinese would counter by envelopment ; their units would fall back before the thrusts, then close in on the flanks and rear to pinch off the garrison supply posts that the Japanese set up to feed their advance . The Chinese could never do more than pinch off the Japanese salients and force them back into their dug-in bases ; to do more than that would have required a weight of metal and equipment that Wong Wen-hao's transplanted industry could not hope to provide . The result was the permanent exhausting stalemate known as the China war. This China war was fought along a flexible belt of no man's land, 50 to ioo miles deep, all up and down the middle of China . In this belt of devastation the Chinese had destroyed every road, bridge, railway, or ferry that might aid the Japanese in one of their periodic 62
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thrusts ; the only Chinese defense was to reduce the country to immobility . Japanese and Chinese troops chased each other across the belt for six years ; the peasants died of starvation, the troops bled, the villages were burned to the ground, towns changed hands as many as six or seven times, and yet for six years the front remained stable with few significant changes . One of the typical campaigns of this period was proceeding in southeastern Shansi in the summer of 1939 . Shansi is an important province-it is laden with coal and has the most considerable iron ores in China south of the Great Wall . It nestles into the elbow of the Yellow River, and its rugged mountains dominate the plains of northern China . By early 1939 the main Chinese positions in the province were cut into the slopes of the Chungtiao Mountains, which lie on the southern boundary, just north of the Yellow River . The guerrilla areas of the Communist Eighth Route Army were behind the Japanese strong points and around them ; in front were Central Government troops . I * went up to see this campaign in the fall of 1939-the first time I had visited the Chinese army at the front . In the next six years I saw the same sights over and over again, each year more drab, each year less inspiring. I started out with a column of Chinese troop reinforcements, marching north to the line from the railhead on the Lunghai line . The troops were strung out over the hills in long files, trudging along without discipline or fixed pace . The padding of their straw-sandaled feet made the dust lift knee-high about them, and for miles away eyes in the hills saw an army marching by serpentines of dust in the sky. The commander of each unit rode at its head on his bony horse. Behind him were the foot soldiers, and behind them came the baggage train-coolie soldiers carrying ammunition boxes slung from staves on their shoulders ; men burdened with sacks of rice ; the company kitchen, consisting of a single soot-blackened cauldron carried by two men, bringing up the rear . This column had several serviceable pack guns slung on mules . At that time the whole Chinese army had about 1400 pieces of artillery all told for a front of 2000 miles . A
* The "I" throughout is Theodore H . White.
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single pack howitzer loaded on muleback looked heavier, more powerful, more important, than an entire battery of Long Toms . Later in the war animal-drawn baggage trains became a rarity, but this was 1939, and the column I accompanied had one-it crawled along even more slowly than the slogging foot soldiers . It was loaded high with sacks of rice and with military gear . On the sacks of rice one or two soldiers would be stretched dozing in the sun ; the driver cracked his whip smartly over the animals, and the wheels screamed for lack of greasing, but no matter how the cart pitched in the rutted road, the soldiers stayed sleeping on their sacks . There was no hurry, for the war had lasted a long time already and would last years more . On wet days the march was a column of agony, the soldiers soaked through and through, their feet encased in balls of clay and mud . Traffic to the front was two-way . There was the insistent beat of the marching men plodding forward, and in the opposite direction came the derelicts of the battlefield. The sick and the wounded usually made their way back to the rear on foot, on their own . A serious head wound or a bad abdominal wound meant death at the front, for the medical service could never move these men to operating stations in time for help . Those who could walk but who obviously were no longer of military usefulness were given passes that permitted them to make their way back by themselves . These were pitiful men, limping along over the mountain passes, dragging themselves up by clutching rocks or trees, leaning on staves . You met them at the saddle of each pass as they sat resting from the long climb and looking out over the next valley and next hill with glazed eyes . More rarely you saw sick or wounded carried by stretcher to the rear . They smelled horribly of wounds and filth, and flies formed a cloud about them or even made a crust over their pus-filled eyes or dirty wounds. We crossed the Yellow River in dirty flatboats and then moved up over thinner passes to the front . We followed hard on the heels of the Japanese army retreating through the Hsin River valley . It was fall, the season of the millet harvest, and the kaoliang too was ripe . Chinese valleys are beautiful to look at from the outside, before you know the burden of sorrow and superstition within each village 64
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wall . When the road was in the clear on the ridge, you could see clouds of chaff puffing into the air from threshing floors where the peasants were flailing the grain from the husks . The persimmons were ripe and red, glowing from the thin branches of trees from which the leaves had long been blown. The earth was being plowed for winter wheat, and it smelled good ; in some of the fields the thin blades of the new crop colored the soil with green, while in the next patch the heavy pink-and-brown kaoliang ears hung down from tall stalks to brush our heads as we rode past . The Japanese had just left, but they had blazed a black, scarred trail of devastation across the countryside . You might ride for a day through a series of burned villages that were simply huddles of ruins. In some places the roads were so torn that not even Chinese mountain ponies could carry you down the ditches cut across them. You had to pick your way down on foot and lead your horse after you or ride for hours on the crest of a barren ridge looking out into the hills beyond . Then there would be a single hut standing by itself in the vastness of the hills ; with roof fallen in and timbers burned black, it would stand as a symbol of the desolation that ran from end to end of no man's land. The stories the villagers told were such tales as I heard repeated later after every Japanese sortie . The peasants had fled before the Japanese advance . When they did not flee voluntarily, they were forced to leave by government edict, and they took with them everything from seed grain to furniture . They bundled their pigs and cattle off into the hills, hid their clothes and valuables in the ground, and retired to the mountains to build mat sheds and wait for the armies to force a decision. The Japanese entered a barren wasteland . They had been held up by floods, and when they reached their key objectives they had two weeks' growth of beard ; caked with mud, they were exhausted and furious . In some of the districts through which I passed, every woman caught by the Japanese had been raped without exception . The tales of rape were so sickeningly alike that they were monotonous unless they were relieved by some particular device of fiendishness . Japanese soldiers had been seen copulating with sows in some districts . In 65
War
places where the villagers had not had time to hide themselves effectively, the Japanese rode cavalry through the high grain to trample the women into showing themselves . The Japanese officers brought their own concubines with them from the large garrison citieswomen of Chinese, Russian, Korean, or Japanese nationality-but the men had to be serviced by the countryside . When the Japanese transport system broke down in the mud, peasants were stripped naked, lashed to carts, and driven forward by the imperial army as beasts of burden . Japanese horses and mules were beaten to death in the muck ; on any road and all the hills you could see the carcasses of their animals rotting and the bones of their horses whitening in the sun . The Chinese peasants who were impressed to take their places were driven with the same pitiless fury till they too collapsed or were driven mad . It took two weeks of riding and walking to get to the front . From a regimental command post I was led up the bank of a hill to the crest covered with stalks of tall wheat . With a soldier, I ran silently, crouching behind the wheat, and then dropped in convenient position . The man parted the wheat carefully and pointed down into the valley. There were whitewashed houses in the distance and the vague outline of a walled town . "Those are the Japanese," he whispered, pointing vaguely . I stared harder . Then I noticed something moving in the grain fields not far from us . "What's that?" I asked . The soldier did not even turn to follow my finger . "Those are the peasants," he said ; "they have to harvest the grain, you know-it is the harvest season ." Even the Japanese could understand that ; they were peasants themselves . Except in the savagery of their raids they too could be neutral to the people who worked in the fields . I traveled the front in Shansi for 30 or 40 miles that week ; in later years I traveled it for many more miles in many provinces . It was always anticlimax . I saw nothing anywhere but detached clusters of men in foxholes who were guarding rusting machine guns or cleaning old rifles . Chinese outposts were clusters of twenty or thirty men linked to their battalion headquarters by runner, from battalion headquarters to division command by telephone . The Japanese were usually disposed in villages with concentrations of two or three hundred men 66
War
supported by light field artillery . You could look down on the Japanese from the hills for over a thousand miles ; at any point there would be five times as many Chinese soldiers as Japanese . Yet always the Japanese had heavy machine guns and field artillery ; before any armed Chinese could move across the open mile or two to get at the Japanese, he would be cut down by enemy fire, which no support in his army's possession could neutralize . It was all quiet on the China front in 1939 It was to be all quiet in the same way, for the same reasons, for five more long years .
67
Chapter 5
Stalemate
WO years were needed to bring the war back from the tranquil front in southern Shansi to the open Pacific-two years of confusion in which the world watched a series of balancing acts in the hills of China without perceiving their inner meaning or historic significance. China's front lines were secure by 1939 ; the government was re-established ; war had become the normal way of life. During the first few months after the migration the government hammered out some general routines of administration and built a complex administrative structure above them . There were very few mysteries about the way the Chinese ran their war . The war rested on the peasant, who supplied the two essentials of food and manpower . With the food he raised, the government fed the army, the Kuomintang, the arsenal workers, and the bureaucracy . With the manpower the peasant supplied, the government kept recruits trudging to the front, built the roads, moved essential tonnages . Ultimately all things, whether military or political, resolved themselves into a peasant, dressed in torn blue or gray gown, straining to supply the raw energy of resistance . The movement of an army, the building of an American airfield for B-29's, the construction of shelter, the organization of supply, all could be reduced to the number of peasant hands available and the number of sacks of rice they could produce to meet the crisis . All China's calculations were balanced on the productivity of the peasant farmer . This was true even of armament production and specifically of the source of China's nitrates for explosives-there, too, the peasant was the key man, for the Chinese got their nitrates from the excrement of the peasant's body, which 68
Stalemate
was carefully collected and used in compounding gunpowder . At the beginning of the war the peasant was taxed in money, and with this money the government bought his grain. The monetary system began to sag in 1941 under the weight of inflation, and the government, on the advice of an American economist, shifted to a tax in kind. For this new tax the government calculated its requirements directly in sacks of grain ; it allocated a quota to be raised by each province ; and the provincial authorities broke this quota down by hsien, or counties, and finally by villages . The old chieftains in each village made sure that the poorest peasant always bore the largest share . The new tax had the one virtue of making exquisitely clear just what was the substance of war-making power and politics . The peasant paid off to his local officials in grain ; the local officials took their cut of what they received and passed on the rest to the government ; the government then paid each of its functionaries in bulging sacks of hard grain, whose value far outweighed the wads of paper money that made up payrolls . The new tax was a symbol of the changes the war was forcing on the Kuomintang . From the day of its maturity the Kuomintang had rested on an association of the businessmen of the coast and the landed gentry of the countryside . The businessmen, the merchants, and the manufacturers of the coast had been wiped out by the Japanese invasion, and the government now got its political support almost exclusively from the gentry . This shift was not clear on the surface . Indeed, a survey of senior appointive officials in 1940 showed that 50 per cent came from the two downriver commercial provinces that had always been the chief Kuomintang bailiwicks-35 per cent from Kiangsu alone, 15 per cent from Chekiang, the Generalissimo's home province. The shift became evident only in studying the things the government failed to do and asking whom all its sins of omission benefited . It was obvious, for example, that the grain tax was being collected in double portion from the small peasants, while the rich were evading it . The government winked at this, left collection of the grain tax in the hands of local officials, and made no protest as long as grain was forthcoming . In bulletins and speeches government 69
Stalemate
officials thundered against the hoarding that was jabbing inflation on to successive pinnacles, and everyone knew that the great boarders were the landlords ; yet no action was ever taken . The government rested on the landlord, the landlord on the peasant . To release the peasant energies from their time-locked bitterness, to marshal these energies against the foreign enemy, would require the harshest action against the gentry who interposed themselves between Chungking and the paddy fields . The gentry was composed in part of former war lords who still had military strength and in greater part of the men who were the girders of the local Kuomintang machine . The government felt the balance was too delicate to survive any fundamental reform. This internal balancing act was only one of a series . It was paralleled by the military balancing act . The Japanese held China with about fifteen or twenty divisions-approximately a million men . Their divisions were disposed along the coast, along the railways, in the river valleys ; each of their garrisons was bound to the rest by a modern system of communications . They held strategic central positions . Along the rim of these positions, in an enormous continental semicircle, were the Chinese troops, approximately 4,000,000 of them, pinned down by primitive roads and lack of transport . To move a Chinese division from northern to central China by foot might take a month ; a Japanese division could be shifted from Peking to Hankow in ten days . It meant that in a war of maneuver the Chinese were licked before they began ; their only hope was to have enough troops at each point of danger to meet any reasonable threat . Three or four key areas had to be held : the gorges of the Yangtze in the heart of the land, the Yellow River bend at Tungkwan in the north, the flanks of Yunnan in the southwest, Changsha and the rice bowl in the east. Each of these danger areas was bolstered by a solid block of Chinese troops under reliable commanders . All but one of the key areas were manned by reliable troops of Chiang's own personal "central" army ; the one exception was at Changsha, where Hsueh Yueh, a peppery Cantonese who had feuded with Chiang K'ai-shek in the years before the war, won the right to command by 70
Stalemate
his exceptional military ability . Between these key areas motley provincial and local levies were scattered . The vital lower Yangtze front was held by Ku Chu-tung, a zealot who would surely pay as much attention to Communist expansion as to the Japanese . Commanders of the secondary areas were usually provincial war lords who stood outside the pale of Chiang K'ai-shek's confidence . At one time half of the eight or nine war areas facing the Japanese were commanded by men who within the previous fifteen years had fought or offered to fight open civil war against Chiang K'ai-shek . All these troops arrived fresh at their new places in 1 939 . In 194o and '41 they were busy digging in . Chungking was too far away to exercise more than nominal control, and the armies settled down to govern their districts ; they made and removed county magistrates and judges, collected taxes, passed laws . Some of the armies felt so secure that the soldiers engaged in private farming to supplement their rations . Directives from Chungking were ignored or obeyed as circumstances suggested . There was no real central system of supply for this Chinese army ; each divisional commander was given a sum of money and told to fend for himself. The straining arsenals of the Central Government could produce at most some 15,ooo,ooo bullets a month and a few thousand shells for guns and mortars . This was an average of four bullets per man per month . No sane commander would dare to plan an offensive with so little reserve, and gradually the spirit of attack eroded ; ammunition was hoarded till it grew old and stale. In 1943 a convoy of ox-drawn carts was seen carrying to the front rifle bullets that bore on their cases the legend, "Made in 1931 ." Chungking was far away ; it took months to cover the rutty roads from its arsenals to the battle lines of the north . No commander could hope to meet a crisis with a plea to Chungking for emergency supplies-a man had to fight with what lay in his own storehouses . Another balance existed in the trade and commerce of this interim period . The world watched the blockade of China with concern when the French railway to the southwest was cut off ; the Burma Road acquired the significance of a symbol as the only breach in the blockade . Actually-all Chinese administrators knew this-the road and 7I
Stalemate
the railway were only minor factors in the supply of China then . The Japanese blockade until late 1941 was a sieve, punctured by one of the greatest smuggling rings in history . It was estimated that half a million men were employed just in the underground railway that brought gasoline from offshore boats through the rocky inlets of the southeastern coast to the Chinese government . The venal Japanese army co-operated with Chinese profiteers . Cloth, rubber tires, and . medicines were brought in by private enterprisers in as large quantities as gasoline and other critical materials for the government, and this was anything but a one-way trade ; Chinese tungsten, tin, and antimony for Japanese arms plants went out to the enemy over the same routes. Both the Japanese and the Chinese were aware of what was going on, and government agents participated actively . The Chinese Liquid Fuel Control Commission paid all the haulage and brokerage expenses for gasoline smuggled in and the full price for any quantity lost en route through enemy action . The China National Aviation Corporation, a government agency, bribed the way for high octane gasoline right through the Japanese army lines at Canton for use on the single vital airline that bound China together . Chinese Communists bought guns, pistols, and gasoline in enemy-garrisoned towns . It was a curious front. The Chinese mail service crossed the line regularly with letters from Chungking to all the major cities occupied by the Japanese and back again . On the Indo-Chinese border the Chinese officers bought the rice to feed their troops from dealers who carried it from Japanese-controlled areas facing them . Government officials remitted money regularly to their families in Shanghai and Peking and received reports of their properties held by the enemy . The stalemate was reflected in Chungking by enormous cynicism and unhappiness . The war had become neither war nor peace, but a shadow world of imitation reality in which neither existed . All the old strains began to re-assert themselves, and the greatest was that between the government and the Communists . The union between government and Communists had not been thought through to a conclusion by either side ; it rested perilously on the one specific point of defense against the Japanese, and when the attack stopped, the 72
Stalemate
union began to fall apart . To create a stable base that might have power of its own a regeneration of Chinese society would have been prerequisite, and the regeneration of society was revolution-something on which the two parties could not agree . The fundamental cause of cleavage was the expansion of the Communist Party . Communist influence and arms were growing month by month behind the enemy lines . Communist headquarters were still in Yenan, in northern Shensi, but by early 1939 the nuclear northern Shensi area had become only a small fragment of the areas the Communists controlled, although it was still the most significant . Their greatest strength already lay beyond the Yellow River, along the coast, in the lower Yangtze Valley . The early Red troops had been decimated in the fjrst years of war ; the new Red army, native to northern China, was-commanded by fresh young lieutenants and captains who had never heard of Communism before the war began . In Yenan, as in Chungking, the same old names persisted in high councils ; but in the field of Red operations new leadership was rising from the grassroots . In essence the Communists relied on the people around them for support. They had no safe rear area with millions of peaceful peasants ; the areas they controlled were crisscrossed with Japanese lines of communications and studded with Japanese garrisons and pillboxes . If they were to maintain pressure against these Japanese, the Communists could never rest . In defending themselves they were forced to agitate or die, to keep public support at fever pitch or see it perish . Their agitation and expansion behind the Japanese lines brought them into incessant friction with government units . The Japanese advance had left pockets of government troops in both northern and central China . As the Communists organized the countryside on a new social basis for support against the Japanese, they clashed again and again with government troops and officials . Civil and military government were one and the same thing to them-it was total war, and there were no neutrals. The old village elders appointed by the government before the war, the middle-aged county magistrates, were unable to adapt themselves to rugged partisan warfare . Those who were able to make the transition remained with the people ; those who 73
Stalemate
were too old and brittle to change were removed on one pretext or another by the partisans, who sought justification for their acts in the war against Japan . Similarly, isolated government units in Communist areas found themselves being sucked into Communist-style war ; when they were unwilling or unable to co-operate, there was friction, and the two sides charged each other with bad faith, with attacking each other . As the years wore on, the government apparatus behind the Japanese lines dissolved, was absorbed, and was replaced by a completely new form of resistance under Communist control . The first armed clash between the two elements came in the summer of 1938. From then on, bands of Communist or government troops in remote areas, isolated from their own high commands, fought each other with increasing frequency . In government areas Communist expansion was seen as a disease. Since the government would not or could not mobilize the people as the Communists did without striking at their own base of social support, they felt the Communists, too, should desist from organizing . In governmentcontrolled areas the various Communist bureaus were put under increasing surveillance . Government zealots in Pingkiang, a small town in Hunan, fell on the local Communist war area liaison office and massacred its personnel ; similar bureaus in other cities were closed down . Communist activity in Chiang K'ai-shek's China slowly went underground till only in Chungking and Sian were open bureaus maintained, and these were watched . In the fall of 1939 fighting flared on a divisional scale in Shansi ; it was halted by a negotiated truce in the spring of 194o, but even more bitter clashes followed in the Yangtze Valley, where the New Fourth Army operated . By midsummer of 1940 it was evident that some agreement would have to be reached, or Chinese unity would be shattered . There were any number of general problems. First was the strict demarcation of the original civilian Communist area in northern Shensi, where border guards of both parties fought intermittently. Second was the matter of supplies. The government had promised to pay and supply 45,000 troops of the Communist Eighth Route Army ; it had been willing in the spring of '38 to undertake maintenance'of 15,000 troops under the name of the New Fourth Army, but both pay and supplies 74
Stalemate
were slow in coming and were guarded with conditions . The government's commitments were good on paper, but in fact the Communists were fighting on their own with little help from the government . Third-and this was most important-the areas in which the government and Communist armies operated against the Japanese had to be clearly defined so as to reduce clashes to a minimum . A general agreement in the summer of 1940 solved both the demarcation of the Communist northern Shensi area and the supply problem . The key to the agreement, however, was a Communist commitment to remove all Eighth Route Army troops to the northern bank of the Yellow River and New Fourth Army troops to the area north of the Yangtze . At the end of 1940 occurred what has ever since been known as the New Fourth Army Incident-one of the major turning points in China's wartime politics, an emotional symbol that still evokes sharp bitterness, the King Charles's head of the Chinese civil war . No one knows precisely how it was that the government troops came to trap and massacre the headquarters detachment of the New Fourth Army in the first week of January 1941 . The best impartial summation that can be made after consulting all available sources is this : The bulk of the New Fourth Army had moved north across the Yangtze by the end of December . There remained a headquarters detachment, including most of the staff, the high command, and some combat troops totaling something more than 5000 men . They had been ordered to move north, and the government fixed their route ; the Communists claim to this day that it would have taken them directly into Japanese garrisons along the river bank . They pleaded for a change in route, and their delegate in Chungking, General Chou Enlai, saw the Generalissimo . The Generalissimo, after approving a change, invited Chou to a Christmas dinner, and the two of them drank the cup of peace and friendship ; all was settled . Then suddenly Communist headquarters in Yenan snapped a radio to their Chungking office ; the New Fourth Army was trapped and surrounded by government troops, and the headquarters detachment was being massacred . Chou rushed to the Generalissimo. He was unable to see him but was assured that all was going smoothly and 75
Stalemate
that orders were being issued to government units not to impede the march of the New Fourth . Who was lying? The Communists claim that the Generalissimo's henchmen launched the attack without his knowledge and that when the attack became known, the Generalissimo lied to cover it up and later condoned the action . The Kuomintang claims that the New Fourth Army had attacked government troops, who disciplined the insurgents . This claim blandly overlooks the fact that the Communist unit was heavily outnumbered and consisted mostly of noncombat staff and headquarters personnel . Chungking buzzed with rumors of an open breach, of an all-out civil war. When the confusion lifted, it was learned that the entire headquarters of the New Fourth Army had been wiped out, its chief of staff had been killed, its commander was in a concentration camp, several thousand of its troops were dead and several thousand more in captivity. The incident itself was bad enough, but the victorious government troops treated their captured Communist compatriots with Japanese ruthlessness. Years later a university professor, not a Communist, who had been captured while traveling with the group, told a gruesome tale of the captivity . He said the Communists had had both men and women on their staff, the women serving as political workers, nurses, and staff members . According to him, government troops raped their Communist captives ; the girls contracted venereal disease, and some committed suicide . The captives were held near ,the scene of battle for a year and a half and were then marched 400 miles overland to a new concentration camp . Both men and women were forced to haul the baggage of government troops ; when they sickened, they were beaten ; some were shot, and others were buried alive . By the time the professor who told me the tale was released, only 30o prisoners of the several thousand captured were still alive. The New Fourth Army incident drew a line of emotional hysteria across all future relations of government and Communists . All negotiations ceased . Supplies were cut off from Communist armies everywhere . A blockade of picked government troops was thrown about the Communist civilian base in northern Shensi and sealed air76
Stalemate
tight. In the beginning it had been a war of all China against the Japanese ; now it was a war of two Chinas-a Communist China and a Kuomintang China against the Japanese ; and there was a subsidiary war smoldering simultaneously with these two great wars-a war between Communist China and Kuomintang China . A visitor in Asia in the fall of 1941 would have found it difficult to predict the outcome of the struggle between China and Japan . Inflation was getting under way and was tugging at prices ; the Chinese army was losing its mobility ; the Japanese were bombing the capital at will . Heroism, courage, and devotion certainly existed among the Chinese-but there was an equal measure of bitterness, suspicion, and treachery . The Chinese could not win, but they would not quit. The Japanese had tried to crush China's armies, wreck her economy, promote internal discord ; they had partial successes to show, but the sum total was failure. China was still locked in a seesaw balance that the imperial armies could not upset . This was confusing only if the struggle were regarded as limited to Asia alone . Gradually it became evident that a decision would not be reached in China itself . The war there was part of something greater, part of a world war that cut across China's own internal problems and sufferings . China could not lose if the democracies won, nor could she win if the democracies lost . Logically enough the Japanese were arriving at the same conclusion at almost the same time . The war in Asia was part of the greater World War in the West . The leaders of the Japanese army realized that the fiction of Versailles and the League of Nations had changed nothing and that this was one of those periods when civilizations are made and broken, when nations become great or perish . From 1931 on, the Japanese saw the world in its true state of anarchy and decided to strike relentlessly, whenever the opportunity offered . The leaders of Japan were small men, but they had large plans, in which China figured as the key to all future Japanese greatness . Before Japan could go on to a future in the larger world, the China affair had to be settled-and settled to Japan's taste, with China playing the role of captive lashed to the chariot of Japanese conquest. 77
Stalemate
Japan paused for reflection in the spring of 1939 . She held every important military objective in China from the deserts of Mongolia to the subtropical delta of Canton ; yet China was still at war with her . To drive farther into the country would require the uttermost exertion of every sinew of Japanese strength . Every available soldier, every drop of gasoline, every ton of steel, would have to be invested over a period of years to garrison the interior of China till the Chinese yielded-if they ever did. This, in 1939, seemed absurd to many Japanese . A war was developing in Europe whose decision, one way or another, would bind the Japanese for decades to come, no matter what the decision in China . The Japanese waited . The collapse of Western resistance before Germany in the spring of 194o rang every bell in the halls of decision in Tokyo . France and the Netherlands had been ravaged and finished ; England was at death's door ; these countries' empires in the South Seas were orphaned . The situation tantalized the Nipponese, and imperial policy in 1940 turned from the mainland to a diplomatic offensive in the South Seas . The Japanese started by making demands on all three colonial powers, and for a few months all went well for the would-be conquerors . The French bureaucracy, having no roots either in their homeland or in their colony, agreed to close the one railway still supplying China, and they let the Japanese garrison northern Indo-China. The British, stunned by the defeat in Europe, agreed to close the Burma Road for three months and thus to seal the last official channel through the back door into China . The Dutch fell in with Japan's desire for economic co-operation ; the Japanese wanted the oil of the Netherlands Indies, and the Dutch prepared to receive a mission to discuss the oil problem in detail . In midsummer of 1940 it seemed that the Japanese had won hands down-and yet by fall they were ready to admit that their diplomatic offensive had fizzled out like a wet firecracker . Only in Indo-China had they got what they wanted . The British reopened the Burma Road and refused to discuss the matter further . In the fall the Dutch received the Japanese oil negotiators in the Indies and offered to sell them something less than 2,000,000 tons a year-barely a quarter of the islands' yield . It took the Japanese through the winter of 194o and into the spring of 1941 to digest the 78
Stalemate
lessons they had learned and to come up with an analysis and a solution . The analysis was correct ; the solution was disastrous . Japan had two major problems . One was the unfinished war in China, the second, the scarcely begun campaign in the South Seas . Far the more pressing was the one involving the mainland, but the campaign in the South Seas presented a time element that made it a now-or-never affair . Ideally a time interval of years should have come between the two enterprises, but history would not wait . In early i94i neither endeavor was going as well as Japan desired . Japan had been considering both for some months ; it took no brilliancy to reach the obvious conclusion that the source of her frustration lay far beyond the field of battle or table of negotiation . It lay in the United States of America . America was becoming month by month the great opponent of the Japanese in the Pacific . China had watched with bitterness the closing of the Burma Road by the British ; she felt it was betrayal of a common cause. China had nothing but contempt for French action in Indo-China . Only the United States seemed to offer her hope . It was true that America was selling oil and steel to the Japanese, but America was gradually beginning to funnel aid into China too . On her faith in America, China pinned all her future . It was the same in the Indies . The Dutch, with a handful of old planes and a few cruisers, were no match for Japan's navy and veteran army ; but the Indies, encouraged by American diplomacy, held firm against Japanese diplomatic pressure. To the Japanese, American policy seemed like a frustrating conspiracy. A single word to China or the Indies by the American government, and all would be settled ; without that word Japan could not move . To force the decision in America, therefore, became the cornerstone of Japan's planning for 1941, and by the spring of that year negotiations were under way in Washr ington . The Japanese insisted that their demands were reasonable. All they wanted in the Indies was the mineral resources ; they would gladly, they said, share these with the United States . All they wanted in China, they claimed, was peace ; and peace could come only with Japanese control . The frustrations Japan met seemed unjust to her79
Stalemate
Japan was not attacking other peoples ; Japan herself was being crushed and destroyed . "What do you expect 70,000,000 people to do?" the Japanese consul general in Batavia asked during the oil negotiations . "To stay locked up in our rocky little islands? . . . We must have oil . . . if you will not give it to us, we must take it here . . . . We must have peace in China-if it takes us one hundred years of war, we must have it . We have risked our whole national life on it . . . . We must expand . . . . You fear us because you have wronged us." Secretly, the Japanese wired their ambassadors in Europe an outline of the negotiations they planned to conduct with the United States : "To terminate the struggle with the Chinese by diplomatic negotiations ; to establish an area of co-prosperity in East Asia ; and to conserve our national resources in preparation for the future." Even while the preliminary conversations were in progress, Japan's fiction of peace was ruptured by the greed of her army . The Japanese generals marched their troops into southern Indo-China, springboard for an assault on the South Seas . With a reflex speed rarely found in democracies at peace, the United States struck back . It clamped an embargo on oil and steel on the Japanese islands, and the Dutch and British followed the American lead . America's oil embargo set the Washington negotiations on a new level . Now they were no longer concerned with abstract fundamentals ; the negotiations had become the raw stuff of war . There was a time limit on all Japanese decisions-she must get American agreement before her oil ran out ; she must surrender and be reduced to impotence ; or she must strike before she became too weak to act . The Japanese could now no longer march and negotiate simultaneously. They were trapped, and they tried to backtrack . They would, they said, withdraw their troops from southern Indo-China to northern Indo-China if America would sell oil and steel again . But America could no longer reverse herself ; to release oil and steel to the Japanese again would mean American support of Japan's ambition in China . It was a course no honorable leadership could take, and the American negotiators made it clear that without a free China there could be no resumption of ordinary relations between our
8o
Stalemate
country and Japan. Try as they might, the Japanese could find no formula to hold China and to appease America at the same time . The United States had a timetable, too . America's program was geared for movement by spring of 1942-by then an American volunteer air force comprising a pursuit group, a bombing squadron, and possibly a torpedo squadron would be operating under the Chinese flag from Chinese bases ; by then the Indies and Malaya would be re-armed ; our island chain across the Pacific would be equipped and garrisoned ; the Philippines would have more American aircraft and American combat troops . By the time all this was done, the Japanese would have been caught, as the Chinese say, like a turtle in a bottle. The Japanese were fully aware of this dead end ; by fall debate within Japan had been settled. On October 17, 1941, General Hideki Tojo was made premier-the first general on the active list to hold that office . Tojo was of the inner core of the army, and the army piloted Japan in her last few weeks of decision . Tojo's plan was to negotiate with fervor to keep northern China while regaining free access to world trade so that Japan might continue to grow stronger . If the Americans refused, the gun was cocked. By mid-November all Japanese embassies had received the code words to be used in case of crisis . For a rupture in Japanese-American relations the short-wave news broadcast was to use twice the phrase HIGASHI NO KAZEAME-"East wind rain ." By the end of November the Japanese fleet was on the high seas, had rendezvoused off Hokkaido, and was steaming toward the northern Pacific ; the ordinary coded cables became too slow, and diplomats in Washington were told to use the telephone . By the first week in December troops were gathered in southern Indo-China for the push into the South Seas . On December 7, 1941, in several thousand newspaper and radio offices in America, the teletype rang twelve times with a bulletin . Tired Sunday editors watched the keys beneath the glass panel beat out the flash . It was 2 :22 P .M. FLASH . . . WHITE HOUSE SAYS JAPS ATTACK PEARL HARBOR . . . The war in Asia was now America's war . 8i
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NINA claimed that she had a government-no election had ever voted it into power, but officials and propagandists liked the legitimacy of the word . They bridged the discrepancies between fact and statement with the Kuomintang's peculiar theory of state, a theory that did not work, but was nonetheless interesting. By this theory, which persisted throughout the war, China was assumed to have not a government of the people but one held in trusteeship for them by the Kuomintang . Sun Yat-sen outlined the party's responsibility in three stages . First came a period of military operations, when the party defended the people against foreign imperialism and domestic war lords . Second was the period of political tutelage, in which the party taught the people how to govern the country . Third would come the period of constitutional government, when other parties would also be permitted, and the Kuomintang would compete against them to win favor at the polls . The Kuomintang alone was responsible for the government during the war ; it was the government . It appointed and directed all government officials . It controlled the national army ; all senior officers and over go per cent of the men were enrolled, at least nominally, on the party roster, and political commissars were attached to each unit. Since government and party were the same thing, the army was a party army . The Kuomintang controlled the censorship ; party work was supported by government funds ; party functionaries lived on public taxes . And since all other parties were outlawed, criticism of the Kuomintang became a state offense . Chiang's difficulty was that he tried to function in two stages of
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trusteeship at once. To fight the war he needed to levy men, money, and rice from the people ; to do this he had to use the old, oppressive network of village chiefs, which kept the peasants under rigid control . And to fight the Communists he had to intensify his censorship and secret police. At the same time he was fond of democratic phrases and catchwords . He talked about the imminence of the ballot and constitutional rights ; he promised the peasants more freedom, but operated always to restrict what little they had . He was enmeshed in his own promises . His government had two facades ; one faced toward the peasant and retained all the old familiar undemocratic features of Chinese feudalism, but the imposing outer front, which faced China's allies, was built of materials pleasing to Western eyespolitical tutelage, habeas corpus, democracy. 'On paper the government was logical . China had a council, the Executive Yuan, that administered civilian affairs, introduced legislation, drew up budgets, made appointments, declared wars, and framed treaties . The eleven ministries under it looked like a cabinet to Western eyes ; the Ministry of Information was not included in the war cabinet but was directly responsible to the Kuomintang. There was a Legislative Yuan, the pale shadow of a congress, which could not make policy or even veto decisions and existed only to rubber-stamp bills submitted to it . Then there was the judicial Yuan, with its system of courts. China had added to these three familiar governmental divisions an Examination Yuan, which passed on qualifications of functionaries from lawyers to midwives, and a Control Yuan, with powers of review, impeachment, and auditing-a sort of state conscience . Over all the five yuan was a State Council, whose functions were nebulous except that the head of each yuan had to be chosen from among its members . Next higher was the Supreme National Defense Council, which exercised "supreme authority ." And at the pinnacle was Chiang K'ai-shek, with "emergency" wartime powers . A sure way to madness was to follow this logic through . Americans were used to a government based on law, and they tried to understand China in terms of what China proclaimed herself to be . After a few weeks of futile pursuit of reality new arrivals often threw up 98
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their hands and declared that China had no government but anarchy or a coalition of war lords, or that all Chinese were of the seed of Fu Man-chu, or that this was stark Fascism . All these simple explanations were wrong. The easiest way to understand China was to decide first that the government was only a false front for the Kuomintang, whose politics and cleavages were the main determinants of decision, and that behind the party was a personal despotism, the oldest form of rule known to mankind . The party chose a National Congress, which in turn chose a Central Executive Committee, which in turn chose a Standing Committee. And here, within the party, were all the debates and decisions and powers that could not be traced in the government itself . The Standing Committee of the party met every two weeks in Chungking and gave orders to the highest government body, the Supreme National Defense Council ; the SNDC then handed down orders to the various branches of government involved . The Central Executive Committee named the heads of the five yuan ; it chose the State Councilors ; it controlled the Supreme National Defense Council ; if ever a new president of China were chosen, this committee would choose him . The Kuomintang's organization was patterned after the Russian Communist Party ; Russian advisers remodeled it that way in 1923 . In every county seat, in every sizable army unit, was a tangpu, or party cell. In the villages the tangpu were usually in the hands of local officials and rural gentry who had enough leisure time or educationor money-to take an interest in politics . The tangpu rose in a pyramid to provincial councils, and the provincial councils were the base of the National Congress, which was supposed to meet every two years . Kuomintang members were a small minority of the people of China-a tight elite . Their duties were outlined thus : All members of the Party must strictly observe the following rules of discipline : (r) to obey the regulations and principles of the Party, (2) to allow free discussions on any problem concerning the Party, but to obey absolutely once a resolution has been adopted, (3) to keep Party secrets, (4) to permit no attack on fellow members or Party organs before out 99
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siders, (g) not to join any other political party, (6) not to organize cliques or factions Loyal members tried with more or less success to follow the line on the first five directives, but the Kuomintang was riddled with cliques-some liberal, some conservative, some only nominally attached to it. It was as heterogeneous a political catchall as the Democratic Party in America . The most cohesive faction within the party and the most potent force in government politics was the right-wing clique called the CC . The Communists had attached this tag to it with the meaning of Central Clique . The CC was reactionary ; it was antiforeign ; it stood closest to the Generalissimo, but it was also the only group in the Kuomintang organized from the grassroots up . It was headed by two men, Ch'en Li-fu and his older brother Ch'en Kuo-fu . Ch'en Kuo-fu was tubercular . Throughout the war he was director of personnel in the Generalissimo's Household Bureau-traffic manager for the flow of memoranda and individuals seeking the Generalissimo's attention . The real boss of the CC was Ch'en Li-fu, the younger brother . He had been Kuomintang Minister of Organization for five years before the war, and he organized well . In any real vote-getting contest within the party the CC could manipulate the levers, rig the issues, and shove its candidates through for an undisputed majority . Whereas all other groups derived their strength either from their armed forces or from the personal relationship of their leaders to the patronage trough at the capital, the CC had been able for a decade to marshal delegates and votes to support its demands . Its votes and intraparty majorities were only part of a well-rounded stock in trade that included such things as the favor of Chiang K'ai-shek, the largest slice of patronage, control of the nation's thought, press, and schools, and administration of an independent secret police force responsible to the party machine alone . The CC manipulated most Kuomintang votes and policies and so it controlled the appointment of most of the minor officials on the
* China Handbook, 1 944,
king, China .
