German Official Account of The Russo-Japanese War

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ERMAN
OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF TH E
RUSSO-JAPANESE
[^
WAR
THE SCHA-HO
(TEXT)
! !!
la^
Presented
to the
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

by the
ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE
LIBRARY
1980
VOLUMES PREVIOUSLY ISSUED.

Vol.
I.
THE
Maps. Price
YA-LU.
six
With nine Appendices and

10.
Qd.
net.
Vol.
II.
WA-FAN-GOU,
preliminary to
"With
four
and actions
and
LIAO-YAN.
Appendices
eleven Maps.
Price
10*.
Gd. net.
Vol. III.
THE BATTLE OF
YAN.
Maps
Price
10*.
LIAO-
^Vith ten Appendices and ten
M.
net.
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

THE BATTLE ON THE SCHA-HO
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in
2010 with funding from

University of Toronto
http://www.archive.org/details/p1russojapanesewar04prus
^4
i^^^mm
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Russo-Japanese
War
THE BATTLE ON THE SCHA-HO

PREPARED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
'..1
*'... i'TK
^
I
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AUTHORISED TRANSLATIO!t BY
KARL
VON
DONAT
"
LATE LIEUT. 83rD (eaST PRUSSIAN) FUSILIER REGIMENT^ GERMAN ARMY

Author of " Stvdiet in Applied Tacties
1r^-
//-
WITH ELEVEN MAPS AND EIGHTEEN APPENDICES INCLUDING FIVE PHOTOGRAPHIC VIEWS
Xonon
HUGH
REES,
Ltd.,
119,
PALL MALL,
S.W.
1910
[AU
rights reserved]
PRINTED BT HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
LD.,
EXPLANATION OF TERMS USED ON THE SKETCHES

Abds.
in the evening.
Hgel,
hgel
Hill,
Hillock,
Abt.= Abteilung.
Abteilung
Knoll.
= (if au Artillery unit) 2-4 batteries (equivalent to
J.
/.
D.
R.
a British Artillery Brigade), otherwise = Detachment. Ag. = Advanced Guard. A. K. = Army Corps.
Allg. Res.
= Infantry Division. = Infantry Regiment.
A. R.
= General Reserve. = Army Reserve, General
Reserve.
Arrieregarde
Artillerie
= Rearguard. Brigade = 2 Regiments of Artillery of 2-4 Abteilung
each.
= Imperial Tomb. = Cossack. ^fli). = Cavalry. K. B. Cavalry Brigade. Khf. = Graveyard, Cemetery. Kohlengruben = C'oal-pits. Kolonne = Column. Komp. = Company. Kp. = Company. Kuppen = Knolls.
Kaisergrab
Kas.
= Hill, Mountain. = Bahnhofe Railway bis = until. Brcke = Bridge.

Berg
Bhf.
Station.
Lj.
= =
Liubavin.
n.
nach
East.
(if
along a road)
to.
Ehem.
formerly, former.
0.
0.
Eisenbahn
Railway.
A. = Eastern Detachment or Group.
Fmhnen Hgel
= Colour or Standard Hill. Fels Hgel = Rock Hill.

H. Q. Hj. R,
Ostl., Oestl.
Eastern.
Ost
East.
Ost-Abteilung
Eastern
Detach-
ment
or Group.
= General = General
Headquarters.
Resej-'/e.
RJ.
Riab, ikin.
yu
vi
Sd
EXPLANATION OF TERMS
=
South.
West-Abteilung
Westlicher
= Western tachment or Group. =

"Western.
De-
Teile der
Portions
of.
Tempelhgel
Temple
Hill.
Truppen
u.
=
=
Troops.
and.
Zgl.
= =
und
(if
= Centre. = Brickfield. zu = to, belonging to. zu (D.) = belonging to

Zentrum
ski).
(Derabov-
V.
along a road) from.

verstrkte
verst.
reinforced.
zwei
two.
=
von
of,
from.
Zwei Kuppen Huge
Hill with
Vorposten
Outposts.
two
knolls.
NAMES SPELT IN THE TEXT DIFFERENTLY TO THOSE GIVEN ON THE MAPS

LIST OF
Baranovski
Bolotov
Baranowski.
Bolotow.
Dembovski
Dembowski.
Kondratovitsh
Koshelevski
= Kondratowitsch. = Koschelewski. Kossovitsh = Kossowitsch. Levestam = Lewestam. Lipovaz - Popovitsh = Lipowaz Popowitsch.
Lissovski
Lissowski.
= Miscbtschenko. = Musshelow. Novgorod = Nowgorod. Novikov = Nowikow. Peterov = Peterow. Pliesbko = Pljeshko. Putilov = Putilow. Riabinkin = Rjabinkin.
Mishtshenko
Musshelov
= Sacharow. Sarubaiev = Sarubajew. Shabyko = Schabyko. Shatilov = Schatilow. Sbdanovski = Schdanovski. Shileiko = Schileiko. Shitkovski = Scbitkowski. Sivizki = Ssiwizki. Soboliev = Ssoboljew. Solomko = Ssolorako. Stakovitsh = Stako witsch. Wassiliev = Wassiljew. Wolkov = Wolkow, Woltshanovski = Woltschanowski. Yenissei = Jenissei. Yepifaii Jepifan. Yuchnov = Juchiiov. ZurikoT = Zurikow.
Sackarov
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
General
Situation
LlAO-YAN
(a) Russians
...... ......
after
the
Battle
of
1
25
17
Mukden, p. 1. Concentration of the Army around Mukden, 8. The " Position of Mukden," 8. Drafts and reinforcements
Kuropatkiii discontinueg his retreat at
arrive,
sive, 13. 12.
Kuropatkin's resolve to assume the offenIntelligence about
Strength of the Army, 16.
the enemy, 16.

(b)
Japanese
19.
......
and
reinforcements
arrive,
17
19.
25
Disposition after the battle of Liao-yan, 17.
Positions
prepared,
Drafts
communication, 20. Intelligence about the enemy, 22. Concentration of the Japanese Army north of the Tai-tsy-ho, 22. Action of Bian-yu-pu-sa, 24.
Lines
of
Shifting the 1st
Army more
to the East, 24.
II.
BEGiXxVma of the Russian Movements

to the
26
49
The order for the advance, 26. Kuropatkin's ProclamaArmy, 32. The battlefield, 33. Advance of the Western Detachment on October 5 and 6, 35. Fresh intelligence about the enemy, 39. The M'estern Detachment remains halting on October , 41. Advance of the
Eastern Detachment until October 6, Detachment rests on October 7, 45.
43.
llie Piastern
Umesawa
escapes
from Bian-yu-pu-sa, 46. Portions of the Eastern Detachment advance on October 8, 47. The General Reserve *nd 6th Siberian Army Corps follow, 48,
ix
xii
CHAP.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Measures
of the Japanese at the Be50 October ginning OF
III.
....
59
Signs of a Russian offensive, 50. Kuroki's Order for the Army, 62. Oyam<a intends to await the Russian attack and then himself assume the offensive, 63. Distribution
1st
of the forces on the extreme right wing, 54.

Wu-li-tai-tsy on October 7, 67.
Action of
IV.
The
First
Four Days of Battle
60222
October 9
6073
60
The
Russians
Tlie Western Detachment and Centre advance, 60. Eastern Detachment attacks at Pen-si-hu, 65.
-70
Japanese
......
72.
71
Out-
73
The 12th
Division reinforces the right wing, 71.
posts of the 4th
and 2nd Armies withdraw,
October 10
Japanese
......
73102
73
89
Oyama resolves to Intelligence about the enemy, 73. assume the counter-offensive, 74. Oyama's attack-order, Order for the 1st Army, 76. Recapture of positions 75. on the extreme right wing, 77. Strengthening the posiThe 4th Array tions of the Guard and 2nd Divisions, 78. The 2nd occupies the left bank of the Schi-li-ho, 82. Array advances to come in line with the 4th Army, 86.
Russians
89102
Kuropatkin's instructions to Stackelberg for enveloping Kuropatkin's interference the enemy's right wing, 89. with the Western Detachment, 90. Advanced bodies of the Western Detachment are pushed back to the SchiITie 6tli Siberian Army Corps is to support li-ho, 91.
the Western Detachment in case of need, 95.
berg's order of October 9 in the afternoon, 97berg's answer
Stackel-
Stackel-
*^
on Kuropatkin's request to advance, 98. Stackelberg orders the attack for October 11, 100. Result of October 10, 101.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
October 11
xiii
102157
Oyama's Disposition of the Western Detachment, 103. plan of attack, 104. Attack-order for the 1st Army, 105. Attack of the Eastern Detachment, 106. Reinforcing of the Japanese right wing, 112. Attack-order for the Guard
Attack of the Guard Division on the Waiand ^Vâtanabe-yama, 113. Attack of the Japanese 3rd Brigade on the Western San-jo-shi-san, 124. Attack of the Japanese 1.5th Brigade on Temple Hill, 127. Man gives up Temple Hill, 130. Kuroki orders the
Division, 112.
to-san
Sarubaiev determines to withdraw, 132. Unsuccessful attacks of the 4th Army against the 1st and 10th Army Corps, 133. The Japanese Attack-order for the 2nd Army, 139. 3rd Division captures Nan-kuan-tsy, 139. The Japanese 6th Division captures Yen-kia-wan, 141. 'llie Japanese 4th Division captures Ta-yu-tschun-pu, 142. Advance of the 6th Siberian
for
attack to be continued during the night, 132.
Army
Corps, 144.
Oyama's attack-order
October 12, 146. Nocturnal surprise of Nan-kuan-tsy by the 17th Army Corps, 147. Stackelberg discontinues the attack, 151. Night attack of the Russians at the Ta-lin Pass, 152. Recapture of Fahnen Hill by the Japanese, 153. Night attack of the Russians on the Tumen-tsy-lin Pass, 154. Recapture of the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass by the Japanese, 156. Result of October 11, 156.
October 12
157222
Kuropatkin's view of the situation, 157. Prince Kan-in 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampf retire, 159. Situation of Ino-uye's Detachsurprises Sarasonov, 158.
ment, 160. Attack-order for the Guard Division, 161. Night attack of the Japanese 1st Brigade at Man-hua-pu, 162. Night attack of the Japanese 2nd Brigade on PaFurther advance kia-tsy and on the AVatanabe-yama, 162. of the 4th Guard Regiment, 167. Occupation of the BaThe Japanese ji-san by the Japanese 1st Brigade, 168. Guard Division covers its right flank against the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division by troops on the Ka-ko-rei-san, 171. Order for the Japanese 2nd Division for a night attack, 172. The .Tapanese 3rd Brigade captures the Western The Japanese 15th Brigade San-jo-shi-san at night, 172. captures at night the heights near Orr-wa and the Nan-san, 172. The Japanese 3rd Brigade captures the heights Matsunaga moves off south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, 17"^
to the right wing, 177-
The
inese 15th Brigade tries
xiv
TABLE OF CONTEXTS
to capture the Lo-to-sauj 179.
Storming by night of the
San-kai-seki-san and of Sau-kuai-schi \-illage by the Japanese
10th Division, 180. The 11th Kobi Brigade tries to capllie M'esteru Detachment mainture the Djo-sau, 184. Kuropatkiu's tains its advanced-guard positions, 186.
correspondence
Siberian
Rifle
with
Stackelberg
188.
about
4th
the
th
East
Division,
ITie
Siberian
Corps
Corps, 193.
being reinforced by portions of the 1st The 2nd Army rolls up the advanced-guard Advance of tlie positions of the 17th Army Corps, 196. Disposition of the 2nd Army during the night, 197.
is
Army Army
17th
Army
Corps, 200.
The Japanese 6th
Division cap-
tures Orr-schi-kia-tsy, Siau-tun-tai, and Lan-tsy-tai, 201.
The Japanese 3rd

order, 207.
li-ho, 208.
Division captures Nan-kuan-tsy, 204.
Counter-attacks of the 17th
Army
Corps, 205.
Wolkov's
The Japanese 3rd DiWsion captures SchiThe Japanese 4th Division captures Siau-tai,
Tsun-lun-yeu-tun, and Ta-tai, 210. Oku's orders for Retreat of the 17th Army Corps in the pursuit, 214. Nocturnal retreat position Ku-kia-tsy La-mu-tun, 214. of the 10th Army Corps into the position south of Scha-
ho-pu, 216.
Result of October 12, 221.
V.
The Last Days

October 13
of Battle
223368 223264
Kuropatkiu's retreat-order for Stackelberg and Sarubaiev, 223. Retreat of the Eastern Detachment to the line Yen-sin-tun Kan-to-li-san Huan-lin, 226. Oyama's
luo-uye remains in his position, 229. Matsunaga's action at the Tschau-hsien-lJn Pass, 230. CounterAttack-order for the Guard Division, 231. attacks of Russians at Mishtshenko's instigation, 232. Retreat of the Japanese 1st Brigade of Guards from the
order for pursuit, 228.
Ba-ji-san, 234. Attack of the 4th Guard Regiment, 235. Watanabe's retreat from the Ka-ko-rei-san, 238. Attackorder for the 1st Army, 240. Tlie Japanese 5th Division joins the 1st Army, 240. Yamada's Detachment remains at Huu-kia-tschuan, 240. The first e'chelous of the Japanese 8th Division are arriving, 241. Capture of
the Lo-to-san by the Japanese, 241.
The 4th
Siberian
Army
37th
Corps'
retreat
from the Len-ge-san, 244.

retires
The
247.
Infantry Division
to the Sei-ko-san,
4th Siberian
Mau withdraws from the D'o-san on Orr-tau-kou, 248. The Army Corp retreat on Fn-kia-pu, 248.
'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Mishtshenko's retreat to the Ba-ken-ji-san, 249. DisposiDisposition of the tion of the 17th Army Corps, 250. 10th Army Corps, 2.52. Six battalions are to go back from the 17th Army Corps to the 10th, 254. The 6th
Siberian
xv
FAOEB
Army
Corps and Dembovski are placed under
Half of the orders of the Western Detachment, 255. Japanese 6th Division is moved up to the right of the 3rd
Attack of the Japanese 3rd Division, 258. attack on Tschien-huauKoizumi surprises Hun-lin-pu and attacks hua-tien, 259. La-mu-tun, 260. Advance of the 4th Division, 261. ReDivision, 257.
The 6th Half-Division makes an
sult of October 13, 263.
October 14
264306
Advance of the 1st Orders for the 1st Army, 265. Order for the Eastern Detachment, 266. 265. Kuropatkin adopts measures for forming a General ReOrder for the Japanese Guard Division, 268. serve, 266.
Army,
The Mishtshenko evacuates the Ba-ken-ji-san, 270. The Japanese 5th Division at the Wai-tau-schau, 271. Russian 37th Infantry Division evacuates the Sei-ko-san and the San-kaku-san, 273. Penetration of the 10th Army The Japanese Corps' position at the Hou-tai Hill, 277. 3rd Division captures the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu, Portions of Shatilov's Brigade rejoin the 10th Army 281. Supports for the 10th Army Corps, 284. Corps, 283. Futile attack of the 36th Infantry Regiment on Schaho-pu, 285.
Kuropatkin's order for a concentric attack
on Ku-kia-tsy, 289. Sivizki pushes forward to Hou-huanKuropatkin collects fresh reserves, 292. hua-tien, 291. Counter-attack of Koizumi captures Lin-schin-pu, 295. the Russians, 297- Advance of the 6th Siberian Army Corps, 298. The Japanese 4th Division delays the 6th Dembovski advances, 802. Siberian Army Corps, 299. Order for the 2nd Army, 303. Bilderling's order to the 6th Siberian Army Corps, 304. Result of October 14, 305.
October 15
307330
Kuroki's order, 307.
Oyama's order, 307.

ese
The Japan-
3rd Division captures Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy, 309. The 11th Brigade rejoins th, 24th Brigade, 310. The The western 6th Division captures La-mu *un, 311. wings are containing each other. 312. Misunderstandings Disposition of the 10th at the 17th Army Corps, 316.
XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Army
Misunderstandings between KnroCorps, 323. The Centre and Eastern Detachment remain stationary, 327. Result of October 15, 329.
Corps^ 320.
patkin and the 10th
Army
Octoher 16
330344
is
Yamada
captures the height with the lonely tree, 331.
Kani's Detachment at the Wai-tau-schan

right flank of the 1st
to the 10th
covering the
Army,
333.
Preliminaries to the
attack intended by Kuropatkin, 335.
Kuropatkin's letter
Army
Corps, 338.
Preparations for the attack
on the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy, 340. The Eastern Result of OctoDetachment retains its position, 343.
ber 16, 343.
Octoher 17
344356
General Putilov recaptures the height with the lonely The 10th Army Corps fights a futile action for tree, 344. Scha-ho-pu with the Japanese 3rd Division, 351. Result of October 17, 355.
October 18 and the
End
of the Battle
356368
Kuropatkin defers the attack, 357. Kuropatkin's Order of October 19, 358. The Russian positions, 359. The Japanese positions, 364. The fight for the ^Vai-tauschan, 366.
Total Losses
Comments
Russians
368
Japanese
Result
.
369405 369389 389405

405
APPENDIX
War
Organisation of the Russian Army of Manchuria during the battle on the Scha-ho in October, 1904
between pages 406
407
APPENDIX
II
War
Organisation of the Ja; anese Field

the battle on the Scha-h
j
Army
1904
during
in October,
between pages 406
407
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX
Order to the No. 5
troops
III
xvii
PAGES
of
the
Army
of
Manchuria,
407408
APPENDIX IV
Order
to
the
troops
of
the
Army
of
Manchuria,
No. 6
409412
APPENDIX V
Order No.
1 for the defensive troops of the
entrenched
. .
position of
Mukden
.413
APPENDIX
VI
Order No. 3 for the defensive troops of the entrenched 414 415 position of Mukden
.....
VII
VIII
APPENDIX
position of
Order No. 4 for the defensive troops of the entrenched
Mukden
......
of the
416
APPENDIX
Instructions for the defence
main position of
Mukden
APPIilNDIX IX
417418
Order to the No. 8
troops
of
the
Army \
of
Manchuria,
. .
419423
APPENDIX X
Kuropatkin's Proclamation of October 2, 1904
.
424
425
APPENDIX XI
Order to the troops of the Western Detachment
.
426
427
xviii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX
XII
PAGES
Order to the troops of the Western
Army Detachment
428
APPENDIX
XIII
. .
To
the
Commander
of the Western Detachment
429
APPENDIX XIV
Order to the troops of the Western for October 16
. . .
Army Detachment
.
'
.430
APPENDIX XV
The General Order
issued on October 19
. .
431432
APPENDIX XVI
Vîew of the Schi-H-ho
and of Putilov Hill
at end
APPENDIX XVII
View of the San-kai-seki-san
.
....
at
end
APPENDIX
Hill
XVIII
View of the ground at the Ta-lin Pass and at Temple

at
........
.
.
end
EXPLAXATIOX OF TeBÎS USED ON THE SKETCHES
List of Najies with Different Spellings
ix
LIST OF
(in
No.
1.
MAPS
separate case)
General sketch for the battle on the Scha-ho, October,

1904.
2.
Advance of the Russians and
positions of readiness of
8,
the Japanese from October 5 to

Situation on October 9, 1904.
1904.
3.
'*
i1
??
?5
10
fj
n
?9
? ?>
"
'^
5?
?>
J>
5?
1^ "
1^ 15 '^
;?
"
55
55
9 '
10.
55
55
55
55
16 and 17, 1904.

after
11.
Disposition
of both Forces
the battle on
the
Scha-ho in October, 1904.
if it*
i.i^- JSr
'
i0
VL-t '.'t^^,
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

GENERAL SITUATION AFTER THE BATTLE
OF LIAO-YAN
(a)
Russia?is
after
When,
during
its
retreat
the
battle
ofRuropat-
Russian Army had succeeded iHgof^gg'to getting away from the Japanese, all its portions stay at continued their march in the general direction on his retreat
Liao-yan,^ the
Mukden.
the
to
patkin,
Army
main bodies of J^P Liao-yau General Kuro- on Tiethe Commander-in-Chief, had first intended
September 6 the ^ crossed the Hun-ho.
On
conduct the Army straight back to Tie-lin.'^ He wished to resume the fight in the position prepared there, to which, from the beginning of the campaign, he had paid special attention, owing Only to its supposed great defensible capabilities. the 10th as well as the 2nd and 3rd Siberian Army Corps were to remain for the present in the earthworks of Mukden,^ designed as a kind
"The Battle of Liao-yan/' pp. 194-207. 65 kilometres north-east of Mukden. * The construction of the " Mukden Position " had been commeuced under the personal supervision of the G.O.C. Engineers of the Manchurian Army during the summer, when the Japanese Armies
Vol. III.
began their advance, converging on Liao-yan.

But when
to
it
of bridge-head, to cover the crossing of the re-
mainder of the Army.

did
became
clear
that the Japanese, contrary
all
expectations,
not pursue, and were not in any strength advancing north from Liao-yan beyond the branch hne leading from Yen-tai Station to the coal-pits, General Kuropatkin resolved to discontinue his
retreat, to concentrate the
Army again
at
Mukden,
and to
advance.
offer
renewed resistance to the enemy's
This resolve meant for the Russians a moral

gain.
The
prestige of the Russian arms, which

after
all
had sunk low

decidedly rose
days'
these
previous defeats,
when the Army, scarcely a three march distant from the battlefield, faced
about again with the object of renewing its reThe Russians had certainly not been completely defeated at Liao-yan they had retired only because their supreme commander had not
sistance.
had the strength of mind to

the bitter end
actions,
;
fight the battle to
yet the final result of the last

sacrifice,
which had entailed such heavy

battlefield.
was
after all a retreat,
making the Japanese undisIn addition to
puted masters of the
the moral advantages gained by ceasing to retreat, By recertain material gains accrued as well. taining possession of Mukden, the rich resources
of that wealthy, thickly populated city continued
to be available for supplying the Russian
Politically
it
Army.
was not without importance that the

capital, the ancient
its
Manchurian
home
of the reign-
ing Chinese Dynasty, with
sacred imperial tombs,
should thus remain in the hands of the Russians.
AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN

Having determined
of the
to
stay his retreat,
Kuro-
patkin next tried to form an opinion on the value
the Generals
"Mukden Position." Commanding

^
He
therefore charged
the 3rd Siberian and
10th
Army
Corps to inspect the works thoroughly.
While General Ivanov
was against the use of
the position, chiefly for reasons of Artillery defence,
General Slutshevski^ was
much
in
its
favour,
recommending the work to be continued. On September 6, the Commander-in-Chief himself agreeing with General inspected the works Slutshevski's opinion, he ordered him to adopt at
;
once comprehensive measures for the completion of the "Mukden Position." Based on his resolve of holding for the present a
Kuropat-
position on the Hun-ho with a portion of his Army, rallies by General Kuropatkin gave his directions to thejênerai troops in General Order No. 5 ^ of September 7. the disThe bulk of the Army, in compliance with them, Jf his""
was concentrated around Mukden on the northern troop at Hun-ho bank, while General Slutshevski was to occupy the " Position " with the 10th Army Corps sketdi i. and the 2nd Siberian Corps.* The 2nd Siberian Corps was to push protective detachments to Kuan-
and Lin-schin-pu, south-west of Mukden, and the 10th Army Corps an advanced guard to Fn-kia-pu, south-east of Mukden. By this General Order were to stand
lin-pu
:
General Commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. * Appendix III. General Commanding the 10th Army Corps. * By General Order No. 4, the actual text of which is not known, it had been settled for the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to occupy the section west of tlie railway, and the 10th Army Corps the section to
'
the east of that line.
THE RCSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Corps southwest of the town on both sides of the railway The 17th Army Corps on the Mandarin Road
Siberian
The 4th and 5th
Army
between Mukden and the Hun-ho, with an advanced guard at Scha-ho-pu, under the orders of the General Commanding the 10th Army
inside the area
Corps
Corps east of the Mandarin Road, likewise between the river and the
1st Siberian
The
Army
town The 3rd Siberian Army Corps south-east of Mukden, on the northern Hun-ho bank at Szwan-fn and Tschin-wan-fn The 1st (European) Army Corps, the main body of which was still on the way, close north-west of the town between the roads to Sin-min-tun and to
;
San-dia-sa.
was covered by General Kossagovski's reinforced brigade standing on the road to Sin-min-tun.^ In front, about halfway between Mukden and Liao-yan, on the general line Hun-linpu Hun-pau-schan Fn-kia-pu, were Grekov's, Mishtshenko's, and Samsonov's Cavalry forces, which were to extend their reconnaissances beyond that line. Three detachments under Generals Iîubavin, Peterov, and Eck were pushed to the Kau-tu-lin Pass, the Da-lin Pass, and to In-pan, to cover the left flank. Eck having advanced bodies
right flank
The
at Sin-tsin-tin.
^
Siberian
-
Kuropatkin had dropped his original intention of using the 3rd Army Corps in the defensive position as well. Kossagovski is said to have advanced on the road to Sin-min-tuu,
to
close
the border of the neutral territory,
i.e.
the
railway line
Sin-min-tun Schan-hai-kwau.

Next day, September
8,
the Commander-in-
Chief issued a fresh Order,^ based in the main on the former, but making various changes in the
distribution of the
forces.
It
Although the Order

being
began with the words, "

to
my
intention
make
preparations for assuming the offensive
with the Army," the Commander-in-Chief at that time had probably not yet made up his mind to
attack, but merely wished
spirit
to
raise
perhaps the
of his troops by these introductory remarks.
essence of the Order was in the arrangements for the defence of the " Mukden Position," in which
The
Kuropatkin thought to offer a determined resistance to the Japanese should they advance. The positions the Russians occupied by General Order No. 6 were then as follows The 2nd Siberian and the 10th Army Corps, under the orders of General Slutshevski, remained in the sections of the " Mukden Position " assigned to them, their advanced guards on the line Kuan-lin-pu Lin-schin-pu Huanschan.^ The 17th Army Corps, forming the nearest support for the main position, was also left in former place immediately south of its Mukden. The greatest care was taken to secure the flanks, especially the left flank, for which Kuropatkin seemed most anxious, probably on account of the mountainous character of the
:
Appendix IV. Different from tbe General Orders Nos. .5 and 6, which prescribed an advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps to be at Fn-kia-pu. Another Russian source states that the protective detachments at Lin-schinpu and Kuan-lin-pu were furnished by the I7th Army Corps since September i).
'
The main task of securing the left flank country. was entrusted to General Ivanov, who in addition to his own, the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, which moved to Fu-schun, was also placed in command of the 3 advanced detachments in the south and east. The disposition of the latter remained the same
;
their strength
merely seems to have been someLiubavin's
what
altered.
Detachment
(6 battalions,
12 sotnias, 14 guns) had to occupy the passes at Peterov's Fan-schn and the Kau-tu-hn Pass
;
Detachment
Da-lin Pass
(3 battalions, 6 sotnias, 4 guns), the

;
Eck's Detachment
(9
battalions,
4 sotnias, 20 guns, 1 Sapper

at In-pan, with a
company) remained
guard at Sin-tsin-tin. The 1st Corps was to move from its former position close south of Mukden to the neighbourhood of Fu-lin and Kiu-san, as a " near protection
Siberian
Army
to the left flank "
that corps served at the same
time as a connecting-link between the main body
Army and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, which it was also its first support. The march to was not to be carried out on the next day (September 9), but on the 10th of that month. The security of the right flank was entrusted to General Dembovski, commanding the 5th Siberian Army Corps, who, however, had at his disposal only 10 battalions, 10 sotnias, 24 guns, and 1 company of Sappers.^ This detachment was to move to Tsz-kia-pu to oppose any hostile forces
of the
^
Appendix
I.
The
tributed
among
various detachments
handed over
losses.
to the 1st
Army Corps was disone portion was, moreover, and 3rd Siberian Army Corps to make up their
rest of the 5th Siberian
;

7
advancing by the right bank of the Hun-ho, or The proto prevent any crossing in the south. tection of the " extreme right flank " was left to General Kossagovski's Detachment (6j battaHons, 9 sotnias, 16 guns), which moved to Tun-ta-wan, The '* General Reserve " was on the Liao-ho.
formed of the 1st Army Corps, whose place of assembly was removed farther north to the country between Hu-schi-tai Station and Pu-ho, and of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which was to go to the north-west of INIukden into the former quarters of The Cavalry detachments in the 1st Army Corps. front remained in the places assigned to them, namely, the Orenburg Cossack Brigade under General Grekov (12 sotnias, 6 guns), in the country the Transbaikal Cossack west of Hun-lin-pu Brigade under General Mishtshenko (24 sotnias, 10 guns), at Hun-pau-schan and the Siberian Cossacks under General Samsonov (18 sotnias, 6 guns), at Fn-kia-pu. The Order did not assign fresh tasks to the Cavalry reconnaissance was to be continued as hitherto. The actual text of General Order No. 4 outlining these duties not being available, we do not know the objects and
;
;
limits for this reconnaissance.
was very much extended including the guard at Sin-tsin-tin from Eck's Detachment, the distance between the extreme wings measured over 160 kilometres. Uncommonly strong forces 34-^ battalions, 43 sotnias, and 78 guns, not counting the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Cv rps had been detailed to protect the flanks. Their protection might very well have
position
The whole
been left entirely to the Cavalry if its duties and employment had been better understood
generally.
as arranged
During the time the movements of the troops by General Order No. 6 were carried out, progress was made in further entrenching the
"
Mukden
Position."
The"Pobeing
The entrenchments then

and
partly
still
\[]^q
existing were partly
Mikden" finished
is
unfinished
earthworks
forts,
rcdoubts, lunettes, trenches, and gun-
structed
pits.
bridgehead with three defeusive
They embraced like a bridge-head the roads Converging on Mukden, with their crossings over The villages Yen-schu-tien-tsy the Hun-ho.
(southcm portion), Ti-kia-wan, Y-schu-tai, and Hun-ho-pu were fortified in addition. General Slutshevski, by a series of Orders,^
arranged
for
. .
hhS e^ch
other.
Sketch
2.
the
further
lines,
consolidation
of
the
one behind the other, came to be constructed, resting with their flanks The foremost line, containing on the Hun-ho. was looked upon as the " Main forts,^ five It stretched in the form of a slight Position." arc from the river-bend west of Tso-tsuan-tun, the railway junction and Tschien-yacross schu-tai, to the country north-east of Hun-hoThe second line extended from the pu village.
" Position."
Three
neighbourhood north-west of Lan-wa by Yenshu-tien-tsy and Sa-kan-tsy to the bridge east and the third line from Schu-Han-za of Tia-ho by Ma-kiao-tun and Hou-kia-ho to the little wood
;
Appendices V. to VIII. Not forts in the proper sense of the term works of a type more or less provisional.
'
'
they were closed earth-
Each of these positions was west of Tia-ho. carefully strengthened by completing the works started, by designing new works, and by fortifying the villages situated within the "Position."
The
fire-trenches
were
provided with overhead
cover and other structures.

front lines
Artillery.
Only
of
fire
in
the
for
two
the
were fire-positions prepared
To
clear
the
field
in front of
the " Position," large tracts of gaoljan and tshu-
misa^ were mowed off, and only where the gaoljan was required to mask the entrenchments or hide movements of troops was it left standing. Ranges were, moreover, marked, roads improved, new roads laid out, guide-posts erected, numerous obstacles constructed in front, and bridges thrown across the Hun-ho, their number amounting to So as fifteen towards the end of September. " Position," emto enfilade the approaches to the placements, for a battery each, were established on the northern bank of the river at Kin-tien-tun and San-kia-la. As garrison were apportioned the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to the section west of the railway, and the 10th Army Corps to the section adjoining east the portion up to, but excluding. Fort II being assigned to the 9th Infantry Division, and the portion from Fort II up to the left flank, to
:
the 31st Infantry Division.
In addition to the general arrangements for the

further consolidation of the "Position," Slutshevski's
Orders contained numerous directions of various

kinds.
With
the object of getting early notice

^
sort of millet.
10

wood
in
of a nocturnal surprise, large heaps of dry
were to be ignited
front
by
listening-posts.
Even by day it was hoped to demoralise the enemy by kindling fires in front of the " Position,"
" At Orders a distance of 800 paces in advance of the foremost trenches large fires must be prepared, which, at the moment the enemy is approaching, are
Slutshevski sajang in one of his
to be ignited
ground.
are to be lit even by day enemy." General Slutshevski also hoped to impose on the Japanese by sham mines. He ordered that, " where it is impossible to construct mines in advance of the works, red flags, marking as it were the position of the mines, must be placed so as to confuse the enemy." The course of events giving the Japanese no chance of attacking the " Mukden Position," the effect of the burning heaps of dry wood and of the
fires
by These
electricity to illuminate the fore-
so as to impress the
red flags could not be tested.
When the Commander-in-Chief inspected the "Position" on September 12, the new works as well as all the measures adopted met with his
approval.
It
was inherent
in the peculiar Russian
conduct
of war to bestow far too
the works south of

their due, for they
much care and Mukden than was

after all
attention on legitimately
were
not suited to an
obstinate defence.
The
position in itself
was not
flat,
a strong one
the country, completely
did
not offer
much
by
view, which, moreover, was greatly
hampered
numerous
'
villages,
hamlets,
and
Appendix VIII.

cultivated
fields.
11
Hun-ho
its
at
But the low water-level of the that time was especially disadvan-
tageous, being fordable at
many
to
places in spite of
imposing breadth (up
500 metres).
To
march on Mukden the enemy was therefore not

obliged to attack the bridge-head, but could cross
over to the other bank at any other place he

pleased.
At the same time that the
" Position of
Mukden "
En-
was being constructed new positions were started iênts are on the northern bank of the Hun-ho. West of^^"? Mukden a number of villages and low sandhills structed were fortified facing west, and connected with each irnorthother by shelter-trenches, thus causing a fresh em bank ^ ofthe -.^ P TT position to arise stretching from Hou-ta by Yu- Hun-ho. liuan-tun Yan-sz-tun to Kin-tien-tun. There were further created a series of fortifications,

extending close to the
river-bank
east
of
the
Mandarin Road by Fu-lin to Kiu-san. These entrenchments came into prominence afterwards
in the battle of
Mukden.
sketch
i.
^
September 10 General Kuropatkin drew the 2nd Siberian Army Corps south-east, away from
the
On
"Main
Position," with the object of
moving
it
to Hei-sun-pu, 13 kilometres north-east of Bian-
yu-pu-sa, where
it
too formed a kind of advanced
flanking position. The gap thus formed in the " Position of Mukden " was to be filled by portions of the
10th
Army
Corps.
General Slutshevski
T\\e 2nd Siberian Army Corps chiefly consisted of only the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division ; the other Division (1st Siberian) belonging to the corps was employed as garrison, and apportioned to other
'
units.
(Appendix
I.)
12

"
re-arranged the occupation of the " Position

assigning the defence of
its
by
right half to the 9th
Infantry Division, and of
its left
half to the 31st
Infantry Division.
sions
The
inner flanks of the Divi-
in touch east of Fort III. (European) Army Corps was completely Sepment!^^^^ssembled north of Mukden soon after
Arrival of
were
Ist
The
Draftsto
replace
losses.
tember 15 the first transports of the 6th Siberian ^ Army Corps had begun to arrive.^ By the arrival
;
of these reinforcements not only the losses of the

battle of Liao-yan
it
and of the actions preceding
were made good, but the

fill
Army
gained also
considerably in strength by them.

ever, arrived in addition to
Drafts,
how-
the gaps, especially
had suffered most. With the object of making good to some extent the severe losses of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps, men of the 5th Siberian Army Corps were handed over to those two corps. ^ The lightly wounded rejoined their units in large numbers. Until the end of September the Army had been increased in strength by 50,000 men it must be left open how far in this number are included drafts and men recovering from wounds. The wastage in horses, materiel, equipment, and clothof
those
regiments
which
'
The 6th
Siberian
Army Corps commenced detraining first

Mukden^ remaining
at Tie-liu,
and with
Charbin.
its last
troops at
for the present at the
disposal of the Viceroy,
whose Headquarters had been transferred to

;
On September 28 the first troops began to detrain at Mukden
they were one battation 220th Infantry Regiment. The corps was then placed under the orders of Kuropatkin for his offensive. In addition to the 6th Siberian and 1st Army Corps, there arrived the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Mountain Batteries, the East Siberian Siege Company, a balloon detachment, and one bridging battalion.
2
P. 6, footnote.

ing was soon
13
made good
as well.
At
the same
time the spirit of the troops was rising visibly. After the retreat had been discontinued the general despondency soon gave way to a more hopeful spirit. This change was aided by the phlegmatic nature of the Russian, who is not slow in shaking himself free of the impressions produced by illluck and misfortune. Within a comparatively short time General Kuropatkin was convinced of having in his hands again an Army ready to strike and to operate. This favourable impression, jointly with the passive attitude of the Japanese, caused
view the situation in a different light from that he had gained under the depressing effects of ill-success and retreat the resolve to assume the offensive was maturing in his thoughts. If the fortune of war was to change at all, it could only be brought about by an offensive in grand style it was necessary to force the enemy to a decisive battle and to wrest victory from him. Kuropatkin saw that a defensive or expectant
;
the Commander-in-Chief gradually to
Kuropatsolves to
assume
sive.
attitude of his
to
its
Army would
The
only bring
it
nearer
doom.
situation of the
enemy, more-
over, invited
to offensive action.
The Japanese
strength was exhausted after the obstinate combats
around Liao-yan. The main body of their Army had been unable to conquer the Russian works
in front, in spite of great sacrifice
;
the intended
envelopment of the Russian left across the Taitsy-ho with insufficient means had not succeeded
to
its fullest
extent.
When
the Russians finally
began to retreat to the surprise of their adversary.
14

;
the Japanese had no longer the strength of following up their success by a vigorous pursuit their
movements came
to a standstill at the branch line
It was then found that the Japanese apparently felt altogether unable to continue their operations for some Presumably they awaited the considerable time. arrival of the 8th Division, of whose dispatch Russian General Headquarters had received knowThat force being unable to reach Liao-yan ledge. before the beginning of October, it was not likely that the Japanese would resume active operations before the middle of October. The opportunity was therefore altogether favourable for a Russian offensive, considering the numbers
leading to the coal-mines of Yen-tai.
concerned.
By
the arrival of the 6th Siberian as
Corps the Russian Army If the resolve to was superior to the enemy. attack had been steadily and rapidly turned into action it might have led to great results being But Russian General Headquarters obtained. were never in a hurry when deciding on any course of action. First of all, Kuropatkin obtained the views of his Generals in command, who were not
well as of the 1st
Army
over-confident.
They
generally
held
that
the
assuming the offensive had not yet General Slutshevski proposed to await arrived. the Japanese in the "Position of Mukden," to beat off their attack, and then only to assume the offensive. Stackelberg, too, advised to be cautious, counselling the Commander-in-Chief to wait as Kuropatkin justly urged against yet a while. these proposals that any delay would procure the
for
moment

enemy time
all
15
to
bring up his reinforcements and
to strengthen his positions about

available means.
Liao-yan with
It was, moreover, likely that
Port Arthur would soon succumb to the siege, power of resistance being not much thought in that case Nogi's of at Russian Headquarters Army would become available, and might appear at Liao-yan in support of the Field Army within measurable time. Now, on the other hand, the
its
;
Japanese as yet had hardly made good their recent in their present plight they seemed to need losses some urgent rest still if the Russians wished to
; ;
make
use
of this
favourable
situation,
it
was
necessary to strike soon.
In addition to these reasons arising from the

general state of
affairs,
some reasons of
a personal
nature urged Kuropatkin
to strike at once.
By an Imperial Ukas of September 24 General Gripenberg had been appointed to command a Second Army of Manchuria, which was to consist
of the 6th Siberian and 8th
Division, the
Army
Corps, as well as
of the 61st Infantry Division and 4th
Don
Cossack
Ukas
at the same time co-ordinating
The Viceroy, Alexeiev, was nominated Supreme Commander over all the forces.
him
to Kuropatkin.
Kuropatkin cherished the legitimate hope of being summoned to the first place himself; but it was not likely that he could count upon being appointed
Commander-in-Chief,
if
he did not gain a real
success in the near future.
All these considerations led Kuropatkin to adhere to his resolve, against the opinions of his subordinate
commanders, and to prepare to attack the Japanese.
16
Strength

Including the 6th Siberian
Army.
Army Corps, the roughly 250 battalions, 143 squadrons or sotnias, 744 guns, and 32 machineguns.^ The strength of the units varied very much. The companies probably numbered only
Army numbered
150 to 160 men, and frequently
less
than
that.'
At
the beginning of October the Commander-inChief gave the strength of his Infantry as " 147,000
;
bayonets " but according to another trustworthy Russian source, becoming known only after the campaign, they were 181,000 men.^ Adding to
these
numbers the mounted branches, one can hardly go wrong in estimating the numbers of
the whole fighting troops of the
Army
as roughly
210,000 men.
intelii-
Intelligence
poor.
about
the
enemy was extremely
about the
enemy,
Japanese advanced bodies were said to be standing at Bian-^Ti-pu-sa, 21 kilometres north-east of the coal-pits of Yen-tai, on the upper reaches of the Scha-ho, also south of the Schi-li-ho, and at Tschan-tan on the Hun-ho, north-west of San-de-pu these were all the details the Russian
;
Cavalry had ascertained.

*
There was
I.
still
want of
War
Organisation, Appendix
The companies of the 213th Infantry Regiment are numbered but 120 to 130 men.
* *
said to
have
Tliis total strength
of Infantry
is
arrived at as under
1st Siberian
Army Corps

clearness
17
about the disposition of the enemy's Ukewise about his strength. The reports of the spies proved inaccurate and contra-
main
bodies,
dictory.
When, on September
21, the
news came
in of Peterov's
at the
Detachment having been attacked Da-Hn Pass on the 19th, and forced to
on
J\Ia-tsiunleft
retreat in a north-westerly direction

dan,^ a general attack
upon the Russian

;
wing
was expected as a matter of course. But such an attack was not made the Japanese it was only a small body evacuated the pass again, enabling General Peterov to reoccupy it without few days afterwards an attack was fighting. feared upon the right wing, reports having come in of an advance by Japanese columns from
Yen-tai in a north-westerly direction.

this
Soon
after
alarming news, too, all was quiet again in It remains unintelligible why front of the Army. the 54 sotnias in front of the Army were unable
to gain
any insight into what the Japanese were
doing.
(b)
Japanese
ofDisposi[Jj^J^japa-
After the actions around Liao-yan the 1st
the Japanese Armies alone was completely north of the Tai-tsy-ho, the 2nd Army and strong
portions of the
êse
4th being
still
on the southern
afte^the
1*^"^^ ""^ Liao-yaii.
bank
at Liao-yan.^
'
The 12th
Division of the 1st
standing at Yan-kia-pu, 6^ kilometres south-west of the coal-pits of Yen-tai, the Guard Division to the west of it at Fa-schi'
Army on the right was
sketcb
i.
The
action
is
not mentioned by the Japanese.

p. 205.
''
Vol. III.,
" The Battle of Liao-yan,"
18
ko-schan, and the 2nd Division at Siau-miau-tsy.
Army Headquarters were at Fon-schan, 4 kilometres

north-east of Iîao-yan.
of September
During the first decade General Baron Kuroki moved the
12th Division somewhat more east to Ta-yau-pu, and the 2nd Division to Yiian-kia-pu into the place of the 12th. The Guard Division was therefore now stationed on the left. The Guard Kobi Brigade, under the command of General Umesawa, forming part of the 1st Army, had, after its participation in the recent fights, marched
to Bian-yu-pu-sa, 21 kilometres north-east of the
coal-pits, arriving there
therefore
day's
on September 9. It was march distant from the right

it
wing of the
Army
belonged
to.
The Japanese
being provided only with very unreliable maps of

that particular country, of which whole districts
were not marked
them, they knew Headquarters little about the various distances. Bian-yu-pu-sa to of the 1st Army thought was it be very much nearer to the coal-pits some time before Army Headquarters became
at
all
on
aware of the isolated position of the Guard Kobi

Brigade.
Of
were
the
4th
Army, Headquarters
of
which
billeted at Tun-tu-dia-wa-tsy, 4 kilometres
south of Liao-yan, the 5th Division was standing

north-east of Liao-yan, on the northern bank of
and the the Mandarin Road 10th Division, as well as the formations attached to that Army, were still south of the town.
the Tai-tsy-ho at
;
The 2nd Army had sought

'
shelter
with the
Exact date not known.
'
19
3rd and 6th Divisions in that quarter of Liao-yan which the Russians had raised outside the city the 4th Division was standing at Si-guan, walls close west of Liao-yan. Headquarters of the Japanese Field Army and the General Reserve were in Liao-yan. Immediately after the battle of Liao-yan, Marshal Marquis Oyama had arranged for a series of positions to be prepared for an obstinate defence in The case of a sudden and unforeseen attack. heights east of Liao-yan were strongly fortified
;
Positions
^'^^'*'^'
sketth
2.
there were, furthermore, extensive positions at Bianyu-pu-sa, on the heights between
Man-hua-pu and
Tsien-tau on the Schi-li-ho, along the branch line
and
at
La-mi-pu, likewise at Hun-ai-tsy south-east
of La-mi-pu,
and west of Tschan-tai-tsy south-west

the
operations
of La-mi-pu.^
Directly the pause in
began,
Drafts to
strenuous efforts were
made
for raising again the^ses'^^

^".*^
'
^
striking ^ ^ power of the Japanese Army. Making good the enormous losses suffered in the
It battle of Liao-yan proceeded but very slowly. was not till the end of September that all units had been brought up again to their proper strength. Of fresh reinforcements, there arrived up to the middle of the month only the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under General Prince Kan-in, as well as some Kobi
reiniorce-
f''^^^
meats.
formations.^
The
value of these formations, of
which in other respects there was little to choose between them and the Line formations, was some'
The entrenchments along the branch

2.
ai*e
identical with the positions of the 10th
line and at La-mi-pu are and 6th Divisions marked on
Sketch
*
Their exact names
not known.
20

different
what impaired by the
armament with
which they were equipped (captured rifles, or of an At home there were still available, old pattern). of regular troops, the 7th and 8th Divisions but General Headquarters could not make up its mind
;
to bring
up these forces at once. The conditions in front of Port Arthur seem to have decided that It is alleged that originally it was question. intended to employ these two Divisions for a siege of Vladivostok, but this idea was dropped when Port Arthur was holding out longer than was anticipated, and the Field Army could no longer It is not be reinforced by the Siege Army. known when it was finally decided to issue the
orders for the dispatch of the
8th Division to
the Field
Army.
The
first
;
echelons arrived at
but the Division did Liao-yan on October 13 not take part in the combats on the Scha-ho. The 7th Division was retained in Japan to cover the Island of Yesso, particularly Port Otaru, against likely enterprises of the Russian Vladivostok
Fleet.
The numbers
of the Japanese Field Army,^ even

If the
including the 8th Division, were inferior to those

of the Russians.
iiie lines
of com-
muuicationare being rearranged.
companies had all their full strength of 200 men, the Japanese Army, including the mounted arms, must have numbered about 170,000 men. Japanese Headquarters took special care to The reorganise the lines of communication. o 2 i. Dal-ni by change of gaugc of the railway from
--
War
Organisation, Appendix
1
II.
Sketch
of Vol.
I.,
" Ya-lu."
21
Kin-tschou to Liao-yan had progressed far enough to allow traffic to commence on the whole line
from the beginning of October, thus facilitating in particular the evacuation of the wounded.^
In addition to this line of railway, the sea transport by Yin-kou,^ at the mouth of the Liao-ho in the Liao-tung Bay, became of increasing importance,
as the winter
was closing the roadsteads of Da-gu;
schan, a port on the south coast of the Liao-tung
mouth of the Ya-lu and the overland route by the mountains to the seaports
Peninsula, and the
of Korea
^
was
far too
long and of too
little
use
for supplying the three
Armies
for
any length of
time.
ammunition. The small arsenal at home was not capable of manufacturing rapidly enough the quantities of ammunition necessary for the Army, and the less so because the siege of Port Arthur made everincreasing demands for ammunition. Even after enlargement it was only able to meet these its demands after the utmost exertions. The supply of draught horses caused some difficulties. In place of the rather useless Japanese horse, Chinese ponies and mules were drafted into the service in large numbers, these animals proving very useful. The supply of sufficient provisions from home for
Japanese trains ran on the line on August 1 as far as on August 20 the portion was finished up to Kai-ping on September 12 up to Ta-schi-tschao and Yin-kou and on October 3 up
'
Difficulties arose in the supply of
The
first
Liau-tau
to Liao-yan.
Sketch 1 of Vol. I., ''Ya-lu." Japanese railway troops worked at the laying of a railway through Korea but the line was not yet open to traffic.
'
'
22

beast was a constant anxiety, for even the
man and
Japanese soldier does not so easily bear up with

shortness of rations,
inteiii-
Until
September
11
the
Japanese
were
in
about the
possession of the following intelligence about their
enemy,
Sketch
1.
Two new Russian Army Corps, the enemy. 1st European and the 6th Siberian, were said to be strong Cavalry was arriving north of IVIukden standing on the road Fu-schun Bian-yu-pu-sa there had further been seen a Cavalry detachment, with some guns as well, on the San-kai-seki-san, at Fn9 kilometres north of the coal-pits kia-pu, north-east, and ISIen-hu-lu-tun, north-west of Yen-tai, Cavalry had also been observed finally, strong Cavalry was said to be on the road between In addition some Sin-min-tun and JNlukden. entrenchments had been ascertained south of Mukden, and the departure from the city of strong forces in an easterly direction on Fu-schun had been noticed. All this intelligence the Japanese owed less to the activity of their weak Cavalry than to the
;
services of Chinese spies,
Marshal
both belligerent powers were particularly fond of employing. About the middle of September Japanese Headi
whom
Oyama
quarters decided to concentrate the Armies on the ^ r^ rr< northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. To the 1st Armiesmi Army was now apportioned the section from thenorthSieu-tschan-tsy, 10 kilometres south of Bian-yu-pudecides to
i i
concen-
the Tai*^^" ^'
sa,
to the coal-pits
it,
to the west of
up
as
Nan-tai,
the left 16 kilometres
the 4th Army was to move and the 2nd Army was to form wing within the space between
;
north east of Liao-yan,

Nan-tai.
23
and Schan-tai-tsy, 11 kilometres to the west of
The
in its
1st
Army
seems, howevêr, to have remained
former position/ The 2nd Cavâlry Brigade, arriving at Liao-yan on September 17, was placed under the command of the 1st Army. General Baron Kuroki charged General Prince Kan-in, its commander, to reconnoitre north and north-east
of the coal-pits and establish communication with
the
Guard Kobi Brigade

is
at Bian-yu-pu-sa.
not known how far the 4th Army complied with the General Order. The 5th Division seems to have advanced on the Mandarin Road to about
It
Tschan-tai-tsy.
If the other portions of that
Army
they probably did not advance far beyond the country north-east of Liaoyan. As a measure of security the 5th Division
did
cross
at
that time,
had pushed a weak detachment to La-mi-pu on the Mandarin Road, which was afterwards reheved by the 8th Brigade,^ to which ,were attached some Cavalry, Artillery, and an Engineer detachment. This brigade was commanded by General Otani. The 2nd Army had crossed completely and of that Army were standing west of the Mandarin Road the 3rd Division at Ta-pa-tai-tsy, with an advanced guard at Ta-tu-san-pu on the Scha-ho the 4th Division at Licn-kia-kou-men, with an advanced guard at Lan-tun-kou and the 6th Division, which had pushed some protective troops to Liu-tiau-tschai, was standing at Si-ku-kan-tsy,
; ; ;
in the centre behind the
two other
Divisions.
The
p. 18.
'
From the
10th Division.
The exact date
is
not known.
24
1st
Cavalry Brigade was reconnoitring from the neighbourhood of Pan-puo-sa, on both banks of
the Hun-ho.
On
place
September 17 the
at
first
serious action took
Bian-yu-pu-sa,
of
revealing
the
exposed
position
At the Guard Kobi Brigade.^ two Russian battalions, with a few squadrons, advanced from Siau-yau-pu in the Scha-ho valley, east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, on Bian-yu11.30 a.m.
pu-sa.
General Umesawa deployed his troops in the prepared position south of that place, receiving The Russians the enemy with a brisk fire. replied to it, but abstained from advancing farther when becoming aware of the strength of the Japanese about 3 p.m. they withdrew, not with;
out
loss,
on Tschin-hsi-sai and Kan-to-li-san, east

Bian-yu-pu-sa respectively.
is
and
north of
This
not mentioned by the Russians, took therefore a turn favourable to the Japanese but the situation of the Guard Kobi Brigade might have become very serious if General
reconnoitring action, which
;
The
1st
*^
heSg
pushed
east.
Liubavin, who probably had ordered the attack, had pushed forward with his whole detachment, or had acted jointly wiih the 2nd Siberian Army Corps standing at Hei-sun-pu. When General Baron Kuroki received knowledge ^^ these events and was, moreover, by the activity of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade informed about the actual distance to Bian-yu-pu-sa,^ he shifted his
Army somewhat
tions assigned to
1
east so as to bring his right

;
wing
nearer to General Umesawa's Brigade
the posi-
the Divisions are not known.

'
p. 18.
p. 18.

Meanwhile reports from
spies
25
came
in
about the
advance of strong hostile forces in a south-easterly direction from the neighbourhood of Mukden. General Baron Kuroki looked upon this as a threat to the Japanese right wing, his view of the matter being strengthened when, on September 22 and 23, reports came in of strong Russian forces reallyadvancing upon the right wing and right flank of the 1st Army, The Guard Kobi Brigade now seemed to be in serious danger decisive measures for its protection were urgently demanded. Kuroki once more ordered his Army to shift to the right at the same time the 12th Division was pushed out
;
in
a south-easterly direction for
employment on
the right wing.

are not exactly
Again the
objectives to be reached
known
the 12th Di\asion seems

the 2nd Division
to have taken post at Kau-kia-pu-tsy, south-east of
the coal-pits of Yen-tai

to the coal-pits,
moving
country west of them.
and the Guard Division to the These movements had been executed by October 1.
No more changes in the position of the forces comprising the 2nd and 4th Armies seem to have occurred up to that date. The outposts in front of the Armies stretched from the neighbourhood east of Tschin-hsi-sai to
the
Hun-ho
at Tschan-tan.
'
''
'^-.''t^T/M Air
II
BEGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS

General
Ai'TEii General Kuropatkin had finally decided to
kinTues ^ttack,^
the Order in
advance.
he issued the particulars for the advance on September 28. a detailed General Order somc extcnsivc preparations were to be carried But out before the movements began General Head;
quarters therefore reserved to itself the fixing of
the
first
day of march.
organised
all
The General Order
the forces into
which was to employed in a special manner. The two main be groups were the AVestern Detachment (10th and 17th Army Corps, 2nd Orenburg Cossack Brigade, and Ural Cossack Brigade ^) under General of Cavalry Baron Bilderling, hitherto commanding the 17th Army Corps, and the Eastern Detachment (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Siberian Cossack Division*) under General Baron Stackelberg, commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps. In addition, the Order provided for
several independent groups, each of
'
p. 16.
Appendix IX.
64 battalions, 40 squadrons, 190 guns, and 2 Sapper battalions. * 73 battalions, 32 machine-guns, 34 squadrons or sotnias, 170 guns, and 3 Sapper battalions.
26
THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS
27
Flank Guards, a General Reserve (4th Siberian, and 1st European Army Corps, and the independent Transbaikal Cossack Brigade ^), and a Rear Protection (6th Siberian
Army
Corps).
the left wing of the
General Headquarters intended to advance with Army the Eastern Detach-
ment
against the right wing of the
Japanese, en-
veloping it;
to push back the enemy's forces in
the mountains, and then, jointly with the Western
Detachment, to advance for a decisive attack upon the enemy's main forces supposed to be concentrated at the coal-pits of Yen-tai.
In this operation the General Reserve, which was retained behind
the centre, was
meant
to
co-operate either by
or filling the
reinforcing one of the
Army groups
gap between them. The most important task fell to the lot of the Eastern Group. General Baron Stackelberg was directed to concentrate his forces on the line Taikia-miau-tsy Hei-sun-pu Pa-kia-tsy, 12 to 17 kilometres north and north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, with the object of making an enveloping attack upon the right wing of the Japanese supposed to
sketch 2
be stationed at that place. The task of the Western Group demanded from
it
somewhat reserved
attitude.
the operations as they were intended,
Conforming to it ought to
have attacked too, but no word was said as yet in the Order to that effect. The troops were first to assemble on the Scha-ho, and then to advance on Liao-yan on both sides of the railway between the Hun-ho and the road east of the railway
'
66 battalions, 20 sotnias, 224 gnns, and 2 Sapper battalions.

28
Sketch
1.
running from Huan-schan (18 kilometres southLiian-fan-tun Pu-tsau-wa Ta-pu coal-pits of Yen-tai. But for the time being it was given the limits of two day's marches only. The main bodies were to halt on the second day of march on the line Lin-schin-pu Scha-hopu Lan-fan-tun, after covering therefore about half the distance to Yen-tai, and then to proceed, the advanced preparing entrenched positions to push to the northern tributary of guards were
east of JNlukden)
the Schi-li-ho.
wings becoming enveloped, which had been apparent already in the former grouping of his units, is shown again in his The detachments charged present arrangements. hitherto w^th protecting the flanks continued in The Order distinguished between a this duty. " right " and " extreme right " flank, and a " left "
Kuropatkin's
anxiety of
his
which had been charged with the close protection of the right, was to advance on the western bank of the Hun-ho along that river, and construct a bridge at Tschan-tan, covering it by forming a double bridge-head on the
banks of the Hun-ho. General Dembovski had for that purpose available the respectable force of 12 battalions, 16 sotnias, 32 guns, and two
battalions of technical troops.^ The " extreme right flank "
and " extreme left " flank. Dembovski's Detachment,
was secured by General Kossagovski with the troops he had before. That detachment was to advance along the left
* The composition and strength of the advanced detachments had meanwhile been partly changed.
29
bank of the Liao-ho and to keep connection with Dembovski's Detachment. The close protection on the left was provided by the detachment of General von Rennenkampf,^
who took
united
command
of the former individual
detachments of Liubavin, Peterov, and Eck.'
He
had available 13 battalions, 16 sotnias, and 30 guns. By the General Order this detachment was to concentrate in the direction of Ma-tsiun-dan Dalin Pass, advancing then by Siao-syr, 45 kilometres south-east of Pen-si-hu, probably against
the right flank of the Japanese.
But the Com-
mander-in-Chief dropped again this intention, doubts having probably arisen in his mind about
the advisability of detaching so strong a
for
force
;
making this wide turning movement it seemed to him more practical to let this detach-
ment
as
closely co-operate with the Eastern

for
Group
wing.
a reinforcement
that
enveloping
General von Rennenkampf was therefore ordered

to join the Eastern
Detachment
in the direction
of Pen-si-hu,
by San-kia-tsy, north-east of the former place, after he had begun the movement originally ordered. ^ On the extreme left, the flank protection was effected by Colonel Madritov's
Detachment, who was to advance with 1 battalion, 2 Scout detachments, 2 sotnias, and 2 guns by
'
General vou Rennenkampf had been wounded on July 13, but bad
to tbe
now returned
Army
convalescent.
During the
battle of Liao-
yan he was seconded by General Liubavin. " With some modifications Rennenkampf's newly formed detachment was somewhat weaker than tlie total strength of those three
;
detachments,
'
It
effect,
cannot be ascertained when Kuropatkin issued the order to that and where that order reached Reimenkanipf.
30

on
Sai-ma-tsy,^
Sketch
2.
keeping at the same time in touch with General von Rennenkampf. The General Reserve was directed to concentrate on the first day of the march on the northern
Ta-pin-di-schan
bank of the Hun-ho on both sides of the Mandarin Road, and to march next day, after crossing the Wanriver, to the neighbourhood of San-lin-tsy
ti-sai,
south-east of
Siberian
Mukden.
The 6th
detraining,
'
Army
Corps,
after
finishing
as
was to remain north of Mukden
rear-protection."
Independent Cavalry corps were not mentioned in the Order. Apart from General Mishtshenko's Transbaikal Cossack Brigade belonging to the General Reserve, the Cavalry, consisting of 143 squadrons or sotnias, was distributed along the whole of the front. With the left wing, which had to operate in the mountains, 50 sotnias were to co-operate in the Hun-ho plain, on the other hand, where strong Cavalry could have rendered excellent service, particularly on account of the small numbers of Japanese squadrons, no independent Cavalry detachment was employed at all. The Cavalry forces attached to the Western Group, as well as to Dembovski's and Kossagovski's Detachments, were partly split up for minor duties, and partly kept in such close contact with the main bodies, that they were altogether removed from their real duties, reconnoitring on a large scale.
;
Ta-pin-di-schan is 32 kilometres south of Sin-tsin-tin, Sai-ma-tsy 100 kilometres south-east of Liao-yau. Madritov's Detachment is no longer mentioned afterwards in any report

It
31
seemed
as
if
the
all
Russian
commanders
by
voluntarily abandoned
their Cavalry
efforts for obtaining
an insight into the dispositions of This limited comprehension of the use of Cavalry for distant reconnoitring is all the more remarkable because the detachments of
the enemy.
mounted Scouts were
available for tactical or close
reconnaissance and other minor duties.
At
the same time the Order was issued for
Army, General Headquarters directed the commanders to make some preparations " in view of the impending movements of the Army for the offensive, or in case the enemy should attack." The additional sentence " or in case the enemy should attack " makes us believe
the advance of the
that the Russian
did not seriously
mean
Commander-in-Chief at heart to act on the offensive

in the
perhaps he had a sort of presentiment that the

initiative
would soon be again
hands of the
Japanese.
For preparation were recommended, among other items, the making good of deficiencies in arms, equipment, clothing, and boots, the storing of
ammunition, procuring of large live stock, keeping ready pack-animals with the Siberian Army Corps, which were going to advance in the mountains,
^
up ammunition, supplies, water, etc. The commanders were directed to make use of local supplies, and advised to establish magazines and
so as to bring
collect fodder for the horses.
Reconnaissances of
the roads and probable billeting-areas were ordered

for tactical reasons as well as for reasons of supply.
'
Mostly small donkeys.
32

;
These measures were, of course, necessary and it is strange only that Kuropatkin should have felt obliged to call his commanders' attention to things which are a matter of course, and to which they might have attended for the most part some weeks before, when the operations came to a standstill. Great activity being now displayed everywhere by the orders of General Headquarters, it was more than likely that Chinese The spies would report this to the enemy. attention of the Japanese was in this way roused artificially, and the Russians lost some precious time, which they could no more retrieve, for every day of delay in the offensive was only of advantage to the enemy. KuropatBut General Kuropatkin apparently did not think it even necessary to hide his intentions ciainirto the Array from the Japanese as long as possible, for on solve of October 2 he issued a long address to the Army, " Confidential," and therefore bound to the"effen- ^^^ marked îvbecome very soon known to the enemy too. In this Proclamation the Commander-in-Chief made
justifiable
^
known
terms.
to the
Army
his resolve in
high-sounding
Therein he stated that the failures hitherto had been caused only by the inadequacy of the forces considerable difficulties had to be overcome for bringing up the Army to a strength that would ensure victory. But now they would no longer retreat, as the Army was this day strong enough to assume the offensive and crush the Japanese by
;
decisive blows.
The Proclamation
'
of the Commander-in-Chief
Appendix X.
33
was received by the troops with great enthusiasm. The announcement of the offensive was joyfully-
At last re-echoed in the heart of every soldier. they were to go forward to search for and beat
the
enemy
before
whom
they had continually re-
treated after bloody contests.
The day before he issued this Proclamation General Kuropatkin sent the Commanding Generals a wire in cypher fixing the advance for October 5.
The country which was
of the combats
is
to
become the scene
Topo-
of very unequal nature.
onhe^
West
of the Mandarin
is
plain stretches to the

vation, view
Road an almost perfect country. Hun-ho apart from culti;
only hampered by some few low
eminences.
Mandarin
stretches
Some few hundred metres east of the Road a narrow low range of hills
rise
north and south, from which
the
eminences east of Wu-li-tai-tsy, and of Schi-li-ho and the Ko-ho-san, east of Pan-kiau-pu. North of the Ko-ho-san the elevation continues as a terrace 8 to 10 metres high as far as the Hou-tai Hill, This thence descending gently to the Scha-ho. range of hills is separated from the heights forming the western edge of the mountains by a broad plain, gently rising and narrowing as it extends While the western portion of the heights north. forms a continuous bare hilly country, with some eminences up to 100 metres high within the space included by the roads Hou-liu-tun (4 kilometres east of Scha-ho-pu) Tun-san-tsy Ta-pu, and Fn-kia-pu Ma-niu-tun Ka-miSia-liu-ho-tsy yo-ka-ko, the country east of it assumes more and more a real mountainous character tlie individual
34
hills

attain
in
the heights of the lesser mountain Germany, but are more rugged and steeper, thus rendering movements of troops very difficult off the few roads and bridle-paths, and causing even Infantry much hardship when moving the other arms are altogether outside the roads
ranges
confined to the roads.
The
ho,
is
Scha-ho, a right tributary of the Tai-tsy-
the
on the average 50 to 80 metres broad at and its northern bottom the Schi-li-lio
;
nameless affluent are of lesser breadth. All these rivers are very sinuous, with a sandy bed about
8 to 10 metres deep, and sometimes steep banks.
water in the dry season at the beginning of October, these rivers were fordable
Carrying but
little
at
many
places,
affording
therefore
serious obstacle to Infantry, at least

first
nowhere a not on the

Artillery
days of battle, their valleys rather affording

rest.
cover to troops in motion and at
was obliged to
cross
by the bridges.
their defensive use
fact
None
still
of the rivers mentioned were particularly

;
suitable for the defence
was
more reduced by the
that the villages
were frequently situated on both banks of the

river, forcing
the defenders to select their position
at the edge of the village on the enemy's side, thus leaving the obstacle in rear of the defender. In addition to a few very open pine and
poplar woods, villages surrounded by high trees
Chinese burial-places are strewn over the The houses are frequently built of stone, the yards and gardens being surrounded by clay
country.
*
and
Appendix X^'I.

walls
35
50 to 60 centimetres thick, and easily adapted for defence. The villages are connected by numerous roads formed by traffic they were in
;
good repair on the
first
days of
battle.
millet and beans in were mostly cut, but the rather pointed stumps of the gaoljan left in the ground hampered the movements of troops, es-
The
crops of the
to
fields,
addition
gaoljan,
pecially those of the
mounted
branches.
easily,
is
The heavy
clay-soil
can be worked
very firm, and
was therefore very

^
suitable
for
constructing field entrenchments.
October 4 the Eastern Detachment began The to move the remainder started on the next day. DetachBv orders of the General Commanding tj^gnientbe^ gins to Western Detachment,' the 17th Army Corps was advance ^ to advance on the right between the Hun-ho and beV 5^ the road Tia-ho San-ho-kuan-tun La-mu-tun, ending about 2 kilometres east of the railway to Liao-yan, and the 10th Army Corps on the left, the last-mentioned road and all the other
;
'
On
Pai-tschi-tschai H uan-schan Pu-tsau-ma Ta-pu coal-pits of

roads as far as the road
Mukden
Yen-tai being placed at
its disposal.
The 17th Army Corps marched in two columns. The right column (8 battalions, 24 guns, and half a company of Sappers') crossed the Hun-ho by
By Kuropatkin's telegram the advance was fixed for October 5 ; but according to Russian accounts the Kastern Uetachnient began the movement already on the 4th, probably on account of having to cross
the Hun-ho.
*
The
places reached on the 4th are not known.
Appendi.x XI.
1st
'
Brigade, and half a
Brigade 3rd Infantry Division^ one Abteilung 3rd Artillery company 17th Sapper Battalion.
36

to
the railway bridge, and then took the road by
Tso-tsuan-tun
Ta-su-kia-pu,
the
village
its
main body was to reach on the 5th. The left column (16 battalions, 48 guns, and 1 company of Sappers ^) crossed somewhat farther east by one of the numerous bridges, marching by Makiao-tun along the railway to Su-ya-tun.
The
march of the corps was
by General lanshul. With this object the advanced guard of battalions, 16 guns, 5 squadrons, and half a 5^
to be secured
company
of Sappers, hitherto standing at Scha-
ho-pu, was to mo^'e a few kilometres west to Lin-schin-pu, on the Scha-ho, uniting, after being relieved by the 10th Army Corps, with another advânced guard, of 2 battalions and 8 guns, standing there. A battalion which had been pushed out to the right by the detachment at Lin-schin-pu
remained in Kuan-lin-pu. The 10th Army Corps formed two advanced General Man's advanced guard, standing guards. already at Huan-schan, 18 kilometres south-east of Mukden, and numbering 8 battalions, 1 sotnia, 16 guns, and 1 company of Sappers,' was to stand still on October 5, and to march on the 6th by Lan-fan-tun (7 kilometres south-west of Huan-schan) and Pu-tsau-wa on Ta-pu at the San-kai-seki-san for relieving the advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps standing in Scha-ho-pu, a new " right advanced guard," under General
;
and
35th Infantry Division, together with the 35th Artillery Brigade 1 company 17th Sapper Battalion. ' 1st Brigade 31st Infantry Division, 1 sotnia 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment, 1st and 7th Batteries 3l8t Artillery Brigade, and
'
company 6th Sapper
Battalion.
37

tahons, 1 sotnia, 24 guns, 1
Riabinkin, was formed, which, numbering 8 bat-
company of
Sappers,
and 1 Balloon company,^ was to arrive in Schaho-pu on the 5th, reaching, on the 6th, Hunpau-schan, 7 kilometres south of Scha-ho-pu.
^
The
main body of the corps was marching with one column each by the Mandarin Road, and by the road Tia-ho San-ho-kuan-tun Sz-kau-tun, and was to advance on the first day's march to about Sia-rr-tun, reaching on the second day's march
the line of villages Scha-ho-pu
Llian-fan-tun.
General Grekov's half Orenburg Cossack Division (12 sotnias and 6 guns ^), attached to the Western
Detachment, was directed to continue reconnoitring between the Hun-ho and Scha-ho, to keep touch with Dembovski's Detachment, and to concentrate on the second day's march at Wan-tschuan-tsy,
10 kilometres north-west of Schi-li-ho.
Colonel
Shabyko, commanding the Ural Cossack Brigade,
was charged with continuing reconnoitring in front between the Scha-ho and the Mukden Fn-kia-pu Bian-yu-pu-sa road the main body of the brigade was to concentrate at Hun-pau-schan on October 6. The orders for the advance were carried out, with some few alterations. On the evening of
2nd Brigade 31st Infantry DivisioHj 2nd, Gth, and 8th Batteries 1 sotnia 1st Orenburg (Jossack Regiment, 1 company 6th Sapper Battalion, and East Siberian Balloon (Company. The actual commander of the 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division was General Wassiliev, who, however, had not yet recovered from his
*
31st Artillery Brigade,
wounds.
'
9th
Infantry
Division,
9th
Artillery
1
Brigade,
sotnias
1st
Orenburg Cossack Regiment, and * Horse Artillery.
company 6th Sapper
Battaliou.
38
Points

:
onÔcto-
^^
^-
October 6 the Western Detachment occupied the The 17th Army Corps on the right had reached with its advanced guard Hun-lin-pu and Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy, and, with an advanced detachment, Liu-tan-kou outposts were The main body standing on the Schi-li-ho.
following positions
;
was standing
in
two groups,
and
at
Ta-lian-tun
(3rd
Infantry Division),
fantiy Division).
at Lin-schin-pu (35th In-
Of
the 10th
Army
^
Corps, General Riabinkin's
advanced guard was at Hun-pau-schan, a small mixed detachment under Colonel Solomko having The left been pushed forward to Sin-tschuan. advanced guard was standing at Ho-schen-kou, with outposts on the heights north of San-kia-tsy. The main body, under General Gerschelmann, had
reached Scha-ho-pu.
Within the
as
lines of the
advanced guards, as well

Bilderling's
within those of the main bodies, entrenching

as
commenced
demanded by
Orders.^
Grekov's Cavalry was at Wan-tschuan as directed, echeloned in advance of the 17th Army Corps'
right
wing
the Ural Cossack Brigade, with the
exception of two sotnias, remaining with the 10th Army Corps, had disappeared behind the front.
The
had
captive balloon,
" Field-Marshal
also arrived at Scha-ho-pu, together

it
Gurko," with the

;
Balloon Company, but
was never used

tore loose
its
for
on the very next day
it
in
a strong
wind, flying away without

'
crew.
Two
battalions
124th Infantry Regiment, 4 guns, 3 troops of
Cossacks, and detachments of Scouts from 124th Infantry Regiment.