page
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lower rungs of government. It spearheaded the drive against liberals and Communists . In all this it acted as the chosen deputy of the Generalissimo, but the Generalissimo, in his own fashion, saw to it that even within the party a system of checks and balances operated to keep the CC from absolute control . In some provinces the tangpu and their superstructures were entirely dominated by the local war lord ; in other areas the party had definite particularistic, provincial tendencies . But most of the tangpu were staffed by local bureaucrats and by local gentry, and these were the stalwarts of the CC . The next clique-reading from right wing to left-spoke for the military . At the party Congresses the army's view was always a critical factor . If army representation had been unified, it might have been the tail to crack the Kuomintang whip . But it was split between the military bureaucracy of Ho Ying-ch'in, Minister of War for fourteen years, and the ardent young men of the Whampoa clique . The Whampoa clique consisted of graduates of the military academy Chiang had founded near the Whampoa River in Canton twenty years before . These were warriors of a new stripe ; Chiang's older friends were architects of the new state, but here was its product . Many Whampoa graduates had been lost in the early civil war against the war lords and in later campaigns against the Communists ; those who survived were a closely knit group . As the years rolled by, they rose in rank . Some forty divisions of Chinese troops, a scant quarter of the total force at the beginning of the war, were commanded by Whampoa men ; by the end over two-thirds of all divisions were under Whampoa command . Two men were popularly accepted as spokesmen for this clique-General Hu Tsung-nan, graduate of the famous first class at Whampoa, and Ch'en Ch'eng, a youthful Whampoa instructor who succeeded Ho Ying-ch'in in 1944 as Minister of War . Ho's men were the most influential of the military in the Kuomintang, as befitted their senior years and dignity . But the younger Whampoa men, with zeal and cohesiveness, held the promise of the future, and they voted at their own discretion . Between the two groups there was little long-range political difference . Both were authoritarian ; both believed in the voice of violence in political decisions . But the Whampoa men stood for a relatively efficient adminisIOI
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tration and a housecleaning of the dead wood that burdened the war effort, while Ho's henchmen wanted simply a perpetuation of the status quo with all its fumbling and corruption . One of the interim successors to Ch'en Li-fu as head of the party's organization board was a German-trained scholar, Dr . Chu Chia-hwa, who detested the CC . He gathered able and progressive party members about him. Chu Chia-hwa's clique could not be pigeonholed so neatly as the others . What it stood for was not precisely defined ; it was right wing, but not of the extreme right . Dr . Chu, using his small faction to make combinations, threw its weight where it might help tip the balance to the side of efficiency . Toward the center and nearer to American standards was the Political Science Clique . These men, mostly educated in Japan or America, understood modern business methods and wanted to make an efficient China, safe for industry and with an industry that would do the country good . They stood for orderly government by law, for a conservative but streamlined modern-style state . Among them were some of China's foremost technicians, who understood what should be but was not being done . The Political Science Clique had drawn its main strength from the businessmen of Shanghai and northern China, and the war, by wiping out these groups, had stripped the Political Science group of its main source of power . Since the thinking of the group was direct, non-mystical, and modern, and since many of its leaders spoke English, Americans found them easier to comprehend than other Chinese . Chiang, as he was forced to deal more closely with America, naturally put more and more of the Political Science Clique into key jobs . Here they performed in an able but restrained fashion, while they dreamed of the efficiency they could achieve if power, as well as the labor, were theirs . The Kuomintang even had its liberals . The left-wingers were led by Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen . Because his father was also the father of the revolution, Sun feared no persecution and, almost alone in China, could say what he believed ; concentration camp or torture could never be inflicted on him . He thought and acted in Western terms; he wanted Western reforms . But he was a scholar, probably
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the best-read person in Chungking-a man of silk, not of steel . His intelligence flickered over the panorama of Chinese politics with astonishing brilliance, but he could not match in drive or vigor the hard-bitten men who controlled the Kuomintang . Though he would not break with the Kuomintang, he did have the courage to oppose it from within and to speak publicly against oppression and corruption . He said what the people were thinking but did not dare to say . Sun was president of the Legislative Yuan, a niche more impressive than important . He knew what was going on in the party, and he used his position to urge democracy and a bill of rights . Tremendous popular support rolled up behind him, but he could command few votes within the party . Chiang K'ai-shek used to refuse to see him for months at a time. The Generalissimo reigned, as tsungtsai, or director general, over the entire Kuomintang. Less than io per cent of the party membership was independent of his will . The few real malcontents rallied about Sun Fo in search of some of the ideals of the revolution ; the others fought clamorously for Chiang's attention . The Generalissimo paid keen attention to sessions of the Central Executive Committee and sensed the temper of minority criticism, then decided on cabinet changes or policy statements in inner council with the leaders of the various factions. Sometimes he tossed away the myth of party trusteeship and simply strode into meetings to announce his will to the Standing Committee and receive its submissive approval . When the grip of the CC seemed threatened, the Generalissimo rushed to its defense . And when American criticism became too pressing, he would give a plum to one or two fairly respectable characters from the Political Science Clique to show his good faith . The inner sanctum of the Generalissimo was the point from which to view the party framework in proper perspective . There his secretaries winnowed the thousands of visitors and gleaned from the hundreds of memoranda the reports the Generalissimo would handle personally . Access to Chiang's ear was access to high political might . Quick decision could be found only in his personal chamber, and only his command could steer the administration out of well-worn
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ruts. The Generalissimo had almost unlimited power even on paper . In theory the Central Executive Committee could instruct him ; in practice he instructed the committee, and he had the legal right to veto any CEC decision . His grip on the government was also legal ; the work of the Supreme National Defense Council, which was the highest wartime organ of state, was concentrated in the hands of eleven members chosen by him . The entire council met only when he, as chairman, called it together . The government insistently denied that this was dictatorship, but it described the function of its supreme body thus : The chairman of the Supreme National Defense Council, according to its organizational law, has emergency powers . He does not have to adhere to the ordinary procedure while handling party, political and military affairs . He has the authority to issue such decrees as may be necessitated by the situation . In actual practice, however, the chairman usually consults members of the standing committee before exercising these powers The great trouble with the Chinese government was that policymaking and administration were separated by a gulf as great as the one that set the Generalissimo off from his trembling functionaries . High policy was the Generalissimo's domain, and administration was conducted by a handful of men who could be trusted never to overstep their limited powers . Chiang divided his administration into three main spheres-army, party, and civil government-which he confided to a triumvirate of three men unquestioningly loyal to him . Even these three men were surrounded by a delicate series of checks and balances that operated to throw all major decisions back into his lap . But in spite of these limits this triumvirate was for five years the greatest power in the land after the Generalissimo . Ho Ying-ch'in ran the army ; Ch'en Li-fu ran the party ; H . H. Kung ran the civilian government . All three, smooth and charming, had learned how to fit their own egos to the harsh angularities of the Generalissimo's personality . Kung was on the far side of middle age and Ch'en Li-fu on the near side, but all of them had been Chiang's comrades-in-arms for some twenty years.
China Handbook, x944, page go.
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In a country at war the army is the most important branch of affairs, and General Ho was probably the most powerful of Chiang's three aides. Ho was in his late fifties-a stocky, well-built man with a round face ; he was invariably courteous, and his eyes, behind spectacles, seemed almost schoolmasterly . His strength came primarily from his position as the Generalissimo's military deputy, secondarily from the political machine he built for himself in the army . Ho was rumored to be one of the wealthiest landlords in all Kweichow, the backward province where he was born . He had studied at the Japanese Military Academy at the same time as the Generalissimo . Like Chiang, he left Japan to join in the 1911 uprising against the Manchus ; his real career began with his appointment as dean of the Kuomintang's Whampoa military academy, and ever afterward he followed Chiang like a shadow . In 1927 he became chief of staff of the national armies, a post that he held until May, 1946 . Ho directed the war from his offices in the rambling gray buildings of the National Military Council . He was a desk soldier, and paper work flowed past his deputies in fantastic confusion . As Minister of War and chief of staff from the outbreak of the war against Japan until the Stilwell crisis, he was probably responsible, more than any other man except Chiang K'ai-shek, for the incompetent direction and gradual rotting away of the Chinese armies in the field. There were times when Chungking openly talked of the current price for a job as a regimental commander . The starving of Chinese soldiers, the extortion and slaughter of conscription, the payrolls padded with the names of dead men were all accepted by the capital as the natural consequence of a corruption traceable directly to the offices of the Ministry of War . Within the army itself Ho was far from being undisputed chief . His opposition was the Whampoa clique, the cadet faction that had grown to maturity during the war . By his control of supplies and funds Ho could favor one unit over another and build up a loyalty `among men who were dependent on him . But two-thirds of the divisions were commanded by Whampoa men, most of whom sneered at Ho . One of the Whampoa leaders was General Hu Tsung nan, in his middle forties . He commanded the troops who blockaded
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the Communists and sat at the Yellow River crossings threatened by the Japanese. Hu was perhaps closer to the Generalissimo's affection than any younger man in the army, and he was mentioned as Chiang's successor. Rabidly anti-Communist, like Ho Ying-ch'in, he detested the latter and during the war permitted no interference by Ho in his personal war area . Even in budget, supply, or personnel matters Hu Tsung-nan took questions directly to the Generalissimo ; his divisions had larger allowances per capita than any other units in the Chinese army . Ch'en Ch'eng, another Whampoa leader and second rival of Ho Ying-ch'in in the army, was probably the officer most liked by Americans in China . He was a slim man, barely over five feet tall, whose hair became grayer with each year of war . He was high in the Generalissimo's favor in the early phases of the war and proved able to get along with the Communists then, but he gradually slipped into the obscurity of a frontal command . His chief task in the mid-war years was to defend the Yangtze gorges, the bottleneck approach to Chungking . He was lifted from this job by the Americans in 1943 and made commander of the joint Sino-American training program and commander of the Salween troops, which were to punch through to Burma. Ch'en's elevation to this post infuriated Ho Ying-ch'in, who saw his rival becoming, with the aid of American supplies and equipment, the most important figure in the army . Americans believed that Ho's irritation caused the sabotage of the training program, the slow rate of combat replacements to the Salween, and the niggardly budget allowed by the general staff to Ch'en's command . Not until Ho forced Ch'en out of his job and had a more amenable officer placed in command of the American training program did it gather momentum . Ho Ying-ch'in, Hu Tsung-nan, and Ch'en Ch'eng all gave fealty to the Generalissimo . Though they rarely agreed on strategy, the Generalissimo liked them all, and he placated and soothed one after the other ; nevertheless he saw to it that Ho, his chief of staff, retained his dominant prestige . It was Ho who had daily access to the Generalissimo's office ; over-all planning and inspection were Ho's responsibility . Even after the storm broke around Ho, when
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the corruption and inefficiency of the troops were obvious and Americans forced the substitution of Ch'en Ch'eng as Minister of War, Ho remained chief of staff and the top figure in the army. Ch'en Li-fu, the party organizer and leader of the CC in the Kuomintang, was easily the most impressive man of the triumvirate of deputies . He had an exquisitely handsome face, with burning eyes and glossy silver hair, and seemed as fragile as a piece of old ivory . He was a ruthless, hated zealot-high-principled, relentless, and incorruptible ; he was antiforeign and a mystical nationalist . He had no personal fortune, nor had he ever been charged with corruption . The Generalissimo was bound to Ch'en by an ancient debt . Chiang's first patron in the days of his poverty in Shanghai was the strong-arm patriot Ch'en Chi-mei ; Ch'en Li-fu was this man's nephew and as such almost a ward of the Generalissimo's . Ch'en had been Chiang's personal secretary during the great Northern March in 1927, and later Chiang named him chief of the organization board of the Kuomintang to purge the party of all elements of liberal or Communist taint . Ch'en Li-fu could explain himself with passionate eloquence . To him the great menace to China was Communism, which he held to be an alien aggression against Chinese thought . Ch'en was a great Kuomintang theorist, and his writings were an inchoate mass of half-rational, half-mystical pronouncements ; no American could possibly understand them . Ch'en dedicated himself to rooting out everything he thought foreign to China's heritage . He believed that Western industry could be grafted onto the body of China's ancient society without disturbing her time-honored codes and customs . He regarded the West as the Japanese did-an inferior civilization possessed of certain savage tricks that are highly useful in modern society . His attitude was the same that Western travelers take when they watch Australian bushmen wielding the boomerang or African savages throwing poison darts-that these are effective devices, which should be studied, but that the culture that begets them has little else to offer. On the other hand Ch'en Li-fu grew lyrical in extolling the greatness of China's past and explained the difference between the Chinese
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and American revolutions in poetical terms . The Americans, he said, had to discover new truths on which to found a state, but the Chinese only had to work backward and rediscover their old truths . Ch'en bristled at the charge that he was a reactionary ; he saw himself as a crusader trying to save China from Communism . His sleep was untroubled by the screams of those who suffered in Kuomintang concentration camps or by the terrors his police imposed on liberals . Thus Ch'en represented all those Chinese who saw their country only through traditional classicism . Chinese classics set their primary emphasis on order and stability in society ; the ruler must be wise, the people obedient . Philosophers had set out for every man his station in life, and from that station there was no escape . All relationships between classes were regulated, and the government's function was to see that each man behaved according to his place in society . The classics are still a drag on Chinese thinking ; despite the tremendous inroads of modern education, hundreds of thousands of semiliterate citizens of China still see the ancient codes and manners as binding on society, much as American fundamentalists regard the Bible as binding on their personal lives . Ch'en Li-fu most nearly symbolized this basic faith in China's past . The rural gentry, the reservoir of Chinese classicism, produced no other figure -unless possibly Chiang himself-with convictions strong enough to withstand the impact of the modern world . Unlike most mystics Ch'en had two great practical qualifications . He had had a sound technological education in America at the University of Pittsburgh, where he studied to be a mining engineer, and he had a brutal mastery of the tools of police power . He was a man of incongruities-he spoke in the tongue of men and angels ; he was a master of polished Chinese classical prose ; he was an exquisite calligrapher ; yet he could roll up his sleeves and make a deal across the table with the toughest characters in Chinese politics . As Minister of Education during the war years Ch'en had a free hand in the shaping of Chinese minds . The great universities had written an epic of scholarship and adventure on their trek into the interior ; the rest of the war was, intellectually, an anticlimax . Both students and professors went hungry ; inflation made the instructors
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beggars . The cream of the nation's youth had been skimmed off for war in the early years ; in the north they joined the Communists, while in central China they became Kuomintang officers . The students who succeeded them were a mixed crew . By law any student at a high school or university was exempt from the draft ; scholarship was more honorable-and much more desirable-than military service . Enrollment boomed . Some of the students, perhaps most, were sincerely patriotic, but the government taught them little and found nothing much for them to do . Ch'en Li-fu boasted of the change he brought about in shifting interest from liberal arts to technology . Before the war almost 70 per cent of the students in Chinese universities were enrolled in liberal arts courses ; under Ch'en the percentage dropped to approximately 5o per cent . There was no quarrel anywhere in China with this shift in scholastic emphasis ; a country at war needs engineers more than professors . But Ch'en was not content ; he established an intellectual reign of terror in political subjects such as history, economics, and sociology . Discussion of politics was forbidden at the universities ; students spied on their teachers, and faculty members spied on one another . The Kuomintang, alarmed by the number of liberal, Communist, and generally critical students, organized the San Min Chu I Youth Corps as a junior branch of the Kuomintang . The Youth Corps went to school ; the government paid the bill . Within a year there were 5o,ooo members . Professors wailed that colleges were being ruined because, although Corps members pulled down the scholarship level, they could not be flunked . The Corps was Fascist in thought and appearance; it hailed the cult of the leader ; it held summer conventions where sturdy young men and women marched about, barking the Chinese equivalent of "Heil" and giving the clenched fist salute . On the campus it bullied liberals and radicals into silence in the knowledge that it had the full backing of the government behind it . Ch'en Li-fu said he believed in academic freedom, but professors who disagreed with him grew thin and hungry as inflation took its course . They watched their words ; their classrooms were dangerous . The most famous economist in China was Professor Ma Yin-ch'u, a jovial man who was graduated from Yale and who once taught eco109
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nomics to the Generalissimo . Professor Ma lectured on inflation, a subject that grew to be of fascinating interest and inevitably touched on government . One evening Professor Ma was invited to dinner with the Generalissimo. When he got into the car that was sent for him, the two guards in the front seat, with apologies for their rudeness, told him that he was under arrest . For two years he lived in concentration camps or under police surveillance . This was not a breach of academic freedom, Ch'en Li-fu insisted . Professor Ma was nominally a member of the Kuomintang ; he had been criticizing the party's policy in public ; it was a breach of party discipline for which he was being punished . Ch'en Li-fu conducted his ministry as if he were directing an army . The careers of opposition professors in the national universities withered, while men who saw their way to agreement with him flourished . Ch'en set about establishing a regimentation of thought that was alien to the entire spirit of modern Chinese education . The government had approved textbooks for all subjects, and these textbooks set the standards of knowledge from secondary schools to colleges . As prewar texts wore out and were replaced by the new texts, Chinese students from end to end of the country began to parrot the same phrases . Given time, Ch'en Li-fu felt that all China would be studying one code of thought, learning one code of manners, and those codes would be after his own heart . Ch'en's intellectual preoccupation went hand in hand with an organizing genius that would have done credit to a Tammany ward heeler . Once having maneuvered his men into key posts, he kept them rigidly in line and had their loyalty checked constantly by the secret police he controlled . During the middle years of the war Ch'en Li-fu rode high . His censors made the press, stage, and literary world writhe under his directives . As the truth and fiction of war separated more widely, the censors eased the government's embarrassment by suppressing the truth and creating a mythical China . A formal edict was handed down by one of the Ministers of Information, a CC appointee, that all authors should avoid realism and pessimism ; they should write gay, cheery things . A whole list of subjects was forbidden for public IIO
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discussion in print ; it included Communism and the Communist problem, China's relations with Russia, affairs in turbulent Chinese Turkestan, criticism of America or Britain, corruption in the government, sufferings of the troops at the front, persecution of the peasantry . It was forbidden to analyze taxation, to criticize government financial policy, to print any figure about the budget or currency circulation . It was forbidden to criticize any member of the government, his personality, his family, his conduct . It was forbidden even to talk about rising prices! The third member of the triumvirate around Chiang K'ai-shek was Dr. Kung Hsiang-hsi, the husband of one of the Generalissimo's sisters-in-law ; he was premier of China until another brother-in-law, T. V . Soong, succeeded him in 1944 . Kung was a round man with a soft face draped with pendulous flabby chins, which made him a cartoonist's delight . He took pride in being a lineal descendant of Confucius, in the seventy-fifth generation . H . H . Kung was born into a Shansi banking family about sixty-five years ago, taught school in Shansi, went to America, received a degree at Yale, and returned to become a revolutionary . Before taking part in national politics he amassed a fortune as agent of the Standard Oil Company in Shansi . His rise to power began with his marriage into the fabulous Soong family . The youngest Soong daughter is Madame Chiang K'ai-shek ; the second daughter is the widow of Dr . Sun Yat-sen ; the oldest daughter is Madame H . H . Kung ; the oldest son is T . V. Soong. Madame Kung is probably the shrewdest of the Soongs . Under her far from gentle stimulus her husband became one of the most powerful men in China . He was made the first Minister of Industry in 1930, president of China's Central Bank in 1933, and premier and Minister of Finance at the beginning of the war . He became the Generalissimo's deputy for the curious apparatus that was supposed to be the civilian government . The war years did not treat Dr . Kung too gently. While his family played in Hongkong or America, Kung lived alone in his mansion under the bombs in Chungking . He acquired malaria and a spleen condition that made his personal life a torment. An amiable man, III
Government by Trustee
he disliked quarrels or crises, and he could be coaxed into almost anything with a smile or a sob story . He was the favorite target of American salesmen for high-pressure campaigns . His one great desire was to be loved, and those who knew him well found him so lovable that they called him Daddy . Kung was a great patron of the Y .M.C.A. in China ; as a Y .M .C.A. man he might have achieved the affection his thirsty soul craved. Unfortunately for Daddy, power politics sets standards that differ from those of the Y .M.C.A . Confucius was no help tither, and after seven years of diligent, bumbling service to the national cause, Daddy ended as runner-up for the title of most unpopular character in China . The Chinese, with the most biting sense of humor in the world, delight in public humiliation . The henpecked figure of their premier, gutlessly presiding over a cabinet that reeked . of corruption and indecision, surrounded by a kitchen council of cringing sycophants, symbolized all the ridiculous decay they saw in their nation . Criticism of Kung, the favorite indoor sport of Chungking for five years, was both personal and political . Kung is intensely sensitive to the personal variety . Once he asked an American what people were saying about him, and the American replied, "Well, people mostly say that you're a sucker for flattery and that your family is terribly corrupt." Kung thought for a moment, then commented, "But I always know when flattery is sincere ." The personal criticism of Kung and his family often passed far beyond truth and decency . One of Kung's friends said that ninety per cent of the gossip was not true, but added, "Ten per cent is even worse than the gossip ." Kung's son, David, was made a director of the Central Trust, the chief government purchasing agency, at the age of twenty-two . The young man was not fitted either by temperament or training for such a job, and his conduct was outrageous . The feminine side of the family was no better . Kung's youngest daughter, Jeannette, was inordinately arrogant . When the American government sent Madame Chiang K'ai-shek and Jeannette back to China on a C-54, the plane arrived across the Hump with barely enough gasoline to make the return trip . Jeannette ordered the American ground crew to drain the wing tanks because she wanted the gaspr12
Government by Trustee
line herself . The American Army crew naturally refused, and she was furious . When Kung's oldest daughter, Rosamund, flew to America to be married, her father commandeered one of the National Airways' aircraft to fly a trousseau across the Hump for her . Madame Kung lived in Hongkong until Pearl Harbor ; then she stayed briefly in Chungking, flew to America to join Madame Chiang in 1943, and remained abroad . She is a woman with a highly developed money sense . One or two of her financial operations, like her whispered activities in the Shanghai textile market, were normal commercial flyers . But many of her deals, such as her transactions in foreign exchange, made commercial history and involved a manipulation based on facts that only the wife of the Minister of Finance would know . The conduct of all Kung's family mocked the misery of the nation . Kung himself was a "liberal" ; he disliked torture, concentration camps, violence, and in foreign affairs he stood for a close association with the Western democracies . He had none of those sinister qualities that made Ch'en Li-fu so dangerous ; yet the people of China saw in him a grotesque caricature of what they were fighting for, and they hated him . Political criticism of Kung was equally sharp . The Generalissimo was the president of the Executive Yuan, supreme head of the government ; in theory his deputy was Dr . H . H . Kung as vice-president of the Executive Yuan, but in practice both the army and the party did as they liked, and Kung was low man on the totem pole . The cabinet met once a week in Chungking. It had little real authority even in routine matters ; what authority the Generalissimo could spare belonged to the Supreme National Defense Council, the Military Council, or the Kuomintang Standing Committee . The ministers took their lead from decisions of the senior councils and rode off on their own out of Kung's reach . Kung, for example, could not control T . V . Soong, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs . Everything in this field was decided on either by T . V . in consultation with the Generalissimo or by the Generalissimo in consultation with the kitchen cabinet . Kung could exercise no authority over Ho Yingch'in, who sat in the cabinet as Minister of War . He could not argue with the Ministry of Education, which was represented in the cabinet "3
Government by Trustee
by Ch'en Li-fu. He could not even command provincial administrations ; their governors were appointed by the Generalissimo on the basis of some local equation of power and politics . Occasionally a daring wave .of public criticism or disgusted American pressure would force some cabinet change . Then Kung was almost powerless ; the Generalissimo did the reshuffling . And the Generalissimo made cabinet changes almost the way American children play musical chairs ; on the given signal everyone would rush for someone else's seat . The Generalissimo's game was unique to the extent that there were usually the same number of chairs and the same number of players, and no one was ever left without a place for long . The Generalissimo trusted few men ; these few held office with monotonous regularity. If a minister were forced out of the cabinet by some particularly noisome scandal, he usually became secretary general of something or other and eventually reappeared as minister of a different department . Outsiders rarely got into the game. Kung was good-hearted . He issued fine orders to remit taxes in stricken provinces and appropriated great wads of money to meet temporary emergencies, but once he had signed his name he thought his work was done, and his good intentions died stillborn in Chungking. His main function was to keep the government and army supplied with money . He was Minister of Finance, president of the Central Bank, president of the Central Trust, and later president of the Bank of China . To run China on any sound economic basis required basic political decisions that only Chiang K'ai-shek could make . To crack down on landlords who hoarded grain, to set up a graduated tax, required dynamic social leadership, which the Kuomintang suppressed . The characteristic Chinese attitude toward taxes is reflected in an item from the government news service : "To set an example for others Mr . Chang Tao-fan, Minister of Overseas Affairs, has voluntarily paid the inheritance tax on a fortune estimated at $i5o,ooo which he recently inherited from his deceased father ." Kung could not touch the vital point where government met people-the grain tax in the villages . There was a horde of some 300,000 tax collectors, usually appointed locally, for the government's au"4
Government by Trustee
thority rested on its ability to hand out franchises for graft . Kung took the easy way out and printed money . Chinese currency in circulation rose from a billion and a half dollars in 1937 to a trillion in 1946 ; prices followed currency upward until at V-J day they stood at 2500 times the prewar level . The people denounced Kung for the inflation, and economists privately flayed him . Kung shrugged, serene in the confidence of his masters . As long as he could produce enough money, Chiang, Ho, and Ch'en were pleased with him . He held Chinese currency at the fictitious rate of $20.00 Chinese to $1 .00 U .S . by a system of rigid exchange controls . The rate had no connection with reality, and the black market exchange went as high as 6oo to i while he held office, later 3000 to i . Kung insisted that as long as the formal exchange rate was fixed, there was no inflation . "If people want to pay $20,000 for a fountain pen, that's their business, it's not inflation," he said once . "They're crazy, that's all ." Kung's preoccupation with the maintenance of the formal 20-to-1 exchange rate was not without an element of cunning . The American Army had to build its installations and bases by paying for them in Chinese currency ; it could not buy its currency on the black market for 400, 6oo, or Boo to 1, but had to pay at the fixed rate-S1 .00 U .S . for each $20.00 Chinese . As prices soared in China, so did the price of every purchase of the American government, till finally the building of an air base was costing $40,000,000 U .S . and the building of a bamboo latrine from $1o,ooo U .S . up . The Chinese government was accumulating ever larger funds of American dollars on deposit in its name in New York, while the American Army was receiving less for every purchase . By the time the Army refused to go on with the agreement any longer, hundreds of millions of dollars had been accumulated by the Ministry of Finance . In a strictly commercial sense Kung had made a killing for his government, but from a long-range point of view it was a penny-wise, pound-foolish transaction . The extortionate exchange rate was known to every American GI in China, who felt that America was being swindled in the most scandalous and blatant fashion . Our men resented the huge outlay of funds, and the bitterness they brought back with them to America
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Government by Trustee
at the end of the war was much too high a price politically for the Chinese to pay for the dollar credits in New York . Kung needed a few good men in order to operate at all, but the financial chaos made efficient members of the government feel as if they were wading through a swamp . He chose one of the most brilliant men in China, Dr . T . F . Tsiang, to be budget director . Tsiang labored like a Trojan over the estimates coming in from the clamorous unco-ordinated ministries . He was denounced by CC people as a pink, by outsiders as a Kung man ; and when pressure was put on Daddy, the estimates always had to cave in . Tsiang drew up the official budget-a publicly known secret, which no one was allowed to publish . In addition the Generalissimo had a personal budget for "extraordinary expenses" that was said to be almost as large ; the Generalissimo wrote enormous checks running into hundreds of millions of dollars for his favorites, and government banks honored them with the same paper credits and paper money that backed up the regular budget . Even Tsiang could achieve little when it was possible for an honored associate to go to the Generalissimo and get twice the money his bureau had been allotted . Yet it was sometimes difficult for an outsider to criticize the way things were going with a feeling of being completely justified . The fixed salaries of junior government officers lagged behind the inflation and offered them no choice but starvation or corruption . Salaries were usually bolstered by bonuses drawn from money received outside the budget ; the supplementary grants kept key men alive and working with relative honesty but also made them dependent on the favor of their immediate superiors, who had to curry favor with other superiors, straight on up to the Generalissimo . Two other men of glowing integrity and ability, in addition to Tsiang, were in vital posts . One was Dr . Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economics and chief of the Natural Resources Commission ; the other was General Yu Ta-wei, the director of ordnance . Wong ran the processing industries salvaged from the coast--copper refining, steel production, electric power ; Yu directed the arsenals that supplied the guns and bullets to keep China's armies fighting . Budget grants to Yu were so small that he could not afford to buy materials
1:16
Government by Trustee
from Wong Wen-hao to make into arms ; Wong could not lower his prices without going bankrupt, because his budget also was too small . So the steel mills functioned at zo per cent of capacity, arms-making equipment lay idle in dugout caves, and the soldiers at the front cursed everyone from Kung on down for the lack of supplies . At a serious conference, when the economic crisis had all but stopped production, Kung gravely suggested that the director of ordnance produce cigarette-making machinery in his arsenals and sell it at a big profit ; then he could afford to make gunsl It was that kind of government .
II 7
Chapter 8
Chiang K'ai-shek-The People's Choice? of the academy's outstanding students . He was one of a handful chosen by the academy in 1907 to be trained in Japan, and there he was soon selected to serve with a Japanese field artillery regiment as a cadet. He did not like Japan and later spoke bitterly of his service there . But he did like military life . Once he told a group of Chinese students who had joined his army none too voluntarily : When I was a young man, I made up my mind to become a soldier . I have always believed that to be in the army is the highest experience of human existence as well as the highest form of revolutionary activity . All that I now possess in experience, knowledge, spirit, and personality I gained through military training and experience . While he was in Japan, he was stirred, like other student thinkers, by Sun Yat-sen's vision of a new China, strong and great . In 1911 he returned to China to join the uprising that overthrew the Manchus and established the Chinese Republic . When the first republic proved a mockery, he went to Shanghai ; what he did there is a matter of gossip and guess, for official biographies skip hastily over this period . It is known, though, that he was helped by a revolutionary named Ch'en Chi-mei, uncle of the CC brothers . In 1915 Chiang participated in another military coup aimed at seizing the Kiangnan arsenal near Shanghai . His comrades of that adventure, who are still among his intimate associates, fled the country, but Chiang disappeared somewhere into Shanghai's murky underworld . He lived a fast, hard life of personal danger, hunger, and abandon ; then for a while he was an inconspicuous clerk on the Shanghai stock exchange . At that time, the underworld of Shanghai was dominated by the notorious Green Gang that controlled the city's rackets of opium, prostitution, and extortion . The Green Gang was an urban outgrowth of one of the many secret societies that have flourished in China for centuries . Such a gang has no counterpart in western life ; it sank its roots into all the filth and misery of the great lawless city, disposed of its gunmen as it saw fit, protected its clients by violence, was an organized force perhaps more powerful than the police . The border line between violent insurrectionary and outright gangster was often blurred ; men passed between the two worlds with ease . No biog120
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132
Doomed Men-The Chinese Army The army had a thousand ailments, most of which were due to starvation. With their constitutions ruined by poor food, sleeplessness, and years at the front, the Chinese soldiers were ripe for any wandering infection . Probably 1o per cent of the troops were tubercular . Their cramped quarters, their undernourishment, their habit of plunging their chopsticks into a common bowl of food, made it almost impossible to take preventive measures. When troops were being gathered in China for the Burma campaign, one unit was marched from the Canton front to Kweiyang, where it was examined before being sent on to the active front in northern Burma. Supposedly it . was a good unit and was being redeployed because it still had fighting effectiveness, but 30 per cent of the effectives died on the 500-mile march, and of the "sturdy" remainder 15 per cent were found by an American doctor to be suffering from consumption . Dysentery, malaria, and scabies were secondary scourges . Dysentery began to take an increasingly heavy toll of the Chinese army in 1939 . The Chinese army treated 3000 cases of dysentery in 1938 ; in 1940, with essentially the same field personnel and the same number of soldiers in arms, it treated 15,9oo-more than five times as many . Of this number io,ooo were treated in the last six months of the year, for the simple but crushing reason that the effect of three years of undernourishment in ruining the resistance of the troops showed up suddenly then . The normal physical reserves of the Chinese soldier's body had sunk so low that when dysentery attacked and he could take no nourishment for a few days, his life would gutter out like a candle . The rolls would list his death as dysentery ; actually he had died of starvation . Chinese hospitals could scarcely handle all the cases that came to them-the badly managed institutions were dark charnel houses of horror . Before the American Army took over, one hospital near the Salween set aside a special ward with a concrete floor for sufferers from dysentery ; the uncontrollable bowels of the sick men emptied onto the floor, which hospital attendants flushed with buckets of water . The filth was gobbled up by pigs near the hospital. The sick men could see the dead carried out each day to be buried on the hillside above the hospital enclosure . Malaria had been widespread in southern China before the war . 135
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Chapter 10
Stilwell's Wax
HE American government set up the China-Burma-India theater of operations in the spring of 1942. The CBI command was the stuff of legends ; Americans used to say that you needed a crystal ball and a copy of Alice in Wonderland to understand it . No Hollywood producer would dare film the mad, unhappy grotesquerie of the CBI . It had everything-maharajas, dancing girls, war lords, head-hunters, jungles, deserts, racketeers, secret agents . American pilots strafed enemy elephants from P-4o's . The Chinese Gestapo ferreted out beautiful enemy spies in our own headquarters and Japanese agents knifed an American intelligence officer in the streets of Calcutta . Chinese war lords introduced American army officers to the delights of the opium pipe ; American engineers doctored sick work elephants with opium and paid native laborers with opium too. Leopards and tigers killed American soldiers, and GI's hunted them down with Garands . Birds built their nests in the exhaust vents of B-17s in India while China howled for air power . Parties stomped over the . silver floors of maharajas' palaces to the sound of boogiewoogie. American agents climbed through Himalayan passes to Lhasa to negotiate with the Dalai Lama for the friendship of Tibet . The U. S. Navy undertook to train a cavalry corps on the fringe of the Mongolian desert ; it also trained the dread State Police of China in the techniques of the F .B .I . American experts taught Chinese everything from potato-growing to the newest methods of artificial insemination . CBI politics were a fabulous compound of logistics, personalities, Communism, despotism, corruption, imperialism, nonsense, and
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tragic impotence. Nowhere in the world did American policy work with such oddly assorted characters . They included Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru ; Lord Louis Mountbatten, of the British royal family, and Sir Archibald Wavell, poetaster warrior of the Western Desert ; Chiang K'ai-shek, Generalissimo of the Chinese armies, and his brittle wife, Madame Chiang ; and for minor characters the much-contriving governor of Yunnan, Lung Yun, and the handsome dark-eyed insurrectionary of the north, the Communist General Chou En-lai, along with a host of others . The Americans dealing with these people were just as colorful ; they inevitably became infected with the same qualities of intrigue and dissension, and it was a divided, unhappy command . The sole reason for the existence of this theater was to keep China in the war . Thus in the final campaign against Japan she might form the anvil on which the hammers of Allied might would beat the enemy to a pulp . It was the CBI's job to supply China, retrain, reequip, and regroup her armies, and send them out once more to fight the Japanese . Almost a quarter of a million Americans were assigned to this task ; billions of dollars were spent ; thousands of lives were lost . It was an essential mission . What was accomplished here was awarded less recognition, less honor, less support, less encouragement, than any other phase of America's war effort . Priority tables rated the CBI theater about the same as the Caribbean. It had a grandiose mission and only a fraction of the tools necessary to perform it . The GI's saw with blunt political realism that they were expendables working on a holding operation; except for the gallant handful of Fourteenth Air Force combat personnel, who were fighting a strategy and war of their own, the Americans felt themselves a sop to political necessity . It is true that in a military way the CBI theater could not compare with the great wars in Europe and the Pacific ; its significance, primarily political, lay in the fact that for the first time men of a Western civilization had come to Asia as allies to fight side by side with Asiatics in a common cause . All the suffering and unhappiness of the Americans assigned to this task might have been justified if their efforts had been made the beginning of a crusade to introduce American ideas of freedom, de146
Stilwell's War
mocracy, and efficiency into the turmoil of Asiatic politics . But they were not. High policy hamstrung the responsible commander in meeting the situation . The political responsibility, just as much as the military responsibility, rested on the shoulders of one man who was expected to accomplish miracles on a shoestring . General Joseph W . Stilwell was cut from no ordinary military cloth . He was a West Point graduate, had had a distinguished career in the First World War, and between wars had become one of the great specialists in infantry tactics in the U.S . Army . His assignments had shifted him between the United States and China for twenty years ; sent to Peking as a language student shortly after the first World War, he had achieved fluency in the language and had also become an expert on Chinese military affairs. The outbreak of the war between China and Japan in 1937 had found him American military attache in northern China, and he had followed the early course of the war on foot till the stalemate in 1939. All this was conventional enough . But Stilwell had another quality rare in professional soldiers-the long view. He was a man who could lift his eyes from the mud and the filth of the campaign and look to the horizon . He knew what the war was about . The awkward, vaguely worded directives that were issued to him to retrain the Chinese armies could easily have been interpreted as a humdrum routine assignment that would have brought both honor and happiness without heartache . Stilwell, however, saw his responsibility not merely to a directive but to the American people as a whole : to fight a war wholeheartedly, democratically, with no tolerance for corruption, duplicity, or the niceties of diplomatic double talk . Stilwell was ill served by his entire public relations staff . They saw the Old Man as a colorful, lovable figure who could best be interpreted to the American people as Vinegar Joe-a cracker-barrel philosopher, a man of dry Yankee wit, a first-class fighting man. They obscured the warmth and tenderness of his spirit almost completely . The key to Stilwell's character was his realization of the dignity and worth of every man . He drew his understanding of life from no complicated ideologies but from a basic strain of American liberal1 47
Stilwell's War
ism . He saw the Chinese peasant soldier as not even the Chinese officers saw him-as a man who would fight like a man only when he was treated like a man . His affection for the Chinese peasant soldier was boundless . He had seen the hopeless early battles of China in 1937 and 1938 and had come to believe in Chinese courage and gallantry as a cardinal article of faith.. At the same time no American officer realized better the havoc that the years of corruption had wrought in the Chinese army . His entire program was to train, feed, and equip the pulpy mass of humanity into which the Chinese army had degenerated and to make it fit to meet the Japanese on equal terms and shatter them . Stilwell's education in China had begun with his earliest assignment there twenty years before Pearl Harbor . Step by step he was led from preoccupation with the soldier as an individual, from the organization of individuals into a combat unit, to a realization that military change could come only by sweeping reform at the very heart of Chinese politics and administration . By the time he was midway in his career as commander of the CBI he realized that no grant of American aid, no fragile paper reform, no single army strengthened or individual battle won, could revitalize China . A modern army could function only in a modern state, and he believed this modern state could come only if American policy actively espoused democracy and efficiency in Chungking. When the Stilwell crisis materialized out of these convictions, many treated Stilwell as if he were an enemy of the Chinese Republic ; the GI's in Burma, however, realized how wrong that judgment was . They were angry at Stilwell for an entirely different reason-because they felt that he had been a "slopy lover," that he had favored his Chinese troops in the jungle over his own Americans . Stilwell was the greatest and most inspiring figure in the CBI theater . His honesty was like a rock ; his martial courage and drive were complete and unquestioned ; his simplicity mocked the garish atmosphere of intrigue in which he was expected to operate . But Stilwell had faults too-and his faults sprang from his virtues . His contempt for cant and hypocrisy was always too thinly disguised for diplomacy . He could be simple and gentle with humble people, but his sharp tongue scraped the sensitivity of the pompous like sand1 48
Stilwell's War
paper. He treated Chiang K'ai-shek as another soldier-with due courtesy and respect but no scraping or bowing-and their personalities clashed bitterly. Stilwell's loyalty to his subordinates was proverbial . A brilliant combat, soldier himself, he had first-class men as his combat deputies ; but he disliked paper work, and the men who did his staff work served him atrociously . He retained old and trusted soldiers long after their usefulness was ended and they had become a handicap . Good administration was essential in a theater as large and complex as the CBI, which stretched from Karachi to Sian, a distance as great as from San Diego to New York . The slipshod staff work of some of his desk deputies left Stilwell open to constant criticism . An American officer once quipped, "To explain the CBI you need a three-dimensional organization chart with a wire framework and five shades of colored ribbon, which ought to indicate at least the simpler relationships ." General Stilwell wore three hats . He was commander in chief of 'the CBI theater ; as such he was responsible to the War Department in Washington and commanded all Americans in the CBI . But in China he was also chief of staff to Chiang K'ai-shek, who was supreme commander of the Chinese theater of war ; in this capacity Stilwell was responsible to Chiang . In India he was deputy commander of the Southeast Asia Command, which had been set up in the summer of 1943 ; and here he was directly beneath British Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten . The dividing line between the China theater and the Southeast Asia theater was vague . Major General George Stratemeyer was air officer for Stilwell ; he commanded the Tenth Air Force in India and the Fourteenth Air Force (Chennault's) in China, but he was also responsible to Lord Louis Mountbatten, for he was strategic air commander of the Southeast Asia Command . In China, of course, Chiang had his own chief of staff, General Ho Ying-ch'in. Ho was chief of staff for the Chinese armies, while Stilwell was supposed to be chief of staff for the China theater . In India, Lord Louis was commander only of Southeast Asia-a command that consisted of Ceylon and areas yet to be reconquered ; in 149
Stilwell's War
practice he was based in India, drew his strength from India, and marshaled his troops in India-but did not command there . India was commanded independently by Sir Claude Auchinleck, G.O.C . in India . The CBI was split down the middle by the wedge of Jap conquest in Burma . Over this wedge flew the air transport command that formed a hinge between the two separate areas, India and China . It was independent of Stilwell, Chiang K'ai-shek, and Mountbatten and was commanded from Washington ; it regarded itself as a kind of interstate command, above theater jurisdiction . In 1944 the Twentieth Bomber Command of the B-29's, a great hoglike organism that consumed enormous quantities of goods and gasoline, entered the CBI ; this command was completely above any control except that of General Arnold in Washington . If all this does not sound exactly clear, it is because it was never quite clear to anyone in the field . None of the elements of this campaign pulled together harmoniously. The one thing Stilwell wanted to do was fight . This was warand he wanted to waste no moment of opportunity to hit the enemy wherever he was exposed with whatever resources were at hand . Fighting the Japanese was an obsession with Stilwell ; the reconquest of Burma and the smashing of the China blockade preoccupied his every thought and energy . But a Burma campaign was opposed by the British, the Chinese, and even elements of the American Army . The main source of opposition was the British . India was the cornerstone of their entire imperial system, and British objectives in the war in Asia were, first, to retain control in India and, second, to reconquer the colonies ravished by the Japanese . China seemed remote to the British in every way . Since the United States was primarily responsible for the war against Japan, they felt that its strategy should be left in American hands ; if American political and military plans required the smashing of the blockade about China, the British felt it would be unseemly of them not to acquiesce, but they gave only acquiescence, not full co-operation. The British had vast reserves in India . They had an estimated million Indian troops, a sizable unit of the Royal Air Force, a native industrial system incomparably greater than China's . Most of the energy of the government in India was devoted, however, not to the
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prosecution of the war but to the maintenance of British rule . What military strength India could spare for the war against the Axis was diverted to the war against Germany, in which there was little danger that Indian troops would be contaminated by dangerous ideas . The British in India, like Chiang K'ai-shek in China, put most of their strength behind maintaining internal stability . This may seem a harsh judgment on the British troops, officers, and civil servants in India who sincerely believed they were furthering the great war against the Axis . In specific instances the co-operation of the Indian government with the American Army was magnificent . But the colonial framework within which the British worked, indeed their whole breeding and indoctrination, made their wholehearted cooperation impossible. Stilwell needed British aid in order to use India as his base for a plunge into the Burma jungles . The British, however, had been shocked into a state of funk by events in Burma and Malaya . Churchill felt that Burma was a bad place for white men-too malarial and with too enervating a climate . The British could not see how Stilwell, with a corporal's guard of Chinese and a few Indian divisions, could hope to make progress in an area the Japanese had won so easily . They did not want to begin any campaign in a colony they had lost until they had an overwhelming superiority in men and material, whereas Stilwell wanted to fight with bare equality or less . For two years Stilwell argued with the British command in the effort to goad them into activity, and tempers frayed to the breaking point. Politically, too, British interests diverged from Chinese and American . The British wanted Burma reconquered neither by Chinese, who were Orientals, nor by Americans, who were outsiders . They meant to have Burma again as a colony ; to re-establish their prestige it was important that it should be retaken by British forces under the same flag they had carried in defeat . The American political advisers of Stilwell and the Office of War Information under his command would have liked to raise the battle cry of freedom in the areas Stilwell planned to reconquer ; they knew this was impossible, and they were unhappy because they could not make American motives '5'
Stilwell's War
clear and clean in Asia . A propaganda campaign based on the idea of freedom-which, after all, was what the war was presumably being fought about-would have struck directly at British interests . The British were fighting two separate wars . In Europe they stood with all honor for the freedom of humanity and the destruction of the Nazi slave system ; in Asia, for the status quo, for the Empire, for colonialism. Chinese opposition to Stilwell's program is hard to analyze, for in theory the Chinese wanted the blockade of their country smashed as quickly as possible ; they did want a Burma campaign-but not at great cost to themselves. If they could crack the blockade by signing documents and agreeing to Allied decisions, they were all for it . But when it became necessary to implement strategy by concrete work, by energetic co-operation, that was something else . Chiang was perfectly willing to let Stilwell have his way with the Chinese troops cut off in India ; they were fed, supplied, armed by other powers . But for China to implement the strategy herself would have meant reform from the ground up-and reform would threaten the delicate balances of Chinese war-lord politics . The Chinese were convinced that America's entry into the war had doomed the Japanese; as one American wit said, "Pearl Harbor Day in America was Armistice Day out here ." The Chinese felt that they need only wait until the enemy crumbled before American strength . The third source of opposition to Stilwell's plan was within the US . Army, in the person of a man just as colorful, just as determined, as much admired and as much hated, as Stilwell himself. This was Claire Chennault, airman extraordinary . Chennault was the advocate of air power-completely, unreservedly . For his beliefs, expressed repeatedly and without hesitation, he was forced out of the US. Army and went to China in 1936, where he watched and analyzed the early battles of the Japanese air force against the Chinese and Russians . In 1941 he took out to Asia a handful of second-rate P-4o's and a collection of undisciplined, courageous, magnificent Army and Navy pilots from America to form the American Volunteer Group, which he welded into one of the most spectacular single striking groups in the history of aerial warfare, the Flying Tigers . When the
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Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, he was ready to fight . Chennault's men shot the Japanese out of the skies with relentless success day after day while other Allied air fronts throughout the Pacific were collapsing before the Japanese Zeros. With the establishment of the CBI command Chennault was brought back into uniform as a brigadier general and was given command of the China Air Task Force, which was later to become the independent Fourteenth Air Force . Chennault held that the Japanese could be, and would be, defeated by air power . He saw China not as a base for ground operations against the enemy army but as a vast staging ground for aerial operations against the enemy's heartland and sea lanes . He wanted to base his American air force in eastern China and lash out from the coast against the enemy's shipping and ports . He felt that fighting in Burma was a waste of time ; if he could sever Japan's ocean communications, the Japanese garrison in Burma would wither in starvation . To Chennault the Burma Road looked like a good thing to have but still a luxury ; all American supplies and effort should be concentrated on the one great task of flying material into China, where it should be converted primarily into air power in the form of strength for the Fourteenth Air Force-what was left should be turned over to the Chinese to do with as they saw fit . Chennault believed that with sufficient air power he could keep the Japanese armies in eastern China from attacking his bases . The Fourteenth Air Force would be the artillery and heavy support of the tired Chinese infantry . Stilwell, on the other hand, held that air power was subordinate to the over-all pattern. No air bases, he insisted, could be held in eastern China for aerial operations against the Japanese without a powerful Chinese army. This army could be developed only by equipping it with supplies brought in over the Burma Road . Therefore the road should have top priority-it was a prerequisite for staving off a Japanese attack against our air power . The great feud between Chennault and Stilwell rocked the entire American Army in China . You could be either a Stilwell man or a Chennault man ; to be friendly with both meant walking a tightrope . Both were dynamic, hardhitting fighting men . Both were badly served by aides who, conscious of the feud, delighted in feeding the bitterness of one commander 1 53
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against the other with bits of gossip . Only Major General Frank Merrill of Merrill's Marauders, of all the top personalities in the theater, sought to heal the breach . The bottleneck for all the conflicting ideas, strategies, and ambitions in China was the Hump . To understand the precise degree of happiness or unhappiness of any contender in the China sweepstakes, you had to know the tonnage he was currently receiving over the Hump . For two and a half years the only contact China had with America and the Allied world was the fantastic airline that crossed the Hump-the spurs of the Himalayas from upper Assam to the plateau of Yunnan . Loads carried over the Hump began at the rate of 8o tons a month in the spring of 1942 ; at the end of the war they were moving at the rate of 8o,ooo tons a month . In the process the Hump drove men mad, killed them, sent them back to America wasted with tropical fevers and broken for the rest of their lives . Some of the boys called it the Skyway to Hell ; it was certainly the most dangerous, terrifying, barbarous aerial transport run in the world . Unarmed cargo carriers crossed 500 miles of uncharted mountains and jungles at 20,000 feet in spite of the Japanese air force, tropical monsoons, and Tibetan ice . In some months the Hump command lost more planes and personnel than the combat outfit, the Fourteenth Air Force, that it supplied . It chewed up four commanders before 1943, when the Air Transport Command finally found in Brigadier General Tom Hardin a man whose spectacular will could master its problems . The Hump was the key to all politics in China . Stilwell, Chennault, and the Chinese government locked in bitter dispute over how the tonnage should be distributed . During most of the period of the blockade, cargo averaged less than 5000 tons a month. Not till Hardin took over in the fall of 1943 did tonnage begin to climb ; it passed io,ooo tons in December of '43 and reached 20,000 tons a month by the fall of 1944. Even io,ooo tons a month was nothing in the arithmetic of war . Two heavy raids by the Eighth Air Force out of England over Germany consumed more tonnage than was moved into the China area in an entire month . The three contenders for Hump tonnage-Stilwell, Chennault, and the Chinese government-were like men trapped and starved in a besieged city . The entire tonnage 1 54
Stilwell's War would have been insufficient for the needs of any one of the three ; split among them, it came only to a tantalizing less-than-subsistence ration. The three appealed again and again to Washington against the iniquities of their superiors, subordinates, -or colleagues ; quarrels over tonnage distribution reached even to the White House . Chennault wanted as much material as possible to feed into the forward eastern China bases where his boys were slaughtering Japanese shipping . Stilwell wanted as much material as possible for the ground forces to reopen the Burma Road and revitalize the Chinese army . The government wanted material to keep the arsenals and the civilian economy functioning at minimum efficiency . The American government promised over and over again that Hump tonnage would be increased to meet Chinese demands . But strain as they might, die as gallantly as they did, the airmen of the Hump could never meet the insatiable voracity of the beleaguered garrisons beyond the mountains . Stilwell, who, as commander in chief of the entire theater, bore the ultimate responsibility for distribution of the tonnage, was cursed from hell to breakfast by everyone whose demands were unsatisfied-from the sweat-stained GI, who wanted beer and Wacs, to the Chinese general staff, which wanted copper and trucks . The original strategy for Asia had emerged from the ChurchillRoosevelt White House conference the week after Pearl Harbor . It was then the Allies' intention to hold the Singapore-Indies line against the Japanese and to send supplies over the Burma Road into China to revive her for battle . The collapse of the entire Allied front in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1942 did not alter the basic continental strategy ; it merely delayed it . The Burma Road had been severed by the Japanese, and it was necessary to reopen the road before the plan to aid China could begin to operate . When Chiang K'ai-shek was given the honorific title of commander in chief of the Allied high command for the China theater, he asked for an American to serve as his chief of staff . The United States plucked Stilwell from command of an army corps in California and sent him off to Asia to serve as Chiang's chief of staff and to command 1 55
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all American forces in CBI . Caught in the disastrous Burma campaign, Stilwell marched out to India on foot ; his plan for the next two years was conceived during this march and was elaborated in the summer of 1942 . The first step was to be the training of the remnants of the Chinese army that had escaped to India from Burma . These troops would be the spearhead of the drive against the Burma barrier that the Japanese had raised on China's flank ; they would pierce Burma in the north, at a point farthest from Japan's bases of supply . At Kunming, within China, another training center for Chinese would be established ; here Americans would teach basic techniques and organize a Chinese force to strike at the Burma barrier from within . The two forces would act as pincers, one operating from Ledo in northern Assam, the other from the Salween in western China ; when they met, the blockade of China would be cut . These two movements were geared to fit with a longer-range plan . A third center for training Chinese was to be established in eastern China, at Kweilin . This center would not turn out so finished a product as the other two, for it would lack sufficient equipment and personnel, but it would indoctrinate the large infantry masses on the eastern front with American methods and practices . The three forces were styled respectively X, Y, and Z -X-ray, Yoke, and Zebra, three words that became famous in the CBI . These forces were the building blocks of Stilwell's plan. He began training the Indian force in the summer of 1942 . At Ramgarh, on the hot, dusty plain of central India, a training school was functioning by fall. Americans taught Chinese officers modern theory and gave them artillery and infantry practice ; they taught Chinese enlisted men signal corps work and 'veterinary work . In India, Chinese troops were for the first time fed as much as they could eat ; they were paid in hard cash ; they were given shoes, clothing, medical care, even vitamin pills . The Kunming school opened in early 1943 ; it was less lavish, for it could not feed the troops so well and could not supply them with artillery and significant items of equipment . The Kweilin school, which was not established till late in 1 943, gave Chinese officers only a hurried exposure to American practices . 156
m KWEIYANG
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KWEILIN
KUNMING LIUCHOW
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(JANAO)qj 2
SUPPLIES ARRIVE AT CALCUTTA, THEN GO BY RAIL TO ASSAM WHERE "HUMP"CARRIES THEM TO CHINA
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The timing of the over-all strategy was very simple. When the X forces from Burma met the Y forces from China and the road was open, both these forces, supplemented by the Z group, would move toward the coast of eastern China. There they would meet the American Navy, driving in from the Pacific to open a port . Direct communications would then be re-established across the Pacific between America and China, and the Japanese Empire would be cut in two . Although all the Allies agreed on the general plan of campaign, they never could agree to set it in motion . Stilwell wanted to fight as quickly, as earnestly, as heartily as possible, with whatever was at hand . He wanted to strike at Burma in the fall of 1942 ; the British overruled him . He wanted to strike in the spring of 1943 ; he was overruled again . He persisted tirelessly in demanding that the blockade of China be broken, and finally in November of 1943 he won the assent of the combined chiefs of staff to start a real effort to retake Burma . According to the Cairo plan the British would land on the coast in southern Burma, the Chinese would push across the Salween front with the Yoke forces, and Stilwell would command the X-ray forces, plunging through the jungles of northern Burma to the road junction . After the Cairo conference came the Allied meeting at Teheran, in December 1943, at which Stalin and the Americans insisted on a massive all-out effort across the English Channel to relieve the pressure on Russia . Stalin's attitude forced a reversal of the Cairo decision. If the Channel effort was to succeed, no landing boats could be spared for Burma . Stilwell was therefore designated to return to China and inform Chiang that the proposed British landings in southern Burma were canceled . Chiang, who had been only mildly enthusiastic about the Burma campaign, though he had committed himself to it at Cairo, now declared that if there were to be no landing by the British, there would be no offensive by the Chinese from the Salween. But he conceded full authority to Stilwell to do as he wished with the three Chinese divisions that had been created in India-to fight or not, as he chose, to go as far as he wanted in Burma, to set his own objectives and halt when he chose . Stilwell, convinced by now that nothing further could be gained by arguing or pleading in Delhi 158
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and Chungking, decided that he was fighting the Burma campaign alone, and he flew to northern Burma . There in January 1944 he launched the epic 2oo-mile jungle campaign that was to end at Myitkyina . That campaign was as primitive and terrifying a war as any in the world . No quarter was given by the enemy, by the jungle, or by disease . Chinese soldiers, Americans of Merrill's Marauders, Kachin scouts, British troopers, killed Japanese and were killed by them for five months in the rain and heat of the swamps . Stilwell, dressed in dirty khaki, puffing cigarettes, wearing a floppy, old-fashioned campaign hat, was almost always within the sound of gunfire . From late December 1943 to May 1944 he was in the jungle almost constantly except for a few days of absence to handle necessary paper work in Delhi or Chungking . By April when the campaign to everybody's astonishment was nearing success, Chiang K'ai-shek consented to launch the trans-Salween offensive to complement the Burma drive . Some felt that Stilwell's proper position was at a desk in headquarters, in the high diplomacy and the intricate administration of his vast theater, but Stilwell felt otherwise . There was a war to be fought in Burma and no one to fight it but himself ; no other man had the faith, will, or energy to drive untried Chinese divisions through the jungle to victory over Japanese veterans . Nothing anywhere else in the whole theater was nearly so pressing, to him, as proving to the world that the Chinese could fight and conquer the Japanese-nothing so significant to the war effort as the cracking of the blockade. In the history of the China war the Burma campaign stands by itself. This was the only offensive combat victory won by Chinese troops against the Japanese in eight years of campaigning .