*
Appendix XI.
39
General Dembovski had apparently received another order, directing him not to advance on the right bank of the Him-ho, but on the left. The detachment crossed the stream at Ma-tou-lan on October 6, taking up a position at Ta-wankan-pu, and pushing an advanced guard to Sintai-tsy.
The
with
poor.
result
the
On
spirits
of the first two days of operations Western Detachment was extremely October 5 the troops had started in
high
and with
flourish of trumpets, in joyful

;
expectation of a vigorous offensive
but, scarcely
10 miles distant from the " JNIukden Position," a halt was made again on the 6th, to prepare once
more some
fresh "positions."
Meanwhile, reports about the enemy had come Fresh inin, which, though they were of a general nature, aboSThe seemed to General Baron Bilderling significant enemy is
enough
for
making some
that nine
new arrangements.
hostile
^'""""^
One spy
at
least
reported
Divisions,
120,000 men,
were concentrated about
Yen-tai, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief being
there too.
This report should have certainly been received with a great deal of caution. It was not likely
that the Japanese should have concentrated almost
their
whole Army within a limited space that could be enveloped by the Russians in the east and west. But there could be no surprise that strong forces should be reported in the neighbourhood of
Yen-tai.
According
^
to
Kuropatkin's
General
Order
four Divisions were supposed to be north

Appendix IX
40
of
THE
Liao-yan.
RUSSO-JAPAT\ÊSE AVAR
Since,
moreover,
two
Divisions
were assumed to be south of San-de-pu and two at the coal-pits, the Western Detachment was bound to expect meeting with strong forces of the enemy. For the success of the operations this could
only be looked upon as favourable
forces of the Japanese
;
for the
more
Army
the Western Detach-
ment was holding

w^hich
fast,
the more successfully would

decision.
turn out the advance of the Eastern Detachment,
was to bring about the
By
im-
mediately reinforcing Bilderling's weak forces from

the reserves, Kuropatkin could have
easily strong
made him
enough to
attack,
which would have
been the best way of solving
his task.
But, after the intelligence received, the situation
was now looked upon by the Western Detachment

as
having
completely changed.
General
Slut-
she vski,
commanding the 10th Army Corps, being
asked for his opinion, declared it impossible for the Western Detachment to continue its move-
ment
in the face of the far superior forces of the
enemy.
The
effect of the
Eastern Detachment's
absolutely.
It
operations
must be awaited
would
be therefore necessary to halt for the present, or even to retire again eventually, so as to be able to repel the attack of the Japanese in a "good position." General Baron Bilderling agreed with
this opinion in all essentials, ordering the
Western
Detachment
October
7,
to remain in
its
present position on
saying that the greatest caution was and that it was perhaps possible to work forward from "position to position." General Kuropatkin, who took quarters in San-lin-tsy on
necessary,

October
too, for
6,
41
evidently approved of these measures
no orders were received from him altering

there was no sign of
anything.
Though
an impending
attack by the Japanese, the Russian offensive was

ah'eady paralysed, even at this early stage, by a
preconceived notion.
Consequently the Western Detachment remained 7, the advanced guards only pushing some portions farther south, probably for the purpose of reconnoitring. This brought about a small action with Japanese outposts at Wu-li-tai-tsy, leading to a temporary occupation of that place by the Russians. On the following day, October 8, the Western The Detachment was to resume its advance. But JJ^^^^j^" taking into consideration the supposed state ofmentreaffairs with the enemy, and no intelligence from halting the Eastern Detachment arriving. General Kuro- ^^^^^^^'
halting on October
patkin decided to stop the Western Detachment

for the present.
He
ordered the entrenchments to
be continued, and, in case of a hostile attack, to hold with the main bodies the positions occupied by the advanced guards. The main body of the
17th
Army
Corps thereupon moved forward to
the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun
Liu-tan-kou
positions
Pan-kiau-pu,
Tschien-liu-tan-kou
improving further the
The begun by the advanced guards. main body of the 10th Army Corps (9th Infantry
Division, the 31st Infantry Division having been
detailed as advanced guards) only
line
San-kia-tsy
Hou-huan-hua-tien,
Army
marched to the
The
ad-
vanced guards of the 10th
Corps worked

42
at

the position Hun-pau-schan
Nin-kuan-tun
the Scha-ho, evacuated by the main bodies, were now named "rear-position," and still further improved. To
protect the working-parties in the main position,
Man-kia-fn.
The earthworks on
Corps pushed its advanced guard to the Schi-h-ho between Nan-kuan-tsy and the village of Schi-li-ho, where it had to entrench The corps therefore, on the fourth day of itself.
the 17th the " offensive," could
positions,
Army
make
use of three defensive
one behind the other, not including the The 10th Corps secured its working-parties by the detachments it had pushed to Sin-tschuan and to the neighbourhood between Man-kia-fn and San-kia-tsy. With the object of strengthening General Man's advanced guard, which, as left wing of the Western Detachment, with its front refused, was to entrench the heights between Man-kia-fn and Yin-schou-tun, and helping his working-parties, General Kuropatkin sent him from the General Reserve four battalions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, whose advanced guard reached the neighbourhood of Hsin-lun-tun
"Position of Mukden."
on October
8.
The heights occupied by the Western Detachment afforded an extensive view. Towards the
west and south-west the plain stretched perfectly Towards level for miles without the slightest rise. the south, too, the country was very flat, height
" 99," about 7 kilometres south-west of Liao-yan,^
being
distinctly
visible.
But view was

2.
inter-
cepted here by the heights

1
of Wu-li-tai-tsy, 4
Vol. III.,
" Liao-yau," Sketch

by Japanese
outposts.
43
kilometres south of Schi-li-ho, which were occupied
The Russian entrenchments

;
consisted of shelter- trenches and numerous pivots
gun-pits had been constructed about half a kilo-
metre
Pu-lie-san-tsy Bian-vu-pu-sa Pen-si-hu, and Fu-schun Ta-yu Pa-kia-tsy Tschau-huan-tschai San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho.
the roads Fu-lin
in rear of the main position. For the advance of the Eastern Detachment the General Order had apportioned the space enclosed by
Advance
Eastern Detach-
ment
until
Oc*
* ^^
The
line
Yen-tau-tsy
Schi-hui-tschn was to be
5,
reached with the main bodies -on October

the line Tai-kia-miau-tsy
and
Hei-sun-pu Pa-kia-tsy
Corps was marching on
on the next day.
The
1st Siberian
Army
the right with a column each by Ko-kuan-tsy and Yen-tau-tsy, and the 3rd Siberian
Army
Corps
on the left by La-ku-yu and Schi-hui-tschn. The 2nd Siberian Army Corps in the centre had already moved to the neighbourhood of Hei-sun-pu before the middle of September.^ On the evening of October 6 the Eastern Detachment was stationed as follows The 1st Siberian Army Corps had got to Hou-schi-tai and Tai-kia-miau-tsy, having pushed an advanced guard to Tsai-kia-tun. LieutenantColonel Grekov, with six sotnias, was dispatched to
:
Liu-tschen-ku-tun, 4 kilometres east of Fn-kiapu, to reconnoitre towards the line Sia-liu-ho-tsy
Bian-yu-pu-sa, and to establish touch with Mishtshenko's Brigade, standing at Liian-fan-tun, from
Right column 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division left column Corps Headquarters, 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, and 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.
'
:
P. 11.
44

8.
October 6 to
The
reinforced 5th East Siberian
which was more or less the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, was standing at Hei-sun-pu, its advanced guard being at Yin-pan, east of Kanto-H-san. Of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps the main body had reached the Pan-mau-Hn Pass and Pa-kia-tsy advanced guards were at the Tsu-tulin Pass and at Kau-tu-hn, on the road to Yin-pan a detachment under Colonel Drushinin,^ which was afterwards to act as flank-guard, had been pushed to Tschau -huan-tschai. The Siberian Cossack Division, under General Samsonov, was standing at Tun-kou in front of and half-way between the two columns of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps it was ordered to reconnoitre beyond the line Huan-lin-tsy (9 kilometres south of Tun-kou) Tschau-huan-tschai, and to report on all the roads and paths leading in a westerly direction towards the section of ground Bian-yuRifle Division,
^
; ; ;
pu-sa
Sien-schan-tsy
(10
kilometres
north
(7
of
Pen-si-hu) from the line Ta-pei-kou (6 kilometres
south-west of
Tun-kou)
Kau-tai-tsy
kilo-
metres north-east of Pen-si-hu). Samsonov was, moreover, to establish touch with Rennenkampf 's Detachment standing on the Tai-tsy-ho within the
space San-kia-tsy
Mi-tsy Pei-lin-pu-tsy.
The
movements of the Eastern Detachment having constantly to be prepared first by detailed reconnaissance, owing to the very imperfect maps, General
Baron Stackelberg employed on that duty General
p. 11, footnote
'
1.
Two
sotnia,
detachments mounted Scouts, two guns, one and half a Sapper company.
battalions, three

Staff officers in addition.
45
They
established during
days of the march the fact of the Japanese having entrenched themselves on the steep hills
the
first
south of Bian-yu-pu-sa
position
on the
line
an entrenched advanced Hu-schi-tai Tun-kou was

;
occupied by them as well.
Although
this intelligence did
not furnish any
stackel-
new
at
information, the occupation of the heights
Bian-yu-pu-sa
having
been
known
already
o^Jf j.g ^ day of
through the reconnoitring action of September 17,^ October ^' it had a similar paralysing effect upon the operations here, as with the Western Detachment, for General Baron Stackelberg ordered October 7 to be a day of rest it is true by order of superior authority, as it seems. After performing a march of scarcely 30 kilometres this solicitude for the
welfare of the troops was,

for.
we may
say, uncalled
The day was
wasted, and again to the ad-
vantage of the enemy.
Army
Only the 3rd Siberian Corps extended somewhat its feelers by

its
portions of
advanced guards pushing to the

;
line
Schin-hai-lin Pass Tschin-hsi-sai the left flankguard remained at Tschau-huan-tschai. Samsonov's advanced bodies, too, pushed forward, driving away some Japanese patrols in the valley Scliin-hai-lin
Li-kia-wo-pn.
Yet, not even on the following day, but only
on October 9 did General Baron Stackelberg
in-
tend to attack the Japanese at Bian-yu-pu-sa. The 8th of October he wished to make use of
for
moving the main bodies up to the advanced

and
reinforcing
'
guards,
the Artillery
in
front.
p. 24.
46

in pre-
Another day was therefore to be spent

parations.
By
this
o\'er-caution
favourable
chance for gaining a success was missed. Had Stackelberg decided to attack the enemy at Bianyu-pu-sa already on October 7, he might have gained a victory which, as a preliminary to the
great offensive,
effect.
must have had a most valuable
On
the heights south of Bian-yu-pu-sa
was standing completely isolated the reinforced Japanese Guard Kobi Brigade under General Umesawa.^ All the Eastern Detachment needed to do was merely to continue marching by its former roads, the right of the 1st Siberian Army Corps by Liu-tschen-ku-tun Yen-sin-tun, and the
Corps by the KauSchun-schui-tsy. The Japanese could then, while the 2nd Siberian Army Corps was advancing in front, be attacked and enveloped on both wings and be beaten. Success was guaranteed alone by the overwhelming numbers of the
left
of the 3rd Siberian
Army
tu-lin Pass
Russians.
But
as Stackelberg did not
make
use
of
the
favourable
chance
he
had,
or
perhaps
decisive
shirked the responsibility of entering
upon
action without special orders, the Japanese were

able to escape in time the danger of being enveloped.
On
the
the morning of October 8 the Russians

heights
The Japanese abandoned. brigade in its retreat having left behind in their former position small tents, accoutrements, also portions of a telegraph station, the Russians almost thought they had gained a victory. Kuropatkin, too, looked upon the event in that light, as he
found
'
Six battalions^ one squadron, and one battery.
(Pp. 24, 25.)

afterwards congratulated the
47
of the
Portions
Commander
Eastern Detachment on this first success. The withdrawal of the Japanese having been ascertained, the leading portions of the Eastern
Eastern
Detachment
of
pushed forward, being on the evening ^^^^'

:
The move forOctober 8 in the following positions Siberian Army Corps October advanced guard of the 1st had entrenched itself on the heights at Sun-wu- ^ pu-tsy, outposts having been pushed some kilometres south-west in the general direction of
of the 2nd Siberian guard was holding the position on the knolls south-east of Wei-tsy-kou. It cannot be ascertained whether the main bodies of the 1st and 2nd Siberian Army Corps closed up as intended on the advanced guards, and up
Yin-tsien-pu.
portion
Army
Corps' advanced
to
what places they moved forward.

Siberian
With
the
Corps the Field Artillery, hitherto attached to the left column, was handed over to the right column (3rd East Siberian Rifle Division) that column only marched about 7 kilometres in a southerly direction to Hou-loutsy-gou, while the left column (6th East Siberian Rifle Di\dsion) reached with its main body Tschuikia-pu-tsy Li-kia-pu-tsy, thus approaching Pensi-hu to within about 13 kilometres. The centre of the Eastern Detachment (2nd Siberian Army Corps), and the right column of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps were therefore remarkably far behind, whilst the left had already come in touch with the enemy. Samsonov's Cavalry had advanced in the direction of Sien-schan-tsy, occupying that village after
3rd
;
Army

48
having driven away weak hostile outposts from the neighbourhood of Kau-tai-tsy.
Rennenkampfs
Detachment,
after
its
leaving
guard at San-kia-tsy, reached with

portions the line Kau-tai-tsy
foremost
;
VVei-niu-nin
two
companies occupied a pass east of Sei-ko on the

road to Pen-si-hu.
The
Reserve
aud 6th
Army
foUow.
The General Reserve had marched forward in Compliance with orders.^ On October 6 the 1st Army Corps moved into the space Schan-hsnkou-tsy Pai-tschi-tschai San-lin-tsy, and the '^^^ Siberian Army Corps into the space Liu-
kuan-tun Yin-tschen-tsy.
of the 1st
schan.
An
advanced guard
Corps was standing at HuanCossack Brigade of General Mishtshenko which had hitherto been active in front concentrated at Liian-fan-tun on On October 7 the 4th Siberian the Scha-ho. Army Corps got on to the road San-lin-tsy rr-tau-kou,^ while the 1st Army Corps remained on the whole stationary, pushing only its advanced On guard from Huan-schan to Sa-ho-tun. October 8 the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which had received orders from Kuropatkin to close the gap between the Eastern and Western Detachments, reached Hsin-lun-tun with its advanced guard the 1st Army Corps reached Pai-tschitschai and Lo-sien-tun.^
Army
The Transbaikal
The 4th
7,
Siberian
its
October
kia-pu.
'
with
Army Corps bivouacked at Orr-tau-kou on advanced guard in the neighbourhood of Fn:
Army
;
tschai
Corps Headquarters and 22nd Infantry Division 37th Infantry Division Lo-sien-tun.
:
Pai-tschi-
49
The 6th Siberian Army Corps, having meanwhile completed detraining at IVIukden, had likewise marched forward on the 7th, reaching the space Ta~su-kia-pu it was Ta-tai Lan-schan-pu therefore standing echeloned to the right behind the right wing of the AVestern Detachment. The corps having been obliged to leave behind the 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division as well as two batteries which were to be employed in the positions at Tie-lin and Mukden, it entered operations
weakened by a quarter of
also very
its
strength.
It
was
annoying for the corps to be without either Cavalry or detachments of mounted Scouts,^ being thus unable to reconnoitre or establish touch with the neighbouring troops by means of its own. On October 8 the corps remained in the
space assigned to
it.
The weather was dry and

and
in the
bright, but at night

;
morning already sensibly cool at times strong winds were blowing, raising up a great amount of disagreeable dust. The mounted arms mostly marched in greatcoats those dismounted partly in tunics, partly in shirt-blouses some men also in blue padded Chinese jackets.
; ;
According to a Russian source.
Afterwards
six sotuias of different
three from the 2nd Werchueudinsk Cossack Regiment, two from the 5th Ural Cossack Regiment, and one from the 10th Orenburg Cossack Regiment.
units are said to have joined
the corps
namely_,
Ill
THE MEASURES OF THE JAPANESE AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER

Various
pSntto
a Russian
Sketch
2.
Japanese side the impression gained daily first days of October, that the Russians were planning some extensive operations. Especially Headquarters of the 1st Army were convinced of the enemy entering upon a
tlie
On
^^^^^
ground, during the
general attack and directing the main blow against
Oyama's Headquarters first the events, however, of the next few days showed that General Baron Kuroki was right. On October 6, strong Russian forces, entrenching on the heights norththe Japanese right wing.
did not share this view at
;
east of Bian-yu-pu-sa,^ appeared opposite General
Umesawa's Brigade.
Several strong cavalry de-
tachments, moreover, advanced towards the weak

outpost-line between Bian-yu-pu-sa and the
kai-seki-san,
San-
trying to pierce
it.
The Japanese
Cavalry available here being inferior to the Russian Cavalry, there was the danger of the Guard Kobi Brigade being completely cut off. Opposite the 4th and 2nd Armies the symp-
toms
'
of
an
impending Russian offensive were

Army
Corps.
(P. 44.)
Probably from the 2nd Siberian
50
THE MEASURES OF THE JAPANESE

increasing
;
51
too. Small Russian detachments appeared here and there frequent skirmishes with Japanese outposts took place. As the
strength of the Russian detachments advancing
was constantly growing, the 2nd Army drew back somewhat the detachments it had sent forward on October 5.
On
arrived
the afternoon
at
of
October
of
6
1st
intelligence
Headquarters
the
Army
re-
moving every doubt about the enemy's intentions. It was reported, probably by spies, that the Russian Army had begun crossing the Hun-ho
on October
only weak forces
the 5th, there had remained on the northern bank the were marching in a south-easterly
3.
;
On
main
forces
direction.
The
forces standing opposite General
Umesawa's
as
Kuroki
[^^^^^j.^
Brigade
were
therefore
to
be
viewed
the
;
advanced guards of the Russian Offensive Army '" ^ posithe brigade seemed very much in danger. So readiness as not to sacrifice it, it had either to be withtê Hue drawn in line with the Army, or the Army iên-siitself must be pushed to the heights south of pit, the Scha-ho. General Baron Kuroki, not wishing to be responsible for the isolated advance of his Army without an order from General Headquarters, resolved to withdraw the brigade. But also his Army seemed seriously threatened, should it continue further in its present position in an expectant attitude. General Baron Kuroki therefore reported to Oyama's Headquarters that the Russians were, without any shred of doubt, advancing to attack the Japanese right wing, and that he was

going
to
52
therefore
place the
1st
Army
in
position of readiness behind the

coal-pits.
hne Pen-si-hu
With this object he issued at 2 a.m. October 7 in Fn-schan, the following on
Army Order
1. The enemy is advancing south from the The heads of Hun-ho valley east of Mukden.
"
his
columns must have reached the

^
line
schui-tsy Kan-to-li-san Tsu-ti-tschuan-tsy

"
Schunon
^
October
"
2.
G.
The Army
will
occupy the
line
neighbour-
hood of Liu-schu-kia heights south of Yin-tsienpu coal-pits. " 3. The Guard Kobi Brigade will go back to Liu-schu-kia as quickly as possible, occupying a position on the heights there. " 4. The 12th Division wall start to-day and
occupy the heights south of Yin-tsien-pu. " 5. The Guards will concentrate at Tschan-heiEntrenchments are to be constructed on the tun.
heights north of that place. " detachment of the Guards will remain on
A
6.
the height north of the coal-pits.

"
The 2nd
Division will remain in
its
present
position.
"
7.
The 2nd Cavalry Brigade
will reconnoitre
towards Schuan-tai-tsy.*
^
10| kilometres east-north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

6 kilometres north of Bian-yu-pu-sa.
^ ^ *
lOj kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa. 5 kilometres east of Schi-li-ho.

"
"
8.
53
The General Reserve

8th.
I shall
will arrive at
Ta-yau-
pu^ on the
9.
After this
be in Fn-schan." Order had been issued to the troops,
the directives of the Commander-in-Chief arrived.
Marshal
,
IMarqiiis
.
Oyama had
,
also
arrived
.
at Oyama
agrees with
'
the conclusion that the Russians were going to
,^
assume
the
offensive.
his
The
latest
intelligence
J^j^^g
Headquarters had confirmed the large masses of advance of strong hostile forces were said to be standing at Schun-schuitroops
arriving at
;
tsy (10|^ kilometres east-north-east of Bian-yu-pusa),
at the San-kai-seki-san (9 kilometres north of
the coal-pits), and at Wu-li-tai-tsy (3^ kilometres
south of
Schi-li-ho).
This intelligence, supple-
mented by the
reports of the 1st
Army, brought
Kuroki had
the
Oyama round
already
to
the
same
view
that
expressed namely,
Russians
intended to direct their main blow upon the right
wing of the Japanese.

so willed
it
A lucky chance, moreover,

officer,
that at the Ta-lin Pass a detailed order
of Kuropatkin to Stackelberg was found on the
dead body of a Russian General Staff

right flank of the Japanese
according to which Stackelberg was to turn the
and push on to Liaoclearly
yan.
The moment Marshal Oyama had
discerned the enemy's intentions he matured the

resolve not to be forced into the defensive
by the
attack of the Russians, but to assume the offensive
himself
at once,
He
but
did not, however, intend to attack

to let
the Russians
first
run up
against his prepared positions, so as to break the

'
5 kilometres south of the coal-pits.
54
force

of
their
offensive.
For the moment

only
to
it
appeared
therefore
advisable
get
the
Armies into a position of readiness. The 4th and 2nd Armies received orders to concentrate their troops within the sections assigned to them the 4th Army was at the same time to extend towards the right to the coal-pits, and replace the outposts of the Guard Division which was moving east every one was to be prepared to assume the counter ofFensivê. The intentions of the 1st Army's Headquarters were approved. The 1st Army, on October 7, carried out the movements ordered by its commander the 12th Division was standing south of Yin-tsien-pu of the Guards, the 1st Brigade had marched by Huiyau to Tan-kia-pu-tsy, and the 2nd to Tschan-hei; : ;
tun
there they
commenced
at once to entrench in
the evening.
slopes
Great
difficulties
were met
in pre-
paring the position, owing
to the steepness of the
Rennen-
adduce
is
being
the exrlffhT
wing.
and the hardness of the rocky soil. The its former position, where it likewise began to entrench. Meanwhile, on the extreme right the advance of Rennenkampfs Detachment had made itself felt, Qn the evening of the 7th the 1st Army received a report from the commander of a Line of Communication battalion stationed at Pen-si-hu, that about 2,000 hostile Cavalry with five or six guns, advancing in the Tai-tsy-ho valley, had reached San-kia-tsy on October 6. This intelligence, as well as the Army Order, was communicated to General Umesawa by the telegraph connection In the leading by Pen-si-hu to Bian-yu-pu-sa.
2nd Division had remained in

tsy-ho
valley
55
face of the Russian forces advancing in the Tai-
General
Umesawa
considered
it
imperative to get
him by a hurried
unmolested
;
away from the enemy opposite night march. Thanks to Stackelarrived at

8.
berg's inactivity the brigade succeeded in escaping

^
it
morning of October
Liu-schu-kia on the During that march its
commander
forces
received the report of the Russian advancing on Pen-si-hu having been strengthened by Infantry, about three battalions and of the enemy having already pushed back the weak Japanese outposts, and crossed the Tai-tsy-ho with a portion of his force, probably with the object of advancing on Pen-si-hu from the south Large supplies of all kinds ^ being stored as well.
;
in Pen-si-hu
and Si-ho-yan,
Pen-si-hu.
it
was undesirable to
let these places fall into
the hands of the enemy,
particularly
General
Umesawa
there-
fore decided to send to
Pen-si-hu one battalion

in support of
4th
Kobi Regiment and two guns
the Line of Communication Defence Troops.
The commander
panies
of the Line of Communication
battalion in that place, consisting of three
com-
drawn
39th Kobi Regiment, had already withhis outposts to the fortified Mei-san and La-ut-ha-la-sa on October 8 they were composed of one company and a half, and had probably been standing along the stream between Wei-niu-nin
;
and
>
Jo-gu.
The
retirement
was made
under
P. 46.
lu Si-ho-yan (1,5 kilometres south of Peu-si-hu) there were, moreover, large stores of ammunition for the Murata Rifle, with which the Kobi troops were armed. One company of Line of Communication Defence Troops formed the garrison of Si-ho-yan.
'
56

fire,
Russian Artillery
loss.
and hence not without some

following
But
Rennenkampfs vanguards,
up
the outposts, confined themselves to occupying
the outpost position that had been abandoned. After the arrival of the Guard Kobi Brigade at
Liu-schu-kia the forces on the extreme right were distributed as follows The battalion of the 4th
:
Kobi Regiment detailed in support of the Line of Communication Defence Troops marched to the Colonel Hirata, comheights east of Pen-si-hu. manding the 39th Kobi Regiment, with the seven companies now at his disposal, formed three groups, directing the right gi'oup to occupy the heights the centre group, with which east of Riu-wo-bio were also the eight guns, to occupy the Mei-san and the La-ut-ha-la-sa Hill and the left group the Seki-san and the heights adjoining west of it.
; ;
The
position to be defended extending almost 10
kilometres, the defensive line was exceedingly weak. The military bridge constructed at Riuwo-bio was guarded by a section of Pioneers Pen-si-hu village was not occupied at all. The 1st Guard Kobi Regiment and one battalion
4th Kobi Regiment were stationed astride of the Ta-lin Pass, two companies of the 2nd Guard
Kobi Regiment being sent to the Tu-men-tsylin
Pass
the rest remained in reserve at Liu-
schu-kia.
The
The
portions of the 4th
Army still
south of Liao-
4th Army yan the

is
being
trated forward,
10th Division, 3rd, 10th, and 11th Kobi Brigades, and 1st Field ArtiUery Brigade were, by Oyama's directions, moved forward to the northern
^^^^^j^
^f
^j^^
Tai-tsy-ho.
The 10th Division took

up
a position on the branch
57
Hne to the
coal-pits,
the 20th Brigade occupying the eastern half of

the position prepared there from the coal-pits to
Sia-tai-tsy,
and
the
8th
Brigade
the
western
portion.
At
the Mandarin
Road
the 5th Division
continued the front, moving up to La-mi-pu.

the Kobi Brigades, as well as to the
Artillery
1st
To
Field
Brigade, places
were
assigned
the 10th and 5th Divisions/
Army
behind Headquarters
of the A
small
at
went from Liao-yan
to Fa-schi-ko-schan.
The detachment which the commander

10th Division had pushed to La-mi-pu
,,.
^
had mean-
fouXt
^^^"-î-
while got in close touch with the enemv.^

mtelligence
came
m
.
or
When tai-tsy
^^
strong Russian columns
on Octo-
having crossed the Hun-ho between Fu-schun and Kiu-san, General Otani ^ caused the 40th Infantry Regiment, with Artillery and Engineers, to go forward and reconnoitre in a northerly direction The detachment reached early on October 6. Wu-li-tai-tsy without encountering the enemy
it
left there, as
well as on the height east of

for
it,
some small
then
force
further observation, going
back
to
Yen-tai.
On
the following day
these posts of
observation ascertained a hostile
Infantry brigade, with one regiment of Cavalry,^

to be standing in an entrenched position at
Pan-
kiau-pu,
'
and about
five
battalions
in
similar
The
places are not known.
P. 23.
At
first
being
relieved
afterwards
the 5th Di^'ision puslied an outpost to La-mi-pu, by Otani's Detachment from the 10th
to that place.
*
Division.
Otani seems to have remained at La-mi-pu even after the
5th Division had

^ '
moved up
P. 41.
Commanding 8th
Brigade.
From
the Russian 17th
Army
Corps.
58
About 11.40 a.m. a one at Hun-pau-schan.^ Russian battalion and several guns advanced from Liu-tan-kou south along the railway, halting west of The village itself was being occupied Schi-li-ho. In the by some other Infantry and Cavalry.
aiternoon a battalion came out of Schi-li-ho, de-
ploying at Siau-wen-kou against Wu-li-tai-tsy, and pushing back the Japanese post of observation.
Eight guns at Schi-li-ho opened fire on the post on the neighbouring hill, forcing it to give way On hearing the sound of guns Colonel south. Kamada advanced with the 40th Infantry Regiment from Yen-tai, deploying the 1st Battalion on the road, the 2nd Battalion to the left of it, and ordering the mountain-guns to come into Towards 4.30 p.m. the Japanese guns action. opened fire, the Infantry attacking the Russians and pushing them again from Wu-li-tai-tsy, as well as from the height on which they had meanwhile Colonel Kamada then established themselves.
left
the 3rd Battalion in the captured position, returning with the rest to Yen-tai towards evening.
On
October 8 two additional mountain batteries were attached to the regiment to make it more But fit for an eventually renewed reconnaissance.
Colonel Kamada, fearing that, when reconnoitring with the whole of his detachment, an action might easily ensue, the limits of which he could no longer control, pushed only the 2nd Battalion to Schanyau-pu, so as to be able to support the 3rd Battalion in case of need, but keeping for the rest his forces
concentrated at Yen-tai.
'
From
the Russiau 10th
Army Corps.
59
Oyama's orders apparently did not cause anyTheJapachange in the disposition of the 2nd Army. A?my reArmy Headquarters went from Liao-yan to Ta- j"^"^ tsy-fan, on the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, The 1st Cavalry Brigade had on October 8. pushed to the neighbourhood of Hei-kou-tai, on the Hun-ho during the last days it had already had some slight skirmishes with Russian advanced bodies, probably from Dembovski's Detachment.
;
IV
THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

October
RrssiAKs
9
well
The Wes- difficulties the Eastern

tachraeiit
^^^, Centre advance

banks of the Schiagainst
^^^
nese
front.
Sketch
3.
aware of the Detachment had to contend with in its operations, and that no rapid success could be expected fi'om it. He therefore ^ scnt the ordcr to Stackelberg on October 8, before ^^^ intelligence of the Japanese having evacuated ^j^g position of Biau-yu-pu-sa had come in, "to confiue himsclf on the 9th to an attack merely upon the advanced position." To give more to this short directive, he soon afterwards emphasis supplemented it by another letter,^ enjoining him once more not to attack the enemy's main position until the 10th, especially on account of the 4th Siberian Army Corps and of Rennenkampfs
^
General Kuropatkin was
" Even if the eneniy^ threatened by Genei-al Ivanov with euvelop' ment, evacuates the advanced position on October 8 or during the night 8-9 without fighting, I do not consider ourselves sufficiently prepared to venture already upon the attack on the enemy's main position on the 9th, having special regard to General v. Rennenkampf
and to the 4th Siberian Army Corps. 1 fix upon the 10th for that attack. Should great difficulties arise through the topography of the country, or owing to superior numbers of the enemy, the attack must be
continued for several days consecutively.
'
60
FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
61
Detachment. The Commander-in-Chief probably wanted to bring up the 4th Siberian Army Corps farther south first, to have it ready in support of the arrival of Rennenkampfs Detachment on the extreme left he apparently had not yet received any news. Kuropatkin therefore expected the decisive attacks of the Eastern Detachment to begin on October 10. To prevent the Japanese from supporting the portions opposite the Eastern Detachment, he considered it necessary to push the Western Detachment somewhat south. General Baron Bilderling was therefore ordered to move the main bodies of the 10th and 17th Army Corps up to the line of the advanced guards (which, moreover, had been done in part already on October 8 ^), and to push these likewise a little more forward, but not so far as to involve them
;
in
serious
action
about
as
far
as
the
line
Nan-wu-li-tai
Schi-li-ho)
(near the railway bridge over the
Fan-kia-tun.
The General Reserve,
The 1st too, received orders to march forward. Army Corps was to push its advanced guard to Tun-san-ho, and the 6th Siberian Army Corps was to occupy the villages of Schau-kia-lin-tsy, Lan-schan-pu, and Pen-tien-tsy. The Commander of the Western Detachment
having
transmitted Kuropatkin's order to the Generals commanding, another order of the Commander-in-Chief arrived, placing the left advanced
guard of the 10th Army Corps (Mau) and the Transbaikal Cossack Brigade (Mishtshenko) under
'
p. 41.
62
the

orders
of
the 4th
Siberian
Army
Corps.
General Sarubaiev, commanding that army corps,
was directed to advance and take up a position to the left, and in advance of the Western Detachment. The advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps had already been pushed to the Schi-li-ho on October 8 it therefore continued its march on the 9th by the Mandarin Road, driving weak Japanese outposts from rr-tai-tsy, Schuan-tai-tsy, and Ke-de-gou, and occupying these villages as well as \A'û-li-tai-tsy, from which the Japanese withdrew without fighting. Colonel Stakovich ^ was sent with a small force (one battalion, six squadrons, and two guns) by the right bank of the Scha-ho to the \illage of Ta-tu-san-pu, from which
'
General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade also arrived at Ta-tu-san-pu. The main bodies of the 17th
the enemy's outposts likewise withdrew.
Army
Corps, on the evening of October

:
9,
were
standing as follows The 35th Infantry Division with a brigade each at Liu-tan-kou and Liu-kiasan-kia-tsy (one battalion had been pushed out the 1st to the southern portion of Hun-lin-pu) Brigade 3rd Infantry Division, with an Abteilung
;
3rd Artillery Brigade, and half a Sapper company, had billeted in Lan-tsy-tai, on the Schi-li-ho, west
of the railway.
Portions of the 35th Infantry
Division were entrenching along the right tributary of the Schi-li-ho between Tschien-liu-tan-kou
and Pan-kiau-pu. While the left advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps was joining the 4th Siberian Army
*
P. 42.
Commanding 52nd Dragoons.

Corps,
63
General Riabinkin, in carrying out the General Order, was marching with the right advanced guard at noon from Hun-pau-schan to Fan-kia-tun, sending thence the 124th InfantryRegiment with two batteries, under Colonel Solomko, still farther south-west. The Colonel
determined to capture Ku-schu-tsy village, which he knew to be occupied by the Japanese.^ He

ordered his batteries to
come
into action, proceed-
ing to attack with the Infantry after the Artillery
had played for some time upon the enemy. The Japanese were pushed from the village, and evacuated also the height west of it. The Russians
occupied
dark,
as
first
Ku-schu-tsy, and,
village
when
it
became
the
also
the height abandoned by the enemy,

of Siau-kan-kia-tsy,
well as the
outposts being pushed to Tschou-kuan-tun.
From
main body of the 10th Army Corps the main portions of the 9th Infantry Division were meanwhile moving up from the line San-kia-tsy Hou-huan-hua-tien to the line Hun-pau-schan Nin-kuan-tun, occupying the positions left by the advanced guard.^ Corps Headquarters went to
the
Hou-huan-hua-tien.
The 4th
Siberian
its
Army
Corps, with Man's
De-
tachment under
evening to the
;
was standing in the left and in advance of the Western Detachment its advanced guard (5th and 8th Siberian Infantry Regiments, from the 2nd Siberian
orders,
*
This occupation of Ku-schu-tsy
is
not mentioned in Japanese
records.
^ A portion of the 9th Infantry Division seems to have arrived within the line Hun-pau-schan Nin-kuan-tun only on the forenoon of October 10.
64

first
from Hsinlun-tun to Sia-hu-ho-tsy, and was then pushed

forward to the western San-jo-shi-san to entrench the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division/ with the it
;
Infantry Division) had marched
Artillery,
had moved from rr-tau-kou to
Sia-
hei-niu-tun.
Portions of the corps, during their
march, had met with some weak outposts of the Japanese, which they pushed back jointly with a right flank-guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps. Mau's Detachment was standing on the heights General Mishtshenko was east of Tan-hai-schi.
on Bian-yu-pu-sa but, when it became known that the Japanese had evacuated that village, the General was, by wire, summoned to General Headquarters, when he was ordered to march with the Transbaikal Cossacks on Ta-pu on the Schi-li-ho. Of the 1st Army Corps, the advanced guard reached Tun-san-ho behind the left wing of the Western Detachment, and the main body Liianfan-tun Sa-ho-tun. Corps Headquarters went to San-kia-tsy. One battalion from the 37th Infantry Division was sent to Orr-tau-kou as escort to General Headquarters, marching with it on the next day to Tun-san-ho. The 6th Siberian Army Corps had advanced by two roads the 1 st Brigade 72nd Division as advanced guard reached Schau-kia-hn-tsy by the evening the 2nd Brigade Lan-schan-pu and the 2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division Pen-tien-tsy,^
originally to advance
;
'
Less 11th Infantry Regiment, being with Mau's Detachment.
'
The
1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division

(P. 49.)
was
left
behind at Tie-
lin
and Mukden.

FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
65
where Corps Headquarters were too. The Artillery was apportioned to the brigades. Immediately after arrival in those villages entrenching commenced. The corps remained in this position on the next day. Dembovski's Detachment retained its former position at Ta-wan-kan-pu
Sin-tai-tsy.
General Baron Stackelberg had decided to attack The Eastthe Japanese at daybreak on October 9 he knew tachment ^dvanTOs them to be on the heights between Pen-si-hu and against ^ Liu-schu-kia. Before the movements had begun, the passes Kuropatkin's two letters ^ came to Headquarters Bian-yaearly in the morning, the one shortly after theP"^'^
;
other, urging delay of the attack.
But Stackelberg
the Japaof
having already issued the orders for the attack, he decided to carry it out, He had probably
arrived
at
Pe^
^"^'*-
the
conclusion
;
that
further
it
delay
could only be injurious

all,
and since
was, after
not improbable that the attack on the 9th would not at all strike the main position, but only the enemy's advanced positions, he believed himself to be acting in the spirit of the Com-
mander-in-Chiefs intentions, if he did not stop the movements he had ordered. The General had given the troops the task of
getting
first possession of the passes in the country south of Bian-yu-pu-sa. With this object the ad-
vanced guards, with the left wing bent forward, were to push to the Hne Tschien-kou-lin Pass Tu-men-tsy-Hn Pass Ta-lin Pass Wei-niu-nin. Pa-kia-tsy was to be occupied on the extreme right, and the ford over the Tai-tsy-ho at Ja-un-ssun on
p. 60.
66
the

left.
General Samsonov was sent to reconhis Siberian Cossacks on Pen-si-hu, while General von Rennenkampfs Detachment, which, for the time being, was placed under the orders of the Eastern Detachment, was at the same time charged with watching to the left of
noitre with
tion,
Samsonov, in a southerly and south-easterly direcand with keeping occupied San-kia-tsy, on
the Tai-tsy-ho.
The
its
Corps on the right continued march forward on October 9 in two columns,

1st Siberian
its right.
detailing a flank-guard to protect
The
right column, under General Krause (3 Infantry
machine-gun company, and 1 Sapper company from the 1st East Siberian Rifle Di\dsion), was to march on Yin-tsien-pu, but, missing north of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass country on the maps available showthe its way ing merely a blank got south of Bian-yu-pu-sa behind the left column of its army corps, on the General Gerngross, road to Schan-pin-tai-tsy.
Regiments,^ 24 guns,
1
;
commanding the
1st Siberian
Army Corps, stopped
General Krause's column at Schan-pin-tai-tsy, so as to send it by the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass to The left column (9th East Siberian Yin-tsien-pu." General Kondratovich, Division), under Rifle
marched by Bian-yu-pu-sa to Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy, where it closed up. The column had pushed forward two protective bodies, namely, a right advanced guard (33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment and 8 guns), under Colonel Lissovski, on Kau-kia-pu,
'
1st, 2nd, and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments. This movement was apparently executed only on October 10,

north of the Tu-men-tsy-hn Pass, and a
(34th East Siberian Rifle
left
67
one
Regiment and
8 guns),
Musshelov, on SienColonel Lissovski's advanced guard schan-tsy. came, some time during its march, under the fire of a Japanese battery standing south-east of Kau-kia-pu, which in turn was fired at by the Artillery of the left advanced guard. LieutenantColonel Musshelov reached the object of his march unmolested. South-west of Sien-schan-tsy the left advanced guard relieved portions of Samsonov's Siberian Cossack Division, and established touch with the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, from the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.
Lieutenant-Colonel
under
The
right flank-guard of the 1st Siberian
Army
Corps (4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, with a battery) marched by Fn-kia-pu to Sia-liu-hotsy.
On
the
way
the
column came
in
touch
Corps,^
with portions of the 4th Siberian
Army
when they
posts.
jointly
pushed
as
back Japanese out-
At
Sia-liu-ho-tsy tlie flank-guard
met some
outposts of the
withdrew.
Pa-kia-tsy.
but these soon In the evening the regiment reached

well,
enemy
On
ian
the
left
of the Eastern
Detachment the
Gth East Siberian Rifle Division, of the 3rd Siber-
Army
Corps, marched only from Tschui-kia-
pu-tsy to Jo-gu,
reaching
that place with
the
main body towards evening. The left flank-guard, under Colonel Drushinin,'"^ was pushed across the
Tai-tsy-ho
bridges,
'
it
constructed
across
the
river
one of which was passable
for all arms,
two and
p. 64.
p. 44.
68

The
occupied the heights south of Ja-un-ssun.

Stackelberg apportioned as his reserve
3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, General Baron

to have
it seems marched on the 9th only to Ta-pei-kou, and to have stopped there. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, followed the left column
;
Corps likewise as reserve, closing up at Sia-pin-tai-tsy and Bian-yuof the 1st Siberian
pu-sa in the evening.
Army
General Samsonov's Siberian Cossack Division, which had advanced from Sien-tschan-tsy against the line Liu-schu-kia Pen-si-hu, came upon the enemy in the neighbourhood of Kau-kia-pu at the Ko-san-shi-sen-san. The Japanese, who had entrenched themselves on the heights north-east of Liu-schu-kia, offered a determined resistance They did to the Cossacks, who at once attacked. not succeed in driving back the Japanese, even after General Ivanov, commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, had sent forward the 24th East
Siberian Rifle
Regiment
last
in support of them.
The
Russians were at
attack and
obliged to desist from the
to look, in turn, for cover in the country.
They entrenched themselves on

;
the height southas

left
west of Sien-schan-tsy stated, they were relieved by the

at
night,
has
been advanced
guard of the 1st Siberian
Army
Corps.
Rennenkampfs Detachment came in close touch This with the enemy as well on October 9.
detachment, transgressing the observant attitude prescribed to it by Stackelberg,^ had advanced in
'
F. 06.
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

left
69
two columns on the
of the 3rd Siberian
Army
Corps. The right column, under General Peterov, was directed to go to Pen-si-hu, on the right bank
while General Liubavin, with his Cavalry Brigade and one battery,^ was to advance south of the river. Peterov 's column had scarcely of the Tai-tsy-ho
;
got on the way when occupied by Colonel

cleverly
it
encountered the position
Hirata.^
in
The
Japanese,
adapting
themselves
very extended
formation to the accidents of the ground, opened at once on the Russians a brisk fire from the
prominent of which is especially the La-ut-ha-la-sa by its rugged forms. General Peterov determined to capture the heights. But the position of the Japanese proved so strong, that the Russian attack, in spite of repeated General Ivanov, who had rushes, did not succeed. already supported General Samsonov's Detachment, helped in this action too, by sending two battalions with six guns of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division from Kau-tai-tsy against the left wing of the Japanese. The action dragged along almost the whole day without the Russians succeeding in driving the Japanese from the
steep heights,
precipitous
Iâ-ut-ha-la-sa.
After a hot contest

JNIei-san
;
the
more weakly occupied captured by the Russians
was
at
last
portions of the
6th
East Siberian Rifle Division, moreover, succeeded in establishing themselves on the Ha-shi-ra-yama, which had been defended by two companies of
'
2nd Brigade Traiislmikal Cossack Division, with a horse mountain

tlie
battery of
Frontier Guard.
P. 56.
70
the 1st Guard Kobi Regiment/ But the Russians were unable to gain any further advantages. General Liubavin, on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, had pushed back small Japanese outposts
;
it
was; only possible to defend the road to
Pen-si-hu by the few skirmishers distributed on the heights east of Riu-wo-bio. But Liubavin,
probably fearing to meet at Pen-si-hu with stronger forces of the enemy, outmatching his Cavalry, and
his
Rennenkampf to give him some Infantry and some few more guns being declined,
request to
Two kilodecided to remain on the left bank. metres from the bridge leading to Pen-si-hu, he
selected a position, in which his troops entrenched
From the trenches themselves towards evening. that two buildings it was noticed in the evening
in Pen-si-hu
were in flames spies reported that the Japanese had set fire to the magazines. The battery had previously been sent to the main body, after having spent all its ammunition in Japanese pontoon- bridge at Riushelling the
;
wo-bio.
Though
October
situation
the Eastern
Detachment's attack on
it
was
lacking in sufficient energy,

right wing.
It
revealed to the Japanese once
more the dangerous

is
of
their
true
the
strength of the Russians
who had appeared east of were estimated at one Division only, but Pen-si-hu it was to be anticipated that the enemy would con'
Ru6siau reports do not mention the occupation of the Ha-shi-ra;
yama probably because the height was lost again next morning. Some reports maintain that the La-ut-ha-la-sa and not the Mei-san, was
,
captured by the Russians, but that been temporary only.
its
occupation by the Russians had
FIRST
In
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

the
71
tinue his attack next day with far superior forces. Japanbse
front, too,
;
enemy had everywhere been The

. .
ist
re-
pushmg on at various points strong lorces shown themselves, driving back the Japanese
posts.
1
1
, ,
11 Army had inforces
out- ^j^J with There could be no longer any doubt of a the main
T^
.
general attack by the Russians being imminent.
body of the i2th

^^V^^'^^^
While these
facts
caused in
Oyama
left
fresh ideas
and resolutions to mature, he
the measures
the
attacks;
necessary for reinforcing the right wing in the
hands of the 1st Army. ^^^^*2nd General Baron Kuroki resolved to strengthen Armies the threatened wing with the 12th Division, which, their po. however, was to leave a portion of its troops in sitions. At their former position south of Yin-tsien-pu.^ the same time, General Umesawa's Detachment was placed under the orders of that Division. General Baron Ino-uye, commanding the 12th Division, left the 23rd Brigade, with Artillery and Cavalry attached, under General Kigoshi, south of Yin-tsien-pu, he himself starting in a southeasterly direction with the 12th Brigade and the bulk of the Artillery on the afternoon of October 9. While the 47th Infantry was at once branched off to the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, General Shimamura continued marching on to Pen-si-hu, with the It was 14th Infantry Regiment and one battery. night, and the fight for the La-ut-ha-la-sa had died away long ago, when this detachment, exhausted by the arduous march, arrived to bring relief to Hirata's defensive force,' already greatly reduced
P. 64. P. 66.
This force
is
said to
have
lost two-thirds of its fighting
strength.
72
in

numbers.
The
troops
having rested
a few
hours, General
Shimamura, about 2
a.m., appor-
tioned
one battalion to the defensive group at
Riu-wo-bio, another battalion and the battery to the group at the La-ut-ha-la-sa the third battalion
;
probably remained as reserve at Sei-ko.^ When, during the day, the passage of Russian forces to the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho had been established. General Prince Kan-in was ordered to march with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade
from the left wing of the 1st Army to Si-ho-yan,' and cover that post on the line of communications. One regiment started thither in the evening the
;
other regiment,
noitring,
being
to
was
charged with reconfollow next day. With the

still
object of strengthening the garrison of Si-ho-yan
by Infantry
as well, the Inspector of
Communica-
tions apportioned for that purpose
300 men Lines of Communication Troops that had just arrived. The Guard and 2nd Divisions were busy preparing their positions. The Guard Cavalry Regiment, which had been sent to reconnoitre towards the Ba-ji-san on October 8, was obliged to with-
draw
again,
before
superior
hostile
forces,
on
the 9th.
The enemy, strong Infantry and Cavalry, seemed to follow by Pa-kia-tsy Man-hua-pu, some patrols pushing to the Wai-to-san. Hostile Cavalry appeared on the Ohara-yama opposite the 2nd Division the Western San-jo-shi-san was being occupied by Russian Infantry.
Some batteries
line.
of the 12th Division were probably distributed along
the whole
*
15 kilometres south of Pen-si-bu.
(Sketch
1.)

With
the 4th
73
Army,
the
3rd Battalion 40th
Infantry Regiment, which Otani had pushed to
Wu-H-tai-tsy, retired south on the approach of
strong Russian forces
the 2nd Battahon of the
same regiment, which had been pushed to Schanyau-pu, rejoined the detachment in Yen-tai^ as
well.
Nothing of importance occurred with the 2nd Army on the 9th the outposts standing in Schuanand Ta-tu-san-pu fell back tai-tsy, Orr-tai-tsy,
;
before the vanguards of the Russian 17th
Army
Corps and Stako\dch's Detachment.^
October 10
The
events of October 9 on the Japanese right Japanese
wing had
reports,
confirmed
the
surmises
attack.
about
the
the
intelli-
direction of the Russian
main
From
fbout the
which frequently varied in their statements, and were often contradictory too, it was difficult for Oyama's Headquarters to gain a true insight into the distribution of the enemy's forces.
Opposite the right of the 1st
"^y-
Sketch
4.
Army
the
enemy
:
was reported to be in strength as follows On the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho about a brigade
east of Pen-si-hu at least a division
;
north of the
;
Ta-lin and Tu-men-tsy-lin Passes another brigade and between the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass and Saiikia-tsy about two divisions. Opposite the Guard and 2nd Divisions, Russian vanguards had on the 9th advanced to the line Wai-to-san Ohara-yama (height " 238 ") Western San-jo-shi-san. By the
'
p. 58.
'
p. 62.
74
reconnaissances of General Otani's Detachment, and by the action of Wu-li-tai-tsy/ the 4th Army had ascertained strong forces on the INIandarin Road in the neighbourhood of Schi-h-ho. Opposed to this was the inteUigence received by the 2nd Army, that the Russians had been reinforced on the Mandarin Road, but had not advanced beyond Pan-kiau-pu. Hostile bodies were said to have advanced in unknown strength west of the Mandarin Road on both banks of the Scha-ho to the line Liu-tan-kou Li-kia-tun, the main bodies standing at Ta-tai and Li-kia-tun. The outposts of the 2nd Army had retired already, on October 5,
before the Russian vanguards."

all
The sum
the fact
total of
these reports
corroborated
that
general attack by the Russians was imminent.
Based on the intelligence received from the Armies, supplemented probably by reports from spies, Japanese General Headquarters believed the Russian forces to be grouped as follows ^ In the country east and north of Pen-si-hu two corps were supposed to be standing at Fn-kia-pu, as well as on the Mandarin Road, three corps each to be assembling and north of Fn-kia-pu one
:
;
more corps to be in right was assumed

extreme
left
reserve.
The Russian extreme
to be at Li-kia-tun, and the
of the Tai-tsy-ho
left bank from this it followed, that the Russian front extended about 70 kilometres. Marshal Marquis Oyama thought the situation
south of Pen-si-hu, on the

;
'
P. 58.
P. 51.
'
The
ideas General Headquarters
had formed did not quite co-
the various intelligences received ; the reports of the armies therefore seem to ha\e been accepted as only partly correct.
incide with

to be
75
the offensive.
enough to warrant his assuming Being probably impressed by the threat to his right, and assuming that the enemy's main forces had not yet finished their concentration on the southern bank of the Hun-ho, he dropped
clear
his original intention of
now
awaiting
first
the Russians
in the prepared positions,

offensive,^
and then to assume the and resolved to anticipate the enemy's
offensive.
Japanese General Headquarters therefore issued Oyama the following Order at 10 p.m. on October 9 Armies to " / shall attack the enemy before he is completely f^^^ ^t-^^
:
deployed, and advance against the line Kan-to-lisan

"
^
tack.
Fn-kia-pu
Li-kia-tun.
will attack,
The
First
Army
with the 12th

Brigade,
Division and Major-General Umesawa's

in
its
the direction of Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy,^ and, with
main
bodies, in the direction of Fn-kia-pu
it
will delay its attack until the
Fourth
Army
has
captured Wu-li-tai-tsy.
"
The Fom^th
Army
will
advance on the 10th
in the
morning, attacking in the direction of Nin-kuan-tun. " The Second Ai'my will advance to attack the Strong forces Tai-pin-tschuan. line Pan-kiau-pu The left retained behind its right wing. are to be wing is to advance more rapidly, and make an
enveloping movement."
The Order meant Army Commanders

'
to
in
leave full liberty to the-
carrying out the general
P. 53.
' '
6 kilometres north of Bian-yu-pu-sa.
6 kilometres south of Biau-yu-pu-sa.
76

General Headquarters expecting the to adapt the directives given
intentions,
Army Commanders
to
to any change in the situation.
And,
the
therefore,
the
1st
Army was
also
left
extremely
With important task of securing the right flank. the object of discussing the probable future course
of the operations, the Chiefs of the Staffs of the Armies had been summoned to General Headquarters at Liao-yan as early as October 6
;
it
was
already on that occasion that Marshal Marquis
Oyama
The
1st
stands
fast
said he intended to assume the offensive. Based on Marshal Marquis Oyama's directives, General Baron Kuroki gave the following Order
^Yie
on
^-Q
the ex-
1st
Army:
'
treme
''^^*'
.
maintaniing and
"Ta-yau-pu, October
<
9,
11.30 p.m.
is,
y^^ enemy,
at least 4 Divisions strong,
ening the
sincc last night,

front, right flank,
gradually advancing against our
rS'
and
rear.
is
advancing on Liao-yan along the Mandarin Road, its head haWng reached
''Another Uivision
Wu-li-tai-tsy.
West
of that road, the enemy
is
Li-kia-tun. standing on the line Liu-tan-kou "2. The Fourth r/fiy is going to assume the
offensive to-morrow,
on the 10th, attacking
in
the direction of Nin-kuan-tun.

"
is
The Second Army, in touch with the Fourth, going to advance against the line Pan-kiau-pu
3.
Tai-pin-tschuan.
"
The Firat
Army
will attack the
enemy
after
in
front in
the direction of
Fn-kia-pu
act in
the
Fourth
"
4.
Army
The
has captured Wu-li-tai-tsy.

Divisio7i will
\'2th
comphance

with
its
77
former orders,^ advancing on Kan-to-li-san after the enemy has been repulsed. " 5. The Gimrd and 2nd Divisions will for the present hold their positions. "6. The General Reserve^ will reach Hui-yau
at 5 a.m. on the 10th. " 7. The Cavalry Brigade will
remain with
its
main body
at Kan-sa,^ covering the
Army
to the
right rear, while watching the Tai-tsy-ho valley. " 8. / shall be in Ta-yau-pu."
to
The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was previously directed move to Si-ho-yan ^ but there being every
;
reason to expect, from the intelligence that had meanwhile come in, that this important line-ofcommunication post would be occupied by the
Russians before the Cavalry could possibly arrive there, the Army Commander kept at first the But, brigade on the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.
strangely enough, the Russians did not pay any
attention to that place, with
all
its
stores.
This
omission enabled the Cavalry Brigade to occupy

Si-ho-yan on October 11, and to intervene on the
12th in a most effective manner in the action on
the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.
The detachment
east of Pen-si-hu,
which
liad
been reinforced by the 14th Infantry Regiment and one battery,^ and being now commanded by Major Honda, in place of the wounded Colonel Hirata, made use of the fog in the early hours
'
p. 71.
29th Kobi Regiment, Kobi Artillery Abteilunj^, ami Hidikata's

(P. 63.)
Battery.
*
20 kilometres west of
P. 72.
Pen-si-hu
on the
northern
*
Tai-tsy-ho
bank.
*
P. 71.
78

Russians the
of the 10th by retaking from the

positions they had captured.
The Ha-shi-ra-yama
was simultaneously attacked by the 3rd Company 14th Infantry Regiment and by the 1st Company 1st Guard Kobi Regiment, who drove back the Russians after an obstinate resistance. Both
companies then occupied the height jointly with
As the action lasted all the morning was decided, General Baron Ino-uye had taken the precaution of calling up to Liu-schu-kia the 24^1 Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Brigade as But, on the leading battalion a reinforcement.
a
third. ^
it
before
of that regiment arriving at
Kuan-lin-tsy about
10 a.m., the Ha-shi-ra-yama had been captured, Meanbeing occupied by the three companies.
while the fog had cleared
position,
away from the Japanese

;
could be seen in an easterly innumerable Russian tents, stretching in a wide arc even beyond the Tai-tsy-ho, and revealing a tremendous superiority of the enemy. General Baron Ino-uye, therefore, did not send back the 24th Infantry Regiment, but employed
a
cainp
direction, with
it
in reinforcing the positions at Pen-si-hu gener-
ally,
and forming a
reserve.
The
Mei-san, too,
was recaptured at the point of the bayonet, and maintained in the face of vigorous counter-attacks, likewise delivered with the bayonet. The positions at the Ta-lin and Tu-men-tsy-lin Passes had not been seriously attacked hitherto nor were they on the 10th. General Baron Ino-uye having on his side no reason for advancing from his covered
;
positions against
'
the superior enemy,
no actual
According to Japanese reports, from the Nakagawa Battalion.
;;

fighting took place
79
on this portion of the front, both sides only firing at each other on for some time, without, however, obtaining any
the batteries
material effect.
maintained an expectant attitude on October 10, in compliance with the Army Order. They occupied a conDivisions
The Guard and 2nd
tinuous defensive position,
stretching
by Ni-do-
ko to the
coal-pits, in
prolongation of the trenches
of the 46th Infantry Regiment, which, together with one or two batteries of the 12th Division, had remained at the Tschien-kou-lin Pass. The 1st Brigade of the Guard Division "was on the right
had pushed forward a small detachment to occupy the Sa-to-rei Pass. In advance of Tschanhei-tun was the 2nd Brigade, facing north-east. The entrenchments, groups of fire-trenches, constructed in the rocky soil, possessed throughout great defensive strength. The position was at first but weakly occupied the main body of the 1st Brigade was at Tan-kia-pu-tsy, and that of the 2nd at Tschan-hei-tun. Some few companies had been pushed to the various knolls in front of the position, as a measure of security. The Artillery was standing ready at Huan-kia-pu-tsy Divisional Headquarters were at Tan-kia-pu-tsy. The 2nd Division adjoined the Guards at Ni-doko. The position of the Division formed an arc
it
;
salient to the north, and, like the
Guards' position,
very
carefully
was
tactically
ably chosen,
for
and
fortified.
The
of
Infantry line had everywhere the

firing
profile
trenches
standing,
with
numerous
overhead
cover,
traverses,
look-outs,
80

The height
east
and covered approaches from the cover-trenches

of the reserves behind the Hne.
position,
of Tsien-tau, which had to be included in the

is
a rocky cHff falling steeply to
the
north-east,
with a clear
field
;
of
fire
in
every
direction
up to 1,500 metres
;
at the corner protiers
jecting farthest north-east were several

fire-trenches
of the village of Tsien-tau, surrounded
by a
was placed in a state of defence in front and on both sides owing to the configuration of the ground, the batteries were distributed throughout the position. For the guns, entrenched on the height east of Tsien-tau, cover had been constructed wth boulders, on which One battery at Schi-hui-yau, earth was heaped. in the plain, was very cleverly masked by gaoljan. Cover-trenches with casemates had been constructed for the gun detachments as well, by partly making use of con-ugated iron taken by the Japanese from Russian barracks.^ All along the front were abattis and wire entanglements. The position was occupied as follows On the right was the 4th Infantry Regiment, in continuation of which, to the left, was the 29th Infantry Regiment the western portion of the position, from Tsien-tau to the low knoll north of the coal-pits, was occupied by the 15th Brigade. On the morning all remained quiet opposite the Guards. Towards noon four hostile guns came into action at the road east of the Ohara-yama,
clay wall,
;
:
;
' At the coal-pits of Yen-tai were unfinished Russian barracks, which were intended for the 22nd Sotnia Frontier Guard. The Japanese afterwards used them for lines-of-communication purposes.
FIRST
firing
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
81
the
2nd
about twenty rounds in the direction of Brigade of Guards. The Japanese
The Artillery not replying, the fire ceased again. Japanese Infantry remained under cover. During the day only a few more Cavalry patrols of the
enemy were
noticed
;
for
the
rest,
nothing else
happened on that day. Opposite the 2nd Division, some Russian batteries, perhaps three in number, having got into position unobserved at the north-west slope of the Western San-jo-shi-san, about 7 a.m. suddenly opened fire on the Japanese batteries standing entrenched on the right wing of the Division. It was previously known that the Western Sanjo-shi-san was also occupied by hostile Infantry they were troops of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. It being impossible from the Japanese position to locate exactly the Russian Artillery, in spite of its fire, an observation officer, with signal-flags and mounted orderlies, was sent forward to a small eminence east of Pan-la-schan-tsy, by whose signals the fire was replied to. The Russian Artillery deHvered a rapid fire for half an hour, and then abated it. But it had no effect at all, all the shrapnels passing beyond the mark. The Artillery force on
^
;
the Japanese
at
first.
left
did not take part in the action
Towards 11 a.m. Russian Infantry, about
a battalion strong, advanced to the height southwest of the Western San-jo-shi-san; two Japanese batteries began directing a brisk fire on them, but ceased the moment the Russian batteries poured
a rapid
fire
into
those of
'
the Japanese.
This
p. 72.
82
THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WAR
alternate firing of both Artilleries
of the Japanese
on Infantry, and of the Russians on the Japanese batteries was several times repeated until noon. Towards 12.45 p.m. the head of a long Russian Infantry column on the march appeared on the
road leading over the heights north of Temple

Hill, in the direction of San-kia-tsy.
about
tinued
the
size
This column, of a brigade, probably likewise

Siberian
a
portions
of the 4th
its
Army
crest
Corps, con-
march
;
to
it
low
north-east of
Temple
Hill
here
partly formed up, extended
until about 2 p.m., and Soon afterwards the Russian Artillery, again unnoticed, moved off by East San-kia-tsy. During the afternoon a Russian battery once more appeared north of San-kia-tsy, firing a short time, and then disappearing again. The Japanese Artillery occasionally fired on
a long skirmishing line
began to entrench.
The 4th
^J
possessioii of
Russian Infantry. Marshal Marquis Oyama had ordered the 4th Army to advance on Nin-kuan-tun but General
;
Count Nodzu considered
it
necessary to abstain
f.
irom an attack on iNm-kuan-tun lor the present. general attack by the Russians on October 10 tSouth^ em bank being looked upon as certain, the General assumed ^ of the the enemy would try to push strong lorces to Schi-ii^"" the gentle range of hills stretching from KuThat schu-tsy in the direction of the coal-pits. would have made it impossible to advance in a northerly direction on Nin-kuan-tun, and would have necessitated a costly attack to drive the enemy away again from the heights. Count Nodzu therefore determined to occupy them at once with
the
^
,
FIRST
the
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

;
88
10th Division
the 5th Division was meanIf he captured the

as
while to take possession of Wu-li-tai-tsy and the

height adjoining
east
it.
low
hills
of
Yun-kuan-tun Tu-men-tsy,
well
as
Wu-li-tai-tsy, the
Army
was
its
in a correct position
with regard to
its
its
neighbour, the 2nd Division on
right
still
standing in
former position, and
in a favourable situation for future operations in
the general direction on Nin-kuan-tun.
General
Baron
Kawamura,
commanding
to
start
the
at
10th Division, ordered
the 39th
Infantry Regi-
ment,
6 a.m.
with
this
some mountain-guns,
Should
tun,
it
from Tun-ta-lien-kou for Yun-kuan-tun. advanced detachment meet with strong
forces of the
enemy
already east of Yun-kuan-
was to hold back, and be sustained by the main body of the Division coming up behind should it meet with weak forces, it was to attack at once. The low heights east of Yun-kuantun were very weakly occupied by Russian outposts, belonging probably to Man's Detachment.
;
On
his
Colonel Yasumura approaching the height with detachment, the Russians withdrew, after a brief
resistance.
Towards
11
a.m. the
main body of
the 10th Division occupied the heights gained.
The Artillery action previously described had meanwhile developed with the 2nd Division on the right. The positions of the Russian batteries on the Western San-jo-shi-san could in part be clearly seen from the heights east of Yun-kuantun
;
General
Kawamura
therefore
ordered the
Artillery of his Division, as well as the 14th Field

Artillery
Regiment from the
1st
Field Artillery
; ;
84

and Yun-kuan-tun
Brigade (probably being under his orders), to come

into action east of Po-lin-tsy
and intervene
in the fight
of the 2nd Division.
The Japanese
batteries gradually
drew upon them-
Russian guns standing at Temple Hill, and belonging probably to Mau's detachment, fighting them until darkness set in. The 5th Division, to which the Commander of the 4th Army had gone, ad^ anced by Yen-tai
selves the fire of sixteen
at
fire
Schan-yau-pu it came under a heavy Artillery from Wu-li-tai-tsy and the height east of it, The Divisional as well as from the railway line.
Commander
of
decided
to
attack
the height east

the
Division.
Wu-li-tai-tsy,
and
with
deployed
great
The
attack
met
difficulties.
The
assailant did not succeed in capturing
by
frontal
attacks the narrow Russian position strengthened by
deep trenches. The attempt of enveloping it in the west was frustrated by a flanking fire of Artillery near the railway. The Russian batteries were so cleverly placed that they could not be located by The hope of being somethe Japanese batteries.
what
Army
by the 3rd Division of the 2nd advancing on Wu-li-tai-tsy was not realised. Considerable loss was being suffered already, without the attack making any progress the situation became more and more serious the more the day advanced. On General Baron Kawamura being informed of the nature of the action in which the 5th Division was involved, he at once sent tke 8th Brigade of his 10th Division, together ^vith some batteries
relieved
on the
left
of the
1st
Field
Artillery
Brigade,
in
support.
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
85
While the Infantry was preparing
for the attack
on the height at Wu-H-tai-tsy the batteries unlimbered under cover at Tschiu-tsai-tai, opening Its effect became soon apparent. fire at 3.30 p.m. Scarcely forty minutes had elapsed when the fire of the Russian guns east of the height, being now enfiladed, was growing sensibly weaker at
;
5.30 p.m.
it
ceased altogether.
first
;
Many
line
horses of
the limbers and
and second
killed apparently
tsai-tai
it
waggons were could be seen from Tschiu-
how the Russian artillerists were trying to push back their guns by hand to get them safely away. Kawamura's intervention gave new life to the
attack of the 5th Division.
Though the Russians
made
as well as
counter-attacks from Wu-li-tai-tsy, from the height, the Japanese, persevering with tenacity, constantly renewed their attacks, until at last, when it was pitch dark, they succeeded in driving the Russians from their trenches, and in capturing the height east of the
several
village.
Portions of the Division had penetrated
also into Wu-li-tai-tsy, driving the hostile garrison
out of
it.
The
5th Division had therefore accom-
plished
its
task for the day.
The
action cost it:
1 officer dead, 10 officers wounded, and 246 men dead or wounded. Whether and to what extent the 8th Brigade had been intervening in the fight cannot be ascertained nor is there any clue as to what became on that day of the 3rd, 10th, and 11th Kobi Brigades,
;
as well as of the portions of the 1st Field Artillery
Brigade not engaged
they were moved up pro-

86
bably to the neighbourhood of Yun-kuan-tun Po-lin-tsy after the 10th Division had occupied the
low height north-west of the coal-pits. General Baron Oku had arranged for the 2nd The 2nd tl,^L^l', Army to advance in three columns in a north ValxC6B OH ôth The right column (6 battalions, easterly direction. banks of ^ i the Scha- 3 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 2 Pioneer companies was to advance between the w^rthe^ of the 3rd Division) 4th railway and the line Ta-pa-tai-tsy Scha-rr-tai ^Sng Schuan-tai-tsy Nan-kuan-tsy to attack the line the centre column Tschen-kia Pau-kiau-pu Russian outposts. (6 battalions, 3 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 3 Pioneer companies of the 6th Division) between the right column and the left bank of the Scha-ho against
,
.
--
the
Hne
Tschien-liu-tan-kou
;
Tsun-lun-yen-tun
left
(the latter exclusive)

talions,
and the
column
(6 bat-
3 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 3 Pioneer companies of the 4th Division) was to march with its right wing along the western bank of the Scha-
ho towards the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun Tai-pinThe columns were to start at 6.30 a.m. tschuan. The other eighteen battalions and five Pioneer companies were to assemble at 8 a.m. on the
line Pei-siau-fan-tsy
Si-siau-fan-tsy
The
1st
as reserve of
Cavalry Brigade Army was charged with covering, jointly with the left
Headquarters.
column, the
left flank
and rear of the Army, and
to reconnoitre especially towards Tschou-kuan-pu, north of San-de-pu.
Each division advanced in two columns. The right column of the 3rd Division (2 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery, and 1 Pioneer company) reached S chin-lien-tun at 10.50 a.m., and the
FIRST
left
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
87
column, consisting of merely 2 companies, Men-hu-lu-tun about the same time. The other portions followed on S chin-lien-tun as reserve of When the heads of the the Divisional Commander. columns had just passed the villages named, the commander of the left column heard that Schuan-
was occupied by the enemy at the same time a lively fusillade, soon mixed with the thunder of cannon, became audible, coming from the neightai-tsy
;
bourhood of
the 4th
Wu-li-tai-tsy.
The columns were
stopped for the moment.
Intelligence arrived from
Army
saying that the 5th Division was in
action with the enemy,

tai-tsy.
who was
holding Wu-li-
General Baron Oshima, commanding the first to advance on Wu-litai-tsy (probably having previously agreed with the
3rd Division, intended
Commander
of the 5th Division to do so), and

battery.
with that object reinforced his right column by
two companies and one
But
as his ad-
vance could be enfiladed from Schuan-tai-tsy he

resolved to attack that village in the
first
instance.
By pushing next towards Nan-kuan-tsy he intended to render the 5th Division indirectly the
wished-for support.
fore
The
right
column was
there-
stopped
at
Schin-lien-tun, the reserve
was
moved behind the left column, and the latter was reinforced. The attack on Schuan-tai-tsy made,
however, but slow progress it was 5.30 in the evening before the Russians, weak outposts of the 17th Army Corps, evacuated the place. When the Japanese showed themselves at the north edge of the village, they were at once
;
briskly fired
on by Artillery from a northerly and
88

;
direction it being further ascerNan-kuan-tsy was strongly held by tained that the enemy, the Divisional Commander decided to delay the attack until next day. The Division remained during the night in fighting formation in the position it had reached.
north-easterly
column of the 6th Division (1 battalion and 1 squadron only) marched by Scha-rr-tai, and the left column (2 battalions, 1 quarter-squadron, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company), followed by the Divisional reserve, marched by Kan-ku-tun. Between 10 and 11 a.m. both columns the right at An-kia-san-kia-tsy, and the left at Siau-tunschan-pu met weak outposts of the 17th Army Corps, who, after a brief resistance, withdrew on Orr-tai-tsy and Ta-tu-san-pu. The Japanese folright
The
lowed, driving, until 5 p.m., the
Russians also
out of these places. The right column had been strengthened for that purpose by three battalions. Strong forces of the enemy having meanwhile been reported to be standing at Nan-kuan-tsy
tinued.
and Yen-kia-wan, the further attack was disconThe two columns established themselves
for the night in the villages captured.
The
reserve
of the Division went to Siau-tun-schan-pu.
Of
the 4th Division, 2 battalions, with

1
of Cavalry, 3 batteries, and
1 troop Pioneer company,
marched by Tschu-tschuan-tsy Si-kuan-schan-tun on Yen-kia-tien-tsy, pushing back here some weak hostile outposts, and pursuing the Russians, who belonged to Stakovich's Detachment, to Yu-kiatien-tsy. To the west of this column, two battalions advanced by Ku-kia-tsy, reaching Hua-kia-tun at
FIRST
noon
;
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

fell
89
weak Russian Cavalry
back before them
north.
Taking into consideration the points the
other Divisions had reached in their march, General
it
Tsukamoto, commanding the 4th Division, halted the reserve at Yu-kia-tien-tsy and Hua-kia-tun
;
closed
up
at Schu-pei-tai.
Cavalry Brigade, under General Akiyama, started from Hei-kou-tai about noon, It left a small reaching San-de-pu at 3 p.m. detachment behind in its late quarters, and another
1st
The
which had been sent to the right bank of the Hun-ho, got as far as Tu-tai-tsy. Army Headquarters arrived in Sun-lun-pu at noon, going for the night to Pu-tsau-kou the reserve of the 2nd Army moved forward to Sunlun-pu and Scha-rr-tai. On the evening of the 10th the main bodies of that Army were standing on the line Schin-lien-tun
party,
;
rr-tai-tsy Ta-tu-san-pu Yu-kia-tien-tsy

Hua-kia-tun.
;
The General Reserve advanced, by orders of Oyama, to L-ta-tai General Headquarters apparently continued to remain in Liao-yan.
Although General Kuropatkin had distinctly Russianb stated in the two letters which Stackelberg re- J^rdeTtte" ceived early on October 9,^ that he expected the Eastern Detaclmientto T-v Jiiastern Detachment to attack the mam position attack, of the Japanese on the 10th, yet he thought it the enem/s
1
11.
necessary to furnish the

TA
1
Commander
T
of the Eastern
T^
Detachment with new directives. During the more letters were dispatched to Stackel- wJltem Deberg. The first document reaching Stackelberg on tachment.
9th two
-1
^'?^* 7'"^' while he 18 holding back
Pp. 60 and 66.
90
the same day, in addition to the congratulations
on the occupation of the Bian-yu-pu-sa position/

contained the adWce to proceed cautiously with
the attack on the main position
letter
;
in the second
Kuropatkin sent to the General an explicit worded directive. This document, dispatched late in the evening of October 9, was
and
firmly
worded
as follows
''
Orr-tac-koVj Qth
October, 11 p.7n.
you to make a wheel forward with the left wing of the Eastern Detachment. Advance with that wing along the Tai-tsy-ho in
" I propose to
westerly
direction
against
the
right
of
the
enemy's position. Push back the Japanese, forming your front in such a way as to bring your left to Kan-kwan-tun on the Tai-tsy-ho,' and your
right
near the heights east of Tsien-tau at the
coal-pits.
You must
apportion sufficient
forces
for
guarding your rear and left flank. Direct v. Rennenkampf to remain for the present General at Pen-si-hu, and to keep the Tai-tsy-ho occupied
east of that place.
Your
right will be secured
by
the 4th Siberian
Army
Corps and by one brigade
of the 31st Division,^ which to-day has occupied
the heights east of Tan-hai-schi.
Let me know by return how far you want The main to go to-morrow and on the 11th.
"
bodies of the 4th Siberian

to-night at Sia-hei-niu-tun.
Army
Corps will stay Report on your move-
ments of to-day by the morning of the 10th."