The average GI in China knew little about the struggle in the stratosphere of Army policy and cared less . He lived on bad food, in stinking, rat-infested Chinese hostels ; he had to fight off heat, mud, and disease. No one bothered to explain to him what the war was about . All he knew was what lay within the routine of his daily 1 59
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life-and he hated it . The United States government was Uncle Chump from over the Hump ; Chiang K'ai-shek was Chancre Jack ; Sun Yat-sen was Sunset Sam ; all Chinese were "slope-headed bastards," shortened in general conversation to the simple term "slopy ." The main port of entry for all Americans into China was Kunming, capital of Yunnan. Before the war Kunming had been even more backward than Chungking . Its streets were narrow, its alleyways filthy ; it was one of the national strongholds of the opium merchants . Almost up to the outbreak of war its prostitutes were penned in a street chained off at both ends ; rich families bought girl slaves to serve in the household . The province was ruled by a curious character called Lung Yun, one of the most devious and shaky supports of the national government . Lung disliked Chiang K'ai-shek, but his power in the province was so strong that not until after V-J Day did Chiang dare attack him . Within two months of victory, however, the Generalissimo moved against the governor, occupied his capital in a daring coup, and brought Lung in disgrace to Chungking . The war had dumped into this medieval cesspool two elements out of the twentieth century in the shape of the finest refugee universities in China and the shrewdest banking and commercial speculators in the land. Both these elements were sheltered by the governor, the refugee universities because their liberal professors formed a front of restrained but vociferous opposition to Chiang's dictatorship, the speculators because their completely unscrupulous blackmarketeering, added daily to the wealth of the city he ruled . By the time the American invasion of Kunming began, the prostitutes had been freed from their chained street, opium-smoking had gone underground, and the city had acquired a facade of respectability . Americans usually arrived at the big airport south of the city . For two or three years this airport was one of the busiest on the globe . It handled most of the Hump traffic, all Chinese civilian traffic, the Chinese National Airlines' commercial carriers, the courier and mail services, and the combat missions of the Fourteenth Air Force . It was a gay place, lying just to the north of a long blue lake, in the lee of a towering, scar-sided mountain called Old Baldy . Old Baldy
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was the first China landmark go per cent of American soldiers saw as they came and the last they looked back on as they departed . You could lie on the grass beside the runways and look up in the sky and see at any moment everything from C-54's and B-24's down to L-5's and L-4's mixing in the congested traffic patterns of the upper air. The field was never silent for a moment from the roar of plane motors except when a monsoon shut it down completely . Within a few miles of the airport were scattered fifteen hostels for American personnel, each with five to ten buildings . Of the 70,000 Americans in China probably half were stationed for a longer or shorter period in the Kunming hostels . These were run by the Chinese government, which established a special branch of supply specifically for the care and feeding of Americans . By Chinese standards the hostels were models of elegance . They were warm, they were dry, and the Chinese thought the food was excellent . The Chinese did their best to feed the Americans what they thought Americans liked -eggs, chicken, pork, vegetables . To most of the Chinese mess attendants and the Chinese soldiers who guarded the buildings even the slops of the American tables were fit for kings . But the average American looked on his accommodations with a jaundiced eye . Six to eight men, crammed into one room, slept on double-tiered bunks ; helmets, gas masks, foot lockers, barracks bags, tumbled about in the dust and confusion of the little cubicles . The Americans were nauseated by the filth, grease, and general putrefaction of the messes, which, however, were cleaner than anything the Chinese army had for itself ; almost every American who ate at them came down with some variety of dysentery or diarrhea during his stay in China. In the barracks Americans, yelling and cursing, vented their wrath on Chinese serving boys, until finally one American headquarters solemnly posted a general order : "U.S . personnel will not beat, kick, or maltreat Chinese personnel under any circumstances . Such is not the policy of this headquarters ." Before the war Kunming had been a resort town . It was 6ooo feet high ; the climate was delightfully clear through most of the year, and the intoxicating sun and sky seemed always to evoke a gay lightheadedness. The American soldiers worked during daylight hours
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and saw the city usually after dark . Once or twice a week, or as often as they could get a pass, enlisted men would pour into town in search of wine, women, and entertainment, and Chinese touts and racketeers would pluck them clean . Restaurants served buffalo steak at $5.00 a head ; whisky was black-marketed at $ioo a bottle and up . Fortunate officers made alliances with English-speaking Chinese college students, with nurses, with Red Cross girls . The enlisted men, all of whom seemed bent on finding out personally whether it was true what they said about Chinese women, had to be satisfied with commercialized sex or do without . Venereal disease rates soared . Entertainment for Americans in Kunming consisted of going to the movies, which were always old and usually bad, or playing poker for stakes that sometimes ran into thousands of dollars, or getting drunk . Some of the air-force squadrons could get enough machinery together to make small distilleries and produce a bad potage out of brown sugar, but most of the men stuck to the tried-and-tested Chinese chin pao juices-mao tai, pai kar, yellow wine, potato alcohol. The army could not spare its precious Hump tonnage to haul beer, liquor, or normal PX supplies over the mountains. USO troupes were likewise few and far between ; the big names seldom came to China . When the big names did come, with a few exceptions like the popular Jinx Falkenburg-Pat O'Brien troupe, they left a foul taste in the mouth of all who had to deal with them . If life was rugged in Kunming, it was worse in the dozens of outposts that were gradually set down all through the land . The Y and Z forces split up their men and officers into teams of four or five who were scattered over all the southern fronts . The men lived with Chinese regimental, divisional, army headquarters in the field . Each American team consisted of a radio set, a jeep, a few enlisted men, one or two officers, and a few cases of dehydrated rations ; each team had a Chinese interpreter and usually a Chinese cook . They lived in deserted farmhouses, temples, paddy fields, jungle hammocks . They trudged through the dust with the, Chinese, crawled over mudslick mountain trails, slapped at mosquitoes, learned to eat rice and like it, grew either to hate or to love one another . Some of these men
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came to know the Chinese to whom they were assigned and to cherish a real affection for them ; most of them did not. The men of the air force lived much better in the field than they did at Kunming. Chennault believed in delegating responsibility and giving his deputies free rein. He placed the eastern China operations in the hands of one of the youngest Americans ever to be made a general, Clinton ("Casey") Vincent, only twenty-nine, and he assigned to Vincent, as his deputy, Colonel David ("Tex") Hill, also twenty-nine ; to these two he turned over the offensive . The young men, both accomplished combat pilots, made the forward echelon of the Fourteenth Air Force a name to conjure with . From their eastern China bases they sank over half a million tons of Japanese shipping and drove the Japanese out of the skies of China south of the Yangtze. The forward echelon had its headquarters in Kweilin, the most lovable and abandoned city in the Orient . Here, as in Kunming, a group of Chinese liberals took shelter under war-lord provincialism to needle the Central Government of Chiang K'ai-shek . For intellectual Americans there was always good conversation ; for Americans of a more earthy sort there were women . Kweilin swarmed with tarts of every degree, fat, thin, stocky, fragile, sturdy. The famous prostitutes of Hongkong had fled inland after the Japanese occupied their home town, and most of them came to Kweilin to re-establish business ; they were silken-clad girls with ivory bodies and complete devotion to their art. The town had two red-light districts ; one was Slit Alley, north of the bridge, off limit to American personnel because of the VD rate, and the other was the main street itself, where the girls thronged every evening, two and three deep, in a symphony of squeals, giggles, laughter, and general jollity . There was no sense of shame, in the orthodox sense, anywhere in the fabulous town . The hotels were full of women waiting for Americans ; they liked the Americans with honest enthusiasm ; they learned American slang and American anatomical terms and spoke all the harsh words in silver, flutelike tones that robbed them of all dirtiness . The harlots, of course, were infiltrated through and through with Japanese agents, and the American counterintelligence corps was petulantly impotent 163
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to stop the leakage of information from the main combat base of the Fourteenth Air Force to the enemy . The one abiding sentiment that almost all American enlisted personnel and most of the officers shared was contempt and dislike for China. Most Americans were attached to the air corps, the service of supply, or training units. They saw little of the Chinese soldier in the field ; no more than a few hundred Americans in China had seen Chinese troops march helplessly against enemy positions and die on their feet . Few of them knew or cared how the Chinese peasant lived ; they saw only the Chinese government, the corrupt officials, the black marketeers . They believed that all Chinese were corrupt, inefficient, and unreliable . Americans saw the black market filled with goods that bore U .S . Army insignia, and they knew that such goods could be bootlegged onto the commercial market only from supplies that other Americans had flown across the Hump at the risk of their lives. With total lack of discrimination they believed that the people were as their government . They saw the squalor, filth, and ignorance of the Chinese peasant and peasant soldier ; the sight inspired them not with compassion or pity but with loathing and revulsion . Americans lived in a wasteland of loneliness and ignorance themselves ; they were 15,000 miles from home ; and they ascribed all their misery to the Chinese among whom they dwelt. The GI's and their officers were afloat in a sea of foggy rumors ; they told each other stories that grew with monstrous exaggeration at each retelling . They literally believed that the Chinese were hiding thousands of planes in the hills, though the Chinese air force had only a few hundred shabby, useless planes laid up for lack of parts and gasoline. They believed that the Chinese had stored literally millions of barrels of oil and gasoline in the north for war against the Communists . They believed in all seriousness that everything that was given to the Chinese government was sold by it to commercial speculators for gold . Almost every American soldier knew a few Chinese whom he liked ; most of them loved Chinese children ; they liked to joke with the houseboys ; the officers enjoyed the sincere friendship they found in cultivated Chinese homes . But each one 1 64
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would exempt the few Chinese he knew from the circle of his contempt and curse the rest with unflagging fervor and eloquence . The feeling was bone-deep and bitter . During the great retreat in 1944, when all the Fourteenth Air Force bases in East China were falling before the Japanese drive, one officer was heard to say, "God, I'd just like to kill one slopy before I get out of here ." The uneducated American attitude was a major tragedy in a land of many tragedies. No one attempted to explain the war to the American soldier, to teach him how and why the Chinese people were as they were . High diplomacy made it impossible to tell the American soldier that the Chinese people loathed corruption even more intensely, because it affected them more bitterly . No one, finally, tried to distinguish between the Chinese people, who were profoundly good, and the Chinese government, which was profoundly bad . One evening at the close of the Burma campaign a number of correspondents were invited to talk to a group of wounded and sick Americans in an army hospital at Myitkyina . The session lasted almost two hours . When it was over, one of the wounded men walking out of the back of the hall said, "You know, that's the first time I ever heard anybody say a good word about the Chinese."
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wound across the paths between the fields, passed silently into the grayness behind. A Chinese crowd is usually a chattering carnival, as mobile as quicksilver and rippling with laughter and curses . But grief and frost had congealed these men to a soundless hush . They lifted one foot after another, mechanically and without thought, and like animals they plodded on into the distance . In far-distant times primitive men may have migrated thus from prehistoric lands of cold and hunger to lands of food and warmth . The little knots of people who studded the paths repeated the same patterns . A dozen times an hour some father pushed a wheelbarrow past, the mother hauling at it in front with a rope, the baby on the padding sometimes silent, sometimes crying ; or the woman of the family sat sidesaddle on her mule with her baby in her,arms, like an unhappy madonna, while the father belabored the rear of the mule with a staff . Old women hobbled along on bound feet, stumbled and fell ; no one picked them up . Other old women rode pickaback on the strong shoulders of their sons, staring through coal-black eyes at the hostile sky . Young men, walking alone, strode at quicker pace, with all their possessions in a kerchief over their shoulder . Small mounds of rags by the roadside marked where the weak had collapsed ; sometimes a few members of a family stood staring at a body in silent perplexity . The children leaned on their staffs like old men ; some carried bundles as large as themselves ; others were dreamwalkers whose unseeing eyes were a thousand years old with suffering. Behind them all, from the land of famine a cold wind blew, sending the dust chasing them over the yellow plain . The march had been going on for weeks ; it was to continue for weeks more . Five hours brought us to the point where regular rail traffic began again . The railway administration had made ready a private car to take us to Loyang, the provincial capital, and by midmorning we were there. The bishop of the Loyang Catholic mission was a greathearted American, Thomas Megan of Eldora, Iowa, a man reported to know more about the famine than anyone else in the north . Megan accepted us kindly and gave us warm food, and when we rode forth two days later, he accompanied us . Our objective was the town of Chengchow, a three days' journey-one by truck, then two by horse. 168
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to supply camouflage . The sweat rolled from them ; dust rose about them ; the heat clutched the entire country, and giddy, glistening waves rose from the rice paddies . Along the way we came on knots of peasants who had been rounded up by the civilian officials for the service of the army . The unit commanders stopped at these stations to pick up baggage bearers, just as a truck in any other army would stop to pick up gasoline at a filling station. The peasants marched with the troops until they were exhausted, then fell out, were fed rice, and were sent back to the service stations again . At night the army holed up for a short rest in the deserted villages a few miles back from the front . The soldiers seized for food what pigs or vegetables the peasants had left in their flight ; they tore boards, doors, and wall planking from peasant homes to make beds; they chopped up staves, fence posts, and rafters to make fire for boiling their water and rice . At three-thirty the next morning the attack was launched . The Japanese held the high hills south of Hengyang ; the Sixty-second held a lower ridge facing them . The attacking division had two French seventy-fives, from the First World War, and a few trench mortars . It had 200 shells for the seventy-fives, and it expended them as a miser counts out gold coins . From three-thirty till midmorning the Chinese crawled up the slopes to the Japanese positions . Their rifles and bayonets tried to shoot or dig the enemy out, but at midmorning the Japanese were still there . Graham Barrow and I clambered up to the highest Chinese position in the afternoon to watch the fight. The Chinese mortars whistled fitfully over the crest where the Japanese were dug in ; machine guns and rifles rattled at long intervals in the summer heat ; not a man was moving along the entire line. We waited for three days to see the counteroffensive get under way ; then we set our faces homeward . We realized that what we had seen had been the counteroffensive, and nothing more would come of the campaign. All that flesh and blood could do the Chinese soldiers were doing . They were walking up hills and dying in the sun, but they had no support, no guns, no directions . They were doomed. 188
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times . The sergeant waited a moment as the gasoline trickled from the holed drums and its fumes filled the rooms . Then he fired once more, and the fumes caught in a single burst . Sometimes thatched roofs lifted several feet in the air at the flash, and then fire rippled through the rooms like racing water. The fires flared in red, gold, and white brilliance, each one capped by black oil smoke . When the thatched roof caught, the fire spilled down from crest to eaves in incredibly swift runlets . The green grass on the hills looked fresh as day in the light of the fires . One by one the buildings went till all the valley blazed as if a monstrous army had lit campfires in the night . From other dumps we heard the booming of explosives letting go and bombs in the distance . In some of the shacks there was ammunition, rifle and pistol clips that careless men had left behind ; it popped off like crackling corn . A cache of tracer bullets in one shack went up in the air and penciled white and red arches over the hills . Two planes were left on the last strip the next morning, one a cargo carrier, the other Casey Vincent's personal B-25 . I flew out with Casey that morning . He pulled the B-25 into the air and wheeled it back to the field . Waving black plumes of smoke showed where our barracks had been ; only one strip was still left of the greatest American installation in China, the one that was to be used till the last moment to rush supplies to Chang Fa-kwei's beleaguered garrison . The others were potholed with black craters as ugly as eyeless sockets. "I'm going to write a book about this campaign," said Vincent . "I'm going to call it Fire and Fall Back ." In the next week the Japanese drove within 25 miles of Kweilin ; then, instead of striking in immediate assault, they halted five weeks to regroup and regather their overextended supply lines . It was as if the stage manager of the war had called a halt to field activity so that the audience might devote its full attention to events in the capital. A crisis was developing there ; it became known in America later simply as the Stilwell crisis . Its ingredients were mixed and confused ; sharply etched personalities were snarling at one another, contending parties were denouncing each other, and popular criticism of the 193
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4 . A coalition government should be established in which they and other minority parties might participate . 5. The government should recognize the legitimacy of all the "liberated" regions as popularly elected governments . Nonpartisan opinion held these Communist demands to be well justified on the whole except for the last .* The Communist-controlled liberated regions spread all over the Yellow River basin and the entire lower Yangtze from Shanghai through Nanking to Canton. To recognize these governments would reduce the Kuomintang to a secondary power in the land ; it would mean that when peace came, the Communists would be in control of the richest, most highly developed areas of the coast, while the Kuomintang would still be locked in the hinterland. It was probable, however, that the Communists had advanced the last demand for bargaining purposes in order to gain their more immediate cad pressing desires and that they stood ready to yield halfway . Indeed, in the following year they did abandon their claim to the Yangtze Valley . The bargaining, which began in May 1 944, broke down in late summer . By that time it was evident that any solution within China must await a solution of China's relations with America-and Chinese-American relations were mounting to the Stilwell crisis.
* Nonpartisan opinion, both Chinese and foreign, usually favored the Communists in their great debates with the Kuomintang. The reason for this was simple . The Central Government until 1944 forbade any journalist or observer to travel in Communist territory ; it insisted that its own version of the Communist problem be fully accepted. It denounced the Communists with its every resource of vituperation. The standing Communist reply to government charges was an invitation to all journalists to come and visit their areas of operation and see for themselves whether the charges were true or false . With one party to a dispute refusing permission for independent investigation of its charges and the other party inviting it, public opinion almost invariably sides with the group inviting investigation.
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while prices tripled, government productive bureaus were limited to budget increases of only 2o per cent . The ordnance department of the Chinese army found it easier and cheaper to get copper from American Lend-Lease, airborne over the Hump, than to purchase it from the government's own factories within a hundred miles of the armament plants . Government steel plants were operating at only 2o per cent of capacity, because army arsenals could not afford to buy the finished steel for conversion into arms . Through the summer of 1944 the American Embassy kept pressing matters that seemed undebatable-a clean and vigorous administration, unity, thorough-going reform. The American Embassy already foresaw the bitterness that was to mature the next year in full-fledged civil war. It urged Chiang to create a representative government for China to express the will of all groups and all parties, to let fresh air into the close atmosphere of its one-party dictatorship . Shrewdly assessing America's own self-interest, Gauss urged Chiang to come to some sort of friendly agreement with the Russians in order that China itself might not become a bone of contention in some future Russian-American rivalry . The pleadings of Gauss and Stilwell fell on deaf ears . In August 1944 President Roosevelt packaged all the problems of China into a neat bundle and handed it to the famous HurleyNelson mission . This mission had sweeping presidential authority to consider every detail of the China crisis . Both men were Roosevelt's personal emissaries . Donald Nelson was to offer the donkey a carrot to make it move, while Patrick J . Hurley was to push it from behind . Nelson was a one-man comfort corps offering a blueprint for the future that seemed one step short of Paradise . He was to survey China's war industries and her economic structure, devise ways and means of increasing production, find out what American supplies China needed, determine how American technical specialists could be best used, and investigate possibilities of postwar trade and investment . He was eminently suited for the task . Hurley, a wealthy lawyer from Oklahoma, had the far more difficult assignment of harmonizing relations between Chiang and Stilwell, securing the
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measure the barrier of language; most have consumed innumerable cups of tea and interminable dinners with Kuomintang officials and with Communist generals. Others have been so at home in this friendly country that they have ridden camels in Mongolia and captured giant pandas . They have all been overburdened by a wealth of Chinese advice, knowledge, and impressions, which most of them have hastened to put into print while it all remained timely and vivid . In bulk these books represent a stupendous but chaotic accretion of information . Very few, indeed, have been planned along broad enough lines to give any sort of panoramic view of the confusing tides of war and revolution that still convulse that exhausted na-
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Chapter 15
Politics in Yenan
OU came down on Yenan from the air, over the roof of North China, after endless miles of topless loess hills whose weathered contours were graced by gentle yellow and brown fields. Within the vast monotony of these semiarid hills, whose arroyos and gulches ran crazily to the horizon, three canyons came together in a slender green flatland . From the air it had the look of a bandit's lair, hidden in the inaccessible fastnesses of the hills, with a note of incongruity touched in by a T'ang pagoda perched atop a low peak, yellow and incredibly lovely against the blue sky. If you came to it by land through the blockade, two days by truck or five days by horse, the place seemed no different from hundreds of other county seats in northern China, except perhaps that it was much cleaner and its people moved with unaccustomed snap and vigor . Its sights were familiar-pack animals with red tassels over their heads, tufted camels from the desert, people padded in thick garments, the thick, choking loess dust of the northland . The atmosphere was different from Chungking ; it was dry and sparkling in summer, frigid but exhilarating in winter . Yenan was a confusing place . A substratum of 30,000 of its people were native to it ; their forefathers had lived there time out of mind . They ate the same foods, spoke the same dialects, wore the same clothes, as all northern Chinese. But there was something more that did not belong to China at all ; the people were ruddier, healthier, and the proportion of young to old was striking . There was bustle and excitement, pitched to the sound of shrill bugles echoing and rebounding from the hills at dawn in silver clarity . The confusion could be
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resolved only by deciding that Yenan was not a political capital, nor an experimental station in politics, nor a Chinese county seat, but a camp, a field headquarters, a provisional command post, ready to be struck and moved on the morrow . This camp centered about two main groups of buildings, the headquarters of the Communist Party and the headquarters of the Communist army . Party headquarters were tucked away beneath the hills in two large buildings of gray brick ; the senior officers of the party-all except Mao Tse-tung-made their homes in clean whitewashed caves near by . Army headquarters were located in an old compound, surrounded by gardens of limpid loveliness, a few hundred yards from the Yen River . These two headquarters were the directing brains of the entire Communist movement . Out of them sped the directives that agitated, trained, and molded the 12,ooo-odd party members who lived and worked in caves that studded the slopes of the hills for miles about the town ; out of these headquarters came commands and guidance that reached from Manchuria to Canton, from Hankow to Shanghai, to mobilize the millions of peasants who formed the base of the movement . The leaders of the Communist Party were a highly interesting group . They could be studied only from the outside, for what went on in their inner councils was a tight secret . Their primary characteristic was their sense of unity. They had been fighting together for twenty years, against the Kuomintang and then against the Japanese ; their families had been tortured, murdered, lost . They had been subjected to every form of police espionage and suppression . The weak had fallen ; the faint of heart had surrendered . Those who were left were tough as leather, hard as iron ; they trusted one another and hung together in a unity that showed no fissure of factionalism . What disputes they had were locked within themselves ; not even the vast majority of party members knew who opposed whom in the all-highest Political Bureau . The leaders had the character of an elite. They were cocky, some of them arrogant . No such burden of politics and administration as plagued the harassed officials of Chungking weighed them down . Conversations with them were pleasantly unhurried sessions ; they reflected on policy for meditative hours, and when interviewed, 227
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they might talk on and on about any particular point of theory that struck them as important . They were above the tangle of paper work ; they thought for the long range, while trusted juniors executed their decisions . These leaders lived with little of the ostentation of Chungking's topmost officials, though they had cleaner homes and better food than the rank and file . They made no fetish of equalitarianism . Here was no such vast gulf as separated a Chungking cabinet minister from his shivering, threadbare office clerk ; but physical distinctions of comfort and convenience were accepted as needing no comment or justification . Though the leaders were recognized and accepted as the elite, they prided themselves on their democracy, and they hewed out for themselves a code of manners to match their professions . Party policy had decreed a production drive after the Kuomintang blockade in 1941 to make the Yenan area self-sufficient . Peasants had been urged to expand their sowing and harvesting . All government officials and party members were expected to cultivate land in order to raise their own food and lift the burden of their support from the local peasants . This drive had been superlatively successful, and the party and its functionaries lived not on taxes but on the sweat of their own brow . Mao Tse-tung tended a tobacco patch ; before the war he had smoked cheap Chinese cigarettes, but now, to keep himself in smokes, he toiled at his tobacco plants and raised enough for all party headquarters. Chu Teh, the commander in chief, grew cabbages . Most of the senior leaders prided themselves on their approachability . Mao, it is true, lived in a suburb several miles beyond the town and was exalted above ordinary mortals . But the others dealt casually with all comers . At the regular Saturday evening dances at Communist army headquarters, where music was supplied by a sad collection of horns, paper-covered combs, and native string instruments, Chu Teh sedately waltzed about with little office girls, and the burly chief of staff, Yeh Chien-ying, gayly accepted invitations to two-step from any maiden who had enough pluck to ask him . These simple, earthy men did not look like any terrible threat to Chungking and world stability. But when you examined their thinking and listened to their conversation, you found a stubborn, irre228
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ducible realism . The first thing you noticed was their knowledge of China . They knew their own country thoroughly and understood the villages . They were engineers of social relationships, and they knew precisely what the peasants' grievances were and precisely how those grievances could be transmuted into action . They based their strength on the peasant, and no matter how discursive or theoretical their Marxist dogmas might be, they always wound up with certain basic conclusions that could be translated into ideas the most illiterate peasant would understand and accept as his own . Their ignorance of the outside world was sometimes shocking . They knew little of high finance, protocol, or Western administration ; their understanding of industry, Western engineering, and international commerce was primitive . They knew Western history only as interpreted by Marxist classics . One of them, for example, in tracing an analogy between China and America, asked me whether or not America had had electric lighting at the time of the American Revolution . But they knew down to the last detail the impact of the Western world on China and how they planned to harness the energy and technology of the West for the benefit of the peasant . They were smug . Chungking had expected them to wither away when the blockade was imposed in 1941 ; instead they had survived, and by 1944, when I visited Yenan, they were physically and mentally sounder than the Chungking leaders . They were so completely sure that their way was perfect that they found it difficult to ascribe any valor or ability to the officials or the soldiers of Chungking . They glowed with self-confidence ; there was always a slight tinge of sanctimoniousness in their speech . You were reminded sometimes of the religious summer camps where people go about clapping each other on the back in rousing pious good-fellowship . Mao Tse-tung's personality dominated Yenan . Mao was a short, stocky Hunanese with a round, unlined, curiously serene face, which, however, was more vivid and more given to broad smiles than the disciplined countenance of Chiang K'ai-shek . Mao drew his audiences to him with an almost conversational tone-asking questions, making earthy puns, gesticulating . There was no formal hierarchy among the Communists, but Mao was set on a pinnacle of adoration . His unchal229
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lenged grip on the party was more intimate and more difficult to define than the grip Chiang K'ai-shek had on his zealots . It was due in part to a solid affection, in part to unchallenged intellectual pre-eminence . He had led the Communist Party for almost twenty years, trudged with the heroes of the Long March from Southern China in 1 935, suffered with the party in the years of hunger . Like Chiang, Mao had something of the teacher in him, and the party regarded him as an oracle . His leadership had brought the party from a ragged underground to huge power in war and international affairs . His leadership was theoretical, but the theories he expounded made sense, and they succeeded in the field . It was dogma in Yenan that Mao was merely the senior among his comrades, first among equals, that his voice in council bore weight only because it was the wisest . Actually, however, Mao was an emotional symbol, and his will was perhaps even more dominant in the Communist Party than Chiang's in the Kuomintang . At public meetings it was not unusual for other members of the Political Bureau, men of great rank themselves, to make ostentatious notes on Mao's free-running speeches as if drinking from the fountain of knowledge . Nor were panegyrics of the most high-flown, almost nauseatingly slavish eloquence unusual . Definitely second in the party was Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Red armies . Mao and Chu were linked by decades of friendship and common struggles ; among the Communists there was no doubt that Mao came first . The Communist Party, like the Kuomintang, had a skeletal similarity to the Russian Communist Party, on which both had been modeled . Theoretically the supreme organ of the party was - a national congress, which chose an executive committee, which in turn chose the Political Bureau, in practice the top council of all . The Communist Party had had no national congress since 1928 . Since then the Communists had been hunted and driven about by the Kuomintang and the Japanese so that no elections could be held . The central executive committee met rarely, and direction of the party lay in the hands of the Political Bureau . This bureau was dominated by the imposing personality of Mao . It included also Chu Teh, the soldier commander ; Chou En-lai, the brilliant and tempestuous
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insurrectionary who was ambassador to the Central Government in Chungking ; and Liu Hsiao-ch'i, a man little known to the outside world, who was general secretary of the party and a shrewd, hardworking administrator . Other thinkers and executives were also included in Yenan's council of senior statesmen . A much sharper distinction was made between policy and administration in Yenan than in Chungking . The Political Bureau made the critical decisions governing economic policy, attitudes toward the Central Government, and foreign policy ; and the smoothly co-ordinated organs of the party and the army unquestioningly executed these decisions . Yenan was a huge laboratory to which students and enthusiasts brought their best ideas ; in the hill caves the party hammered these ideas into national policy, molded the talents into organizing ability, and pumped both ideas and personnel back into the field . It was estimated that the Communists at Yenan had trained some 40,000 young men and women by 1 944 . Yenan insisted that it was a functioning democracy . Administratively, freedom of criticism and discussion was practically unlimited . Anyone could attack the improper carrying out of an accepted directive, the blunders of civilian or military officials . In fact the Communists indulged periodically in orgies of self-purification, when they would examine each of their own sins with a magnifying glass . They beat their chests in pledges of self-improvement, wore sackcloth and ashes for their blunders. In the field this freedom of administrative criticism created the most democratic system of government the villagers had ever known . Local councils could answer their complaints and wants, and for the first time they were full citizens in a community . High Communist policy was something else again . The Political Bureau handed down high policy after the leaders had argued it out, and Yenan made no criticism . Unanimity on policy was total in Yenan-a stark contrast to Chungking, where Communist papers guardedly criticized the government and independent papers delighted in slipping one over on the censors . There was only one newspaper at Yenan . No one grumbled loudly, at least to foreigners, about what the government should or should not do . Every now and then the local newspaper threw its columns open to
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bitter analyses by party members that highlighted flaws in party policy and conduct, but there was none of the critical atmosphere of Chungking, where the cynical, civilized bureaucrats of the Kuomintang gossiped and picked each other to pieces constantly . Yenan's unanimity of spirit could be judged as you wished . One explanation was that Yenan stressed action, not politics ; people kept so busy at their work that they had little time for political disputation . Communist sympathizers claimed that the unanimity came from total agreement, but few systems of government are so perfect that they evoke total accord spontaneously . Cynicism is an essential part of politics, and when it is missing, something of the savor of freedom is also lacking . The Kuomintang claimed that Yenan's unity was totalitarian, that Yenan operated with secret police, with concentration camps, with all the other apparatus that the Kuomintang possessed itself but denied possessing. I could find no evidence of any such machinery of oppression in Yenan ; I was there for only a few brief weeks, but other Americans who were there for months were equally unaware of any such Communist apparatus of dictatorship as Chungking had mastered . In the field there were verifiable instances of Communist brutality to the rich and to the landed . There were verifiable instances of Communist gunmen at work in the underground in Japanese-occupied cities, and it was well known that in the past Communist terrorists had fought and killed both Kuomintang spies and Communist traitors . But all that was part of war . Chungking argued that whereas the Central Government permitted a Communist paper to publish in its capital, under rigid censorship, no opposition paper at all was permitted in Yenan . To this the Communists had a pat answer, difficult to refute . The printing press on which they published their paper had been smuggled through from a Japanese-occupied city ; the paper on which they printed was brought out of the occupied areas under the guns of the Japanese. If the Kuomintang wished to publish in Yenan, they said publicly, let the Kuomintang send a printing press and enough paper into their city ; they would gladly allow it . The Communists promised that in the postwar world all groups should be allowed to print precisely what they chose in a completely free press . They pointed
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out that no foreign correspondent's dispatch from Yenan had ever been censored. I questioned one of the top-ranking leaders sharply about this : "You mean that anybody will be able to say exactly what he wants, no matter what it is, just as in America?" "Yes," was the reply, "they can say anything they want as long as they are not enemies of the people." Who should decide what enemies of the people were and what standards of judgment should be used was not explained. The life of the Communists seemed undemocratic, because there was no organized opposition political party ; this was explained historically . The Communists had organized themselves best and strongest in the hill regions and in the roadless plains where the Japanese could not penetrate. These regions, because of their backwardness, were precisely those that were least alert politically before the war ; the ancient villages the Communists dominated were villages where no political parties had been organized, and no man had thought beyond the harvest and the market. In establishing their party in such villages, in growing from a membership of 200,000 to 1,ooo,ooo during the war, the Communists had worked on virgin minds and made the most active personalities part of their machine. They acknowledged that the lack of an opposition was undemocratic, and they instituted a scheme called the 3-3-3 system, by which not more than one-third of those elected to any county or regional council could be members of the Communist Party. At least onethird had to be members of the Kuomintang Party (although the Kuomintang claimed that such people were renegades), and another third nonpartisan . In practice the system did not always work this way, but the Communists tried to keep their own proportion from exceeding the accepted third . In fact it mattered little whether the Communists had more or less than a third . In each regional government they were the only group that was linked to a nation-wide policy with a cohesive program . They were the leaders of the army that was the shield of the peasantry . They set policy, and by and large the peasants accepted the Communists as their own leaders, as an expression of their own will . 233
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The Chinese Communists flatly deny the assumption of many American friends that they are merely agrarian reformers, not Communists at all . They insist they are Communists in the full sense of the word, and they are proud of it . Communism, they say, is the application of Marxist principles to the problems of a changing society ; the principles are constant whether applied in Russia, America, or China. Since each of these societies is different, however, the application of the same principles will yield different results . In practice the Chinese Communists are among the world's greatest empiricists, trial-and-error artists par excellence. Their principles have led them in the course of twenty years along a changing party line that always, at any given moment, has been presented as the ultimate, unquestionable truth . Most other Communist parties have been in a position of irresponsible theoretical opposition, but the Communists of China have been governing millions of their fellow men for a score of years . Their discussions are practical ; the fundamental question is always, "Will it work?" The current quotient of Marxist principles in Chinese society is laid down in a book by Mao Tse-tung, The New Democracy, published in Yenan in 1940 . This book is still the Bible of the movement . It was written during the Nazi-Soviet pact period and many passages would probably be different if it had been written somewhat later . These passages are interesting as showing the mentality of the Communist movement in China at the time ; the book completely ignores the role of America in the Pacific and declares, for example, that "without the assistance of the Soviet Union, final victory in China against Japan is impossible ." The book is noteworthy because it represents a basic change in the party line from the more radical revolutionary principles of the 1930's and because it was written before the profound impact the American war later made on Japan . The Communists are hardheaded men ; they reach for power constantly . Mao's book is hardheaded and in many respects brilliant, a program of action that sets forth broad standards by which the party can guide itself in any given situation. Originally, in southern China, the party stood for a program of sovietization of Chinese land-for expropriation, for mass uprisings, 2 34
Politics in Yenan
for punishment of the landlords ; in southern China they had denounced the San Min Chu I of Sun Yat-sen as a sham device to destroy the people . When they were driven north, they adopted a new line calling for a united front of all elements against the Japanese . They had decided on this policy as a means of ending civil war and preventing further Japanese invasion ; internationally it coincided with general Comintern policy, which shifted to a call for united fronts everywhere at that time. By their agreement with the Kuomintang in 1937 the Communists accepted the San Min Chu I and gave up their policy of expropriation and sovietization of the land . They adhered scrupulously to this agreement, and by 1941 their new tactics had succeeded beyond all expectation . Mao's book is a formal Statement of a policy that had been in successful operation for some years. The main goal is still socialism ; eventually the old system must go . But between the "now" in China, with the feudal, semicolonial misery of the present, and the future world of classless, strifeless socialism the era of the "new democracy" intervenes . How long or how short this period may be Mao does not define . He merely says that China is not ready for socialism at this time ; therefore the peasants and workers must seek allies in their struggle against the old feudalism. These allies are the bourgeoisie, the progressive urban elements, the intellectuals and liberal-minded of the middle class, who are as much oppressed by the feudal shackles of the land as peasants and workers are . Only in alliance can any of them hope to change China, create democracy, and lay the foundations for socialism . Communist political thinking has some curious technical terms. Although "bloc" is not used by Mao Tse-tung, the framework he recommends for the transitional state is obviously a bloc of the peasants, workers, and petty bourgeoisie. A bloc does not necessarily mean that the participating groups will oppose each other in organized effort at the polls ; Mao does not speak of voting . He looks forward to a union of two groups, representing associated classes who come to power and enjoy it together . These two friendly groups settle differences among themselves by discussion or arbitration rather than by appealing separately to the people at the polls . A similar situation would exist in the United States if the Democratic Party 235
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represented the whole people ; differences between Southern and Northern democrats would be settled between themselves, and the resultant program would be presented to the people as a whole for confirmation . Such an alliance was devised by the Communists during the war . They swept into their government the most progressive and energetic men of the countryside . These men were not necessarily members of the Communist Party, but they co-operated with the Communists against the common enemy for ends beneficial to them all . In practice this policy became the 3-3-3 system, and the Communists found their policy of compromise and conciliation with the middle class in the villages fantastically successful . Out of this policy of alliance came also the great affection for the Communists that grew in every sphere of intellectual and democratic activity. The policy has been so successful that there is every reason to believe that for the next decade or generation the Communists of China will continue their conciliation of the lower middle class and compromise with it . There is little likelihood of their returning to a policy of ruthless land confiscation or terror in the village except under the sharpest provocation . Mao's The New Democracy leaves some questions unanswered . There is first the question of how long the period of new democracy is to last. Is the alliance with other groups to be temporary or permanent? Are the Communists eventually to cut loose and strike for socialism on their own, or are the other groups to be persuaded that the socialist society is their society too? Secondly there is the question of civil liberties and minority rights, which lie at the root of America's concept of democracy . During the war the Communists championed all that was good in Chinese life ; they fought against Kuomintang dictatorship and in so fighting fought for the liberties of all other groups . But up to now the Communists have been in opposition to the dominant regime, and their base has lain in the backward villages, where opposition has been nonexistent. How will they react to the organized opposition of the large cities where the Kuomintang middle class is firmly established and where, with money and influence, it can command a press that will present an alternative program? Will the Communists, if they 236
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govern large and complex industrial cities, permit an opposition press and opposition party to challenge them by a combination of patronage and ideology? They say that they will, for they believe that in any honest contest for the vote of the people, the people will vote them and their allies a majority against the candidates of the landed and well-to-do minority . But if the Communists are wrong in their calculations and are outvoted, will they yield to a peaceful vote? Will they champion civil liberties as ardently as they do now? This is a question that cannot be answered until we have had the opportunity of seeing how a transitional coalition regime works in peace time practice . Americans have a third and most important question to ask the Communists. In The New Democracy, Mao sets down three main conditions for the alliance with middle-class elements during the transitional period . The first two of these are unexceptionable : cooperation with the Communists and protection of the interests of the peasants and workers. The third condition, listed first by Mao, requires that all groups subscribe to an alliance between China and the Soviet Union. This alliance between China and the Soviet Union is not explained . An exclusive alliance, irrevocably locking China into a hypothetical Soviet world front against all other nations, would be dangerous in the extreme ; an alliance that would be simply one of a number of associations made by China with the outside world is a progressive requirement . Do the Chinese Communists see a revolutionary China as having one friend or many friends? On many scores it seems certain that The New Democracy does not represent a final crystallization of Mao's ideas on the outside world . His views grew and expanded in the years that followed, and they were reflected in the entire attitude of the party . The change in Chinese Communist thinking about the outside world was reflected most dramatically in attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the United States . Briefly, from Pearl Harbor on, the United States became more and more important to the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union ever more remote . The Chinese Communist Party had been originally, in the early 237
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'2o's, a bureau of the Comintern, controlled body and soul from Moscow and racked by the internal disputes, theoretical factionalism, and arbitrary directives of the Russian party . Its disastrous defeat in the split with the Kuomintang in 1927 reflected partly its own immaturity, partly the ignorant advice of Russia, to a large extent the calculated support of Chiang K'ai-shek by foreign imperialism . In southern China during its Soviet days, from 1929 to 1935, the party was isolated from contact with the Western world ; it ruthlessly applied a code of extreme revolution to the countryside, and it was still swayed by Comintern mentors . Many of the foremost Chinese Communists to this day attribute their defeat in southern China to their own willingness to submit to ill-considered foreign advice . The Long March to the north marked a turning point . The Chinese Communist Party resettled in Yenan under its own leadership . Mao, the unchallenged ruling spirit of the party, was a Chinese who had never been abroad, whose genius consisted not only in a brilliant clarity of mind but in an almost uncanny understanding of Chinese peasant problems . The extreme left within the party, headed by several Moscow-trained members who were never purged or driven out, was nevertheless reduced to a minor influence . By no stretch of the imagination could Mao's unchallenged ascendancy be construed as an anti-Soviet reorientation of the Chinese Communists ; Russia remained the patron country, the oracle and citadel of world revolution . The new attitude was simply that Chinese Communists knew better than any foreign party what the best interests of China were. In a lecture in 1941 Mao attempted to hammer home his belief that Chinese reality, not foreign doctrine, ought to be the Communists' sole frame of reference . Said he : Many of our comrades regard this ignorance, or partial knowledge, of our own history not as a shame but on the contrary as something to be proud of. . . . Since they know nothing about their own country they turn to foreign lands . . . during recent decades many foreign-returned students have made this mistake . They have merely been phonographs, forgetting that their duty is to make something useful to China out of the imported stuff they have learned . The Communist Party has not escaped this infection. 238
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Soviet foreign policy was also entering a new period at this time . During the early '3o's the Soviet Union found itself menaced both from the east and from the west, by Germany and Japan. It sought new allies to counter these threats . In Europe, Russia attempted to establish France and Czechoslovakia as firm allies against Hitler by solemn treaties . In the Orient the single greatest power that might be used against Japanese aggression was the Kuomintang government of Chiang K'ai-shek ; rather than weaken this government by internal discord, Russia sought to strengthen it by material aid . When the war between China and Japan broke out, Russia was the first of the great powers to come to China's aid ; while America sent scrap iron and oil to Japan, Russia was sending gasoline and planes to China . Russian aid to the government of China from 1937 to 1 939, exclusive of an expeditionary air force that fought for Chiang K'aishek in central China, came to a credit total of US . $250,000,000. American aid to China at the same time amounted to one-fifth as much . Russia pursued a scrupulously correct policy throughout. It recognized only Chiang K'ai-shek as the head of state . When the proCommunist governor of Sinkiang proposed that his province should be incorporated into the Soviet Union, the Russians refused his suggestion . When the same man proposed, during the. Sian coup d'etat, that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party make an all-out drive against Chiang's government at Nanking, he was spurned . The Soviets wanted a strong China to balance Japan . Even the Kuomintang found the attitude of the Soviet Union impeccable . Yet the Chinese Communists, desperately short of supplies and arms in their own huge war against the Japanese, could take little comfort in the Soviet's correctness. During the entire course of the war they received not so much as an airplane, a ton of gasoline, or a single crate of munitions directly from the Soviet Union ; all aid from Russia went to Chiang K'ai-shek, and of this aid the Central Government is said to have given only one battery of four second-hand guns to the Communist Party in the early days of the war . The Communists of China fought on their own . From 1937 to 1945 no more than hve Russian planes made trips to Yenan ; each of these planes was ap239
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proved by the Central Government and brought a Central Government inspector with it as it flew in, and all materials carried were thoroughly checked . By 1944 two Tass newspapermen and a Russian doctor constituted the only instruments of Soviet influence in Yenan, and, these men had come with Central Government permission ; the American military observers' outpost in Yenan had five times as many people. What minor frictions there were between the Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists no one fully knows . It is known, though, that there was a falling out over the organization of Sinkiang. This vast province lived for almost ten years in a state of alienation from the Central Government . It shared a border of almost a thousand miles with the Soviet Union. In its councils both Russian and Chinese Communists took a large part ; Mao Tse-tung's younger brother was a high official in the provincial government . The Chinese Communists felt that since Sinkiang was a Chinese province, the Chinese party should have the right to organize it ; the Russians felt that because of its proximity to Russia, the Russian party should organize it . The issue was settled by reference to Moscow, which decided in favor of the Russian party . By 1944 the Chinese Communist party was rooted in its own soil, Sinified, nationalistic . It had fought so long against an alien enemy that it had become as thoroughly and as ardently patriotic as the Kuomintang. Its leadership was tuned to Chinese necessity and interest . Simultaneously Communist leadership was re-assessing America . America had been in Communist mythology a land of predatory capitalism, whose imperialist greed dug into Chinese soil for profit and nourished a decadent Kuomintang for its own interest . Contact with Americans in China, whose leadership was symbolized by General Stilwell, had by 1944 given them a new picture of American policy . Through Stilwell and Gauss, America was demanding certain basic reforms that paralleled what every honest Chinese wanted. The furious American campaign in the summer of 1944 for Kuomintang reform convinced the Communists that the word "democracy" meant roughly the same things to the Americans 240
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as it meant in northern China . America, rather than being an enemy of reform and change, became their protagonist. Another factor entered into this new picture . It was all very well to admire Russia for her great victories over Germany and to reprint Tass dispatches of victories on the eastern front-but the Communists were fighting Japan, and in the war against Japan only America was great . In the hill villages where the Communists ruled, final victory seemed like a distant vision, a mirage born out of hopelessness . But news of American battles in the Pacific brought a promise, . a fact that could be built on, that could encourage soldiers shivering at night in their shelters ; somewhere far away in the Pacific, they knew, there was an ally more powerful, heavier in tanks, planes, guns, ships, than the Japanese . And that ally was slowly approaching China in order to reinforce native resistance to the invader . This feeling of double alliance-against both the domestic and the foreign enemy-was strengthened by every contact the Communists made with Americans in Yenan . The military observer mission set up in Yenan by the American Army in the summer of 1944 was entrusted to the leadership of one of America's ablest specialists on China, Colonel David Barrett . Barrett was the very prototype of a regular Army colonel whose personality was adorned by a warm humanity and an overwhelmingly infectious humor . He boasted himself a rock-ribbed Republican and a "black-hearted reactionary ." The Communists loved him ; his round jokes in flawless and fluent Chinese destroyed much of their imaginary picture of calculating American imperialism . Barrett's reports on the Communists were honest, hardheaded military assessments ; a soldier himself, he recognized the Communists as effective fighting men, sound allies against a common enemy . They felt his respect and reciprocated it . To them Stilwell, Barrett, and the enthusiastic American reporters who passed through became the embodiment of American good will . The fall of 1944 opened a high opportunity to America . For a brief period it was possible to prove to the Chinese revolutionary movement that America too stood for progress . In all the last twenty years the magnificent energies and the social conscience of the Communists had been linked by a rigid formula to exclusive support of the 241
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Soviet Union . Now was the moment to prove to both the Russian and the Chinese Communists that America acted not out of any Marxian predestination but out of a conscience that sought freedom and democracy everywhere in the world . We cast this opportunity away . During the next six months we chose to prove to the Chinese Communists that no matter how friendly they might be to us, we would support the government of Chiang K'ai-shek against them under any circumstances . We chose to prove to the Chinese Communists that indeed the only friend they had was the Soviet Union ; we forced them back to . an alliance and dependence on Russia more unquestioning than at any time since the days of the Long March . By so doing we created the very thing we feared most, a huge organized mass of Asiatic peasants believing that America was their enemy and Russia their only friend . It was not the relief of Stilwell that did this ; the Communists accepted that as a minor tragedy arising from American ignorance . It was the course of American diplomacy during the year of 1945 that finally convinced the Chinese Communists that America was a hostile power .
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Chapter 16
Patrick J. Honey
TH the departure of Ambassador Gauss and General Stilwell, a new chapter was opened in the joint history of China and America ; Patrick J . Hurley was the man chosen to write its opening pages. For a hundred years-since Caleb Cushing had wrung America's first trade concessions from the Manchu Empire in the treaty of 1844-America had charged its envoys to China with but one interest : trade, the defense of the expanding economy of the United States . By 1944, however, diplomacy in the Orient was no longer a matter of tariffs, treaty rights, loans, and trade concessions . American diplomacy was now charged with creating peace, and China was one of the places where peace could be made or lost. The American Embassy in Chungking had taken on the impressive attributes of court of appeal and horn of plenty. China needed guns, planes, money, modern techniques, international prestige ; all these could flow from the spare, white rectangle overlooking the Yangtze River. Clarence Gauss had watched the change come and had moved with it . He had risen in the service of the State Department from junior consul, thirty-five years before, to the eminence of Ambassador Plenipotentiary . By the summer of 1944, Gauss felt fresh forces pressing him on to a new concept of the role of American ambassador . Gauss, like Stilwell,, saw internal peace in China a prerequisite for any understanding between America and the Soviet Union ; and upon that understanding rested the hope for a new and warless world . Like Stilwell, Gauss was discarded as he labored to bring this peace to birth.