'
P. 46-47.
'
12 kilometres south of the coal-pita.
Mau's Detachment.
FIRST
the
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
91
General Kuropatkin, adhering to the view that Western Detachment must not attack before the Eastern Detachment had made some more decisive progress, gave no orders to Bilderhng to advance. All he considered necessary were a few
movements by some troops of the 10th

Corps,
Army
to
sending therefore
of
his
orders
straight
the
chief
the
staff
of
that
corps.
These
altered twice until forenoon of On the evening of the 9th the October 10. Commander-in-Chief made known that the left flank of the 10th Army Corps would be sufficiently secured by the advance of the 1st Army Corps, which was going to move into the line Tun-san-ho
movements he
Schi-miau-tsy, as
therefore
to
well as by the attack of the

;
Eastern Detachment
place
so as to
the 10th
reserves
Army
behind
Corps was
its
its
right
be capable of supporting, in case wing of need, the 17th Army Corps. little later was dispatched to occupy, with General the order Riabinkin's advanced guard, the height west of
Finally, on the next morning, Kuropatkin ordered the height west of Ku-schutsy to be occupied with only three battalions, while Riabinkin was to move with the rest of the advanced guard into a fortified position on the Schi-li-ho between Fan-kia-tun and Yin-pan this position, he said, was selected as the pivot of "the position of the 10th Army Corps" in its
Ku-schu-tsy.
further progress.
The 17th Army Corps,

not receive any orders
;
as far as
is
known, did
but it was probably informed of the 6th Siberian Army Corps having
92

" to respond to
been directed,
General
v.
Bilder-
ling's request for support, in case the
enemy should
The
ad-
troops
proceed to make a decisive attack." During October 10 the 17th Army Corps began to feel the pressure of the Japanese 4th and 2nd
Western Armies.^
Detach-
The detachment
sent
under
Colonel
back into
*osiSon
Stakovich to Ta-tu-san-pu, as well as the outposts pushed by the advanced guard to rr-tai-tsy and
Schuan-tai-tsy, were in the afternoon driven back
on the
in the
by portions of the Japanese 2nd Army.^

vicli
^j^g
Stako-
established
himself
again at Yen-kia-wan,
. . .
face of
Japanese
attacks,
portions withdrawing into the position other ^
of the 3rd Infantry Di\'ision behind the Schi-li-ho.
...
Centre is entrench-
General
g^^g o
Grekov,
with
his
Cossack
Brigade,
mg
its
wav
./
in the direction of Li-kia-tun.
main poSia-liu-
ho-tey.
Latc in the evening the main bodies of the advanced guard gave up Wu-li-tai-tsy, when pressed i^y ^bg ^^^ Japanese Division, having previously been told not to engage in serious action. They withdrew on Schi-li-ho.^ The various orders of Kuropatkin caused at first
great confusion in the 10th
first
Army
Corps.
On
his
directing to
place the reserves behind the
General Slutshevski ordered General obliged to evacuate the advancedguard position, to move behind the right wing to
right wing,
Riabinkin,
when
Tschan-sin-tien, 5 kilometres south of Scha-ho-pu.
When
next Kuropatkin's second order, to send
Riabinkin 's
Detachment
his
schu-tsy, crossed
Kuarrangements, he meant to
to
the heights of
withdraw the
'
1st
Brigade of the 9th

2
Infantry
;
Division into the reserve at Tschan-sin-tien

Pp. 82-89.
this
pp 88 and
89.
P. 86.
FIRST
movement
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

Finally,
93
to be carried out during the forenoon
of October 10.
patkin's orders,
only the last of Kuro-
heights at Ku-schu-tsy with

to be executed.
demanding the occupation of the some portions, came

last
Having received this

Riabinkin
directed
^
order from Slutshevski,
with his party
Colonel Solomko to remain on the height near Ku-schu-tsy, causing at the same time two battalions of the 123rd Infantry Regiment and two batteries to occupy the villages of Siau-fan-kia-tun and Fankia-tun, as well
as
the course of the Schi-li-ho

;
two companies and the Scouts of the 123rd Infantry Regiment of that force were detached to move to Yin-pan. Two
between these places
from the 123rd Infantry Regiment, and one battalion from the 124th, were stationed as General Reserve south of Sin-tschuan. Colonel Solomko pushed one battalion as outposts beyond Tschou-kuan-tun, occupying, with one battalion each, Ku-schu-tsy village and the height west of it here they used the trenches abandoned by the Japanese. The outpost battalion beyond Tschoukuan-tun was directed not to engage in decisive action, but to withdraw in time before an attack by the enemy behind the height at Ku-schu-tsy, so as to be available as reserve of the detachment. The battery was standing ready under cover west of the village, behind a ridge. The attack of the Japanese 5th Division developed towards noon against the height between
battalions
;
' ITiree battalions from the 124th Infantry Regiment, and the 2Dd Battery 3lBt Artillery Brigade. (Pp. 62-63.)
94

^
;
the outpost batand Ku-schu-tsy had previously retired from Tschou-kuan-tun to that height. After the Japanese Artillery had opened fire on the heights, the Russian battery left its position, withdrawing to the country north of Ku-sehu-tsy. As it did not reopen fire, and the Japanese continued to fire upon the unoccupied height, its losses were very small.
VVu-li-tai-tsy
talion
The
issue of the fight for the height, lasting
till
dark, is described by both parties in a different way. While, according to Russian reports, the hill remained in the hands of Solomko's Detach-
upon having captured At any rate, Solomko it at 10 in the evening." evacuated the position at daybreak on October 11,
ment, the Japanese
insist
leading his battalion back behind the Schi-li-ho,
between Hun-kia-tschuan and Fan-kia-tun. During October 10 the last portions of the 9th Infantry Division's main body of the 10th Corps
moved
forward, in compliance with the Order, early

9,
with the object of occupying the former position of the advanced guard. After completing the movements, the troops were stationed in the following manner Of the 9th Infantry
on October
Division the 2nd Brigade, with the 2nd Abteilung
9th Artillery Brigade, was on the right, the 35th

Infantry Regiment having occupied
village
Kian-hu-tun and the pagoda west of the height of Hun-pau-schan, and the 36th Infantry Regiment
1
p. 84.
p.
85.
The Japanese probably captured only the southern
part
still
of the height on the evening of October 10, the northern portion remaining in the hands of the Russians.
95
Hun-pau-schan and Wan-kia-lou-tsy villages. The Abteilung Artillery had unlimbered in the gun-pits on the western and eastern slopes of the height of
Hun-pau-schan. The 1st Brigade, together with the 1st Abteilung 9th Artillery Brigade, was on the left, the 33rd Infantry Regiment standing in Nin-kuan-tun, while the 34th Infantry Regiment, with the Artillery, was pushed forward to Schuantai-tsy, to establish touch with Man's Detachment, from the 4th Siberian Ai-my Corps, which was
standing with
in
its
main body
at Tan-hai-schi.
Headquarters of the 10th Hou-huan-hua-tien.
Army
Corps remained
Corps and Man's Detachment remained in their positions north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy and at the Nan-san, which they had to fortify. The 4th Siberian Army Corps seems to have reinforced the regiments standing
The 4th
Siberian
Army
already on
the Western
San-jo-shi-san
troops.
by
dis-
patching
also
there
some more
The
1st
Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division probably advanced to Pa-kia-tsy as early as October 10.
Man's Detachment occupied Temple Hill with an advanced guard, after weak outposts had abandoned the low heights on the western bank of the Schi-li-ho on the approach of the Japanese 4th Army.^ Mishtshenko's Cossack Brigade was
moved from Ta-pu

Siberian
Siberian
to
tlie left
wing of the 4th

of the 4th
San-jo-shi-
Army Corps. The Artillery Army Corps on the Western

some passing
san had
'
fight with Japanese Artillery
east of the coal-pits."

P. 83.
'
p. 81.
96

The 6th
Siberian
10.
Army
Corps did not advance
on October
its
During the night October 9-10
commander had received the following directive from the Commander-in-Chief: " In case the enemy is advancing for decisive attack against the Western Detachment, I have left it to General v. Bilderling to apply to you Respond to such for any support he should need.
request, but not with small parties, nor,
if
possible,
by breaking up units. " But remember that

Strategic Reserve."
you
are
forming
my
Dembovski's Detachment on the right of the

corps was standing, as before, at Ta-wan-kan-pu
Sin-tai-tsy
;
the 1st
its
Army
likewise retained
Corps in the east had widely scattered position at
The Eastachmeut, contrary

to Kuropatkin's
Tun-san-ho and Liian-fan-tun. General Kuropatkin, with his Staff, went to Tun-san-ho on the left of the 10th Army Corps. General Baron Stackelberg had probably expected somc better success with the Eastern
Detachment,
^
in spite of his insufficient measures,

.
being consequently
coursc of
cvcnts.
disappointed
with the
real
remains initspo-
mountainous country without roads, represented by very imrugged

perfect
The
maps giving
the
little
information,
coupled
in
awkwardness of the Russians moving through the hills, made it not easy
with
the Eastern Detachment to carry out
its
for
task.
Without once more thoroughly reconnoitring the ground, the Commander thought it hopeless to
continue the
attack against the
Staff did
steep
heights.
Though
Stackelberg's
not think they
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
97
were facing a superior enemy, still they were convinced that even a small force could successfully face far superior forces on ground so
exceedingly favourable for defence as
it
was
here.
General Baron Stackelberg therefore decided to make use of October 10 merely for reconnoitring In this decision the General was conpurposes.
firmed by the Commander-in-Chiefs last
arriving
letter
on the 9th/ and exhorting him to be cautious in the further attack upon the main position. On the afternoon of October 9 General Baron Stackelberg issued the following Order " The Eastern Detachment will remain in its
present position to-morrow.
The
1st
Siberian
Army
Corps will occupy the point of observation north-west of Yin-tsien-pu ^ and Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy
advanced guards are to be Kau-kia-pu Sien-schan-tsy.
left
on
will
the
line
"
The
S7^d Siberian
Army
;
Kau-tai-tsy and Jo-gu

niu-nin.
remain at advanced guard at WeiCoi'ps

^
"
"
The
27id Siberian
Army
10,
Corps
will
remain in
Corps
will
general reserve at Bian-yu-pu-sa.
To-morrow, October
its
each
Army
reconnoitre in
for turning
section the enemy's position, with
the object of ascertaining the approaches and roads

it is
;
at the
same time the strength of

march from
the
"
enemy
The
to be established.
Siberian. Cossack Division will
Sien-schan-tsy to Hoe-lin, reconnoitre towards the

'
P. 9.
It
caunot be ascertained which point
is
meant.
'
The 3rd East
Siberian Rifle Division was placed again under the
orders of the 3rd Siberian
Army
Corps.
98
Kuan-lin-tsy Pen-si-hu valley, and serve as a connecting-link between the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps. All roads and paths leading into the valley named are to be followed up, so as to ascertain whether it is possible to turn the passes occupied by the enemy. Lieutenant- General von JRennenkampf s Detachment will look to the safety
of the
left left
;
flank.
He
is
requested to co-operate
on the
bank of the Tai-tsy-ho by marching on
Pen-si-hu a provisional protective force is to be pushed to San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho for guarding the lines of communication of the 3rd Siberian
Army Corps." When day

dated October
broke on October 10, the letter^ 9, 11 p.m., arrived from General
Headquarters, calling upon the
Commander
of the
Eastern Detachment,
in contradiction to the ex-
hortation just previously given, to act with vigour.
In reply Stackelberg sent a lengthy document to General Headquarters, pointing out the awkward situation of the Eastern Detachment, and at the same time complaining about the deficiency
of his
maps
" Despatch 10,053 I have received.
The enemy
line Tan-kia-
has occupied a strong position

pu-tsy
as
^
on the
Pen-si-hu facing north-north-east, holding
advanced posts the strongly entrenched positions on the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Ta-lin
Passes in front, as well as the three successive Pen-si-hu. defiles on the road Wei-niu-nin This I have ordered to be spent in day (October 10)
p. 90.
'
6^ kilometres south-west of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass.

reconnoitring the approaches
to the
I
99
and roads leading
enemy's positions
to-morrow, the 11th,
intend to attack only the advanced positions.
You
have not yet received
describing the situation of
my my
report apparently,
Force.
cannot
until I
execute the envelopment demanded of

;
me
have captured the position of Pen-si-hu if matters proceed normally and favourably this cannot be done before the 12th or 13th. On the maps in our hands the country where the attack is to be made is a blank surface, with only one road leading from east to west (from Pen-si-hu to the coal-pits), without showing any kind of features. On the other hand, the country through which we have to ]^march is in reality exceedingly mountainous, and scarcely passable for artillery. The map not showing any roads deprives me of the possibihty of apportioning to the columns the roads, the choice of which I must first settle by reconnaisThus, for instance, the road from Kausance. kia-pu by Pa-kia-tsy to Schan-liu-ho-tsy is only a narrow path, completely impassable for artillery and military wagons. " I report this, expecting further orders. Should there be maps at General Headquarters showing the country in which my troops liave to move, 1 beg you to send them liere." Nothing was changed in the orders for the 10th. At daybreak the Japanese, under cover of the fog, recaptured the positions they had lost on the 9th. Apart from the unsuccessful counter-attacks, no other attack was made on the Russian side.'
'
Pp. 77-79.
100

p.m. Kuropatkin's answer to Stackelberg's
arrived.
At 8.40
letter
*'
The Commander-in-Chief wrote you sent by Lieutenant-Colonel A. The directives given to you I have received. remain in force. The time for executing them is left to your discretion, but you must not lose another day without urgent reasons, especially not
The
report
only weak forces are opposing you." General Baron Stackelberg had already decided to attack the Japanese with the utmost vigour on October 11. "For to-morrow, the 11th," so
if
ran the order to his troops, "

the
order you to attack
enemy
in his
advanced
cost
positions, driving
it
him
take
from
there,
and,
what
might, to
possession of the passes."
The
forces
1st
and 3rd Siberian

to
Army
;
Corps were the

object
apportioned
attack
with this
Rennenkampf 's and Samsonov's Detachments were placed under the orders of General Ivanov,
commanding the 3rd
1st Siberian
Siberian
Army
Corps.
The
Army Corps was
to drive the Japanese
from the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and TaPasses, General Ivanov was to attack the lin enemy's extreme right wing at Pen-si-shu, and to threaten it by a movement on the left bank a strong detachment on the of the Tai-tsy-ho road Hoe-lin Kuan-lin-tsy had to establish touch
;
with the 1st Siberian Army Corps. With the object of particularly calling the attention of the troops to the difficult tasks of
the
"
next
day,
Stackelberg,
in
addition
to
:
his
Order,
made known the
following address
You
heroic troops of the Eastern
Group and

FIRST
of
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
101
von Rennenkampfs Detachment From to-morrow we will have to face a series

General
of fights with the Japanese.
is
Russia looking on you during these days, expecting

all
Remember,
from you the highest courage, manliness, and heroic will ever keep before our eyes that deeds. we are Russians, and that we must be victorious." October 10, in the course of events, brought Result of about a change of decisive importance. Marshal ^^^ô^!* Marquis Oyama did not wait for the further advance of the Russians, but directed his Armies, in conformity with his orders of October 9, in the evening, to go forward, with the object of The 4th and forestalling the enemy's attack. 2nd Armies pushed back the Russian outposts south of the Schi-li-ho, as well as on the western bank of the Scha-ho, arriving on the line generally
We
heights
east
;
of
the
Hua-kia-tun
1st
Yun-kuan-tun Wu-li-tai-tsy Guard and 2nd Divisions of the

to give a start to the 4th
Army, who were

on
Army
their left, maintained, for the present,
on the right bank of the Upper 1st Army, on the right, succeeded in snatching from the Russians the advantages they had gained on October 9.
their positions
Schi-li-ho.
The 12th Division of the
On the Russian side, the intended offensive, though hardly begun, was nearing its end. The Western Detachment had remained halting on the Schi-li-ho and its right tributary, and was entrenching by orders of Kuropatkin, the 10th Army Corps having thus as well the use of three defensive positions, one behind the other. The
Eastern Detachment was,
it is
true, directed to
102

but
it
attack,
also
remained
halting,
its
com-
mander considering it first necessary some special reconnaissances. Even at

it
to
make
this stage could be guessed pretty well that it would not be long before the whole Russian Army was
confined to the defensive.
October
Karopatpect the
11
After the directives he had given to the Eastern Detachment on October 10, with his peremptory
Eastern Detach-
demand
to continue the offensive. General Kuro-
mentto
^ctorv,
patkin thought he could calmly await the course

of events on his
for
left
wing.
He
hoped that within
J^^^^^
ern Deto'^reTap^
the next few days he would hear of the longed-
turethe
positions
which would probably mean the end of the campaign. General Headquarters were therefore absolutely confident.
mcssage of
victory, the effect of
south of
li-hoit^
participation in the attack of the Centre (the
.....
hadiost
ber 10.
term applicable to the General Reserve after it had moved into the front line), and of the Western Detachment, the Commander-in-Chief did not consider necessary it seemed to him sufficient if these Army Groups would proceed to attack the moment the Eastern Group had accomplished the main work. On the other hand, was not permissible to allow the Western it Detachment to be pushed back previously, as it would otherwise not be able to march at once with the Eastern Detachment on Liao-yan and
;
envelop the Japanese after Stackelberg's victory. But the initial retrograde step had already been
taken, since the 10th and 17th
Army
Corps had
103
left their advanced positions in the hands of the Japanese on the 10th. Kuropatkin therefore thought it proper to cause these Army Corps to recapture on the 11th the positions they had evacuated on the 10th he issued orders to that
;
effect to
the
Commander
of the Western Dethe

:
tachment.
On
Army
the morning of October 11

as
Western
Detachment was disposed

Corps
occupied,
follows
The 17th
Infantry
to
with the
3rd
Division, the strongly entrenched position extend-
ing on the
Schi-li-ho
Schi-h-ho
from
rr-schi-kia-tsy
village,
two
battalions
of
the
10th
Infantry Regiment, the 9th Infantry Regiment, and three batteries standing in the western section from rr-schi-kia-tsy to Nan-kuan-tsy, and three battalions of the 11th Infantry Regiment, two of the 12th, and likewise three batteries in the eastern section from Lun-wan-miau to Schi-li-ho. Three battalions and a half remained available as local
reserve south of Pei-wu-li-tai.
The 35th
brigades
as
Infantry
Division
reserve
was
of the
standing
in
general
Corps at Tschien-liu-tanWith the 10th Army Corps the advanced kou. guard, under General Riabinkin, was in the Schili-ho
Army
position
east
of
Siau-schan-tun,
the
9th
Infantry Division being in reserve at Hun-pauschan.
When, towards
9.30 a.m., the
Commander-in-
Chief's request to recapture the former positions had become known to the Western Detachment, General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, gave General Riabinkin the order to hold
104
the position Hun-kia-tschuan

to
state
Fan-kia-tun
occu-
pied by him, at the same time requesting
him
what numbers he considered
sufficient
for recapturing
the height west of Ku-schu-tsy.
General Riabinkin thought an Infantry Division, with the proper amount of Artillery, would be
necessary
;
but that an attack on the Mandarin
Road ought to be made at the same time as To have the forces ready for such an well. attack. General Baron Bilderling, commanding the
Western
Detachment,
Army
Corps, about
then ordered the 17th noon, to send one Infantry
regiment,
together with an Artillery Abteilung from the 35th Infantry Division in reserve, on
Schi-li-ho.
Meanwhile the action had been proceeding

along the front.
Oyama
all
October 11 pSthr Î^rshal Marquis Oyama had issued an Order to Russians the Armics, expressing the intention of pushing The 1st Army'' was thereeast. The the enemy north-east.^ ^^^^ ^^ advance from its position in a northerly isf Army
continuing
the
attack
initiates
For
on
direction
.
to
the
line
Ba-ii-san
to
Yen-tschienits
the attack in a
di'rectiolf
tschai
the 4th
Army
regulate
advance
Armies on the wings, to push the enemy from the height east of Wu-li^" Conformity with the
According to Japanese sources of Captain Sanders (retired). The making a wheel with the 2nd Army was only apparent (P. 75.) in the General Order issued at 10 in the evening of October 9. * The Order, the wording of which is not known, does not contain anything about the task of the 12th Division, which was covering the right flank on the extreme right of the 1st Army.
'
intention of
'
*
10 kilometres west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.
8 kilometres west of the Ba-ji-san,
FIRST
tai-tsy^
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

;
105
and then carry out a right wheel in the direction on Tan-hai-schi ^ and the 2nd Army to push back the enemy opposing Lin-schin-pu it, and then advance on Scha-ho-pu
before daybreak,
in support of the attack of the 4th
Army.
Based on these directives of General HeadBaron Kuroki issued in Ta-yaupu the following Order for the 1st Army on the evening of October 10 " 1. The enemy facing the Army is entrenched on the line Height north of Man-hua-pu Sankia-tsy outposts are standing on the heights south of Schan-liu-ho-tsy and north of Shimo-roquarters, General
: :
kun-ko.^
of the Fourth Army is going to attack the enemy to-morrow, October 11, in touch with the left of the First Army. " 2. The First Army will at daybreak on the 11th, with its main bodies, advance to attack the line Heights north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy heights
"
The
right Division
north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.
The 12th Division will hold its position, but, can possibly be done, will support the attack of the main body of the army by an offensive
3. if it
"
stroke of
some portions
in the direction
of the
height
"
'
enemy from 238 before daybreak, attacking then the heights north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy.
the
'
'
Tschau-hsien-lin Pass. " 4. The Guards will push
5.
The 2nd Division
will capture the height

11.
The height
east of Wu-li-tai-tsy was, as a matter of fact, in the

(P. 85.)
hands of the Japanese already at daybreak of October * 9 kilometres east of Wu-li-tai-tsy. * North and south of the Watauabe-yama.
106
north-west of Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko, advancing then to

attack the heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.
"
6.
TJie
General Reserve
will
be
south
of
Hui-yau
"7.
at 4 a.m.
/ shall be on the Ma-tsi-schan^ at 8 a.m." The 5th Kobi Brigade, under General Aibara, after landing at An-tung ^ on October 10, was placed under command of the 1st Army, receiving orders to move on Si-ho-yan by forced
marches.^
TheRusg^^jj^j)^^*"
At
daybreak on the 11th Stackelberg initiated
the Eastern Detachment's attack by a powerful

ffuns of the 1st and Corps poured their fire into the The troops Positions of General Baron Ino-uye. then deployed for attack. The 1st Siberian Army Corps, on the right of which was the Cavalry of the Army Corps under Lieutenant-Colonel Grekov, attacked the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Ta-lin Passes, the 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampfs Detachment, reinforced by five battalions of that corps, at the same time pushing on the left of the 1st Siberian Army Corps ^ to the heights north and east of Pen-si-hu. Between both these attacking groups there was a wide gap. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, together with the 2nd East Siberian Field Mortar Battery, attached from the
tachment fire
attacks the right
of artillery
. .
more than 100
3rd Siberian
Army
the Japauese.
'
At the coal-pits. At the mouth of the
Ya-lu.
*
*
15 kilometres south-south-east of Pen-si-hu. The 1st Siberian Army Corps was fighting with the 9th East Siberian
Division on
its
Rifle
right
but the units seem to have got mixed
afterwards.

3rd Siberian
107
Army
Corps, as well as the 1st Bri-
gade 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, from the 1st Siberian Army Corps, were retained in reserve
at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy.
generally.
turned out to be very difficult In the morning the air was cool and bright, the heat, however, increasing during the forenoon, until it was oppressively hot about noon. The troops being all in full marching order, the movements over the mountainous country were extremely trying and fatiguing. Noon was approaching without the attack making any progress. The Japanese Infantry, hidden in their deep trenches at wide intervals, presented but a bad while the Japanese target to the Russian fire themselves were able to make good practice from Nor did the Russian their commanding heights.
attack
;
The
Artillery
much
assert itself in spite of its
enormous
superiority, because
coming
into action in suitable
positions
on the
on the one hand, and, became engaged mostly singly, never unitedly and were, therefore, unable to establish superiority of fire anywhere. The Japanese batteries often evaded the Artillery
difficult
was very
other, because the batteries

;
duel, with the object of using their full strength
against the enemy's Infantry.

teries of
It
was
difficult for
the Russian Artillery to locate the hidden bat-
the Japanese. The Russians, moreover, diminished their effect by needlessly keeping at too great a distance from their enemy, mostly
4,000 metres
;
at these long
ranges the battery
commanders allowed themselves to be misled to fire on sham batteries, with which the Japanese
108

them by exploding powerful
122
detonators.
deceived
Of
the
guns^
apportioned
to
the
attack,
numbers were not engaged at all, it is said, owing to the difficulties of ground; yet the great numbers actually engaged in the action ought to have produced some effect, if properly
large
employed. Climbing and clambering up from one hill to the other, the Russian Infantry was working its way forward sometimes the men had to crawl
;
on
all
fours to avoid slipping
and
falling
on the
for
poHshed
surface
of
the rocky
soil.
Whenever
a
the skirmishers had gained
some gi'ound
short distance, they lay again for hours engaged

in fire-action on the rocky ground, which was kept at red heat by the rays of the sun. General Baron Ino-uye's troops awaited the
attack in their positions on the rocks.
For the
time being
it
was impossible
for the
General to
think of any counter-attack, which Kuroki, by his

Order, expected
him
to
if
make
task as accomplished
he looked upon his he succeeded in merely

;
holding at bay the superior forces of the enemy.
The whole
position from the valley of the Tai-
tsy-ho at Pen-si-hu to the Tschien-kou-lin Pass
had now been occupied,

in others weakly, just as
it.
in
some places strongly, the ground necessitated

;
Units could not be kept intact defensive groups were apportioned to the various sections of ground, battalion commanders being given
'
1st Siberian
3rd
Army Corps
62 guns 60
122 guns.
(less
H.A. mountain
battery).
(less mortars).
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
109
charge of them. The reserves still available were placed so as to rapidly reach any point
threatened.^
While the troops of the
1st
and 3rd Siberian
Army
Corps were attacking frontally the passes
Rennenkampf had charged General Liubavin wath making once more an enveloping movement from the southern
south of Bian-yu-pu-sa, General von
bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. No Infantry having been attached to the General in this case either,^ it could be foreseen that the result would be just as indifferent as on October 9. General Shimamura, commanding the 12th Brigade and in the section east of Pen-si-hu, had already made provision to meet this expected attempt of the Russians to battalion was formed of odd turn the position. companies,^ and pushed to the southern bank of When the Cossack Brigade came on, the river. the battalion occupied the heights south of Riuwo-bio, preventing the enemy by their fire from pushing beyond To-ka-ho-shi. Liubavin, finding the road to the northern bank barred, gave up the enveloping movement, and retired in an easterly direction. General Samsonov's attitude may have contributed to this resolve he had been charged with guarding Liubavin's left fiank and had like-
'
More
Tlie
details about the occupation of the
Japanese positions are not
known.
detachment of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps (2 battalions, 1 sotnia, and 3 detachments of mounted Scouts) under Colonel Drushinin, which had been pushed to tlie heights of Ja-unssun, on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, was withdrawn to the north bank of the river during the night (X-tober 10-11. * Two companies 39th Kobi Regiment, 2 companies 4th Kobi Regiment, and 1 company 14th Infantry Regiment.
*
2 guns,
110
wise fallen back east, feeling himself threatened
from Si-ho-yan probably/ The Japanese composite

directed
to
battalion
co-operate
arrival
with
in
the
had been 2nd Cavalry
Brigade,
whose
the country south of
Pen-si-hu was expected on that day.
But Prince
Kan-in, who, after an exceedingly fatiguing march,
reached Si-ho-yan on the 11th, did not turn up

yet.
The Japanese
battalion, after having repulsed
the Russians on the south bank, returned to the
bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, and was then being distributed along the whole front. When noon had passed without the Japanese on the right wing having abandoned a single point of their position, Stackelberg by a verbal
right
order urged
the
'*
attack to be carried forward
The 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampfs Detachment then engaged all their
now."
forces,
the
reserves
following
each
other
like
waves, carrying the firing-lines with them. Six times the assault was repeated, but not in a single instance did they succeed in breaking into
the enemy's main position.
assailants at
It
is
true, the gallant

far
some points pushed

;
enough
for-
ward
to oblige their Artillery to cease firing, for
fear of hitting their own Infantry some Japanese advanced trenches were also temporarily captured by General von Rennenkampfs troops, but the
strength failed
them
for
the final decisive blow.
Completely exhausted from the fatigues of the unaccustomed tactics, tormented moreover by thirst
lu Si-ho-yau were only Lines of Communication Troops on the
morning of October
11.
FIRST
ahiiost
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

the Russians broke
in the
111
in the excessive heat,
down
an-
when
enemy's trenches, exposed to
the cross-fire of the enemy, unable to
make
They crowded together in other step forward. dead ground and holes not seen into, waiting for Till night the 3rd Siberian Army Corps dusk. and Rennenkampfs Detachment had lost about 5,000 men, surely an eloquent testimony of the heroic self-sacrifice and devotion of these troops. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps had remained standing inactive all day at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy the General Commanding had been unable to make up his
;
mind to stake it.^ The Japanese, too, paid

sacrifice.
for that
in,
When
darkness set
one-third
day with heavy ending the fight

brave troops
for
the moment,
of the
was dead or wounded. Major Honda's composite battalion, which had to face the most serious attacks east of Pen-si-hu, had suffered most of all. General Baron Ino-uye reported to Headquarters of the 1st
"
Army
in the
evening
The enemy
east of Pen-si-hu has increased in
strength to about one division and a half.

riglit
The
being attacked in very great strength.
and centre of Shimamura's Detachment are General Shimamura was obliged to engage all his forces,
20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was started at 6 p.m. wing of the 1st Siberian Army Corps this regiment was to guard against envelopment a battalion of the .3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment which the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division bad engaged on the extreme right of the Eastern Detachment in support of the attack of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division. The General Commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps probably disposed of the let
'
Only
tlie
for the riglit
Brigade 1st East Siberian Rifle Division.
112

is
and
has
"
fighting a desperate action.

thither
The
its
division
last
re-
sent
battaHon
from
serve.
Enemy
in direction of Ta-lin
and Tu-menaction pro-
tsy-lin superior in
numbers.
obliged to
Severe
ceeding there.
"
The
division
is
move up
a battalion
from Kigoshi's Detachment."^ General Baron Kuroki, seeing from the great danger still threatening his
orders
to
this report
right, sent
General
Kigoshi
to
leave
only
one
once
battalion of the 4Cth Infantry
Regiment south of
rest at
Yin-tsien-pu, and to
to the 12th Division.
march with the
Kigoshi, thereupon,
moved
to the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, pushing from there

his troops into the left of Ino-uye's force.
The JapaGuards
General Asada, commanding the Guard Division, decided to capture before daybreak the Wai-to-san,
s'dir^
vision ad-
on which the enemy had not yet shown himself

he did this to enable him to carry ^^^ ^^^ attack on the heights north of Schan-liuin Strength
;
against
*J^ Russian
.
Centre
berian
the direction required. He therefore ^ issucd the following Order " "^^^^ right column^ under Major-General Izaki
ho-tsy
'
.
in
^rmy
Corps and
(5
p
battahons of the 1st Brigade

,
,
Maus
ment), gaining a
ing on
of cavalry), will
and half a troop be ready in the valley south of

^
^^^ Wai-to-san at 5 a.m., and attack that height

at daybreak.
"
The
left coluvin, under
Major-General Watanabe
battalions of the soifhând (5

west of Schanliu-hotsy.
'
2nd Brigade' and half a troop

left
The detachment under General Kigoshi,

(P. 71.)
behind by the 12th
Division south of Yin-tsien-pu.

i
One
battalion remaining as Divisional Reserve.

daybreak, ready to attack height
"
'
113
of cavalry), will stand at Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko before

238.'
Of
the Artillery^ the batteries on the heights
north of Tan-kia-pu-tsy and north of Tschan-hei-
tun
will
remain in their positions, supporting,
if
necessary, the infantry attack.
The
four batteries
standing at Huan-kia-pu-tsy will be prepared to advance.
The Engineers will remain with the lastnamed batteries to aid and improve roads, in case the artillery is moved forward. " The Guard Cavalry Regiment will advance on
the right of the right column, covering the right
flank of the division. " One battalion each of the 1st
"
and 2nd Brigades remain at Tan-kia-pu-tsy and Huan-kia-pu-tsy, at the disposal of the General Commanding the
will
Division."
The
1st
Brigade
a.m.,
;
started
between 2 and 3
of the Wai-to-san
from its bivouacs advancing in the direction
the 1st Guard Regiment was marching on the right, and the 2nd Guard Regiment on the left. It was soon seen that the Wai-to-san was occupied by the Russians with but very weak outposts, which at once withdrew in a northerly and north-easterly direction on the approach of the Japanese. The height was occupied by the brigade at 6.30 a.m. the brigade halting there for the present. At the same hour
the
Guard Cavalry Regiment

covering
arrived
at
Hi-ro-
ki-rei,
the right flank of
the
Guards
after establishing
touch with the
left
of the 12th
Division at the Tschien-kou-lin Pass.

114
General Watanabe, commanding the 2nd Brigade Guard Division, received the Divisional Order at 1.30 a.m. On this, the 4th Guard Regiment, of which the 1st Battalion was apportioned as
of the
the Divisional Commander's reserve, was

to a road east of Ni-do-ko, and the 3rd
moved Guard
be
Regiment
brigade,
to that village, both regiments to
ready there at 3 a.m.

retained
disposal.
The commander of the who was with the 3rd Guard Regiment, two companies of that regiment at his
of the 2nd Brigade had
true,
it
The men
loaded,
it is
their
rifles
but they had been ordered not
to fire before
grew
all,
light,
and to
close
on the
enemy with
recommended
the bayonet.
to
should ensue after
in the dark, the
In case a fire-action men were
fire
than the Japanese. from their position of assembly across country the 4th Guard Regiment to the right of and past Shimo-ro-kun-ko in the direction of height " 238 " and the 3rd Guard Regiment past the left of the village named, against a low knoll west of the
;
on those who were taller Both regiments advanced
The regiments suited their formations to the ground. The 3rd Guard Regiment covered its front by a battalion moving on a broad front and
height.
forming a chain of patrols, followed at 50 metres' distance by three companies in line, the fourth company in the same formation keeping in third The other two line at about 150 metres' distance. battalions were marching in column of route partly in fours, partly in groups behind the The battalion in front, at 200 metres' distance.

manner.
115
4th Guard Regiment was advancing in a similar
The
night was very dark.

difficult,
the roads proving rather

to be made.
Marching off frequent halts had
Towards 5 a.m. the advanced

line
of both regiments were
patrols " 238 " ; approaching height
when the skirmishing
of
the
4th
Guard
Regiment was mounting the slopes, it suddenly came upon Russian sentries, who at once gave fire. Without replying to it, the Japanese patrols fell back on their companies. The regiment continued
its
advance
the Russians,
who were
out-
posts of a brigade pushed to
Pa-kia-tsy by the
north.
4th Siberian
into
Army
Corps,^ after a few shots retired

little
a position a
more
When
the
foremost battalion of the 4th Guard Regiment had approached that position to within about 300
metres
it
began to dawn.
opened
fire.
The
individual
The Russians then Russian marksmen
being clearly visible against the brightening skyline, thus presenting a good target, the Japanese
began to
fire
too
at
the same time, the front
of the leading battalion was prolonged to the right
by two companies. It was soon seen that the Russians had only a weak garrison there the Japanese therefore advanced to within closest distance of the position. Meanwhile the leading battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment, after advancing over the low knoll west of height " 238," had deployed against the right wing of the enemy.
;
The Russians, threatened in front and flank, did not wait for the assault, but withdrew to the
'
p. 95.
116

the
northern portion of
VVatanabe-yama.^
in
Six
wounded Russians were found
the advanced
trenches, which had been occupied by one company, and one Russian was made prisoner the main position, somewhat farther north, had been defended by one battalion. The 3rd Guard Regiment now occupied the Ohara-yama, and the 4th Guard Regiment on the right the slopes east of it on both sides of the road from Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko to Pa-kia-tsy. The Divisional Commander had meanwhile been holding back the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Guard
;
own use. The regiments at once entrenched. By this time it was broad dayThe commander of the Russian brigade light.
Regiment
for
his
engaged a fresh battalion, which had been standing on the road to Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, against the 2nd
Guard Brigade, ordering also

action east of Pa-kia-tsy.
a battery to
come into
This battalion deployed,
advanced to within 200 metres of the fire-trenches of the 4th Guard Regiment, and opened a brisk
fire.
Lieutenant-Colonel
still
Ida,
commanding the
regiment, on this account reinforced his front by
one of the companies

garrison
available.
The Russian
farther
of
the
X^'âtanabe-yama
fire
north
maintaining also a hot

losses
on the 4th
Guard
Its Regiment, it had a rather hard struggle. were increasing at noon the last company It was afternoon, after the had to be engaged. Japanese Artillery had done some good practice,
;
' This height was afterwards named Watanabe-yama, after the Japanese General of that name^ who had captured it. 'ITie Oharayama is named after Colonel Ohara, commanding the 3rd Guard Regiment.

was improving.
117
before the situation of the hard-pressed regiment
When
the Divisional
Commander
received the
report of the capture of the Wai-to-san and Oharayama, he ordered the four batteries standing at Huan-kia-pu-tsy to advance. The order found the batteries already on the march, the Artillery commander having been watching the action, and having started the batteries on his own initiative without waiting for orders.
The 4th Battery therefore arrived

after
already, shortly
Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, coming into position east of that village, and opening fire on
9
a.m.,
at
the Watanabe-yama.
In the afternoon the Russian detachments lying immediately opposite the 4th Guard Regiment
withdrew to a distance of about 500 metres, but resumed their fire-action there. The losses of the two battalions of the 4th Guard Regiment fighting here amounted to 180 dead and wounded, of whom 50 by Artillery fire. The 3rd Guard Regiment, too, had been unable to advance beyond the Ohara-yama. The Russians were lying quite close opposite the regiment, up to within 100 metres. Towards 8 a.m. they
strengthened this
portion
of their fighting-line
some
batteries at the
north of
their fire
Division,
same time came into action Western San-jo-shi-san, directing chiefly on the right wing of the 2nd but at times also upon the 3rd Guard
the
Regiment. Three sotnias as well, probably from General Mishtshenko's Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, rode up in a long extended line, in the
118
Western San-jo-shi-san, against the left wing of the 3rd Guard Regiment. One company was deployed against the Cavalry, driving it back rapidly by fire. Towards 9.30 a.m. the Russians were again considerably reinforced on the Watanabe-yama, whilst Mishtshenko at the same time was trying once more to make his arm felt by moving forward strong Cavalry from the neighbourhood of Schanliu-ho-tsy against the left wing of the 3rd Guard Regiment. But this attack also failed, with convalley east of the
siderable loss.
At
their
11 a.m. the 1st and

at
5th Batteries of the

directing
Japanese arrived
Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko,
fire, upon the Watanabe-yama.^ But the Russian Infantry found good cover on the steep slopes, and was, moreover, entrenched the effect of the Artillery was therefore
jointly with the 4th Battery,
too small for allowing the 3rd

to advance.
Guard Regiment
Towards
efforts for
1 p.m. the Russians made more vigorous pushing back the 2nd Guard Brigade,
General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Corps, ordered fresh Infantry to advance from Schan-liu-ho-tsy against the 3rd Guard Regiment, and the batteries north of the Western
Army
and east of Pa-kia-tsy to direct, same time, an enveloping fire upon the Japanese lines the Russian Infantry on the \\âtanabe-yama began to fire more vigorously too. But the 3rd Guard Regiment, having reinforced
San-jo-shi-san
at the
;
'
It
cannot be ascertained what became of the fourth of the batteries
that had been ordered up from Huu-kia-pu-tsy.

its firing-line,
119
was able to stay the advânce of the
Russians
nevertheless the situation of the regi-
ment continued to be very difficult. Meanwhile, on the right of the Japanese Guard
Division, affairs
had developed
in
the following
way. After the 1st Brigade had occupied the Wai-tosan at daybreak, patrols ascertained the enemy to be standing with about two companies at JNIen^
ka-ko.
The commander
of
the
brigade then
pushed a party to the right, to cover his right flank he deployed the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment against height " 135 " on
;
the northern slope of the Wai-to-san, which the
Russians had occupied but weakly. The battahon succeeded in pushing back the enemy and occupying the height at 7.30 a.m. after a brief fire-action.
Shortly after 10 a.m. a long column, estimated
was ascertained from the Wai-to-san to be marching from Pa-kia-tsy on Man-hua-pu it was evidently the 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division from the 4th Siberian Army Corps under General Shileiko, which had been pushed to Pa-kia-tsy already on October 10.'
at five battalions of Infantry,
;
One
battalion of that force deployed against height
" 135," held
by the 2nd Battalion of the
1st
Guard
Regiment, and opened fire at perhaps 700 metres' range about two companies continued marching on JNIen-ka-ko, and, with the two companies already there, advanced against the right flank of the 1st Brigade the rest seemed to remain halting at
;
;
'
Probably from the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

P. 9.
120

Simultaneously with the Infantry,
fire
Man-hua-pu.
a battery of eight guns appeared east of Man-huapu, taking under
the Japanese Infantry lying
on the Wai-to-san. The situation of the brigade would doubtless have become very serious had the Russians engaged all their forces available in a decisive assault on the right of the Guard though the strength of the column Division marching from Pa-kia-tsy on Man-hua-pu may have been overestimated, there is no doubt it was
;
several
battalions
strong.
But
its
commander,
according to Russian custom, being unable to
make
up
his
mind
to stake his whol-e force, and supporting
the troops engaged in fighting merely by driblets, the Japanese succeeded in maintaining themselves
after their firing-line
the reserves available.
had been reinforced by all The Infantry was sup-
ported by Major Hidikata's Battery,^ which, shortly

before 2 p.m., unlimbered north of Ka-mi-ro-kun-
good effect upon the battery at Towards 3 p.m. the 1st Brigade received further welcome aid by the intervention of a battalion from the 46th Infantry Regiment, which had probably been standing as Kigoshi's
ko, firing with
Man-hua-pu.
with this battalion the right wing of the brigade advanced as well, driving the Russians back at Men-ka-ko at 4.30 p.m. the heights east of that place were occupied by the Japanese.
reserve
^
at
Ria-ka-ho-shi.
Jointly
When,
^
shortly after
p.m., the Divisional

straits in
Ya-lu.
Comwhich
mander was informed of the great
Composed of Russian guns captured on the

P. 112.

his
121
2nd Brigade was, he handed back to the 3rd Guard Regiment the 2nd Battahon he had retained as his reserve after the Ohara-yama had been occupied. About this time General Asada had gained the impression that the right wing of his division was not in very great danger, and would be able to hold on in spite of the Russian attempt to envelop it by Men-ka-ko but the 2nd Brigade, forming his left wing, on the other hand, seemed
;
to be threatened seriously, because the 3rd
Guard
ground and, moreover, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, fighting on the left of that regiment, had as yet been
to gain
;
Regiment was unable
unable to capture the strongly occupied height of the Western San-jo-shi-san. To safeguard the
left
of the
first
Guard Division
sure
it
make
of that
hill.
seemed urgent to The 2nd Guard

" to
Brigade was therefore
ordered
jointly
attack the
Western
General
San-jo-shi-san
with
the
3rd
Brigade, with as
many
troops as were available."
Asada, in addition, ordered the comArtillery to unlimber an Artillery Abteilung south-west of the Ohara-yama, near the road from Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko to Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko, in support of the attack.
mander of the
But, owing to a report wrongly delivered, the attack of the 2nd Guard Brigade did not come off
manner intended. The 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment having arrived south-west of the Ohara-yama, the commander of the brigade attached it to the 4th Guard Regiment, ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Ida, commanding the regiment, to advance with
in the
"
122

own
1st Battalion,
that battalion and his
which
during the night attack had remained as Divisional Reserve at Huan-kia-pu-tsy, to attack the Western
San-jo-shi-san in co-operation with the 3rd Brigade.
While General Watanabe was
issuing this order,
a warrant officer (holding an honorary commission) of the 3rd Brigade 2nd Division turned up,
reporting that his brigade was facing a strongly
superior enemy,
and was withdra^\'ing

it
into
its
original position north of Tschan-hei-tun.
Under
was no longer a question of attacking the Western San-jo-shi-san, but for

these
circumstances
General Watanabe rather a question of directly protecting his seriously endangered left wing. He therefore ordered the 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment to occupy the knoll north-west of Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko, the Di\dsional Commander at
the
same
time
this
dispatching
immediately
to
after
receiving
report
an
adjutant
the
3rd
Brigade, to inform himself

state of affairs there.
more exactly about the

the adjutant returned,
officer
When
at
4.20
p.m.,
it
proved the warrant
had
delivered the report he had to transmit wrongly.
should have been actually: "The unable to capture the Western Sanjo-shi-san alone in the face of the strength of the opposing enemy it will therefore remain for the
Its
wording
is
brigade
present in
its
position
on the heights south of
Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko.
The misunderstanding having been cleared up, General atanabe, at 4.30 p.m., ordered LieutenantColonel Ida to proceed now with the attack in support of the 3rd Brigade. As the 1st Battalion

4th
123
Guard Regiment, coming up from
Huan-
did not arrive before dark, the 2nd BattaHon 3rd Guard Regiment alone was available That battalion deployed in the direcat once. tion of the Western San-jo-shi-san, engaging the Russians occupying the north-eastern slopes of that hill but it did not succeed in making material progress, the Russian Infantry, entrenched and supported by the batteries in the v'alley west of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, taking the assailants under an
kia-pu-tsy,
;
effective
fire.
Even when
was
the 1st Battalion 4th
Guard
Regiment
being
engaged
towards
evening, the attack did not
make
progress beyond
Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko. The Divisional Commander finally ordered General Watanabe to withdraw his troops from Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko to the heights north-west of
Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko.
The Japanese 2nd

the
Division, on the
left,
received
Army Order for October 11 about midnight. General Baron Nishijima then ordered the 3rd Brigade to attack the Western San-jo-shi-san at
daybreak, and the 1.5th Brigade to be standing at

the same time ready on the line Pan-la-schan-tsy
Schuan-lun-sz,
Hill
so
as
to
turn
against
Temple
and the Russian position on the heights north of San-kia-tsy in co-operation with the advance of
the 4th
Army.
night
brought forward to the north-west corner of Tsien-tau, and the three batteries standing hitherto on the left were brought forward into positions south and
south-east of Pan-la-schan-tsy.
During the
one battery
was
The
Artillery regi-
ment had
orders to support the attack.
124
General JMatsunaga, commanding the 3rd Brigade, at Ka-mi-chin-ka-ko at 5 a.m. with the four battahons he had still available, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 29th Infantry Regiment having been taken away from him to form the
was standing ready
Commander. He ordered the 4th Infantry Regiment to advance against the The 3rd heights of the Western San-jo-shi-san. Battalion 29th Infantry Regiment remained behind
reserve of the Divisional
in reserve.
The Western
south of
it
and the heights and perfectly bare. The are steep

San-jo-shi-san
hills,
valley in front of the Japanese, stretching south
and being 500 to 600 metres broad, could be completely seen into from the Russian positions, the gaoljan having been everyDitches traversing the fields, where harvested. and numerous nullahs on the slopes, were the only means affording some cover to the attacking
of the block of
Infantry.
The Colonel Commanding the 4th Infantry Regiment deployed the 2nd Battalion in the direction
of Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko and of the Western
shi-san,
San-joagainst
and the
1st Battalion
on the
left
the height south-east of Pan-la-schan-tsy, jutting out south-west, and occupied by the Russians as
early as October 10.
During the advance of the regiment, and while was approaching the bottom of the valley, it was seen that the Russian lines on the Western
it
being gradually reinforced the main hill-top was ascertained to be very the occupants of the height strongly occupied
San-jo-shi-san
;
were

south-west of the
hill
125
were estimated at about There was further reported an two battalions. advance of strong Russian Infantry about a brigade from Sia-liu-ho-tsy towards the Western San-jo-shi-san. These were troops of the 4th Siberian Ariny Corps, evidently bent on offering here a determined resistance.^ Under these conditions General Matsunaga decided to confine himself to an attack on the height south-west of
the
After giving the Colonel of the 4th Infantry Regiment the necessary instructions, the
hill.
latter
brought
his 3rd
Battahon on the
left
wing
into action too.
Meanwhile the Japanese batteries had opened fire, directing it partly on the Russian Infantry on the Western San-jo-shi-san, and partly on the
height south-west of
it.
The Russian
same
say,
is
Artillery
had come into action
in the
position as
on
on the northwestern slope of the hill, on the Japanese Artillery and on the 15th Brigade, which was
the previous day, that
to
firing
advancing
action.
farther
in
the
west.
The Japanese
in decisive
batteries did not
engage with the Russian

fire
They followed
was
generally the tactics fre-
quently used by them, to

Artillery
only
firing slowly or
not at
when the Russian all but when

;
the Russians directed a rapid

batteries
fire on the Japanese they at once became silent, the gundetachments withdrawing under cover. The 3rd Battalion 4th Infantry Regiment having prolonged the left of the firing-line, about
'
Nothing
is
known about
Corps.
the
employment
iu
detail of the 4th
Siberian
Army
126

The
attack across the
10.45 a.m., the whole Hne began to advance against
the San-jo-shi-san in rushes.
valley against the slopes occupied by the Russians took a pretty long time more than two hours elapsed before the Japanese had worked up close
;
enough to deliver the

of the field
In the last portions of attack the nullahs on the slopes

assault.
afforded the skirmishers in part good cover, enabling
them on their left to approach the enemy to within 30 paces. When the Russians found themselves face to face with their assailants at such close quarters, they rose from their trenches, rushing out to meet the Japanese, who were charging them with the bayonet. After a violent struggle, lasting a few minutes, the Russians were pushed back in a north-easterly direction, pursued with a hot fire by the victor. The pursued crowded together in a deep ravine in the west, at the foot of the
Western San-jo-shi-san afterwards more than 200 dead from the 8th Siberian Infantry Regiment were found in there. The advance of the Japanese 4th Infantry
;
Regiment came
to a standstill after this success.
General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps, was determined to hold the northern
portion of the Western San-jo-shi-san at
all cost.
He
occupied that height very strongly, ordering,

all
in addition, several counter-attacks for recapturing
the lost advanced positions

Artillery
of which, how-
ever, failed, in face of the Japanese Infantry

fire.
and
Such was the situation when in the afternoon General Matsunaga made another vain attempt
127
of advancing against the northern portion of the
Western San-jo-shi-san, aided by portions of the Guard Division.^ Further attacks had to be postponed till night. The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division, in accordance ^\ath Orders, was standing at daybreak of October 11 on the line Pan-la-schan-tsy Shuan-
lun-sz ready to advance, the 16th Infantry Regi-
ment being on the
Two
and the 30th on the left. companies of each regiment were stationed
right,
south-west of Schuan-lun-sz as reserve of the
On the left the brigade was in touch with the right Division of the 4th Army. The advanced guard of Man's Detachment on the
brigade.
Russian side had occupied Temple Hill." The Russian position extended from the country north of San-kia-tsy in the direction of Siau-pu in the centre the line occupied formed a salient projecting from Temple Hill south. ^ The position was not well chosen. The salient angle was exposed to the danger of being enveloped on both sides by an assailant. The country north of
;
Pan-la-schan-tsy to the line San-kia-tsy

Hill
Temple
being perfectly open, the Russian position might have been chosen much better perhaps
from the southern extremity of Temple Hill to East San-kia-tsy along the bed of the brook south of Temple Hill. In front of this ready-made trench was a clear field of fire of more than 1,500 metres' extent the villages of West and East San-kia;
'
P. 124.
p. 05.
Temple
Hill
is
a knoll wooded on
its
western slope, and contain-
ing a large temple, several buildings enclosed by walls.
(Appendix
XVIII.)
128

of massive buildings suiTOunded by
tsy, consisting
stone and clay walls, would, moreover, have served

as excellent pivots.
The
position selected
by the
Russians was occupied by five or six companies
weaker parties had been pushed to San-kia-tsy and

Ko-ka-tsy.
As
time
as
the Orders ran, the 15th

its
Brigade was to
attack with that of the 4th Army.^

left
But
the 10th Division on the

all
did not attack
at
in
the morning,
the
15th
Brigade was
lying idle too
in its position
of readiness until
Russian batteries standing northwest of the Western San-jo-shi-san, further, one battery north of East San-kia-tsy, and one on the
the afternoon.
San-kai-seki-san, sometimes directed their fire
upon
the troops resting, who, however, covered by the

country, did not suffer any loss
talion of the 16th Infantry
;
only the 1st Bat-
Regiment, finding no proper cover, lost 10 men dead or wounded by Artillery fire. The Russian battery north of East San-kia-tsy was fired upon by two batteries standing at Pan-la-schan-tsy, and by some batteries of the 4th Army it therefore changed its position frequently, but continued firing until evening. Towards 3 p.m. the 15th Brigade was ordered not to wait any longer for the advance of the 4th Army, but to attack Temple Hill now. General Okasaki, commanding the brigade, thereupon deployed his troops for attack The 16th Infantry Regiment was to advance on West Sankia-tsy, and the 30th Infantry Regiment to try gaining as rapidly as possible Ko-ka-tsy, and then
; : '
p.
123.

to capture
129
Temple
;
Hill.
aligned in line
the
The regiments deployed skirmishers moved at first
with intervals of two to three paces, but drawing

closer together as the attack proceeded.
At
first
the whole line
moved
at a walk, but shortly after-
wards began to run, because the Russians opened the moment the advance commenced. The Japanese skirmishing-line opened fire, after arriving within about 900 metres of the Russian detachments at San-kia-tsy and Ko-ka-tsy thence the advance over the perfectly level plain began in rushes, mostly carried out by companies. Though the gaoljan cut was still lying on the fields, their small bundles did not afford any
fire
;
cover to the troops.
The
supports,
as
well as
;
the companies in reserve, advanced by rushes
in
doing so they adopted generally a single-line formation with loose touch. Nowhere on the field of
attack were column formations seen which would have offered favourable targets to the Russian
Artillery
on the
flanks.
The
four companies of
lun-sz
the brigade reserve also advanced from Schuanby rushes in single line, following each
left at about 75 metres' distance. From Ko-ka-tsy a portion of the 30th Infantry Regiment's right wing made very clever use of the deeply cut bed of the brook south of Temple Hill for pushing the attack farther.
other echeloned to the right and
The Russian
a severe
fire,
Artillery took the assailants under
but without obtaining any material effect. Only the 10th and 11th Companies of the 30th Infantry Regiment, which had remained in
9
130

were, about 4 p.m., struck by two per-
reserve,
cussion-shells, killing or
wounding some 50 men.
The
attack proceeded without material delay.
approaching the villages the advanced detachments withdrew at 4.45 p.m. Ko-ka-tsy village was left behind by the 30th Infantry Regiment. The fire-fight became now most violent. It was necessary to engage one company of the brigade reserve, which had followed behind the left wing, against the Russian Infantry on the San-kai-seki-san, to ward off
On
the Japanese
Russian
flanking
fire.
Shortly after
p.m.
the
firing-line
assaulted
Temple Hill, capturing its foremost trenches. The Russians hurried back to the northern
edge of the hill, offering renewed resistance behind the rocks there. The Japanese pushed on. Another violent fire-action developed at close range on Temple Hill, producing no longer any
decisive result.
The
riglit
of the 16th Infantry
Regiment, having somewhat lagged behind during the main attack, probably on the report of Russian Infantry advancing from the east on East Sankia-tsy, the advance of the brigade now came to a standstill. The Japanese, as was their custom, at once began to entrench after their successful assault the newly captured position, beginning west of East San-kia-tsy, stretched to the western slopes of Temple Hill, projecting on the hill itself in a salient bent north. The villages East and West San-kia-tsy, as well as Ko-ka-tsy, remained occupied. During the e\'ening, troops of General Mau's
;

Detachment and portions
of
131
the 4th Siberian The
Army
out
Corps made several counter-attacks, with- centreT in pushina; the Japanese from ^'iQiy ttempts to F Temple Hill. Appreciatmg the situation correctly, drive the General Okasaki, commanding the Japanese 15th 2nd^D!-^ Brigade, had previously asked support from the ^^^'?" Divisional Commander, so as to have fresh troops from at hand to oppose any likely counter-attacks. hIu.^^* General Baron Nishijima then placed at the disposal of the brigade six companies of the 29th Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 3rd Brigade. Two counter-attacks, made by General Mau against Temple Hill from a north-easterly and north-westerly direction in the evening failed, owing to the well-directed fire from the Japanese But the repulse of an attack from the trenches. east was more difficult. General Sarubaiev had detailed a regiment from the 4th Siberian Army Corps to attack the right flank of the 15th Brigade from Sia-liu-ho-tsy. In dense columns, and with bands playing, the Russians advanced on East San-kia-tsy, but then stopped short north-east of the village, looking calmly on how the six companies of the Japanese 29th Regiment proceeded to occupy that village, quietly adopting measures for meeting the expected counter-attack. Three more companies of the IGth Infantry Regiment were moved up to reinforce the garrison. When darkness had set in, the Russian regiment began to assault, penetrating into the village on three sides at one and the same time there was an obstinate fight of man against man, ending
succeeding
.
.
finally
with the discomfiture of the Russians.
The

132

East San-kia-tsy remained
in the
Russians withdrew in the dark in a north-easterly

direction.
hands
of the Japanese.
All the counter-attacks having
failed,
the troops
of General Man's Detachment abandoned the portions of Temple Hill still held by them in
front,
evâcuating
the
height
to
completely during
the
knolls
the
night,
and
retiring
situated
farther
north.
Behind
the
rocks
where
the
Russians had once more established themselves the Japanese found afterwards, in addition to some wounded, about 50 dead, of the 121st and
and 122nd Infantry Regiments,^ mostly shot in the head they found, moreover, at various other spots on Temple Hill more than 300 dead, and
;
buried them.
That day
cost the
15th Brigade 921 men, of
whom
The
112 were dead.

course the fight was taking with the
of
Division and with the right wing

that the position the
the
Guard 2nd
Division caused General Baron Kuroki to think
the general line
enemy was still holding on Man-hua-pu Watanabe-yama
Western San-jo-shi-san could no longer be captured on October 11; he therefore, at G.30 p.m., arranged for the Guard and 2nd Divisions to continue
the attack during the night.
Although the two Divisions had not succeeded

till
the evening of the 11th in pushing the troops
of the 4th Siberian

the
Army
Corps entirely from

San-jo-shi-san,
Watanabe-yama and Western

1st
yet General Sarubaiev, taking into consideration

'
Brigade 31st Infantry Division, belonging to Mau's party.

the
severe
losses,
133
thought he could no longer he therefore determined to withdraw gradually during the night to the
maintain himself there
;
heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy
Schan-liu-ho-tsy.
Man's Brigade, after the loss of Temple Hill, had fallen back in a north-easterly direction to the heights at Orr-wa, thus gaining touch again
was on the left of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, where he had made some local attacks on the Japanese Guards/ General Count Nodzu, after capturing the heights Tiie Japaeast of Wu-li-tai-tsy, which the Russians, by the ^Tmy a^. way, had already evacuated,^ was to make with tacks the his 4th Army a right wheel, timing his advance orthelst with that of the 1st and 2nd Armies.' The move^rm^^^ ments of his Army thus depending in the first Corps instance on the progress the Armies on his flanks making were making, he decided to support their attacks ^"^ P^**"
still
with the 4th Siberian Army Corps. General Mishtshenko's Cossack Brigade
with strong forces. He ordered the 5th Division to continue its attack upon the line Fan-kia-tun Schi-li-ho, in touch with the 2nd Army, and caused the 20th Brigade of the 10th Division
to co-operate with the attack of the
1st
Army.
Colonel
(also
Kamada, commanding the 8th Brigade

in
of the 10th Division),

ill,
place of General
received orders to attack the Sanbut to arrange beforehand with the 20th Brigade and 5th Division. To each of the two brigades of the 10th Division were apportioned as a reinforcement one Abteilung
Otani, fallen
kai-seki-san,
'
P.
118.
p. 85.
104.
134

Di\4sional
Artillery,
of the
one Kobi regiment,
another Abteilung from the 14th Field Artillery
Regiment, as well as a detachment of Cavalry and Pioneers. Just the same as the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division, adjoining on the right, had been waiting for the advance of the right of the
4th
Army
before
so
deploying
the
for
attack
against
Commander of the 20th have waited for the start of Brigade seems to The Infantry remained inthe 15th Brigade. north-east of Tu-men-tsy, while the active Artillery attached to them was intervening in the Artillery fight of the 2nd Division from The Russians positions north of Yun-kuan-tun.
Temple
Hill,
bringing gradually numerous batteries into action

at
General Baron Kawamura, commanding the 10th Di\'ision, sent one more Abteilung of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade into the fire position, probably on the authority of his Army Commander, there being thus finally in action at Yun-kuan-tun, 18 mountain-guns of the 10th Division and 36 field-guns. When the 15th Brigade proceeded to attack Temple Hill in the
different
places,
afternoon after the Japanese Artillery had
made
good practice
Brigade
for
some considerable time, the 20th

too, deploying
started,
and
advancing
it.
against that height on the left of the 15th Brigade,
without, however, keeping in close touch with

part.
In the actual assault the brigade did not take As the 15th Brigade was making rapid progress, the 20th Brigade gradually wheeled
north in the direction
of
the
San-kai-seki-san,

reaching the country east of Ta-pu
to
135
when
it
began
grow dark. The 8th Brigade had not done anything decisive up to this time either. General Baron Kawamura, commanding the 10th Division, probably wishing
first for
to wait
some success of the 5th Division,
directed the Artillery attached to the 8th Brigade

to
support the advance of that Division.
The
unlimbered east of Tschou-kuan-tun, taking the Russian Artillery standing at Schi-li-ho under fire. The hesitating attitude of the 10th Division was of advantage to the enemy, who at first had not occupied the threatened San-kai-seki-san at all. The critical situation of his Centre had caused the Russian Commander-in-Chief already some
batteries
anxiety.
ing,
When
the Japanese, early in the morn-
several kilometres long,
Russian front, the interval, between the left of the 10th Army Corps at Fan-kia-tun and Man's Detachment on Temple Hill looked rather serious, a downright challenge to penetrate. To meet this danger Kuropatkin, by direct orders,
attacked
the
moved up
the nearest available portions of the
General Reserve
battalions
1st
145th
Infantry
Regiment and
Brigade
the
Battery 43rd Artillery
from the advanced guard of the 1st Corps directing them to occupy the Sankai-seki-san. Orders were dispatched to the 10th Army Corps to hold Yin-pan village so as to protect the right flank of JNIau's Detachment. Meanwhile the Japanese 5th Division, supported by Artillery of the 10th Division, was attacking
Army
136

Army
Corps
the Schi-h-ho, where General Riabinkin
the advanced-guard position of this
on
in
was
pro-
command.
during
The
the
attack did not

day.
make any
gress
insufficiently
supported
fire
The Japanese by its own
Infantry,
Artillery,
suffered
from the
of the Russian batteries

off.
various attempts to assault were beaten
The
indifferent progress the 5th Division was
making was somewhat due
to the hesitating atti-
tude of the right of the adjoining 3rd Division belonging to the 2nd Army.^ Riabinkin's troops had nevertheless a hard time.
When the Commander-in-Chiefs
request to occupy
Yin-pan village for protecting the left flank of Mau's Detachment was received, the commander of the advanced guard had but two battalions still General in reserve, which he could not spare. Gerschelmann, commanding the 9 th Infantry Division, which was standing idle at Hun-pauschan, was therefore ordered to send two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment to Yin-pan,^ and to place them under General Riabinkin, who was Afterto keep touch with Mau's Detachment. wards the 9th Infantry Division was obliged to detach two more battahons from, the 35th Infantry Regiment in support of the advanced guard, whose Under these reserves had been quickly used up.
More details about the combat of Nor is it known where on this day the
'
the 5th Division are wanting.

10th, 11th, and 3rd
Kobi Bri-
gades, as well as the portions of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade not
employed in action, were stationed. * Yin-pan had been occupied by two companies on October 10, but it looks as if these two companies retired early on October 11 into the Schi-li-ho position with Colonel Solomko's Detachment. (Pp. 93 and 94.)
137
circumstances recapturing the height of Ku-schutsy was out of the question. Apart from the severe losses suffered by the Infantry (the 124th
Infantry
officers
Regiment had
and
250
lost
in
the
morning 7
of
men), the
superiority
the
Japanese Artillery was very much in evidence too, the very unskilful handling of the Russian
batteries certainly contributing to that effect.
The
advanced guard having in all only three batteries available,^ these ought to have been brought into instead of this, General action at least together Riabinkin ordered first one battery to unlimber, and later on a second. The third battery the General did not engage at all, but sent it back to the main body at Hun-pau-schan at 4 p.m., with the remark that he had no use for it. The two batteries in action were fought down within a short time without having obtained any effect against the batteries of the Japanese which had unlimbered under cover. In the evening the batteries had lost a third of their gun-detachments and numerous horses. It was not till matters had come to such a pass that General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, made up his mind to push forward to Sin-tschuan an Abteilung of the 9th Artillery Brigade to reinforce the advanced guard, and to withdraw to the main body during night the 6th and 8th Batteries, which had fought with so much loss. The other Abteilung of the 9th Artillery Brigade was to go into position between Fan-kia-tun and Ta-kou to Ta-kou were to move,
;
; '
Two
batteries 31st Artillery Brigade belouged to
Mau's Detach-
ment,
138
moreover, another battalion and a half of the 34th Infantry Regiment, which had already pushed two
battalions to Yin-pan.
These measures were to
be carried out during night. The 4th Battalion 145th Infantry Regiment, from the 1st Army Corps, arrived in the afternoon
at the San-kai-seki-san
from Tun-san-ho, while the 146th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd and half the 3rd Battery 43rd Artillery Brigade were marching
the
to
height east of
Tan-hai-schi,
prolonging
the position of the 145th Infantry Regiment east-
ward. The 146th Infantry Regiment established touch with Mau's Detachment standing at Orr-wa. The 2nd Brigade 37th Infantry Division, together with the 2nd Abteilung 43rd Artillery Brigade,^ was then moved up to Tun-san-ho by order of Kuropatkin one battalion of the 147th Infantry Regiment, serving as escort to Kuropatkin's Head;
quarters,
was there already. The 22nd Division of the

to
1st
;
Army
Corps
moved forward
The 2nd
Tun-san-tsy Kuropatkin's Headquarters remained at Tun-san-ho.
General Baron Oku, with the 2nd Japanese Army^^ Army, had, after the actions on October 10, ascertained that the enemy's main position into which ^'^JJ'^^^ tacks on the Russiau advanced troops had retired, was on the
^^
of the^
lir"^^
Scha-ho
the ad-
vanced
of the""^ Russian 17th
and had decided to attack that position on the 11th. He therefore, on ^ Octobcr 10, at 8.30 in the evening, issued an Army Order embodying the following
Schi-li-ho
i
Yen-kia-wan,
J.3Q
The 6th Battery 43rd Artillery Brigade, during its transport by fj.Qjjj home, had managed to provide itself on its own initiative with
and Infantry
fire
Cori^
protective shields giving cover against shrapnel
up to
500 metres' range.