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The publicity attendant upon the relief of Stilwell and the resignation of Gauss suddenly focussed world attention upon the new ambassador. The Embassy in Chungking was now one of our three great global outposts, operating in the same level of diplomatic stratosphere as London and Moscow. Its duties, however, were even more difficult and complex than those of its two companion posts . Its' function was to mold American policy in relation to an uncontrollable revolution . Set down in the chaos of a crumbling civilization, disturbed by the alarums and violence of a new world, its mission was to seek out the most vital forces in the turbulence and encourage those forces to the creation of a new and stable Chinese society . Its responsibility, above all, was to see that whatever happened in China, there would be a foundation of friendship on which America might erect an enduring peace . For the first time, the United States could tip the balance in China . Both warring factions knew that, with America on their side, China was theirs ; with America against them, victory was remote ; and both trusted America's honesty as arbiter of their troubles . The United States Embassy had become the crossroads of destiny in the Orient. All this monstrous burden rested squarely on the shoulders of the new ambassador . Hurley had come to China as the personal representative extraordinary of Franklin D . Roosevelt . And Hurley was extraordinary . He was a fine figure of a man, with stiff mustaches, a flowing mane of white hair, and ramrod stiff carriage . In uniform, with all his ribbons, he looked the very model of a modern major general. He was a man of eloquence, with a huge fondness for earthy oratory. In physique and appearance, in personality and lung power, he outmatched anyone the Chinese had ever dealt with, and they treated him gingerly, waiting for clues to his character . Hurley's career in America read like a page out of Horatio Alger . He had been born in Oklahoma-he constantly reminisced about Oklahoma-and left an orphan. He had worked in coal mines, been a soldier and a cowboy, learned to talk the language of the Choctaw Indians. He had fought as an officer in the first World War, and he told long stories about how he had devised a quick, unbreakable 244
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code by putting his Indian friends at both ends of the Signal Corps telephones and letting them relay orders to each other in Choctaw . He had become a lawyer, a millionaire, and Secretary of War . As Secretary of War he had approved the battle on the bonus marchers . He had played a leading part in negotiations between the Mexican government and American owners of oil properties in that country ; he had tried, early in the war, to send relief ships to the blockaded Philippines ; he had traveled the world as trouble-shooter in diplomatic affairs. Hurley had said, time and again, that he would not be named ambassador, did not want the job, would not take it . He explained that he had been offered the post of ambassador to Russia, a much bigger assignment, and refused . In the early days of his mission he misunderstood Ambassador Gauss's impatience with the long series of special emissaries sent from Washington to dabble in ambassadorial duties ; Hurley told how he had reassured Ambassador Gauss with an old Oklahoma story . He had told Gauss, he said, of his boyhood in the frontier west when a roistering barroom ran a barber shop in its rear . On one particularly rugged evening a customer arrived . As he reclined in his chair being shaved, shots began to whistle back and forth . The customer twitched himself erect, but the barber prodded him back casually with the point of his elbow saying, "Lean back, brother-nobody's shooting at you." Hurley said he had recounted the tale to Gauss, admonishing the ambassador to lean back, brother-nobody was shooting at him . Hurley repeated that he had told Gauss again and again that he did not intend to become ambassador. When he did become ambassador, in the fall of 1944, the American Embassy looked down from its steep knoll in the suburbs over a capital that trembled with political explosive . Chungking was a town that seethed with personalities and politics, and Chungking analyzed every character in the great drama for clues to what was happening . The American Embassy was the most important single center of influence in the town ; and within a few months the muffled explosions that boomed from within its cloistered walls delighted and astonished the audience . 245
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The Chinese associate a man with a cause, a representative with the state he represents. Hurley was America's representative. Therefore, in the eyes of the Chinese, Hurley himself was America . The Chinese had found Gauss chilly, and his New England manners inscrutable . They had nicknamed him "the Honest Buddha ." Hurley was gregarious, enjoyed people, delighted in parties and celebrations . In Chungking there was no such thing as privacy ; government officials and foreigners lived in a tight, compact community, visiting, wining, and dining each other . Each member of this small circle knew, with a fair degree of accuracy, the personal habits, prejudices, tempers, and limitations of most other members. Chungking soon heard how Hurley lived, whom he saw, what he said ; his smallest action, unimportant in another setting, was inevitably tinged with world importance in Chungking. As Chungking saw the new ambassador do an Indian war dance at one Embassy party, and heard him yelp blood-curdling Choctaw "yahoos" on other occasions, they gave him a handful of nicknames . The Communists promptly called him Hsiao Hu Tze, "Little Whiskers ." Hurley's encounters with the Chinese language evened the score; he pronounced Communist leader Mao Tse-tung's name as "Moose Dung ." Perhaps Hurley thought that was Mao's name ; for months after he arrived he referred to General Chiang as Mr. Shek . Americans of an intellectual twist called Hurley "the Paper Tiger ." But by far the most incisive of all the nicknames applied to the American envoy was the choice of some of his friends of the Kuomintang, who call him Ti Erh Ta Feng, "the Second Big Wind ." Hurley's personality was neither interesting nor significant in itself ; but as ambassador of the world's greatest power his personality was endowed with transcendent ex-officio importance . All men acknowledged that Hurley had arrived in Chungking in great sincerity to labor as hard as he could at the directives given him . Most men who knew him well enough saw in him the tragedy of a mind groping desperately at problems beyond its scope . By the time Hurley assumed his duties in China, he was no longer a young man . He tired easily and his eyes bothered him ; he disliked 246
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reading long documents or books . He seldom visited the Embassy, where China in all its complexity was stored in indexed files . Any man who wanted to understand China should have launched into a serious study of history, landholding, social structure, insurrections, political movements . Instead, although his memory was not infallible -he sometimes could not remember conversations-Hurley chose to imbibe knowledge aurally from an ever smaller number of men he trusted and liked . His junior officers used to come to his home and read aloud dispatches and documents . The outward dignity of the man would sometimes break in outbursts of temper and livid profanity . Within a few months of his arrival all Chungking knew that he had excoriated T . V. Soong in the presence of a handful of Chinese officials . Several American correspondents who crossed his path were cursed by the ambassador to their faces . At a huge cocktail party in Chungking he lost his temper when he was offended by Wedemeyer's honest chief of staff, Major General Robert McClure . Not even General Wedemeyer, the U . S. commander in chief in China, was exempt from Hurley's moods. As envoy, Hurley had lived with Wedemeyer ; when he became ambassador, it was assumed .that he would move into the Embassy house. Hurley disliked the building ; he ordered a complete paint job, new rugs, new upholstery -commodities almost impossible to find in Chungking. The Embassy house had been repaired for weeks, but Hurley stayed on in Wedemeyer's house . Then suddenly he had a violent argument with Wedemeyer ; for more than a day they did not speak to each other, and Hurley decided to move out. He gave his charge d'affaires and other attaches who had always shared the Embassy House a few hours' notice to find other quarters in overcrowded Chungking . Then he moved in in solitary grandeur, to share the echoing space with only his army sergeant orderly and the Chinese domestic staff . The Embassy that Hurley had inherited was a delicate instrument . Its routine paper work was grooved sedately across the desks of the chancery and required little of the ambassador's attention . Its political staff consisted of a corps of brilliant young career diplomats 247
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who had been trained and selected for their ability to report what was happening in China . The ambassador-who was charged with the duty of formulating and applying basic American policy-was responsible for seeing that every shred of significant political information they had gathered for him was applied immediately to the problems at hand . Gauss had been a stern but just taskmaster ; he was cautious and demanding, but a great believer in the mechanism which he had operated . He insisted that his Embassy should be the best informed in China, and it was . His men traveled through the country far"and wide, in hardship and turmoil, to ferret out a vital mass of information about conditions in the land . Most of the Embassy staff had had years of training in China, wide contacts, and possessed a fluent command of Chinese . Hurley treated these excellent assistants like unfriendly hangovers from a previous regime . They were familiar with the complexities of Chinese politics ; he saw only two arguing parties . Members of the staff who disagreed with his interpretation (they included every political reporter of the Embassy at the time) were classed as Reds . When they pointed out Chinese political realities that underlay negotiations, he accused them of sabotaging his policy . Part of the tradition of the State Department, and an honored one, is for members to report the truth to the American government as they see it and to temper no factual report merely to conform with the prejudice of a superior . Hurley disapproved of reports critical of the Chiang government . This meant that little could be told about the Chinese people, press, or politics-about public opinion, the Communist problem, or the military background . As the clashes of government and Communist troops became more-violent, one of Hurley's reporting officers made a memorandum about them-which he cleared with U. S . Army Intelligence-for the information of our State Department ; at a meeting Hurley denounced the report as without basis in fact and against American policy in China . For months, when Washington should have been completely informed, it got little unprejudiced information from the American Embassy in Chungking. Hurley sent brief progress reports of his successes, 248
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but Chinese politics moved on toward civil war in spite of the opinion of the American Embassy . As life in the Embassy became more cramped with each new stricture of the ambassador, the staff grew silent and cowed and greeted their turn for the ambassador's "red purge" with joy. Life in Chungking rapidly dissolved Hurley's early geniality, and as he drove his own staff farther and farther from him, he grew more bitter and isolated . Within three months of his arrival he was an island of outraged dignity in the American community . He saw in the differing opinions of other Americans a constant plotting to undermine him. His fear of the working press became enormous . He imported two personal press attaches, and invited visiting correspondents to live with him. The Embassy watched home-going news dispatches to check on the sources of criticism of the ambassador . The Chinese government cherished him, and shielded him from the American press. The chief censor officially informed an American newspaper correspondent : "The censorship of the Chinese government does not permit anything to go out which will disturb the cordial relationship between the two governments (America and China) . Ambassador Hurley represents the president and the American government ; any attack by an American upon him on Chinese soil is therefore not permitted to go out." General Wedemeyer as commander in chief of the U . S . Army also felt it wisest to protect the ambassador from the public criticism of war correspondents, although he privately admitted the truth of many charges . The corps of foreign correspondents could only fume in silence and frustration at a situation which they knew must some day erupt in disaster . Hurley had already failed on much of his assignment when he turned his attention to the great internal political struggle in China . He had been ordered to secure American authority over the Chinese army ; he had failed . He had been ordered to secure harmony between General Stilwell and Chiang K'ai-shek ; in this, too, he had failed. But both these matters were trivia compared to his third task of making peace between the Kuomintang and the Communists . This would have required infinite patience, an almost saintly tol249
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erance, vigorous administrative skill, and a deep understanding of China. Hurley approached this task in blithe good spirits . He believed that shrewd bargaining would settle the basic social problems of Asia in revolution . Success in the Communist matter would more than compensate for - failure elsewhere, and a Hurley Pact would echo down the corridors of Chinese history forever, to the glory of American diplomacy. Even before Stilwell had been relieved, Hurley confided to one of the authors of this book that he had been negotiating with Chiang K'ai-shek and Chungking's two leading Communists . This was vital information ; it meant that for the first time America was taking active steps to avert a Chinese civil war . The author questioned the ambassador ; Hurley could not pronounce the Communists' names, but he listened to descriptions of the Communist emissaries and agreed that yes, those were the two men with whom he had worked, and he was hopeful of a solution . Thereupon both authors hastened to the Communists to verify the story and to learn their views as to the possibility of a settlement and what had they thought of Mr . Hurley? The Communists flatly denied that they had ever met the ambassador . They asserted that they had invited him to dinner but that he had never replied, and they had no idea when they might be asked to participate in the start of negotiations . The correspondents returned to Hurley and told him what the Communists had said, asking for a clarification of the story, but beyond repeating that he had been presiding over negotiations, the ambassador was unable to account for the confusion . The two men whom the ambassador had taken for the Communist emissaries were never positively identified . Hurley had noticed their presence in the course of a routine meeting, but that was all . One thing is certain . They were not the accredited representatives of the Yenan government . Undismayed, Hurley pressed on with his task . He heard the pronouncements of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang K'ai-shek ; both used the same symbols and sometimes the same phrases in their passionate invocations of democracy, unity, and peace . Only a student of China could tell what the leaders meant, which of them was reactionary,
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which revolutionary. Hurley thought each statement proved that the two parties were within a hand span of agreement, that only procedural differences stopped them from flying into each other's arms . He acted as though only a scattering of agitators frustrated his efforts to make peace . Among these intriguers, he believed, were his own American compatriots in the capital . He thought that Chiang K'aishek was right ; the Communists challenged this . Thus, anyone else who thought Chiang not all shining pure was suspected of Communism . Technically, the new ambassador bogged down in the twin problems of army and government without thoroughly understanding the background of either. The armies were both party armies . The Central Government's army was Kuomintang to the hilt, its officers members of the Kuomintang, its units accompanied by Kuomintang political commissars, its direction legally entrusted to the Kuomintang. But the Kuomintang called it the Government Army . The Communist army made no bones about being a party instrument and was frankly responsible to the party rather than to the nation . Neither side would consider yielding up its army so long as the other party possessed armed force . A backlog of distrust, treachery, torture, and extermination had been piling up since the first split in 1927 . Chiang K'ai-shek might swear by all the oaths of holiness that if the Communists gave up their arms, he would not wipe them out . But the Communists knew that if they gave up their army, everywhere in China Chiang's secret police would operate ; Communist troops would be broken up and then butchered like their New Fourth Army. They remembered the slaughter in Shanghai in 1927 and refused to trust Chiang's word . "We will offer him one hand in friendship," a Communist general said, "but our other hand we will hold on our gun ." Only if a representative government was set up in which the Communists could share would they abandon their one means of defense . Too much emotion was involved. In any case, Mao Tse-tung found it impossible to trust the Kuomintang . The party had been responsible for the murder of his first wife ; his younger brother had been strangled to death in 1942 in
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Sinkiang. The relatives of dozens of other Communist dignitaries had also been killed . The Communists saw their army as their sole guarantee of safety . The argument advanced by Hurley made no sense ; he was saying, in effect : "Put down your gun and come out with your hands up. Chiang says he won't shoot you." It was pointless to argue the legal case. There was no answer to the Kuomintang's claim that a centralized modern country must have one army, one command. Hurley agreed, but he forgot that the Kuomintang was not China but one Chinese party, with a party dictatorship and a party army . A coalition government was an even more involved undertaking . Chiang politely refused to consider a coalition government that would give other groups the right to question his decisions . The period of political tutelage was the legal responsibility of the Kuomintang, he explained . The only meaning he was willing to attach to a coalition government was the giving of a few unimportant titles to Communists, with himself issuing the orders and the Communists obeying. The Communists refused to be specific about what they meant by a coalition government ; they would not say how many seats they wanted, what proportion of representation they thought due them, or what organs should be set up to make them a part of the government. A coalition government, according to general conversation in Chungking, meant granting the Communists seats in the National Military Council, the Supreme National Defense Council, and the Executive Yuan . Actually no minor number of seats would satisfy the Communists . What they wanted was a changed government, which would attack the social problems of the land . The problems of honest administration, of grain collection, of education, of personal and political freedom, of vigorous war against the Japanese, were what agitated them . A government that tried to solve these problems might have granted the Communists only token representation and still won their support ; a government that maintained its censorship and secret police, its dictatorship and terrorism, would have to give the Communists enough power to destroy it . The Communists said they wanted sovereignty to revert to the people ; they felt sure they had the people's support .
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When Hurley entered the negotiations, he held all the trumps. Chiang had won the Stilwell affair, but it had been a Pyrrhic victory, and - American officers were disgusted. The American press had broken through censorship in a storm of criticism of the Chiang government ; in China public criticism of his policies was at high tide . He needed American aid and support more than ever before ; his armies seemed like a sieve through which the Japanese filtered almost at will. It was his turn to yield . As for the Communists, although they were irritated by the dismissal of Stilwell, they were friendly to America, confident and trusting. A skillful American negotiator might have moved into the driver's seat . Hurley flew to Yenan on November 7, 1944, to meet the Communist leaders . He landed unannounced and unexpected on the cold, bleak valley airfield, his uniform dazzling, his chest covered with gay ribbons . Mao Tse-tung and the other Communist leaders had been telephoned after Hurley's plane landed . The Communist high command gathered hastily, piled into the war-scarred ambulance Mao used, and raced over the rocky roads to the runway . They piled out pell-mell and ran across the field to meet Hurley . The envoy greeted them affably, gave an Indian war whoop, and climbed into the ambulance. It was a joyful ride, and everyone became friendly at once as they jounced over the ruts in a welter of dust . When they passed a shepherd prodding some animals, Mao announced that he had been a shepherd boy himself ; then Hurley told how he had been a cowboy in his youth. As they passed the shallow Yen River, Mao explained how the water rose in winter and dried up in the dry months ; this reminded Hurley of the rivers in Oklahoma-so dry in summer that you could tell when a school of fish went swimming past by the cloud of dust they raised . Colonel Barrett translated Hurley's jokes into Chinese, and when the ambulance arrived at the American military outpost in the suburbs, it disgorged a gay crowd . That evening the Communists gave an enormous banquet in honor of the November revolution in Russia, and Hurley was the star guest, though he baffled the Communists with an occasional bellowed "yahoo l" Actual negotiations between Hurley and the Communists opened 2 53
Patrick j. Hurley
badly . Hurley had brought up the Generalissimo's proposal that the Communists receive legal status, share some of the foreign supplies received through Lend-Lease, and get one seat in the Supreme National Defense Council ; in return Chiang required the Communists to submit their armies and all their areas to his command . Mao would not subject his army and people to a government in which they would have the voice only of a mendicant guest, and he launched into a tirade against the Kuomintang. Hurley, infuriated, charged Mao with repeating the propaganda of the enemies of China . Mao insisted that what he said was only what most of China's illustrious friends already knew. Hurley passionately defended the Kuomintang, and the first day ended in failure. That evening and the next morning Hurley drafted what he believed was a genuine solution of the deadlock . It proposed a real coalition government in which the Communists would participate and the integration of Communist armies under Central Government control . Besides these two main points Hurley tossed in a whole bill of rights-freedom of press, of speech, of movement, and of assembly . An impressive document, it is still an excellent outline for unity-and an even better outline of how little Hurley understood his old friend Chiang K'ai-shek . The Communists were wildly enthusiastic; this was even more than they had hoped for . They agreed that they would give up their armies to a true coalition government . Hurley was careful to point out that he could not speak for Chiang K'ai-shek, but these were his views, and he would urge them. As a mark of good faith he was willing to sign his name to the document . One copy was made for the Communist archives, another for the Americans, and both were signed by Hurley . On the basis of this document and Hurley's backing, the Communists delegated General Chou En-lai to fly to Chungking and discuss the matter with Chiang K'ai-shek . Chiang was ill when the plane returned. Chou waited, cooling his heels for days, to see the Generalissimo, while he bargained with minor negotiators on the basis of the Hurley draft . When the document was finally brought before the Generalissimo as the best compromise the Americans and the Communists could work out, Chiang 254
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flatly refused to have any part of it . He held firm on his offer to the Communists of one seat in the Supreme National Defense Council on condition they give up their army . Chou was admitted but once to see the Generalissimo-and then he was treated so contemptuously that he vowed on emerging never to return to Chungking again . Hurley made another effort to bring the Communists into agreement . He asked Chou to accept the Generalissimo's offer, on the basis of its being at least a foot in the door, with possibly more concessions later. Chou was bitter ; he thought Hurley had sold out the Communists, and he said he would not yield up the Communist army of a million men for a single seat on the Defense Council on the dubious strength of the Generalissimo's word . Chou was invited to American Army headquarters, and Wedemeyer repeated Hurley's plea . Then Chou went back to Yenan . , One more belated attempt was made to solve the problem . The chief architects of the new proposal were two Kuomintang liberals, T. V. Soong and Wang Shih-chieh . Their idea resembled a suggestion that Sun Fo had offered the Generalissimo earlier and that the Generalissimo had turned down . Soong and Wang offered the Communists membership in a wartime Political Affairs Committee, which would have broad powers of administrative decision, but which would be under the Supreme National Defense Council, the Generalissimo's rubber stamp . A year earlier such an offer might have been accepted, for it was the nearest the Kuomintang had ever come to being willing to share power . This proposal, however, was made in late winter, and the Communists had already launched a campaign for dominance in East China . They were unwilling to settle for anything that would leave them-and China-subject to the Generalissimo's veto power. By the time the February negotiations collapsed, the issue between the two parties had narrowed down to a pinpoint of clarity-the personality of Chiang K'ai-shek . The Communists would accept no solution that left China governed by the will of one man ; Chiang would accept no solution that challenged his complete authority . He said that his control of China was a sacred trust from Sun Yat-sen, and this trust was a responsibility that he could not share . As the Communist radio 2 55
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station grew more vituperative, Chiang grew more stiff-necked . The Communists harangued him from behind the blockade with fishwife adjectives that made his hatred even stronger . They called him a lunatic and his associates gangsters ; they declared that if they permitted Chiang to remain in the coalition government that China must eventually have, it would be only to expiate his past crimes . As the Communists' invective grew more fearsome, it became almost possible to sympathize with the Kuomintang . The manners of the Kuomintang in public were perfect ; its only faults were that its leadership was corrupt, its secret police merciless, its promises lies, and its daily diet the blood and tears of the people of China . China had become a secondary concern of American strategy by the spring of 1945 . It had already been decided that the main drive would skirt China and go straight to Japan. Stilwell and Gauss had tried to reform the Chinese government to avoid military collapse . China's politics no longer had an immediate military bearing, so Hurley was left to interpret vague directives as he saw fit . The new policy held that China and Chiang K'ai-shek were exactly the same thing . Chiang, his government, and his party had never been elected by popular vote . There were two armed parties in China ; they had cooperated in driving out the war lords, had fought the Japanese, and had support in millions of homes ; the only difference between them was the fact that the Kuomintang held the international franchise, and the Communists did not . The Kuomintang was recognized by the powers and therefore received supplies, aid, and honor . The Communists for their part refused to be nonrecognized out of existence ; if they had failed to get American recognition by negotiating, they meant to win it by arms . And so, in the spring, they embarked on new ventures.
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1945
E Kuomintang and the Communists, from the moment negotiations broke down, went their separate ways toward the one goal of American support. The Kuomintang took the road of propaganda and promises ; having won the American ambassador, they tried to consolidate their conquest with brilliant doubletalk . On this road the Communists would have been lost ; they took the rough, direct way of the battlefield . There seemed to be only one means of matching the aid that was pouring in to the Kuomintang ; that was to wage a military offensive that would secure American recognition-and the arms and supplies that followed American recognition anywhere in the world . The Communists were sure American recognition of Chiang K'ai-shek was not based on democracy, for it was obvious to them that America knew how corrupt Chiang's government was . America's relations with Chiang must then be based on expediency ; America needed his help against the Japanese and therefore offered him aid . The Communists set out to prove that they could be more valuable than Chiang against the enemy . They believed that the Americans would have to land in northern China, probably near Shanghai, before they could go on to invade Japan . The Communists determined to control all the coast of China, from Shanghai north to Tientsin . Any American commander who landed on the China coast would be greeted by Communist armies offering immediate assistance against the Japanese . Communist guerrillas in the rear would be ready to rip up rails, destroy bridges, and tear Japanese communications while the Americans established 2 57
their beachhead . The guerrillas could prevent the Japanese from moving up reserves for days while the landing was being consolidated. Any American commander who was offered such assistance, the Communists felt, could not afford to ask questions about political loyalties ; he would necessarily co-operate with anyone who could aid him in killing Japanese. And out of such an association in combat would come recognition for the Communists . So the Communists began a new program of expansion . They already held a complete chain of communications from the Yangtze Valley to Yenan and the Great Wall . They moved one of their finest field commanders-Huang Chen, the ruddy-faced, hearty defender of the blockade line in the north-to south central China . Huang Chen's objective was the reconquest and reorganization of the Japanese-held areas of Hunan . By the end of March he had won the town of Pingkiang, 50 miles from Changsha, and was beginning to set up a civilian government there. Northern Hunan was old Communist territory, the original Communist base of the late 1920's, and the peasants still remembered the Communists and rallied to them . The success of Huang Chen precipitated a counterattack by the Kuomintang, and in April civil war was bubbling all through the lake region . A far more dramatic enterprise was under way at the coast at the same time . Thousands of Communist troops drove south of the Yangtze from the Nanking region toward Hangchow Bay . They hoped to build an impenetrable line from the Yangtze River to Hangchow and to seal off the Kuomintang from Shanghai . For a time they succeeded, but the Kuomintang resisted bitterly . Ku Chu-teng, a zealot and an old friend of Ho Ying-ch'in, had been placed in command in the east, to defend Kuomintang interests there . Ku broke the Communist line and re-established Kuomintang contact with the Shanghai delta . Both sides thought that control of Shanghai meant control of the American landing area, and in their fighting for the territory no holds were barred . The center of the struggle was Shanghai itself. The coast north from Shanghai, a region of fishermen, small villages, and sampan masters, was under Communist control . Communist agents in the city began to strengthen their hold on students, waterfront laborers, indus25 8
7945 -The Year o f the Great Promise trial workers. But Shanghai was the spiritual and financial citadel of the Kuomintang and the middle class of China . Chiang had his own underground in Shanghai, an underground of huge proportions and great skill. While profiteers and puppets danced and the poor hungered, the Japanese hunted Communist and Kuomintang zealots, who were hunting and tracking each other . But Shanghai was far away behind a thick wall of censorship ; almost no news of the fighting seeped through to Chungking, which was absorbed in spring and victory . The Japanese had been stopped in eastern China by the end of January 1945, and the Chinese divisions Stilwell had trained in India were marching back through the blockade. The drive through Burma had seized 50,000 square miles of jungle in a year . A line 470 miles long had been secured, from the railways of India to the flatlands of central Burma, and a road had been built to follow it . The men who did the job were a motley polyglot crew, British and American, Kachin and Indian, but the heroes were the Chinese . Stilwell's divisions were tough and good, and they knew it . They had flesh on their biceps, meat on their bodies . They handled modern American instruments of war with familiar confidence . They were more than sure of themselves ; they were arrogant . They slugged Americans, British, Burmese, anyone who got in their way . They held up trains at the point of a tommy gun . They were the best troops China had ever had, and they bristled with pride as they approached the last objective separating them from their own country . The last Japanese-held stronghold still barring the road was a village called Pinghai. On January z7 the final attack was launched. American tanks rolled back and forth through the last Japanese-held village . Their seventy-fives chewed up the banana trees ; their machine guns probed every suspicious clump of foliage . Chinese infantry, in battalion strength, was deployed on ridges around the village, under the command of an American general, who, when the tanks had finished, ordered an advance in combat formation. They went forward at a crouching run and disappeared into the soundless thickets about the village . Nothing happened . There were no shouts, no shots-just complete silence . Inside the village a few 25 9
1945-The Year o f the Great Promise Chinese soldiers sat munching sugar cane . The Japanese had pulled out two hours before the attack began ; China lay a few hours ahead, with nothing in the way . The khaki-clad Chinese pushed on up the road . As they approached a junction, the cocky foot soldiers who had mopped up the Japanese in northern Burma saw a knot of raggle-taggle, blue-gray men at a fork of the road. Certain that these were, the enemy, they deployed to shoot . But American Brigadier General George N . Sliney threw himself in front of a Bren gun and ordered them to stop . He hurried ahead on foot ; as he drew closer, the blue-gray figures-Chinese troops from within the blockade-recognized his uniform and rushed forward, cheering, to shake his hand and clutch him . American tanks rolled into the road fork . The Chinese laughed and chattered, shouting "Ting haol" to every American face. The troops from China, dirty, footsore, and bedraggled, gaped at their countrymen trained in India-at trim khaki uniforms, leather shoes, shining guns . The Salween soldiers stared with peasant eyes at the monstrous steel hides of, American tanks ; one or two of them reached out to touch. All the hungry Orient stood gazing at the weight and power of America where the five tanks knotted together. The Burma Road was open again .
The cracking of the blockade was one of the causes of Chungking's high spirits . Even more important were the personality, craftsmanship, and gifts of the new commander of the China theater, Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer arrived with a grim determination to stay out of political entanglements . For him the past was a closed book . All the documents, cables, and memoranda on the Stilwell crisis were sealed in a folder marked "Oklahoma" and stowed away in a safe at Army headquarters ; this folder Wedemeyer refused to open . He wanted to forget the heartaches, bitternesses, and smoldering aggravations of Stilwell's regime, to be friends with all men, to please everyone, in order to have his way clear for a single technical job . His orders were specific-to create, train, and implement a first-class fighting Chinese machine . What the machine was to be used for, who was to drive it, where it was to go, was not 260
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nels . But he operated on only one of several levels of administration . Above him the Generalissimo made all basic decisions and all important appointments . Below him the Food Ministry, the Conscription Ministry, and the whole web of village government remained unchanged . He issued clear directives ; but the only machinery for carrying out his reforms was the old band of marauding tax collectors and peculating village headmen, whom he could not touch . But Americans saw T.V. Soong, not the Chinese peasant, and for a while the reforms seemed prodigious . Victory came in Europe, and Chungking received it with bland urbanity . The war in Europe was a distant madness, a superior form of butchery fought with tanks, trucks, planes, radar, and God knew what other inconceivable forms of Western devilishness . China's war was the war against Japan, and V-E day came as the sound of a winding horn to a beleaguered garrison heralding armies marching to lift the siege . The accumulated homesickness of half a decade had lain like an iron weight on the spirit of the exiles in Chungking . Spring, bringing the winds of victory, boiled off the dark clouds and filled hucksters' stalls with fragrant flowers from the countryside . The high hills lifted from the white morning fog into the dazzling sun ; in the hot black night twinkling street lights were golden necklaces flung across the ridges . Chungking sensed that this would be the last summer of war . "When peace comes," a housewife said, "I'll buy a chicken and make chicken soup for the children ." "When peace comes," a girl said, "I'll buy a red dress and go dancing ." "When peace comes," everyone else said, "then we'll go home ." Spring madness was in the air . Trees that the government had planted along the bombed-out streets of the downtown district put forth green leaves for the first time in honor of Chungking's final year of questionable glory . The press inveighed against conditions in the town's filthy prisons . The police obliged with an "Extermination of Lice" campaign ; every prisoner turned in twenty of the creatures per day or received a whipping across his palms ; as the lice decreased, the whippings increased . ' Prisoners found their own solution in a private "Rearing of Lice" movement: The louse population soared ; every prisoner produced 266
wanted it! The Generalissimo outdid himself in good intentions . He did not ask the people to wait until peace for democracy ; he did not even ask them to wait until November . He was going to end the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang on the lowest levels closest to the people . Kuomintang branches in the army were to be abolished by the first of August ; all party branches in schools and colleges were doomed before November . And real grassroots democracy was promised to the people themselves . They were to have the right to choose local and provincial assemblies by popular suffrage, and these provincial assemblies were to have a real, solid realm of authority, which should include even the budget . All registered parties could stand at election, and all men could vote, regardless of property or educational qualifications . The resolutions of the Kuomintang tumbled out of Congress sessions in a glittering cascade . The government was going to stimulate the eugenic breeding of children ; it was going to improve sex education . China was to have an eight-hour day ; workmen would all be organized in national unions and would have paid vacations . Every exploitation of the peasant was going to cease ; high interest rates were to be abolished . It was the millennium . Chungking should have burst into cheers, but Chungking sagely nodded its head and kept its fingers crossed ; no Chinese took the resolutions seriously . Such high-sounding wind had blown through the corridors of Chinese politics for twenty years ; much of it was embodied in dead legislation on the statute books . But this year the lavish promises held extra meaning, for all were aimed at American public opinion. America had pressed for reform in China ; here was reform to pay for recognition and a new army . As long as America and its representatives were satisfied with a sack of wind, the government stood ready to meet its obligations .
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Utopia Stillborn
HE grim reality of politics underlay all the glowing promises . The Congress of the Kuomintang proved only one truth, that the party was still in the grip of the same reactionary machine that had straitjacketed the nation for seven years . The resolutions had been left to the liberal wing of the party, which hopefully wrote a Utopian platform. But the struggle for party power behind the scenes had revolved about the election of two committees, which could implement the platform or destroy it . These committees decided on key government appointments, national policy, and relations with other parties . For a week before the Congress, in an atmosphere of grimness, exuberance, and electioneering, the delegates made and broke alliances, buttonholed each other for votes, gave lavish banquets, gossiped in smoke-filled rooms . Ranged on one side were those who wanted reform-the Political Science Clique . Chu Chia-hwa and his followers, some of the Whampoa clique, and adherents of Sun Fo ; on the other side were the CC machine and Ho Ying-ch'in's army delegation. As the week's session approached its climax, tension mounted . A ballot with 70o names, including liberals, had been drawn up ; the convention was to select 360 of them for the two central committees, the executive and the supervisory . The reformminded could not hope to win a majority, but they had enough power to shake the machine's grip . On the day of balloting the Generalissimo appeared in the hall . He was not trying to influence the gathering, he said, but he had a suggestion to make. The ballot was very long ; he had drawn up 269
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for the help of the delegates another, to be called Ballot B, for which he had personally selected the names of people he thought fit for posts on the central committees. He was not attempting to dictate . The delegates had free democratic choice ; he had left room on his list for them to cut out the names of men they did not want, and of course anyone who wanted to use the regular ballot could do so . When he finished, the chairman called for a rising vote to see how many approved the suggestion . About 200 of the 8oo party delegates stood up . There was a brief flurry at this lese-majeste. The Generalissimo remarked that perhaps he had not made himself clear, so he would explain again . At the conclusion another rising vote was called for ; this time a majority endorsed the Generalissimo's proposal for a shorter ballot . The Generalissimo had arbitrarily increased the number of committee members to 460 . His ballot had 48o names, and it operated as an unpopularity contest ; those who used it merely had to scratch out twenty names . To make doubly sure of effective control, every voter was required to sign his name to his ballot . About a hundred men refused to vote ; another hundred insisted on using the original ballot ; the rest accepted the Generalissimo's ticket, and his men swept into office . The Generalissimo had given the kiss of death to all reform hopes. His ticket represented complete victory for the CC machine . The liberals with whom he had salted his list remained precisely as before, lonesome voices, a small minority . This was the Generalissimo's will, his idea of democracy . The Kuomintang was still to be controlled by the same men who had led the country to the verge of ruin and resisted every attempt at democracy or unity . If anything should happen to the Generalissimo, his successor would be chosen by the machine that had always done his will in the past . There was a reform administration in the cabinet, but it had been placed there by the Generalissimo ; when he decided to change it, it would have to go, for it had no machine of its own to fight for it. The Kuomintang had promised to dissolve its cells in the army by August . August came and went, but the Kuomintang continued
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its work in the army . November came and went ; party branches continued in the schools . Peace came, civil war came, and a truce followed ; but the popular elections promised in the spring never materialized . None of this mattered very much to the Kuomintang . The resolutions and promises had been read and noted with approval in America ; that was the important thing. Only one broken promise gladdened the liberals . Yielding to a wave of postwar public pressure, the Generalissimo postponed the great constitutional convention to some unspecified date in the future. Americans, not knowing what this constitutional convention would be like, regarded with perplexity and annoyance the loud outcries of Chinese liberals against it . Long before, in 1936, a draft constitution had been written, a constitutional convention scheduled, and delegates "selected ." Nowhere in China was an open election held ; in Shanghai, to be sure, the Chamber of Commerce was allowed to appoint a few businessmen to represent the populace, but elsewhere the Kuomintang handpicked the nominees . The 1936 Kuomintang was bitterly reactionary ; Communists were illegal, as were liberal parties . Only the purest of the pure had come through the process of sifting for the honor . Of 144o delegates, 95o were selected before the Japanese war forced the cancellation of the assembly . Now, nine years later, Chiang proposed that the old and tired men left over from the 1936 lists be called to make a new constitution for the new land . Some of the old right-wingers of the Kuomintang, who had deserted to the Japanese, would be excluded, but the rest of the fossilized delegation were to draw the high enduring outlines of all China's future. The central committees of the Kuomintang would also be given seats . It did not matter that a great war had swept the land, that a new generation had grown to maturity, that the old delegates had never represented more than' the most undemocratic fragment of the old Kuomintang, that the reactionary group could not build the kind of state that all the people would support . Chiang's reform cabinet labored in vain . Ch'en Ch'eng drew up elaborate plans to reform the Chinese army, only to find that his title of Minister of War meant little ; Ho Ying-ch'in still controlled the army . T. V. Soong went to Washington, to San Francisco, to 271
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London ; he spoke for China in the great councils and returned home to find few things changed . Inflation had skyrocketed in late winter . The entire month's salary of a civil servant would not buy enough coal or charcoal to keep his stove full and his room warm . Chicken was $400 a pound and fish $700. A peanut sold for a dollar in the street ; eggs, which had sold for a few cents apiece before the war, now sold for $50 ; the general price level had risen to 2000 times the prewar level . The municipal government tried to limit one month's house rent to 20 per cent of the building cost. Alcohol manufacturers complained that they were losing $700 on every gallon they made, because the government forced them to sell at fixed prices, while the price of raw materials was not fixed . Price-setting committees got around to raising the legal rates on baths, leather, haircutting, laundry, and printing, but by the time the decision was announced, the market was charging 50 to ioo per cent more than the newly granted increases . There was a rash of industrial failures . Salt production fell by one-fifth ; cotton factories closed by the thousands ; flour factories, alcohol plants, and mines shut down, for profits on current sales would not pay for the next month's raw materials . The people were hungry . A quarter of the students at the bestequipped middle school in Chungking were found suffering with tuberculosis ; ,43 per cent of the members of the faculty of one of the refugee universities had the same disease . The Chungking electric system all but gave up the ghost . Each section of the city suffered a powerless, lightless night each week . On lighted nights the bulbs on the overburdened system glowed with the feeble strength of a candle unless you had a transformer installed-at a cost of $2,ooo,ooo. The sewer system had been challenged and had failed . Every other Chinese city in history, a native social scientist said, had been limited in size by the problem of disposing of human wastes . Except for Shanghai and a few other coastal ports, they had all been held to the number of inhabitants whose excreta could be used as fertilizer by the neighboring peasants . Chungking had five times its prewar population, but the peasants had only been able to increase their consumption by a third . Five hundred tons of sewage a day
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found its way through gutters and rivulets into the Yangtze, from which the drinking water came, or collected in great stagnant cesspools between the hills . Miraculously the city survived ; no epidemics flourished beyond the usual round of cholera, dysentery, syphilis, worms, and scabies . Under the benign influence of Dr . Wang Shih-chieh, the new Minister of Information, local censorship was liberalized . But when newspapers tested the limits of the new tolerance, they found they could not report conditions at the front, the Communist crisis, relations with Russia, or a revolt in Sinkiang . They did not dare investigate too closely reports that children of refugees were being sold on the streets by parents unable to feed them. They did not repeat the story Chungking savored for weeks of the Szechwanese war lord and his favorite concubine . The war lord had been away at the front for several years and in his absence had sent his concubine to a college where she might be educated in a way befitting his station ; when he returned, he was shocked to find that college had infected her with liberal ideas, and she disappeared without a trace . The press did, however, expose the scandal of two Chungking poorhouses where 40o adults and ioo orphans died within a month and investigators found 300 corpses lying unburied, "scattered here and there ." Newspapers noted briefly that four months after Chiang K'ai-shek had promised the full institution of a habeas corpus act, the noted liberal professor Fei Kung was carried away by secret police and never heard of again . And the press had a field day with the gold scandal in the Ministry of Finance . This was a minor bit of knavery by which a few insiders, learning in advance of a rise in the official price of gold, cleaned up millions upon millions of Chinese dollars by purchasing gold bars with their advance information . Since America was shipping gold bullion to China to bolster her currency and not to create fortunes for Chinese officials, the scandal echoed all the way to Washington and back . The government promised to seek out the malefactors and punish them ; one arrest was made ; a mantle of silence settled over the episode and it was forgotten . China seethed from end to end at a recruiting drive that in brutality, callousness, and corruption matched the worst in her dark 273
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record . The suffering was made all the more pitiful by the pious protestations of the government that now at last all things were mending. So many bought their way out of the draft that village heads could not meet their quotas ; in order to supply the requisite units of human flesh, organized bands of racketeers prowled the roads to kidnap wayfarers for sale to village chieftains . Army officials engaged in the traffic on their own, and they made no protest no matter how decrepit the recruits' health . In Chengtu a black-market recruit, a trussed-and-bound victim of the press gangs, was sold for $5o,ooo to $xoo,ooo Chinese, the equivalent of the purchase price of five sacks of white rice or three pigs . In one Szechwan district the village headman stationed himself at a crossroads with armed soldiers and seized a fifty-year-old man and his grandson . The boy was leading the grandfather to the hospital, but it made no difference ; off they went to the recruit camp . In two instances village chiefs took their gendarmes to a river to seize boatmen. The boatmen produced cards proving they were engaged in an essential occupation and were draft-exempt . Two were drowned ; two were beaten to death ; the fingers of another were cut off ; more than ten were drafted . One company commander took a platoon of men out on the road to gather recruits ; they seized a man in civilian clothes. Their prisoner proved to be the battalion commander, who outranked the company commander . The junior officer was so terrified that he murdered his superior on the spot ; later he was shot himself. While government propaganda machinery ground out promise after oily promise, terror stalked the country roads . Ablebodied men deserted their villages and formed bandit gangs in the hills to wait until the drive was over . Peasant youths_ refused to haul pigs and rice to city markets for fear of being seized on the road . The Chinese did not fear to fight for their country ; there was no deficit in patriotism. But they knew what recruiting camps were like . Government regulations could be read with a mirror . Officers were forbidden to mix sand with the rice they fed the recruits ; they were forbidden to seize any clothes, baggage, or personal possessions a conscript carried with him; they were forbidden to torture, tie up, or lock their recruits in barred rooms at night ; they were forbidden 274
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to ask families of deserting recruits to pay for the uniforms and food the soldier got at the induction center . Conditions in combat units were horrible, but by comparison to conditions in induction centers they were idyllic . Recruits ate even less than the starving soldiers ; sometimes they got no water . Many of them were stripped naked and left to sleep on bare floors . They were whipped. Dead bodies were allowed to lie for days. In some areas less than 20 per cent lived to reach the front . The week that the stories of Belsen and Buchenwald broke in Europe coincided with the height of the conscription drive in China ; the doctors who dealt with the recruit camp about Chengtu refused to be excited about German horrors, for descriptions of the Nazi camps, they said, read almost exactly like the recruit centers in which they were working . Near Chengtu one camp had- received some 40,000 men for induction . Many had already died on the way ; only 8,ooo were still alive at the camp at the end of the drive . One batch of rooo inductees was reported to have lost 8oo recruits through the negligence of its officers . A few of the men responsible for the horrors were shot . In one dispatch the Central News reported : Hsu Cheng-kun was accused of misappropriating military food supplies, causing the death of 105 recruits, the murder of company commander Wei Chao-jen, burying recruit Tai Ching-shan alive and sundry offenses . . . . Lieutenant Feng Tsun was accused of viciously beating up recruit Sun Kiu-shun, torturing his relative, and extorting $xo,ooo. Captain Li Po-chien was accused of misappropriating military food supplies, causing the death of Li Cheng-tsin and other recruits by physical torture, extortion to the amount of $x97,000, and maiming recruit Tseng Hsien-feng . The Minister of Conscription had been selected as a reform appointee after his predecessor was shot for just such excesses as these . The new minister's performance spoke for itself . Whereas he was supposed to collect 360,000 recruits in the spring, he actually gathered in 500,000 . The official army newspaper observed, "The Ministry of Conscription has reported the names of hard-working staff members to the Generalissimo for meritorious reward ." While the Ministry of Conscription was scouring the countryside for new men, Ch'en Ch'eng, the Minister of War, was desperately trying to reduce the 275
Utopia Stillborn army from more than 30o divisions to too in order to be able to equip and feed those who were left. Indignation grew and surged among the people . They saw that nothing had changed, that nothing would change . All the glittering words of the government covered a determination to hold fast against reform. If the old regime had its way, a rigged National Assembly and an undemocratic constitution would legalize the grip of ancient oppression . Discontent reached from peasant to government officials ; it touched every group. The peasant groaned under the grain tax and conscription . Workers raged at inflation and corruption . Intellectuals demanded a bill of rights . The breach within the Kuomintang grew wider ; progressives outlined plans for bringing the Communists into a coalition government, and reactionaries resisted . Few Chinese dared talk much in public, but cabinet ministers, bankers, industrialists, students, writers, officials, peddlers, coolies, all agreed in private that something must be done . They had little choice, since every political group but the Kuomintang was outlawed . There is no doubt that the vast majority of Chinese agreed with the short-range program the Communists advocated, but few Chinese wanted Communism . Only two solutions could be seen . The Kuomintang might reform itself, give the people every right the Communists offered, and fulfill the promises it had made ; this, however, was hardly likely, with the CC holding the reins . Or the Kuomintang might agree to a coalition . If the Communists came into the government, each party might act as a brake on the other and compete with it for the favor of the people . And perhaps, with all parties made legal, a democratic middle group would emerge . A middle group did break through the ice blanket of political suppression-the Democratic League . It described itself as "standing midway between the Kuomintang on the right, and the Chinese Communist party on the left unreservedly opposed to dictatorship of any shape, and believing implicitly in national unity as a prerequisite to victory." The League was an amalgam of six minor parties that had come together in 1941 . There was no way of knowing how many members it had enrolled ; an outlawed party had difficulty in declaring 276
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its members, when membership was treason . It claimed professors, writers, scholars, some bankers and industrialists, and a few military men. It admitted its weakness among the peasants ; organization was risky, with the Kuomintang secret police working to suppress political action . Leaders of the League were rarely allowed to travel from city to city ; they conducted meetings and issued statements with the greatest caution . They believed that they represented most of China, and they insisted courageously that all parties and nonpartisan leaders be called together to discuss national issues, and to work toward unity and democracy before the end of the war . It was summer, hot and sticky, when victory came to Chungking. It was evening, and Chungking was going about its business . Mothers had finished putting their children to bed, the river bank was full of strolling young people, the downtown shops were crowded with evening trade. General Wcdemeyer was entertaining the British ambassador at dinner. News of the victory came in over the town's few radios and was relayed from telephone to telephone, from friend to friend . The city broke out into little eruptions of shouts and firecrackers, scattered and sporadic at first but growing to a volcano of sound and happiness within an hour . Men, women, and children flooded out of their homes into Chungking's downtown squares . Wedemeyer called off the eleven o'clock curfew, and American soldiers joined the celebration . Jeeps crawled through torrents of people with twenty passengers clinging to them by a fingerhold . Buses staggered through the streets under doubledeck loads, with people hanging onto the tops, shouting and waving flags, and dozens more clutching the fenders or riding on the hoods . Army trucks poured out into the mob . Parades carried lighted tapers . There was no time to put out extras, so the Central News Agency plastered huge handwritten announcements on its walls . Hundreds of people surged about the outdoor loudspeaker at the American office of information. MP's abandoned the American soldiers to the mob, and people clutched at American uniforms, cheered them, suffocated them . "Mei kuo ting hao, mei kuo ting hao (America is wonderful)," they shouted . Some burst out in all the English they could muster 277
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with "Thank you, thank you," or thrust cigarettes into any American hand they could reach. Victory had come, the war was over and by dawn the city was still . The elation died quickly ; peace had come, but the old government, the old misery, the old fears, still remained . China was no nearer reform than ever ; she was further from internal peace . The war was over, but there would be fighting and bleeding in China for a long time to come.
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Victory and Civil War nese, and American troops . Thousands must have participated in the movement that put Changchun, Manchuria's capital, into their hands in the late spring of 1946 . The struggle in the field was paralleled by negotiations between the Communists and the government in Chungking . A huge pressure from the very depths of Chinese society was acting on both parties to force them to peace . The outcry in the press and in private was a spontaneous welling up of public opinion such as had never been seen since the outbreak of war . "Victory has come," was the cry ; "let it bring peace ." Mao Tse-tung, his personal safety guaranteed by the American government, flew to Chungking in an American plane, and a few technical agreements were quickly arrived at . The government promised that it would postpone its constitutional convention scheduled for November, though it would not promise to widen the membership ; it promised to release some of the political prisoners it was holding in concentration camps . The Communists agreed to pare down their military demands to recognition of twenty Communist divisions. A conference of all parties was proposed for some time in the following year, though just what it was to do was never decided ; the Communists wanted it to work out a general political settlement, and the Kuomintang would make no promises . The negotiations deadlocked on the basic problem of mutual security . It is impossible to imagine in America the atmosphere of a bargaining process where both sides feel their lives are at stake ; yet for twenty years terror, bitterness, and bloodshed had suffused every contact between these two groups . Thousands of Communists or suspected Communists lay rotting in government concentration camps even while the delegates talked of peace . The Communists formulated their quest of security by insisting that the government recognize the legitimacy of the regional governments they had set up behind enemy lines during the war . They withdrew their demand of 1944 for recognition of their government in the Yangtze Valley, but they still demanded that the Central Government concede the legality of Communist control in Hopei, Shan286
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has been too long the custom, even within China, to stress her terrifying history of disunity and the even more terrible prospect of further civil war. Yet the demands of the future are so huge that if reconstruction is once set in progress, the talents and energies of all will be so fully utilized that little margin will be left for political violence . China must build the same railways over the same valleys, must open the same mines, clear the same rivers, erect the same steel mills, whether the Kuomintang or the Communists, or both, or neither control her destiny . The promise of the future against the dread of war is the greatest uniting force in Chinese politics today . The reconstruction of China has been in the blueprint stage for forty years . The first plan for Westernization was submitted to a boy emperor by a group of reformers almost fifty years ago . The Emperor had the necessary documents drawn up for a fiat Westernization . His decrees so amazed the court of Peking, which literally thought him mad, that the Empress Dowager staged a palace revolution and imprisoned him until his death . The plans were forgotten while the Empress ran China to ruin in such a vivid and vicious fashion that the entire Manchu Empire collapsed . Sun Yat-sen was the next to work out a plan for China's future. In 19m he published a book called The International Development of China, which was an open appeal to British and American capital to invest in the industrialization of his country . For the Kuomintang, Sun's book remains today the supreme national plan . A group of China's engineers, during the war, tried to make an itemized program of Sun's industrial targets . Chiang K'ai-shek appropriated the en. gineers' studies and incorporated them in his own book, China's Destiny . Chiang's figures will certainly be revised under the scrutiny of technical experts and with fuller knowledge, but as they stand they are interesting as signposts to the future . Every plan ever conceived for China starts with a fundamental handicap, since basic physical data about the land are pitifully inadequate . Only one-third of China has ever been surveyed by modern geological methods ; its borderlands may hold treasures richer than anything the world knows of at present . Its own people are a mystery to its scholars, for there are no adequate statistics by which to analyze their daily life. 299
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Chapter 21
Tentatively, Then
HAT are the chances for such a united, enduring government in China? Unity is a word that has been worn meaningless by years of talk in Chungking . Many of us have wished that there were a mint for words as there is for coins, so that when the edges of a word have become blurred and its legend obscure it could be exchanged, as a coin can, for a new one as crisp and sharp as the old when first used. Unity is such a word . Unity means simply a Chinese state under one flag, guarding its own borders from the Amur to Annam, from the Pamirs to the ocean, controlled by a government in which Kuomintang, Communists, and other groups can speak freely and participate jointly in policy making . The creation of such a government is one of those terribly perilous and difficult tasks in which our world today abounds . Success or failure depends entirely upon the future of two interacting sets of rivalries : one within China itself, the other between the two dominant powers of the world today, the U.S .A . and the U.S .S .R . The rivalry within China is too often seen as a simple clash of two power-hungry parties, the Kuomintang and the Communists . But the most primitive-and most truthful-way to express China's politics today is to say that the Chinese people are seeking a government that will give them change . A revolution is stirring and shaking every province, every county, every village in the land-making its demands of every man in bitter and direct invasion of his personal life . It is working in the columns of hungering refugees, in
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the bivouacs of every regiment, in the memory of every soldier who marched to disaster across the bare mountains and cold paddy fields . In the changes that history demands of China, one large group must lose its privilege in order that another even larger group may gain. For centuries the peasants of China have worn themselves to desperation in serfdom to those who control the land and government ; for centuries the cruel and graceful men who dominate Chinese society have had all the weight of morality, law, and power on their side. The struggle between the landed and the landless, the well-fed and the hungry, is as old as the story of China . But now with the injection of new techniques, new learning, new needs, the grip of the gentry is threatened for the first time . Today China stands at a pinnacle of historic crisis . The dangers are sharp and clear. First is the danger that the feudal-minded men who control the Kuomintang may try to transfer their ancient vested rights to the new world of tomorrow as their counterparts in Japan did a century ago . From the Kuomintang's blind resistance to change comes the second danger : that the Communists may foster the bitterness against all China's time-crusted iniquities so skillfully that the people will be willing to give up new liberties, almost within their grasp, in order to rectify the ancient wrongs . For the first time in Chinese history the struggle is written down in clear political terms . The war lords have ceased to confuse the pattern of Chinese politics-they have been pushed far back to the marches of inner Asia, where within a few decades they will wither away . Chinese politics will be molded by three well-defined political groups-the right wing of the Kuomintang, the men of the middle way, and the Communists . The greatest danger to peace in China is the right wing of the Kuomintang, the dominant party machine. This machine is the political expression of Nationalist army leaders, feudal landlords, and the war-inflated bureaucracy . These men have benefited most by the old way of life ; for peace to be effective these groups must give up most . In vast areas of China only they can give immediate implementation to the policies of any new government . They control
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the Kuomintang and the "legal" government, which is the only government America recognizes ; if anything should happen to Chiang K'ai-shek, they will nominate his successor . These groups of the right-wing Kuomintang hold the law in their hands ; the local codes that govern the villages of China were written by their forefathers, and justice is meted out by their appointees . In a sense these men are pitiful, for they guard brilliant relics of Chinese culture, philosophy, and tradition and cannot understand how or where this culture can be made to fit into the modern world . Under their stewardship Chinese political thought has lost all inner fruitfulness, has become dead and sterile . Their war record of leadership was one of progressive failure ; they could supply no social dynamic to rally men forward, because they saw men not as men but as servile peasants . Their wisdom was reduced to the cunning of the marketplace ; their strength became only an unbending stubbornness . The greatest indictment of these men is their sheer inability to govern, to give leadership . With the victory over Japan and the return of the Kuomintang to the coast the old governing group was given its last opportunity to purge and cleanse itself . The advance guards of the Nationalist armies and government were greeted in Shanghai and Canton with flags and parades, with all the festivity of a carnival. Within six months of their re-establishment they had succeeded in alienating from themselves not only the broad masses of the undernourished and underprivileged, but even the sturdy, active business groups who ten years before had been their great reservoir of strength . It is an axiom that the last attribute to wither in any governing group is its ability to exploit, to oppress, to misgovern . The Kuomintang returned to the coast only to prove the axiom . In an atmosphere of seething inflation and moral decay the officials of Chungking returned to fatten on the cities and provinces they had liberated . With a feeling of nausea the people of Shanghai watched the government they had welcomed back sell licenses, sell privileges, mismanage foreign relief supplies, condone hoarding . They watched the printing presses spin off reel after reel of worthless money while 3"
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prices soared and bureaucrats danced at night clubs and wined at fine hotels . Shanghai's labor organizations watched the Kuomintang hold its first general meeting of labor at a dance club within the first week after victory, saw the old opium rackets flourish again under the guidance of some of the Kuomintang's most powerful men . They had watched the government retreat, bleeding but glorious, from Shanghai in 1937, to be replaced by the Japanese and the traitors of the puppet army ; now the same government returned to accept some of the most odious of the traitors back into its fold . Superficially it seems difficult to reconcile the extravagance and debauchery of the Kuomintang's machine with the stern and puritan fibre of Chiang K'ai-shek . Yet the power of this machine over the rank and file of the party membership was confirmed by Chiang personally at the party congress of 1945 . The brutality and extortion of the visible bureaucracy at the coast is only the image of the brutalities and extortions that have existed in the villages of the interior for generations . The old system in the villages is condoned by traditional practice and glossed over by the timeless Chinese graces ; the gentry of the villages who form the great base of Kuomintang support are represented above all by Chiang K'ai-shek . Accepting their support and clothing himself in their morality, Chiang must go along, as if against his will, with their urban counterparts-the machine bureaucrats who are destroying his support in the great metropoles . The sentence of judgment passed on Chiang by a wise American statesman is a sentence on the entire dominant Kuomintang machine : "Chiang K'ai-shek," said he, "is trying to fight an idea with force ; he doesn't understand the idea and doesn't know how to use force ." It is an historical paradox, therefore, to say that the greatest single personality in the equation of peace and war in China is Chiang K'ai-shek. The men of the Kuomintang right wing give trust and confidence to no leader but Chiang ; if they are to be persuaded, committed, or forced to progressive action, only Chiang K'ai-shek can do it . He alone can assure his feudal retinue that' in giving up their ancient privileges they will not be entirely liquidated in the new
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state. Only he can guarantee them a fraction of their former dignity . And even the Communists recognize that Chiang's co-operation is indispensable if there is to be even the briefest of truces . Between the extreme right of the Kuomintang and the disciplined Chinese Communists on the left stands a mass that seeks a middle way . It includes the Kuomintang moderates, the intellectuals, and nonpartisan liberals, the splinter groups of the Democratic League . A huge proportion of the Kuomintang rank and file belong to this group, as do most thinking people in China. This middle group, whose members are the sincerest friends of America, is surest of being wiped out in civil war. If true peace could last for a generation these men might eventually form the majority of the new administration ; certainly they would dominate the thought of its press, literature, and stage . This is the group that wants peace and will labor for it . If the men of the middle group were well organized, they could guarantee peace . But they are not . They lack an army, a political machine, roots in any social class . Only the spread of education and industry can create enough men of the modern world to give them a broad social base . Their entire future depends on the reconstruction of China. On the left stands the Communist Party . The Communist Party wields power, has struck for power in the past, may attempt to strike for absolute power in the future . The Communists now insist on having a solid base in North China to protect their security and lives . No one knows whether they will use this area as a staging ground for their next drive to supreme power . Only if the new government moves energetically forward to reform can the Communist protestation of loyalty be tested . If a new government of China resists change as rigidly as the old, there will be unrest, upheaval, bloodshed, and the Communists will make the most of the opportunity. Only an enduring truce can clarify the Chinese Communist Party's real goals . Their leaders have fought from hill caves and mountain lairs for twenty years ; they have been too close to the people to be unaware of the suffering civil war brings . Up to now the Communist Party has shone by comparison with the Kuomintang . Brilliantly led 313
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throughout the war, it found its way to power by offering the people not only protection against the enemy, but relief from ancient woes . Those who visited Communist territory escaped from the oppression of the Kuomintang into what seemed an area of light . Now the Communists are part of the world-they must stand examination not by comparisons but by achievements . They have been more democratic than the Kuomintang; now they must prove whether democracy was a means or an end . It would be dangerous to judge the Communist Party of China by American standards . More than any other Communist party in the world, they have dealt directly with masses of the people in turmoil and agitation in the past twenty years. They feel themselves now immeasurably strong, for they are riding a huge crest of revolution . They are cold-blooded, ruthless, and determined . They would hesitate as little to demand the ultimate sacrifice of thousands or even millions of peasants as they would to offer their own lives as sacrifice . They play hard politics-they have cheated and broken agreements ; they are bitterly intolerant of criticism for they consider themselves always at war . There is only one certainty in Communist politics in China : the leaders' interests are bound up with those of the masses of povertystricken, suffering peasants, from whom they have always drawn their greatest support . They, and they alone, have given effective leadership to the peasant's irresistible longing for justice in his daily life . In great areas of North China the Communists have established a new way of life, and these areas they will never give up, though it cost them their lives and the lives of all their supporters . Because the peasants now want peace as well as food, the Communists too seek peace . They offer to halt for a period the storming drive of discontent and participate in a general government with the Kuomintang until the country heals its wounds . What Communist policy will be five or ten years hence no one can foretell . If the Kuomintang had used the period of truce to offer the people the same things offered by the Communists, it might eventually have evolved into a broad multiparty government, with all its members committed to fundamental change . Having wasted the truce, nothing can save the Kuomintang 3 14
Tentatively, Then . . .