"
;;
139
The A?^my
first
will attack the
the
"
objective
of
the
enemy to-morrow attack is the enemy
standing on the Schi-li-ho.
The foremost
for
line
of Infantry will begin to
move
attack from the line Schuan-tai-tsy

Schi-li-ho
Ta-tu-san-pu at 6 a.m., the Srd Division against

the section
Nan-kuan-tsy
(inclusive),
and the 6th Division against the section to the west of the former as far as Yen-kia-wan. " The Mh Division is to advance against Ta-yutschun-pu and to the west of it. " The General Reserve will assemble in their
bivouacs at 6 a.m."
When,
tives for
after issuing this Order,

^
for
October 11 arrived, changing that Order. General Baron Oshima started with the 3rd Branching off Division at 6 a.m. on October 11. two battalions, probably from the 6th Infantry Regiment, to go from Men-hu-lu-tun to Wu-litai-tsy, to establish touch with the 5th Division, the main body of the Division advanced from Schuan-tai-tsy on Nan-kuan-tsy over the gaoljan
fields,
Oyama's directhere was no need
The 2nd mostly cleared of their crops. Battalion 18th Infantry Regiment formed the advanced guard. On approaching Nan-kuan-tsy to within 800 metres, it met with intense Infantry fire coming from the southern edge of the village at the same moment several Russian battalions from the 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division 17th Army Corps, as well as two batteries of the 3rd Artillery Brigade and one sotnia, advanced from
'
P. 104.
140

Nan-kuan-tsy. While the Russian unhmbered south-west of the place, the
the north on
batteries
Japanese advanced-guard battalion deployed, engaging in a fire-action but Russian Infantry

;
The advancing was threatening its left flank. which was 3rd Battalion of the same regiment, marching at the head of the main body, then prolonged the left of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st The Battalion advancing to reinforce the right.
Artillery of the Division
came
into action in
two
groups north-east of Men-hu-lu-tun.
The two battalions 6th Infantry Regiment had meanwhile traversed Wu-li-tai-tsy, which the Russians had previously evacuated, and were
moving
li-ho
in
the direction of Siau-wen-kou.
Schi-
being strongly occupied, the 5th Division on
the right being hotly engaged without making any
and on the left the 17th Brigade, which was engaged south of Nan-kuan-tsy, seeming to be hard pressed, the 6th Infantry Regiment was also unable to advance any farther. The commander
progress,
therefore decided to halt for the present at Siau-
wen-kou.
The
assumed
action
at
Nan-kuan-tsy had
of
a
meanwhile
fight.
the
character
stationary
Vigorous counter-attacks of the Russians with two the 3rd Infantry Division's Reserve obhged the Japanese to engage gradually all their the Japanese line was but slowly forces available gaining ground at some points. At first the front of the 18th Infantry Regiment was prolonged to the right by the other regiment (the 34th) of the later, after severe loss, General 17th Brigade
battalions of
; ;

Baron Oshima brought up
last reserve, the
141
as reinforcement the
33rd Infantry Regiment of the Once, by an energetic counter-attack of the Russian 9th Infantry Regiment from Nan-kuan-tsy, the Japanese were driven back for a considerable distance but ultimately, towards evening, after engaging also portions of the General Reserve of the 2nd Army, they succeeded in repulsing the Russians for good and occupying Nan-kuan-tsy. Especially the Japanese 18th In5th Brigade.
;
fantry
Regiment had
suffered
much
in
the ex-
ceedingly bloody action. the small effect of

batteries,
striking feature
was
the
the
Russian
Artillery
hampered in their view by the gaoljan which was still partly uncut, probably could not locate the Japanese guns, and hence fired at random, without any material results. The Japanese Gth Division, advancing in two columns to the left of the 3rd Division, had some more rapid success. Though the 45th Infantry Regiment, advancing by Orr-tai-tsy as right column, was gaining ground but slowly, owing to the ground being open, the left and
stronger
column,
the
24th
Brigade,
succeeded
about 3 p.m. in driving Colonel Stakovitch's Detachment, belonging to the 17th Army Corps, from Yen-kia-wan, and in occupying that place.
On
its
the right column hearing of
this, it
worked
way up
the
closer, too,
when
loss,
it
reinforced by portions
of
13th
Infantry
Regiment,
the
little
reaching
by
rushes, without
undue
wood south
of Yen-kia-wan, where
began to entrench. Of the Artillery of the Japanese 6th Division

142
four batteries had unlimbered west of rr-tai-tsy,
and two east of Ta-tu-san-pu, supporting the advance of their Infantry. Great alarm was caused in the Russian position by the evacuation of Yen-kia-wan this alarm increased when, farther west, General Grekov, with his Orenburg Cossack Brigade was, owing to the advance of the Japanese 4th Division, obliged to give way north from Li-kia-tun, exposing the
;
Hank of the 17th

of
Army
Corps.
With
General
the object
recapturing
Yen-kia-wan,
Wolkov,
commanding the 17th Army Corps, reinforced Stakovich's Detachment by two battalions 140th Infantry Regiment and one battery, these being
taken from the 35th Infantry Division in reser\'e, and put in motion on Tsun-lun-yen-tun. But nothing came of it, the right column of the Japanese 4th Division having meanwhile deployed on the western bank of the Scha-ho against Ta-yutschun-pu, threatening to capture that place.
The
with
4th Division, after starting in the morning,
likewise in
two columns,^ to advance,
in
compliance
Orders, against Ta-yu-tschun-pu and west of it,^ received about 10.30 a.m. instructions from General Baron Oku to keep more to the right, and drive the enemy from the line Yen-kia-wan Ta-yu-tschun-pu, so as to facilitate thereby the
attack of the 6th Division.
Army
But the left column of the 6th Division having meanwhile made progress unaided, and driven the
From the 7th Brigade the 19th Brigade General Reserve altogether.
'
;
is
said to have joined the
P. 139.
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
143
enemy from Yen-kia-wan, the Army Commander

ordered the 4th Division to push in the general
on Lin-schin-pu, to threaten the right General Baron Tsukamoto, commanding the 4th Div ision, was, however, unable to carry out the order, he having ascertained the presence of strong Russian forces in the neighbourhood north-west of Lin-schin-pu. He was,
direction
flank of the Russians.
^
moreover, obliged
fore,
to
deal
with
the
enemy
at
Ta-yu-tschun-pu first. The right column theredeployed against that village, attacking six companies of the 11th Infantry Regiment, from Colonel Stakovich's Detachment, which had retired
thither.
ance, Stakovich gave
After a prolonged and obstinate resistway to the superior pressure of the Japanese, retiring on Tsun-lun-yentun. The Japanese, however, did not pursue, but established themselves for the night at Ta-yu-tschun-pu. The left column of the 4th Division had merely met portions of General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, driving them
away
as
the
column
advanced.
The column
remained overnight at Li-kia-tun, so as to be ready for opposing at once any likely attack of the enemy from the country north-west of Linschin-pu. General Baron Oku reiterated, in the
course of the day, several
therefore, does not
times
his
order
;
to
he,
the 4th Division to advance on Lin-schin-pu
seem to have been

4th
Division
sufficiently
informed
Siberian
by the
about
the
6th
Army
'
Corps.
vigorous intervention
by that corps might have placed the whole of

Gth Siberian
Army
Corps.
144

Army,
in
the 2nd
billeted
or at least the 4th Division, in a
very tight corner.
Headquarters of the 2nd Army the General Reserve Pu-tsau-kou

;
The
?th^T
beriau
bivouacked there too. General Baron Bilderling had requested General

6th Siberian Army morning, to relieve the Corps, already in the right flank of the 17th Army Corps by going forward. But, having regard to Kuropatkin's
Soboliev,
commanding the
Corps adprotect*" the Russian right

flank.
telegram, in which the Commander-in-Chief had

.
Corps as his strategic reserve,^ General Soboliev did not think himself justified in responding to this request. He only promised to look after the protection of
designated the 6th biberian
lo-i-
Army
*.
/^
the right flank in case the Western Detachment
was going to
retire
he
would
then
accept
After this reply General Baron Bilderling applied to the Commander-in-Chief direct, obtaining from him at 12 noon an order causing the 6th Siberian Army Corps to move with the advanced guard on Wan-tschuan-tsy, and with the main body to
the
this
line
battle in his prepared positions.
Schau-kia-lin-tsy
Ta-lian-tun.
at
After
4 p.m.,
movement had been completed
the sorely pressed Colonel Stakovich, and General Grekov, also turned to Soboliev, wth the request
of supporting
them by an
offensive
move
of his
advanced guard.
Thereupon, General
Soboliev
directed, at 7 p.m., three battalions of the advanced guard to go forward in a south-westerly direction and occupy Ta-tai. This order had been effected about 10 p.m., but when, during the night, General
P. 96.

his Cossacks farther north,
145
Soboliev heard of General Grekov retiring with
he ordered the three battalions to face about likewise, and to withdraw on the main body of the advanced guard. Nothing is reported on what Dembovski's Detachment was doing therefore seems that it Dembov ski was standing fast at Ta-wan-kan-pu Sin-tai-tsy on the 11th as well. The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade had reached San-de-pu in accordance with orders. In the afternoon the brigade was attacked by several Russian companies, which, probably belonging to Dembovski's Detachment, were advancing from Ku-kia-tsy. After a brief fire-fight, in which the brigade was considerably supported by the Infantry
;
attached
to
it,
the
attack
was
in
repulsed,
a
the
Russians
direction.
withdrawing
before the
again
northerly
At
6 p.m.,
3rd
Division had suc-
ceeded in capturing Nan-kuan-tsy, Headquarters of the Second Japanese Army dispatched to
Oyama's Headquarters a report on the situation, and on the further intentions. This report stated that after the capture of Yen-kia-wan, on the Scha-ho, the Army, having been opposed by at least two Divisions, had continued the attack in the direction ordered, but had failed to make any more material progress that, if at dusk no further advantage was gained, it was intended to continue the attack during the night and in the early morning. Marshal Marquis Oyama did not, even on October 11, obtain quite an accurate picture of the actual distribution of the Russian forces.
;
10
146
Views
andintentions of

the reports coming
i
,
From
,
in,
/.
he thought he must
i
concluae the
in
mam
.
mass
oi the
enemy
to be con-
cSraf
Headon the
of o"to ber 11.
centrated about Fn-kia-pu.
He
therefore hoped
the further conduct of his operations, which were to consist of a gradual wheel of his whole ^^"^y north-east, to be able to meet the main With the forces presently, and to beat them. object of the better quah tying for its task the 4th Army, which had certainly initiated the wheel demanded of it for October 11, but had not carried it through completely, and in all likelihood was bound to come across the main forces of the enemy about Fn-kia-pu, the Commander-in-Chief placed under its orders the whole of his General Reserve, retaining in
its
stead at his disposal the 5th Division,
which was being assembled at Ku-schu-tsy. The General Reserve of the Japanese Army had marched during the day from Lo-ta-tai to Tumen-tsy thence it could be moved up by the In the evening the Armies received 4th Army. orders to continue the attack on October 12 the right wing of the 1st Army was to remain on the defensive, and its left was to attack jointly with the 4th Army. The task of the 2nd Army to advance on Scha-ho-pu and Lin-schin-pu, with the object of facilitating the right wheel of the 4th Army, remained unaltered. The closing of the day did not synchronise with the finish of the fighting. The action continued on the western and eastern wings. When the Japanese succeeded in capturing Nan-kuan-tsy towards evening,^ General Wolkov, commanding the 17th
;
p. 141.

Army
that place.
147
Rus-
Corps, became very anxious at the loss of The
Taking into consideration the

^
fact that Army

^^'
this extensive ^ place close opposite Yen-tou-niu-lu ^**^P^ ^^ captures village might form an excellent pivot for any the vil-
further attacks
by the Japanese, and be of the
nJ,!."
J<uan-tsy.
utmost value to them, especially in any attempt

at penetration, he resolved to retake that village.
But the 3rd Infantry Division was no longer fit for the combat lasting all day had to do it
;
absorbed already
talion
all
its
reserves.
The
;
right
at
rr-schi-kia-tsy had been
by one batof the 10th Infantry Regiment it had

reinforced
fighting at
been also necessary to support the 12th Infantry
Regiment
Lun-wan-miau.
But the
re-
capture of the heights west of Ku-schu-tsy having
meanwhile been abandoned,^ the 138th Infantry Regiment, that had been brought up to Schi-li-ho, became available six companies of it were to march to Lun-wan-miau, and to advance at once on Nan-kuan-tsy. But on the news coming in from the right that Colonel Stakovich, after his retreat from Yen-kia-wan to Ta-yu-tschun-pu, could no longer hold on even to tliat place, the attack was given up for the moment the General
;
;
Commanding
resolved,
however, to capture the

the fire-fight was dying
place by a night attack.
With growing darkness

away
gradually.
When
darkness was complete,
General
Wolkov
ordered the General

for this
Commanding
the 35th Infantry Division to attack Nan-kuan-tsy.
The latter detailed Regiment and two
duty the 139th Infantry battalions of the 140th Infantry

'
P. 137.
148

closest at hand.
Regiment that were

batteries,
The
last
reserve of the 137th Infantry Reghnent, with
some
the
was placed
in
readiness at Tschien-liu-
tan-kou in case of
right flank.
failure,
and to protect
The troops attacking were ordered to leave behind their knapsacks, to put on their greatcoats,
and to carry out the assault without firing a shot. The start was made from Tschien-liu-tan-kou, the 139th Infantry Regiment leading. The night was perfectly dark. When the leading companies marching through the man-high gaoljan were approaching Lun-wan-miau, a lively fusillade was
suddenly heard.
General Glasko,
who commanded
the 2nd Brigade 35th Infantry Division, and was

leading the troops, was afraid his approach had
been discovered by the Japanese, and thought he had better carry out the attack at daybreak supported by the Artillery. But the fire soon ceasing, the advance was continued. Next morning it became known that the fire they had heard had proceeded from their own troops of the right section.
At Lun-wan-miau
Regiment was Company, the
skirmishers,
the colour of the 139th Infantry

behind, escorted by the 3rd
left
support.
1st and 2nd Companies extending and the 4th Company following in The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions formed
up
in companies, following the 1st Battalion after-
wards.
Of
the 140th Infantry Regiment, the 1st
Lun-wan-miau to assault Nankuan-tsy from the east, the 2nd Battalion of that regiment forming the General Reserve. The troops having gone forward in this formation for about
Battalion traversed
149
another quarter of an hour, they suddenly met with a severe fire, doing but little damage, the Japanese firing too high. The contours of Xankuan-tsy village now emerged from the darkness.
The
4th
Company 139th
Infantry Regiment was

;
brought up into the first line the skirmishers descended the precipitous slopes of the river-bank,
resolutely forcing their
way
into
the village on
the other bank.

off to
Portions of the battalions of that

village
regiment following in rear had previously wheeled
from the west, while the 1st Battalion. 140th Regiment pushed into the village from the east. A furious fight with cold steel ensued, ending with the victory of the Russians. The Japanese, being taken partly by
assault the
behind their piled arms on the village green, gave way, and are said (according to Russian reports) to have left about 1,000 dead in Nan-kuan-tsy. The chief loss of the Japanese fell upon the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Division the Russian loss was insigsurprise,
so
much
as to leave
nificant.
It
was 11
in
the
evening when
the
attack was decided.
The 17th Army Corps was

its
now^ holding again

;
position as in the morning but this success was purchased by staking almost the whole of the reserves, although the troops who had attacked Nan-kuan-tsy had suffered little. Of fresh forces the General Commanding had now
only available
fifteen
companies
;
of
the
137th
Regiment and four batteries of these troops one more battalion had to be detailed during the night to go to Orr-schi-kia-tsy to reinforce the right
loO
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE
WAR
section,
movements of the enemy being constantly
noticed in front, giving rise to fears of a night

attack.
The chances
for a successful continuation in
of the battle on October 12 were therefore,

spite of the nocturnal success,
all
;
not favourable at
and the less so because the right wing was exposed to an envelopment, owing to the loss of Yen-kia-wan and Ta-yu-tschun-pu. There was, of course, no need to be afraid of this, if the 6th Siberian Army Corps could be But General relied upon to intervene vigorously. Wolkov having waited all day in vain for this
co-operation of that corps on October 12 did not seem to be ensured at all. General Baron Stackelberg had been firmly Portions resolved to push the eastern wing of the Japanese sfbl^Ln^*^ Army back and carry through the task imposed on him. Corps rle, /y i feat Japa- But whcu the day passed on and evenmg came without liis troops by their efforts being rewarded "anted troops at with succcss, he almost gave up the game. He Certainly had the intention of continuing the lin and attack during the night, but dropped it at once tsy-Jhi" Passes, when hearing of the state of affairs in the Centre to pive up of the Russian front.^ Towards evening, reports came in from the position's^ captured. 4th Siberian Army Corps adjoining on the right, saying that the corps was unable to hold its advanced positions any longer, and that the General Commanding felt therefore induced to withdraw
intervention, the
, ,
his troops to the heights north
of Sia-liu-ho-tsy
and Schan-liu-ho-tsy. This message greatly alarmed General Baron

1
Pp. 132 and 133.
FIRST
Stackelberg.
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

Not only had the attack of
151
his
troops failed, but his
own
right wing, the portion
of the 1st Siberian
Corps standing at the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass, was now also unguarded, and liable to be enveloped, owing to the retro-
Army
gi'ade
movement of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The General therefore decided to discontinue the
attack against the heights of the passes, so as to be
able to
meet the new danger. issued the following Order

^
:
About midnight he
"
"
1.
The
attack initiated will be discontinued.
2.
ness, as
At once, during night, under cover of many troops as possible are to be

the
fighting-line,
darkwith-
drawn from
"3.
*'
to
reinforce
the
en-
reserves of the corps.
The
positions
occupied
are
to
be
trenched.
4.
The main
reservê (5th
Division), reinforced
East Siberian Rifle by a portion of the artillery
3rd Siberian
hostile attack
Army
Corps, will
move
to Sia-pin-
tai-tsy,^ establishing
there a position, in case of a
through the gap between our right and the 4th Siberian Army Corps. Two regiments, with two batteries, will march to the Wai-tauschan ^ and the hill with the two knolls.* " 5. If the 4th Siberian Army Corps continue*
retreating, only
what
is
absolutely necessary
;
must
on the heights mentioned the main reserve, with all the rest, will advance from the Wai-taube
left
'
Staff ("
^ ' *
According to sources of Captain Markov of the Russian General Woienni Sbornik," 1905).
2^ kilometres south of Biau-yu-pu-sa.
West
of Bian-yu-pu-sa.
South-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa (" Zwei
Kuppen Hgel " on the map).
152
THE KUSSO- JAPANESE WAR

and rear of the
all
schan, vigorously attacking flank
enemy pressing the 4th Siberian Army Corps." But before this Order had become known to
the troops, which, owing to the
difficulties
of trans-
mission in the mountainous country, taken all night, the various attacks for capturing
may have
the passes continued.
On
the Japanese side, the 2nd
Guard Kobi Regi-
ment and one battalion 4th Kobi Regiment, from the Guard Kobi Brigade, were holding the small hills on both sides of the Ta-lin Pass. The largest of these hills was east of the pass, somewhat in advance of the
rest of the hill range, being
defended by one section
of the 2nd
Company 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment.

^
heights at the passes
Although the ground favours an attack on these much more than an attack
on the southern section of the Japanese position

east of Pen-si-hu, the 1st Siberian
Army
Corps
had not seriously attacked them during the day. The Japanese only noticed the enemy pushing
gradually
closer
to
the
Ta-lin
Pass
position.
General Baron Ino-uye therefore reinforced his line towards evening, placing at the disposal of the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment one company of the 24th Infantry Regiment, from General The Russian Kigoshi's 23rd Brigade,^ as reserve.
movements continued also during the night, until towards 3 a.m. about two battalions rushed forward But this to attack on both sides of the pass-road. surprise having been anticipated,^ it was easily
I
Appendix XVIII.
fire
P. 112.
'
Patrols on the foreground had, moreover, signalled the approach

to fagots of dry wood.
of the Russians by setting

beaten off by the Japanese.
another attack was
153
At
34th
5 a.m., however,
made
in greater strength, the
and 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiments) this time rushing the enemy on the small advanced hill and capturing the height. In the furious bayonet charge, every man of the Japanese section was cut down. If the Russians had now made use of this success by establishing themselves on that height, bringing up at once strong reserves behind it, and continuing the attack upon the main position after a brief rest, there was every likelihood of their piercing the thin Japanese line in the centre. But an attempt of this kind was not made. The main forces engaged in the attack apparently retired again at once on the height they had stormed only a small force was left behind, which was bound to succumb to a determined counter-attack. When Colonel Ota, commanding the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment, heard of this event, he charged the 3rd Company 24th Regiment, which had come
Russians (portions of the
;
up
in the evening,
to recapture the
hill
in
the
dark.
The company advanced,
and, arriving to
within 20 paces of the knoll,
was then pushed
while
back by a counter-attack of the Russians. Meanit began to dawn. Two Japanese guns in the neighbourhood of the position could make out
the contours of the
fire.
under Colonel Ota, placing himself at the head of his colour-company, which was joined by the other two sections of the 2nd Company, as well as by the rest of the 3rd Company 24th Infantry Regiment, seized the colour, and assaulted the hill
hill,
it
and began to take
154
with his troops. The Colonel was killed, likewise the officer commanding the 1st Battalion, the
officer
carrying the colour, and the
Regimental
Adjutant, who, one after the other, had seized the Finally a private planted it on the hill, colour.
Standard Hill " (Gun-giyama).^ The Russians were driven away, leaving 95 prisoners, and making no other attempt to
henceforward
called
"
attack the Ta-lin Pass.
Among
their
numerous
dead (exact data are wanting) was also LieutenantColonel Pekuta, of the General Staff, who was found with sword in hand, and having apparently A document led the Russian attacking troops. found in his pocket contained the task assigned to the Eastern Detachment,
Kobi Regiment, engaged in that fight, lost 4 officers and 48 men killed, 5 officers and 148 men wounded.
half-battalion
The
of
the
2nd
Guard
The loss of the 3rd Company 24th Infantry Regiment was 40 men dead, and about 100 men
wounded.
The Russians made
a night attack also on the
Japanese positions at the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, occupied by the 47th Infantry Regiment and one
mountain battery. About 700 metres in front of the Japanese position, held by the 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry Regiment, east of the pass-road, was an isolated rocky hill of rugged shape," affording an extensive
view, but otherwise rather unsuitable for placing
troops.
If that hill
'
was
left
unoccupied, an ex-
Called
Called
" Fahnen-Hgel " on the map. " Felshgel " on the map.

155
ceedingly favourable point of observation would
be surrendered to the Russians, from which they would be able to overlook completely the Japanese position but if, on the other hand, the height was
;
included in the general line of defence, a prominent

salient
would be
created, challenging
envelopment
sides. Colonel Sugihara, commanding the iTth Infantry Regiment, pushed, therefore, merely the 5th Company to that height, to deny its
on both
occupation by the Russians.
The Captain
of the
company ordered one

to the right of the
left
hill
section to occupy a position
and two sections to the of it, where they entrenched. The rocky itself was apparently not occupied at all, or
hill,
only weakly.
The
trenches to the left of the
hill
were the object of attack of the Russians. Several field batteries and heavy mortars having taken these trenches under fire since early morning, but with little effect it seems, the Russian Infantry portions of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, under Colonel Lissovski moved forward against them, the Infantry being continually reinforced
during the day.

5th Company supported by the firing-lines, not far in rear, but upon it was concentrated the bulk of the Russian fire it suffered, therefore, considerably. Night came on without the Russians proceeding to deliver the assault. Both adversaries were lying opposite each other at closest range,
In the ensuing
fire-fight,
the
was
'
until
about 3 o'clock in the morning, when the Russians rose to storm. The two sections of the 5th Company, after a gallant defence, succumbed
156

;
to the superior numbers, being almost completely
Result of October
The Captain was killed all the other were wounded. The noise of the action was heard in the main position, but no support was sent, because leaving the main position in the darkness seemed inadvisable. The Russians were therefore able to establish themselves within the but they did not adopt any line captured measures for taking advantage of their success At daybreak on October 12, Colonel here either. Sugihara proceeded to make a counter-attack, pushing the Russians back again after a hot contest, bravely fought on both sides, and lasting for some hours. The 47th Infantry Regiment lost 146 men,^ most of whom belonged to the 5th Company. The Russians left 200 corpses on the field of action. No more night attacks were made by the 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampfs Detachment. The result of October 11 was the following Qj^ |.|^g Japanese side the extremely weak right wing maintained its position east of Pen-si-hu and at the Ta-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Tschien-kou-lin Passes. The rest of the Japanese Army gained ground in the attack, the 1st Army reaching the line Men-ka-ko Temple Hill, the 4th and 2nd
annihilated.
officers
; :
Armies the
Schi-li-ho.
On
the
left
wing the 4th
Division overlapped the enemy's right wing, since
Corps was hanging back. The Russian Western Detachment was sorely pressed, the Centre was wavering, the Eastern Detachment gave up the attack.
the 6th Siberian
'
Army
1 oflicer
ami
-i2
men
dead, 3 officers and 100
meu
i\
ouuded.

Kuropatkin's battle-plan of attacking the
157
enemy
failed
and enveloping
already.
his eastern
wing had therefore
October 12
General Kuropatkin had not obtained a correct
idea of
Kuropat-
what had happened on the eastern wing on ^jj" ^^ÂiaOctober 11. Maybe General Baron Stackelberg t;" of had sent in favourable reports, maybe he had ians in not yet reported at all the Commander-in-Chief, abie^H^ht at any rate, felt confident that all was well with the Eastern Detachment, and that ultimate Sketch 6. victory was ensured. Kuropatkin had given up the original plan of supporting the enveloping movement of the Eastern Detachment by an offensive along the front he thought there was no longer any need at all for the Western Detachment to attack in order to complete the enemy's
;
;
defeat.
It
seemed to him
sufficient if the
main
forces of the
Army
held their ground until the
decision had been brought about in the east.
The
the Commander-in-Chief had Western Detachment, on the evening of October 11, to continue the battle on October 12 in the positions of the advanced guards, and to continue
therefore
ordered
strengthening
General them during the night. Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, on this, pushed to Ta-kou the other two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment (two being already in Yin-pan'), placing them likewise under the
orders of General Riabinkin, so as to form in this
way
strong connecting-link between the 10th

'
P. 1^8.
158
THE RUSSO-.IAPANESE WAR

the brigade of
The
Extern
Detachopposite
on and west of Tan-hai-schi. The Japanese continued their attacks early in the morning the battle on the eastern wing assumed the character of a stationary action. After Ino-uye's Detachment had steadfastly
'
Army Corps' position and 1st Army Corps standing
the
the heights east
Tcpulscd
all
attacks of the Eastern
Group during
fail
October
11, as well as
during the night following,
the strength of the assailant seemed to
him
The Russians certainly opened fire again Japanese hiially. Detachwith Artillery tfcnerally at dawn, but there was no ' -^ .^ nient discoutinues
Its
longer any vigorous

^î^gj^p^
east of Pen-si-hu
attack
by Infantry
some
attac
Qf pushing once
more
to
the heights
were soon given up again, when towards noon the sound of brisk rifle-fire was heard coming fi'om the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. A composite half-battalion, with Cavalry attached, had been pushed out to the heights south of Riu-wobio, as on the previous day, to guard the right flank. General Samsonov's- Siberian Cossack Division came upon this detachment, but was attacked in turn by the Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade. General Prince Kan-in had arrived in Si-ho-yan ^ on October 11. Reinforced by 359 men, Lines of Communication Troops, he started at 6 a.m. on October 12, by several roads, for Pen-si-hu, to remove, by an attack against the Russian forces on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, the danger of the Japanese right wing being enveloped. The
'
145th and 146th Infantry Regiments.

P. 109.
(P. 138.)
15 kilometres south-south-east of Pen-si-hu.
(Pp. 77
and 110.)
159
advance through the roadless, rugged, mountainous country proved very difficult, the four-horsed vehicles carrying the machine-guns being only able to proceed after the utmost exertions. The machine-guns had to be carried by the men over the steep passes of the road, the limbers and
^
waggons finding
all
Yet, for approaching General Samsonov's Cossack Division unobserved, and in occupying with the main body a position almost in rear of the enemy. About 11 a.m. a
it
impossible to follow.
in
that,
the
brigade succeeded
from rifles, carbines, and machine-guns suddenly poured into the hostile Cavalry masses the Russians, completely taken by surprise, hurriedly retreated in an easterly direction, a portion of the Japanese Cavalry following them. The main body of the brigade remained for the present in the position occupied. One machine-gun section, moreover, fired with some good effect on Russian
hot
fire
;
battalions standing
in
close formation as reserve
on
the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, probably in the neighbourhood of Cho-ka-ko. The
intervention of Kan-in's Cavalry Brigade greatly
alarmed the Russian Eastern Detachment.

berg believed
standing
east
Stackel-
the whole wing of the Japanese

of
Pen-si-hu
was
advancing
to
attack, ordering therefore the 3rd Siberian
Army
Corps to hold its ground at all cost. General Ivanov, nevertheless, withdrew from the fighting-Hne all the portions he had still
In place of this mode of transport, ill-adapted for Manchuria, pack-horses were introduced for carrying the machine-guns but it was not till the end of January that the former system of transport was completely replaced hy the pack-horse system.
' ;
160

the
engaged, except
24th
East
Siberian
Rifle
Regiment, which was fighting in the direction of Kuan-hn-tsy the main body of his Army Corps remained all day in a position north of Kau-tai-tsy during the night the corps began to retreat in a north-easterly direction on the Kau-tu-lin Pass. General von Rennenkampf, who in the morning had assailed once more the heights east of Pen-sihu, abstained from any further attack the moment he heard of Samsonov's Division having been attacked by surprise and forced to give way in an easterly direction, and all the more did he abstain because he had to return to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps the five battalions General Ivanov had given him on October 11. Anxiety for his left flank caused him to abandon all the positions he was still holding opposite the enemy, and to retire in the direction of San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho. By the timely intervention of Prince Kan-in the last danger was removed from the Japanese right wing. But General Baron Ino-uye was looking upon the situation of the troops under his command as being, all the same, extremely serious early in the morning. Not knowing anything about the Russian intentions to retreat, he was bound to assume they would continue their attacks with every man available. He therefore, with the consent of General Headquarters, withdrew the last battalion of his Division from the extreme left in the neighbourhood south of Yin-tsien-pu,
;
so as to give a little fresh strength to the greatly
reduced numbers of the defensive troops at Pensi-hu. Until the morning of October 12 Major

Honda's
composite
battalion,
161
which
all
had
its
been
;
fighting east Pen-si-hu,
had
lost
officers
of the five companies, three had about 20

left,
men
one only 16, and one even had no more than in the ranks it was just possible to form one section with the rest of the battahon.^ The
12
men
total loss of Ino-uye's

all
Detachment amounted
in
to 1,765 men, over 1,000 of
whom
fell
to the
lot of
the 14th Infantry Regiment alone.

still
The gap
remaining
between
the
12th
Division and the Guards in the neighbourhood

of the Tschien-kou-lin
Pass was combined Cavalry of the Guards Division under Colonel Kasa. On the afternoon of October 1 1 Kuroki had ordered the Guards
the
closed
by the and the 2nd
General Baron The Japa-
and the 2nd

;
Division to continue the attack during the night
cfuard Division
Guard Division was first to capture the through Watanabe-yama, and then the heights east ofgi^^ "J. Do-mon-shi. The 2nd Division was given the ^'^'^ ^*
1
task oi attackmg aia-nu-ho-tsy and
1-
o-Ti
after
iiii the heights

the
Man-hua-
pu,
north-west
of
it,
capturing
Western 5^.^
tshenko's
San-jo-shi-san.
As
the
enemy was
still
general
line
Man-hua-pu
Watanabe-yama
holding strongly the
Brigade
JionJ*of'
Western San-jo-shi-san, the General Commanding the ist the Guard Division decided to capture first the Army position JNlan-hua-pu Watanabe-yama, and then [iJJor*tJi to push on gradually farther, in conformity with "fi po""
the
1 1
Army
Order.
for the attack
11.
y-v
tioUS of
the 4th
The order
on October
The
1st
was issued at 11 p.m. ^'1?,^"^" Brigade was to capture <^W? to

the uorthwest.
.\ccording to Japanese accouuts of Captain Sauder (retired).
11
162
Man-hua-pu and the heights farther north, the 2nd Brigade to drive the enemy from the Watanabeyama, and then to advance to the heights east It being assumed that the 2nd of Pa-kia-tsy. Brigade would meet with more serious resistance, the 1st Brigade was ordered to time its advance by the former.
The 1st Brigade started at 3 a.m. on October 12. The 1st Guard Regiment advanced on a broad front over the northern extremities of the Waito-san and the heights east of
it,
its
left
taking
the direction on Man-hua-pu.
but it did touch with the neighbouring brigade being soon lost. On the first line approaching Man-hua-pu village, the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment of the 1st Siberian Army Corps withdrew in a northerly direction, Mishtshenko's Cavalry Brigade at the same time giving way in a north-easterly direction. This being reported to the Commander of the 1st Brigade, he resolved to continue his advance alone, although he had been ordered to time it Scarcely meeting by that of the 2nd Brigade. with any resistance, the brigade occupied the heights north of Man-hua-pu about 7 a.m., pursuing the retreating Cavalry by fire. The attack of the 2nd Brigade was not so
;
Regiment was following in company was pushed out to the in touch with the 2nd Brigade
not
succeed in maintaining
it,
The 2nd Guard second line. One

left
to
keep
the
simple.
General Watanabe had ordered the 4th Guard Regiment of his command to start from
position at 2.30 a.m., and, marching with
its
its

left
163
past the eastern outskirts of Pa-kia-tsy, to
attack the heights east of that place.
The
3rd
Guard Regiment was to drive the Russians from the Watanabe-yama, and then to occupy Pa-kiatsy. The Brigadier remained with the 3rd Guard
Regiment, of which he retained the
at his disposal.
1st Battalion
When,
positions
in the evening, the 4th
Guard Regiment
east of
it
received the order to
move
forward, the enemy's
on the Watanabe-yama and
were
still
occupied, as during the day, by portions
of the 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division, under General Shileiko but the Russians fell back before the 4th Guard Regiment had any chance With bayonets fixed and rifles of attacking. unloaded, the two battalions " of the regiment started at the appointed time from the country east of Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko, in the direction generally on the heights east of Pa-kia-tsy, some few shots only being fired at them by the retreating Russians. But they could hear, in a westerly direction, the 3rd Guard Regiment being hotly engaged in action, the left of their own regiment even suffering considerable loss by stray shots from the Watanabeyama. When the regiment, moving on a broad front, was approaching a height south-west of Man-hua-pu, the glare of bivouac-fires became
^
;
clearly visible
at
Pa-kia-tsy.
Lieutenant-Colonel
resist-
Ida,
commanding the regiment, expected, from

meet there with strong
a
the last reports, to

ance.
The advance having taken

'
long
time
P. Ill)
One
battalion was Divisioual Reserve.
164
owing to darkness and the difficulties of ground, he was afraid it would be daylight before the regiment had crossed the valley in
hitherto,
front
tsy.
for
attacking the heights east of

a matter of fact
it
Pa-kia-
As
was dawning when
the foremost lines arrived in front of the village but it was only weakly occupied by about one
the same as the heights east of it, from which a brisk fire was directed upon the Japanese. AVhen six companies of the first line advanced
company
to
charge with the bayonet, the Russians, after a brief resistance, withdrew in a northerly direction.
By
7 a.m. the heights were taken. The left company of the regiment had peneinto
;
trated
its
Pa-kia-tsy, which
garrison
was evacuated by the company then fired with some
effect
upon a Russian battery bivouacking to the west of the village. Most of the battery succeeded in limbering up in time and escaping, escorted by fifty Cavalry, but three vehicles remained behind, disabled by the fire of the Japanese. The 3rd Guard Regiment was standing deployed
at the cross-roads, 1 kilometre north-east of Shi-
mo-ro-kun-ko, ready for the advance at 3 o'clock in

the morning, the 2nd Battalion being on the right,
and
the
3rd
Battalion
on
the
left
the 8th
by the Colonel. It was believed the enemy would not be met until the Hachi-maki-yama was reached, but the foremost lines of the 3rd Battalion met him before The 2nd Battalion therefore advanced its that. right shoulder, so as to wheel a little to the left,
held in
reser\'e
'
Company was
The
1st Battalion
remained at the disposal of the Brigadier.
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

On
the approach of the
165
towards the west.
enemy
a loud whistle was heard in the Russian position,
command to fire a volley about 100 metres' range. The Japanese, being put on their guard by that whistle, threw themselves down flat on the ground, just
followed by the word of
this
was done
at
in
time to
let
the projectiles pass harmlessly over
their heads.
ing-line,
They then deployed a dense skirmishfiring on their own part several volleys
on the Russian skirmishers, clearly visible against the sky-line. The 2nd Battalion, receiving some flanking fire from the Hachi-maki-yama, after
executing the wheel, the battalion commander sent one section of the 7th Company of his reserve to the right to guard the flank. The 5th and 6th Companies meanwhile ascended the steep
slopes
of the
Watanabe-yama
to
assault.
The
throwing some hand-grenades at short range, which caused great loss. The first bayonet charge was beaten off, and likewise a second, in which the two sections of the 7th Company still in reserve took part as well. The two adversaries were now lying opposite each other at from 2 to 20 metres' range, until at last a third assault succeeded. The Japanese on the steep slopes are said to have slipped right underneath the Russians, seizing the muzzles of the rifles projecting beyond the edge and breaking off the bayonets. The 3rd Battalion advanced to assault, too. After a furious hand-to-hand fight the Russians withdrew to the Hachi-maki-yama, and to the heights west of it. The Japanese followed, reaching, at 5.30 a.m., the neighbourRussians delivered a rapid
fire,
166

close south of the
hood
Hachi-maki-yama, where
they halted for the moment. Three companies of the 1st Battalion, standing behind the left wing at the disposal of the
Brigadier, were securing the left flank,
and drove,
with the bayonet, a weak Russian garrison from a knoll on the southern slope of the Watanabe-
yama, north-west of height " 238." The night attack had cost the 3rd Guard Regiment heavily, especially the 2nd BattaHon, which lost its commander, 9 officers, and 197 dead or wounded. About four-fifths of the casualties were caused by the hand-grenades. The Russians also lost very considerably on the Watanabe-yama and its slopes were found about 400 dead. The 4th Guard Regiment was meant, by Brigade
;
Orders, to take possession of the heights east of
but the Colonel commanding the regiment thought he would be acting more correctly, after carrying out this task, if he followed up the enemy. He therefore engaged in the first line the company he had till then held back, advancing with his eight companies north of the road
Pa-kia-tsy only
;
Pa-kia-tsy
Schan-liu-ho-tsy
both
to a gentle elevation
villages
;
half-way between
these
weak
garrison remained in Pa-kia-tsy.
When
^
the regi-
ment had reached the height named, the advanced detachments of General Shileiko's troops, as well as those of General Levestam, who commanded the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division,^ were just then
'
Pp. 119 and 163.

It
was impossible to ascertain when the troops under General Levestam occupied the Hachi-maki-yama, and what units they were.
*
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
167
retiring north across the valley from the Hachi-makiyama, from Kami-yo-ka-ko, and from the Western
San-jo-shi-san, with the object of rallying.
The
4th
Guard Regiment faced about, opening

forces,
at once,
on the about a brigade in strength, of whom some portions were at first endeavouring to reach Pa-kia-tsy but under the fire they thronged
at 1,200 to 1,400 metres' range, a hot fire
enemy's
together in the direction of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, suffering heavy loss.
The garrison left behind by the 4th Guard Regiment in Pa-kia-tsy had meanwhile found there a weak Russian Infantry detachment, hiding in the buildings. Then ensued a brief street fight, in
which the Russians were cut down.
commanding the 4th Guard Regiment, seeing the 3rd Guard Regiment advâncing from the Watanabe-yama in pursuit of the enemy,
Colonel Ida,
and knowing also that the Divisional Reserve had started from Kami-ro-kun-ko on Pa-kia-tsy, determined to push on in the direction of the heights east of Do-mon-shi, so as to cut off the enemy retiring on Shan-liu-ho-tsy. The regiment started, and occupied with one battalion a steep height
north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy
;
the other battalion
was being rallied under cover behind the height. Soon the last battalion of the regiment that had
been following as Divisional Reserve arrived here also. Further advance was inadmissible, the heights
south of Do-mon-shi being strongly occupied by
the Russians,
various
sides
who
a
were, moreover, directing from

Artillery
fire
strong
upon the
regiment.
168

1st
Brigade of the Guard Division had meanwhile rested for some time upon the heights It then continued its north of JNIan-hua-pu. movement over the Eastern San-jo-shi-san, drivdng away without serious fighting a few protective
The
parties of the
Russians (probably from the 4th
East Siberian Rifle Regiment), and occupying with

the 1st Guard Regiment the Ba-ji-san, unmolested,
at 11.30 a.m.
On
the Russian side the vanguards of the 4th
Corps had, after the loss of the Watanabe-yama and Western San-jo-shi-san, reThe main tired to the heights near Do-mon-shi. body was standing at Schan-hei-niu-tun. General
Siberian
Army
Kossovich,
commanding the
'3rd
Siberian Infantry
Division, had occupied the heights east of Sia-liu-
ho-tsy with the 12th Siberian Infantry Regiment
and two batteries, so as to cover the retreat of General Shileiko's battalions from Schan-liu-ho-tsy
to Yen-san-sai.
The Japanese
1st
Guard
its
arrived on the Ba-ji-san,
Regiment ha\dng left wing noticed the
and at once opened The Russians deployed with some fire on it. portions against the regiment, which wheeled to the left, facing north-west. By degrees the 2nd Guard Regiment also came into action on the right of the 1st Guard Regiment.
retreat of Shileiko's column,
As
in
soon as Pa-kia-tsy, as well as the heights
north-east of that place, had been captured, early
the
morning,
the
sent
General
orders to
Commanding
his
the
to
Guard DiWsion
Artillery
move
forward.
At
8 a.m. three batteries arrived in
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

fire
169
the valley at Pa-kia-tsy and unlimbered south of the village, taking under
a Russian battery
of the Artillery of the 4th Siberian
Army
Corps'
main body in position south of Sia-hei-niu-tun. As no effect could be obtained, owing to the distant range, the batteries were brought forward
to the gentle elevation close north of Pa-kia-tsy,
whence they afterwards supported the attack of the 3rd Brigade adjoining on the left against the
heights of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.
Of
was
the 2nd Brigade, the 4th
Guard Regiment
on the heights north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, and the 3rd Guard Regiment was standing with its main body concentrated at Pa-kia-tsy. Small parties were still holding the Watanabe-yama.
as yet standing
About
in the
this
time perhaps
9.20
a.m.
the
ap^
pearance of strong hostile Cavalry with Infantry

tau-schan
Scha-ho valley, near the villages of Waiand Ta-tsy-pu, was reported to the Divisional Staff, whose position is not known. No reports on the movements of the 1st Brigade having been received up to that hour, the Divisional Commander detached two companies of the 3rd Guard Regiment, which occupied the Ka-ko-rei-san, to guard the right flank of the
Division.
The last batteries of the Division had meanwhile been moved up. It having become apparent that
the effect upon the
enemy's Artillery was too little, even from the position north of Pa-kia-tsy, these two batteries, as well as one of those stand'
TTie reinforced th East Siberian Rifle Division.
(P. 151.)
170

to
ing north of Pa-kia-tsy, were ordered

into action west of Schan-liu-ho-tsy.
come
portion
of
the
road
thither
was
under
fire
from the
Russian battery stationed south of Schan-hei-niutun the guns were therefore obHged to advance With the aid of the singly at long distances.
;
Pioneers, forming the escort to the Artillery,
it
was possible to bring the batteries into action by 3 p.m. The fire was then opened from this new position with good effect upon the Russian Major Hidikata's^ battery, which the Artillery. day before had suffered considerable loss, especially
in teams, did not arrive at Pa-kia-tsy until
about
5 p.m.
No more
Guard
attacks were
made by
Infantry.
The
1st Brigade
the Japanese on the Ba-ji-
san entered into a stationary fight against portions
Corps on the Lien-huaschan, lasting into the afternoon neither Russians nor Japanese made any decisive step. The 4th Guard Regiment, standing north-east of Schanthe 3rd Guard liu-ho-tsy, did not advance either Regiment was still at Pa-kia-tsy, with two of its companies on the Ka-ko-rei-san. In the afternoon the Divisional Commander received a message from the Chief of General Staff, 1st Army, saying that about one regiment of Russian Infantry was apparently marching against the Guard Division from the direction of Sia-pinColonel Kasa's tai-tsy, south of Bian-yu-pu-sa. Cavalry, on the right flank of the Division, moreof the 4th Siberian
; ;
Army
over, reported the presence of strong hostile forces

'
P. 120.
171
about
10,000
men between Wai-tau-schan and

natives
Bian-yu-pu-sa,
estimating
the
enemy's
strength in that neighbourhood even at 20,000
These reports evidently referred to the men. 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which the Commander of the Eastern Detachment was pushing forward in a north-westerly direction from its
position at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy.^
The
right
wing of the 2nd Division, having
at
that time not yet pushed beyond the heights east
of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, the
it
Guard
Division, deployed as
was towards the north-west, with its back turned against the newly reported hostile forces, was in a very dangerous situation. So as to have at once strong forces available to oppose the new enemy, should he continue to advance from Wai-tauschan, the Divisional
for the present
Commander decided to abstain
from continuing the attack on the Lien-hua-schan. As an immediate protection, the detachment the 3rd Guard Regiment had sent to the Ka-ko-rei-san was reinforced by two more companies.
The
it
Division then spent the night in the

1st
position
in
was holding, the
Brigade probably
close touch with General Shileiko's battalions which were occupying the Lien-hua-schan. When, on October 11, the attack of the 3rd Brigade 2nd Division on the Western San-joshi-san was making no progress. General Baron Nishijima asked for support from Headquarters of the 1st Army, which then gave him the 29th Kobi Regiment. The Divisional Commander placed the regiment at the disposal of the 3rd Brigade,
'
P. 151.
172

of capturing the
The Japa- with the objcct

Division
the'i-rht wing of
jo-shi-san at night,
Western Sanwhile the 15th Brigade was to
attack the heights north-west of Sia-Hu-ho-tsy.

in
Siberian
Army
from the
San-jo-
shi-san back to
Brigade, after a severe contest, succeeded The attack, of which completing its task. details are not known, began as early as 7 p.m. on Octobcr 1 1 but it was past midnight before the Japanese were masters of the Western
,
The 3rd
San-io-shi-san. ^
The
losses of the four battalions
the
wSof
Do-mousouth^
taking part in the attack, including the action on October 11, were 185 men dead and 718 men
...
wounded.
The 29th Kobi Regiment was taking
part in the night attack only as reserve.

1'he great exhaustion of the troops obliged the
Len-ge-
san,aud
Detach-
Commander
to give the brigade a rest for a few
from the
heights
hours in the position captured. 15th Brigade, which, on the afternoon of 'J^'he October 11, had captured Temple Hill, continued
waand
from the back to
san.
advaucc at 3.30 on the morning of October 12, proceeding to attack the heights of rr-wa, held by portions of the 4th Siberian and 1st Army The Corps, as well as by Plan's Detachment. The six companies of following were to attack
its
:
the 29th Infantry Regiment,^ the heights east of rr-wa; the 16th Infantry Regiment, the height
projecting south
of the Nan-san
left
and the 30th
Infantry Regiment, to the

'
of the 16th Infantry
Regiment and the .3rd Battalion 29th Infantry the other two battalions of the regiment were the reserve Nishijima had six companies of it of the Divisional Commander. attached to the loth Brigade on the afternoon of October 11. ' Belonging to the 3rd Brigade placed under orders of the 15th
Tlie 4th Infantry
;
Regiment
Brigade by the Divisional

(P. 131.)
Commander on
the afternoon of October 11.
173
Regiment, the slopes west of the Nan-san. The Divisional Commander was following from West San-kia-tsy with two companies in reserve behind The the centre of the 16th Infantry Regiment. latter formed up at Orr-wa after some strong officers' patrols had driven away small protective bodies the Russians had left behind before the movement had begun. Then seven companies advanced to assault with the bayonet the height south
of the Nan-san, driving back, after a brief struggle,
the Russian garrison, completely taken by surprise and furnished by the 146th Infantry Regiment,
which, by direct orders of Kuropatkin, had occupied

the heights east of Tan-hai-schi on October 11/
The Japanese were in possession of the heights One company of the 16th Infantry at 5.10 a.m. Regiment was acting as flank-guard, and had
passed Orr-wa on the east
;
one of
its
sections,
without meeting with any resistance, had just been reaching the knoll east of that place, when, in the dark, one battalion of General Man's Detachment, probably from the 121st Infantry Regiment, was marching past it at a distance of not more than 50 metres. The section delivered a rapid fire at this range, taking the battalion completely by surprise and causing it to face about and stream back into the valley west of Sia-liu-ho-tsy. The six companies of the 'iOth Infantry Regiment occupied the height south-east of Orr-wa without serious opposition by the enemy. The 30th Infantry Regiment, advancing against the western slopes of the Nan-san, met at first with superior
'
r. 138.
174
Russian Infantry, which, however, withdrew in a

northerly direction as soon as the sahent height
south of the Nan-san had been captured by the
advance the regiment had estabhshed touch with the right wing of the 4th Army that wing, having likewise taken its direction on the Nan-san, the 30th Infantry Regiment was moved towards the right, behind the 16th Infantry Regiment, and engaged between it and the 29th Infantry Regiment. The 16th Infantry Regiment had meanwhile continued its attack, capturing the Nan-san itself without meeting with any material resistance. That height was then given over to the
its
^
;
16th Infantry Regiment.
During
4th
Army.
the morning of October 12 the brigade was
On
holding a position extending from the ridge west

of Sia-liu-ho-tsy by rr-wa to the Nan-san, facing
north-east generally. The firing-lines entrenched, the reserves finding good cover in the deep nullahs
on the slopes. began to be light the Russian Artillery commenced to fire. At first two batteries did so from the neighbourhood east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, but they soon ceased and moved off. Then some
clefts
and
When
it
batteries
came
into
action farther north

as
at
the
Len-ge-san, without producing any effect whatever,
the projectiles,
patrols,
usual,
overshooting the
mark.
The
sent
by the 15th Brigade beyond

;
the position, ascertained that the heights northeast of rr-wa were strongly occupied a Russian
'11th Kobi Brigade.

at
175
Infantry brigade was reported to be in reserve
Ha-ma-tan.
which had captured the Western San-jo-shi-san, had started again after a repose at night of some hours' duration, and at 6.30 a.m. was standing south of Sen-kiu-yo ready
Brigade,
to attack the heights south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.
The 3rd
As soon
as the concentration of these troops
noticed, the
Russian batteries opened
fire
was from
these heights, but, the bursting points of the shells
behig far too high, no results were obtained.

right half of the Japanese
The
2nd Artillery Regiment

itself
then came into action on the western slopes of the
Western
fire
San-jo-shi-san,
drawing upon
;
the
of the Russian batteries
the other half, having
taken up a position north of Pan-kia-tsy already on the evening of October 11, resumed its fire too.
ith considerable
expenditure of ammunition they
succeeded in silencing, about 9.30 a.m., the Russian

batteries standing at Sia-liu-ho-tsy
;
they could
now
direct their fire entirely

position.
upon the Russian Infantry Previously two batteries of the Guard

Brigade,
Artillery, at the request of
commanding the 3rd
General Matsunaga, had fired from
Pa-kia-tsy upon that position. ing from

volleys
At
10.30 a.m. the
3rd Brigade deployed for attack.
When
;
emerg-
Sen-kiu-yo the Russians began firing from their shelter-trenches the Japanese returned the fire, after having come up by rushes to within 1,300 to 1,400 metres. Meanwhile the Russian Artillery resumed its fire, but again without
effect,
the sights not being altered to suit the
advance of the Japanese.
Only
at
one spot of the
176

fire
space covered by the
seemed the ranges exactly

;
to agree with the length of time-fuze the Japanese turned that dangerous zone by closing in to the
right
and
left.
After advanced by rushes brief fire-pauses the whole in groups of comparatively large size, mostly combut frequently men singly threw thempanies
attack was carried through rapidly.
line
;
The
selves
down
to recover their breath or to shoot.
Although the Japanese were obliged to traverse a perfectly level and open valley, the Russians were unable to repel the attack. At about 700 metres' range the main fire-fight blazed up, lasting, however, for seven minutes only, after which the Japanese lines resumed their rushes. The Russian fighting-line was as yet being reinforced by some
battahons of the 1st Brigade 8rd Siberian Infantry Division, under General Shileiko, which were just
at that
from the neighbourhood of Pa-kia-tsy to the Lien-hua-schan,^ but when, at 300 metres' distance, the attacker made ready to The assault, the Russians abandoned the position. retreating croAvd was rallied by supports mo\dng up and occupying a crest-line east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy. About 12.30 p.m. the 3rd Brigade was in possesretiring
moment
sion
of
the height south-east
of
Sia-liu-ho-tsy.
The comparatively small losses 29 men dead and 213 wounded were pretty evenly distributed over
the whole distance traversed in the advance, thus

indicating that the Russians
tice
first
made no
better prac-
even at the close ranges.

'
General Matsunaga
reorganised his troops in the position captured,

P. 166

;
177
and then gave them some rest he meant to resume the offensive against the Len-ge-san in the But about 2 p.m. he was ordered to afternoon. march with his brigade and two batteries by way
of the Tschau-hsien-Hn Pass, urgent reinforcements
being needed on the eastern wing.

For, about
10.30 a.m., a message of the 4th
in
its
Army came
saying that
of
at
Headquarters of
of
1st
Army,
Infantry had captured the heights
Man-kia-fn, north
the
San-kai-seki-san.
The Guards, moveover, had
reported that they had
already reached the heights east of Do-mon-shi.
Headquarters concluded from these reports that the attack was making progress, and that the Russians were falling back generally, opposite the situation of the Guard and 2nd Divisions the 12th Division being still looked upon as critical. General Baron Kuroki resolved to rein;
Army
force
the right wing by the 3rd Brigade.
The
message from the 4th Army was afterwards found to be erroneous, the 10th Division having not got beyond the San-kai-seki-san. In view of the Russian batteries still in position at Do-mon-shi and south-west of the Len-ge-san, an immediate departure of the 3rd Brigade through the open valley of Tsun-yau Pa-kia-tsy did not seem feasible the Commander therefore ordered his troops to cook, and arranged for them to start at 7 p.m. When about that time the brigade was on the point of moving off, the report of a patrol seemed to indicate that the Russians were advancing to attack from the Len-ge-san but it was soon found that it was nothing more than a
12
178
small

party,
probably
Th'j
pushed
after
forward
a
to
re-
connoitre.
skirmishers
deploying
against
them drove them back
brief fire-fight.
At
7.30 p.m. the brigade started for the eastern

battalion
wing, leaving one
of
the
29th
Kobi
Regiment behind
to
hold the captured position
south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.
The 15th
Brigade, after occupying the heights

first
east of rr-wa, remained at
in the position
by numerous fire-trenches. The Infantry fire of General Man's troops, directed from the Lo-to-san at distant ranges, was not replied to during the forenoon. About noon the left Abteilung of the 2nd Artillery Regiment,
captured, fortifying
it
standing hitherto in action north of Pan-la-schantsy,^
was placed under the orders of the brigade. The Abteilung then advanced by batteries on rrwa. The battery arriving first unlimbered on the low-lying slope north-east of Temple Hill, between 1 and 2 p.m. about 3 p.m. the other batteries had completed their change of position too. One
;
came into action at rr-wa, firing common shell upon Russian Infantry north of the Lo-to-san,
the other joined the battery which
first.
had arrived time Headquarters of the 2nd Division arrived on Temple Hill. Afterwards the last battery of the regiment ^ was brought up too it did no longer come into action, but remained limbered up in reserve east of Temple Hill. Close south-west of Temple Hill was standing an Abteilung of the 10th Division adjoining on
About
this
p. 175.
'
Two
batteries
had been hauded over to the 3rd Brigade.

the
left, firing
179
in a north-westerly direction
upon
Russian batteries, probably belonging to the 1st Army Corps. The officer commanding the Abtei-
lung was on 'I'emple Hill directing the fire from there with the aid of a chain of men, transmitting his orders by word of mouth. When the Japanese batteries had opened fire, the 15th Brigade made several attempts to storm
the Lo-to-san, each attempt failing owing to the
severe
fire
of
General
JNIau's
Infantry.
Those
portions of the firing-line which, rushing forward,
were unable to maintain themselves on the open groimd, and were therefore obliged to crawl back again into the trenches. Darkness coming on, the attempts for assaulting were given up for the present. The brigade lost 569 men on October 12, and spent 110,000 rounds of ammunition. heavy thunderstorm broke during the night, Under cover of that storm lasting till morning. General Okasaki, commanding the 15th Brigade, once more tried to capture the Lo-to-san. But the Russians were not to be surprised they beat
had
left
the trenches,
off the attack.
The
at
Staff of the
2nd Division, together with the

^
Divisional Reserve
still
available, spent the night
East San-kia-tsy.
To comply as quickly as possible with Marshal Marquis Oyama's demands of executing a right wheel in the direction of Tan-hai-schi,- General
Two companies 2yth Infantry Regiment and one battalion Syth Kobi Regiment.
'
P. 106.
180
The Japa- Couiit
ncsc 10th Division

Nodzu had ordered
the 10th Division on the
th^Sankai-seki-
evening of October 11 to capture the San-kai-seki^^^ ^y ^ night attack. This rocky height, rising
pushes
of the"^ Russian
Corps
north,
named by the Japanese Futa-go-yama or Twins Hill, owing to the similarity of its two knolls, seemed to them to be the key of the Russian position at the foot of the hill, as well as on its slopes, were strong entrenchrnents on the saddle between the knolls was a Chinese temple surrounded by a wall.^ The troops of the 10th Division, after what they had been doing on October 11, were, on the evening of that day, standing in two separate groups. While the 20th Brigade, under General Marui, was to make a frontal attack from its position
abruptly from the plain,
also
; ;
south of Ta-pu, Colonel Kamada, with the 8th
Brigade and 12th Kobi Regiment, was to attack from the west both columns were to start at a fire-signal appearing on a hill to their rear. The
;
assaulting troops took off their knapsacks, leaving
behind all clattering and rattling objects, and put on their greatcoats. To recognise each other more readily in the dark, they fastened a white
band round their left arm. At blazed up, and so they started.
a.m.
the
fire
Of the
was
20th Brigade, the 39th Infantry Regiment
in first line, the battalions being deployed on a broad front, in line with each other the 20th Infantry Regiment was following, Echeloned to the right. In spite of all precautionary measures the attack was discovered early in the Russian position, which was occupied by the 145th Infantry Regiment,
;
'
Appendix XV'II.
FIRST
from the
a hot
1st
fire
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

Army
upon the
assailants
it,
181
Corps/ the regiment directing

in
the darkness.
The Japanese
did not return
but advanced by
rushes as far as San-kuai-schi village, at the foot

of the San-kai-seki-san.
obstinate resistance.
Here they met with an
A destructive fire was poured

proving,
on them from the houses and loopholed walls, forcing them to seek cover and take up the firefight.
Their
fire
however, ineffective,
all
they presently rose again and attacked the trenches

at the foot of the
hill,
rushing from
furious
sides into
fight
the village, where
hand-to-hand
developed.
The 20th
farther
east,
Infantry Regiment, sweeping around
and
losing
touch
with
the
39th
Infantry Regiment, took part in the fray from
3 o'clock in the morning.

while,
also
Rifle-fire being,
mean-
heard in the neighboin-hood of the

left
Nan-san, a battalion was

the
right
behind to protect
flank
the
other
two
battalions,
on
hearing the noise of the action at the San-kaiseki-san,
wheeled around north-west and attacked
the Russians holding the rocky knolls.
The struggle lasted for some time indecisively. When, finally, both regiments had engaged their reserves, they succeeded in driving the enemy from
the trenches on the southern and
slopes,
south-eastern
and pushing them
in a northerly direction,
;
after charging
vigorously with the bayonet
the
Russians in San-kuai-schi village alone continued

to offer an obstinate resistance, their retreat having
been cut
off.
With
the object of avoiding un1
p. 138.
182

the Adjutant of
his
necessary bloodshed,
Brigade,
called
the 20th
acting
for
upon
the senior Russian officer

;
wounded Commander, commanding
down arms but LieutenantGringenberg, the acting Colonel of the Colonel 145th Infantry Regiment, replied he had ordered Another his men to hold out to the very last.
in the village to lay
summons
to surrender,
which a non-commissioned
officer addressed to the Russian privates straight, the rewas responded to by some 100 men
;
mainder, about 200 men, determined to continue Tlien the Japanese rushed into the the fight. many of them were carrying in their village
;
hands
dry
gaoljan
fagots,
laying
fire
to
the
In a few minutes the village was ablaze. houses. All the Russians remaining in the village were either cut down or perished in the flames. The sister brigade of the 20th (the 8th Brigade)
took an active share in the attack, too, as ordered.
The
'iOth
Infantry Regiment was set to assault
the San-kai-seki-san from the south-west, and the 10th Infantry Regiment to assault from the west.
The 40th
deployed
Infantry Regiment, with two battalions

in first line,
and followed by one battalion as well as by the 12th Kobi Regiment in second line, gained touch with the 39th Infantry Regiment at Sui-tsy-schan. At Ta-pu its left came in touch with the 10th Infantry Regiment, which had likewise deployed two battalions, with one in The attack of both regiments proceeded reserve. at the same rate, as the 20th Brigade slowly As the 145th Russian Infantry gained ground. Regiment was holding especially strongly the
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

;
183
westernmost of the two hilltops, the position could not be stormed ofF-hand the 10th Infantry Regiment was, moreover, being enfiladed by fire from
Tsan-kia-tun.
Towards
the
morning
its
the
5th
Company
of the regiment worked
way forward
slopes,
single-handed, climbing
up the south-western
and breaking by surprise into the enemy's
position.
The Russians fell back, leaving a large portion of the rocky knoll in the hands of the Japanese.
the 2nd Battalion example of the 5th, the whole western portion of the hill was gradually taken possession of. Only in a few clefts of the rocks, difficult of access, the defenders were still offering a desperate resistance. The combat lasted till daybreak when it was perfectly light, the whole height was in the hands of the the other companies of
following the
;
On
Japanese.
The 10th
Division had lost heavily
15 officers
dead and 45 wounded, 1,250 men dead or wounded. The Russians left about 800 dead behind on the hillsides in addition, 200 prisoners, 2 field-guns, and 8 ammunition waggons fell into the hands
;
To give some rest to the muchexhausted troops after the attack, and to allow them to reorganise their units. General Count Nodzu, early on the morning of October 12, when
of the Japanese.
the Banner of the Rising

the captured
heights
hill,
Sun was
floating over
ordered the 10th and 11th Kobi Brigades to continue the attack against the line
east
of Yen-tschien-tschai
JNIan-kia-fon,
and the 10th Division to stand

at
fast for the present
the
San-kai-seki-san.
The 8th Brigade was
184

by
General
apportioned
Baron
Kawamura
as
Divisional Reserve.
On
the Russian side, the 1st Brigade 37th In-
fantry Division, from the 1st

losing the San-kai-seki-san
Army
Corps, after
and the Nan-san, with-
drew to the line Tsan-kia-tun

Ha-ma-tan, being
Brigade.
reinforced
heights
there
south of
In addition, the 88th Infantry
by the 2nd Regiment,
the
Battery 7th Artillery Brigade, the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, as well as the two Transbaikal Cossack Batteries, were brought up
4th
at the
from Tun-san-tsy to Tun-san-ho, and placed

disposal of the Division.
division
In
this
new
position the
12.
was no longer attacked on October
On
fallen
the east, the 37th
Infantry Division was
again in touch with Mau's Detachment, which had
back before the Japanese 15th Brigade^ to the heights south of Ha-ma-tan. The attack of the Japanese 10th Division was continued by the Kobi troops. The 11th Kobi Brigade had been moved up so early that it was already deployed and advancing from Siau-pu on Tan-hai-schi when the 15th Brigade was making The Kobi Brigade its attack on the Nan-san. resumed touch on the right with the 30th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Brigade 2nd Division, and, advancing over the Nan-san after the Russians had
given
way to the pressure of the 15th Brigade, occupied a two-knolled low hill to the west of The 2nd Division, on the left Yen-tschien-tschai.
of the 1st
Army, intending
'
to continue
its
attack
on the Lo-to-san, the 11th Kobi Brigade was given

Pp. 176 and 179.
FIRST
as its
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
185
next objective the occupation of the Djo-san, The brigade was deeast of Yen-tschien-tschai. ployed on a broad front, with the 43rd on the
and the 22nd Kobi Regiment on the left. The 10th Kobi Brigade and portions of the 10th Division were standing at the San-kai-seki-san, covering the left flank of the 22nd Kobi Regiment. The Divisional Artillery Regiment, as well as the 14th Field Artillery Regiment, unlimbered in the plain east of the San-kai-seki-san the former was firing upon hostile Artillery of the Russian 1st Army Corps in the direction of Tun-san-ho and Ku-kia-tsy, and the latter, pushing some batteries to the foot of the height west of Yen-tschientschai, was firing upon the strong position at the Djo-san. The various attacks made by the Inright
;
fantry against the heights failed in like
manner
as
those
made by
the 15th Brigade on the right against
the Lo-to-san.
The Russians had
again strongly
entrenched themselves on the Djo-san.
The
ad-
vance was, moreover, rendered very

the flanking
fire
difficult
by
of Artillery from the neighbour-
hood of Tun-san-ho.
material progress
after 9 o'clock in the
being
The day passed without any made an attack made

;
evening likewise
Division,
failed.
The 10th Kobi

ployed of
the
Brigade, and the portions de-
10th
who might have
attacked frontally in the direction of Tsan-kia-tun,

to relieve the pressure
on the 11th Kobi Brigade,
abstained from doing so, in consideration of the evident superiority of the enemy in the positions
opposite.
The 5th
Division, which, by
Oyama's
order,
had
186
The
Western
Detachcider, to

his
Ku-schu-tsy on Octobcr 11,^ deployed again on the 12th, in cooperation with the 3rd Division, against the
concentrated as
reserve
at
advanced guard
ou the
Schi-h-
advanccd-guard position of the 10th Army Corps ^^ the Schi-h-ho but did not carry out an attack Infantry, merely confining itself to firing \yy with Artillery. The Russians replied with their ^j,îiigj.y from their position, but for the rest did nothing decisive against the Japanese Division. The Russian Commander-in-Chief had no intentions at all of acting offensively with the Western Detachment the loss of the San-kai-seki-san and Nan-san having become known to him, he even
; ;
in consideration also of of the 2nd Japanese the threatening Army on October 11 to withdraw the advanced portions of the 10th and 17th Army Corps to the main position on the hne Liu-tan-kou Hun-pauconsidered
it
necessary
attacks
be sent to that effect to the Commander of the Western Detachment, adding that the 10th Army Corps should atj the same time concentrate at least one Division,
schan.
He
directed
orders to
keeping
it
as long as possible in reserve.
The 17th Army Corps being

engaged
this
already
hotly
with
the
Japanese
at
it
2nd
Army
wheni
Baron]
order arrived,
7.30 a.m.. General
Bilderling considered
it.
impossible to comply with
Retreating at once under the fire of the' Japanese simply spelt ruin. He, moreover, knew
the 6th Siberian Army Corps to be echeloned to the right behind the 17th Army Corps, and wasj hoping that that force, as well as Dembovski'si
'
P. 146.
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

his
187
Detachment, would prevent

being enveloped.
tinue the fight
in
right flank
from
He
therefore resolved to con-
the advanced-guard positions
on
This intention was his own responsibility. made known to the Generals in command, the
10th
Army
Corps receiving Bilderlings order at
8.15 a.m.
But General Slutshevski had already received

the directive above mentioned straight from Kuropatkin, and
had handed
it
;
down
to the
commander
of the advanced guard
General Riabinkin had
thereupon reported that the retrograde movement was being gradually initiated from the left. General Baron Bilderling, shortly after sending
advanced-guard positions, requested the 10th Army Corps to keep its reserves behind its right wing, so as to be able, in case of need, to close the gap between But almost at the 10th and 17th Army Corps. the same moment a fresh order came in from the Commander-in-Chief demanding the reserves of the corps to be placed behind its left wing, ready to support Man's Detachment with one regiment or with one brigade. General Riabinkin, moreover, asked to be allowed to delay the retreat into the main position until evening, as a withdrawal
his
order to stand fast
in
the
by day would be causing too much

shevski thought he
loss.
All these contradictory demands General Slut-
would meet best by agreeing
with Riabinkin's intentions. With the units of the 9th Infantry Division assembled around Hunpau-schan,
support,
he
was
able
to
meet requests
for
as well as to
prolong the right of his
188
THE RUSSO JAPANESE WAR

To
enable him in ur-
advanced-guard position.
gent cases to bring rapid aid to the Centre, he ordered General Gerschelmann, commanding the
9th
the
33rd Infantry Regiment from Nin-kuan-tun to behind

Infantry Division,
to
move up
the
wing of the corps, and to occupy the \dllage mentioned by one battalion from the 36th Infantry Regiment. General Slutshevski reported the arrangements he had made to the Commanderin-Chief, and to the leader of the Western Detachment.
left
Kuropattends to
Kuropatldn's directive to Slutshevski, to place

his
reserv'cs
behind the left wing, probably oriorinated from the Commander-in-Chiefs general <^ gap be... tween the anxiety for the Centre. The possibility of the Japanese advancing into the gap between the Detachmentand Eastern Detachment and the ^th Siberian Army
closethe
.
Centre
Corps, in the neighbourhood of the Eastern San-
Teserveôf jo-shi-san, breaking thereby the
the East- ^,rjs
tachment,
5th East
Jjiêrian
vision,
Russian Centre, Constantly preying on the mind of Kuropatkin. The danger of penetration was increasing, when during the day it became known that the 1st Brigade of the Japanese Guard Division had occupied the Ba-ji-san, thus actually penetrating
into the imperilled
;
gap staking strong forces was all that was wanted now for completely breaking the Russian battle-fi'ont. It seeming impossible to spare for the moment
the only reserve
still
available in the Centre, the

1st
22nd Infantry Division, from the

'
Army
Corps,*
Division had already been
The 88th Infantry Regiment and one battery of the 22nd Infantry moved up from Tuu-san-tsy to Tun-san-ho
(P. 184.)
in support of the 37th Infantry Division.
FIRST
to bring
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
189
standing north of Tun-san-ho, Kuropatkin decided
up the 5th East
Siberian Rifle Division,
forming the reserve of the Eastern Detachment, and to close the gap with it.
But General Baron Stackelberg did not feel By inclined to comply with Kuropatkin's request. reason of the reports arriving from the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the evening of October 11, he had finally resolved to give up the attack, and to conhimself entirely to the defensive.^ The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which he had not yet engaged, he wished to keep available for
fine
guarding his right flank, which he believed to be in danger of being enveloped but he had not yet reported to the Commander-in-Chief the grave
;
resolve
he had come
to.
Even
in
the
letter
Stackelberg was dispatching to
General
quarters at 6 a.m. on October 12, there
Headwas not
a single word of it. He reported on the measures he meant to adopt in case of his right flank being enveloped but kept silent on the fact that all
;
attacks of the Eastern
Detachment had hitherto failed, and that he had given up persisting in them further. He therefore kept the Commander-inChief for the
moment
still
in the belief that all
was going well with the Eastern Detachment. A lively correspondence was carried on between the Commander-in-Chief and the leader of the Eastern Detachment about the employment of
the
5th East
Siberian
Rifle
till
Division,
nightfall.
dragging
along from early morning
As
early as 5 o'clock in the

'
morning Kuropatkin
P. 151.
190
had sent General Baron Stackelberg tlie order to start at once the whole available reserve of the 2nd
Siberian
Army
Corps, or at least ten battalions,

Siberian
for joining
temporarily the 4th
Army
Corps
the height, moreover, west of Yen-sin-tun,'
was to be secured by one battalion with some guns. Of this intention the Commander-in-Chief
informed General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th
Siberian
Army
Corps, by a message received by

a.m.
him about 10
first
The
letter proposed,
in
the
instance, to keep, in case of retreat, the eye
on
rr-tau-kou, 4j kilometres north of Fn-kia-pu, but to fall back only step by step, offering
an obstinate resistance, especially on the heights north of Schan-hei-niu-tun. " If you are obliged," Kuropatkin concluded his letter, " to evacuate your present position in the face of a superior enemy, I authorize you to demand, in my name, from the leader of the Eastern Detachment, the dispatch of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps ^ to Fn-kia-pu that corps will then come under your orders. The leader of the Eastern Detachment will be informed of this at the same time." When the Japanese 3rd Brigade was about to
;
capture the height of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, and General
Kossovich in front
was
gradually falling
back
upon
the
for
main
position,
south
of
Schan-hei-
niu-tun,^ General Sarubaiev thought the time
had
come
Corps,
*
dispatching
moving up the 2nd Siberian Army therefore about noon to
On
' ^
That
the Upper Scha-ho, north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa. is to say, essentially, the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.
P. 168.
FIRST
the
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

Detachment
a
191
that
Eastern
summons
to
effect.
Stackelberg had abeady rephed to the

after
Com-
mander-in-Chief, at 9.45 a.m., in a negative sense,

receiving his letter.
" If the 4th Siberian
Army
support
Corps
it
is
retiring
farther
north
into
I
the
shall
position of Schan-hei-niu-tun," he wrote, "
with the 2nd
Siberian
Army
Corps.
With
that object I have
moved up one regiment

to the west of Bian-
of infantry,
yu-pu-sa.
to
with
artillery,
it
become necessary, I intend advance with the 2nd Siberian Army Corps,
Should
. . .
and attack the right flank of the enemy pressing the 4th (Siberian) Army Corps. The 1st and 3rd (Siberian) Army Corps," he goes on in the same telegram,^ "have orders to go forward, and in no case to retire."
The Commander of the Eastern Detachment thought he was relieved by his report to the Commander-in-Chief from replying to the General
Commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The additional remark, referring to the 1st and
worthy of notice. Even at this hour General Baron Stackelberg fought shy of reporting clearly how matters were proceeding on his wing. Instead of reporting that the attack was given up as impossible, and that the Eastern Detachment had assumed already the defensive, Stackelberg thought fit to choose some ambiguous terms. Before this letter arrived at General Headquarters, General Kuropatkin had drawn up a
3rd
Siberian
Army
Corps,
is
'
The complete wording
of the telegram
is
not available.
192
fresh order for Stackelberg, dispatched at 9.40 a.m.
from the heights of Tun-san-ho, and received by

the Eastern Detachment about 2.30 p.m.^
The
Detachment's attack is hanging fire, and the Japanese, on the other hand, are continuing their attack on the 4th Siberian Army Corps with great obstinacy, leading perhaps to penetration between the Eastern and Western Detachments, I have left it to General Sarubaiev, when forced to evacuate the position he is occupying, to move up to him the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. Should General Sarubaiev make this demand, I propose you should start the Corps on
Fn-kia-pu.
note ran as follows " Since the Eastern

:
Try to avoid that

-
necessity.
[?]
have ordered General Gerngross to-day to support General Sarubaiev, and to send at least one brigade
to the left
wing of the
this,
latter."
In reply to
Stackelberg reported at 3.40
p.m. the following
"With
the object of securing myself and the
Corps against penetration by Yen -sin- tun and Bian-yupu-sa, 1 have pushed forward the 2nd Siberian Army Corps into a position south of Tin-kia-tai Sun-wu-pu-tsy, facing west and south-west touch has been established with the 1st Siberian Army Corps by the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass. During the night 1 will withdraw from the fighting-line every
4th Siberian
Army
the Japanese between
The indifferent connection between General Headquarters and the Eastern Detachment is striking, orders and reports needing five to six hours before reaching their destination. General Commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps.
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

of
193
unit that can be spared, so as to strengthen the
General Reserve
Corps.
the
corps
and the better
secure the right flank of the 1st Siberian
Army
By day
it
is
difficult for
the troops to
having regard to the commanding positions of the enemy. The General Reserve, seven battalions from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, is standing between Ta-tsy-pu and Wai-tau-schan at the northern foot of the height with the temple, so as to hide its position from the Japanese post of observation at A.' ^ I have no longer any sectional reserve, since, by your Excellency's Order (10,081), I am holding ready
'
carry out the movements,
the 2nd Siberian the disposal

of
Army
the 4th
I
Corps for placing

Siberian
it
it
at
Army
Corps.
At
the same time
consider
my
duty to report
by the withdrawal of the 4th Siberian Army Corps to Fn-kia-pu, the country between Yensin-tun and the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass will be completely denuded of troops, and thus open to an attack by the Japanese." As the asked-for support by the 2nd Siberian The 4th
that,
Corps failed to arrivê, General Sarubaiev, Army*" meanwhile, appealed directly to Kuropatkin's Head- porps quarters for help. On this he received a note reinfrom the Chief of the Staff* at 2.10 p.m., saying f%^'p^ ^^ that three remments and five batteries of the 22nd from the 22nd Division 1st Army Corps ^ had starte 1 and were infantry '^'^'^"'"coming under his orders. But since the Commander-in-Chief, in his constant practice of always
'
Army
The The
position of this post of observation
"A
"
is
not known.
85th, 86th, and 87th Infantry Regiments, and the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, 5th
and Gth Batteries 7th Artillery
Brifj:ade.
13
194
forming fresh reserves, was holding back the 86th Infiintry Regiment, as well as the 5th and 6th Batteries 7th Artillery Brigade, only two regiments of two different brigades and the 1st Abteilung 7th Artillery Brigade, as well as a Sapper company, joined the 4th Siberian Army Corps and with them arrived the General Commanding the Division and three Generals of Brigade Of these reinforcements two battalions from the 87th Infantry Regiment were engaged in first line at Ma-niu-tun, on the left wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps the other portions did no longer come into action on October 12, but bivouacked
;
!
2 kilometres north-east of Schan-hei-niu-tun.^
In spite of this direct support he had given to the 4th Siberian Army Corps, General Kuropatkin
adhered to his intention of moving up the 2nd Siberian Army Corps as well for reinforcing the Centre. "Without waiting for Stackelberg's reply to his letter dispatched at 9.40 a.m., he therefore sent another order to Stackelberg, worded as
follows
^*
SCHI-MIAU-TSY, EAST OP TuN-SAN-HO.
" Dispatched
\.\5 p.m.
" General Sarubaiev,
who was
holding a position
north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy and Pa-kia-tsy, is forced to retire, and is falling back in the direction of
Yen-san-sai and Schan-hei-niu-tun.
the 22nd Division in his support.
I
am
sending
Immediately
' During the action, lasting all day, two battalions of the 147th Infantry Regiment and one battery of the 43rd Artillery Brigade were already engaged by the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The battalions were employed on the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.
"
FIRST
after
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

;
195
receipt
of this order, start the 2nd Corps
(by forced march) on Yen-sin-tun^

further, as the
continue then
General Commanding the 4th Siberian Corps may arrange. If you have already engaged portions of that corps, you must at all
Army
cost replace the missing units, or relieve

parts of other corps.
I
them by
grant that the situation
of the 1st Siberian
Corps is rather alarming. There must not be an isolated withdrawal without maintaining close touch with the left of the 4th Let me know your views Siberian Army Corps. on the co-operation of the 1st and 3rd Siberian
Army
Army
Corps."
With the portions attached to him from the 22nd Division General Sarubaiev thought himself now strong enough for holding the heights south of Sia- and Schan-hei-niu-tun without the aid of He reported this the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.
view to General Kuropatkin.
When,
late
in
the afternoon.
General Baron
dispatched
at
Stackelberg
the
received
the
Order
1.15 p.m., he reported in reply at 6 p.m. briefly " Order No. 108, dispatched following
:
1.15 p.m., just received.
The 2nd
last
Siberian
Army
Corps
west
is
entrenching for the
three hours in
a position south-east of Yen-sin-tun, facing south;
the right
is
standing at the knoll with the

last report to
temple."
General Headquarters was settled by a message from Kuropatkin

General Sarubaiev's
'
9 kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa. He probably means the Wai-tau-schan.
196

Stackelberg,
to General Baron
being dispatched
by way of the 4th Siberian

reading as follows:
I
Army
Corps, and
" Dispatched 5 A^
p.m.
"
The whole
front of the 17th and 10th
Army
Corps has been standing fast until sunset. The 4th Siberian Army Corps has somewhat retired,
so as to be in line with the other corps
;
reinforced
by
fresh troops,
it
is
occupying a very favourable
position.
"The
be
issue of to-day's fight
on
this front
may
looked
1
upon
as
very favourable
generally.
have no news. The orders regarding the 2nd Siberian Army Corps you need no longer execute, the 4th Siberian Army Corps having been reinforced by portions of the 1st Army Your report on the 1st Siberian Army Corps. Corps approaching Sarubaiev's left wing I have
From you
received."^
The main body

Siberian
of
the
reinforced
5th East
TheJapa-
Army
th^^Ru?
sian ad-
guard
\Tuir
17th
Coi^s from the

west.
Rifle Division from the 2nd Siberian Corps remained therefore at Sun-wu-pu-tsy. Army While General Kuropatkin was focussing his wholc interest on his Centre, a decision was brought about on the western wing determining the 17th final issuc of the whole battle tlic Army Corps succumbed to the attacks of the Japanese 2nd Army. Oyama's Order on the evening of October 11,- by which the 2nd Army was to continue the attack
'
This report
is
not known.
P. 146.

on ho
its
197
former objects, that
is
to say, against Scha-
and to the west of it, was followed at 1.15 a.m., during the night October 11-12, by a telegraphic direction requesting the 2nd Army to reach, above all, the line Pan-kiau-pu Liu-tanvillage
kou, to enable the 4th

wheel.
Army
the
to continue
its
right
The Commander of
previously informed the
his intention to
had already Commander-in-Chief of
Army
continue to attack during the night
October 11-12.
Of
the 3rd Division, the 6th Infantry Regiment,
reinforced
by two battalions from the General Reserve of its Army,^ advanced, about midnight,
entrenching a position opposite that
from Siau-wen-kou to within 800 metres of Schili-ho village,

village,
which the Russians had strongly fortified. The fire-trenches were occupied by six companies, and connected by a communicating trench with Siau-wen-kou. Three batteries of the Divisional Artillery unlimbered at 3 a.m. close south of, and the others south-east of, Siau-wen-kou. In addition, one battery of the 4th Division and one composite battery of 10*5 centimetre guns, captured at Kin-tschou, took up a position on the western border of VVu-li-tai-tsy. The advance and the entrenching of the Japanese were discovered by the Russians, who fired at the Japanese, but without material effect, the fire being too high in the darkness. The Japanese remained in their trenches till morning, the trenches being constructed to allow
'
them
to fire standing-.
llegimeut.
From the 34th Infautry
198

^
The main forces of the Division, after having been driven out of Nan-kuan-tsy by the Russians at 11 p.m. on October 11, entrenched themselves again 800 metres away from the village, waiting The reserve of for the morning of October 12.
the Division was standing at Schuan-tai-tsy.
From
wood way up
its
positions at Yen-kia-wan,
it,
and the
little its
south-east of
the 6th Division worked
to the enemy slowly, by very cleverly advantage of the darkness but the taking greatest caution had to be exercised, the Russians keeping a sharp look-out, and frequently opening Repeatedly it was thought the enemy was fire. going to sally from his position at Siau-tun-tai and
;
Orr-schi-kia-tsy for counter-attack.
The 11th Brigade
6th Division, which in the
evening had reached the little wood south-east of Yen-kia-wan, and was commencing to throw up shelter-trenches," was suddenly surprised at The commander decided night by a violent fire.
to await the enemy's attack in the shelter-trenches.
But when,
patrols,
after
some time, the
firing ceased,
all
pushed forward, reported that again in the enemy's position, the

seized the favourable
and was quiet
commander
began to en-
moment
to lead his battalion

it
some 400 metres forward, where

trench once more.
The
left
column
of
the
6th
Division
24th Brigade
resumed its by advancing on Orr-schi-kia-tsy. But the column had proceeded only a short distance when it also
had captured Yen-kia-wan, movement after sunset on October 11
^which
the
P.
149.
'
P.
141

met with
a
199
lines
heavy
till
fire.
The
leading
was quiet again. Then Three times the the advance was continued. Japanese found themselves obliged to stop and
entrenched, waiting
all
work with the spade before they succeeded

getting within 600 metres of rr-schi-kia-tsy.
1st Battalion
in
The
45th Infantry Regiment, which, at
5 p.m. on October 11, had been
moved up from
the reserve to Yen-kia-wan, had cooked, and received there the order at 9 p.m. to advance and
envelop the enemy's right wing at rr-schi-kia-tsy, was unable to carry out the order completely. It
is
succeeded in advancing a good distance without loss in the deeply cut bed of the Scha-ho but when it had to quit that cover, the battalion
true,
it
was obliged
entrenching.
by heavy fire to seek shelter by It then advanced for about another 300 metres, when trenches were constructed once more, because news came from the battalion on the right that it was likewise unable to advance any farther. The 3rd and 6th Divisions had worked their way up to the enemy far enough for enabling
them to continue their attack against the right wing of the Western Detachment at dawn on
October
12.
Division remained during the night October 11-12 in the places they had reached on the 11th at the end of their march, on the line Ta-yu-tschun-pu Li-kia-tun. The 17th Army Corps of the Russians made use of the night for feeding the troops and providing them with ample ammunition, but it had
The 4th
200
been impossible to reorganise the strongly mixed

units.
On
the right, under the uniform

Stakovich,
:
command
of
Colonel
standing
at
Tsun-lun-yen-tun,
were
2 battalions from the
140th Infantry
Regiment, ^ battalion from the 11th Infantry Regiment, 1 battery of the 35th Artillery Brigade and 2 guns of the 3rd, and, in addition, the 52nd Dragoon Regiment and a detachment of Scouts from the 10th Infantry Regiment.
The
tun-tai
section Orr-schi-kia-tsy
Lan-tsy-tai Siau-
was held by: 1 battalion 137th Infantry Regiment, 2 battalions 10th Infantry Regiment, the whole of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 6 companies from the 12th Infantry Regiment, and
3 batteries 3rd Artillery Brigade. The 139th Infantry Regiment was standing in Nan-kuan-tsy. Two battalions 140th Infantry Regiment, and 1 battalion 10th Infantry Regiment, were at Lun-
wan-miau. Between Lun-wan-miau and Schi-liho were Ij battalions from the 138th Infantry Regiment, and 2 batteries 3rd Artillery Brigade. On the left, Schi-li-ho village was occupied by 2 J battalions from the 11th Infantry Regiment, 6 companies 138th Infantry Regiment, 2 companies 12th Infantry Regiment, and, in addition, by 3 batteries 35th Artillery Brigade and 2 batteries One battalion 138th Infantry Regiof the 3rd, ment and 2 squadrons 51st Dragoon Regiment were standing at Nan-wu-li-tai as sectional reserve the main reserve 3 battalions 137th Infantry Regiment and 4 batteries 35th Artillery Brigade was standing somewhat behind the centre.

Some
other battalions and
distributed,
batteries
all
201
seem to
the
have been
moreover,
along
front, the place
where they were employed being
unknown.
Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army was staying in Pu-tsau-kou from daybreak, October 12. In like manner, as partly on the previous days, officers of the Staif were sent to the Divisions with the object of keeping the General Commanding the Army constantly informed on the progress
of events.
After it had become known that the 1st Army had successfully advanced during the night, and that the 4th Army had captured the San-kaiseki-san. General Baron Oku ordered the Divisions
to carry out the attack
now
at all cost.
The advance of the 3rd Division did not make rapid progress in the forenoon. While the left
column, which, during the night, had suffered heavily, was slowly working its way up towards Nan-kuan-tsy, the 6th Infantry Regiment, being too weak for carrying out a frontal attack on the strongly fortified Schi-li-ho village, remained for
the
moment
in its position.
The
Divisional
Com-
mander first wanted to wait for the Artillery to have some effect, and also to see how the attack on Nan-kuan-tsy would turn out, before carrying
out the attack on Schi-li-ho
village.
More
rapidly and
more
effectively proceeded the

'
attack of the 6th
Division, which, at daybreak,
opened with an overwhelming Artillery fire. Army Headquarters had, from its reserve, placed at the disposal of the Division one Field Artillery regi-
202
THE RUSSO.TAPANESE WAR
ment, which the Divisional Commander, together with five batteries of his own Division, ordered to come into action at rr-tai-tsy one battery When it began to unhmbered at Yen-kia-wan. dawn, the Infantry commenced to attack. The Russian position was at first indicated merely by some glimmering points, which the Japanese took With the object of inducing for glowing cigarettes. the enemy to fire, some companies of the 2nd Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, standing north of Yen-kia-wan, began to shoot. The Russians
;
at once replied, and, contrary to their habit, not
with volleys, but with a wildly delivered individual fire. The fire-fight now ensuing increased in
violence as daylight was growing.
effect of fire could
About
;
9 a.m.
the 2nd Battahon was reinforced by the 3rd.
The
not be mistaken clearly could the Japanese watch how the Russians were carrying
back from their trenches numerous wounded, and perhaps also dead. To the 1st Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, which, the night before, had been
designated by the Divisional
the Russian
right
Commander
to turn
at rr-schi-kia-tsy, the
order
was renewed at 10 a.m. to cross the Schi-li-ho and carry out the envelopment. The battalion first pushed one company to the left bank of the Schi-li-ho, with orders to occupy the farther edge
of the river-bank
;
then a second company followed,
and
finally a third.
:
The movement was
com-
plete success
straight
;
the Japanese skirmishers appeared
on the right flank of the Russian entrenchments the Russians were altogether taken by surprise. Its effect increased when, about 11 a.m,,
203
on the left of the 1st Battalion ^Sth Infantry Regiment, came up the 1st Battalion 13th Infantry Regiment, which the Divisional Commander had likewise ordered to turn the position, with the
object of increasing the pressure.
There being no longer any sectional reserves

behind the right wing of the Russian position on the Schi-li-ho capable of meeting this envelopment,
the Russians were exposed to the
enfilade
fire.
full effect
of this
Within a short time they began to disorder and consternation began lose heavily to spread, and, without waiting for any orders, the firing-line commenced to retire, pursued by
;
the withering
first
fire
of the Japanese.
When
the
signs of demoralisation in the Russian lines were being noticed, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions 45th Regiment stormed forward against the front. Soon after 11.30 a.m. rr-schi-kia-tsy was captured by these four battalions. flag, hoisted on a tall tree, announced to the troops in rear, and particularly to the Artillery, the success gained. For the moment the Russians were still holding out in Siau-tun-tai, and in the trenches to the east of it their Artillery, too, was keeping up a brisk fire on the assailants. Portions of the lines, surging
back, established themselves again at Lan-tsy-tai.
The
Japanese, after rallying and reorganising at
pushed on towards Siau-tun-tai and Lan-tsy-tai, capturing those places about 1.30 p.m. The 48th Infantry Regiment, hitherto held back in reserve, arrived about that time in Lan-tsy-tai. A Russian battery of the 3rd Artillery Brigade, north of that village, standing in an
rr-schi-kia-tsy,
204
little lake, and almost move, was attacked and captured by unable to one company of the first line. With great difficulty
unfavourable position near a
the
artillerists
succeeded
in
escaping
with
the
breech-blocks, which they took with them.
When
the Japanese were advancing from rr-
schi-kia-tsy
on Lan-tsy-tai, an attack was made

their left flank
from a northerly direction upon
by seven
Russian squadrons, probably from the 2nd Independent Cavalry Brigade, belonging to the 17th Army Corps. The horsemen, however, did not charge îth cold steel, but
or
eight
fired at pretty close range, sitting
on
their horses.
To ward
off the attack,
one company of the 1st
Battalion 13th Infantry Regiment, acting as flank

protection, deployed, succeeding within a short time
in driving
away the
hostile Cavalry
by
fire.
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions 13th Infantry Regiment had been carrying on a lively fire-fight against
the Nan-kuan-tsy
since daybreak.
Siau-tun-tai
When, towards
to
left
section of
ground
fire
noon, the
the
of
the
Russians
;
began
slacken,
Japanese
into Siau-
advanced
their
wing penetrated
tun-tai, crossed the Schi-li-ho, and, together with
the right wing of the
45th Infantry Regiment,
captured a Russian battery standing east of that

\'illage.
companies of the right wing had been facing Nan-kuan-tsy since morning, and were but slowly working up to that place, with heavy losses.
Two
The Divisional Commander therefore reinforced them by one battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, which the Army Commander had placed at his
205
But the Russian 139th Infantry Regidisposal. ment, holding Nan-kuan-tsy, and being attacked by the 3rd Division, stood fast with great gallantry. It was only when, at 1 p.m., the troops of the 6th Division were penetrating into the village from the west, and those of the 3rd Division
from the south, that the bulk of the defenders withdrew north isolated groups, however, were still making a stand in some few buildings, and could not be driven out until about 3.30 p.m., after an obstinate contest.
;
After the capture of Lan-tsy-tai, the

of the Gth Division
Commander
moved up
all
his Artillery,
which he attached to the 13th Infantry Regiment, and initiated the pursuit. To carry it out, he detailed 4 battalions of which two were from the 23rd Infantry Regiment 2 squadrons, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company, all under General Koizumi, commanding the 24th
except
one
battery,
Brigade.
After his right wing had given way. General Th
^^*-
Wolkov, commanding the Russian 17th Army Army Corps, made some futile attempts to restore the tHeHn battle. Whatever of intact bodies he had available ^'^"1 he engaged in counter-attack. Several battalions positiuu
1^>
of
reserve
having probably been in J5cij\*.\^. were the first to ho. make a counter-attack, which, however, failed completely. In dense columns, as on review, the battalions advanced without firing a shot. The Japanese, being deployed in firing-lines in and near Lan-tsy-tai, allowed them to approach within about 600 metres, wlien they poured a
the
right
section,
north of
Lan-tsy-tai,
'
206
on the Russians, which they were unable to resist. With heavy loss, they streamed back in a northerly and easterly direction. General Baron Okubo, commanding the Japanese
rapid, withering fire
6th
Division,
expecting
further
counter-attacks
by the Russians, reinforced the troops apportioned for the pursuit by one more battalion and five
batteries.
The Japanese then

1
pressed on.
When
they were about

the Russians
kilometre north of Lan-tsy-tai,
many
made another counter-attack. After urgent requests from Bilderling, the 2nd
Brigade 55th Infantry Division was placed at last, by the 6th Siberian Army Corps, at the disposal of the Western Detachment, and arrived at
Tschien-liu-tan-kou during the forenoon.
At
12
noon the 219th Infantry Regiment of that brigade

received orders to attack, with the object of giving
relief to
the 17th
this
Army
Corps.
attack being
as the
first,
made in the same
impracticable
But the countermanner
attempt to turn the fortune of the With the same result ended a counter-attack made by portions of the 139th Infantry Regiment about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. When the Commander of the Russian 3rd Infantry Division saw that the position on the Schi-li-lo was no longer tenable, he issued orders to withdraw to the main position on the line
day
ftiiled
too.
Tschien-liu-tan-kou
who had
Pan-kiau-pu. All the troops not yet evacuated their former positions
began the movement in the direction ordered. The General Commanding the 17th Army Corps, on the other hand, seemed to be of opinion that there was no need for evacuating the Schi-li-ho

FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

;
207
position at once
he thought
it
more
practical to
begin the retreat under cover of night, and therefore issued the following
Order to the Generals com:
manding
"
Divisions, as well as to Colonel Stakovich

Officer
The General
Commanding
till
orders the
positions occupied to be held
dark, to withdraw
then into the position Pan-kiau-pu

Tschien-liu-tan-kou
Hun-lin-pu,
:
Liu-tan-kou
and
to
make
there the following dispositions " The 35th Infantry Division will occupy the
Pan-kiau-pu to Tschien-liu-tan-kou inthe 2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division will move to the right of the 35th Division, and extend to Hun-lin-pu Stakovich's Detachment will occupy Hun-lin-pu the 3rd Infantry Division will be stationed in reserve at Schu-lin-tsy. '' The General Commanding 35th Infantry Division will rally the troops retreating, organise them, and occupy with them the second position. The 3rd Infantry Division will not stop in the second
section
clusive
; ; ;
position,
but march at once to Schu-lin-tsy.
The
brigade from the 55th Infantry Division will rally
and move into the line assigned to it, a portion of which it has already been occupying to-day. All the positions taken up are to be defended. Colonel Stakovich will establish touch with the 6th Siberian Army Corps, and General Dobrshinski
with the 10th
of the action.
Army
Corps.
^
" I shall be at Scha-ho Station
at the beginning
xVmmunition
-
is
to be
replenished
during night."
'
" Bhf. Scha-ho" on map. The Order also contained
details
about baggage and ambulances.
208

conditions then prevailing,
it
Under the
was
impossible to carry out the Order.
4.45 p.m., the Order was received mander of the 35th Infantry Division, the whole
When, about by the ComSchi-
of the
li-ho
position between the Scha-ho and
village
was
already
evacuated.
;
All the
it was therefore troops were mixed, moreover out of the question to disentangle the various
units.
Not only was

till
it
impossible to hold the
Schi-li-ho position
dark, but rallying and dis-
posing the troops on the line indicated by General Wolkov were also impossible, as the Japanese were
pressing hard in pursuit, and the last pivot of the
position
TheJapaDivision captures
defended, the village of Schi-li-ho, had
fallen into the
hands of the enemy as well.
column of the Japanese 3rd Division had, by direction of the Divisional Commander,
right
The
remained
tsy, in
in its
trenches, north of Siau-wen-kou,
ho village, to
Wait for the result of the attack on Nan-kuanwhich the main forces of the Division were
engaged.
became clear, from the din of battle, that the crisis was near at hand at Nankuan-tsy. Its effect seemed already to spread to
it
About noon
the position at Schi-li-ho village,

noticed how, at
first,
it
being distinctly
quitting the
single
men were
Russian trenches, and then small groups. And moreover, the Japanese Artillery had evidently gained the mastery over the Russian batteries, the moment for successfully carrying out the assault seemed to have arrived. At 3 p.m. the order to
as,
attack was given.
Increasing their Artillery and
Infantry
fire,
by which means the Russians were
FIRST
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE
209
kept down in their trenches, the Japanese succeeded in approaching by rushes to within 600 metres without any loss. Then the Russians, with portions of the 2nd Brigade 3rd Infantry Division,
as well as of
the 138th Infantry Regiment,^ en-
gaged
in a fire-fight with volleys.
slowly worked their

of the assault.
village
way forward
The Japanese an envelopment
of the enemy's right wing accelerated the success
The
position west of Schi-li-ho
Russians,
having already been abandoned by the two companies of the 34th Infantry Regiment, advancing along the railway, succeeded
crossing the
Schi-li-ho
by the railway bridge unmolested, and in appearing then on the right The attack in flank, and in rear of the Russians. The Russians fell front was continued by rushes. back from the southern portion of the village, but
in
were still maintaining the trenches on either side, and the portion of the village north of the river the Russian batteries resumed their fire against the Japanese Infantry with great violence, too. The Japanese advanced by rushes of small groups. The flat country affording no cover at all, the men individually, after each rush, formed some small earth-cover with their spade, as was the custom with the 2nd Army generally after its experiences at Liao-yan the wounded, too, tried to protect themselves in this way from being hit once more. The whole field of attack was strewn with these
;
small earth-heaps.
When
the Japanese had approached to within
about 300 metres, the Russians withdrew in large

'
P.
147.
14
210

by the deep
troops also from the trenches outside the village,

retiring at first to the cover offered
and then through the The two companies which had made their appearance on the right flank took the retreating Russians under a most effective fire, shooting down also some of When next the Japanese their artillery horses. rose to assault in front, the trenches had all been abandoned four guns and five ammunition waggons fell into the hands of the assailants. The fight was over at 4.20 p.m. One regiment followed
valley
of the
Schi-li-ho,
northern portion of the village.
the Russians to Pan-kiau-pu.

of the village
The
heights east
being
still
strongly occupied
by
portions of the 9th Infantry Division 10th
Army
and darkness meanwhile setting in, the Japanese abstained from further pursuit, and
Corps,
bivouacked at Pan-kiau-pu.
TlieJapaLHvtsfon attacks
sian
On
the
the
left
wing of the 2nd
Army
it
the 4th
Division likewise
commenced
right
to attack early in
(4 battalions
momiug, the
column of
we? of
the Scha-
of the 7th Brigade, J squadron, 3 batteries, and ^ Pioneer company) being directed on Tsun-lun-
while the 1st Battalion yen-tun Hun-lin-pu 38th Infantry Regiment, with 2 squadrons, as left column, was to attack the line Ta-lian-tun Kuanlin-pu. The reserve of the Division assembled It was known of the enemy at Yu-kia-tien-tsy. that there was about one regiment with eight guns at Tsun-lun -yen-tun, and that there were troops of unknown strength at Ta-tai Siau-tai. In con;
sideration of the
enemy being
at Ta-tai
left
Siau-tai,
the object indicated to the
column seemed
FIRST
rather far
fore
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

;
211
away
the Divisional
order,
Commander
the
to
there-
changed
his
directing
column,
first
supported by three
Siau-tai.
companies,
attack
protective party from the Corps standing there withdrew without fighting on the approach of the .Japanese the left column therefore succeeded in capturing
The weak
6th Siberian
Army
Siau-tai as early as 8.20 a.m.
column was, meanwhile, attacking Tsun-lun-yen-tun, which Colonel Stakovich had

right
The
occupied with six companies of the 11th Infantry

Artillery on October 11, after from Ta-yu-tschun-pu.^ Fearing he would again be obliged to give way to superior forces of the Japanese, he addressed a request for support to the advanced guard of the 6th Siberian Army Corps" standing at Wan-tschuan-tsy. General Bolotov, commanding the advanced guard, did not feel justified in giving troops away but
his
Regiment and some

retreat
he decided to give
Siau-tai.
relief to Stako\'ich's
Detachment
by an offensive move of
his
advanced guard on
The .Japanese attack, meanwhile, continued to make progress. Towards noon the Japanese Artillery
succeeded in silencing Colonel Stakovich's

;
guns at Tsun-lun-yen-tun but it was not long before three Russian batteries turned up at Wantschuan-tsy, probably as a preliminary to General Bolotov 's intended offensive move, drawing upon themselves the fire of the whole Divisional
p.
143.
llie 1st Brigade
72nd Infantry Division^ with an Abteilung lOtb
Artillery Brigade.
212

The Russian
battery at Tsun-lun-yen-
Artillery.
tun was therefore soon able to resume its fire. The Japanese left column had, meanwhile, been reinforced by one more company and three batteries. The Japanese Divisional Cavalry was pushed to
Li-kia-tun to cover the left flank.
About 1 p.m. General Baron Tsukamoto, commanding the Japanese 4th Division, was informed
by Army Headquarters of the success of the other two Divisions, being at the same time requested to
contiime his attack.
The
Divisional
Commander
then reinforced the right column by one battahon,

ordering the attack on
Tsun-lun-yen-tun to be pushed home. It was about this time that the Russian 17th Army Corps was making tlie futile counterattacks
with
its
reserves
in
order
to
retain
possession of the Schi-li-ho
line.^
One
battalion
of the 138th Infantry Regiment was directed to
counter-attack from Nan-wu-li-tai on Lan-tsy-tai
Hke that of the 139th and 219th Inthe battalion was driven in north-westerly direction, where it met a Stakovich's Detachment, to which it was a welcome reinforcement. Tlie battalion was then engaged north-west of Tsun-lun-yen-tun. When
its
attack,
fantry Regiments, failed
the Russian batteries in action at Wan-tschuan-tsy,

as well as their
advanced Infantry
the
at Ta-tai,
were
4th
being
to
reinforced,
Commander
;
of
the
Division thought the Russians were
now going
make
still
counter-attack
but General Bolotov
was
holding back, causing the Japanese attack

'
Pp. 205-207.

to
213
make
further progress.
in
At
4.30 p.m. the right
column succeeded
there.
penetrating into Tsun-hmstill
yen-tun, and pushing back the Russians
in
The evacuation
a
of Tsun-lun-yen-tun was
act,
meanwhile, Colonel Stakovich had probably received General Wolko\'s order directing him to establish touch with the 6th Siberian Army Corps, and occupy Hun-lin-pu.' It was only now that several battalions of Bolotov's advanced guard sallied forth to make a counter-attack from the line Ta-tai Ho-lien-tai. The Japanese having been on the look-out for this attack, it did not come upon them as a surprise. The Russians were opposed by a strong fire-front at Siau-tai, and were obliged to fall back with considerable loss' to AVantschuan-tsy, after they had fought and carried the attack forward to some distance.^
perhaps
ôluntary
because,
The
left
column of the 4th Division followed,
occupying Ta-tai. Owing to darkness coming on, the Division

'
p. 207.
In the attack took part in first line: the 14th, 15tb, and 16th Companies 286th Infantry Regiment^ and the 2nd Battalion 28otli Infantry Regiment. Of each regiment one battalion formed the
^
reserve.
Losses.
285th Infantry Regiment

3 officers dead, 9 wounded.
139
Losses. 286th Infantry Regiment
23
men men
dead, 348 wounded.

dead.
3 officers, 78 men wounded. During the night October 12-13 the advanced guard was ordered to march back to Schau-kia lin-tsy at .5 a.m. it started unperceived by the enemy. Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, which had taken no part in the action of October 12, withdrew from Kau-kia-tai in a
;
northerly direction too.

' According to Japanese information the Russian Infantry have been firing standing all the time in that attack.
is
said to
214

beyond the
line
did not go
Ta-tai.
Tsun-lun-yen-tun
The main body of the 1st Cavahy Brigade had The party which had remained in San-de-pu. been dispatched to the right bank of the Hun-ho advanced 3 kilometres farther north from Tutai-tsy.
Based on the reports giving information on the

favourable course of the attack
of the
"
all
along the front

issued in
Army, General Baron Oku
the
afternoon the following Order
The 3rd Division will pursue the enemy with some portions to Pan-kiau-pu, occupying with the
Hun-pau-schan Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy the 6th Division will go forward to the line LiuHun-lin-pu the 4th Division to kia-san-kia-tsy that place, and to the west of it." It was not possible at first to carry out this order completely, for at Hun-pau-schan were still some strong hostile forces, as the 3rd Division had
rest the line
;
ascertained,
Hun-hn-pu being
4th
also
still
occupied.
The
3rd and
Divisions
remained at the
places previously mentioned.
The
pursuit, initi-
ated by the Gth Division,
came
to a standstill
on
the right tributary of the Schi-li-ho.
The main
taking
his
body of that Division closed up. While General Baron Oku was
measures for pursuit, the 17th
in full retreat.^
Army
Corps was
The
made
'
events at Schi-li-ho, as well

clear that
as the steady
advance of the 4th Division against

it
the right flank,

position
taking up a
between
Tschien-liu-tan-kou
P.
and
Pan-
206.

FIRST
kiau-pu was
FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

save
215
the
Contrary
orderl *^^ ?! (jdieral
,
no longer possible. To much-weakened corps, and disengage it vdctorious enemy, it was imperative to ^ the retreat a good way beyond the right
^
from the
continue
tributary Comvisions of
of the
Schi-li-ho.
The
to
Divisional
Commanders d"^
the Scha-ho.
forward,
essian 17th
therefore agreed
retreat behind
The Japanese constantly

pecially
pressing
from Lan-tsy-tai, the troops were directed ^^ rally in the direction on the railway. to The withdraw 137th Infantry Regiment, standing in reserve at the SchaTschien-liu-tan-kou, was ordered by the General ^'
Division to hold the trenches with the object of ensuring the there at with the same object, two retreat of the troops battalions from the 140th Infantry Regiment, who had fought at Lun-wan-miau, were sent towards
all cost,
;
Commanding the 35th
These measures were reported to Commanding, who was staying at Scha-ho Railway Station. Under cover of darkness, which had meanwhile set in, it was possible to lead back the rest of the Divisions, and thus save them from destruction.
Nan-wu-li-tai.
the General Officer
Nevertheless, they
especially
still
incurred considerable
loss,
when
crossing the Scha-ho at Han-kui-
pu, where, at the ford
and at the small bridge

of Japanese Artillery. In
previously constructed, the troops were crowding
together under the
fire
At Scha-ho
Station the intelligence of the corps'
defeat produced
the greatest consternation.
feverish haste, measures
were adopted to bring into safety the wounded more than 500 in number as well as to send back the stores collected there. The general confusion was increased by the
216
numberless vehicles of the baggages that had assembled there, and had now to be started northwards as well. According as the troops arrived, places were assigned to them in the position prepared beforehand, extending from Ku-kia-tsy (on the right) by three battalions of Lin-schin-pu to La-mu-tun the 138th Infantry Regiment were detailed to The 2nd occupy the trenches at La-mu-tun.^ Brigade 55th Infantry Division, which the 6th Siberian Army Corps had placed at the disposal of the 17th Army Corps,'^ was directed to continue marching on Pen-tien-tsy to rejoin its corps. It was broad daylight before it arrived there. The bringing back of the wounded and of the stores, likewise the crossing of the impedimenta, was carried out in perfect order under the direction of General Dobrshinski, commanding the 35th Division by 3.30 in the morning not a single vehicle was left on the southern bank of the river. TheRusXhe 10th Army Corps, the advanced o ffuard of J ir sian 10th which, uudcr General Riabinkin, was still holding Army ^^^ position on the Schi-li-ho, while the main body wSr
;
draws from the

Schi-li-ho
of the 9th Infantry Division was standing in the
mam
.
polkion south of
pu.
Hun-pau-schan, had received during the day, from an officer dispatched to the 17th Army Corps, several reports on what was happening with that Army Corps on October 12. From this intelligence, as Mêll as from the repeated requests addressed to him for support,
position
at
^ The other details are not known. Stakovich's Detachment, too, probably withdrew from Hun-lin-pu to the new position.
..
""
iîi-i
P. 206.
103
217
General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th ArmyCorps, who was on the height at Hun-pau-schan, gathered that the neighbouring corps was in great
distress.
Towards 2 p.m. two

ously,
orders, arriving simultane-
were received at Corps Headquarters. In the one the Commander-in-Chief requested six to eight battalions, without Artillery, to be held in readiness to support, in case of need, the right wing of the Army the other was a demand from the
;
Commander
him one
of the Western Detachment to send

brigade
at
Infantry
once.
General
Shatilov,
Slutshevski thereupon directed General
main position, to dispatch the 36th Infantry Regiment in support

right section of the
commanding the
of the 17th
Army
Corps.
He
ordered General
to start two battalions of the 35th Regiment with the same object. And, Infantry finally, General Gerschelmann was to conduct the 33rd Infantry Regiment to the right of the corps, and occupy with it the section formerly held by the 2nd Brigade 9th Infantry Division. Three battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment
Riabinkin
moved
two
off first to the 17th
Army
Corps, then the
from the 35th Infantry Regiment of the advanced guard started, and lastly the 4th
battalions
Battalion of the 36th Infantry
the last-named
battalion
Regiment followed had only just gone to

;
Nin-kuan-tun, in compliance with an order issued
but a short time previously.' The issue having been decided meanwhile with
the 17th
Army
Corps, these supports from the

'
v. 188.
218
10th

Army
Corps were no longer able to change
the fortune.
The two
leading battalions of the
36th Infantry Regiment, on arrival, were first employed in securing the departure of transport from Scha-ho Station, and afterwards in forming was impossible to ascertain the rearguard it whether, and where, employment was found for the other two battalions of the regiment, as well as for the portions of the 35th Infantry Regiment.
;
General Riabinkin, in response to Kuropatkin's order,' began to withdraw with the advanced guard on and through the main position.
4 p.m.
At
and from the main position the enemy was prevented from pressing too closely or occupying the position evacuated. The advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps retired as far as Hou-huan-hua-tien, where it remained as reserve.^ The Japanese 5th Division did not follow until the 3rd Division had captured Schi-li-ho, reaching then Hun-kia-tschuan in the evening of October 12. The Japanese records do not mention whether the General Reserve of the Japanese Armies, which had been placed at the disposal of the 4th Army on October 11, was pushed forward.^ It does not seem to have been employed at all. It was evening before General Slutshevski obretreat
in perfect order
fire
The
was carried out
without any
loss.
By
a strong Artillery
Pp. 186-188.
The 34th Infantry Regiment had already evacuated Yin-pan and Ta-kou when the 1st Brigade 37th Infantry Division gave up the San^
kai-seki-san.
' Accordingto alecture given on the battle by General Baron Kodama, Chief of the btaif of the Army, at the beginning of 1905. (P. 146.)
219
tained a more exact knowledge of what had happened to the 17th Army Corps. He had sent a General Staff Officer to the western wing, hearing through him from the General Commanding the 3rd Division, as well as from the Chief of the
Staff of the
17th
Army
Corps, that the corps,
severely shaken after fighting hard, was retreating, and would be unable to make another stand in the main position it would, therefore, continue its
;
retreat to behind the Scha-ho.
Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps had meanwhile ridden to Hou-tai, intending to billet General Slutshevski was now placed before there. the alternative of either continuing next morning the battle in the position of Hun-pau-schan, or of
retiring likewise into the prepared positions south
of Scha-ho-pu.
Having
available for the defence of the position,
extending on a front of about 7 kilometres, only 18 battalions,^ 8^ of which had been fighting for some days already, the right flank, by the retirement of the 17th Army Corps, having nothing to
lean upon, and no orders from the
Commander
all,
of
the
Western Group coming

to
Commanding decided
south of Scha-ho-pu.
the General withdraw into the position

in at
The beginning
of
the
retreat
was
fixed
for
in-
12 midnight, the Commander-in-Chief^ being
formed of the decision arrived

'
at.
The
officer
Tlic 2ii(l Brifjâde 31st Infantry Division (8 battalions), the 1st Brigade !)tli Infantry Division (8 battalions), and 2 battalions from the ' Riabinkin's Brigade. 35th Infantry Regiment. ' It was impossible to ascertain whether the Commauder of the
Western Group was iut'ormed
as well.
220

Head-
carrying the dispatch to Kuropatkin, whose
quarters were not exactly known, but were guessed

to be in San-kia-tsy, had scarcely left at 7.30 p.m.,
when an
arrived,
order of the Commander-in-Chief to the
leader of the
Western Group, issued at 6 p.m., instructing him "vigorously to hold the

;
main position to-morrow, the 13th to resist at the point of the bayonet and in no case to retire
;
to the Scha-ho."
Though this order was issued earlier than the Commander-in-Chief could have known of the
Corps' defeat, General Slutshevski thought he could now no longer depart for the Scha-ho without a special order he therefore resolved to move, for the present
17th
Army
nevertheless
bank of the Schaand otherwise to wait for special orders. At 9.5 p.m. an aide-de-camp of the General Officer Commanding was dispatched to Kuropatkin's Headonly, all the trains to the right
ho,
quarters at Liu-tsien-tun to report in this sense.
saw the Commander-in-Chief before the General Staff Officer, who had brought the first dispatch, had left General Headquarters. On
This
officer
of the 17th Army Corps' retreat, General Sakarov, Chief of the Staff of the Army, had replied "that the corps, even if it should have actually retired, would, after receiving the order for an obstinate resistance, surely have returned to the position indicated, and that, therefore, the right flank of the 10th Army Corps was absoIn the name of the Commanderlutely secure." in-Chief, General Sakarov gave the order to
the report
maintain at
all
cost the position of Hun-pau-schan.

Before, however, the the
to
221
two
officers
dispatched
Kuropatkin's Headquarters had returned, an
order by wire from the leader of the Western
Detachment was received by the 10th Army Corps withdraw during the night to the Hne of the Scha-ho. General Slutshevski then no longer waited for
at 11.15 p.m., to
the Commander-in-Chief's decision, but began to
heavy thunderstorm, in perfect order. Early on October 13 the prepared position, south of the river at Scha-ho-piu, was Corps Headquarters billeted in Pa-taoccupied.
retreat at night during a
kia-tsy.
On
the evening of October 12 fate had

the
irre- Result
êr 12
vocably decided in favour of the Japanese in the
combats on
Scha-ho.
The Japanese
right
wing, under General Baron Ino-uye, was repelling

the last attacks of the
Russian Eastern Group

those heights.
against his position on the heights of Pen-si-hu
and
at
the passes north-west of

of General
Samsonov's Cossack Division, General von Rennenkampf and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps were induced to retire too. The Japanese Guard Division had pushed over the Eastern San-jo-shi-san to the Ba-ji-san, embracing the left wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps and the Japanese 2nd Division had pushed back the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps to the heights of Do-mon-shi and to the Djo-san. In the centre, the 10th Division of the Japanese 4th Army had captured the San-kai-seki-san, defended by portions of the 1st Army Corps. And finally, on the western wing, the Russian 17th
the retreat
By
222
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAK
Army Corps was pushed back by the Japanese 2nd Army from its advanced-guard position on
the Schi-h-ho to behind the Scha-ho, beyond the
main position on the northern tributary of the

Schi-li-ho in this retreat the Russian 10th Army Corps joined, though remaining still soutli of the Scha-ho. The Russians had thus been thrown on a very trying defensive, after conducting an offenBut the Japanese sive in a half-hearted manner. had not succeeded in pushing them north-east the Russians retired straight back on the Hun-ho.
;
V
THE LAST DAYS OF THE BATl^LE
October 13
After
the Western Detachment had retired to
General
and behind the Scha-ho on October 12, the kinTmti^^^ ^Y Russian Centre seemed to be affain in an ex- retreat '^ of his The positions of tremely dangerous situation. the 4th Siberian and 1st Army Corps were pro-îugto
_
jecting Hke a bastion beyond the general Hne
of^^^^^PP^''
the front, and downright challenging the

to a twofold envelopment.
enemy
Sketch
7.
But withdrawing the Centre at once seemed impracticable, having regard to the Eastern Detachment, which otherwise might be completely cut off. General Kuropatkin therefore
decided
to
reinforce,
for further resistance,
the 4th Siberian
Army
Corps,
whose
left
flank
was being threatened in the first instance by the Japanese Guard Division. At 5 a.m. he dispatched an Order to the Eastern Detachment, requesting it, as before, in his Order of 1.15 p.m.* on October 12, to put in motion the whole available reserve of the 5th East Siberian Division, from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and to place it
>
P. 194.
223
224

Corps.
command of the 4th Siberian In a letter dispatched at 7.20 a.m. he informed General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps, of this measure.
under the temporary
Army
General
Baron
Stackelberg
had
already,
at
3.55 a.m., dispatched a report to the

in-Chief, describing in a
Commander-
of the Eastern
Detachment
few words the situation " I have given orders

: ;
be held to the last man there be no retreat." Apparently somewhat later, " If the 4th Siberian Army he reported further
for the position to
will
Corps continues to
covered
;
retreat,
my
rear
will
be unright
am
anxious for the safety of

I
my
flank and rear, but
cannot do anything myself to protect them, having no more reserves." copy of this last report was also sent to the 4th
Siberian
If
Army
Corps.
General
Kuropatkin
the
first
had
of
still
any doubt,
messages,
before
receiving
these
whether success could be looked for from the Eastern Detachment or not such doubts being justified by Stackelberg's ambiguous reports of October 12^ this last dispatch must have made
him
see clearly the hopeless situation of Stackel-
berg.
As
it
must be assumed that
Stackelberg's
message of 3.55 a.m. did not reach General Headquarters before 9 or 9.30 a.m., owing to the
defective
mode
of transmission, the
in-Chief seems to have
made up
his
Commandermind im-
mediately after receipt of the letter to look upon

Stackelberg's operations as having finally failed,
and to withdraw now the Eastern Detachment.

'
Pp. 191-193.
LAST DAYS OF THE BATTLE

He
sent
its
:
225
commander the following
directive
Corps has suffered a defeat, on the Scha-ho line. This defeat, together with the failure of your operations, forces me to abandon the task imposed upon the Eastern Detachment, and to withdraw your troops north, so as to bring them in closer touch with the other units. The retreat of the 17th Army Corps, and, after it, that of the 10th Army Corps, entailed the withdrawal of the 4th Siberian Army Corps by my orders. gap was thereby caused between the latter corps and your own troops. I have ordered the 4th Siberian Army Corps to make a stand again at Schanhei-niu-tun. I propose to you to abandon further operations for gaining the passes, and to select
at 10 a.m. " The 17th
Army
and was obliged to
retire
a position covering the left flank
of the
Army.
The
retirement of the troops must be effected

since another failure
rapidly,
may
"
lead to the retreat
on the right wing of that wing being con-
tinued on
even to-morrow. Forward the order to General von Rennento go to
Mukden
kampfs Detachment
cover
"
San-kia-tsy
and
the Army against any enterprises the Japanese may plan towards its line of retreat.
Report to
me
at
once when and
how you
Siberian
intend to concentrate the 1st and 3rd
Army Army
Corps and the portions of the 2nd Siberian Corps not belonging to the reserve you dispatched to General Sarubaiev." In this letter General Kuropatkin was still counting upon the 4th Siberian Army Corps
15
226
THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

at
making a stand
Schan-hei-niu-tun
an hour
afterwards he decided to withdraw also that corps.
At
"
11.20 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief sent the
following Order to General Sarubaiev
During the night the Japanese forced the 17th Army Corps to retire to the Scha-ho. This movement affecting the 10th Army Corps, that corps retired too. I am therefore obliged to order you
to evacuate
your position south of Yen-san-sai,^
and to retire somewhat more north into a position which you may select at your discretion." Kuropatkin had thus initiated the retreat of the w^hole of the eastern wing of the Army. Since an immediate retreat by the 4th Siberian Army Corps in face of the Japanese Guard Division would probably have entailed great loss,
General Sarubaiev decided to carry out the retrograde movement at dusk. After receiving Kuropatkin's instructions to retreat, General Baron Stackelberg issued the
necessary orders to
places
his
troops.
The
following
:
were to be reached by the main bodies The 2nd Siberian Army Corps, portions of which were meanwhile attacking in a south-westerly
direction in relief of the 4th Siberian
Tai-kia-miau-tsy-
the 1st Siberian

;
Army Army
;
Corps, Corps,
Kuan-tai
and Hei-sun-pu
still
the 3rd Siberian
Army
Corps, Pan-mau-lin,
farther east
rearguards
were to be left 5 to 7 kilometres south of these places on the line Tsai-kia-tun Kan-to-li-san Hou-lou-tsy-gou by the 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Siberian
'
North of the Len-ge-san.

7 kilometres uorth of Kaii-to-li-san.
* ^
5i kilometres uorth-east of Kan-to-li-saii.

Army
227
Corps respectively. The beginning of the movements was fixed for 7 p.m. When the troops were on the march, Headquarters of the Eastern
Detachment received
brief
at 8.15 p.m., the following
Order of Kuropatkin " Make at once arrangements for the Eastern Detachment to retreat on a level with Bian-yu-pusa Army is facing about on the Scha-ho." After this Order had left General Headquarters, probably a message from Stackelberg came in, stating the various places he intended to reach. But Kuropatkin desiring the Eastern Detachment to be somewhat in advance on the left of the Centre, he sent an Order modifying matters, this Order being received by the Staff of the Eastern Detachment at 1.25 a.m. on October 14.
!
Stackelberg then reported
to
the
Commander-
in-Chief, at 3.30 a.m., that, in compliance with the
changes ordered, he had arranged for the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to remain in its former position south of Yen-sin-tun Hu-schi-tai, the
Corps to occupy the fortified position south of Bian-yu-pu-sa and that the 3rd Siberian Army Corps had been ordered to entrench on the line Scliin-hai-lin Pass (11 kilometres south-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa) Tschau-huan1st Siberian
;
Army
tschai (7 kilometres east of Schin-hai-lin).
Owing
it
to the difficulties of transmitting orders,
was, however, not possible to concentrate the
troops at
mentioned in the report. When receiving the fresh Order during the night, they had already marched beyond the points reported, except the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.
the places

228

:
Early on October 14 there were on the Scha-ho the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, between Yen-sinthe 1st Siberian Army tun and Sun-wu-pu-tsy north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, with Corps, north and one Division each at Kan-to-H-san and Ya-mahn-tsy and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps on the Une Tschin-hsi-sai Huan-hn, 6^ kilometres east
;
;
of Bian-yu-pu-sa, and 10 kilometres east of Tschinhsi-sai respectively.
Rennenkampfs Detachment had
fallen
back to
San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho, to cover the left In the days succeeding, it flank of the Army.
gradually drew near the
Army, marching
east of
the Kau-tu-lin Pass. Disengaging the Eastern Detachment from the
enemy had succeeded without

nocturnal retreat proved very
since,
difficulty
but the
the
Marshal
Uyama
orders a pursuit to
Lnkôf
the Schaho.
owing to the bad roads, had to be carried. Bascd OR the cvcuts of Octobcr 12, Marshal Marquis Ovama issued the following General '^ ^ Order in the afternoon " ^ shall pursue the enemy to the left bank of
'
more most of the wounded

difficult, all
^j^g
Scha-ho.
"
The
-
First
Army
^
;
has to reach the line Tai-
kou
Tun-kia-fn
Matsunagas ^ march
is
to be
accelerated as
"
much
as possible, to cut the Russian
line of retreat.
The Fourth Army

'
will
advance on Lu-su-tun^
Summary only known.

7 kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa. 3 kilometres south-east of Fn-kia-pu.
P. 177.
*
*
1^ kilometres south-east of Fn-kia-pu.

229
Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy
Scha-ho-pu
" If the
the
Lin-schin-pu."
Second
Army on
enemy is standing with strong forces in an entenched position on the right bank of the Scha-ho, he is no longer to be attacked there. *' The General Reserve of the Army will concentrate at Ku-schu-tsy."
^
General Baron Kuroki, after receiving the afore- ino-uye's mentioned Order, arranged for the Japanese 1st ênTof Army to continue the attack on October 13, and tê -âpa116^6 r6Tun-kia-fn. to reach the line Tai-kou mains General Baron Ino-uye, on the right, thought [^j''^'^''
\x\
already on October 12 that the Russian attack was
slackening
this impression
13th
it
even seemed as
grew stronger on the if the Russians were
on the Tai-tsy-ho. To assume the offensive himself, Ino-uye did not think feasible, having regard to the extensive ground occupied by his greatly reduced numbers. His party therefore confined itself to holding the position, and opposing the fire-action which the Russians were still carrying on in a half-hearted manner on various points along his front. Towards night, the 5th Kobi Brigade, under General Aibara, arrived at last in Pen-si-hu ^ it had been eagerly looked for during the last few days. The brigade had landed at An-tung, and was then put in motion, going by Tiu-ren-tschin on the Ya-lu it came under the orders of the 12th Division.
retiring, especially in the section
; ;
'
'
* ^
9 kilometres west of Fon-kia-pu. On the Scha-ho, not far from the railway. 4 kilometres south-east of Schi-li-ho.
P. In8.
According to Japanese sources of Captain Sander
(retired^.
230
General
General JMatsimaga, with the reinforced 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division,^ being apportioned aga's"reto support the 12th Division, had got as far as D^r*'}i"^ ment Man-hua-pu ' on the evening of October 12, after At iifdeci.Se various detours, and was taking a rest there. action at 4 a.m. on October 13 the detachment started Man-hua.ii puagainst agam. With the object oi contmumg its march by Kau-kia-pu. When, towards 5 a.m., the brigade Rifle*"
.
r,
...
Rgiof the Eastern
Oroup.
was approaching the Tschau-hsien-hn Pass, it came General Matsunaga determined upon the enemy. ^^ attack. The Russiansthe 3rd and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, from the 1st and 2nd Siberian Army Corps, forming the right wing of the Russian forces engaged at the passes had, however, chosen a very favourable and strongly commanding position, from which they repelled
repeated attacks of the Japanese.

of the 3rd Brigade grew very
The
situation
it
difficult,
and
was
only due to the effect of

the brigade was able to hold
its
its
two
batteries that
own. On General Baron Stackelberg learning of this action, he became anxious for the safety of his right flank, and therefore at once moved Infantry,^ with two batteries from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, in support, the force starting from the country south of Tin-kia-tai, north-east of the Wai-tau-schan. About 1 p.m. this Russian detachment arrived at the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass, and proceeded to
Less the six companies 29th Infantry Regiment, being with the 15th Brigade. (Pp. 131 and 172.) ' South of the Eastern San-jo-shi-san. ' The 17th East Siberian Rifle Reerimeut apparently.
'

attack the left flank of the 3rd Brigade.
further
231
General
Matsunaga, having meanwhile abstained from any attempts of attacking the exceedingly strong position of the Russians, and having confined himself to the defensive, succeeded in warding off this attack, as well as the blows directed on him by the other Rifle Regiments. The fire-action continued till cAêning the Japanese tried to avoid too great losses by looking for shelter in the rents and clefts formed by the thunderstorm of the previous night, as well as behind the numerous high boulders strewn about there. No decisive results were obtained on either side. The Japanese remained during the night in fighting order within the position next morning the Russians had disappeared.
;
On
Kuroki's orders for continuing the attack, The JapaGuard

Divisiou
General Asada had given the following directions

to the Guard Division " The 3rflf Guard Regiment, with one battery,
:
unsuccessfuiiy
^^ftu por-
under the occupy the
command
line
of General Watanabe, will
Riu-ka-san Ka-ko-rei-san, coverit,
ing at the same time the right flank of the division,
^^ Jj^"^ aud 4th
As
"
soon as the situation allows

**
.
the detachment Army^"

Corps,
will reioin the division.
and
^vith
The \st Brigade will advance at 6 ing the enemy on the Lien-hua-schan
of the brigade one battalioji of the
a.m., attack- theTrana;
on the
Uh Guard
The
Regi-
left c^^saik Brigade
ment
will likewise
deploy for attack.
rest o/' heights
the regiment will

'
:
remain as divisional reserve at the^K^

ko-rei-
Their loss was 4th Infantry Regiment, 27 29th 36
sa and
men
dead, 102 wounded.
Do-mon-
325
232

The
Artillery will support the
its
Schan-liu-ho-tsy.
attack from
liu-ho-tsy."
positions at Pa-kia-tsy
and Schan-
Cavalry having appeared on the right flank of the 1st Brigade, its commander, at daybreak,
pushed the 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment on the Ba-ji-san forward to the right. The 2nd Battalion of that regiment, as well as one battalion from the 2nd Guard Regiment, deployed in their positions on the Ma-rr-schan, engaging in a firefight with Russian Infantry (portions of General
Shileiko's Brigade
^)
holding the Lien-hua-schan.
The other two battalions of the 2nd Guard Regiment were ordered to make an enveloping attack on that height from the east. The battahons
without meeting with serious resistance, the country east of Ma-niu-tun, after passing over the Ba-ji-san, when they were suddenly met by a hot fire. General Mishtshenko, who, with his independent Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, had fallen back from the Eastern San-jo-shi-san north-east," had been watching the Japanese battalion advancing, and immediately informed the 85th Infantry Regiment,^ standing north-east of Ma-niu-tun, which, with other portions of the 1st Army Corps, had been
started,
reaching,
handed over to the hard-pressed 4th Siberian Army Corps on October 12. The colonel of that regiment at once moved the 1st and 2nd Battalions In view of the imminent against the enemy. danger, he abstained from obtaining first the con
'
P. 162. Pp. 166 and 168. TheColonel-in-Chief is his Majesty the Gennaii Emperor. (P. 193.)

sent of General Sarubaiev,
Siberian
233
commanding the 4th
Army
Corps, whose reserve the regiment
was forming.
skirmishers
fire,
The
battalions deployed, taking the
of the 2nd
as these latter
Guard Regiment under were advancing especially two

;
companies of the 2nd Battalion were able to fire The enveloping movement with great effect. initiated by the Japanese came to an end thereby. Meanwhile, the Artillery on either side had opened fire too, the Russian north of Do-mon-shi, and the Japanese from Pa-kia-tsy and Schan-liuThe Russian batteries had made good ho-tsy.
practice, especially
1st
against the left
wing of the
Brigade at the Ma-rr-schan. When against that wing Russian Infantry advanced to attack
Do-mon-shi, the brigade commander engaged the 3rd Battahon of the 1st Guard Regiment.
fi-om
The
battalion
came
into action
on the
JNla-rr-schan
about 8 a.m., drawing upon itself strong forces of it had a very hard time until dark, the enemy suffering considerable loss, especially from Artillery fire. The battalion commander and all captains were placed out of action, a lieutenant ultimately commanding the battalion. Here, as well as on the right wing of the 1st Brigade on the Ba-ji-san, the attack did not make any progress, support by It is true, the Japanese Artillery being wanting.
;
Artillery did fire from their positions at Pa-kia-tsy and Schan-liu-ho-tsy, but the 1st Brigade could not see any effect upon the enemy opposing it. The Japanese Infantry had the sort of feeling
that the batteries shirked leaving their protecting
earth-cover for a
more
effective
range
farther
234

;
forward
Artillery,
but the Infantry was wrong, because the as a matter of fact, was firing in a
of the 2nd of
direction altogether different.
The
north
battalions
of
the
Ba-ji-san
Guard Regiment, on the right, making

ground,
repeated attempts
gaining
General
Mishtshenko once more turned to the 85th Infantry regiment with a request for support. The colonel of the regiment gave him the 3rd Battalion, and
more companies, hitherto not engaged, of the 2nd Battalion. These forces were
afterwards
two
engaged east of Ma-niu-tun, on the left of the portions of the regiment first sent forward. Meanwhile the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which Mishtshenko had attached to his detachment on October 12, had also deployed, advancing against the 2nd Guard Regiment from the neighbourhood of Wu-tin-kou. Under the destructive fire of the Russians on its right flank, the situation of the 1st Brigade was beginning to be serious. Considerable loss was caused in a short time reserves were no longer available. The commander of the
;
brigade, therefore, with the consent of the Divisional
his troops to the
at 2 p.m. to withdraw Eastern San-jo-shi-san as far as the country south of Tia-tun-nan-kou. The movement was carried out in dchelons. The Russians pushed after them, establishing themselves again opposite the Japanese on the line Ma-rr-schan Hill Tia-tun-nan-kou. On the left of the Japanese 1st Brigade, the 2nd Battalion 4th Guard Regiment, in compliance with Divisional Orders, had started at daybreak
Commander, decided

;
235
from the neighbourhood south of Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko, advancing in the direction on Do-mon-shi but it was not long before it was obhged to engage in a fire-action, owing to severe hostile fire from The enemy, showing himthe heights opposite. self considerably superior, and threatening the right of the battalion by advancing into the gap between the battalion and the 1st Brigade, General Asada, commanding the Guard Division, convinced himself
of the impossibility of the battalion attacking

;
Do-mon-shi single-handed he therefore placed the battalion again under the command of the colonel
of the regiment, ordering attack
him
to
carry out the
Two with two battalions and a half. companies were held back as Divisional Reserve
at Schan-Uu-ho-tsy.
was 8 a.m. when the 4th Guard Regiment, starting from Schan-liu-ho-tsy, deployed for attack
It
,
against the heights north of Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko.
It
had to traverse
first
a broad,
open
depression.
At
about 1,800 metres from the enemy the regito
ment began
of
deploy.
The 2nd
left
;
Battalion was
ordered to advance against the heights south-east
Do-mon-shi, with
its
skirting
the
road
Schan-liu-ho-tsy
Do-mon-shi
the 3rd Battalion
was engaged on the right, keeping touch with The two companies available the 2nd Battalion.
of the
1st
Battahon were being held
in
reserve
by the
colonel.
At about
fire
1,500 metres the Russian
Infantry
(portions of General Shileiko's
Brigade^) opened
from the heights at Do-mon-shi.

'
The
4th
Pp. 168 and 232.
236

to
Guard Regiment, without replying

began to advance
distances
it
the
fire,
in
rushes
of
of
40 to 80 metres.
companies for In this manner
succeeded in traversing the depression rapidly,
and even without any material lass, for, although the Russians were firing pretty rapidly, they fired The Japanese did not open fire until the badly. leading lines had approached the enemy's position Till then the regiment had to within 600 metres. not suffered by Artillery. The three Japanese at Schan-liu-ho-tsy had kept up a brisk batteries
fire
since daybreak, supporting the attack of the

;
4th Guard Regiment
the Artillery Abteilung at
Pa-kia-tsy was acting against the heights north-
west of Do-mon-shi, thereby supporting the 2nd

Division, adjoining on the
left.
On
the foremost line of the 4th
Guard Regiment
reaching the foot of the heights north of Na-kako-ri-ki-ko, the
reserve followed.
in
two companies of the regimental The companies were marching

sections in fours at 15
company columns, the

but somewhat farther
to 20 paces' intervals, and

line,
not behind the front
east, for covêr's sake.
The regiment had

slow progress.
By
been making but engaging, however, the comhitherto
panies retained in support, the leading line finally
succeeded in working up so close to the enemy that portions of both adversaries were lying partly
opposite
each
other
at
shortest
ranges,
up
to
were very great, especially on the right wing, where the company on the
150 metres.
lost
The
its
losses
right
all
officers.
The
colonel
decided
to engage his reserves now, ordering, at 2.30 p.m.,

company on the
right,
237
the two companies in reserve, together with the

to
storm the
enemy's
position with the bayonet, after dehvering for a
few minutes a rapid fire the remaining companies were to support that assault by a rapid fire. The assault, delivered by the three companies, was successful. The portions of General Shileiko's Brigade opposite were pushed back in a northerly the But, direction on Schan - hei - niu - tun. trying to push farther, victorious companies under such a hot cross-fire that the they came attack came to a complete standstill. Then fresh Russian forces made a counter-attack in front, causing considerable loss to the Japanese assaulting companies it was only with the greatest difficulty that they were able to maintain themselves in the position they had captured. The small success on the right was therefore Lieutenantof no use to the regiment as a whole.
;
Colonel Ida,
commanding the 4th Guard Regi-
ment, had meanwhile tried to assault with the remaining portions of his regiment, too, all attempts, however, failing under the vigorous fire of the Russians. Nor did it help to change
the situation
when the 7th Company was

of the firing-line to the right.
shifted
from the
left
The
ment.
Artillery of the
Division was trying

to the 4th
in
its
best to be of
It
some help
orders
Guard Regiall
seems that,
the afternoon,
to
the
batteries
received
support the
attack
of
the regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Ida had asked the commander of the Artillery to continue tiring heedlessly until the very last moment before
238
his

own
Infantry was in the enemy's
position.
The
Artillery complied
with this request.
The
Japanese shrapnels therefore burst immediately in front of their own skirmishers. The whole height is said to have been under Japanese and Russian
was scarcely possible to distinguish where their own and where the enemy's projectiles were coming down.
Artillery
fire,
to such an extent that
it
But, in spite of this vigorous support of the

Artillery,
no success was gained.
on without
the regiment pushing the enemy from the heights. The loss of the ten companies the regiment had engaged was 132 dead and 338 wounded. Ammunition had been spent freely 354,447 rounds, it is said, were fired several times the ammunition had to be replenished. The packhorses had been moved up to Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko. When, in the afternoon, the ten companies had all been extended, the ammunition was brought up into the firing-line by Army Service Corps men many of their carriers were killed or wounded. The 3rd Guard Regiment, with a battery, under General ^^âtanabe, which had been detached to cover the right flank of the Guard Division, was meanwhile holding the position assigned to it on the line Riu-ka-san Ka-ko-rei-san,^ where four companies of the regiment had been standing on the previous day,- without seeing any enemy, until noon. But in the afternoon an attack was made by strong Russian forces from the direction
Darkness came having succeeded in
P. 231.
p. 171
239
of the Wai-taii-schan were deploying six battalions
and a half, with Artillery and Cavalry, of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.^ Without waiting for the final assault, the 3rd Guard Regiment abandoned its position, retiring into the valley Nor was Colonel of the river at Man-hua-pu. ^ Cavalry able to stay the attack when, Kasa's at Kuroki's orders, it advanced from the country
south of
the
Riu-ka-san,
in
relief
of
the
3rd
The enemy occupied the height evacuated about 6 p.m. The Russians could have
Guard Regiment.
continued the attack against the right flank of the 1st Brigade, which had gone back from the
Eastern San-jo-shi-san,^ but probably abstained from doing so as it was beDuring the night they ginning to grow dark. joined in the general retreat of the Eastern
Ba-ji-san
to
the
Detachment.
At
"
10 p.m.
the
Commander
its
of
the
Guard
Division issued the following Order
The
The
Division will remain in
present position,
ready to advance at any moment.

"
troops will bivouac in fighting formation,

Divisional
keeping in close touch with the enemy."
The
Commander
the
portions.
at
that time had

in
already been
retreat with
informed of
enemy being
some
ing
During the night preceding October 14 the followArmy Order was received by the Division
:
* Tlie 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2^ battalions from the 18th East Siberian Regiment, 1 battalion from the 2nd Siberian Infantry Regiment, 1st, 2nd, and ;3rd Batteries .5tli East Siberian Rifle Artillery
Brigade,
'
detachment of Scouts, and
squadron Dragoons.
3
P.
161.
p_ 234.

240
"
1.