from the next wave of Communist expansion but continued unstinted, unquestioning American aid . In such a situation the most sensible solution is probably the one supported by the middle groups in China-a federal union with spheres of local and national power strictly marked . The national army, they say, must be reduced until it cannot dominate the entire physical map of China at one time. Each province must be responsible for its own internal security . Each province will probably have to possess the same autonomy in education, local justice, land taxes, and criminal and civil law as made the American union possible . Such a situation would, of course, bring about an uneven development in China ; some provinces would march ahead rapidly and others lag far behind . But China is too vast, her communications too poor, her techniques too primitive, to achieve the complete centralization that Kuomintang theorists have sought in the past. Such a union can hang together only if the federal government fills the same role it does in America-the guarantor of national defense against outside aggression, the framer of foreign policy, the chief factor in the economic life of the nation . The federal government can exist only if groups from all provinces and parties participate in its operations . It must further guarantee that within each province minority rights will be respected-that all parties will be free to organize and campaign ; that civil liberties will be granted to Kuomintang members in Communist territory, to Communists in Kuomintang territory, and to the mass of people everywhere . The creation of such a union is extremely difficult. Each side has great contempt for the other . The Communists believe the Kuomintang is strong only because of America ; the Kuomintang believes the Communists are strong only because of Russia . But without outside intervention, both sides are almost evenly matched . In a civil war Chiang, with his legacy of American arms and equipment, can take highways, railways, and cities . The Communists, with the support of the peasants, can hold the countryside, and strife must be long drawn out and incalculably costly . Any truce, any agreement, any union reached in China must sink its foundations into the quicksands of suspicion and distrust . Each 31 5
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party expects the other to betray any compact arrived at . Both are trigger-happy ; no normal agreement can persist against the corrosion of mutual ill-faith . If China were an island continent, embarking in isolation on a new adventure in change after a generation of bloodshed, there would be every reasonable hope that unity and co-operation would outweigh disunity and civil war . The Chinese are a sensible people. They want peace. China is utterly exhausted-the men, the animals, the machines, the land itself . There are few buffaloes to plow the paddies, little food to feed the hungry, little shelter, little clothing, little warmth . There are hundreds of thousands of soldiers straggling home who want never to march again, who crave rest above all things . Left alone, the Chinese people would in time find peace in their own way . But China lives today in a turbulent world . The common man's hope of peace is menaced from without as well as within . She is flanked to the north by the world's greatest land power, to the east by the world's greatest sea and air power . The mutual fears, suspicions, and rivalries of the Soviet Union and the United States meet in China in their most aggravated and dangerous form, and this foreign rivalry is more than half the threat to Chinese peace and unity . It is interesting to trace the growth of China's dilemma over the course of the past few generations . For half a century the world has fretted about the "China problem" ; statesmen of great powers have spent decades of their lives pondering China's role in their imperial plans . From a Chinese point of view the problem is different : What can China do about the world? What can she do about the aggression of her neighbors? China cannot plan and cannot hope until she lives in a world that treats her as an equal, not a subject . For a millennium, China was the greatest power in the Pacific and East Asiaso powerful that she became soft . The predatory nations of Europe found her so easy to dismember that they parceled her off into spheres of influence and proceeded to strip her of all dignity . China was everyone's colony and no one's responsibility . The rivalry of the great powers was finally regularized at the turn of the century by America's 316
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Open Door policy . This meant simply that China was "open" to everyone but the Chinese . Even so the Open Door policy was a great advance over the earlier imperialism of the European powers . The older powers would have carved the goose up into easily digestible portions of meat, but the Americans insisted on the integrity of the goose so that all might be able to share her golden eggs . From the point of view of the goose this was preferable to dismemberment but still highly unsatisfactory . The first World War and the Chinese revolution changed the entire situation in the Far East . Czarist Russia, the most brutal of the predatory powers, was now finished, as was Germany ; England was weak ; and revolution surged through China herself. America tried to re-establish the Open Door policy by a series of conferences and understandings . But the vigor had gone out of the policy-Japan was on the march, and Japan believed that China was a power vacuum that she was divinely appointed to fill . From 1931 to 1945, Japan's attempt to fill this vacuum dominated the Orient. Today a totally new equation exists . For all purposes of history the two greatest powers operating in the Orient now are the United States and Russia . Both powers recognize that the vacuum left by Japan's collapse must be filled by a strong Chinese government, and each of the two is determined that this new government shall be at least as friendly to itself as to its rival . If America and Russia become sponsors of the two great parties in internal Chinese affairs, if they regard the success of their client parties in China as the only guarantee of friendship in the new Chinese state, then for China this will be stark tragedy . In a sense this war, which was fought by the Chinese for unity and nationhood, will have become a wasted war . For ourselves as Americans the acceptance of such a formula will be no less than disastrous, for by its definition we are left as the patrons of the decadent and corrupt, and the Russians become the patrons of the vigorous and dynamic . There are majestic rhythms in history, moments of high opportunity. The war between China and Japan cast up many such moments of opportunity . Time and again-in 1938, in 1944, in , 945-there came those great crests of fortune when internal peace might have 3 17
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been made by the two Chinese' parties . Imperiled by the enemy or under pressure from the people, the two parties were forced again and again into truce and fleeting co-operation . Each time the opportunity was cast away ; each time civil war was sealed even more certainly into the future of the nation . Of all the opportunities that presented themselves in the course of the war the most hopeful was that which followed immediately on victory over Japan . It was a moment of jubilation and hope in which the thundering voice of the people exerted on the two great parties a compulsion completely without precedent. The disgrace inherent in the waste of this historic moment must be shared in equal part by the Chinese parties themselves and by American diplomacy . Americans must realize now one of the hard facts of Chinese politics-that in the eyes of millions of the Chinese their civil war was made in America . We were the architects of its strategy ; we flew government troops into Communist territory, we transported and supplied Kuomintang armies marching into the Communists' Yellow River basin and into the no man's land of Manchuria, we issued the orders to the Japanese garrisons that made the railway lines of the north the spoils of civil war . Our marines were moved into North China and remained there to support Chiang's regime-though fiction succeeded fiction to explain their continued presence in noble words . They were there month after month "to evacuate Japanese from China," though the Japanese might have been evacuated in a fraction of the time by a common-sense political agreement with the Communist partisans . When the Japanese began to leave and that fiction exploded, they remained to counter the Russian troops in Manchuria. When the Russians evacuated Manchuria and that fiction too exploded, it was announced that the marines were remaining indefinitely merely to "guard" supply line from coal mines to the coast. These fictions hold only for the American people themselves ; in China it is clear to all that the chief duty of our marines there is to preserve, protect, and defend Chiang K'ai-shek's government in the northern areas where he is under attack . Both parties in China realize this. The Kuomintang knows that its new army, the coastal cities, and the Peking-Tientsin area were all gifts from America and that 318
infect America with these gifts will its own fear and terror of a league of the Communists with the Soviet Union . The Communists, too, realize it ; all North China and Manchuria might have been theirs long since had it not been for American intervention, and their bitterness has grown with each passing month . By that process of emotional autointoxication that is characteristic of the Communists their propaganda has passed again into a phase of violent, intemperate denunciation of America and its works. For a full year the underlying motive in the policy of both the Soviet Union and the United States has been a compound of fear and suspicion . Both have tried to build a bulwark across the body of China as they have across Europe to protect themselves and what they regard as their interests . Fear is even more dangerous than greed as a motive in international diplomacy, and the mutual fears of two such huge and powerful states as Russia and America have made a mockery of China's sovereignty . The United States pursued, under Hurley, a policy that led from blunder to blunder, into eventual participation in a civil war . Only after we had committed ourselves did we send General Marshall to China with instructions to perform the miracle of re-establishing American integrity . Out of fear of the United States the Soviet Union blundered on from the questionable Sino-Soviet pact to the final looting of Manchuria . In Manchuria the policies of the two great powers came to fruit in the blood and death of thousands of Chinese citizens. America's interest in China is very simple . It is the same as our interest everywhere else in the world ; it is peace . In thinking about peace it is vital for Americans to distinguish between peace and stability-it is stability we have been pursuing up and down the frontiers of Asia and Eastern Europe . We have been seeking to reestablish as much of the old order as our diplomacy could achieve, and our allies everywhere have been those who have profited most by the old order . We have been trapped by legalities, legitimacies, and such dubious phrases as law and order . In China, for too long, we have sought an evanescent stability where the Chinese people themselves wanted change ; as long as we marshaled ourselves against 319
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that change and supported all those who opposed it, we were leading the Chinese people and the world toward a situation where violence was inescapable . Asia today regards America as the last great bastion of reaction, a nation that speaks of freedom but in the ultimate analysis always aligns itself on the side of the status quo . Even for the most conservative of Americans a conservative foreign policy is unrealistic ; e as between stability and change, change must win . American loans, American troops, the constant invocation of the word democracy, may delay this change. But eventually agents of change must creep into the peasant's village and tell him there is another system, a system by which the masters are wiped out and the land divided, a system in which village elders no longer rule, but the peasants decide their own fate. Liberty is a glistening word of many faces, and the peasant will believe that that system is best and offers the most liberty which gives him the quickest solution to the troubles of his daily life. He will vote for it, fight for it, die for it . If we move to halt this tide, we are lost . Not all our powers can do more than preserve a brief and somewhat ignoble isolation . China is the most advanced politically of all the Asiatic nations. What will be happening in the rest of Asia tomorrow is being worked out in blood in China today . For a century, white men have looked down on the peoples of Asia, classifying them in the status of secondclass human beings ; the historic trend in each of these countries has been for all the people, rich and poor alike, to join in driving the white men from their positions of power . In each of these countries the conflict between the white man and the subject peoples has only paralleled a second struggle, the struggle between the rich and the poor, between the landed and the landless . This is a struggle between those advanced groups who wish to throw out the foreigner in order to occupy the positions of advantage he has built in the country and those backward, unhappy groups who wish to throw the foreigner out in order to-destroy all positions of advantage and exploitation that oppress the common people . China today has almost succeeded in freeing herself from the yoke of the foreigner ; she is now enter-
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ing the second phase of her struggle, the struggle within herself. She stands one step ahead of the rest of Asia : India, the Indonesians, the Annamites, fight now to free themselves from the white man, a fight that China has already won . Tomorrow the peasants of those countries will be fighting against their own native overlords for a share in the new freedom that the struggle of all has bought . Since it is impossible to halt the revolution going on in China and in Asia, a realistic foreign policy for America should attempt to establish three goals : i . That this revolution, when successful, should regard America as a friendly state . 2. That it should be achieved with a minimum of violence and bloodshed. 3 . That it should preserve within itself always the right of minority groups to speak, to protest, to act under law and that it should permit the great outer world to observe, to witness, and to report what it does . These should be our goals . But the policies America may pursue at the present moment are limited in number . We cannot pursue the policy that prevailed during most of 1945, the policy that led to the direct intervention of our marines in a Chinese civil war . This policy is unconditional support of Chiang K'ai-shek . There is no doubt that Chiang K'ai-shek has been a valuable ally, but the Chinese people as a whole are more important to us than the personality of a single individual ; what they want, not what he wants, is important . This policy might have led, and still may lead, to either one of two results . One might be the division of China ; in South China there may be an alliance of the Kuomintang and the U . S. A ., in North China an alliance of the Communists and Russia . This would mean that neither half of China is free, and friction would grow in an annual crescendo to the end result of war . The second result of this policy might be total victory of the Kuomintang . Chiang K'ai-shek, supreme with American surplus war equipment, his army staffed by our combat personnel, might be able to establish his rule over 321
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most of rural China, the main cities, and the major arteries of communication . A China ruled entirely by the Kuomintang dictatorship (and this, after all, was what our policy sought all through 1 945) would be a historical monstrosity . For a period there would be flourishing industry ; railways would be built ; factories would rise . But the peasants in the village would rot ; their tensions would accumulate ; their sons would be marshaled into the army . Having no outlet for domestic tensions except by revolution, which had been made inconceivable, this state would become, as Japan's did, a menace to all the Orient, eventually to all the world . Like Japan, it would possess all the skill and techniques of modern science, and these skills would be under the direction of men whose thoughts were still rooted in the barbarism of feudal antiquity . There is a second policy we might pursue-an isolationist policy . We can shrug our shoulders and say, "The hell with it!" But if we pull out of China, our fears and our past deeds will come home to disturb our quiet . There is no possibility of Chiang K'ai-shek's surviving even for the briefest moment if in the future the Communists are backed from Moscow . If we withdraw unilaterally, then in ten years all China may be under Communist control-and in measurable years to come, all Asia . This would not be a terrifying prospect if our relations with China were to begin then with a fresh slate . But there can be no fresh slate, for our tortuous diplomacy has already earned the bitterness and enmity of the Chinese Communist Party ; it will be a long time before they return to the friendliness of 1944 . We may exist for decades before this hostility abates-but we will live in a state of armed watchfulness . The only practical policy for us to pursue is a third ; the encouragement of a multi-party government in China that will be a vehicle for the changes the land needs . It means that many men of the Kuomintang whom we now regard as friends must be dropped ; it means that to re-establish our nonpartisan status, American intervention must cease and American troops must be withdrawn . The encouragement of such a multi-party government depends above all on a prior understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States of America . We hold the key . So long as any part in China feels that
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Tentatively, Then . there may be an appeal to a partisan court outside China that will judge in its favor, the really constructive forces of the nation will be hamstrung . We must come to an agreement with Russia either by direct negotiation or by a conference that includes, along with us, the two great parties of China . First we must make clear to the Russians that what we want is a China in which the friends of Russia will have as large and free a voice as the friends of America, that a union of the two parties is as much our object as theirs . Second, we must try to have Russia join us in a negative agreement-that if civil war goes on in China despite our most sincere efforts to end it, then a cordon of immunization will be maintained by all the world ; if civil war continues, Russia and we ourselves must pull out lock, stock, and barrel from China-our troops, our equipment, our financial aid . A mutual understanding between Russia and the U . S. A . is only the first step in an American policy to peace . The second step is the unstinted, unsparing use of American economic strength . Economic aid from America can be useful only if it has one overriding condition-that it be granted a government in which Kuomintang, Communists, and Democrats all participate . Civil war can be ended permanently in China only by beginning on the physical and social reconstruction of the nation . China cannot rebuild in our time without our aid . Our resources, our technical skill, our material, can mean a difference of twenty years in her development, can mean that millions who may die of hunger will live to maturity . Both the Kuomintang and the Communists realize how terribly China needs American aid ; both are willing to moderate their demands very significantly to have this aid in the future . Such a policy of economic aid is not charity . If by a loan to China we can buy the peace, it is a cheap price ; furthermore, a loan to China will be in the profitable tradition of American enterprise . Once the valleys are opened, once communications tap the market of four to five hundred and fifty million people who will soon pant for new things, a vast and limitless market for goods will be spread before our factories . Once the process of reconstruction is set under way, America and 32 3
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Russia must agree to stand aside politically . There will be namecalling and bitterness in China for decades ; when the program of change begins to touch the peasant and alter his status, there will be sporadic unrest. This will be healthy unrest and must be expected ; we must not allow any casual outcry to alarm us into a belief that freedom is being assailed . A great and superficial quiet in China would be alarming ; the shrieks and countercharges of two political parties, each able to express itself freely throughout the land, may be one index of progress . There remains a last question . Suppose we cannot get Russian agreement either to a hands-off policy or to an affirmative policy of co-operation, what then do we do? We must match the dynamic of Russian foreign policy with an equally vigorous dynamic of our own . Our program cannot be the type of program we have pursued in the past or the type of program we are pursuing in Eastern Europe or the Near East at the present moment. We cannot defend democracy by defending it where democracy does not exist. We cannot defend a system of oppression, feudalism, and corruption anywhere in the world and tell people we are doing so in defense of their democratic rights . No peasant, be he Chinese, Iranian, or Indian, will believe that the system that makes him a bondslave to hunger is democratic or free . We ourselves must become the sponsors of revolution . Our policy must offer the masses of Asia the same things that Russian revolution promises them-bread and equality in their daily life . But we can offer them more than that, for we are nourished by a tradition of an earlier revolution, a revolution that promised the world not only equality and security but liberty . We can offer not only bread and land in the future but bread now, in the present, from the granaries of our surplus. The allies we seek must be those governments that promise and give their people what they need and want ; we cannot have strong allies or a strong policy if our Allies block the desires of their own people or if we ourselves remain obdurate to the misery of millions . To adopt the concept of change as our course in Asia is not only in the best interests of Asia but in the best interests of America . If we 324
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proceed on such a course, we will not clash with Russia ; we can parallel her or outstrip her in winning the affection of new peoples ; we cannot menace her by such a policy, nor can she menace us. If we proceed on such a course, the new world that is being born in Asia must inevitably become a friendly world . To try to frustrate or delay the birth of this new world is not only wicked but perilous ; it might well result some day in the melancholy verdict that ours was an age in which men died that peace might come-and no peace came, or came too late.
325
Index
Air bases, 141, 153, 165, ,8o, 183, 190-3 Air Transport Command (ATC), 150,154, 191-2,282 American soldiers, 158-65 American Volunteer Group, 152 ArmY, 42, 63, 67, 70-I, 75, 132- 44, 185, 251, 281-2, 288 ; corruption, 139 - 40, 175, 184, 189 -90, 194, 224 ; and America, 106-7, 132,1135-7, 140-2, 148, 156, 516, 219-20, 222, 261, 294 ; and Kuomintang, 97,101, 104-7, 251, 270-1 Arnold, Gen . H. H ., 150 Asia, 21, 84, 90,155, 242, 250, 290, 320-2, 324 Atlantic Charter, 89 Auchinleck, Sir Claude, 250 Barrett, Col . David, 241, 253 Barrow, Graham, 187-8 Belden, Jack, 88 n. Blockade, 71-2, 142, 150-1, 154, 156, 158-9, 180, 259-60 ; of Communists, 105-6, 139, 185, 197, 199, 206, 212, 217, 221, 224, 226, 228-9, 258 Blucher, Vassily, 38 n . Borodin, Michael, 38 British, 79-80, 82-3, 86-7, 89-95, 111, 128, 150-2, 158-9. See also England Burma, 88-90, 95 - 6, 135 - 6, 150 -3 . 156, 258-9, 180, 215-7, 221, 224, 259-60, 282 ; Road, 71, 78-9, 1 :Z8"36,142,153, 155, 223-4, 260, 262 Cairo conference, 158, 26,, 288 Calcutta, 89, 95, 145 Canton, 11, 17, 54, 59, 72, 78, 129, 135, 185, 281-2, 296, 311 ; capital, 37-8, 40, 101, 121 ; Communists in, 200, 213, 227 . Censorship, 19, 97, I IO-I, 126-7, 130, 179, 217, 231-3, 249, 253, 259, 263, 273, 290 Central Bank, 43, 121, 114 Central Broadcasting System, 25 Central Clique (CC), right wing of Kuomintang, 100, 102-3, 107, 269-70, 276, 310-2 Central Executive Committee (CEC), 99, 103 - 4, 294 Central Planning Board, 124 Chahar, 287 Chang Fa-kwei, 18r, 185, 190, 193, 220 Chang Tao-fan, 114 Changchun, 285, 295 Changsha, 58, 70, 181, 183, 258 Chekiang, 38, 69, 118-9 Ch'en Ch'eng, 101, 106-7, 142, 263, 271, 275 Ch'en Chi-mei, 107, 120 Ch'en Kuo-fu, zoo Ch'en Li-fu, 100, 102, 104, 107-11, 113-5, 217 Chengchow, 168-70, 174, 176 Chengtu, 6- 7, 31, 59, 274 - 5 Chennault, Gen . Claire, 13, 149, 152-5, 163, 190, 221 Chiang K'ai-shek, 34, 44, 96, 118-31, 151, 229 - 30, 238, 255- 6, 285, 294, 299 -300, 355-4 ; prewar career, 4 - 5, 38-47, 107, 119-22 ; favorites and opponents, 15, 277, 163, 183, 196, 264-6 ; and America, 44- 5, 102, 214, 216, 218, 225, 242, 253, 256-7, 280-2, 288-90, 318, 321-2 ; and army, 42, 70-1, 104 -7, 136, 539, 284-5, z89,194, 262 ; and Communists, 40-1, 44 -7, 49, 75-6, 98, 127 -9, 197, 202, 212, 217, 287-8, 295-7 ; and economics, 110, 114-6, 126, 16o ; government, 7, 97-8, 100-1, 103-17, 124, 128, z6o ; and Hurley, 219, 221, 246, 248, 250-1, 253-4 ; and reform, 128-9, 186, 224, 263, 267 -71, 273 ; in war, 11, 46, 48, 51-3, 146, 1150, 152, 155, 158 -9, 179, 181, 2Io ; quoted 119-20 Chiang, Mme ., 111-3, 122-4, 126, 146, 186, 221 Chiang Ting-wen, 177 China Air Task Force, 153
327
Index
China-Burma-India theater (CBI), 145 -7, 149 -57, 225 China's Destiny (Chiang), 126, 299, 301 Chinese National Airline, 18, 16o Chinese Republic, 120, 126, 148 Chinese Turkestan, III Chou En-lai, 75, 131, 146, 230, 254 -5 Chu Chia-hwa, 269 ; clique, 102 Chu Tch, 206, 228, 230, 279 Chuanhsien pass, 189-9o Chungking, 3-20, 57, 59, 99, 112-3, 123, 142, 226, 272 -3, 309 ; Americans in, 124, 159, 219, 243 -7, 249 -50, 261, 267 ; bombings, 11-6 ; and Communists, 74-6, 212-3, 228-32, 252 , 2 54 -5, 286, 289 ; and Honan situation, 166, 173 - 5, 177, 179 ; morale, 72, 129-30, 214, 217, 228 ; and war, 61, 71-2, 1o6, 133, 136, 140-1, 185 - 9, 194 -7, 259 - 60, 266-8, 277-9 Churchill, Winston, 151, 155 Chuting, 185 Civil war, 44-5, 119, 123, 203, 212, 2,8, 249 -50, 258, 261, 265, 271, 279 - 97, 292, 299, 315-23 Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, 128 Coast, 31, 34, 54, 69, 73, 179, 206, 213 i 257, 281, 305 Comintern, 235, 238 Communiques, 61-2 Communists, 34, 199-213, 226-42, 276 ; and America, 210, 215-6, 221-2, 234, 240-2, 253, 257- 8, 293, 318 ; army, 197, 199, 205-11, 2 1 9, 227, 25 2, 2 54 -5 ; expansion, 50, 61, 73 - 4, 199 -200, 211, 258 ; and future, 305 -7, 310, 313-5, 323 ; and government, 53, 101, 107-8, 111, 1 43, 164, 1 79, 217, 219, 246, 262 ; negotiations, 212-3, 250-6, 280, 28690, 293-7, 309 - 15, 323-5 ; and Russia, 40-1, 45, 230, 234, 237-42, 290-2 Conscription, 132-3, 273-6 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 90-I, 93 - 4 Cushing, Caleb, 243 Dairen, 291 Delhi, 94-5, 158-9 Democracy, 98, 131, 147-8, 203, 231 - 3, 236-7, 240, 242, 250, 257, 268, 270, 314, 320, 324 Democratic League, 276- 7, 294, 296, 313, 323 Dutch, 78-80, 82-3. Sec also Netherlands East China campaign, 165, 179-98, 210, 223-4, 259 Education, 58-60, Io8-11o, 138, 303 - 4 Eighth Route Army, 50, 63, 74 -5, 200, 206-8, 210, 279 England, 78, 128-9, 317 . See also British Executions, 189 -90, 275 Executive Yuan, 98, 113, 125 n ., 252, 263 Fei Kung, 273 Flying Tigers, 152 Forman, Harrison, 166 Formosa, 52 Fourteenth Air Force, 146, 149, 153-4, 16o, 163-5, 180-1, 183-4, 186, 194, 282 Fukien, 131 FuPing, 51 Galen, 38 Gandhi, Mahatma, 92, 94, 146 Gauss, Clarence, 214, 217 -9, 223, 225. 240, 243-6, 248, 256, 290 Germany, 42, 45, 7 8-9, 151, 239, 241, 290, 317 Gleason, Major Frank, 195-6 Government, 42-4, 68, 97 -117, 154-5, 1646, 172-7, 251, 304-6 ; coalition or new, 213, 218, 237, 251-2, 254, 256, 276, 3o8-9, 313 -7, 322-3 ; opposition to, 163, 276 ; and peasants, 20, 25, 29 - 30, 32, 306 ; and war, 63, 183, 189, 197, 210, 212 ; and war lords, 49, 61 . See also negotiations under Communists Great Wall, 46, 48-9, 63, 199, 258, 279, 284, 300 Green Gang, I2o-I Guerrillas, 49 -51, 63, 199, 207-10, 257-8, 279, 283 -4, 296 Hainan, 200 Hangchow Bay, 258 Hankow, 8, 11, 13, 39 -40, 53 - 4, 57, 179, 181, 197, 200, 227, 282 Harbin, 295 Hardin, Gen. Tom, 154 Hengyang, 185-6, 188 Hill, Col. David, 163 Ho Ying-ch'in, 101-2, 104-6, 113, 115, 149, 185, 215, 217, 225, 258, 263, 269, 271 Hochin, 196 Hokkaido, 81
32 8
Index
Honan, 172, 174. 198, Zoo ; campaign, 177-8, 181, 197 ; famine, 166-78 ; rebellion, 178-9, 184, 212 Hongkong, 18, 85, 89, 163 Honshu, I8o Hopei, 1199, 209, 283, 286 Hopkins, Harry, 222-3 Hsiang River, 1811, 185 Hsinkou, 50 Hsueh Yueh, 70, 181, 183-6 Hu Tsung-nan, 1101, 1105-6 Huang Chen, 258 Hump, 154-5, ,6o, 162, 164, 192, 217-8, 262 Hunan, 74, 181, 185, 187, 198, 258, 302 Hundred Regiments' Battle, 199 HuPeh, 51, 1311, 143, 173, 200 Hurley, Patrick J., 123, 196, 218-25, 24356, 261, 288-90, 292, 319 India, 89-96, 149-52, 156, 158, 192, 259 6o, 321 Indies, 79-82, 88, 155 . See also Netherlands Indies Indo-China, 72, 78-81, 128, 180-1, 197, 200, 281 Industry and resources, 31, 55-7, 102, 292, 300-7 Inflation, 16- 7, 69-70, 77, 111, 115-6, 126, 139, 217-8, 272, 311-2 Japan, 44,'77-81, 90, 105, 310, 322 ; and Communists, 46-7, 199, 201, 209-10, 257-8 ; and Russia, 152, 234, 239, 279, 284, 291 ; and United States, 79 -85, 96, 146, 152, 158, 200, 241, 256-8, 28t ; at war, 4 -5, 11, 48, 51, 53 -5, 70, 83 - 7 125, 128, 132, 139, 141, 152, 163, 184, 205, 262, 292 ; defeated, 279-86, 288-9, 291, 3 11 , 317- 8 Jehol, 287 Kalgan, 284 Kansu, 131, 140 Karachi, 149 Kashgar, 300 Kiangsu, 69, 200 Ku Chu-tung, 71, 258 Kung, H. H., 104, 111-7, 217, 222-3, 265 Kung, Mme ., 111, 113 Kunming, 59-60, 136, 156, 1160-3, 192, 296 Kuomintang, 33-47, 91 - 2. 97-117, 121 . 2511, 299 ; and American aid, 212, 239 40, 263, 282-3, 284 - 7, 289- 93, 293 . 295, 311, 315. 318, 321-2 ; early split with Communists, 40, 227, 235, 238, 251 ; and Communists, 36, 3 8-9. 77, 2,6, 230, 233, 236, 249 . 252, 2 54 . 2569,262, 279-80, 295 - 6, 309 ; demoralized, 197, 212 ; and the future, 305-6, 3110-5, . 323 ; and peasants, 43, 69 -70, 174, 201, 203, 2111, 307 ; and reform, 240, 267-71, . 276 -7, 294, 296 ; and Russia, 99, 239 . . See also National Congress Kwangchowan, 281-2 Kwangsi, 1 3 6, 189, 194 Kweichow, 105, 131, 185, 197, 263 Kweilin, 156, 163, 181, 185-6, 1 9 0- 3 ; campaign, 193 -7 Land, 22, 27 -32, 43, 69-70, ,o8, 128, 174, 203-4, 215, 234- 6, 287, 306 League of Nations, 48, 77 Legislative Yuan, 98, 103 Lend-Lease, 218, 221, 254 Li Tsung-jen, 142 Liangtang, 190 Lihsien, 143, 144 Lim, Dr. Robert, 138 Liu Hsiang, 4 - 5 Liu Hsiao-ch'i, 231 Liuchow, 11811, 189, 194-6 Long March, 45, 129, 230, 238, 242 Loyang, 1168, 1177-8 Lu, Dr . Richard, 138 Lung Yun, 146, 16o Lunghai, 63 Ma Yin-ch'u, ro9-1o MacArthur, Gen . Douglas, 83, 85, 222. . 28I McClure, Gen . Robert, 247 Malaya, 81-2, 85 - 8, 95, 151 Manchuria, 38" ., 46, 180, 1199-201, 216, 2 27,279- 80, 284-6, :z88-9, 291-2, 294-6, 302, 318 -9 Manchus, 4, 33 -7, 58, 105, 120, 139, 243,. 299 Mandalay, 127 Mao Tse-tung, 123, 227 -30, 234 -8, 240, 246, 250-1, 253-4, 286, 289 ; quoted 238 Marco Polo Bridge, 47
329
Index
Marshall, Gen. George, 223, 292-7, 319 Megan, Thomas, ,68 Merrill, Gen . Frank, 154 Merrill's Marauders, 154, 158 Missionaries, 08, 170-I, 296 Mongolia, 11, 78, 145, 279 Moscow, 38, 40-1, 45, 121, 238-9, 291 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 146, 149-50, 261 Mukden, 285 Myitkyina, 159, 165 Nanking, 39, 42, 49, 52-4, 141, 203, 213, 239, 258, 282-3 Nankow Pass, 49 Nantan Pass, 194 National Assembly, 267, 271, 276, 286,297 National Central University, 59, 125 n ., 127 National Congress, 99, 267-70 National Military Council, 53, 105, 113, 12 4, 25 2 National Resources Commission, 116 Nationalist Revolution, 44, 47, 121-2, 130 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 92, 94, 146 ; quoted, 93 Nelson, Donald, 218-20 Netherlands, the, 78. See also Dutch Netherlands Indies, 78, 85-6. See also Indies New Army, 262-3, 281, 318 New Fourth Army, 53, 74, 206-7, 210, 279, 284-5 ; Incident, 75-6, 200, 211-2, 251 New Life Movement, 123 Nimitz, Admiral Chester, i8o Northern March, 38 -9, 44, 107 Office of War Information, 151 Okamura, Gen., 250 Open Door policy, 317 OSS, 195 Outer Mongolia, 288, 291 Pai Chung-hsi, 185 Paoting military academy, 119, 139 Pearl Harbor, 18-9, 81, 83, 85, 132, 148, 152-3, 155, 216, 237 Peasants, 19 -34, 43-4, 98, 129, 131, 147-8, x64,175-6 ; and Communists, 40, 201-5, 207-8, 229 ; in war, 65-6, 68-70, 143, 178-9, 188 ; and future, 301, 306-8, 310, 314 Peking, 4, 6, 8, 17, 33, 47, 49, 51, 54, 58 . 70, 72,147, 282-3, 287-9, 296, 299, 318 Philippines, 81-2, 85-6 91, 222, 245 Pinghai, 259 Pingkiang, 74, 258 Political Affairs Committee, 255 Political Bureau (Communist), 227, 230-I Political Consultation Conference, 294 Political Science Clique, 102-3, 269 Port Arthur, 291 Port Darwin, 89 Potsdam, 279 Puppets, 283, 289 Revolutions, 32-4, 40, 58, 73, 84, 211, 244, 250, 280, 309, 314, 317, 321, 324 . See also Nationalist Revolution Roosevelt, Franklin D ., 145, 258, 220-4, 244 Russia, 56, 99, III, 230, 273, 305 ; and Chiang, 41, 45, 121, 239, 288, 291 ; and Chinese Communists, 40, 237 - 42, 315, 319, 321-2 ; revolution, 37, 40, 253 ; and Sun Yat-sen, 37-8, 40 ; and United States, 218, 242-3, 290, 309, 316-25 Saipan, i8o Salween, ,o6, 135-6, 141-2, 156, 158-9, 216, 221, 223, 225, 260, 262 San Min Chu 1, 36-7, 47, 235 San Min Chu I Youth Corps, 109, 125 n. Shanghai, 17 - 8, 31, 54, 56, 72, 102, 113, 141 ; battle, 51-2, 56, 186; and Communists, 213, 227, 257-9, 271-2, 284-5, 287 ; coup of 1927, 39 - 41, 251 ; and Kuomintang, 107, 120-2, 296, 311-2 Shansi, 49-50, 63, 66, 68, 74, 111, 136, 199, 283 -4, 287, 302 Shantung, 200, 283, 286 Shensi, 45, 58, 73, 74, 76, 167, 173, 199 Siam, 6, 46, 58, 74, 122, 149, 166, 174, 178, 206, 239 Sikang, 129 Sinkiang, 239-40, 252, 273, 300 Sino-Soviet treaty, 288, 290-1, 319 Singapore, 86-8, 155, 180 Sliney, Gen. George N., 26o Smuggling, 72 Soong, T. V., 111, 113, 127-8, 131, r36. 179, 225, 247, 255, 263-6, 271, 291 South Seas, 80-96, 180, 200
3 30
Index
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), 149, 261 Stalemate, 68-81, 132, 147, 204 Stalin, 158 Stalingrad, 89 . 143 Standing Committee, CEC, 99, 103 Standing Committee, Kuomintang, 113, 222 State Council, 98, 124 Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W ., 88 n ., 1 42. 145 65, 190, 197, 240- 2, 259 . 262, 280 ; aims and strategy of, 156-9, 180, 256, 290 ; and Chiang, 127, 149 . 155, 214-5, 218-25, 249, 253 ; crisis, 105. 148, 193, 214-25, 260, 296 ; leaves China, 194, 243 - 4. 250, 261, 263 Stratemeyer, Gen . George, 149 Stuart, Dr. J. Leighton, 296 Sun Fo, 130, 179, 255, 269 ; clique, 102-3 Sun Li-jen, 142 Sun Yat-sen, 35 - 8, 40-1, 47, 97, 102, 1201, 130, 16o, 235, 255, 299 Sun Yat-sen, Mme ., 111 Supreme National Defense Council, 98-9, 104, 113, 124, 252, 254 -5 Szechwan, 3-4, 8-11, 17, 57, 59, 123, 129, 131, 140, 274, 301 Taierchwang, 53 Taiyuan, 284 Tang En-po, 177-8 Taxes, 29, 69-70, 114, 174-6, 266, 307 Teheran conference, 158 Tenth Air Force, 149, 282 Tibet, 145, 3O0 Tientsin, 18, 49, 54, 257, 287-9, 296,318 Tojo, Hideki, 81 Tokyo, 78, 283 Tsiang, T. F., 116 Tsing-chih, 143 Tungkwan, 70 Tushan, 196 Twentieth Bomber Command, 150 Unification of China, 41-4 United States. See Gauss ; Hurley ; Marshall; Stilwell ; and under Army ; Chiang; Communists ; Japan ; Kuomintang ; Russia U.S. Air Corps, 83, 180, 189, 281 U .S. Army, 115, 124, 135-7, 150-2, 164, 255, 261, 267, 281 U .S. Marine Corps, 289, 296, 318, 321 U .S . Navy, 145, 158, 180, 281-2 Universities, 35, 58-60, 1o8-1o, 16o Versailles, Treaty of, 58, 77 Vincent, Gen . Clinton, 163, 190, 193 V-J Day, 19, 115, 210, 296 Wang Ching-wei, 18, 143 Wang Shih-chieh, 255, 263 . 273 War, 48-67, 96, 147, 210, 317 ; victory, 279-86 . See also Burma ; East China campaign ; South Seas; Stalemate War lords, 4-5, 31-2, 34-8 . 42 . 45-6, 61, 70-1, 128-9, 310 Wavell, Sir Archibald, 146 Wedemeyer, Gen. A. C., 125 . 194, 197, 225, 247. 249, 255, 260-3, 277 . 281, 288 Wei Li-huang, 142 Western influences, 31 -2, 35, 43, 107, 229, 298 -9, 303 Whampoa academy, 38, 42,105 Whampoa clique, ioi, io5-6, 177, 269 Woman's National Salvation Association, 204 Wong Wcn-hao, 55-6, 62, 116-7 Wu, K . C., 15 Wu Te-chen, 54 Yalta conference, 290-1 Yangtze River, 3, 5-6, 9, 12, 301 ; Communists on, 44, 73 -5, 200-1, 213, 258, 285-6 ; Kuomintang on, 38-43, 121, 288, 297 ; in war, 51, 53 - 4, 56, 70-1, 106, 163, 179, 183 Yeh Chien-ying, 228 Yellow River, 42, 51, 54, 57-8, 6o, 63-4, 136, 177 ; Communists on, 73, 75, 199, 206, 213, 283, 285, 297, 318 ; in war, 48-50, 70, ,o6, 197 Yen Hsi-shan, 284 Yenan, 45, 73, 75, 200, 204, 206, 216, 225, 226-42, 253, 255, 258, 279, z85, 288, 291 Young brothers, 9 Youth National Salvation Association, 204 Yu Han-mou, 181, r85 Yu Ta-wei, i 16 Yunnan, 7, 59, 70, 129, 136, 140, 146, 154, 156, 158, z6o, 162, 184, 191
331