The Army
will
continue
the
attack
to-
morrow.
Division will advance to the and the 2nd Division to the west of, the road Do-mon-shi Fn-kia-pu. " 3. Watanabe's Detachment will be relieved by a portion of the General Reserve." The Divisional Commander gave no further orders on that evening. When Marshal Marquis Oyama received during the day the report of the Guard Division having given up the Ba-ji-san, the Ka-ko-rei-san, and the Riu-ka-san, he gave the Commander of the 1st Army to understand that he would send him support so as to continue the fight on the 14th For reinforcing the 1st with better success. Army he apportioned the bulk of the 5th Division and a Mortar Abteilung, standing at his disposal They in the neighbourhood of Hun-kia-tschuan.^ were sent to Headquarters of the 1st Army at Pan-la-schan-tsy, where they arrived on the evening of October 13. The 41st Infantry Regiment, with an Artillery Abteilung, was left behind at Hun-kia-tschuan by the 5th Division to these were added, as a reinforcement, the 20th Kobi Regiment, and two
2.
"
The Guard
east of,
batteries
of
the
1st
Field
Artillery
Brigade.
General Yamada, commanding the 9th Brigade, was in charge of this detachment. Oyama's General Reserve was not employed on
this
day
either.
If
it
was
still
in existence,
and
The Mortar Abteilung probably belonged to the General p. 218. Reerve of the Army, which \va=i standing at Tu-meu-tsy,
241
not perhaps dissolved, it probably remained at must assume Tu-men-tsy, as on the 12th.
We
it
it
to be
still
there on the days succeeding, since

is
no further mention
available.
made
of
in the sources
The
first
Echelons of the 8th Division arrived at

13,
Liao-yan on October
and were thus at the
disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.
The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division was fighting The Japawith more luck on the left of the Guard Division. Division
After
its
to-san durinff the
vain attempts of capturing the Lo- f'jlji^g^f night of October 12-13,^ the Maus
attitude
brigade assumed an expectant
on
the
Detach-
forenoon of October 13.

available
The
Divisional Artillery "^Ji^he

firing
had since early morning been
upon
Lo-tothe'rigiit
f^^^>^^_
Russian Artillery of the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the Len-ge-san, but with little effect apparently,
The Russian
batteries replied to the
fire,
searching
berian
and sweeping, moreover, with a great amount of corps ammunition, the neighbourhood of San-kia-tsy, lî^ e^.^ south of the Lo-to-san, and more particularly san. the low ground close south-west of Temple Hill, where, on October 12, the batteries of the 10th Division had been standing. Shortly after 2 p.m. the 15th Brigade was ordered to attack, one battalion of the 29th Kobi Regiment being placed at its disposal for that purpose. The Iô-to-san, which was held by the bulk of Mau's Detachment,^ and by portions of
'
P. 179.
Portions of Mau's Detachment seem to have withdrawn already, on October 12, in a northerly direction, to the heights north of
^
Schi-miau-tsy
Tun-sau-ho.
16
242

Army
Corps, being
still
the 1st
looked upon as
the key of the Russian position, General Okasaki
ordered the 16th

that height.
attack,
Infantry Regiment to capture
With
the object of supporting this

Infantry
the six companies of the 29th

right,
Regiment on the
and the
the
.30th
which on the afternoon
of October 11 had been attached to the brigade,^ Infantry Regiment, were to engage
to
enemy in the direction of the Len-ge-san. The Artillery Abteilung received orders
engage the Russian Artillery with two batteries, and with one battery to keep playing on the The Kobi Artillery Abteilung went Lo-to-san. into position at Sen-kiu-yo, firing at Russian
batteries near the Len-ge-san.
The space at rr-wa, within which the 16th Infantry Regiment was to attack the Lo-to-san,
being rather limited
colonel
the
left
right of the 4-th
Army
was fighting on the

attack
of
the
at
regiment
the
The
skir-
only deployed the
1st
Battalion.
first.
made
rapid
progress
The
mishers worked forward by
rushes,
making partly
use of the deep nullahs for cover, and arriving about 3.45 p.m. close below the knoll, thus
bringing
at
the
least.
right
wing
its
of
the
battalion
to
within 60 to 70 metres from the Russian hne

the
In
rushes
the
firing-hne
became a deep dense swarm, into which the Russians were firing. The Russian trenches were sited so far back on the heights that the men had to rise to fire, else the assailant would have The remained invisible in the dead ground.
'
p.
131.

bearing of the Russian rank and
highest praise
regularly rose
;
243
file
deserves the
in
spite
of the sevêre Japanese

fire,
Infantry and Artillery

to
their
the individual
height,
men
full
deliberately
aiming and firing. The Japanese Artillery was firing here, too, over the heads of their own Infantry to the very last moment, the shells bursting sometimes within
their
own
line.
Within close range of the Russian position the 1st Battalion's force of attack was spent. The 2nd Battalion was therefore deployed shortly after 4 p.m. The supports came up to the firing-line of the 1st Battalion by long rushes, and, on entering the firing-line, made it denser still. Towards 5 p.m. two officers, followed by an irregular crowd of about two sections, broke out from the right wing of the firing-line to assault the height. The
Russians started to their
feet,
meet the Japanese with
rushing forward to Fresh the bayonet.

;
Russian Infantry hurried up from the left but the Japanese were receiving reinforcements too.
furious struggle with cold steel
was enacted,
Japanese.
ending after ten minutes with the victory of the The Russians were defeated, and the Lo-to-san was occupied by the Japanese. The whole slope was covered with the slain particularly in the last Japanese fire-position severe
loss
was
suffered.
The
assault
cost
the two
Japanese battalions 15 officers, of whom 6 were dead, and 337 men. Major Nihira, commanding the 1st Battalion, who with his Adjutant had
followed
the
firing-line,
was
also
killed.
The
244

of
Commander
the
1st
Army, who had been
watching the assault from a small eminence north of Pan-la-schan-tsy, at once sent by wire a
"Kanjo"^
to
the
1st
Battalion
16th
Infantry
The 1st Battalion of the regiment Regiment. the kept the height occupied during the night
;
other two battalions went to Sia-liu-ho-tsy.
The regiment
spent 212,950 rounds of
ammu-
nition in the attack
on the Lo-to-san. About 500 Russian dead were found on the Lo-to-san these were from the 1st Army Corps, and from the 10th, of which Man's Detachment had been originally the advanced guard. While the 16th Infantry Regiment was attack;
ing the Lo-to-san, the 30th

and, to the right of
it,
Infantry Regiment
the six companies from
the 29th Infantry Regiment, advanced against the

Len-ge-san, held by troops of Generals Kossovich and Levestam from the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The battalion of the 29th Kobi Regiment which General Matsunaga's Brigade had left behind in
the position east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy

attack too
;
took part in the
but the other battalion of that regiment, which had been placed at the disposal of the brigade, seems to have remained in reserve. The attack over the open country was exceedingly To avoid unnecessary loss. General Okadifficult. saki, commanding the 15th Brigade, ordered the The firingattack to be delayed till after dark. lines therefore remained in their positions from
4.45 p.m. until about 7 p.m.,
when
the
movements
*
were continued. At 8 p.m. the assault with the P. 178. A letter in praise of valour.
'

;
245
bayonet was delivered the Russians were driven But having previously decided to retreat, their off.
retirement, at least in part,
tary act.
was probably a volunThe Russians eased their withdrawal by

lost
two counter-attacks.
The Japanese
about 300
men
in this attack
the Russians left 180 dead behind. Marshal Marquis Oyama had given
the
the
4th The
line
^.^^^
Japa.
^*^''
Army J
the task of advancing
aisfainst
^
Lu-su-tun Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy on October 13. pushes To be able to advance with the right wing on Sf the"*^ Lu-su-tun, the Djo-san had first to be captured, if t Army That height, which was being held by General andViau's Man's Detachment and by portions of the 37th lenT Infantry Division 1st Army Corps, had been un- ^-"".^^'^ successfully attacked by the 11th Kobi Brigade and from on the 12th, as well as during the night following try nor"h that day. ^ The Djo-san being still strongly occu- "^
*
.
Army
^^'J^
pied on the morning of the 13th, repeating theseki-?au.

frontal
attack looked rather hopeless even now.
But, in order to carry out his task, the
Army
left
Commander
decided to advance
first
with his
in the direction of
Tun-san-ho and Schuan-tai-tsy

it
against the Russian 37th Infantry Division, and
then to attack the Djo-san, enveloping

the north.
position
from
He
this
not only hoped to capture the
by
movement, but
also to cut the
Russian
line of retreat.
As
a preliminary to the attack, General
Count
Nodzu brought
into action strong Artillery, with the
object of subduing the hostile batteries which had been maintaining a brisk fire since early morning.
'
P. 228.
Tp. 184-185.

246

Field Artillery
Regiments, belonging to the reserve of the 4th Army, unlimbered at the San-kai-seki-san, taking under fire a Russian Artillery force of about 24 guns from the 1st Army Corps, which, from the heights north of Ha-ma-tan, were enfilading the 11th
The 14th and 15th
Kobi
Brigade, as
;
well as portions of the
1.5th
was
one portion of the Japanese batteries upon a long line of Russian guns of the 1st Army Corps at Schuan-tai-tsy, which had been further rem forced in the morning. Of the Artillery of the 10th Division, one Abteilung was fighting against General Man's batteries standing
Brigade
firing
at the Djo-san.
Towards 10 a.m. it was noticed that the enemy was gradually withdrawing from the line Ha-matan
San-kia-tsy Schuan-tai-tsy.
The Army
at once gave orders to follow up the some Kobi regiments and the 8th Brienemy, gade being, with that object, sent forward on a broad front. On the right, the 10th Kobi Regiment advanced on Ha-ma-tan, with the 34th Kobi Regiment on its left. The 12th and 40th Kobi Regiments took the direction on Tun-san-ho Schuan-tai-tsy,^ and the 8th Brigade of the 10th Division on the left on Schuan-tai-tsy. To cover
this
Commander
movement
the 14th Field Artillery Regiment,
and one Abteilung of the 15th, fired upon the Russian batteries that had still remained in action. One Abteilung of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment followed the 12th and 40th Kobi Regiments.
'
It
is
remarkable
tliat
the
Kobi troops were not employed in
brigades.

The
effectively
247
retreat of the Russians proceeded slowly,
covered
5 p.m. before the 12th
the
first
at
their Artillery. It was Kobi Regiment arrived as Tun-san-ho and the heights east of it
by
gradually the other portions
came
up, establishing
themselves to the right and
left of the 12th Kobi Regiment. The weak rearguards the Russians had left behind evacuated their positions after a brief resistance. The Russian 37th Infantry Division,
less
the portions attached to

Corps,
^
the 4th
heights
Siberian
Army
retired
is
to
the
north of
Sei-ko-san,
Schi-miau-tsy, that
Regiment.''
to say, to the
where they were supported by the 86th Infantry
The
is,
reserve
of
the
37th
Infantry
Division
4th
that
wa.
the 88th Infantry Regiment, the
Battery 7th Artillery Brigade, and the 7th
Siberian Cossack Regiment, with the

to Pu-tsau
two
batteries
moved to Tun-san-tsy, Corps Headquarters going

The
Artillery
Abteilung of the
15th
Field
Artillery Regiment, which followed the 12th
Kobi Regiment, came into action at Man-kia-fx^n, facing south-east, and taking under fire the right flank and rear of the enemy at the Djo-san. Soon afterwards one more Abteilung of the Artillery,
'
Two
battalions of
tlie l-47tli
Infantry Regiment, and one battery of
the 4.3rd Artillery Brigade.

also supported
According to other information, the 87th Infantry Division was by tlie whole of Man's Detachment, which in that case must have been standing on the hciglits north of Sclii-miau-tsy already since October 12. But after the attack of the Japanese 1.5th Brigade against the Lo-to-san on October 13, numerous dead of the 121st and 122nd Infantry Regiments (belonging to Mau's Detachment) having been found, the assumption seems justified that the main body of Mau's Detachment had been standing fast on the heights south of Ha-ma-tan (Lo-to-san Djo-san) as yet October 13. (Pp. 2-41-242.)
^

248
standing at the San-kai-seki-san
probably the other
Abteilung of the 15 th Field Artillery Regiment advanced to the height south-east of Tun-san-ho. The effect of the Japanese batteries was, however, a limited one, as it was beginning to grow When all was dark, General Mau's Dedark. tachment evacuated its position on the Djo-san, the position having become untenable after being turned by the Japanese Kobi Regiments, and retired by the Sen-san on Orr-tau-kou during the The withdrawal of the Russians was night. carried out under the vigorous pressure of Nihira's Battalion,^ and of the 11th Kobi Brigade. The Japanese remained during the night in the the 20th Brigade of positions they had reached 10th Division seems to have halted at the the
;
San-kai-seki-san.
The RusS)eriau
By
fautry
the opportune intervention of the 85th In-
Army
Corps retires on
puud'
M'*^; thenko Brigade
ken-jl
^*",
Regiment, as well as of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and the Cossack Brigade " '^ under the command of General Mishtshenko, which had pushed the 1st Brigade of the Japanese Guard Division from the Ba-ii-san to the Eastern om * San-jo-shi-san, the 4th Siberian Army Corps was able to carry out the retreat ordered by Kuropatkin' to Schan-hei-niu-tun in perfect order, and to disengage itself without particular difficulty from the enemy. The 37th Infantry Division, and with it Mau 's Detachment, having gradually given way in the
,
.
/-i
'
TTie 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry
Regiment, which had the
largest share in the storming of the Lo-to-san.

'
Pp. 232-234.
Pp. 226-226.
249
course of the day, thus enabhng portions of the
Japanese 4th Army to make their appearance at Tun-san-ho about 5 p.m., any protracted resistance of the 4th Siberian Army Corps about Schan-heiniu-tun would have no longer been feasible either.
Moreover, all reserves available had gradually been engaged, so that there were no fresh troops at
hand
for
continuation of
the
battle
in
the
former position.^ General Sarubaiev resolved to

retreat
retire
on Fn-
kia-pu, issuing orders to that effect at 6 p.m.
The
was
carried out under cover of a rearguard
formed of troops from the 22nd Division, under

the orders of the General
Brigade
of
that
Division.
Commanding The 85th
the
1st
Infantry
Regiment was entrusted with forming the rear party, which at the same time had to fulfil the duty of not allowing any man, or any wounded, The march of or any vehicle to be left behind.
the regiment in the dark of night, on bad roads,
soil, was exceedingly wearisome and fatiguing it was 5 o'clock in the morning when the exhausted troops, after picking up on the road numerous wounded and vehicles of all
with the soaked

;
kinds,
arrived
at
their
;
rendezvous,
kilometre
south of Fn-kia-pu
their
at
7 a.m. they continued

itself.^
march to that place
Mishtshenko's
Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, together
with the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, joined in the
Apart from Kuropatkin's last reserve i.e. the 86th Infantry Regiment, as well as the 5th and 6th Batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, which probably had not yet been engaged. (P. 194.) ' Loss of the regiment on (October 1-3:4 officers, 59 men dead 6 officers, 210 men wounded.
;
250

Army Corps, withdramng
retreat of the 4th Siberian
ji-san,
Tl)e
Western
Detachtii Si-
Anny
Corps,
bovski's
from Ma-rr-schan in the direction of the Ba-kenand occupying that height, probably by order of General Kuropatkin. No instructions were given apparently by the Commander-iu- Chief to the Russian Western Detachment, regulating its attitude in the new Kuropatkin position on and behind the Scha-ho/ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ have been very angry about the issue of October 12, although the defeat of the 17th Army Corps can be mostly attributed to his failing of
leaking up his mind to place at the disposal of
the
^^
meift r pel on the
Western
Corps
Detachment
the
6th
Siberian
the at-
Army
^^
and General Dembovski's Detach-
tacksof
the pursiii'i^
On
i,e
the morning of October 13 the 17th
Army
:
âpaii
Army.
main position between Ta-lian-tun and La-mu-tun was occupied by the 35th Infantry Division; two battalions of the 139th Infantry Regiment were standing west of Lin-schin-pu and the 137th Infantry Regiment in the village itself, and
;
^^^.p^. j^^^ ry^^^
taken up the following position
in the position adjoining east, as far as the railway.
To
the
left
of
it
fourteen companies of the 138th
Infantry Regiment occupied the position extending

to the western outskirts of Iâ-mu-tun.
The
other
two
battalions of the 139th

as sectional
Infantry
Regiment
were retained
Lin-schin-pu
;
reserve north-west of
the 140th Infantry Regiment was
forming the General Reserve at Yin-kuan. The 35th Artillery Brigade was apparently posted in two groups north of Lin-schin-pu.
I
Pp. 215-216 aud 220-221.

251
Colonel Stakovich's troops were, in the morning, not altogether in their new position west of Linthey were not complete there until schin-pu
;
about
p.m.
Of
the 8rd Infantry Division, the 11th and 12th
Infantry Regiments,
available,
with
all
the
Artillery
still
were standing
in
the section
;
Ku-kia-
tsy
Sz-fan-tai, farther in rear
the 9th and 10th
Infantry Regiments, each formed in three battalions,
were
in position close north of Sz-fan-tai.
Corps were, moreover, the six battalions General Slutshevski had sent in its support from the 10th Army Corps on the afternoon of October 12^; and of these the 36th Infantry Regiment was standing not far from the 140th Infantry Regiment at Yin-kuan while the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment, which at first had also been at Yin-kuan, moved to La-mu-tun about 10 a.m. Nothing was seen of the Japanese until noon, but towards 1 p.m. strong forces were ascertained
the 17th
;
With
Army
witiiin the space Tschan-lin-pu
^Ki-siau-tun, further
;
at Schu-liri-tsy,
and at Scha-ho Railway Station. Both Artilleries conmienced to fire the Japanese were firing chiefly upon Lin-schin-pu village and on a series of gun-emplacements constructed by the Russians some time ago, but not occupied by them now the Russians were firing upon the places where the Japanese were assembling, and upon their batteries. No attack was made by
;
the Japanese Infantry in front
but the Russians were expecting an attack on their right wing

;
P. 217.
252

Little
before evening.
reliance being
placed on
the 6th Siberian Army Corps, standing with its advanced guard on the line Lan-schan-pu Pentien-tsy, after what had occurred during the last few days, the General Commanding the 35th
Infantry Division ordered the line Sz-fan-tai
Yin-kuan, as well as these places themselves, to be artificially strengthened, in case of the front line having to retreat one battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment was, moreover, ordered to construct trenches between Yin-kuan and Kuan-tun, and some earthworks behind them at Han-tschenpu, as far as time would admit. For reinforcing
;
the garrison of Iâ-mu-tun,

to that place
one more battalion
of the 140th Infantry Regiment was sent forward

;
the 36th Infantry
Regiment then
line Sz-fan-tai Yin-kuan. The Corps was thus standing in two entrenched lines, one behind the other.
occupied
17th
the
Army
At La-mu-tun
the position of the 10th

;
Army
Corps adjoined that of the 17th its extent was about 6 to 7 kilometres, stretching by Yu-kiala-tsy, the heights north of Hou-tai, and by Kukia-tsy to Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy, and consisting
of
shelter-trenches,
fortified
villages.
small
earthworks,
its
gun-pits,
and
For
occupation, after
deducting the six battalions handed over to the 17th Army Corps, General Slutshevski had available eighteen battalions only, of which
some had
;
been in action
for
some days already
towards
noon two battalions had, moreover, to be detailed, by order of Kuropatkin, to occupy the heights
east
of
AVa-ho-pu-tsy, so as to keep in touch

with the Centre.
position, the available forces
253
Considering the extent of the were thus very weak. General Slutshevski retained only one battalion
his
at
disposal
he was hoping General Baron

addressed to
Bilderling would, after the request
him, presently send back the six

10th
battalions the Corps had given to the 17th Army Corps on October 12 these forces were to be held ready in reservê. The position was occupied in the following manner In La-mu-tun was 1 battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment 2 battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment were standing between La-mu-tun and Yu-kia-la-tsy
Army
the salient portion of the position projecting south
between Yu-kia-la-tsy and Ku-kia-tsy was being held by the 123rd and 34th Infantry Regiments
;
at
Ku-kia-tsy 3 battalions of the 33rd Infantry

left
;
Regiment adjoined on the

at
the 4th Battalion

Brigade,
of this latter regiment was standing in reserve
Scha-ho-pu.
batteries,
Of
the
31st
Artillery
under escort of 1 battalion 35th Infantry Regiment, were entrenched north-east of La-mu-tun the 9th Artillery Brigade was standing in two groups south of Scha-ho-pu and
;
north-east of Ku-kia-tsy.
the
General Gerschelmann was in command of all troops occupying the position. The right section, extending to Hou-tai Hill, was at first under General Riabinkin, who, however, in the
evening, handed over the
Wassiliev, the convalescent
command to General Commander of the

;
2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division Riabinkin was to resume next day command over his own
2.54
THE RUSSO.JAPANESE WAR

the
1st
brigade,
of
the 9th
Infantry Division,
which was holding the left section, but did not, as he was shot before he could do so. General Baron Bilderling, like the General Com-
manding 17th Army Corps, anxious for the right wing of the Western Detachment, thouglit he could not yet spare on the western wing the six battalions
of the 10th
Army Corps, declining, therefore. General
But on the General ComSlutshevski's request. manding the 10th Army Corps renewing his request,
representing that, with
position,
the great extent of his
he ought to have a strong reserve, and must, at all cost, count upon these six battalions, the leader of the Western Detachment informed
him, at 5.35 p.m., that the six battalions would rejoin the 10th Army Corps, but that, in order not
to rouse the enemy's attention, their departure for
rejoining the corps
would not be
eiFected
till
dark.
General Slutshevski thereupon requested the 17th Army Corps to start the battalions for Schaho-pu, where they were to remain for the night
at
he the disposal of General Gerschelmann intended to place these six battalions next morning
;
as General Reserve farther
Opposite the 10th

not
Army
back at Pa-ta-kia-tsy. Corps the enemy did
make a decisive attack with Infantry either. The Japanese 3rd Division, it is true, tried to
;
advance against the position, but was unable to make any progiess it therefore chiefly confined The Russian to firing with Artillery. itself batteries replied, directing their fire mainly on the villages in advance of the position. General Kuropatkin's constant anxiety was that

the Japanese, disregarding the 10th
255
Army
Corps,
might advance against the right flank and rear of the 1st Army Corps in the Centre, and thus carry out the much-feared penetration of the Russian front for that reason he had ordered the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy to be occupied by two battalions, as previously stated. The concentration of strong Japanese forces being reported south of Hou-tai, he directed, moreover, by a telegram, that Hou-tai and the country east of that village should be taken under a severe fire of Artillery. Several batteries, by degrees, began to fire thither, 56 guns of the 10th Army Corps
;
finally uniting their fire in the direction indicated.
Apart from these measures, Kuropatkin had
also
come to the conclusion that the most effective means of preventing penetration was to assume the offensive himself. The Gth Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment had not been
engaged
as
yet
if
these
fresh
forces
were to
attack the Japanese 2nd

that not only that
Army, it could be assumed

be placed in a
this
Army would
but
that
very
difficult
position,
offensive
would
in
also
make
it
itself felt
with the 4th Army,
preventing
from making attempts at penetrating the Centre. General Kuropatkin, therefore, at

the Gth Siberian
last resolved to place
Army Corps,
mand
Dembovski's Detachment, under the comDetachment on the evening of October 13 an order to that effect was received by its commander. But General Baron Bilderling still hesitated to
as well as
of the Western
make the only
practical use of the forces placed
256

his
merely ordered ^ the 6th Siberian Army Corps to advance at daybreak on October 14 to the Une Schau-kia-hn-tsy Ta-hantun. Dembovski's Detachment was even to remain " on the right bank of the Hun-ho." Bilderhng, therefore, did not know at all that Dembovski's Detachment was already for some time on the left bank of the Hun~ho, and thus available for The Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, use at once. attached to Dembovski, was to reach, with its main body, Yen-schu-lin-tsy, pushing its advanced guard farther to the south-east. Grekov's Cavalry
under
command.
He
Brigade was directed to cover the right flank of the Western Group, and to drive the enemy from San-de-pu. The 10th and 17th Army Corps
were
to
positions
obstinately defending their the Scha-ho, but " to be ready for on
continue
assuming the offensive." It being expected from the results of this day, when the Japanese did not make any material progress opposite the Western Detachment, that they would continue their attacks during the night, measures were adopted to guard against surprise. With the 10th Army Corps, General Gerschelmann gave orders to keep the trenches on the Hou-tai Hill Detachoccupied, and those on either side of it. ments of Scouts were pushed farther out, and a double row of listening-posts was established. The pivots remained occupied by small parties, the actual garrisons being withdrawn to have some rest. On the left, the two battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment, as well as the Scouts of the 33rd and
'
Appendix XII.

the 1st
257
34th Infantry Regiments, had resumed touch with
Army
Corps.
General Gerschelmann went into quarters at Scha-ho-pu, anxiously awaiting the arrival of the 2nd Brigade of his Division, which had been with
the 17th
Army
Corps.
General Baron Oku, commanding the Japanese 2nd Army, had given it orders for October 13 to advance from the line Pan-kiau-pu Liu-tan-kou
Ta-tai
Order. ^
in a northerly direction, with the object
of continuing the attack
Lin-schin-pu,
hostile forces
in
upon the line Scha-ho-pu compliance with the General

that strong
It being
reported to him
were still on the height east of Pankiau-pu on the Mandarin Road, he ordered the
11th Brigade, retained in reserve by the 6th Division, together with the units of the other arms
attached to the brigade, to
the latter to employ
move
as a flank-guard
to the right of the 3rd Division, so as to enable

its full
strength in the direction
General Baron Okubo, commanding the 6th Division, had started already with the reinforced 11th Brigade from Tschen-kia in a
of Scha-ho-pu.
northerly direction, with the object of following
General Koizumi, who, on October 12, with 5 battalions of the 24th Brigade, 2 squadrons, 8 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company, was in pursuit
of the
enemy after the capture of Lan-tsy-tai,^ when he received the order of his Army Commander
"
the direction of the march was thereupon

12,
P. 229.
' The report was probably dispatched ou the evening of October when the 10th Army Corps was still holding Hun-pau-schan.
'
Pp. 20 and 214.
17

258
at
once changed to the east, in the direction of the Ko-ho-san. About noon the brigade met several orderlies of General Headquarters, one of whom was bringing the 6th Division a " Kanjo " of JNlarshal Marquis Oyama for its conduct on October 12. General Baron Okubo, on this, at once dismounted, reading to the officers assembled
this
mark of
approval.
When
the head of the

it
was seen by the enemy. General Baron Okubo rode up to it, meeting there the Army Commander and General Baron Oshima, commanding the 3rd Division, both watching the Russian position of the 10th Army Corps at Hou-tai,^ as well as a captive balloon which had ascended behind it. The Army Commander, on the morning of October 13, had ridden forward from INIen-hu-luThat tun by Nan-wu-li-tai to the Ko-ho-san. height was the objective also of the 3rd Division, whose commander believed it to be still occupied by the enemy in the morning he had therefore
that the height was no longer occupied
;
column had reached the Ko-ho-san,
adopted measures before daylight for attacking the Ko-ho-san but the troops found the trenches and gun-pits abandoned by the enemy, and so they occupied the hill at 7.30 a.m. When the report
;
came
tien,
in of strong
forces
Division, at least
standing on the heights north of Hou-huan-huathe
Army Commander
reinforced
the 3rd
Division by the greater part of his reserve," order'
Pp. 253 and 256.

It
'
cannot be ascertained how strong the reserve was on October 13,
consisting on October 10 of 18 battalions and 5 Pioneer companies.

ing the Division to support the attack of 4th
259
the
Army upon
by an
the
tai-tsy/
offensive
hne Tun-san-ho Schuanblow against Hou-huan-
hua-tien.
General Baron Oshima, commanding the 3rd Division, charged a mixed brigade {5^ battalions, 2 squadrons, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company)
to deliver this blow in a northerly direction.
rest of the
The
3rd Division was being concentrated

;
at
the two batteries which, on Pan-kiau-pu October 12, had been attached to the Division,^ were returned to the General Reserve. The advance of the troops of the 3rd Division encountered but little resistance at first. At 10 a.m. two battalions occupied Tschan-sin-tien
;
the three batteries

village,
came
into action east of the
opening fire against the line Hou-tai Hill La-mu-tun, occupied by portions of the Russian 10th Army Corps,^ but the batteries did not succeed in silencing the Russian batteries standing at Being, moreover, fired at from the latter place.
the neighbourhood of Ku-kia-tsy, the attack
here to a standstill for the
came
moment. The Army Commander becoming aware, about noon, that the Russians were still holding Tunsan-tsy
on
his right flank,
that the
Army
being therefore clear adjoining on the rigiit could not

it
have made any material progress, he thought the

right flank of the 3rd Division seriously threatened
;
he therefore ordered General Baron Okubo to advance with the 11th Brigade on Tschien-huanhua-tien, placing, for that purpose, at his disposal
'
P. 246.
'
V. 17.
'
P. 263.
260

General Reserve
;
eight batteries of the
the 3rd
was to attack the enemy in front. General Baron Okubo ordered his Artillery to come into action east of ^^'ân-kia-lou-tsy, and to fire on the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy the Infantry did no longer attack, owing to the day
Division
;
rapidly
declining.
The
reinforced 11th Brigade
slept during the night at AVan-kia-lou-tsy
Hunwhole
pau-schan.
The 3rd
tien,
Division
moved
as
yet
its
Artillery into position south-east of Tschan-sin-
and reinforced the right wing of the leading

; ;
but the attack did one battalion did push to Houtai, but, finding itself quite alone here, 100 metres distant from and opposite the enemy's line, was ordered to come back after darkness had set in. The foremost line of the Division remained during the night on the line Kian-hu-tun ^Tschan-sinbrigade with three battalions
not gain ground
tien.
Of
the 6th Division, General Koizumi's Detach;
ment^ had started from Liu-tan-kou at 6 a.m. on October 12 it had pursued the retreating Russian 17th Army Corps from Lan-tsy-tai, getting as far
as Tschien-liu-tan.
Reconnaissance having estab-
lished the fact that the
lin-pu, the brigade detailed a
enemy was still in Hunweak right-flank-guard,
which was to march on Han-kui-pu, and itself attacked Hun-hn-pu, surprising here two Russian battalions, probably from Colonel Stakovich's Detachment,^ resting there quite unconcerned they fled in disorder north, leaving behind them most
;
'
Pp. 205 and 214.
Pp. 213, 216 (footuute
1),
and 251.

of their equipments.
8.20 a.m.
261
At
the same hour 4th
about
troops of the
Division hkewise
entered
Hun-Hn-pu from the south-west.
After capturing that place, General Koizumi's reinforced 24th Brigade continued its advance,
reaching
the
line
Schu-lin-tsy
Ki-siau-tun
its
at
11 a.m., and engaging there with

hostile batteries of the 10th
Artillery the
Army
Corps at LaCorps, having
mu-tun.
The Russian 17th Army

^
strongly occupied
the Hne La-mu-tun
Lin-schin-
pu, the brigade could not advance beyond the line

it
had reached.
The
portions on the eastern bank
of the Scha-ho were barely able to repel several

counter-attacks of the Russians.
had formed two columns on the morning of October 13. The right column started from Tsun-lun-yen-tun, occupying Hun-lin-pu simultaneously with troops of the
Division
6th
Division.
It
The Japanese 4th
then
continued
fire
;
its
advance,
reaching, at 11 a.m., the line Ki-siau-tun

lin-pu,
in
spite
of the
Tschanfrom three Russian

Artillery
batteries
at
Ta-lian-tun
the
of
the
Division unlimbered at Tschan-lin-pu.
At
p.m. the Division
was ordered by the

the attack of the
Army Commander
by
vigorously
to support
3rd Division and of the reinforced 11th Brigade,
advancing jointly
with
General
Koizumi's Brigade of the 6th Division.
The enemy facing the 24th Brigade and 4th Division was about this time assumed to be in a strong position on the general line Lin-schin-pu
Ta-lian-tun Schau-kia-lin-tsy
'
three batteries
p. 250.
262

said to be at Ta-lian-tun,
one at Schau-kiaand one between both places.^ The right column of the 4th Division tried to carry forward the attack on Lin-schin-pu, after three batteries from Hun-hn-pu and six (including three from General Koizumi's Detachment) from Schu-lin-tsy had been firing on Lin-schin-pu but, owing to the severe flanking fire from Ta-lian-tun, it was impossible to advance over the open plain. The troops were therefore ordered to wait until it was dark, but as a matter of fact the fight was no
lin-tsy,
;
were
longer continued in the evening.
column of the 4th Division advanced from Tsun-lun-yen-tun on Ta-tai, but was unable to get beyond Ta-tai, owing to strong forces of the
left
The
enemy being at Wan-tschuan-tsy. One battalion of the enemy at AVan-tschuan-tsy made a counterattack on Ta-tai, but was easily repelled by the
two battalions standing there three batteries, sent by the Divisional Commander in support, did not come into action any more.^ The Divisional Cavalry was again to cover the But when the 1st Cavalry left flank at Li-kia-tun.
;
left
Brigade moved to Li-kia-tun, the Divisional Cavalry that place to the brigade, going to Tai-pin-
tschuan.
The Japanese
1st Cavalry Brigade
had arrived
it
in Li-kia-tun at 7.30 a.m.

'
When,
at 2 p.m.,
The country about Schau-kia-lin-tsy was free from the enemy ; on the other hand, Russian batteries were standing 2 kilometres north of
Ta-lian-tun at Ku-kia-tsy.
*
tschuan-tsy
Russian reports do not mention the forces left behind in Wanprobably a rear party of the 6th Siberian Army Corps is ;
meant.
263
resumed its march on Ho-lien-tai it was attacked by strong hostile Cavalry presumably Grekov's Brigade^which, however, withdrew on San-kia-tsy, when fired upon by the battery of the Japanese brigade. The detachment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, hitherto on the right bank of the Hun-ho, went to San-de-pu. Headquarters of the 2nd Army, together with
the reserve, spent the night at Pan-kiau-pu.
Orders had come in from Oyama's HeadWhile the one, arriving about 5 p.m., contained the information that the enemy was advancing to attack the Guard Division, and that, therefore, the larger portion of the 5th
quarters during the day.
Two
Division was placed under the orders of the 1st
demanded the continuation of the attack next morning in the

;
Army
the other, arriving at 10 p.m.,
direction ordered.
Based on the
latter directive
General
Baron
Oku
at
ordered the 3rd Division,

14th,
together with General Koizumi's Detachment, to

attack the
all
enemy
La-mu-tun on the
and
Result
J^^^^'g*"-
other troops to attack straight ahead.
No
material success was gained by either party

13.
on October
On
right
the Japanese side, the danger threatening the
removed by the withdrawal of the Russians. But the greatly reduced 12th Division was unable to follow up the enemy, and remained in its position about Pen-si-hu, where the 5th Kobi Brigade arrived in support. In the Centre, the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division and the 4th Army pushed the right wing of the Russian Centre from the Len-ge-san and Lo-to-san
finally
wing was
264

itself
enveloped on its right, had to fall back to the Eastern Sanjo-shi-san, unable to advance again till evening.
while the Guard Di\dsion, being
Nor was the 2nd Army

opposite
able
to
gain
the
line
the
strong
position
of
ground Western
Detachment,
reaching
only
the
generally
Tschan-sin-tien
Tschan-lin-pu.
Everybody began
to feel exhausted.
Kuropatkin gave up the plan of deciding the battle by an enveloping attack with the Eastern Detachment, ordering therefore this detachment and the Centre to retreat. Stackelberg faced about again in the country north of Bian-yu-pusa; the main body of the Centre took up a position at Fn-kia-pu, but portions established themselves still on the southern bank of the Scha-ho, on
the line Sei-ko-san
of
the
Ba-ken-ji-san.
its
The Western
Detachment maintained
Scha-ho
;
position on both banks
for
future operations the 6th
Corps and Dembovski's Detachment were placed under its command. Although the Russians began to feel somewhat exhausted too, Kuropatkin, probably in view of the events of the day having not been altogether unfavourable for the Russians, was filled with fresh
Siberian
hopes.
Army
October 14
Japanese General Headquarters ordered the Armies, during the night October 13-14, to continue the attack next morning in the directions prescribed for the rest Oyama probably expected
;
the
Army Commanders
to push the
enemy beyond

on October
12,
265
the Scha-ho in conformity with the directive given TheJapa-
but to attack him no longer on Army

river.
ad-
the northern bank of the
General Baron Kuroki issued various separate

Orders to the 1st Army.
continue the
attack
yanres to the Senaho, push-
the 2nd potions Divisions were, as previously mentioned,^ directed 2^ *^?

to
The Guard and
by advancing on both Fn-kia-pu. The sides of the road Do-mon-shi 5th Division,^ attached to the 1st Army on received the following Order October 13,
'
,
Eastern
ment and
fentê
beyond
the river.
*'
Russians
have
apparently
withdrawn.
The
sketch
8.
division will follow in the direction of
Wai-taureinforced
schan, pushing to the Scha-ho."
The
3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, under General
Matsunaga, which on October 13 was stopped by

the
Russians at the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass,^ reits
ceived orders to cut off
opponent * by advancing
in the direction of Schan-pin-tai-tsy.
The Guard
Kobi Brigade, under General Umesawa,was directed to march from the neighbourhood of Liu-schu-kia
to San-kia-tsy, 4 kilometres south-west of Scha-
ho-pu.
The
1st
Army
having been reinforced by
the 5th Kobi Brigade,'^
Umesawa was
to join the
General Reserve of the Japanese Army. On the morning of October 14 the whole of
the 1st
advanced again. General Ino-uye's Detachment included, which apparently had received no fresh orders. The last of Stackelberg's weak rearguards, which had been holding their positions hitherto, having been withdrawn during
'
Army
P. 240.
240.
pp_ 230-231.
Portions of the 1st Siberian

P. 229.
Army
Corps.
266

it
the night, General Baron Ino-uye thought

less to
use-
keep
his forces
;
any longer scattered
in their
he therefore concentrated the bulk of his forces and advanced on Schan-schi-tsiautsy in pursuit, probably going by Sien-schan-tsy.^ Following the example of the Army's right
extensive positions
wing, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade went forward too
on the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho from the neighbourhood south of Pen-si-hu it crossed the river, marching on the northern bank to San-kia-tsy, which Rennenkampf's rearguard had probably evacuated already. General Matsunaga's Brigade, establishing touch with the 12th Division on the right, started from the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass on
;
Schan-pin-tai-tsy.
General Baron Stackelberg made arrangements Eastern Detachment to continue its retreat. The 1st Siberian Army Corps, which, early on October 14, had reached Ya-ma-lin-tsy with the
for the 1st
East Siberian Rifle Division, and Kan-to-li-san
with the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, was ordered to march on Hei-sun-pu the 3rd Siberian Army Corps was to continue its retreat to the Kau-tu-lin Pass, and the 2nd Siberian Army Corps
;
to cover the retreat as rearguard at Bian-yu-pu-sa.
During the forenoon an order of the Commander-in-Chief arrived, demanding the immediate
dispatch of
2.5
battalions to rô-sien-tun, 8 kilo-
metres north-west of Fn-kia-pu, for the formation Stackelberg, of a General Reserve of the Army. probably assuming that Kuropatkin was going to
'
Tlie 5th
Kobi Brigade, which had arrived on October

12tli ivisiou as well.
13,
seems to
have goue ahead with the
267
cencentrate such a strong reserve only for oifensive

purposes, thought he would most effectively sup-
port such an attack

fore dispatched
if
he likewise assumed the
offensive with all his available forces.
He
there-
an officer to General Headquarters with the report that he " intended to concentrate the whole of the Eastern Detachment, and to fall upon the right flank of the Japanese in a southwesterly direction to-morrow,
if
the
Commander-
in-Chief was going to attack towards the south."
the
Kuropatkin insisted upon his demand. JMeanwhile retreat had commenced. General Baron
Stackelberg
detailed,
for
the use of
the
ComRifle
mander-in-Chief,
the
9th
East
Siberian
Division, which had already arrived at Yin-pan, and was now marching back to Kan-to-li-san, and, in addition, the 19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, as well as the 218th Infantry Regiment, attached These to that Army Corps in all, 22 battalions. troops, under the united command of General
;
Gerngross,
commanding the
1st
Siberian
Army
Corps, were put in motion, going by Orr-tau-kou,
and arriving at liO-sien-tun on October 1.5. The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was directed not to march now to Hei-sun-pu, but to march back to Kan-to-li-san, where it remained for the present. The main body of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps went back to about the Kau-tu-lin
Pass,
its
tsy
Wan-fu-lin
rearguard reaching the line Schun-schuiPass.
The
rest of the 5th
East
Siberian Rifle Division, of the 2nd Siberian
Army
Corps,
remained halting north-west of Bian-yu-

268
pu-sa.

The
protective
detachments, which had
remained on the left bank of the Scha-ho, at the Wai-tau-schan and Tsio-tso-schan, were attacked and pushed back to the right bank by portions of the Japanese Guard Division and by the 5th Japanese Division. The Japanese Guard Division had been noticing since midnight that the Russians facing them were in full retreat portions only, opposite the 3rd Guard Regiment, were holding still the Wai-tauschan and Wu-tin-kou village. At 8.30 a.m. General Asada issued the following
^
;
Order, north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy

"
1.
"2.
The Division will pursue the enemy. The 1st Brigade will advance at 11
a.m.
from the country north-east of Do-mon-shi, with the object of occupying the line Hua-sa-tun Kin-cho-san. It will reconnoitre on Fn-kia-pu and secure the right flank. One battalion is to be left north of Do-mon-shi, at the disposal of the
Divisional Commander. " 3. The Mh Guard Regiment (less one battalion)
advance from Do-mon-shi at 10 a.m., occupying the line from the Kin-cho-san to the road
will
Schan-liu-ho-tsy
"
4.
Fn-kia-pu.
One
battalion
of
the
Mh Guard
Regiment,
and the Pioneer the 4th Guard Regiment.

the Artillcrij,
battalion will follow
"5.
'
Watanabe's
Detachment^
will
rejoin
the
Siberian Army Corps and Mishtshenko's Brigade. Watanabe's Detachment consisted of the 3rd Guard Regiment and one battery it was to cover the right flank of the Guard Division on October 13, and had retired before superior Russian forces to the neighbourhood of Man-hua-pu. (P. 238.)
The 4th

Division,
after
269
being
relieved
by the
said to
General
Reserve."
The
due
late
hour of starting
difficulty
is
have been
to
the
of
reconnaissance.
The
Divisional Cavalry
Detachment
since
October
Regiment having joined Kasa's 11,^ the Guard Division
had but a very small party of horse. The 1st Guard Brigade, which at daybreak had pushed one battalion of the 2nd Guard Regiment
to the Ba-ji-san, to
cover the right flank, must
have started earlier than the Order prescribed, for its vanguards occupied the Sen-san as early as 11 a.m. During its further advance thence it
was reported to the brigade that strong forces of the enemy, with advanced detachments on the Tsio-tso-schan, were standing to the east in the Scha-ho valley the forces in question were portions of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division. It being not safe under these circumstances to march straight on Kin-cho-san village, the brigade commander detached a force of some strength, which, in co-operation with the battalion from the 2nd Guard Regiment on the right, on the Ba-ji-san,
;
succeeded, after a
short
action,
in
driving the
enemy from the

dent
;
Tsio-tso-schan.
The advance of
the brigade was considerably delayed by this inciit was 5 p.m. before its head arrived at Tai-kua-tun and established touch with the 4th
Guard Regiment.
had started at the appointed time from Do-mon-shi, probably marching by the road
latter
'
The
p. 161.
The
fur
October 14
aiul
wlieroabouts of Kasa's Detachment cannot be traced the days afterwards.
270
through Yen-san-sai, driving back weak Russian rearguards and occupying the Kin-cho-san with It having become known its vanguard at 1 p.m. meanwhile that the enemy was still in strong
on the Ba-ken-ji-san (Mishtshenko's Brigade, with the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment), the bulk of the Japanese 4th Guard Regiment was formed up south of the Kin-cho-san ready to The Artillery had attack the height mentioned. meanwhile also arrived, and gone into position at Ta-yin-schou-tun four batteries were firing upon Mishtshenko's troops on the Ba-ken-ji-san, and on his Artillery, which was ascertained to be east of the hill three batteries took under fire the Sei-ko-san, being held by the Russian 37th Infantry Division, against which the Japanese 2nd Division, on the left, was advancing to attack at the same time. Together with the 4th Guard Regiment, which about 5 p.m. was deploying against the Ba-kenji-san, the 1st Guard Brigade advanced to attack that height from Tai-kua-tun, the 2nd Guard Regiment being in first line, and the 1st in second
force
; ;
The Infantry attack having been well prepared by the Artillery, and being well supported
line.
also
by the batteries, it made at first good progress but shortly after 5 p.m. a terrible thunderstorm
all
broke suddenly, rendering

impossible.
further
movements
The
rolling of
;
thunder drowned the
roaring of the guns
regardless of the action, friend
and foe
'
alike looked for shelter in the country to

battery was
Tlie
seventh
probably Major
Hidikata's Battery.
(P. 170.)

save themselves, at least to
271
some
extent, from the
floods of the torrential rains.
storm dusk came rather quickly.

darkness the Russians
With the thunderUnder cover of
evacuated their position, retiring behind the Scha-ho, probably to the neighbourhood of Orr-tau-kou. When the storm had abated sufficiently for the action to be resumed,
the
enemy had
already
disappeared.
Growing
of
darkness prevented pursuit.

to rest.
The Commander
the Guard Division therefore ordered the troops
Having probably learned meanwhile of
the evacuation by the Russians of the Sei-ko-san,
he ordered outposts to be placed merely facing

the Scha-ho, between Yen-sin-tun and the country
west of Fn-kia-pu.
To
the 1st
Guard Brigade
was assigned the section from the Kin-cho-san to beyond the Ba-ken-ji-san, and the task of estabthe main lishing touch with the 2nd Division body bivouacked at Ta-yin-schou-tun. Adjoining, on the right, the 4th Guard Regiment furnished outposts as far as the Sen-san, and bivouacked near
;
Kin-cho-san
its
village.
The
Artillery bivouacked near
positions, and the Divisional Reserve north of Do-mon-shi. It cannot be ascertained whether, and when, Watanabe's Detachment rejoined the Guard Divi-
sion
on October
14.
The
it,
5th Division,^ wliich was detailed to relieve
had meanwhile advanced against the Wai-tau-
schan, west of General Matsunaga's Detachment,
pushing back there rearguards of the 5th East

Siberian Rifle Division.
At
12.30 p.m. the Divi-
Pp. 240 and 2G5.
272
sional

Commander
;
reported to the 1st
Army
that
the 5th Division was on the point of crossing the
Scha-ho that the enemy facing it was retreating. But an order of Marshal Marquis Oyama having
in the
meantime
arrived, saying that the

left
were to halt on the

finish
Armies bank of the Scha-ho, and
the battle as soon as possible, the intention

directive,^
of the Division was no longer carried out.
Conforming to General Baron Kuroki's

its
the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division continued

Patrols had advance, too, early on October 14. pushed during the night to the heights of Schauthe schi-miau-tsy without meeting any enemy brigade therefore started in good time, occupying the heights mentioned as early as 7 a.m. Russian batteries being observed there on the Ba-ken-ji-san, and farther north (Mishtshenko's
;
Artillery),
the
Divisional
Artillery
moved
into
position,
two
batteries unlimbering
on the heights
of Schau-schi-miau-tsy, and two east of Miau-kou,

all four then uniting their fire upon the Russian guns on the Ba-ken-ji-san. The Divisional Artillery was supported by the Mortar Abteilung attached to the Army on October 13,- which General Baron Kuroki engaged east of Miau-kou The between the Guard and 2nd Divisions. enemy's Artillery moving off from the Ba-ken-jisan^ about 1 p.m., the batteries of the Division stationed east of Miau-kou went forward to the
northern slope of the heights of Schau-schi-miau' P. 240. I'p. 239-240. Probably to change its position merely, because in the afternoon the Guard Artillery was firing still upon Russian guns at the Ba-ken'
'
ji-san.
(P. 270.)

tsy, shelling, jointly
273
with the other two batteries, the Sei-ko-san, occupied by portions of the Russian 37th Infantry Division of the Infantry of the brigade, only the 30th Infantry Regiment was deployed for attack, in touch with the right wing
;
of the
4)th
Army.
effective, the
The Artillery fire was very Russians retreating before the actual
assault
was pushed home by the Infantry.
When
delivered in the afternoon, jointly with troops of
the 4th
Army, the
assault
by Infantry met with
small forces only of the enemy, who, after a brief

resistance, retired.
The 15th
After
Brigade, apparently, did not advance
afterwards beyond the Sei-ko-san.
the 4th
Army
had
pushed
back
Russian 37th Infantry Division to the north of Schi-miau-tsy Tun-san-ho on October 13,^ the right General Count Nodzu, acting in the spirit oftbeind Oyama's Order, dated October 1 2 in the evening,^ tick ^h*e" decided to continue the attack on October 14, and 37th in-
the The Japaheights ^^^^ ^^'^^
clear the left
bank of the Scha-ho of the enemy

,
, .
DhrisLu
?f Russian
ist
completely. ^
"^
*^?
was ascertained that the enemy was, with strong forces, still on the Sei-kothe first san, and on the heights at Tun-san-tsy
reconnaissance
it
;
By
Army
aud^^'
Pr^^vJ^"^
object was,
therefore,
to
capture these heights,

the
carry
loth, on
The Army Commander charged

11th
10th and koVan

attack,
reserve.^
^"<^j^^^"-
Kobi Brigades
to
out
the
in in
*
the 10th Division being
held
back
sau.
The 11th Kobi Brigade formed up
readiness
P. 228.
p. 247.
not standing north of the Nan-san.

'
Locality of
its
position
known
the Division was probably
18
274

Tun-san-ho.
Infantry
as
south of Schi-miau-tsy, and the 10th Kobi Brigade

at
The Russians
Division
had entrenched their but without special care, the lines of trenches and gun-emplacements being clearly visible on the Japanese side. Four batteries were counted on the Sei-ko-san and on the heights of Tun-san-tsy, and, in addition, about three batteries (probably from the 4th Siberian Army Corps), which had gone into position on the northern bank of the Scha-ho, on the south-eastern slope of the To-san, rising steeply from the lowland, and were directing an ineffective fire upon the Japanese at Schi-miau-tsy and Tun-san-ho, of
37th
position
usual,
portions
of the
course,
owing to the distant range.
With the
object of fighting
down
the hostile Artillery on the
heights straight in front, three Abteilungs of the
14th and 15th Field Artillery Regiments, as well

as an Abteilung of the 10th Division, unlimbered
on the slopes east and west of Man-kia-fn, opening an overwhelming fire at 9 a.m. some batteries prepared to accompany the attacking Infantry
;
during
its
advance.
Artillery of the 4th
While the
Army
was thus
engaging the enemy's position in front, General Baron Okubo, of the 2nd Army, commanding the Gth Division, advanced, by direct orders of Oku, early on October 14, with the reinforced
11th Brigade, to attack the heights east of
Tschien-huan-hua-tien.
Wa-ho-
pu-tsy, bringing his batteries into action east of
By
enfilade freely the Russian
this he managed to guns at Tun-san-tsy.

(retired).
According to Japanese sources of Captain Sander

This superior
batteries
fire
;
275
from two directions the Russian
within a were unable to stand long short time they all ceased fire. The Infantry had in the meantime deployed for attack, the 11th Kobi Brigade advancing against the Sei-ko-san, and the 10th Kobi Brigade against the heights of Tun-san-tsy of the 11th Brigade
comparatively
of the 6th Division, the San-ka-ku-san.

in their trenches
two
battalions attacked the
heights north of Tun-san-tsy, and
two
battalions
The Russians being kept down
the fog,
by the strong Artillery fire, and which was lying over the lowlands on the
morning, facilitating the approach, the attacking Infantry gained ground without undue loss, the 11th Brigade of the 6th Division capturing the
coveted heights even before noon.
to let the Artillery have
The
attack
of the Kobi Regiments, which had begun later,
some
effect first,
made
rapid progress too.
When, about
4th
2 p.m., most of the Artillery of the
Army was
obliged to cease
fire,
in order
not
to endanger its
own
Infantry, which had arrived
quite close to the enemy's position, four batteries
of the 2nd Division of the 1st
Army
on the right
intervened most effectively in the action of the
4th
Army
the batteries had unlimbered east of
Schau-schi-miau-tsy,
and were partly enfilading the Russian position on the Sei-ko-san. The 30th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division, as was mentioned,' took a share in the attack of the Kobi Brigades. The Russians do not seem to have waited for the final blow of the assailant,
'
P. 273.
276
that.
but to have evacuated their position previous to When the heights were in the hands of the Japanese, Artillery was brought up at once, taking the troops streaming back under a withering fire, without the Russian batteries on the To-san being able to prevênt it. Nine ammunition waggons had been left behind in the captured position. Batteries of the 6th Division had meanwhile unhmbered on the heights east of Wa-ho-putsy,
fire.
and were joining
in the concentric
The Russians fell west of rr-tau-kou Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps billeted in Huan-schan. The 2nd Battalion of the 40th Kobi Regiment, and the 30th Infantry
;
pursuing back to the country north-
Regiment of the 2nd Division went

and
inflicting fresh losses
in pursuit, pre-
venting the defeated from making a renewed stand,

portions of them.
on them by cutting off was only when the thunderstorm began,^ and the tremendous rain made it impossible for the gunners and marksmen to continue
It
their
fire, that the remnants of the Russians succeeded in escaping further pursuit under cover of the storm, and in gaining the right bank of the Scha-ho. The 1st and 4th Armies had accomplished
task the enemy opposing them had been pushed to the northern bank of the Scha-ho. Continuing the attack across the river was for the present not the intention of General HeadMarshal Marquis Oyama therefore quarters
their
;
;
ordered both Armies to establish themselves in

the positions captured.
General Yamada's Detachment, which the 5th
p. 270.
277
Division had left behind on its recent battleground in the country east of Schi-li-ho on October 13,^ did not take any part in the combats of October 14 it therefore seems to have remained
;
in reserve at Hun-kia-tschuan.
The
action on October 14 having brought about
a temporary mixture of units on the inner wings of the 4th and 2nd Armies, General Headquarters ordered the country east of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy
to belong to the 4th
Army, and therefore the
troops
of the 2nd therefrom.
Army within that area to be withdrawn On this, the Commander of the 6th
three battalions only on the heights
Division
left
south-east of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy in the evening,
concentrating the rest of his troops as reserve at

Tschien-huan-hua-tien.
Next day the whole of
the 11th Brigade started to rejoin the 24th Brigade, making the 6th Division thus complete again.
The losses of Nodzu's Army during the combats from October 10 to 14 were roughly 3,140 men, among whom were 40 officers dead and about 100 wounded.
Complying with the
the 6th
tun,^ the
Army Commander's
the
direction
direc- The Japa-
tive to attack, jointly with the 24th
Division,
in
Brigade of ^hisfjn of La-mu- attacks

the Russian
General commanding the 3rd Division got his troops ready for attack long before daybreak three battalions were to advance against Hou-tai Hill, and six battalions on their left against Yu-kia-la-tsy. Before these had started,
;
J)^^^["
"!"*;
its
front.
a reconnaissance
Russian
companies
was made in the dark by two from Hou-tai Hill. They
P. 240.
p. 263.
278
pushed to Hou-tai, but retired again apparently satisfied when they were not fired upon from the village, which the Japanese had not yet Without being noticed by the enemy, occupied. the Japanese followed to the northern edge of the village, while the lines deployed on the Mandarin Road were at the same time gaining About 3.30 a.m. the whole ground as well. line rose to assault the enemy's position on Houbut the Russians tai Hill and at Yu-kia-la-tsy (123rd Infantry Regiment, and 4th Battalion 34th Infantry Regiment,^ which had been moved up for the night to Hou-tai Hill) were not to be surprised, for they repelled the assault by a hot fire. The Japanese then rallied and formed
;
for
another
assault,
assaults, but failing likewise. had shaken the Russians to such an however, extent that soon afterwards a third assault sucbut it must be stated that some porceeded tions of the garrison (two companies of the 123rd
;
made shortly after The vigour of the
a.m.,
Infantry Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the
34th Infantry Regiment) had retired already after the second assault, thus weakening the defensive
front.
While the Japanese made

chiefly
their
first
assaults
with the bayonet, their third assault at daybreak was opened by a sudden fire of the whole line on the Russian position, producing
extraordinary consternation.
disorder
prevailing,
Making use of
pushed
the
on,
the
Japanese
Army
Corps.
capturing the whole section of the front assaulted.

'
From
tlie
10th

The Russians streamed back
in disorder,
279
pursued
by the Japanese, into whose hands fell the whole of the 2nd Abteilung of the 9th Artillery Brigade, under the command of Colonel Smolenski 24 guns in all, as well as some ammunition waggons. The gunners, taken by surprise, vainly tried to mow down with case-shot the swarms of skirmishers assaulting them so suddenly, and which they had taken at first to be their own Infantry within a few minutes the whole Abteilung was The commander of the Abteilung and disabled. two commanders of batteries were killed, the third in addition, battery commander was wounded the Abteilung lost 8 officers and 151 men dead or wounded, and most of its horses. On the report of his front having been pierced, General Gerschelmann, commanding the Russian 9th Division, engaged the only battalion ^ he had
available as reserve at Scha-ho-pu
but
this
weak
force did not succeed in stopping the Japanese,
who, on the contrary, pushed forward along the Mandarin Road as far as Scha-ho-pu. Here they
met with a more
obstinate resistance.
The
it,
village,
had been occupied, after the retreat from Hou-tai Hill, by the 4th Battalion 34th Infantry Regiment, which but the Japanese obstinately defended its position
as well as the fire-trenches in front of
;
by degrees gained ground. While the centre of the Japanese attack pushed through as far as Scha-ho-pu, the wings of the 3rd Division were meeting with far greater
'
'
Shrapnels with time-fuze set O. From the ySrd Infantry Regiment.
280

The
left
wdng certainly succeeded, pushing beyond the Scha-ho the Russian garrison holding the portion between Yu-kia-la-tsy and La-mu-tun, and furnished by the 124th Infantry Regiment, but inside the village of La-mu-tun the adversary held his ground with the utmost obstinacy; the 1st Brigade of the
difficulties.
after a short time, in
Russian 9th Infantry Division maintained itself in like manner opposite the Japanese right wing on the southern river-bank the brigade was facing there south-west, leaning with its right on the Scha-ho.
;
In spite of the success in the centre, the situation of the 3rd Division was therefore not favourable
was fighting on three fronts if fresh strong forces were going to make a counter-attack now, the Division was not only running the risk
at
all.
It
of losing the advantages gained, but also of being hemmed in on three sides, and of being defeated
itself.
General Baron Oshima, commanding the Division, nevertheless determined to remain on

rest,
the defensive with his right wing only, and, for
the
to continue
the attack on
Scha-ho-pu
and Iâ-mu-tun. Six batteries of the 2nd Army's General Reserve had been placed for support at
the
disposal of
the
Division
these
came
into
action
to that
^
south
of Yu-kia-la-tsy.
The
Divisional
Artillery had
;
come
into action probably previous

is
but
its
fire-position
not known.
Nor was it possible to ascertain how many batteries the Division had available on that day. The Japanese Army Commanders mostly
detailed a portion of the Artillery of each Division into their General
Reserves ; but it seems that the number of batteries taken from the General Baron Oshima had most Divisions was not always the same. likely not more than three batteries with his Division on October 14.

Russians were unable to
;
281
This most determined attack on Scha-ho-pu the resist they evacuated the southern portion of the village, withdrawing
to the right
lished
bank of the
river,
where they estabpart
themselves in the
northern
of
the
renewed resistance. The Japanese followed them, occupying the southern part of the
village for
Shortly before the Russians crossed the river. General Riabinkin, who, after handing over
village.
the right section of defence^ to the convalescent
General Wassiliev, was on the point of returning
resume command of his own brigade,' was mortally wounded by a rifle-bullet at the southern edge of Scha-ho-pu village. That the 3rd Division succeeded in pushing back the Russian front south of Scha-ho-pu, was probably due only to the want of strong reserves
to
with the 10th Army Corps. If the six battalions of the 2nd Brigade 9th Infantry Division had
returned in time to
the day. But, in spite of the assurance given by the General Commanding the 17th Army Corps, these battalions had not yet arrived on the evening of October 13. In vain did General Gerschelmann wait during the night for the brigade to make its
its
corps from the 17th
Army
Corps,^ they might have changed the fortune of
appearance at Scha-ho-pu.
the
When, on
the morning,
enemy had penetrated into the fortified position, the General Commanding dispatched two
troops of Cossacks in search of the brigade, and to bring it up to Scha-ho-pu he presumed the
;
'
P. 253.
1st
Brigade yth Infautry Division.
P. 254.
282

its
brigade to have missed

or
its
way
in
the darkness,
commander not to have received the order. General Staff Officer was sent off with the same mission he was, moreover, to carry to the
Commander
of the 35th
Infantry Division 17th
Army Corps the request to move to Pa-ta-kia-tsy whatever he could spare of troops, because the front of the 10th Army Corps had been pierced, and the corps was now retiring behind the Scha-ho.
The
officer, riding off at
7.30 a.m.,
met near the
railway south of Han-tschen-pu General Wolkov,
commanding the 17th

greatly
Army
hearing
joined
Corps,
that
who was
Shatilov's
astonished
on
yet
Brigade had
not
the
10th
its
Army
village
Corps, he having given
orders for
departure
yesterday already.
the
North of Lin-schin-pu
General
Staff Officer
met General Dobr-
shinski,
learning from
commanding the 35th Infantry Division, him that Shatilov's Brigade had
his disposal,
but had now started Corps that he could not spare any of his own troops, on account of It proved, his own corps being hard pressed itself. however, that of the missing brigade only three battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment had started for Scha-ho-pu, General Dobrshinski having sent the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment to La-mu-tun, with the object of reinforcing the fourth battalion his own troops engaged there of the 36th Infantry Regiment General Dobrshinski had retained at first too, but allowed it The first three to follow its regiment afterwards. battalions arrived at Scha-ho-pu towards 9 a.m.,
been hitherto at
to rejoin the 10th
Army

firing-Hne of the 123rd Infantry
283
where they formed a rallying-point for the retiring Regiment. The
two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment it was impossible to withdraw from the fighting-line at La-mu-tun one company of them seems to General have been the only one not engaged
;
Shatilov,
kia-tsy with that
commanding the company
brigade, reached Pa-taat 10

a.
m/
ho-pu, the Japanese got

position along the
After the capture of the southern part of Schasome machine-guns into
bank of the
river,
overwhelming
the Russians on the northern bank with a murder-
ous
fire.
After a short time the latter evacuated
the northern part of the village as well, withdrawing on Pa-ta-kia-tsy without the Japanese pushing
after
them. Generals Gerschelmann and Shatilov succeeded in staying the masses streaming back, and occupying with them the fire-trenches existing half\\ây between Scha-ho-pu and Pa-ta-kia-tsy at about 11 a.m. It was 1 p.m. before the last
Infantry Regiment arrived
battalion of the 36th

here.
occurred with the
General Kuropatkin, having heard of what had The 10th Army Corps, at once ^}^g'^"^ resolved to come to the rescue with his reserve, iêtachAt 11.35 a.m. Headquarters of the 10th Army vainly atCorps were informed by telephone from General ^^"^P^^jj^g
Headquarters that tlie Commander-in-Chief was advancing to attack with all his available forces in
-"^t-îa-
from the Japanese On his arrival at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, he reported that General Dobr- q^^ Divi. shinski on the day before, when receiving the order to send back the sion. brigade to the 10th Army Corps, had said "he would never dream of obeying the order until after the battle he was expecting an attack
;
himself."
284

^
the direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy

tsy
Ku-kia-
the enemy's right flank. The 10th Corps was to maintain itself obstinately, and to attack as soon as Kuropatkin's counter-attack
against
Army
became
effective.
Somewhat later the copy of an Order' by the Commander-in-Chief to the leader of the Western Detachment came to Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps, saying that the 1st Army Corps was going to join the General Reserve in the neighbourhood of Lo-sien-tun San-kia-tsy, and that INlau's Detachment had started from the neighbourhood of rr-tau-kou^ to join the 10th Army Corps that the 10th Army Corps, whose left flank was being secured by the disposition of the General Reserve, was to prepare a position on its left, in which it would be able to delay the enemy's attack until the General Reserve, under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief, was advancing to attack. About the same time tliis last message arrived at Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps, General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division, received a message direct from the Commander" I am in-Chief, dispatched from San-kia-tsy coming to help you, and am advancing in the
direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy, with the object
of pushing against the right flank of the

attacking you.
'
enemy
For the present
have only four
North-east of Hou-tai Hill.
The main
forces of Mau's
^ Appendix XIII. Detachment, after the action at the
I>jo-san
on October
Siberian
Army
13, had probably retired, jointly with the 4th Corps, to the country north of Fn-kia-pu during the
night following that day.

battalions, but
285
hope to gather together eight to

General Slutshevski, commanding Corps, was ordered by the Comto retake at so
as
twelve."
At
p.m.
the 10th
cost
in
Army
mander of the Western Detachment

all
the position
line again
of
Scha-ho-pu,
to
come
with the 17th

arrived,
Army
Corps.
Finally, at the
same time, a message from the

saying that
the
Quartermaster- General
started
leading regiment of the promised supports had
from San-kia-tsy in the direction of Tschienall
san-ta-kan-tsy.
From
this intelligence
General Slutshevski
was justified in concluding that help for his corps was coming up soon for, apart from the fact that the Commander-in-Chief was apparently marching to his aid, the arrival of Man's Detachment could be expected. Although Kuropatkin had demanded
;
Corps not to advance before the reserves were intervening against the Japanese 3rd Division, General Slutshevski, probably influenced by Bilderling's urgent order, resolved to attack Scha-ho-pu at once. The attack was to be carried out by the 36th Infantry Regiment, which was now complete, and standing in the trenches half-way between Schaof the 10th
Army
ho-pu and Pa-ta-kia-tsy. While two battalions, under Colonel Shdanovski, commanding the regiment, were to make a frontal attack along the Mandarin Road, General Shatilov, commanding the brigade, was to attack with the other two In support of the battalions from Schan-lan-tsy. detailed the Abteilung of the 31st attack were
286

^
Artillery Brigade and the 3rd Battery of the 9th Artillery Brigade
which had gone into position
south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, the former to the west, and the latter to the east, of the Mandarin Road.
Shatilov's
column succeeded
in crossing the river

little
at Schan-lan-tsy,
and taking possession of the

All
failed,
wood
severe
north-east of Scha-ho-pu.
of the Japanese.
attempts,
however, of pushing farther

fire
owing to the
Colonel Shdanovski,
commanding the 36th Infantry Regiment, occupied the empty northern portion of Scha-ho-pu one part of his column worked its way still farther
;
forward at the north-east corner of the village, gaining the southern bank of the river, and
establishing touch
wth
Shatilov's
firing-line,
in
prolongation of which they engaged in the

fight.
fire-
The
were
frontal attacks of Shdanovski 's

all
main
forces
repelled, the Russians maintaining
themselves, however, in the part of the

situated on the northern bank.
village
upon supports that were promised, thus ended without any material gain it was, of course, evident from the beginning that four battalions alone would not be able to snatch from an ever- victorious Japanese Division anything it was holding, if the promised Neither JVIau's Detachment aid failed to come up. had arrived, nor had Kuropatkin intervened. Towards 2.30 p.m. Man's Detachment had reported, it is true, that it was marching in support of the
attack,
in
The
made
reliance
corps
'
to
]
San-kia-tsy,
on
Kuropatkin's personal
still
I'he
et
and 2nd Batteries were
on the southern bank of the
Scha-ho

direction
;
287
of
the attempt, too, had been
made
sending an officer to meet the detachment, so as
up in the direction on Hou-tai-lin-tsy but the detachment did not arrive, and nothing more was heard of what had become of it. When it began to grow dark during these vain
to bring
it
attempts of carrying through the attack, to which no vigour could be given, from want of fresh sup-
General Commanding the 10th Army Corps resolved to abandon the attack finally. The troops on the southern bank of the river were ordered at 8 p.m. to go back to the northern bank, but the 36th Infantry Regiment was to hold the northern part of Scha-ho-pu at all cost. To prevent being surprised again, all the batteries were sent back for the night to the country north of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, with instructions to resume their positions on the northern Scha-ho bank at
ports, the
daybreak.^
General Slutshevski reported to the

of the
Commander
Army
troops
Corps, asking
Western Group the situation of the 10th him at the same time to send,
;
during the night, at least one brigade of intact to Pa-ta-kia-tsy else his Army Corps,
owing to the loss and exhaustion of the troops, would be unable to face fresh fights The 1st Army Corps at Huan-schan was requested by Slutshevski to send back again to the 10th Army Corps the two battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment which had been covering the right Hank of the 1st Army Corps.^
'
back
During the night the Artillery, except one Abteilung, was brought * Pp. 252-253. still farther north, beyond Hua-schi-lio.
288

river
The
ordered.
was
crossed
during
the night,
as
The
troops of the left defensive section

;
went into bivouac east of Pa-ta-kia-tsy the remaining portions were probably stationed between Pa-ta-kia-tsy and Kuan-tun. On the southern bank of the Scha-ho, La-mu-tun village only remained occupied by two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment the 36th Infantry Regiment was hold;
ing the northern part of Scha-ho-pu, as directed.
Maus Detachment
it,
not having arrived after dark,
a General Staff officer
was dispatched
in search of
and to conduct
it
to Pa-ta-kia-tsy.
After
many
wanderings, the officer found the brigade at last

near Fu-kia-tun-kou at
1
o'clock in the morning.

tired, after
marching to and fro on the bad roads softened by rain General Kuropatkin had ordered them, therefore, to spend the night wherever they would be at dusk. After its first rapid success the Japanese 3rd Division had a hard struggle. The last man of Division had to be engaged to maintain the the position gained and to beat off the various counterattacks. It vainly attempted to recapture from When night made the Russians also La-mu-tun. at last an end to the combats, the Japanese remained in the position captured on the Scha-ho, where they had probably entrenched themselves
;
The men were exceedingly
during the day. Infantry fire lasted all night in Scha-ho-pu, without, however, leading to more
serious fighting.
General Kuropatkin, as
we mentioned
before,^
on the intelligence of the Japanese having pierced

'
p. 283.
289
the front of the 10th Army Corps at dawn, de- General termined to push with strong forces against the kiuTnes right flank of the Japanese 3rd Division in relief *^ ^^^^P"
of the 10th
ing the 1st
Army Corps. The General Command- ho-pu Army Corps was to advance with the TastVe-^
37th Infantry Division from Yin-schou-tun at the s^''^^Sei-ko-san, whilst the Commander-in-Chief himself
intended to attack with portions of the 22nd Infantry Di\dsion from Liian-fan-tun in the direction
on Ku-kia-tsy, east of Hou-tai Hill. General Baron Meiendorf, commanding the 1st Army Corps, who was in his quarters in the neighbourhood of Huan-schan, therefore received, at 9.55 a.m., the following Order " The enemy has broken through the 10th Army AVhile covering your Corps' position at Hou-tai. front, advance to attack the right flank of the enemy, who is pressing the 10th Army Corps. *' I myself am proceeding to attack with the reserve, eight or twelve battalions from the 22nd Infantry Division for the moment I have only four battalions. I shall direct my blow from San-kia-tsy on Ku-kia-tsy you must direct your attack so as to let your right touch my left." Attached to this Order was a sketch showing the converging advance of both attacking columns in the direction on Ku-kia-tsy. After the Commander-in-Chief's directive had arrived at Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps, the Chief of the Staff sent the document to Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps, accompanied by the following commimication
;
'
North-east of Lan-fan-tun.
19
290
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE AVAR

"Dispatched 11.35 a.m.
" In compliance with the accompanying order
of
the Commander-in-Chief, the 37th

its artillery,
Infantry
Division, together with
one sotnia 7th
Cossack Regiment, and 2nd Siberian Cossack Battery, which has been standing south of the villages Yin-schou-tun Tun-san-tsy, are advancing at once to attack the right flank of the Japanese, who have pushed through The same the centre of the 10th Army Corps. order has been given to the 1st Battalion 88th Infantry Regiment, standing in the section east of
Siberian
Wa-ho-pu-tsy. " The Chief of the Staff of the Army wishes to inform you that he is collecting reserves in your
support."
At the time the Commander-in-Chief, apparently from Huan-schan, was disposing of the 1st Army Corps, and the General Commanding that Army Corps was directing the 37th Infantry Division to march on Ku-kia-tsy, and the Chief of the Staff of the Army was informing the 10th Corps of the imminent intervention of these forces, the 37th Infantry Di^dsion itself was being attacked on all sides at the Sei-ko-san by portions of the Japanese 1st, 4th, and 2nd Armies, and able only to escape annihilation by favour of the disturbances in the
weather.^
1st
On the other hand, of the 22nd Infantry Division Army Corps, which, since October 12, had been
for carrying
'
broken up, some troops were collected

r. 276.
291
In addition to the out the intended attack. Commander-in-Chief's last reserve 86th Infantry Regiment and 2nd Abteilung 7th Artillery Brigade, from the 1st Army Corps which
Kuropatkin had retained on October 12, when the 4th Siberian Army Corps was being supported by portions of the 22nd Infantry Division,^ there were detailed for this attack the 88th Infantry Regiment,- likewise from the 1st Army Corps the 2nd and 3rd Transbaikal Cossack Batteries, as well as the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, which, about 12 noon, had been withdrawn from Pu-tsauwa, north-east of the San-kaku-san, into the General Reserve of the Army. During the afternoon these forces, by General Kuropatkin's personal arrangements, made a counter-attack from Liu-tsien-tun
: ;
in a south-westerly direction against the line

tai-lin-tsy
Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy under
The
Houfirst
the com-
mand
of Colonel Sivizki.
attack was at
accompanied by success on both wings, but, when meeting at Hou-huan-hua-tien the reinforced 11th Brigade of the Japanese 6th Division, it was repelled
by that
brigade, with the co-operation of portions
from the
Japanese 3rd Division. The attack therefore could not materially relieve the 10th
Army
Corps.
The
troops engaged in the attack
withdrew again north-east. In the evening they were standing north-west of Liu-tsien-tun and at Liian-fan-tun, with outposts on the heights northeast of Ku-kia-tsy
>
;
portions occupied the height
Pp. 193-194.
'
Probably
less 1st Battalion^
which had been fighting already on
the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy.
292
with the isolated tree south of the Scha-ho, afterwards called Novgorod Hill. The 85th and 87th Infantry Regiments and the 1st Abteilung 7th Artillery Brigade of the 22nd
Infantry Division, which were ^Wth the 4th Siberian Army Corps after Kuropatkin had placed them at
the disposal
of the General Commanding that on October 12,^ had retired with that Army Corps corps on the morning of October 14 from Fnkia-pu, where during the night October 13-14 they had interrupted their retreat, in a north-westerly the 5th and 8th direction, by order of Kuropatkin Infantry Regiments of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division,- and half the 3rd Siberian Infantry Di\ision, had moved to rr-tau-kou, the remaining
;
portions of the
3rd
Siberian
Infantry Division
being placed as reserve of the Commander-in-Chief Thither was also at San-kia-tsy Lo-sien-tun.
by Kuropatkin s direct order, the 85th Infantry Regiment, which, after its arrival at Fnkia-pu,^ had marched on to Orr-tau-kou, to join the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division. After cooking its dinner it continued its march to Lo-sien-tun
directed,
on muddy
roads, at 1.45 p.m., during a violent going, moreover, by roundabout thunderstorm ways, the troops arrived completely drenched and
;
exhausted, at their place of destination, only 3 to 4 kilometres distant, which took them several hours
to cover.
The
87th
Infantry
Regiment was
likewise
p. 193.
The 6th and 7th Infantry Regiments were with the 3rd ' P. Army Corps. (War Organisation, Appendix I.)
^
Siberian
249.

detailed
293
to
reinforce
the reserves of the
Com-
regiment being in the evening at San-kia-tsy, south-west of Huan-schan. It is not known where the 1st Abteilung of the 7th Artillery Brigade went to. The Japanese Gth Division was on October 14TheJapaD6S6 24tll still divided. While General Baron Okubo, com- Brigade
mander-in-Chief,
the
manding the
east
Division,
was attacking the heights
[i^*^pj_
of Wa-ho-pu-tsy with the reinforced 11th
vision
Brigade
from Tschien-huan-hua-tien, and
Hou-
the
f-"^^'*'^
huan-hua-tien, covering thereby the right flank of

attack of the 4th Army,^ General Koizumi, with
the 3rd Division, as well as facilitating the frontal Army

over* the
the reinforced 24th Brigade, was lying opposite the
^t
ui**
Corps between schin-pu. La-mu-tun and Lin-schin-pu, held by the 137th and 140th Infantry Regiments. After the futile attempts of capturing the strong position on October 13,- General Koizumi continued his attacks on the 14th. The brigade had been bivouacking at Schu-lin-tsy, one company having been pushed to Scha-ho Railway Station. Reconnaissances during the night had established " Close north of La-mu-tun are the following large bivouacs. Lin-schin-pu is being defended by one battalion entrenched south of the village. The Scha-ho is fordable everywhere, its bed affording good cover for an attack on Lin-schin-pu. The country between La-mu-tun and Lin-schin-pu is a perfectly open plain the attack upon one of the villages can be flanked from the other both places must therefore be attacked at one
Russian position of the 17th
:
Army
'
l\ 291.
V. 2G1.
294

;
and the same time." But the strength of the 24th it Brigade was not sufficient for that purpose seemed therefore imperative to carry out the attack
jointly with the 4th Division.
But the neighbourits
ing Division being itself hard pressed, the brigade
was
left
for
the
moment
to
own
resources.
General Koizumi made, however, some preparations for carrying out the attack, in case the 4th Division should be able to render some assistance two battalions occupied Scha-ho Railway Station
at 11.15 a.m., at
and two battalions crossed the
river
Schu-lin-tsy, deploying along the outskirts of
the northern portion of that place.
the position practically in the same the day before.^
The Russian 17th Army Corps had occupied way as on
By
reconnaissance at night, the
enemy was
siau-tun.
established to be in force at Scha-ho
Station, at Schu-lin-tsy,
Han-kui-pu, and at KiKuropatkin's directive for the Western Detachment was for it to hold its position with
General Wolkov had therefore given the
necessary orders to his
obstinacy.
Army
Corps.
At
7 a.m.
the officer
commanding the 2nd
Battalion 137th
Infantry Regiment, in the fire-trenches south of

Lin-schin-pu, reported the approach of three hostile
columns from the direction of Schu-lin-tsy. General Wolkov then ordered the position to be held to When later, between 10 and 11 a.m.. the utmost. Headquarters of the 17th Army Corps became aware of the 10th Army Corps' front having been pierced at Scha-ho-pu, the General Officer Commanding sent his last Reserve two battalions
r. 250.

of the 140th Infantry Regiment
for reinforcing
his
left
295
to
La-mu-tun,
troops were
wing.
The
exhorted once more to hold their ground firmly. Meanwhile, the Japanese had commenced to
attack.
When,
advancing
at 10.30 a.m.,
two
battalions
and
left
a half of the 4th
Division adjoining on the
from Siau-san-kia-tsy on Linschin-pu, establishing touch with the 24th Brigade, General Koizumi gave the order for the attack to be carried through on La-mu-tun and Linschin-pu. Whilst the two battalions holding Scha-ho Station were unable to gain any ground over the perfectly open plain towards La-mu-tun, especially owing to the heavy fire of Artillery directed upon them, the attack proceeding from Schu-lin-tsy and Siau-san-kia-tsy on Lin-schin-pu made good progress. Until noon the firing-line
succeeded in approaching Lin-schin-pu to within about GOO metres. The attack was supported by
three batteries of the
were
6th
Division attached to
the 24th Brigade, their position being unknown.
The
Artillery of the 4th Division
had gone into

in
a fire-position south-west of Tschan-lin-pu during the night

;
but
it
seems to have taken no part
the attack on Lin-schin-pu.
On
the Russian side, batteries were firing from
the neighbourhood of Ta-lian-tun and Sz-fan-tai
upon the Infantry attacking Lin-schin-pu, as well as La-mu-tun the 2nd Abteilung J35th Artillery Brigade, from its position north-west of La-mu;
tun, took Scha-ho-pu especially under
fire.
The
vigour of the attack of the

against
Infantry advancing
Lin-schin-pu threatened to grow weary
296

effect of this Artillery fire,
under the
and
all
the
so, because the Russian fighting-line was being reinforced at 10 a.m. by a composite also battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, and at 12 noon by one battalion from the 12th Infantry
more
Regiment. General Koizumi therefore ordered two companies of his reserve to advance from Schu-lin-tsy along the bed of the Scha-ho river against the left flank of the enemy's firing-line,
south
of
Lin-schin-pu,
facilitating
thereby the
continuation of the
attack
in
front.
The two
companies succeeded in coming up entirely unnoticed and in opening at 400 metres' range unexpectedly an enfilade fire upon the Russians
in
the
fire-trench
south-east
of
Lin-schin-pu.
flaking use of the confusion caused thereby, one of the two companies continued to rush forward,
penetrating into the fire-trench at 1.15 p.m.
JMeanwhile, the other firing-lines attacking in
front had also pushed on, and were
assault as well
;
now
rising to
about 2.30 p.m. the whole of the enemy's line in front of Lin-schin-pu was captured. But the Russians were still holding on at the
southern borders of the village, and, reinforced by reserves,^ were even making repeated counterstrokes.
The Japanese being

But when,
brought
;
at that
moment
of
short of ammunition, their situation

serious.
grew rather
pack-
after
the
arrival
horses at Schu-lin-tsy, fresh supplies of

tion
'
ammuniby
were
up
into
the firing-line
Details are not
13S)tb Infantry
known probably by degrees the two battalions Regiment were engaged which had been kept back as
sectional reserve uorth-west of Lin-schiu-pu.

companies
fire.
297
held
in
reserve,
it
was possible to
prepare the assault on Lin-schin-pu by a brisk
The
assailants succeeded in penetrating into
the village
during
the
time
the thunderstorm
broke in the afternoon. The Russians offered a determined resistance it was only after a long and severe street-fight that they were pushed back
;
to the northern edge of the village, where they

still
maintained themselves in a group of houses
at the north-west corner of the village. tect
To
pro-
themselves from the strong Artillery fire coming from the neighbourhood of Sz-fan-tai, the assailants at once proceeded to construct some
cover.
till
The Infantry
fire-fight
continued to last
dark.
The news of the loss of Lin-schin-pu made the General Commanding the 17th Army Corps feel
he immediately ordered the village to be recaptured by the troops charged with the defence of that section. At 11 p.m. two companies of the 140th Infantry Regiment and the
;
very uneasy
2nd Battalion 12th Infantry Regiment advanced to attack, probably from the neighbourhood of
Sz-fan-tai
;
but the attack
failed, in spite
of their
of the companies from the 140th Infantry Regiment,^ owing to the hot fire of the vigilant Japanese. small portion only
gallantry, especially
succeeded in pushing into the

inferior
village,
but their
its
number was unable
to
hold
own
after a long
and obstinate hand-to-hand fight the Russians were again obliged to abandon Lin'
schin-pu.
The two companies
lost
120 meii^ 70 of
whom
were
killed.
298

the
around the position of the 35th Infantry Division, General AYolkov was casting his eyes west, distinctly
raging
While
combat
was
expecting
last,
the 6th
Siberian
Army
to
attack at
in his relief, the left
wing of the Japanese
2nd Army.
The Gth
Army
amSted
in tiie
General Soboliev, commanding the 6th Siberian Army Corps, had ordered an advance to be made ^^^^Y ^^ October 14, in compliance with Bilderhng's directive.^
The
corps
started at 5 o'clock
bourhood in
the morning with a right column from Lan-
kSn-"" schan-pu on Schau-kia-lin-tsy, and with a left column from Pen-tien-tsy on Ta-lian-tun, passing n r^ -r 1 -n Reports stated the villages the Japa- west ot Ku-kia-tsy.
t*y by the attack of
^
Dh'lsfou
^^ Sin-tai-tsy, San-kia-tsy, AVu-tschan-yin, Tschanlin-pu,
and Lin-schin-pu to be occupied by the

the 6th
its
Japanese.
When
lin-tsy
Siberian
Army
line
Corps
had
reached with
vanguards the
Schau-kiaof
Ta-lian-tun at 7
the
attack
a.m., the General Officer
Commanding
the Western
received from the
Commander
letter
:
Group the following

on
" Please
Hun-lin-pu Ta-tai, and occupy the places mentioned. The 17th Army Corps has orders to support you as reserve General Dembovski is instructed to post himself as a protection for your right flank in the neighbourhood of Pau-sen-tun Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy. I request you to start at once, reporting to me." The movement began by the right column first turning on Sin-tai-tsy and San-kia-tsy, 800 metres south of Sin-tai-tsy, and attacking and driving
begin
p. 256.

;
299
thence the Japanese protective parties^ stationed there the left column, meanwhile, does not seem The attack to have advanced beyond Ta-lian-tun.
was continued
after 9 a.m., the right
now
its
direction
on Ta-tai,
column taking and the left by Tschan-
lin-pu
on Hun-lin-pu. the Japanese side, the 4th Division had arranged to advance with one battalion and a half on Ton-tai-tsy whilst the attack on Linschin-pu was proceeding, so as to prevent the enemy standing there from flanking the attack. The Artillery of the Division had gone into
On
position south-west of Tschan-lin-pu
the reserve
was in a position of readiness south of that place one battalion occupied Wan-tschuan-tsy as a flank
protection.
The Japanese
troops
detailed
to
advance on
Siberian
Ton-tai-tsy seem to have
met the 6th

its
Army
engage
Corps
in
first,
forcing
leading portions to
a fire-fight, the Japanese Artillery at
the same time intervening in the action.

in
The
strongly superior forces of the Russians succeeded
pushing back the .Japanese for the moment, thus enabling the Russian right colinnn to occupy, with portions, Wu-tschan-yin, and the left to push on to Tschan-lin-pu by Ton-tai-tsy and Talian-tun. While General Baranowski, commanding the 72nd Infantry Division, was then continuing with a portion of the right column his advance on Pau-tsy-yan, reaching it about 11 a.m., General
^
In Japanese reports nothing
standing- in Sin-tai-tsy
is mentioned of protective detachments and San-kia-tsy they were therefore probably

;
quite insignificant parties.
300
Laiming, commanding the 55th Infantry Di\asion, with the left column, was meeting with an obstinate resistance at Tschan-lin-pu. Probably the main body of the Japanese 4th Division was being engaged here. In spite of the conspicuous gallantry of the Russian troops, of whom the greatest sacrifices were demanded, they did not succeed in pushing the Japanese from Tschan-
was probably, in the first instance, the antiquated and unsuitable tactics insisted upon by the Russians the same as ever,
lin-pu.
The
reason for
it
notwithstanding
all their bitter
experiences.
An
side
eye-witness of the combats on the Japanese
gives the following account of one of the Russian attacks on Tschan-lin-pu "About 11 a.m. two more battalions advanced from Ton-tai-tsy they acted as if they were attacking a skeleton enemy in Ton-tai-tsy they formed up the mounted officers dismounted and inspected their troops. Then they moved off in column, forming a dense firing-line after covering a distance of 300 to 700 metres, and advancing without firing to within 700 metres of Tschan-lin-pu. When, at that moment, the Japanese Infantry and Artillery opened fire on them at one and the same time, they suffered at once severe loss, and retired completely disorganised." The Japanese battalion standing in AVan:
tschuan-tsy as flank-guard, and being meanwhile attacked by the Russian right column, had been
by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, with one company and two guns afterwards two more companies arrived from the Divisional Reserve to
reinforced
;

support
the
left
301
wing of the Division. The Russian right column, which was to continue its advance from San-kia-tsy on Ta-tai, succeeded in
approaching the Japanese line at Wan-tschuan-tsy to within about 500 to 600 metres, where it commenced to entrench itself. In all attempts
at pushing
failed
home
the attack, the Russian tactics
as with Laiming's column. calm and deliberate fire of the Japanese, the clumsy attack broke down, the Russian battalions streaming back again in a
similarly,
Under
the
hurried
retreat
north
so
hurriedly
that
the
battery with the column had to leave behind two
guns and
five
ammunition waggons.^
by
their
The
disorder arising with the Russians,
repulse in the attack, was
made use
of by the
troops of the 4th and 6th Divisions, opposite Linschin-pu, for a further advance.
After one battalion of the General Reserve had been placed at the disposal of the 4th Division, the Russians, at 4 p.m., advanced once more from San-
and Wu-tschan-yin to within 1,000 metres of the left wing of the Division at Wan-tschuantsy, where they entrenched themselves. The
kia-tsy
Divisional
Commander, expecting another attack
by the enemy, reinforced the threatened wing by three companies. But the Russians made no further attack they remained for some time in their position, and then retired north at
;
dusk.
The Japanese
;
followed, with their
left,
to
Pau-tsy-yan
'
the
main
body of the
Division
The guns were, however, brought back by the Russians during the
night.
302
bivouacked within the Hne Lin-schin-pu

tschuan-tsy.
Wanportion
of
The Japanese
with
of
its
it,
1st
Cavalry Brigade had remained

at Ho-Hen-tai.
main body
intimated,
at
One
left
as
supported
the
the
4th Division
AVan-tschuan-tsy,
and
another
portion occupied Li-kia-tun, posts of observation
being stationed between the latter place and the Hun-ho. On the Russians advancing to attack
Wan-tschuan-tsy,
the
battery
of
the
brigade^
its
came
at the
into
action,
materially contributing by
It
flanking
lire
to the repulse of the attack. so cleverly placed
was
to
or
same time
batteries,
it,
that three
Russian
appearing
at
San-kia-tsy
to
combat
were
unable
either
locate
it
bombard it. Towards 6 p.m. General Dembovski's troops advanced from a westerly direction on Fu-kiatschuan-tsy, driving in some Japanese Cavalry and then occupying Li-kia-tun. The covering detachment standing there fell back on Tai-pintschuan, where also the squadrons returning from Occupying the 4th Division arrived at 7.30 p.m. the villages Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy and Li-kia-tun was General Dembovski thought he could all that achieve, and yet he was standing with 14 battalions, 16 sotnias, and 32 guns on the flank of the Japanese 2nd Army. Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army and
effectively to
its
General Reserve remained during the night at
Pan-kiau-pu.
'
Less two guns, handed over to the garrison of ^Van-tschuan-tsy
(P. 300.)

At
*'
303
10 p.m. General Baron

viain forces
;
Oku
issued the fol-
lowing Order
The
along the line
of the enemy are in retreat all some detachments are still making
a stand west of the
main
road.
"The Srd
opposite
it
on both
"The
;
6//^
Division will push back the enemy sides of the Mandarin Road. Division will keep Hou-huan-hua-
tien occupied
and support the attack of the 3rd

will attack
Division General Koizumi's Brigade La-mu-tun.

"
The Mh Division will support the attack of General Koizumi's Brigade, but otherwise maintain the line occupied to-day. "The Reserve will assemble at Tschan-sin-tien to-morrow at 5 a.m. Hcadqnarters of the Army will be on the Ko-ho-san at 5 a.m."
home
Portions of the 8th Division having arrived from at Liao-yan/ were moved up by General
;
Headquarters to Yen-tai but they did not come any more into action. The day had caused great loss to the Gth Siberian Army Corps. The 219th Regiment, belonging to Laiming's column, lost almost all its officers in the attack on Tschan-lin-pu. As was customary with the Russians, the companies which had no more officers left had then simply retired. General Laiming, as well as the officers of his staff, were obliged
to step in personally to conduct the retreating troops back into action again. Nevertheless, the
repeated attacks failed under the murderous fire of the enemy. Having regard to the enormous
'
p. 241
"
304
loss

suffered
by the
left
^
column
55th Infantry Division
the General Officer Comand

to
2nd
Brigade,
manding ordered the 219th Infantry Regiment

to be withdrawn from the fighting-line during a
retrograde
movement,
be
replaced
by
another regiment.
attempts to attack, the Army Corps was on the point of entrenching itself north
After
its last futile
of Tschan-lin-pu,
from the of the Western Detachment, dispatched from Han-tschen-pu village on

the railway
when Commander
the following letter arrived
"Thanks
17th
I
to your forward
move we succeeded
;
in maintaining the Scha-ho line
but the lOth and Corps had to engage all their reserves. request you to lead back for the night your
Army
main body to the
line Schau-kia-lin-tsy
Ta-lian-
tun as echelon behind the right wing of the 17th
Army Corps, awaiting in that position further orders

of the Commander-in-Chief.
Keep in closest touch Corps and take care of your Send frequent reports on your situaright flank. I shall spend the night at Su-5â-tun village." tion. General Soboliev, on this, led back his Army Corps into the position it had been holding early
with the 17th
Army
morning at Schau-kia-lin-tsy Ta-lian-tun. Although the success of the 6th Siberian Army Corps on October 14 was an extremely moderate one if it can be called a success at all yet the Commander of the Western Detachment saw fit to
in the
'
The 219th Infantry Regiment
is
said to have lost 2,000
men, dead
or wounded. * Near the railway junction, 9 kilometres north of Lin-schin-pu.

express once
305
more his special acknowledgment to the General Officer Commanding for what he had done. Next morning Soboliev received the following letter
and comradeship T take the liberty of expressing to you my deep gratitude for the timely and vigorous support rendered to us yesterday by the 6th Siberian Army Corps, enabling thereby the Western Detachment, and
especially the
3
"
As an
act of duty
7th
Army
Corps, to sustain the
severe combat with the enemy's
to maintain all the positions " General Bilderling."
main bodies, and they had occupied.
General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade seems to have taken no part in the combats of October 14, but to have remained at Kau-kia-tai. By continuing their attacks on October 14, the Result of Japanese had almost gained their object of driving ^^^*"^^'' the Russians from the southern bank of the Schaho apart from the low hills west of Liian-fan-tun, only La-mu-tun remained in the hands of the
;
Russians.
the
left wing that is to say, Guard Division and the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division had met as yet with serious resistance
Of
the 1st
Army, the
at the Ba-ken-ji-san
right
fell
and Sei-ko-san. Opposite the wing of the Army, the Eastern Detachment
back without fighting behind the Scha-ho. 5th Division, sent in support of the 1st Army, did not become fully engaged, INIarshal Marquis
The
intended attack of the Division from the Wai-tau-schan on the northern bank of the Scha-ho.
Oyama
prohibiting the
20

SOG
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

forces of the 4th
The
Army, which had taken

and
part in the combats, as well as the half-division (6th)
of the 2nd
1st
Army,
also attacked the Sei-ko-san

it,
the heights north of

Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy.
in
close touch with the
Army, gaining roughly

the 2nd
the line Sei-ko-san
With
Army, the 3rd Division succeeded
in piercing the front of the Russian 10th

;
Army
Corps and pushing to Scha-ho-pu its success had, however, no further effect, the 24th Brigade of the 6th Division, engaged on the left of the 3rd
Division against the line La-mu-tun
Lin-schin-pu,
on the left Russian 6th Siberian Army Corps, against the being unable to make any progress, apart from
as well as the 4th Division, fighting
the capture of Lin-schin-pu.
For the Russians the day was one causing only

fresh
losses.
By
using the 6th
Siberian
Army
Corps in the impracticable way it was done, that corps had now lost much of its fighting strength
too.
Of the Centre, the main forces had retired during the night October 13-14 to the neighbourhood
of rr-tau-kou, only the 37th Infantry Division of
Corps and JNlishtshenko's Detachment remaining without any object still south of the Scha-ho. As could be anticipated, they were attacked there again, and pushed back to the northern bank of the Scha-ho with loss. In spite of all the failures of the day, Kuropatkin concentrated in the neighbourhood north-west of Fn-kia-pu strong reserves, with which he int^nd^d to assume the offensive presently.
the
1st
Army

October 15
307
Early on October 15, Oyama's Headquarters The Japaissued the following General Order "^dVth " 1. The First, Fourth, and Second Armies have Armies pushed the enemy north. posftion* " 2. Marshal Marquis Oi/ama intends to re- ^^ ^^^^^'
organise the troops and prepare for continuing the
oiiensive.
{^
.
south of the Schaho.
"
3.
The
First
Army
will reorganise its forces sketch
9.
Tai-kua-tun^ Hsin-lun-tun," reconnoitring on INIukden the 12th Division and 5th Kobi Brigade will remain south of Biansouth of
the
line
;
yu-pu-sa. " 4. The
bth
Division will rejoin the

will hold
Fourth
Army.^
*'
5.
The Fourth Army
the line Pu-
tsau-wa*
heights
north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy,
reconnoitring on Mukden. " 6. The Second Army will gain the line Scha-
ho-pu Lin-schin-pu it will reconnoitre west of the Hun-ho." Based on this Order, General Kuroki directed General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment to move from Schan-schi-tsiau-tsy ^ somewhat farther north.
;
The 12th
Division,
reinforced
by the 5th Kobi
Brigade, therefore marched to the neighbourhood of Sia-pin-tai-tsy. Opposite of it, on the heights of
Kan-to-li-san, portions of the
'
2nd Siberian
Army
'
* '
1 "G kilometres north-east of the Kin-cho-san. 4 kilometres north-west of Tai-kua-tuu.
r. 240.
3 kilometres west of PIsin-lun-tiin. Ji kilometres south of ian-yu-pu-sa.

308
Corps and of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division entrenched themselves. The 2nd Cavahy Brigade continued its reconnaissance in a northerly direction The 3rd from San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho. Brigade of the 2nd Division, under General Matsunaga, which on the 14th had advanced to Schanpin-tai-tsy, 5 kilometres south-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa,
was relieved of its task of cutting off the Russians,^ and marched to rejoin the rest of its Division probably by INIan-hua-pu, 3 kilometres north of
the Wai-to-san.
The
5th Division received orders
to start returning from the Wai-tau-schan to the
4th
Army
on the
16th.'
The Guard Division seems
to
have advanced
somewhat from the position it had reached at the Sen-san and Kin-cho-san^ on the 14th, pushing its outposts farther east to the Tsio-tso-schan, and occupying and fortifying the low heights southeast
of Fn-kia-pu, facing north and north-east.

the
left,
On
the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division

the
Ba-ken-ji-san.
adjoined,
holding
General
Umesawa's Brigade, after departing from General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment, was marching to
with the object of remaining there at the disposal of General Headquarters.''
San-kia-tsy,'*'
The
is
disposition of the 4th
not
known
in detail
it
on October 15 probably advanced to

north of Tschien-
Army
the line Pu-tsau-wa

tschan-lin-tsy
in conformity ^vith Oyama's Order. There was no longer any serious fighting on the
heights
15th, either opposite the 1st

'
or the
4th
' *
Army.
P. 200.
^ Pp. 271-272. South-west of Scha-ho-pu.
P. 271. P. 265.

At
was
carried on.
309
times a feeble and ineffective Artillery duel
On
the other hand, a portion of
the 4th
Army
the 2nd
tinued.
Army, where
had an opportunity of supporting the combats were conof the 2nd
The Commander
Army had
requested The Japa.
the 3rd Division to push back the

sides of the
enemy opposing
nese 2u(i
Army
Mandarin Road.^ But after J!"^!-^^., it on both portions the great exertions imposed upon the Division on of the the previous days, especially on October 14, the Western troops were no longer able to continue the attack ^gjj^*^'
over the Scha-ho section with sufficient vigour,
from
General Baron Oshima confined himself to de- san-taploying Mêak forces for capturing the low heights aj^^*"j!f_ north-east of Ku-kia-tsy, on which were standing mu-tun. advanced detachments of the Russian 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, from the 1st Army Corps.^ Under the severe but ineffective fire of
Russian batteries from the neighbourhood north of Schan-lan-tsy, to which six Japanese batteries were replying from Hou-tai Hill, the capture of the heights mentioned was effected by 10 a.m. In Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy the Russians maintained the portions themselves with greater obstinacy engaged here by the 3rd Division were unable to push them from the village it was only when, at 3 p.m., a detachment of the 4th Army intervened in the action,^ and continued the attack, that any progress was made. The Russians evacuated the village, as well as the small eminence east of it, retiring to the one-tree hill south of the Scha-ho two guns with two ammunition waggons fell into
; ;
r. 303.
r. 21.
More
detail not
known.
310

who
at
once pushed after the Russians, occupying the small eminence

the hands of the Japanese,
after sunset.
The
was
reinforced 11th Brigade of the 6th Division
in the
morning
in its
former position,^ three

to give
battalions standing south of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy,
and the main body
at
Hou-huan-hua-tien
the support to the 3rd Division
demanded by the
;
Army
Order, one battalion was pushed forward in
the direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy
with the
same object the three
batteries of the brigade
had
moved
into a position of readiness east of
Hou-
huan-hua-tien.
ferring with
General Baron Oku, after con-
the
Commander
of the 4th
Army,
having gained the impression that there was no longer any attack of the enemy to be feared from
the east, gave, at 10 a.m., orders to the
reinforced
Commander
of the 6th Division for assembling the troops of the
11th Brigade at Kian-hu-tun, 5 kilo-
metres south of Scha-ho-pu.
By noon
this order
was executed.
quarters
When
2nd
next, at 1.20 p.m..
Headof
of
the
portions of the 4th
of attacking Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy in support of the 3rd Division, the 11th Brigade was evidently no
longer wanted in
its
Army received notice Army being on the point
of Scha-ho-pu.
former section of defence east General Baron Oku therefore
Commander of the 6th Division to support with his whole strength the attack of the 24th Brigade on La-mu-tun ' for this purpose
ordered the
;
the Artillery of the 11th Brigade was to come into action at San-kia-tsy, south of La-mu-tun, and to
^
P. 293
p_ 303^

be under the orders of the Artillery
of the Division.
311
Commander
The 24th Brigade
of the 6th Division continued,

15,
on the morning of October
the attack on
La-mu-tun, which it had begun already on October 13. One battalion from the General Reserve at Tschan-sin-tien was placed at the disposal of the brigade General Koizumi engaged
;
this battalion to reinforce the
two
battalions
at
Scha-ho Station, with orders to press

the attack on La-mu-tun.
home now
batteries
The
three
of the brigade had to support the attack from

their fire-position at Schu-lin-tsy.
The
garrison of
Lin-schin-pu was also directed to co-operate against La-mu-tun but the forces standing there were held fast by a counter-attack of the Russians.
:
About
6 a.m. three Russian battalions, probably
from the 12th Infantry Regiment, suddenly appeared about 30 metres in front of the village, having approached from the 17th Army Corps' Yin-kuan, by position in rear, at Sz-fan-tai
making
rapid
able
use of the cover afforded by the
group of houses north of Lin-schin-pu.

fire
By
the
of the defenders their further advance

for the
was stayed
line,
moment
but,
when two more

whole
battalions then
came up
in their support, the
the
with the greatest gallantry, made a rush for village. furious hand-to-hand struggle
which the Russians were ultimately the vanquished. With great loss, they retired on Sz-fan-tai, where they were supported by fresh troops. Under these circumstances, the Japanese battahons at Scha-ho Station were left to their
ensued,
in
312

resources in their attack on La-mu-tun.
own
At
7.30 a.m. they began to advance, but were gaining ground very slowly, because the defenders, being well covered by the clay wall surrounding the village, were difficult to reach by the Japanese fire, and because Russian batteries were enfilading the Japanese attack, as on the day before, from the neighbourhood of Sz-fan-tai. About 9 a.m. the Japanese had worked up their way to within 600 metres of the village farther they could not go
for the present
a hot stationary fire-action then
originated.
When,
Japanese
at
11
Army
Headquarters of the 2nd was informed of the difficulties

a.m..
the attack on La-mu-tun was encountering, the
whole of the Artillery reserve came into action support it, and was placed under uniform command. At 12.30 p.m. thirteen batteries,^ on the line Tschan-sin-tien Pa-kia-tsy, opened fire on La-mu-tun. At 1 p.m. the Commander of the 24th Brigade was informed that the rest of the 6th Division had also been detailed for the attack on La-mu-tun. The 23rd Infantry Regiment, standing in Lin-schin-pu, having about this time to ward off a counter-attack of the Russians, and the enemy having evidently been reinforced in La-mu-tun, General Koizumi decided to await the co-operation of the 11th Brigade before he
to
continued the attack.
Towards 3 p.m. the 45th Infantry Regiment

arrived at the northern exit of San-kia-tsy, south
of
La mu-tun, and began

'
to deploy against
La-
Including a captured Russian field-battery.
313
mu-tun with two battalions in first line. The defender had meanwhile been very much shaken by the severe Artillery fire, individual groups commencing already to retire north. It was
therefore
not a particularly
difficult
task which
the 45th Infantry Regiment had to perform.

attack,
The
which the battalions from Scha-ho Station had also resumed, was then carried out almost
without a single stop
fire-action,
;
at
4 p.m.
the southern
portion of the village was captured after a short
and at 4.40 p.m. the portion also on the right bank of the Scha-ho. The Russians retired north, pursued by a hot fire of Infantry and Artillery. Noticing this failure, the Russian detachments, which had again advanced against Lin-schin-pu, now also gave up their attack. The Russian trenches on either side of Lin-schin-pu had been
evacuated already early in the afternoon.
The
retrograde movement, which the Japanese never
expected, began in the section between Lin-schin-
pu and the
and was spreading everywhere. In the evening the whole of the Scha-ho position was abandoned by the Russians.
railway,
The
right of
tlie
Japanese 4th Division supported,
from Siau-san-kia-tsy, the garrison of Lin-schin-pu in repulsing the enemy's attacks. The Division was unable to make any progress against the
strongly occupied line of the Gth Siberian
Army
Corps west of the Scha-ho, between Ta-lian-tun and San-kia-tsy, which was being supported by a long row of batteries at Schau-kia-lin-tsy. The main body of the Japanese 1st Cavalry
314

reinforced
Brigade,
by two
companies
of
the
4th Division, tried to push General Dembovski's
But that village troops again from Li-kia-tun.^ and Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy proved to be too strongly
occupied
;
the attack was, moreover, being enfiladed

batteries
by two Russian
from a northerly direction.

at Tai-pin-
The Cavalry
kia-tun
tschuan.
till
Brigade, after failing to capture Li-
sunset,
was concentrated
;
The
the
Russians
the
the
during
night
village
evacuated Li-kia-tun could then be
re-occupied by portions of the brigade.
detachment
of
Cavalry Brigade
was
standing during the day at Han-schan-tai, maintaining itself there, in spite of repeated attempts
by General Dembovski's troops

from
there.
to
push
the
it
back
The 2nd Army, having

assigned to
it
attained
object
by the General Order for the 15th, General Baron Oku did not intend to advance any farther. Army Headquarters went back for the night to Schi-li-ho the General Reserve was
;
being assembled at Tschan-sin-tien.
As we
can guess already, from the acknowledgBilderling to
ment addressed by General Baron

the General
Commanding
tlie
Gth Siberian
Army
upon the task of the Gth Siberian Corps, as well as of Dembovski's Detachment, as altogether accomplished neither of these two commanders received any intimation for continuing the attack on the left wing of the Japanese 2nd
Corps,^ he looked
;
Army. General Soboliev, being not inclined to advance on his own initiative, in view, probably,
1
P. 302.
p. 305.

315
of the bloody action on October 14, confined him- The Rusself, from his position between Schau-kia-Hn-tsy Army
and Ta-Han-tun, to replying with
his batteries at
^^J^^^tes
its
Schau-kia-lin-tsy to the Artillery fire the Japanese
posi-
4th Division was keeping up in a half-hearted
the Scha^'^^j^^j^^_^J^"
manner.
-
Dembovski's Detachment,
likewise, re
mained standing inactive at Pau-sen-tun, Fu-kia- and Lamu-tun in 1 T i tschuan-tsy, and Li-kia-tun, merely mtent on face of repelling any attempts of the Japanese 1st Cavalry J^^j^^*"
1
j_
Brigade to attack.
theJapa-
hotly engaged in Army" the fight for Lin-schin-pu and La-mu-tun since the Jj'Jg/fj^,, morning of October 15, the action increasing initsposiWhen, about that time, farther violence towards noon.
The 17th Army Corps had been
Headquarters of the 6th Siberian
Army
Corps
JJ^rth'^^
received intelligence of portions of the 17th
Army of Yin,
Corps evacuating the first position at Lin-schin-pu under the pressure of the enemy, and retiring to the second position on the line Ku-kia-tsy Szfan-tai, the whole of the 40 guns, which were engaged in the Artillery combat, transferred their
fire,
by Sobohev's
order,
to
the section of the

;
17th Army Corps, which was in imminent danger the 285th Infantry Regiment was, moreover, moved up to Ta-lian-tun from the reserve standing at
Kuan-lin-pu, to cover, at the request of the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, the
right flank of the
first
position, w^hich
rest,
was much
Siberian
For the shaken already. Army Corps retained its former position
the
Gth
;
the four
belonging to three different brigades, and

batteries were,
in the evening, ui the
Infantry regiments 285th, 28Gth, 288th, and 220th
seven
entrenched
316
line
THE RUSSO-JAPAx\ESE AVAR

Schau-kia-lin-tsy
Ta-lian-tun
the
287th
Infantry Regiment, as well as the
much reduced
standing in reserve at Kuan-lin-pu.
219th Infantry Regiment, with three batteries, were Touch with
General
Dembovski's
Detachment was
effected
by a
time,
sotnia of Ural Cossacks, which, at the
same
was charged with securing the
right flank
of the
Army
Corps.
The evacuation of the position held by the 3oth Infantry Division astride of Lin-schin-pu, coming as a surprise even to the Japanese, must be attributed to the unsuitable measures
adopted.
In his Order for October 15, the General
Commanding the 17th Army Corps had arranged for the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division
on October 15, all the troops he had received from the 3rd Infantry Division as reinforcement on the 14th. There was no difficulty in bringing back to the 3rd Infantry Division the two battalions of the 12th Infantry Regiment, one of which had been engaged in Lin-schin-pu, and the other in the nocturnal counter-attack on Linschin-pu two companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment, which on the day before had fought in the trenches south of Lin-schin-pu, could be sent back without any trouble too but it was not possible, for the moment, to return again the other two companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment. These companies were being engaged in the section
to send back,
^
; ;
close
'
east
of Lin-schin-pu, just at the
moment
On October 14, in the erening, jointly with two companies of the 140th Infantry Regiment. (P. 207.) 'Hie renewed attack on Linschin-pu early on October ITj was probably als;o made by battailous of
the 12th Infantry Regiment.
(P. 311.)

when
the southern portion of
;
317
the
village
was
task,
captured by the Japanese

Lin-schin-pu
recapturing
it
was
their
therefore, to cover the right flank of the section
railway against
Lin-schin-pu,
the hostile garrison

in
of that village.
The Russians not succeeding

the
task
of the
two
companies continued the same for the night, as It, therefore, did not well as for the coming day. seem feasible to withdraw them from their position. But during the day urgent requests were repeatedly addressed to the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division to send the two companies to Han-tschen-
pu
as reserve for the
Army
Corps. ^
Although
General Dobrshinski begged to be allowed to wait until it was dark, the General Commanding de-
manded the execution of the order given. The Divisional Commander then issued the order for
the departure of the two companies
he intended, in case of need, to move into their place one battalion of the 138th Infantry Regiment, which, during the night, had been detailed to the left
;
section.
General Wolkov, commanding the 17th Army measures to occupy Han-tschen-pu and Kuan-tun, east of the railway, with portions of his reserve, should retreat become necessary he had, moreover, given verbal instructions to Colonel Martynov,^ commanding the left section, " that, should the right section retire, he was to fall back likewise behind the line HanCorps, had meanwhile taken
;
'
Two
battalions of the
already since the evening of October 14
10th Infantry Regiment had been there the composite battalion of

;
the 9th Infantry Regiment was to join them in addition. * Commanding the 140th Infantry Regiment.
318
THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WAK
tschen-pu
Kuan-tun,
fire
and not to make a stand

rear."
again before he reached that hne, so as not to
mask the
order,
from the position in

the
This 35th
of
wliich
Commander
of
the
Infantry Division had. not been informed, entailed

for
some undesirable and unexpected consequences when, at 3 p.m., the two companies of the
9th
Infantry Regiment, during a pause in
action, retired in groups, led
the
by
their officers, to
march
to Han-tschen-pu as directed, the adjoining
portions of the 138th Infantry

to evacuate their positions too.
Regiment began
by
These were joined whole section between Lin-schin-pu and the railway gradually to be abandoned. True, at some places it was possible
others, thus causing the
to
make
;
the retreating forces see the mistake they
had made, and to induce them to re-occupy the position but the movement had already made such
progress as to
make
it
altogether impossible to
hold the position between Ta-lian-tun and La-mutun any longer. The order had therefore to be
given to abandon the Scha-ho position, and to halt again in the second position Szo-fan-tai Yin-
Kuan-tun. The 138th and 140th Infantry Regiments, under a most severe fire of Japanese Artillery, entrenched themselves on the line Yinkuan Kuan-tun, in which portions of the 36th had commenced digging Infantry Regiment trenches already on October 13.^ The evacuation of the Scha-ho position, commencing at 3 p.m.,
kuan
'
Losses
1.38th Infantry
Regiment
,,
4 8
officers,
,,
48 men.
217
UOth

was probably
also the
319
main cause why the Japanese 6th Division, after its former vain attempts,^ was able to execute the attack on La-mu-tun without
delay at 4 p.m.
During the time the 35th Infantry Division was

reports were
evacuating the Scha-ho position, fresh disquieting coming in it was said that strong
;
forces of the
enemy were being concentrated

Schu-lin-tsy,
;
at
on both banks of and it was the Scha-ho, south of Lin-schin-pu feared that the Japanese were on the point of advancing against the second position. No more
Ki-siau-tun and
fresh reserves being available, the
Commander
of
the 35th Infantry Division resolved to stop the
enemy from continuing

Artillery
fire.
his
attack
by massed
All the batteries of the Division were directed

to sweep and search
by
their fire the area in
which
the Japanese were supposed to be concentrating.
An
exceedingly
violent
cannonade
developed
within 40 minutes, of which 20 minutes must be
deducted for observation and change of target, the 48 guns engaged fired about 8,000 rounds." The result of this rapid fire is said to have been " splendid." According to reports from observing officers, the Japanese had been thrown into the greatest confusion columns had been literally scattered the men had dispersed, and had disappeared behind houses and in the folds of the ground. Of losses suffered, the observing officers
; ; >
p. 313.
Each gun 166 rounds,

.^ctug,,! .firings).
i.e.
8 to 9 rounds per minute (allo-ing" ?0
inutcis for
320
did

not mention anything.
fire
The Russian massed mentioned in Japanese reports, its effect seems to have been very small only it was, at any rate, out of all proportion to the enormous amount of ammunition spent. But as the Japanese desisted from continuing then* attacks, confining themselves to occupying the position abandoned on the Scha-ho, the Russians believed this result to have been brought about by
Artillery
not
being
their Artillery.
Tlie Rus-
Armv^
Corps
After the proceedings of October 14, General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps,
weak
pro-
looked forward with anxiety to what might happen on the 15th. He was afraid the Japanese were
dSchmeiits on
going to continue their attack beyond the Scha-ho, and believcd his troops unfit to resist another onslaught after the precedmg exhaustmg nght, and
tne Senaho, and
,,f.
"^
.
,.
position
en^S*^' ^^1 ^^^ iôre unfit when INIau's Detachment had not vet arrived from rr-tau-kou by 2 o'clock in
Pa-ta-kia-
south of
*^*
the mornmg.^
search of
The
officer
of the
1st
Orenburg
r-\
Cossack Regiment, who had been dispatched in on the tliis detachment at 2.30 p.m. 14th," returned without having effected his object. No hope being thus held out for the arrival of the anxiously looked-for reserve at daybreak, the Chief of Staff of the 10th Army Corps informed
the Chief of Staff of the Western Detachment at 2.30 a.m. of the httle-hopeful views entertained by
his
the situation, asking at the same time for any fresh body of troops to
as reserve.
;
Commanding General on
be sent to the Mandarin Road

reply to this request
The
is
not
known
but the quesPp. 286-287.
p. 288.
321
tion of support became less urgent, because the Japanese did not continue their offensive against the 10th Army Corps either during the night Early on the morning of or on the next day. October 15 the General Staff officer who had been dispatched to Man's Detachment returned, moreover, with the reassuring report of the detachment having spent the night at Fu-kia-tun-kou, and of its
^
going to march at daybreak to Pa-ta-kia-tsy. At noon the Quartermaster-General of the Army gave the additional information of the 85th Infantry Regiment from the General Reserve, together with a battery of the 7th Artillery Brigade, going to start about 12 noon f'om San-kia-tsy, 3 kilometres south-west of Huan-schan, north of the Scha-ho, with the object of joining the 10th Army Corps. Somewhat later this information was supplemented by an order arriving from Kuropatkin, saying that this regiment was to be looked upon as the last reserve, and to be engaged only in the very last
instance.
The
reinforced 1st Brigade of the 31st Infantry
Division, under General JNIau,^ arrived at last at
Pa-ta-kia-tsy at 12 noon, and the 85th Infantry
Regiment
at 6 p.m.
These troops now formed
the " general reserve " of the corps, being posted
north of that village.
On the orders of Kuropatkin and of the Commander of the Western Detachment, to offer an
p. 288.
121st and 122ntl Infantry Regiments, the 1st and 7th Batteries of the 31st Artillery Brigade, tlie 3rd Sotnia of tlie 1st Orenburg Cosack Regiment, and one Sapper company. (1*. 36, footnote 2.)
The
21
322

enemy
in case of attack,^
obstinate resistance to the
the fortifications of the position south of Pa-ta-kia-
which had been commenced already the day were continued on October 15. The position was divided into two sections the right section, stretching from Kuan-tun village to the IVIandarin Road, was occupied by the 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division^ as well as by two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment, under General Wassiliev in the left section, east of the Mandarin Road, was the 9th Infantry Division,' under General Gerschelmann, commanding the
tsy,
before,
Division.
Of
the
35th
Infantry Regiment two
battalions, jointly with portions of the 17th
Army
Corps, were
pu, which
still
fighting at
La-mu-tun
*
;
between
that village and the northern portion of Scha-ho-
was still being held by the 36th Infantry Regiment,^ there remained only weak detachments on the right bank of the Scha-ho. To keep in touch with the 1st Army Corps, Wu-kia-tun was occupied by two sotnias of the 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment.
The Artillery of the Army Corps was moved up from Hua-schi-ho in the afternoon only. The batteries came into action south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy,
Road, taking the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu under fire. The Japanese Artillery rephed to the fire, but not
sides of the INIandarin
on both
vigorously.
*
Pp. 283-285.
'fhe 123rd
It is
not certain wlien Kuropatkin gave the order
to that effect.
^ *
and 124th Infantry Regiments. Less the 35th Infantry Regiment.

P. 282.
*
Pp. 287-288

The Commander-in-Chief was standing with
Staff on the
hill
323
his General
*"
east of Schan-lan-tsy.
He
was i^jJJ^jPf
the^'^^^^to
planning an offensive for October 16, with
was necessary for the DgâSi" Army to hold its present positions on the 15th. ment and Kuropatkin therefore became very indignant when, reserve quite unexpectedly, the 10th Army Corps reported be/i6*" that the General Officer Commanding was determined to evacuate the position north of the Scha-ho. This information was, however, wrong, and seems not to have emanated from General Slutshevski. The facts were the following
it
Western Detachment and available. But to do this
all
the reserves he had
attack with the
When
General Slutshevski, in the morning,
re-
ceived from the Quartermaster-General the rather
hazy intelligence " that those units of the 1st Army Corps which had captured the height of Hou-tai on October 14"^ would be handed over to the 10th Army Corps, when he knew nothing about the capture of the height indicated, he charged the Commander of the 0th Infantry Division with clearing up the matter. When next a report came from Colonel Sivizki, who on October 14 had conducted the attack from Liu-tsien-tun in a southwesterly direction under the immediate orders of Kuropatkin, that he was standing on One Tree Hill- at the disposal of the 10th Army Corps, with the 88th Infantry Regiment, 3 battalions of the
* Colonel Sivizki's troops were evidently referred to, who, on October 14, had carried out the attack from Liu-tsien-tun in a southwesterly direction. (P. 291.) They had, however, not captured the height at Hou-tai, but had only pushed to the neighbourhood of Hou-
tai-lin-tsy.
*
Afterwards called Novgorod Hill.
324

1
86th Infantry Regiment, and

the 87th
company each of
11th Siberian
Infantry Regiment and
Infantry Regiment, as well as with 4 batteries of
the 7th Artillery Brigade, a General Staff officer
was dispatched to him

the
left
Avith the order to
support
of the corps, and, should the Japanese
advance to attack the 10th Army Corps, to take the enemy's right flank under Artillery fire from the height. The General Staff officer was, moreover, directed to inquire, in passing the
in-Chief,
Commander-
whether the troops mentioned of the 1st Corps were actually at their entire disposal, If on that or were charged with a special task. occasion the Commander-in-Chief should inquire
Army
after the situation of the
Army
Corps, this officer
was to report
"having regard to the great exhaustion of the troops and their bad condition after the combats of October 14, the Army Corps was unfit for active employment on that day, but that, after the expected arrival of Man's Detachment, the General Officer Commanding was counting on being able to maintain his position."
that,
^
But, as
officer
a matter
of fact, the
General Staff
reported to the Commander-in-Chief some-
thing quite different, as can be guessed from the

written reply Kuropatkin handed to the bearer
**
:
The officer you dispatched reported to me you were determined to evacuate the Scha-ho
position.
your attention to the fact that such a step would entail the retreat of the whole Army.
*'
1 direct
'
General Slutshevski
tliis
insists
upon having charged the
officer
with
delivering
report.
325
If you have no confidence in the troops placed under your command, I recommend you to remind them by your personal example of the glory of the colours under which they are ser\dng. " Supported you shall be to the utmost of retreat there can be no question " You have completely misled me by your report of yesterday, as I inferred from it that Scha-ho-pu had been recaptured." ^ Verbally, the Commander-in-Chief added that the 10th Army Corps was to hold its position at
;
!
all cost.
The officer was further told that the detachment on One Tree Hill was now under the command
of General Novikov,^ and entirely at the disposal
of the 10th
officer
Army
Corps.
On
the General Staff
expressing
some
doubts
regarding
the
capture of the Hou-tai height on the day before, General Kuropatkin replied that its capture by troops of the 1st Army Corps had been reported
him the day

to
;
it
had, moreover, been reported to
him
before, that General
Gerschelmann had
recaptured Scha-ho-pu,^ in consequence of which
he had initiated the attack, not on Scha-ho-pu, but ftu'ther south. With the 10th Army Co^ps nobody knew anything about a report on Scha-ho-pu but no
;
may have arisen l)y the General Staff Commander-in-Chief where the 10th Army Corps had been standing with the main bodies on the morning of October 1.5. The officer probably did not mention the weak outposts
'
Tlie
misunderstanding
tlie
officer explaininj^ to
in the actual Sclia-lio position.

* ^
Commanding
still iu
the 1st Brigaile 22nd Infantry Division.

fact,
As a matter of
the portion of Scha-lio-pu north of the
ri\-cr
was
possession of the 10th
Army
C'orps
ou October
15,
326

up the matter
attempt was made of clearing

either.^
During
all
that time, at Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy

still
going on, ending with the retreat of the Russian advanced troops of the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments to One Tree Hill, and with the occupation of Tschien-san-takan-tsy village, as well as the small eminence east of it, by portions of the Japanese 3rd Division.'^ Although Kuropatkin had only a moment before expressly emphasised the fact that retreat was out of the question, he himself suggested to the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps a few hours afterwards to retire a little. When, in the afternoon, the evacuation of the 17th Army Corps' advanced position had become known, Kuropatkin dispatched the following letter to General Slutshevski *' According to reports I have received, the 17th
the action was
Army
Corps has retired a
little.
I leave it to
you
to retire likewise somewhat for the time being. " Novikov's Detachment of seven battalions and
a half (of the 86th, 87th, 88th, and 11th Infantry
Regiments), with
flank.
*'
artillery, will
secure your left

will
The
height
east
of
Schan-lan-tsy
be
officer brought General Novikov on One Tree Hillj to support the left wing of the 10th Army Corps, he happened to mention also the capture of the Hou-tai height. It came to light that an error had been committed the Russian troops who made the attack on October 14 did not capture Hou-tai Hill, but temporarily occupied a height situated farther east ; it was probably the eminence north
'
Wlien^ afterwards^ the
General Staff
Slutshevski's order to General
of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy,
'
P. 309,
327
occupied, and the position on both banks of the
Scha-ho entrenched, as I have directed. " Of my General Reserve I have pushed twelve 22 battalions, under battalions to Tou-sien-tun General Gerngross, remain at San-kia-tsy.
;
"
With
these forces I intend to
make
a decisive
attack to-morrow."
Corps
Only weak protective parties of the 10th Army being on the Scha-ho, whilst its main
bodies were holding the entrenched position south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, there was no reason for retiring
farther back without being forced
by the enemy.
The
General Slutshevski, therefore, to go back makes it appear as if Kuropatkin was even then not yet clearly informed
request addressed
to
of
Corps was disposed. The Commander-in-Chief, moreover, in spite of the assurance distinctly given, that Novikov's Detachment was under tlie orders of the 10th Army Corps, seemed to wish to dispose of it himself, as is apparent from his remark about the flank protection and the construction of a position on both banks of the Scha-ho. Not many changes were made in the dis- The Russian _^ ^ /-v position or the Russian Centre on October 15. Centre Of the 1st Army Corps, the 37th Infantry Division enîfe***" remained at rr-tau-kou, whither it had retired tachment establish r^ * 1 T on October 14. At the n^ lo-san, and adjoining themeast, were the two half-divisions of the 4th po^sjtimis Siberian Army Corps - on the left was standing orth of Mishtshenko's Detachment,^ with which was as ho. yet the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment." These
the 10th
,,
how
Army
'
r. 27(1
p. 240.
V. 270.:
1\ 234,
328
troops

entrenched a continuous
line,
stretching
from the country north-west of rr-tau-kou over the To-san in the direction on the Tio-to-san. The troops under General Gerngross,^ dispatched by the Eastern Detachment for forming the General Reserve of the Army, arrived on October 15 at Lo-sien-tun, 2 kilometres southwest of Huan-schan. The Commander-in-Chief, who had billeted in Huan-schan, thus had at his disposal 411 battalions,^ with Artillery attached,^ including Novikov's Detachment, standing on the heights west of Liian-fan-tun. The remainder of the Eastern Detachment did
not continue
.5th
its
retreat.
The
1st Brigade of the
East Siberian Rifle Division, with the battalion
of the 2nd Siberian Infantry

it
Regiment attached to by the ^Var Organisation, and four batteries,

to
occupied a position on the Hou-ho,* from Tsaikia-tun

Kan-to-li-san
;
one
left,
detachment was
to the east, the
pushed to Tso-kou.
'
On
the
p. 267.
1.
'
9th East Siberian Rifle Siberian Army Corps)
Division
. . .
(from
.
1st
.12
6 4 8
7^
battalions.
2.
loth and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments
3.
4.
5.
(from 2nd Siberian Army Corps) 213th Infantry Regiment (from 5th Siberian Army Corps) Half 3rd Siberian Infantry Division (from 4th Siberian Army Corps) Novikov's Detachment (from 1st Army Corps)
6.
87th Infantry Corps)
...... ..... ........

Regiment
(from
1st
...
,,
,,
}>
batteries.
Army
4 battalions. 41 1 battalions.
detail,
Total
'
*
It
was not possible to ascertain the number of batteries in Right tributary of the Scha-ho.

1st
329
East Siberian Rifle Division,^ from the 1st
Siberian
Army
Corps, adjoined,
its
left
reaching
as far as east of Yin-pan.
The
3rd Siberian Army-
Corps continued in
its
former position, with the
main body at the Kau-tu-hn Pass, and with its rearguard on the Hne Schun-schui-tsy Wan-fu-hn Pass.^ Headquarters of the Eastern Detachment
billeted in the Ya-ma-lin-tsy.
October 15 showed Oyama's efforts to finish the battle as quickly as possible. All was quiet already with the 1st and 4th Armies. The troops on the southern bank of the Scha-ho proceeded to entrench their positions the 12th Division, with the 5th
Result of
15.
Kobi Brigade, south of Bian-yu-pu-sa the Guard Division and the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division, in the neighbourhood south of Fn-kia-pu and the 4th Army, in touch with the 1st, between Putsau-wa and Hou-tai-lin-tsy. Nor did anything of importance occur on both wings of the 2nd
; ;
Army
the 3rd Division captured Tschien-san-ta-
kan-tsy,
and the 4th maintained the positions it had gained already on October 14. The 6th
Division alone,
now
again re-united, continued
its
La-mu-tun, the Russian 17th Army Corps falling back before it from the Scha-ho to its position in rear, between Sz-fan-tai and Yinattacks on
kuan.
On
the Russian side, October 15
may
be characportions
terised almost as a
day of
rest too.
The
of the Eastern Detachment which had remained
under Stackelberg's orders entrenched themselves

'
Less the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, being with Mishtshenko's
^
Detachment,
P. 2(57.
330

the
line
generally on
half the 1st
Kan-to-li-san
Pass, and the Centre
The 10th
posts
Army Corps north of Fn-kia-pu. Army Corps, after its front was pierced
14, held the
half
Kau-tu-lin
the 4th Siberian and
on October
Scha-ho section with outpositions
only, taking
up the
of readiness
south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy on October 15, with the main bodies. The 6th Siberian Army Corps, apart
from Artillery
Japanese 4th Division.
remained inactive opposite the Every one of the Western Detachment felt more and more exhausted. Yet, for all that, Kuropatkin thought this detachment still strong enough to advance with it, and, with the reserves collected at Lo-sien-tun and Tou-sientun, to attack on October 16.
fire,
October 16
TheJapanese orce
QJi^jg^^.
heie:ht8 CHst or
The Japanese 2nd Army, having

assigned to
it,
attained the
of Capturing the Scha-ho
section
n
t
La-mu-tun
-r
Schan-
of
the Japanese P'leld
lin-schin-pu. Headquarters TIT
Army
looked
upon the
;
keeping
occupied
tions they
battle as finished.
Marshal
jNlarquis
Oyama seems
but the
to havc given no order for October 16
ained
on Octo-
Sketch 10.
Armics had been directed to entrench the positions occupied ou October 15, and to hold them against any attacks of the enemy, thus causing all movements on the Japanese side to cease generally on the morning of October 16.
But,
attack was
afterwards.
during the night of October 15-16, an made by some Japanese forces, entail-
ing disastrous consequences for the Japanese arms

The 11th
Brigade, having
331
moved on October 15
from the right wing of the 2nd
Army
to the left
wing, the 6th Division being thus re-united for

the attack on La-mu-tun/ the detachment which the
5th Division had

to
tschuan,
left behind at Hun-kiaunder General Yamada,^ was to move
up
the right of
of
the 3rd Division, thus rethe 2nd

started
it
establishing touch
Army
with the
in
is
main body of the 4th. The detachment had

the evening.
said to
The
object
on October 15, was to march on
have been a height situated south of Scha-
ho-pu, east of the JNlandarin

therefore,
Hou-tai
Hill.
Road most likely, But General Yamada

and mistook
visible
did not find the height

for
it
indicated,
a group of hills west of Iîian-fan-tun and
Scha-ho-yan, prominent
and
clearly
for
some long distance in the flat country. The column therefore advanced in a direction somewhat more north-easterly, encountering, north of
Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy
and
Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy,
outposts of Novikov's Russian Detachment,^ and
pushing them back. The Japanese then attacked One Tree Hill,"^ as well as the hill east of Schanlan-tsy. General Novikov's Russian troops standing
here
had
received
tlie
orders
already
in
the
afternoon to evacuate
salient of the line held
position, as
being too
Corps,
by the 10th
Army
and at dusk had begun to
retire across the Scha-ho.
p. 310.
'
The
41st Infantry
tlie 20tli
forced by
Artillery Brigade
P. 335,
Regiment and an Artillery Abteilung, reinKobi Regiment ami two batteries of the 1st Field altogether 5 battalions and 30 guns. (P. 240.) * Afterwards called Novgorod Hill,
332
Only two battalions, the detachments of Scouts from the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, and two batteries, were as yet standing on the heights
mentioned, covering the
retreat.
At
being
the
moment
the Japanese were making their attack, the 3rd
and 4th
Batteries
were just
withdrawn
over the river, with the help of some
men
of the
88th Infantry Regiment.

fusillade
caused great confusion.
noise of battle abated.
The sudden and violent But soon the About midnight all was
troops,
quiet again.
During the night the Russian
which had covered the withdrawal of the main body, remained on One Tree Hill. The main body bivouacked at Scha-ho-yan and in the trenches
north of
it.
On October 16, between 8 and 9 a.m., the Russian covering troops abandoned One Tree Hill, owing to a panic, it seems. The whole of Novikov's Detachment retired, under the fire of Japanese Artillery, 1 kilometre farther north at The 1st and first, and ultimately to Wu-kia-tun. 2nd Battalions of the 88th Infantry Regiment covered their retirement at great sacrifice, two oflficers and one man of the 4th Company only The detachment covered being unwounded.
itself
by outposts on the
;
line
kia-tun-kou
batteries.
strength, three
Wu-kia-tun Fucompanies and five
General Yamada's troops at once occupied and entrenched the position captured on the heights. For the rest, only individual units of the Japanese The carried out some movements on October 16.
main
forces of the 5th Division were,
by Kuroki's

orders,
383
to start from the Wai-tau-schan on October 16, to rejoin the 4th Army.^ It cannot be ascertained how far the Division, which left a battahon on the Wai-tau-schan, actually got on
that day.
General Prince Kan-in's 2nd Cavalry Brigade advanced to Ko-dai-rei,- in compliance with the reconnoitring duties it was charged with, but, encountering there strong Russian forces of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, withdrew again to
Tschau-huan-tschai.
The 3rd Brigade
of the 2nd Division, led by
General JNIatsunaga, which, after the action at the

Tschau-hsien-lin Pass,^ had advanced to Schan-pintai-tsy,
with the object of cutting off the Russians, but was then withdrawn, arrived at Ha-ma-tan at 2 p.m., rejoining the main body of its Division on
tlie
following day.
The 5th Division, having left behind on the Wai-tau-schan only one battalion. General Baron Kuroki dispatched thither Lieutenant-Colonel Kani * with three battalions ^ to mve more strength
to the force protecting the right
Hank of
his
Army.
One regiment
of the
Guard
^^
Division, which had
been put in motion with the same object, as well as one mountain battery, was placed under his command. The detachment reached the neighbourhood of Tien-liu-yu, south of the ^^âi-tauschan,
hearing there that the

*
^
battalion
of
the
P. 308.
18 kilometres north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.
Pp. 230-231.
Comuianding
detiiils.
tlie 2i)tli
Kobi Ilegimeut. and had beeu
Impossible to ascertain more
* 'ITie mountain battery ])elongê(l employed with the Guai-d DivLsiou.
to the 5th Division^
334
5th Division had been pushed back by superior

forces of the Russians (these were six companies from the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, belonging to the 1st Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division), and had abandoned the Wai-tau-schan.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kani, however, did not
make
any counter-attack, but confined himself to watching the enemy. General Umesawa's Brigade, which Oyama had detailed for his reserve, continued its march to
San-kia-tsy, south-west of Scha-ho-pu.
General Kuropatkin had given his orders in conformity with his intention of making a final theVua'a" attempt to attack with the newly formed General Western Reserve, in co-operation with the Western DetachDetachThe
at^
, .
The General Order is not known, but ment. scems to havc arranged for the Western Detachment to attack straight ahead generally, whilst iSarf- ^^^^ Commander-in-Chief intended to push with tions are the General Reserve in a south-westerly direction, made for The hour for commencing the enterprise was to ^^ communicated separately. The portions of the hirSie"^'
IJ^î^*^^"^
Russian Reserves does not
heights
Schanlan-tsy.
and 4th Siberian Army Corps standing at rrtau-kou the 37th Infantry Division, half the 2nd,
1st
^^^^
^vdli:
the 3rd Siberian Infantry Divisions, as well
as Mishtshenko's
Detachment
were
for
to hold their
fire.
positions, supporting the attack
by Artillery
the
Based on the General Order, General Baron

Bilderling
issued
his
orders
Detachment." The places to troops were fixed rather distant, probably in compliance with Kuropatkin 's directives.
'
Western be reached by the
p. 323.
-'
Appendix XIV.

command
earlier for
335
General Dembovski's Detachment, under the

of the 6th Siberian
Army
its
Corps, which
could have taken advantage of
position
left
much
;
enveloping the enemy's

right
wing, was
the
to push to Tsun-lun-yen-tun on the Scha-ho
unnamed
tributary of
the
Schi-li-ho
was
indicated to the three corps as their objective
Corps was to Army Corps the section Liu-tan-kou Pan-kiau-pu and the 10th Army Corps the section Hun-pau-schan Nin-kuan-tun. General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, which had last established connection between the 6th Siberian Army Corps and General Dembovski's Detachment, was to cover
namely, the 6th Siberian
reach Tschien-liu-tan-kou
;
Army
the 17th
the right flank of the
Army.
As
fire
a preliminary to the attack, a strong Artillery
was opened at daybreak all along the front of Western Detachment on either side of Yinkuan. The 6th Siberian Army Corps, on its own initiative, began to advance with some portions.
the
^
General Soboliev, thinking
it
advisable
to
take
possession of VVu-tschan-yin village for the future
development of the attack, ordered General Bolotov,
commanding the
right
section of the
attack, to
advance against that place. The place was probably but weakly occupied by the Japanese 4th Division,
the right column of the 6th Siberian
succeeding, therefore, in capturing
loss
it
by 11 a.m.
Army Corps without gi-eat Before continuing the attack
' The 217th Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division 0th Siberian Army Corps, which had remained in tlie
" Position
of Tiii-lin," joined the corps.
(1*.
4-)
336
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE
Soboliev waited for
WAR
of
General
the order
the
Western Detachment to advance, as it was to be but the order never communicated separately came. General Dembovski's Detachment seems
;
to have advanced a
little
in
an easterly direction
as well, but to have stopped again shortly after-
wards.
The Artillery of the 17th Army Corps took under fire the Scha-ho position held by the Japanese, and the batteries of the 10th Army Corps fired from their positions south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy upon the Artillery of the Japanese 3rd Division at Hou-tai Hill both vigorously replied to that The distance inter\'ening between the two fire. Artilleries was 5 to 6 kilometres.
;
At
early
dawn two battalions of the 34th Infantry
Regiment, from the 10th Army Corps, advanced from their position west of AVu-kia-tun across the river, occupying Schan-lan-tsy. The colonel commanding the regiment had received the order by occupying for this already the night before Schan-lan-tsy it was intended to fill the gap between the 36tli Infantry Regiment in the northern portion of Scha-ho-pu, and the 33rd Infantry Regiment in the trenches on the right bank of the river. But the order having arrived very late, the regiment had first occupied the northern portion of the village only at daybreak the southern portion was then taken possession
; ;
of.
for, after
battalions could not stay there long General Yamada's Detachment had driven General Novikov from the heights east of Schan-
But the
lan-tsy
on the morning of October
16, the
Japanese

batteries directed their fire
337
upon the
village.
To
prevent the troops being altogether annihilated
by the effective flanking fire, the colonel commanding the regiment obtained from General
Gerschelmann,
battalions
commanding
the
9th
Division,
permission to evacuate Schan-lan-tsy again.

Infantry Regiment north-east of the village,
The
withdrew into the position of the 33rd
Colonel Shitkovski,
when commanding the regiment, was
wounded.
On
the intelligence of General Novikov's retreat
Wu-kia-tun Fu-kia-tun-kou, General Gerschelmann was afraid of losing touch with that general's detachment he therefore ordered a low eminence at Wu-kia-tun to be occupied by the other two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment which had belonged to the sectional reserve.
into the line
;
General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, placed, moreover, the 121st Infantry Regi-
ment
at the north-east corner of Pa-ta-kia-tsy ready,
in case of need, to support the left
wing of the
Army
At
Corps.
8.10 a.m. a note
Staff of the
came from the Chief of the Army, saying that Novikov's Detach-
ment was withdrawn again from General Slutshevski's command, and placed under the orders
of the General
Commanding
the 1st
Army
Corps.
The detachment had been ordered by the 10th Corps to hold and strengthen its new position for the present, because the Commander of the Western Detachment had apparently
Army
deferred
the
general
moreover,
made
Slutshevski had, opportunity of recalling use of the

attack.
22
338
to
his
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE
own Army Corps
WAR
the two battalions of
the 124th Infantry Regiment attached to Novikov's
Towards 11 a.m. the two battaUons of the 35th Infantry Regiment detained by the 17th Army Corps returned at last to the comDetachment.
^
mand
of the 10th
Army
Corps, too, the corps being
thus again completely united, excepting the Artillery
Abteilung the enemy captured on October 14.^ Whilst the Artillery duel was proceeding, which both adversaries conducted with great violence, the troops of the Western Detachment were wâiting in vain for the order to advance, which Kuropatkin had reserved to himself. It seems the successful night attack of General Yamada's
Detachment exerted
at first a paralysing influence

in the morning.
is
on Kuropatkin's decisions
The
said
Commander
of the
Western Detachment
:
to have received at 11.15 a.m. the following communication from the Commander-in-Chief " I do not intend carrying out the attack, considering
it
sufficient
if
the
Western Detachment holds

Bilderling accordingly
in
the Scha-ho line to-day."
directed his troops to remain
their
positions,
the attack being postponed. But inconsistent with this is a letter sent by Kuropatkin to the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps in the afternoon, containing the following
By whose directions has General Bilderling abandoned the attack ? Don't you think it
"
necessary to
If
make
use of the presence of
my
?
reserves for recapturing the village of Scha-ho-pu
you
'
prefer
postponing
the attack until to-
Pp. 282-283.
P. 279.
339
morrow, report to me how you intend preparing the attack by artillery fire, and whether you do
not think
it
advisable to take hold of Schan-lan-tsy
village as yet to-day, whence the attack on Schaho-pu could be prepared by common-shell batteries ^ from my reserve. General von Meiendorf 's - task for to-day is to retake One Tree Hill, and the positions of the 86th and 88th Infantry RegiSupport General von INIeiendorf by the ments. fire of your batteries." Kuropatkin, nevertheless, seems still to have counted upon the Western Detachment assuming
the offensive on October 16, late in the day as

it
was, for at 2.30 p.m.
word came from the Chief

the 10th
of the Staff of the

that the
had been ordered to 1st push to the line Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy Liu-tsientun in support of the Western Detachment's attack, and that a brigade of the General Reserve of the Army would be moved against Schan-lan-
Army to Army Corps
Army
Corps
tsy village, for

left
supporting, in case of need, the
wing of the 10th Army Corps. But no one of the Western Detachment thought of attacking any longer the troops did not stir
;
in their positions.
Of
the General Reserve, single batteries
first,
then constantly more and

since early morning,
more
batteries,
had,
come
into action with General
Yamada's Artillery standing on One Tree Hill

'
Only with the 4th Siberian Army Corps were some guns
still
of an
old pattern firing
common
shell,
llie shrapnels of the quick-firing
guns having proved ineffective against masonry, the old guns had come into prominence again in village fighting. * General Commanding the 1st Army Corps,
340

it.
and north-west of
General Baron Meiendorf,
commanding
other units,
the
1st
Army
Corps,
troops the 22nd Infantr}'^ Division, as
whose well as some

of
Reserve,^
belonged to the
General
hearing in the morning of the loss of the height
mentioned, ordered the commander of the 7th Artillery Brigade belonging to his corps, before having received any directive from Kuropatkin, to
support Novikov's Detachment with 2j battalions of the 87th Infantry Regiment, 2 batteries of his
brigade, and the 2 Transbaikal Cossack batteries,
in
case
the
capture
of
the heights should be
ordered.
But, meanwhile. General Gerngross," commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps, who was with
the General Reserve
portions detailed
to recapture the
and
in
command
of the
by the Eastern Detachment to

heights
lost,
the General Reserve, was ordered by Kuropatkin
with a reinforced
brigade from the General Reserve, and with the
2nd Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, which was going to be placed under his command. General Gerngross detailed for that purpose the 2nd Brigade of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division under General Putilov, as well as the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, from the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division. General Baron INleiendorf then ordered General Novikov, at 11.35 a.m., to join the attack of Putilov's Brigade with the 86th, 87th, and 88th Infantry Regiments, the 1st and 5th Batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, the 3rd and 6th Batteries of the 43rd Artillery Brigade,
'
P. 291.
-'
P. 267.
341
and one Sapper Company. In addition, the 11th Siberian Infantry Regiment was to take part in
the attack.
All the other tasks assigned by Kuropatkin to Western Detachment, and to the General Reserve for October 16, were relegated to the
the
background in favour of the imminent recapture

of the lost heights.
Commander-in-Chief informed the 10th Army Corps that the brigade of the General Reserve which was going to be moved on Schan-lan-tsy had now been detailed to attack, jointly with Xovikov's Detachment, One Tree Hill it would therefore not be available for taking part in the attack on Scha-ho-pu until that height had been re-occupied.
4f
At
p.m.
the
A
19th
General
Staff
this,
officer
of
the
10th
Army
Corps, who, on
was sent forward to

Rifle
find out
what was going

East
on,
met the commander of the

Regiment, belonging
Siberian
to Putilov's Brigade, in the position this regiment
was occupying at Uû-kia-tun, learning from him that that brigade had orders to attack the
knoll
east
of Schan-lan-tsy
at
dusk
General Novikov was going to attack

Hill.
and that One Tree
When, about
that time,
movements were noticed
on the western slopes of the knoll east of Schanlan-tsy, as if the Japanese were retiring, the colonel ordered his regiment to start, with the object of advancing first to the Scha-ho. Should the Japanese be actually retiring, he intended to cross the river at nightfall. He begged the 10th
342

Corps to make a move forward with
in support of the attack.
his
its
Army
left
wing
General Staff officer's report, General Slutshevski ordered General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division, to support the attack of Putilov's Brigade, and to re-occupy Schan-lantsy should the attack prove successful. When reporting tliese measures, the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps at the same time informed the Commander-in-Chief regarding the attack on Scha-ho-pu, that " he considered it necessary to capture first One Tree Hill, and next the villages of Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy and Tschientschan-lin-tsy
On
Scha-ho-pu and Hou-tai Hill must then be prepared by common;
the
attack
on
shell batteries
from these places." was evening. For the night the 121st Infantry Regiment, standing at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, placed two battalions at the disposal of General Gerschelmann, commanding the left section of the attack, and one battalion at the disposal of General
INIeanwhile
it
AVassiliev,
left section
commanding the
right
section.
The
was, moreover, reinforced by the two
battalions of the 35th Infantry
Regiment which
had arrived
in the forenoon.^
In the Centre, the batteries of the 37th Infantry

Division, of half the 4th
Siberian
Army
Corps,
and of IMishtshenko's Detachment, kept up a brisk fire on the left wing of the Japanese 1st Army, and on the right wing of the Japanese 4th Army, both of which vigorously returned the fire. But neither the Russians nor the Japanese seem
'
p.
338
'

to have felt
343
much
of the effect of the Artillery
duel, conducted
\iolence.
on the whole front with great

altered in the disposition of the Th Ras"
Not much was

forces with
the
Eastern Detachment.
_
The
1st
em
De-
East Siberian Rifle Division 2nd*^'!^."* maintains Siberian Army Corps, whose main body was stand- it postBrigade
_
5th
ing north-west of Kan-to-li-san, hearing that the
Wai-tau-schan was occupied by but weak parties of the enemy, the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, forming probably the rearguard standing at Tso-kou,^ drove the Japanese from that height, and re-occupied it. The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division remained in its former position, north-east of Kan-to-li-san
;
^^^
north of ^^^^'
the 3rd Siberian

;
Army Corps,
likewise, at the
Kau-
tu-lin Fass its rearguard only seems to have been withdrawn a little farther back. An attack of the Japanese 2nd Ca\alry Brigade, penetrating
as
far
as
action.^
was repulsed after a brief Rennenkampfs Detachment arrived at

Ko-dai-rei,
Result
ber
i^6.
the Da-lin Fass.^
AU had become quiet on the whole of the Japanese front. Yamada's Detachment alone pushed back some weak Russian protective parties of General Novikov's Detachment from the last Russian position, south of the Scha-ho, on the
heights east of Schan-lan-tsy.
This small success of the Japanese affected the Russian Commander-in-Chief to such an extent
that the grand attack of the AVestern
Detachment
3
and of the newly formed Reserves, planned by
P. 328.
>
p. 333.
Sketch
1,
344

off,
Kuropatkin, did not come

east of Schan-lan-tsy.
but merely shrunk
into preparations for the recapture of the heights
October 17
TheRustroops of
General
push back
nese Detachment
Yamada
heights^ east of
lan-tsy.
From the events of October IG it appeared to General Yamada as though his small detachment "would be u nable after all to hold for any length of time the heights it had captured east of Schan-lan^^^^^ strong Russian Artillery fire directed ^^Yupon and maintained against the position for hours, as wcll as the enemy's masses of Infantry pushing
gradually against the heights,
i\^Q
made
it
clear that
Sketchio.
Russians were bent on recapturing the position ou the heights at any price. It being, further, almost impossible to count on being reinforced by own troops, General Yamada decided to abandon the heights as yet on October 16, after darkness had set in. General Yamada had distributed his forces in this way the 20th Kobi Regiment was standing on the left, therefore with its main body probably on the height east of Schan-lan-tsy, and the 41st Infantry Regiment was occupying One Tree Hill the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Infantry Regiment, and the 7th Company, with the colour, remain:
ing concentrated in reserve.
The two
batteries
furnished by the 1st Field Artillery Brigade were
standing on the western slopes of the height behind the 20th Kobi Regiment the Abteilung mountain;
guns of the 5th Division had come into position

^
At two
battalions.
345
somewhat farther to the left, and in rear. The retreat was intended to be carried out by the Artillery moving off first, then the Kobi Regiment
and the reserve battalion were to retire, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 41st Infantry Regiment finally
following as rearguard.
But before all the orders had been issued, and before it was possible to begin the movement, the Russians had begun
General Putilov having, at 4 p.m. on October
16,
to attack.
been placed in
command
of
all
the troops detailed the right column,
for the attack,^ got his forces ready for attack in
four columns at 6 p.m.

consisting of the
With
2nd Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, under his personal command, he intended to attack, from Wu-kia-tun, the western
height, afterwards called Putilov Hill.
The
centre
main column, formed of the 86th, 87th, and 88th

Infantry Regiments, under the command of General Novikov, was to turn from Wu-kia-tun on Schaho-yan, capturing One Tree Hill, afterwards called
Novgorod Hill
and, to the left of this column,
the centre minor column, the 11th Siberian Infantry
Regiment, was to push forward from Fu-kia-tunkou by Lan-fan-tun. The left column, or 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, was to sweep round from Sa-ho-tun by Liu-tsien-tun to get on the right flank and in rear of the Japanese on the Novgorod Hill. It was therefore intended to envelop Yamada's Detachment on both sides. With the centre main column, the 87th Infantry Regiment was to attack in first line. The com1
Pp. 340-342.
346

therefore sent his detach5 o'clock in the afternoon,
mander of the regiment ments of Scouts, before

in driving
from Wu-kia-tun to Scha-ho-yan. They succeeded from that village Japanese outposts of General Yamada. This rapid success led to the whole centre main column advancing to attack already, at 5 p.m.
:
instead of at G p.m.
in first line, the 87th Infantry
Regiment
88th
in second line, three battalions of the

left,
Infantry Regiment echeloned to the
and two battalions of the 86th Infantry Regiment echeloned to the right the reserve of the column one battalion 88th Infantry Regiment, and two battalions 86th Infantry Regiment remained at The first line occupied Schafirst in Wu-kia-tun. the second moved up then fire was ho-yan The troops in the neighbourhood of the opened. village took cover from the Japanese Artillery fire
;
behind the walls of that place. The 88th Infantry Regiment was the first to reach the steep banks of the river, under heavy loss many officers were
;
disabled
already.
It
"was,
nevertheless,
possible
to bring the regiment across the Scha-ho, M'hich,
owing to the numerous

is
projectiles falling into
it,
said to have looked as if it was boiling. Then, on the right of the 88th, the 87th Infantry Regiment, from Scha-ho-yan, gained the left bank Colonel Rondenko, commanding the regiment, and the lieutenant-colonel were killed. In dense masses the regiment now tried to climb Novgorod Hill, the same as the neighbouring sisterregiment (88th) on its left. Four times the troops were on the point of streaming back, but were pre-

vented by their
officers
347
from doing
so.
At
6 p.m.
the 86th Infantry Regiment, on the right of the
At the 87th, had got at last across the river too. same time, the enveloping wings began to intervene as ordered, and the reserves were moving up. The 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment surrounded the left battalion of the 20th Kobi Regiment, penetrating with portions into the batteries and ammunition column standing behind the Kobi Regiment. The left company of the 10th Army Corps the 12th of the S-ith Infantry Regiment was led away by the neiglibouring skirmishers,
and, likewise, took part in the attack.

flanks,
In the front,
fire-action
and rear of the Japanese a hot
ensued.
General Yamada now urged an immediate retreat, charging the 41st Infantry Regiment with
covering the withdrawal.
Owing
to the rains of
the days preceding, the roads had changed into a deep mire and, worse still, the night had grown
;
pitch
dark.
The movement
of
all
vehicles
was
therefore but very slow.

tion of his regiment for
To
maintain the posi-
some time longer against
the overwhelming odds of the assailant, LieutenantColonel Uzawa, commanding the 41st Infantry Regiment, detailed also the 3rd Battalion to reinforce the foremost fighting-line
as well as one section of the 9th
Company, Company, was The 20th all that remained available as reserve. Regiment disengaged itself from the enemy Kobi
;
the 7th
with heavy loss after a furious hand-to-hand struggle it succeeded in cutting its way through,
;
in the direction
on Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy.
The com-
348

it
plete darkness, aiding
thereby, was to the dis-
advantage of the assailants. On One Tree Hill, on which was the Japanese right, the situation had, meanwhile, grown from bad to worse. With the few bodies still intact,
the
commander of the
was behind the front
Regiment on a small eminence, making

41st Infantry
arrangements for the retreat of the colour-company, as well as for the removal of the wounded, when he heard in his rear hot rifle-fire. By patrols,
was ascertained that the Russians about two companies strong, probably from the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment were close in rear of the regiment, and attacking the trains.^ The commander of the regiment thereupon ordered the ensign to go back with the colour on Houit
san-ta-kan-tsy.
Immediately afterwards, the enemy emerged from the dark, pushing forward from behind
against the small eminence.
The 7th Company

rushed
;
and
the section of the 9th the Russians witli the bayonet
to
meet
the colonel and
his staff joined In them, swords in hand. the hot fire-action at closest range, and in the hand-to-hand struggle, both adversaries suffered
Lieutenant-Colonel Uzawa and the officers of his staff were killed. Ultimately, the Russians occupied the small eminence. On the noise of battle behind the front of the regi-
enormous
losses.
ment. Major Ino-uye, with two companies of the 3rd Battalion 41st Infantry Regiment, which were just going up to reinforce the front line, hurried
'
Probably
first-line transport.
349
back again to the height on which he thought the commander of the regiment to be. When finding the enemy in possession of the height he Once at once deployed the companies for attack. almost more a hot struggle developed, ending with the annihilation of the Russians, exhausted Portions of the 20th Kobi as they were already.
Regiment intervened
in
the
action
too.
The
remnants of the Russian troops were pushed back south, thus leaving the Japanese free to retreat south-west. After more severe losses the foremost line of the 41st Infantry Regiment succeeded in gradually evacuating the position and withdrawing in the dark.
By
order of Major Ino-uye, the
dead bodies of the officers killed, as far as they could be recognised, wxre picked up and carried along. The last unit to leave One Tree Hill was the 1st Battalion, whose share it was to form the rearguard. Towards 3 o'clock in the morning, the Russians were finally able to occupy the heights. General Yamada's Detachment fell back on the Japanese 3rd Division, in the neighbourhood of
Ku-kia-tsy.
The nocturnal
heavy
at,
struggle cost both
adversaries
their loss
sacrifice.
The Japanese estimate
roughly, 32 officers and 1,000 men.

killed,
With
the
41st Infantry Regiment, 8 officers and 322
men
were
officers
and 184 men Avounded.
The
great
number
of dead, in proportion to the
wounded, shows how gallantly the Japanese had been fighting. The equally high losses of the 20th Kobi Regiment are not known in detail. The Japanese Artillery seems to ha\'e taken an
350

combat
as well.
active share in the
Not
all
the
batteries succeeded in limbering up and getting away in time nine field and four mountain guns, and one machine-gun, all intact, remained in the hands of the Russians. The two Russian guns captured by the Japanese the night before were also left behind by them on the height. The Russian losses were still greater in all, they were 2,250 men, the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment alone losing about 800 men. The regiment is said to have met in the dark with some of their own troops, who opened a withering fire, believing they were facing the enemy. Early on October 17 General Kuropatkin
;
inspected the theatre of the nocturnal combats.
With
the
consent
of
the
Tsar,
to
whom
the
^
message of victory was conveyed by telegraph, the height fought for was named " Putilov Hill," General Putilov, commanding the 2nd after Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, who had directed the attack. But the Russian Army afterwards gave this name only to the height east of Schan-lan-tsy actually attacked by Putilov's Brigade, One Tree Hill being named " Novgorod Hill," after the peace garrison of the regiments engaged against that height. By order of Kuropatkin, the ridge was occupied by the Putilov Brigade, as well as by the 33rd and 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, with Artillery attached, under the command of General GernThe 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments gross. and one Sapper company were stationed in reserve
'
Appendix XVI.

at the
351
other
eastern foot of
the height.
The
troops which had shared in the attack returned to the General Reserve at San-kia-tsy.
The
the
^
success
gained
during the night roused The
Rus-
spirit
of enterprise of the 10th
Army
Corps, Army
^^l^f
^^
which had intended the recapture of Schan-lan* When, at daybreak, tsy already on October 16.
lighting
with the
Colonel 3*^01^^ the Russian victory became Woltshanovski, with the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry ^jon a
Division and two battalions of the 121st Infantry
action for
^'
known,
Regiment, advanced from

village,
his
position
north of ^^'
the
Schan-lan-tsy across the Scha-ho, occupying the

and, by an offensive
move
against
taking part General Putilov's Brigade, which about that time was descending on the enemy's The lastside from the height it had captured. named village had been occupied already by
line
Scha-ho-pu
Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy,
in the attack of
Putilov's
skirmishers
the portions of the
10th
Army
Corps ensconced themselves at the edge

into
of the ravine situated north-east of Scha-ho-pu,

entering
a
fire-action
with
the
Japanese
holding the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu.

the General
When
Army
Commanding
received intelligence of
the successful advance of the troops of his the enemy's Artillery,
Corps, and at 7 a.m. was, moreover, informed of
standing
at
Scha-ho-pu,
limbering up and retreating, he decided to attack

the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu.
of the corps was
to the southern
The
reserve
moved up
to Pa-ta-kia-tsy.
The
troops of the left wing, which had crossed over
bank of the Scha-ho, were ordered

'
r. 342.
352
to entrench themselves in the position they had taken up, and to wait there for the general attack. The 1st Abteilung 9th Artillery Brigade, standing
east of Pa-ta-kia-tsy,
was directed to prepare the
attack by their
fire
on Scha-ho-pu.
At the same time, General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Infantry Division, pushed two battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment from
his reserve to the northern portion of Scha-ho-pu,
while charging two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment with supporting the portions already
The colonel the left bank of the river. commanding the 35th Infantry Regiment then
on
took
command
over
all
the troops in
first
line
on
this
wing of the
corps.
AVhen, at 9.30 a.m., these arrangements had been made, the 10th Army Corps receivêd an Order of the Commander-in-Chief to the leader of the Western Detachment, dispatched on October 16, at 11.40 p.m. The Order contained the tasks of the Army for October 17 namely, the 10th Army Corps to capture Scha-ho-pu, while the Jst Army Corps was to attack the line Scha-ho-pu Hou-tai Hill General Dembovski's Detachment, as well as the 6th Siberian and 17th Army Corps, to hold their positions. At the same time, to the 6th Siberian and the 10th ^Vrmy Corps were handed over two mortar batteries each and to the 17th Army Corps one,^ for preparing and supporting the attack. It is not
The
2iid
East Siberian Field Mortar Battery and 1st Battery 5th
Field Mortar Regiment.

'
1st East Siberiau Field Moi-tar Battery.

known how
;
353
far the Commander of the Western General Detachment acted upon this Order Baron Bilderhng, at any rate, does not seem to
have issued any special orders to the 10th

Corps.
Army
Conforming with Kuropatkin's directive, General Dembovski's Detachment and the 6th Siberian and 17th Army Corps confined themselves to ordering their Artillery to fire on the enemy. The mortar battery attached to the 17th Army Corps went into position at Yin-kuan, taking La-mutun under fire. The effect was small, though the
have fired 181 shells. With the 10th Army Corps, the portion of Scha-ho-pu south of the Scha-ho still in the hands of the enemy was to be prepared by the mortars for an assault. But the batteries apparently arrived too late for fire to be opened on the 17th.
battery
is
said to
The Japanese 3rd

fire
Division replied to the Artillery

Hill,
from Hou-tai
the Mandarin
it
Road and
overwhelming, especially, the ground adjacent to
with high explosive shells. Though the whole road was covered with vehicles and troops of the Russian 10th Army Corps, and shells were falhng
into the Russian reserves, the
actual
effect
was
likewise very small.
The
preparation
of
the
offensive
by
heavy
Artillery
recommended by Kuropatkin,
as well as
his intimation of
'
common-shell batteries going to
The Japanese
;
Shiraose shell took effect only close to the point of
shell, for instance,
it there was hardly any danger. One on October 17, fell right into one battalion of the 85th Infantry Regiment, between two companies lying close behind each other in column formation, without a single man being injured.
impact
a few paces distant from
23
354

to
be attached
the General
the
1st
Army
Corps, with the
particular object of attacking Scha-ho-pu, was, for
Commanding
the 10th
Army
Corps,
a welcome inducement for postponing his attack

Slutshevski was confirmed in his by the report of strong forces of the enemy advancing on Scha-ho-pu. The troops of the 10th Army Corps on the southern bank of the river were, meanwhile, engaged in a severe and costly combat. No orders
to the next day.
decision
nor fresh forces as reinforcement arriving, their situation grew more difficult from hour to hour. Of this. General Slutshevski, who, as on October 16, was spending all day in a trench at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, seems to have had no report, as he did not adopt any counter-measures. In the afternoon, Kuropatkin's order came for withdrawing the troops of the 10th
for executing the attack,
the Scha-ho, so
Corps stationed on the southern bank of as to give the common-shell batteries of the 1st Army Corps, which had come mto position at Schan-lan-tsy, and on the Putilov Hill, the chance of bombarding Scha-ho-pu. The Commander-in-Chief himself, therefore, no longer thought of carrying through the intended attack on October 17. General Slutshevski directed the portions of his Army Corps on the southern bank of the Scha-ho
to
effect
Army
the recrossing in the dark.
The
ex-
hausted troops,
retire,
who would have been
obliged to
anyhow, without
any orders, began
the
movement
at night, the southern part of Schan-
lan-tsy alone remaining occupied
on the
left
bank.

sion, the portions of the 4th Siberian
355
In the Russian Centre, the 37th Infantry Divi- The
Army
Corps,
centre
and Mishtshenko's Detachment, remained in their ^"^ ^^ hastern positions about Orr-tau-kou. The batteries shared Detachin the general Artillery duel.
thdrpii-
The Eastern Detachment

^
retained
^
its
.
position ^?"^v IheJapa-
and at the Kau-tu-hn Pass as nase reThe Wai-tau-schan remained occupied by ^y^^Jj of well.^ six companies of the 18th East Siberian Rifle ^^^^^*" Regiment, by three detachments of Scouts, and by two machine-guns. On the Japanese side, the troops completed the movements as ordered.- General Umesawa's Guard Kobi Brigade got as far as San-kia-tsy, south-east of Scha-ho Railway Station. The 5th Division seems to have joined the 4th Army,^ and taken up a position on that Army's left but no other details are known. October 17 caused only indifferent changes in Result the position and distribution of both forces, ex- bLî^?'*
at
Kan-to-li-san,
haustion being
felt
generally.
On
the
eastern
part of the battlefield, where fighting had ceased
already for days, individual groups, widely separ-
ated from each other, had formed on either bank

of the Scha-ho, the Russians being north, and the Japanese south of that line. But on the western portion, where the battle had not yet completely died away, both adversaries were standing opposite each other at gun-shot range, in long, continuous positions, which were being entrenched. Serious actions were no longer fought on October 17 the successful recapture, during the night preceding
;
P. 343.
Pp. 307-30.
"
Pp. 308 and 332-333.

356

17, of the Putilov
October
and Novgorod Hills
the only success of a lasting nature the Russians had during the whole of the battle was merely
of local importance.
Marshal INIarquis
as finished already
Oyama
looked upon the battle
side the battle

too,
though
on October 15. On the Russian had finished, as a matter of fact, Kuropatkin had not yet given up
completely his intentions to attack.
October 18 and the End of the Battle

Tiie Russiaiisab-
stainfrom attacking
r^ht'^re-
maining
tion north
SchaSio
During the night of October 17-18 a steady, copious rain came down, lasting till noon on ^^ ^^ n Octobcr 18, softemng agam all roads and paths, ^^^ changing them into a mire. Under cover of this bad wcathcr, the Japanese tried to regain posscssion of the lost heights. But the attack, probably made by the main body of the 5th Division, was repulsed by the Russians.^ Kuropatkin intended to carry out at last, on October 18, the offensive ^ he had deferred day
,
after
yet,
day.
The 10th Army Corps probably,
as
on the evening of October 17
was ordered to
The
get possession of Scha-ho-pu at daybreak.
reserve of the corps had therefore been standing
under arms
rain.
all
night at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, in pouring
The troops were waiting, in vain, for the heavy Artillery to open the fire which was to
prepare
the
attack
thoroughly.
One
its
of
the
mortar
'
batteries,
Division
is
however, had selected

said to have arrived again
;
position
The 6th
4th
Army on
October 17
on the left of the General Yamada'a Detachment belonged

"
to that Division.
P. 323.

in the
357
break
dark so close to the enemy, that at dayfound itself within 600 metres opposite It was at once overwhelmed by a Scha-ho-pu. rapid fire, without being able to fire even a single
it
its ammunition waggons had, moreover, stuck The attack was thereon the muddy roads. the reserve of the corps fore postponed again the 85th and 122nd Infantry Regiments re-
shot
fast
turned to
the
its
bivouacs at Tschan-kia-pu-tsy.
of
Soon
3
p.m.
afterwards an order of Kuropatkin's arrived, fixing
commencement
the
attack
for
But on General Slutshevski
reporting
that his
reduced and exhausted troops, without a previous thorough rest, were not in a position to carry out an attack with any hope of success at all, Kuropatkin yielded, withdrawing the order. He resolved to defer the attack for a few days, to grant
the troops some rest during that time, and to
prepare the attack by Artillery.
The
be
positions
occupied
fortified.
by the
troops were
to
held
and
The
order having been issued to that
effect,
the troops at once began to entrench. Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps went to Hua-schi-ho towards evening.
East Siberian Field Mortar Battery had taken under fire Lin-schin-pu, but without result on this day too, the Japanese being not induced to evacuate
Corps,
With
the
17th
Army
the
1st
that village.
On
the
strengthen
Kuropatkin's order coming in to positions occupied, the troops

line Sz-fanbatteries are not
began to establish themselves on the

'
llie locality
and employment of the other mortar
known.
358
tai

north
of
Yin-kuan^country
The 6th
Siberian
Wan-tie-ku-
kia-tsy.
Corps and General Dembovski's Detachment, probably by a separate order, disengaged themselves without difficulty The former took post on from their opponent. the right of the 17th Army Corps between Kuanand Sz-fan-tai General Dembovski's lin-pu Detachment was withdrawn behind it to the neighbourhood of Siau-su-kia-pu. No material changes occurred in the disposition of the Centre and Eastern Detachment on October 18. On the morning of October 19 a wire from the Commander-in-Chief was received by the General
;
Army
Officers
Commanding, ordering the troops
to set
work at once constructing pivots, with overhead cover, obstacles, etc. These measures were meant to give the Army the chance of holding
to
its
positions
for
some
time.
The
^
intention
of to
resuming the
offisnsive
within a limited time was
expressed in a General Order
made known
This Order at the the troops in the forenoon. same time testifies to the imperturbable optimism the Commander-in-Chief was imbued with. Side by side with a partly exaggerated estimate of
the enemy's forces,
alleged deplorable state
Kuropatkin pointed to the of the Japanese Army the Japanese had incurred enormous losses, and were suffering from want of supplies and from
their defeat at Putilov the cold of the nights Hill, where three regiments had been completely
;
'
Appendix
XV

annihilated,
359
had caused the utmost consternation " We must wish and depression in their ranks. the Japanese some more of these lessons," con"we are already somewhat cludes Kuropatkin superior in numbers we are more experienced must take in the conduct of an action. advantage of the defeat we have inflicted on The troops must be made clearly to them. understand that fresh and vigorous efforts are necessary for the relief of Port Arthur that no time must be left to the enemy for reinforcing himself and making good his losses." The Order produced but a faint impression on the troops not much weight was attached to the vague announcement of continuing the offensive. The physical and psychical exhaustion of every one was so great as to produce merely a general craving for rest. Nor did Kuropatkin return any more to his intention of " leaving no time to the enemy " he probably became aware of the
;
We
Army,
deliver
in its present condition,
being unable to
any decisive blows. The idea for the offensive faded more and more out of sight, being for the next month finally abandoned altogether.
The Army had meanwhile begun

its
consolidating
Positions
position.
the Western
lin-pu
the right, the main position of Russian Detachment stretched from Kuan- fôm^ by Ku-kia-tsy ^Sz-fan-tai Kuan-tun to October
On
the
General Dembovski's Detachment, by its position behind the right wing of the 6th Siberian Army Corps
part
Schan-lan-tsy.
at
northern
of
sketchii.
Siau-su-kia-pu,
was securing the
right
flank
360
of the

Army.
were Facing the Japanese
1st Cavalry-
Brigade
Cossacks, probably from
General
Grekov's Detachment and from the 4th Don Cossack Division,^ who, in continuation of the advanced troops of the 6th Siberian Army Corps,
entrenched
position.^
At
in
Schan-lan-tsy
the
Western Detachment was
touch with General
Gerngross's Detachment, which was in occupation
of Putilov and Novgorod Hills.
East of Liian-
fan-tun, in the neighbourhood of rr-tau-kou,
was
the position of
the
4th
Siberian
Army
Corps,
which was rejoined by half the 3rd Siberian this latter had Infantry Division on October 26 moved to Lo-sien-tun and San-kia-tsy on October 14, forming part of Kuropatkin's General Reserve.^ The 1st Army Corps was to form
;
the reserve of the
Army,
in addition to
the 9th
East Siberian Rifle Division, standing as yet at Lo-sien-tun, but was rather scattered within the space Ta-san-pu * Huan-kia-tun ^ Liu-tsien-tun Lan-fan-tun. The 85th Infantry Regiment, with the battery attached to it from the 7th Artillery ^ Brigade, was still with the 10th Army Corps and the 146th Infantry Regiment, with one battery from the 43rd Artillery Brigade, was in the position held by the 4th Siberian Army Corps/
The 4th Don Cossack Division began to arrive in Mukden on October 20, being placed under the command of the 6th Siberian
'
Army
'
Corps.
Sketch 11 only indicates the general line of the position.

P. 292.
' * *
2 kilometres north-west of Huan-schan.
3 kilometres south of Huan-schan.

P. 321.
'
P. 138.

Corps
pu.^
361
Headquarters
was
billeted
in
Ta-san-
Mishtshenko's Detachment, including the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, seems to have gone forward to the Scha-ho, and to have taken up a position at Fn-kia-pu it was charged with keeping connection between the 4th Siberian Army Corps and Stackel berg's Detachment. The Eastern Detachment made some few more changes in the distribution of its forces. The
;
position north-west of Kan-to-li-san

1st
held by the
East Siberian Rifle Division being too extended for that force, two regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division ^ were handed over to it these had been making a
Brigade
5th
;
reconnaissance in force in a south-westerly direction,
without
by order of Stackelberg, but had returned having met the enemy. On General Sassulitsh' reporting, however, on October 19 that
'
detail, as
Army Corps on October 20 was, in the 22nd Infantry Division were standing in Lan-fan-tun, as reserve for General Gerngross's Detachment, Divisional
The
disposition of the 1st
follows
Of
Headquarters, the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, five batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, and one Sapper Company ; the 85th Infantry
Regiment and one battery were with the 10th Army Corps the 87th Infantry Regiment was stationed behind the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the road to Huan-schan. Of the ;J7th Infantry Division, the Staff, tlie 145th and 148th Infantry Regiments, as well as the
;
(less one battery) and one Sapper company, were at San-kia-tsy of the 147th Infantry Regiment, two battalions were at Sa-ho-tun, two being pushed to Liu-tsien-tun the 14(ith Infantry Regiment, with one battery, was with the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment and the 3rd Transbaikal Cossack Battery were in Ta-san-pu. The position of the 2nd Transbaikal Cossack Battery, as well as of the company missing from the Sapper battalion, cannot be traced. * The 1st and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments. * General Commanding the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.
43rd Artillery Brigade

;
362
the
forces at his disposal were insufficient for occupying the whole of the position at Kan-toli-san, hecause it had meanwhile been still further prolonged in a north-westerly direction to the neighbourhood of Liu-tschen-ku-tun, the 6th and 7th Siberian Infantry Regiments, from the 4th Siberian Army Corps/ were placed, a few days afterwards, under the orders of General Sassulitsh
as well.
East Siberian Rifle Division at first retained its position east of Kan-to-li-san but on October 24 it was moved, by Kuropatkin's orders,
1st
;
The
in
north-westerly
direction.
The
Division
marched
Huanin two nights by rr-tau-kou schan to Siau-tschan-rr-tun, 5 kilometres north of Putilov Hill, and to Tou-sien-tun.- The 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, of which only the 36th
East Siberian Rifle Regiment had shared in the attack on One Tree Hill, being still at Lo-sien-tun, the 1st Siberian Army Corps was again united towards the end of October.^ Corps Headquarters
billeted in Fu-kia-tun-kou.
The
position the 1st
East Siberian Rifle Division had abandoned was occupied by five battalions from the 6th and 7th Siberian Infantry Regiments. The 3rd Siberian Army Corps remained as it was before, forming an entrenched position on the
' They had been attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. (War Orgauisation Appendix I.) * The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment returned to its Division on October 27. * Tlie 1st and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments, which Stackelberg had placed under the orders of Sassulitsh on October 18, seem to have
joined in the march.

line
363
Fan-schn
Kau-tu-lin Pass.
regiments of this Corps are said
Three Infantry to have moved to
Yin-pan, 1*5 kilometres north-east of Kan-to-li-san, to form the reserve of the Eastern Detachment.
Corps Headquarters billeted in Schan-ha-lin-tsy, and General Baron Stackelberg, on October 20, in
Kan-to-li-san.
Kuropatkin's
schan.
Headquarters
was
in
Huan-
All along the front, the troops were actively engaged in consolidating their positions. By means of groups of fire-trenches, batteries, and fortified localities, entrenchments grew up, gradually attaining powerful defensive capabilities, through the great amount of labour spent on them. Putilov Hill was particularly strongly fortified. Some localities,
like Liu-tsien-tun
Sa-ho-tun,
in the section of the
1st
Army
Corps, were almost changed into small
by the clay walls of the farms and buildings being prepared for defence, by deep trenches being dug in front of them and connected with the localities by communicating trenches, and by surrounding the whole position with a thick belt of obstacles, like military pits, abattis, and
fortresses,
wire
entanglements.
The
fire-trenches,
being
generally well adapted to the ground, were mostly
narrow, and sunk into the ground almost 6 feet

deep.
fire
They were
often covered against Artillery
by roofs formed of doors, tops of tables, window-frames, or planks, which, again, were covered by straw mats on which earth was piled. In a similar way were also constructed the trenches for the gun-detachments.
364
Positions
Japanese
^'^^
After the futile attempts of recapturing Putilov HiH the offensive power of the Japanese was also
spent.
wti
Marshal Marquis
battle.
Oyama
had, moreover,
declared already on October 14 that he wished to
and 4th Armies had begun to entrench On October 16 the positions occupied by them. the 2nd Army began to entrench as well. The actual positions of the 1st Army immediately after the battle cannot be exactly traced. The 12th Division, with the 5th Kobi Brigade, was still in the country south of Bian-yu-pu-sa had constructed a very extensive position it stretching from the Schin-hai-lin Pass, west, some few kilometres beyond Schan-pin-tai-tsy. The Guards and the 2nd Division had evacuated the heights they had recently been occupying south of Fn-kia-pu and had somewhat retired the line now occupied by them probably extended from the end the
1st
The
therefore on that day already
country east of the Eastern San-jo-shi-san over the

Ba-ji-san to the Sen-san.
On
the
Sei-ko-san was the right of the

position ran
4th
en-
Army, whose
by Pu-tsau-wa to the
heights north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy.
The
trenchments were occupied by the 10th Division, with the exception of a small portion on the left, where Kobi troops were standing. The main body of the Kobi troops, probably under the uniform command of General Uchiyama,^ was quartered within the space Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy Hou- and Tschien-huan-hua-tien. The 5th Division, Marshal Marquis Oyama again retained at his own disposal,
'
Commandiug the
1st Field Artillery Brigade.

ordering
it
365
to
move
to Schi-li-ho.^
of the 4th
Army
was
in
Headquarters Ta-kou, north-west of

position
the San-kai-seki-san.
The
of the
2nd
Army
tsy
stretched from Hou-tai-Hn-tsy by Ku-kia-
Hou-tai
Hill
to
La-mu-tun Lin-schin-pu
Wan-tschuan-tsy.
Adjoining on its left were the outposts of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which extended by Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy to
Tschan-lin-pu
Han-schan-tai, thus making the position of the
2nd Army 25 kilometres long. It was probably owing to the futile attempts of recapturing Putilov
Hill that General Headquarters ordered the evacuation
of Scha-ho-pu, which could be permanently
enfiladed
from the
hill
named.
The
troops of
the
3rd
Division garrisoning Scha-ho-pu
with-
drew therefore to Hou-tai Hill during the night October 19-20. When, at noon on October 20, the abandonment of that village became known
General Slutshevski at once ordered the village to be re-occupied. The withdrawal of the Japanese was looked upon as a fresh
on the Russian
side,
sign of the demoralisation affecting the Japanese
Army. The Japanese,

available in the
too, took great pains in consoli-
dating their positions.
The
great
numerous
villages
amount of wood made it possible
to provide the trenches and Artillery positions with
the requisite structures, like casemates,

tion chambers,
struct extensive obstacles.
ammunihaving,
and overhead cover, and to con-
The Russians
as usual, constructed, mostly, several defensive lines
Instead of
it,
orders of the 1st
the Guard Kobi Brigade was again placed under the Army.
366
in
advance of each other, and the Japanese having
covered various sections of defence by fortified
advanced outpost positions, both adversaries were at some places lying opposite each other, within a stone's throw. The consequence was that both parties had a most trying time on outpost duty, especially at the beginning, when skirmishes were frequent, though ending mostly without any tangible result. Both opponents, moreover, tried to disturb each other from time to time in their entrenching operations by fire from heavy and light guns. But there was no longer any serious fighting the 1st Army alone had one more action of some importance to record. Because General Baron Kuroki felt it annoying for the Russians to be in occupation of the Waitau-schan, on the left bank of the Scha-ho, at such comparatively close distance opposite the position of his Army,^ he ordered General Umesawa, on October 26, to recapture that height. Covered by the Artillery fire of the
;
Guard
Division, the 1st Battalion of the 1st
Guard
Kobi Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 39th Kobi Regiment deployed, at 8 a.m. on October 27, in the valley of Tia-tun-nan-kou, and attacked the Wai-tau-schan, while the main body of the Guard Kobi Brigade was standing as reserve
in the valley Avest of that height.
The
attack of
the two Kobi Regiments,
made under
the eyes
of numerous representatives of foreign nations,
met
with an obstinate resistance on the part of the
Russian ga/rison.
It
was not
till
4 o'clock in the
p. 34;..
p. 355.
367
afternoon that the height was finally in the hands of the Japanese, who lost 12 officers and 190 men,
dead or wounded. The Russians, under the orders of Colonel Lipovaz-Popovitsh, had been obliged to fight unsupported by any Artillery the firing-lines, apart from the losses, were weakened by many of the men, without authority, insisting on helping to carry away the wounded. The losses were very considerable they are said to have been 426 men all the officers except two were wounded.
;
;
The
left
Russians, in their retreat on the main position,

;
about 30 dead behind in machine-guns fell into the hands A counter-attack, attempted by the night of October 28-29, and
addition,
both
of the victors.
the Russians in
preceded by a strong Artillery fire directed against the Wai-tauschan on October 28, failed. The Japanese remained in possession of the height, but did not
prevent
the
Russian outposts from establishing

left
themselves on the
bank of the Scha-ho, northeast of the Wai-tau-schan and Tsio-tso-schan. The fortified position was now advanced to the Wai-tau-schan, and occupied by the Guard Division. The Guard Kobi Brigade was withdrawn behind the front to Man-hua-pu Pa-kia-
tsy.
Both adversaries stood opposite each

inactive.
other, in
the positions indicated, for three months, mostly
The Russians awaited the
arrival of the rein-
forcements mobilising at home, and the Japanese the fall of Port Arthur, with the object if hurrying
368

Army
for
up the besieging
battle.
the
final
decisive
middle of January, 1905, Port Arthur, that Kuropatkin felt strong enough for renewing the offensive he hoped to beat the Japanese decisively before General Baron Nogi's Army could make its
It
was not
until the
after the surrender of
appearance on the
battlefield.
Total Losses from October

(a)
5 to 20
Russians
.
Dead
Wounded
Missing'
...
. .
187 Officers
854
4,964 Men. 31,002
,5,638 Officers
and Men.
Total
'
42,645 Officers and Men.

as dead.
Most of the missing may be counted
{)
Japanese
detail.
Reliable statements are wanting in
Total
loss,
roughly,
20,000
all told.
'ITie Japanese captured 46 guns, 1 machine-gun, 37 ammunition waggons, 5,474 rifles, and, in addition, entrenching tools, tents, and
clothing.
COMMENTS
After
the unfortunate battle of Liao-yan the
Russians.
Russian Army regained its freedom of action by an able retreat, and by completely disengaging itself from the enemy. There is no need for arguing the point that this advantage of the
situation,
after
reorganising and reinforcing the
left no other course open than to attack the enemy, who remained on the Tai-tsy-ho, apparently inactive and weakened. That not all the General Officers Commanding agreed with the good reasons the Commander-in-Chief urged in favour of attack showed already before the battle how little impressed the Russian Commanders were with offensive ideas. The open and noisy manner in which Kuropatkin pursued his preparations for the attack made, however, every one expect that he at least was thoroughly imbued with the firm will to act, and with the conviction of doing the right thing by what he had resolved. But, then, he
Army,
certainly forgot
the precaution
we must
practise
in war, of hiding
plans.
from the adversary one's own and ought not to, have been unknown to the Russians that they were surrounded by spies who secretly informed the enemy 369 24
It could not,
\
370
of
all that was worth knowing. The Russian unconcern was in strong contrast with the scrupulousness with which the Japanese used to guard the
secrets of their intentions.^
General Kuropatkin followed the principle derived from military history, that, in attack, a blow
directed on the flank or the rear of the
offers the
enemy
best chances
for
victory.
There was,
indeed, the possibility of gaining the flanks of the
Japanese, though not their rear.
From what was

outpost position
known
of
the Japanese,
their
stretched from San-de-pu on the
Hun-ho
to the
country east of Bian-yu-pu-sa
the main body was
behind the centre, and two Divisions were behind each of the two wings.- The left wing, it seemed,
was leaning on the Hun-ho, and the

without support.
fully enveloping the right wing.
right
was
it
This offered a chance of success-
But
It
it
against
could be raised weighty objections.

*
would be
is
The
carelessness in the handling of things which

is
absolutely
necessary to keep secret
a fault to be frequently noticed with the
Rusian9. In the " Memoirs from the Life of the Imperial Russian General of Infantry Carl Friedrich Graf von Toll," Bernhardi recounts the following incident " In 1812, a i&w weeks before the battle of Borodino, some papers were captured during a village fight in the quarters of the French General Sebastiani. Among them was an Order of the Day, in which Murat was informing General Sebastiani of the Russians being on the point of marching with all their forces on Rudnia, and requesting him to withdraw on the Infantry. On the Russian side they were astonished at finding the enemy so well informed, treason being suspected. But afterwards it was found out that an equerry of the Emperor had heard the Russian plan of attack being discussed in the open street among young officers of General Headquarters in Smolensk. He hastened to warn his mother, who was living in the country whereabout the operations were in progress, by a letter written in French and Murat being quartered in the house of the lady, the information
:
came as straight as * Appendix IX.
it
could be to the right man."
COMMENTS
necessary to
371
make
the envelopment in a
moun-
tainous country, of which there were only defective
maps or none at all, where the movement of troops would meet with many difficulties, where the display of Russian superiority might be hampered,
and
where
everything
favoured
the
defence.
Hitherto the Japanese had proved far superior to the Russians in the conduct of mountain warfare
it
was therefore to be expected that, when forced to retire, the Japanese would give way only inch by inch, defending in their retreat every new height and every fresh section of ground with the utmost obstinacy. The Russians could hope
for a really decisive result only if they succeeded in pushing the enemy from the railway line Charbin Port Arthur, which, for the Japanese, as well as
the Russians, was the all-important line of communication to the rear. But this was hardly possible by enveloping the enemy's right wing from the neighbourhood of Bian-yu-pu-sa and Pensi-hu to Liao-yan is a long distance, and it was not likely that the Japanese could be denied an orderly retreat along the railway line. These objections therefore point to an envelopment of the enemy's left wing. This would have been carried out in the plain, would have allowed a full use of superior forces, and would have severed the Japanese from the railway with greater certainty. The operations in the open country could have been veiled by 143 squadrons or sotnias. The support the Hun-ho gave to the enemy's left wing was only an imaginary one,^ and if it had been
for
'
Sketch
1.
372

bound to assume,
a support, as the Russians were
there would have been hardly any objection of
pushing enveloping troops to the western bank of the Hun-ho, and dividing the forces by this watercourse, the river here forming no material
obstacle.
We do not know what considerations decided Kuropatkin to envelop the Japanese right wing. Perhaps the fact finally settled the matter that this unsupported wing was already overlapped by the disposition of the Russian forces, which were There is no doubt extending far to the east. that success could have been achieved by the plan adopted, if only the enveloping attack had been conducted with circumspection and energy, after once the Russians had deprived themselves of the advantage of surprise. But they did not act with circumspection they rather acted with too much caution, energy being replaced by a hesitating mode of procedure, which has nothing in common with the sine qua non of success, nothing in common with the firm confidence in the performances of commanders and troops, and nothing in common with the imper;
turbable will to conquer.
The
attack
distribution
of the forces alone
for
the
makes it clear that Kuropatkin was more bent upon guarding himself against reverses than
securing success at
all cost.
Of
the eight
Army
Corps available on the spot, not less than three were retained by the Commander-in-Chief at his own disposal, one of these corps being used in securing the rear. Although these three Army
COMMENTS
373
Corps, as well as other detachments, with the exception of far-distant flank-guards, ultimately took a share in the battle, yet the numbers allotted
to the
main fighting groups, Western Detachments, were
viz.
the Eastern and
insufficient
from the
outset.
Especially for the Eastern Detachment,
which was meant to bring about the decision by its enveloping attack in the mountains, it was not It had to be reckoned possible to be too strong. with that the enemy would oppose a fresh front to the enveloping force, perhaps on the line Pen-si-hu Bian-yu-pu-sa that front it would have been necessary to pierce, or to turn on the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho if required, and it was then
necessary to carry the attack farther in the direction
on Liao-yan.
General Baron Stackelabout three Army Corps,^ berg disposed in which were obliged to extend over a space of 30 kilometres' length. The Western Detachment was to advance in front on both sides of the railway, with the object of engaging the enemy's main body and pinning it to the ground, while
his
difficult
For
task
all
farther in the east the decision
was maturing and
brought to an
the
The two Army Corps of Western Detachment were faced by the 2nd
issue.
and 4th Japanese Armies
in
superior strength,
necessitating very soon afterwards fresh forces to
be brought up to the Western Detachment for repelling the hostile attacks. By placing his
The .5th East Siberian Rifle Division and Rennenkampfs Detachment together were about the size of an Army Corps. In addition,
'
there was the Siberian Cossack Division.
374
General Reserve behind the centre of the whole battle-front, Kuropatkin had, from the outset, kept in view the contingency of having to close with it the gap existing already between the Eastern and Western Detachments at the beginning of the
movements, and increasing as operations proceeded. He thereby interpolated between the two main
fighting groups
another group,
commanded,
and, although of
never uniformly badly wanted in the

all.
front line, yet reluctantly used as reservê after
An
allotment
the
General
Reserve to the
Eastern and Western Detachments would have strengthened tliem for their task and made matters the Gth Siberian Army Corps would have clearer
;
General Reserve for the Army. The fighting power of an Army Corps is great enough
sufficed as
for the
Commander-in-Chief to ensure
that
influence to
his influence
on the course of the battle

desires
at the spot
felt.
where he
;
be
True, the 6th
Corps was not complete one remained behind at Tie-lin and Mukden, brigade had The Russians were to occupy the positions there. adhering to the principle of staking still far from for final decision everything, even the very last man. But the mistake in the allotment of the forces might have been made good during the battle, if only the attack had been carried through with It was then the Commanderthe utmost energy. in-Chief himself who, by his directive for the advance,^ paralysed the undoubted longing of his soldiers for closing with the enemy. The object
Siberian
'
Army
Appendix IX.
COMMENTS
of the advance was
the defeat of
375
the
enemy
but he gave
it
as the task of his
Array
" to take
possession of the right
bank of the Tai-tsy-ho first." The Western Detachment ought to have attacked the enemy in front, the same as Prince Friedrich Karl's Army did attack the Austrian front on the Bistritz on July 3 of 1866. But in the task assigned to the Western Detachment there was no mention made of attack merely a slow advance from position to position by short marches was prescribed to it, which did not bring it in touch with the enemy, even after a two days' march. For the Eastern Detachment it was a question
;
of bringing rapidly against the enemy's right flank

as strong a force as possible, the remainder,
mean-
wing in front was charged with attacking the enemy in front and on the right flank, but the start necessary in the difficult mountainous country to be traversed by it was denied to the detachment. The points to be reached by it were on the same level as those of the Western Detachment, far away from the enemy's front, and farther still from his right flank. It was first to capture the Japanese
while, gripping the Japanese right
true,
it
position projecting north at Bian-yu-pu-sa, in front
of which the whole of the Eastern Detachment
Against the right flank of the Japanese was sent, alone, across the Tai-tsy-ho, on the line Mi-tsy Siao-syr, llennenkampfs Detachment, less than a division strong, and far too weak in comparison with the forces engaged in
therefore stopped.
front.
It
was
certainly justifiable in itself
when General
376
Kuropatkin prescribed certain objects to be reached by his troops before they were in touch with the enemy, so as to harmonise their advance but it was out of place to give this first move against the enemy the impress of an over-cautious, nay almost
;
timid, operation.
Where
did
come
in
the
self-
consciousness, the assurance, and the eagerness to
accomplish great feats, with which the commander of an army proceeding to attack must be ani-
Commanderin-Chief was, his subordinate commanders were not less so, especially the Commander of the
mated? Cautious and reserved
as the
who had
October
Eastern Detachment, General Baron Stackelberg, dissuaded General Kuropatkin from
On and had advised him to wait.^ when, with greater expedition of the 7, advance, the attack of the Western, as well as of the Eastern, Detachment could have commenced, Stackelberg probably by superior orders interposed a day of rest not justified by anyattacking,
thing
he therefore did not attack the enemy's position at Bian-yu-pu-sa, but rather allowed the enemy to escape thence, and even on October 8 advanced only by quite short marches, without
;
To prepare the envelopreaching the enemy. he sent ahead, in a southerly direction, a ment,
Division, which
Detachment. had much of
Yet even the

its
was approaching Rennenkampfs idea of envelopment wings already clipped. Rennen-
kampf 's
line
original direction of advance towards the
Mi-tsy
Siao-syr
into the enemy's rear
would have almost led him on the southern bank of the

>
p. 14.
; ;
COMMENTS
Tai-tsy-ho.
377
;
seemed too bold he was recalled to San-kia tsy, on the northern bank here he was certainly still on the flank, but the portions of the Eastern Detachment next to him he pushed towards the enemy's front, causing him
But
this
afterwards to execute the decisive flank attack,
by himself alone. The Western Detachment made as little progress on October 7 and 8 as the Eastern Detachment. Here it was an exaggerated report of very strong hostile forces being at Yen-tai which destroyed every trace of offensive spirit that was still alive, replacing it by the idea that all that was wanted was repelling the superior attack of
chiefly
the Japanese in the three positions prepared behind
each other
here the appreciation of the situation, afterwards adopted by Kuropatkin, too, asserted itself, that there was no need for the Western
;
Detachment
to
attack
at
all
until
the Eastern
Detachment's decisive operations had become effective. By this they failed to recognise the principle that pinning the enemy to his ground in front is the first condition for successfully enveloping one or It is true, it was not till the other of his flanks. October 13, after they had become certain of being superior to the Western Detachment, that the Japanese dispatched a portion of their western wing (5th Division) in support of their 1st Army but it was not permissible for the Russians to count upon the enemy acting in this manner. It was to be presumed that the Japanese would endeavour
;
to transfer forces as strong as possible in support
of
their
more
seriously
threatened
right
wing
378

it
accordingly,
was
its
the
duty of the
itself as
it
Western
forces
Detachment
as possible
to attract
upon
If
many
by
attack.
suffered a reverse,
there were sufficient reser\'es available to support

it
in the entrenched positions.
When, on October
Detachment began
to
9,
the
Russian
still
Eastern
possible.
to attack in earnest, contrary
Kuropatkin's wish, success was

right
which the envelopment was directed, was extremely weak. Between the Tai-tsy-ho at Pen-si-hu and the Tumen-tsy-lin Pass about seven Japanese battahons, with one battery,^ were standing, on a front more than 20 kilometres long, in a mountainous position undoubtedly rather strong the short flank east of Pen-si-hu, refused towards the south, was defended by but three companies. originally Stackelberg could not know that the enemy was so weak but, in spite of this ignorance, it would have been advisable to give the attacking troops more distant objects than was done on October 9. " If we wish to attack, we must do so with determination. Half-measures are out of place vigour and confidence alone carry the troops away and assure success."^ The day had no results to show only on the enemy's right flank some small progress was made by Rennenkampfs Detachment, whose attack did not agree with StackelThis should have been a hint berg's intentions.
wing,
against
;
The Japanese
Six battalions of the Guard Kobi Brigade, three companies of Lines-of-Commimication troops, one Pioneer company, and one battery, ^ From "Instructions to Superior Commanders" ("Verordnungen fr die hheren Truppenfhrer "), of June 24, 1869.
'
COMMENTS
379
where the strongest lever was to be applied next day. Kuropatkin, too, recommended, on October 9,
in the evening,
left
an enveloping movement with the
wing along the Tai-tsy-ho. But Stackelberg, becoming doubtful, owing to the strong positions of the enemy and the repeated reminder of the Commander-in-Chief to be cautious, did not continue the attack on October 10, thus taking the
fatal
step
leading
to
failure.
The advantages
gained were lost again on October 10; the Japanese
found time to reinforce their right wing by one Division. Their position was therefore a little improved when Stackelberg carried out the attack on October 11. It was in accordance with Russian custom, when he retained a very strong reserve more than a Division behind the centre of the Eastern Detachment but it cannot be approved that he did not stake it even in the afternoon, when he ordered his troops, which had been fighting hitherto without
success, to deliver the final desperate blow.
A re-
is never provided for its own sake, but must be engaged to the last man when the struggle for If on October 11 the 5th the mastery demands it. East Siberian Rifle Division, in touch with Rennenkampf's Detachment, had attacked on the southern
serve
bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, thus completing the envelopment of the Japanese right wing, the Eastern Detachment would probably have been the victor, and the Russians, pushing by Pensi-hu on Liao-yan, would have seriously menaced Yet it might have the Japanese fighting in front.
been possible to pierce even the front
of
the
380
Japanese right wing, if the Division had been employed more promptly and judiciously, for the defenders were still far inferior to the assailants, and near the end of their resources, with the
positions quite thinly occupied.
October 1 1 thus became a failure of the Eastern Detachment, and, worse, the fundamental idea of the Russian operations, to decide the battle by
the enveloping attack of Stackelberg's troops, was
wrecked.
flank,
On
the evening of October 11, Stackel-
berg found himself being threatened on his right
owing to the 4th Siberian
Army
fall
Corps,
adjoining on his right, intending to

little
back a
during the night before the Japanese Guard
Division.
His resolve to discontinue the attack
now
altogether can hardly be justified.
He knew
the Commander-in-Chief had reserves available
he could therefore ask him to look after the safety he himself ought to have tried with every possible means to accomplish on October 12 the task he had failed to solve on October 11. But having once thwarted the Commander-in-Chief's plan, he should in no case have left him in ignorance of it for such a long time as he afterwards did. The excessive for the flanks was, moreover, peculiar to anxiety
of the Eastern Detachment's right flank
;
most of the Russian commanders Rennenkampf, Liuba\dn, and Samsonov, too, succumbed to it in the actions east of Pen-si-hu. Nothing can more illustrate this anxiety than the employment of Stackelberg's reserve, which, on October 11 or 12, might have decided the day on the left wing by enveloping the enemy's right wing, but on
;
COMMENTS
381
October 12 was standing as a flank-protection behind his own right wing, where never a flank
attack was
made by Japanese
forces really
worth
mentioning.
The Eastern Detachment having once given up

the attack, the Russians were then actually fight-
The Western Detachment had allowed itself to be forced on the defensive from the outset, it is true but this did not prevent the offensive being resumed at the proper moment. At first the Japanese left wing proved superior to the Western Detachment but when, by October 11, the 1st (European) and the 4th Siberian Army Corps had marched into line with it on the east, and the 6th Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment had been placed
ing merely to ensure their retreat.
;
in readiness
at
least
equal,
behind its right wing, the forces were and the troops retained on the
offered
left
tlie means of attacking and wing of the Japanese engaged enveloping the opposite the front of the Western Detachment and of the Centre. But in spite of this equality in numbers, the Japanese had already gained a moral superiority on October 11. The tentative and hesitating advance of the Western Detach-
right
wing
ment,
the
construction
of
several
entrenched
positions behind each other (although the talk
was
previously of attack), and a series of small successes
by the enemy against the Russian advanced detachments on October 10 all this served to depress officers and men. To this must be added the fatal view that the Eastern Detachment alone was In this way, on to carry out the main task.
382
October 11, and on the days following, it was omitted to strike a great blow and regain again the initiative. Especially remarkable is the constant omission
of recognising the
possibility of
enveloping
the
Japanese
left
wing.
Neither
em
Kuropatkin, nor Bilderling, commanding the WestDetachment, ever gave the slightest thought
Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment with that view. Nothing could be hoped from the initiative of the General Commanding the Gth Siberian Army Corps after Kuropatkin, during the night of October 9-10, had certainly given him permission to support the Western Detachment, but with the additional remark, " Remember that you are forming my strategic reserve " With this remark all idea for bold and decisive action was nipped in the bud. All that Kuropatkin did from October 11 for conducting the battle on the western wing were small and indifferent measures adapted to meet momentary tactical wants. On October 11 he ordered the Western Detachment to recapture Nothing came the positions lost on October 10. of it but the Japanese on that day successfully advanced against the front of the Centre and On October 12 of the Western Detachment. withdraw the advanced guards of he decided to the 10th and 17th Army Corps in the main
to employing the 6th Siberian
!
but it was already too late for that. The advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps was enveloped on the Scha-ho by the Japanese 2nd
positions
;
Army,
the whole corps being pushed behind the

;
Scha-ho
the 10th
Army
Corps was of necessity
COMMENTS
forced
to
join
in
this
383
retrograde
movement.
The envelopment was made

march
distant
scarcely half a day's
from the main bodies of the 6th Corps and of Dembovski's Detachment, who remained inactive. How was it possible that the Commander-in-Chief did not make use of these reserves to prevent the Western
Siberian
Army
Detachment
plained, but
being defeated
It
may
be
ex-
not
excused, by the unsatisfactory
Centre on October 12, which drew his attention entirely away from The Japanese 1st Guard Brigade the right wing. had pushed between the Centre and Eastern
state of affairs with the Russian
Detachment
as far as the Ba-ji-san
it
must be
conceded that such a penetration, although mostly highly dangerous to the penetrating troops themselves, is certainly apt to
cause the leader of the

It
is
affected party great anxiety.
intelligible that
Kuropatkin should have turned his attention thither and looked for fresh forces to meet the danger but for the means of warding off in the Centre the danger he was looking in the wrong direction. Of his former General Reserve he had still directly available the 22nd Division of the 1st Army Corps at Tun-san-ho. That he did not engage it, was on all fours with the reluctance of the Russian Commanders generally to engage he in case of urgent need even the last man
;
therefore preferred asking for the reserve of the
Eastern Detachment, from a portion of his Army, therefore, which at his bidding was fighting the He thought, really decisive action of the battle. of course, that all was going well with the Eastern
384
Detachment, but he knew that it was still in action, and he had no report of its having defeated the enemy's right wing, One almost feels inclined to think that at that time already he no longer seriously believed in a victory of his Army, and that the order for the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division to come up was a makeshift, inspired by the wish of preventing a defeat above all
things.
Strange
patkin and
is
the correspondence between KuroStackelberg,
who
refused the
Com-
reserve, but at the same time hid from him the hopeless situation of the Ultimately, portions of Eastern Detachment.
mander-in-Chief the
22nd Di\dsion were,

In
all
after
all,
placed at the dis-
posal of the threatened 4th Siberian

this, there
is
Army
Corps.
nothing
indicating
energy
in-
and mastery of the
situation,
nothing of that
timate co-operation between Commander-in-Chief and subordinate commanders so essential for the Why were not the Japanese welfare of the whole. who had penetrated, attacked and pushed back, or annihilated, by all the Russians troops available in the neighbourhood ? On October 11 the Russian Army, thanks to its superiority in numbers, could have obtained a victory by enveloping both wings of the Japanese on October 12 the conditions were not at all
;
unfavourable to a degree as to prevent the situation taking a favourable turn by staking and
uniformly employing every unit available October 13 defeat was an accomplished

the
on
fact,
Eastern
Detachment
was
retreating,
the
COMMENTS
385
Centre in danger of being enveloped, and the
That Western Detachment severely pressed. the Centre was still able to escape from its dangerous position was due to the weakness of the Japanese, who had not troops enough for achieving here a great success. And it was just at this period that the Russian Commander-in-Chief conceives the astonishing idea of
sive.
Did he
really
hope
assuming the offento make good his
omissions, or did he wish to
make
sure of being
?
having tried his utmost Eastern Detachment he had done the

vindicated for
;
With now the
Western Detachment and a newly formed reserve were to be the bearers of a belated victory. Meanwhile the Western Detachment was obliged to
give up, with heavy
loss,
the whole of the southern
bank of the Scha-ho; general exhaustion increased; nobody shut his eyes to the fact that the severely tried troops would need first some considerable
they were able to strike another blow. And, therefore, the offensive idea met with no response during the last days of the battle, but
rest before
faded aAvay more and more, until only the capture of Putilov and Novgorod Hills, during the night
of
October
16-17,
ultimately
itself,
behind.
was all the trace it Although unimportant
left
in
and made by superior numbers, this capture was at least some performance, the only one during the whole of the battle of lasting success.
The two
hills,
as well as a short stretch of country
north-east of the Wai-tau-schan, were maintained after the rest of the Russian Army had crossed
over to the northern bank of the Scha-ho.

'25
The
386
THE RUSSO-JArAXESE WAR
ground the Russians were holding on the southern Scha-ho bank could not alter the fact that the Russian arms had suffered a severe and costly defeat. The battle was lost because the deliberate attack was made in a half-hearted manner and with too many in reserve, and because it was prematurely abandoned after some few failures. The chief blame must therefore be attached to General Headquarters, which is responsible also for the frictions and evils revealed in the inner working The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. acted judiciously when he formed armies in the shape of the Eastern and AA''estern Detachments for the number of army corps had increased to such an extent as to render guidance from one was rather bad that the It place difficult. Commanders of the Eastern and AVestern Detachments did not take over their commands before the forward movement began, having thus no time to accustom themselves and their troops to the new order of things but it was worse when the Commander-in-Chief himself broke the chain of responsibility he had forged, by sending over the
insignificant portions of
;
heads of the
to the Generals
Army Commanders orders direct Commanding Army Corps, and
occasionally even to their Chiefs of the Staff.
the Western Detachment, in whose neighbourhood the Commander-in-Chief was conthis,
From
had especially to suffer while the Eastern Detachment was a little more removed from him. This habit originated with him from
stantly staying,
;
a strongly developed desire of advising his subordi-
COMMENTS
nate commanders, and of disposing,
387
if possible,
of every single unit himself Admirable is the amount of work the Commander-in-Chief managed to get
through, he even finding time to write long letters and orders during the battle, and to arrange for many details forming no part of a Commanderin-Chief's office. He thought he was guiding the battle, yet his reins were dragging along the ground. Communication between him and his subordinate leaders was bad it is almost inconceivable that the transmission of letters and messages from the Commander-in-Chief to the Army Commanders and vice versa took hours and hours, and this not only with the Eastern Detachment, but also with the Western Detachment, standing much closer to him. The telegraph seems to have been used in a most perfunctory manner. Under these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief was not always
;
sufficiently
battle
mony
informed about the progress of the he frequently assumed things more in harwith his wishes than with the hard facts,
desire
and, in his
of directing everything, often
enough adopted measures not suiting the occasion, and which had to be adjourned, changed, or withdrawn, or were not carried out by the subordinate leaders at all. It was his own fault if his will was not enforced everywhere though we cannot deny that little support was rendered him by many of
;
his subordinate leaders.
Conspicuous as was the want of precise and firm command, the disadvantage of mixing units which in part had existed already before the battle was
no
less
of
nn
evil.
complete
division
was
388
broken up and distributed among other units some bodies of troops were not with the unit
they originally belonged to, but were forming detachments newly organised. This process of breaking up the established war organisation continued during the battle. Higher points of view had never a share in deciding such a quesspecial
tion
merely
;
the demands of the
moment were
consulted
the
Commander-in-Chief's mania for
constantly forming fresh reser\es had something

it too. Thus brigades, regiments, and were shifted from corps to corps, and from division to division new units were created the commanders were robbed of their troops, and these were placed under leaders unknown to them. It was due to this practice that the .Japanese succeeded in penetrating at Scha-ho-pu on October 14 in their fight with the 10th Army Corps, which found itself deprived of two brigades, getting them back only after some difficulty, and then too At the conclusion of the battle the powers late. command with Kuropatkin's newly formed reof serve were perfectly undefined. ^Ve need only recall to mind from what a chaos of orders the attack on the Novgorod and Putilov Hills originated, where troops of four different army corps But the Russian commanders were engaged. were so much used to the arbitrary manner in which their troops were employed, that Stackelberg was the only one who, for a time, refused to be
to do with battalions
deprived of his reserve. In the face of the defects of

military
organisation
it
is
the
an injudicious Russian soldier
COMMENTS
alone
389
who
deserves
high
praise.
The same
as
the Japanese, the Russians captured \dUages and

heights, defeated attacks after fighting hard, stood
their
ground
in hopeless situations,
finite fatigues and privations. on both sides the performances decisive for the issue, a tremendous balance for the Japanese will, after all, be the result. They had the advantage of a better field-training, of better command, and of a more judicious employment of their forces. They knew what they were fighting for whereas, on the Russian side, the war had no place in the
;
and bore inBut, if we add up
heart of the people.
Liao-yan the Japanese did not pursue the Russians, the former were perfectly aware of the disadvantage of having, at
after the battle of
When
Japanese,
no
distant
date, to
repeat the struggle for the
decisive issue of the war.
They might have gained much by a pursuit, no doubt. The retiring masses of the Russians were thronging together on few roads, made almost
impassable by the heavy be anticipated that the
rains,
retreat
and it was to would suffer
dangerous delay at the Hun-ho bridges, south of JMukden, as really proved to be the case.
It would havê been easy, therefore, to close with the retreating enemy. If, for all that, the Japanese did not continue beyond the battlefield,
there
their
must have been weighty reasons preventing doing so and tying them to the Tai-tsy-ho,
they were in all they did. And so it was indeed. Exhaustion of man and beast was so great after the battle as to make it quite hopelogical as
390
less to

exact anything from the troops in the
way
of
rapid
marching.
little
INJoreover,
the
ammunition
it
was almost
there being
spent, especially that of the Artillery,
prospect of replenishing
soon.
losses
There was also want of provisions, and the much exceeded those of the enemy.
One may
certainly urge against
this that the
Russians, after the same battle, proved still fit to march, and that the feeling alone of being pursued, even without great quantities of ammunition, would have accelerated disorganisation. However
much value we may therefore attach to the reasons preventing the Japanese from following up their
victory at once,
war
it
by the fundamental principles of must be considered a neglect of having not

attempted to pursue.
at least
But the Russians once having been permitted to withdraw without molestation, it was certainly
wise of the Japanese after a short respite and hasty reorganisation,
not to
6,
have followed the

disappeared with the
enemy, who, on September
bulk of his force behind the Hun-ho. It was then no longer possible to strike terror into his ranks it was known that the Russians were falling back on their resources, and it was necessary
;
to bear in
mind the possibility of having to fight another battle, which could not be fought without sufficient ammunition. It was a characteristic
feature of the Japanese conduct of
war never to venture upon anything adventurous, and always to avoid reverses and failures. The Japanese resources were not as inexhaustible as those of the
Russians
bringing up reinforcements and supplies
COMMENTS
391
was not safe, as long as complete command of the The si7ie qua non for sea was not yet assured. continuing the campaign were a thorough rehabilitation of the forces and of the materiel, and the bringing up of reinforcements. The latter was
being expected that the Russians would be reinforced too, but it extended the pause
very important,
it
in the operations
it
more than was
desired.
At
first
was probably hoped that the fall of Port Arthur would set free the besieging Army it was only after this hope had disappeared that the 8th Division was called up from home. It arrived too late the Japanese had to meet the unexpected attack of
;
the Russians certainly well furnished with materiel

of every kind, but inferior in numbers by about
40,000 men.
The
attack of the Russians
came
as a surprise
indeed, not in the sense of the Japanese
having
had no timely warning of

selves took
;
it
the Russians them-
care of that but it was scarcely expected that the enemy would recover so soon after his defeat at Liao-yan. There was the danger of the Russians retaining the initiative if the Japanese
did not act promptly.
not, even for a single
Oyama's Headquarters were moment, in doubt that the Russian attack must be met by a counter-attack. But on October 7 it was at first decided to let the enemy, who, in the plain, had already approached
to within about 10 kilometres, and, in the
tains at Bian-yu-pu-sa,
moun-
was
still
closer to
Umesawa's
Brigade, run up against the prepared positions, and
then to issue from them for counter-attack. plan was therefore adopted frequently recom-
392
mended by Field-Marshal Count von JNloltke.^ As late as 1874, when criticising a tactical problem,
he expressed the view that the improvement in firearms was to the advantage of the defensive, and that it would be much better to assume
the offensive after several attacks of the
enemy
had been repulsed, than to attack, oneself, the enemy at great sacrifice.^ Undoubtedly the Field-lSIarshal was perfectly aware of the fact
that he
his
who
acts in this
opponent, up to the
of
action
way leaves, moment of
of course, to
the countergreater free-
attack, certain advantages
namely,
time
dom
and
gaining
side,
advantages
many
dis-
which, for the other

advantages.
mean
so
JMoltke, in his campaigns,
had never
to deal with these disadvantages, but always
man-
aged to retain the initiative from the outset, which is proof that he never sought salvation in principles, but always acted as suited the occasion. Oyama
was acting
in a
similar
way when
come
the expected
off.
attack of the Russians did not
Perhaps the defensive plan was merely adopted to allow the Armies time for properly arranging their forces, and to wait for more information, giving a clearer view of the situation. But on October 8 the situation was already clear enough to leave no doubt, either in Oyama's or Kuroki's mind, that the right wing of the 1st Army was most seriously threatened by an enveloping
Von Moltke,
''Taktisch-strategische Aufstze" ("Tactical and

xii.
Strategical Essays "), Preface, p.

*
" Moltke's Tactical Problems," Solution of Problem 60, (Hugh Rees, Ltd., 119, Pall Mall, Loudon, S.W.)
p.
105.
COMMENTS
attack of
393
the Russians. It is astonishing that only the Guard Kobi Brigade, which had retired from Bian-yu-pu-sa, and three companies of
Lines-of-Communication troops were employed, without any reserve, for holding the extensive posiIf the Russians had attacked tions at Pen-si-hu. them there on October 9 with stronger forces, making better use of the chances offered to an envelopment, Umesawa could not have avoided
was only due to the mistakes committed by the Russians that the Japanese were able to reinforce in time their right wing by one Division (the 12th) before the attacks were renewed. Even then the total of all the forces engaged there was far too small it almost looks as if the danger so imminent was not recognised.
defeat. It
;
9, Japanese General had obtained an idea of the distribuHeadquarters tion of the enemy's forces pretty well corresponding with what it actually was, being at the same time certain that the Russian advance, which had led to a serious encounter on the extreme right wing only, was hanging fire. The moment, therefore, was propitious for anticipating the enemy by the counter-attack that had been planned already. Oyama's first attack orders of October 9, at 10 o'clock in the evening, combined with the later directives he issued, up to October 11 inclusive, make it clear that he did not mean to push the Russians back in the direction they had come from, but to cut them off from Mukden and Tie-lin. This was to be attained by the Army during its advance and in the combats (for the advance was
Until the evening of October
394

to
fighting)
bound to lead at once
executing a
right wheel, with the 1st
Army, which, however,
was to advance on its own part too, acting as pivot. The right wing of the 1st Army was given an objective for attack close at hand to its left wing and to the 4th and 2nd Armies were prescribed more distant objectives. The 1st Army was to wait with its attack until the 4th Army had gained ground for some distance the 2nd Army was to advance more rapidly with its left wing, and inake a wide enveloping movement, but to keep strong
;
;
forces ready behind its right wing.
No
exception can be taken in these arrangements
against the resolution,
proving self-reliance and
boldness, to advance for attack with inferior

bers.
num-
But
it
must have been questionable, from

still
the outset, whether the battle could

into a decisive victory
his line of
this
be turned
by pushing the enemy from
communication.
The
plan of attaining
a situation
it
;
by a
right wheel found the
Army in
where, close in front of the enemy,

longer master of
its
was no
own movements
the enor-
mous
close
were pretty well running parallel and Pushing the enemy away from his line of communication is, as a rule, the consequence of a blow directed against one or the other of his flanks, such a blow being necessarily But it was now initiated by forming up in depth. too late for shifting considerable forces towards the right flank of the Russians nor was the Japanese Army strong enough for that. An effort was therefore made to obtain the decisive effect by prescribing to the left wing an enveloping movefronts
to
each other.
COMMENTS
395
ment, in addition to the wheel, with the hope,

probably, of outflanking the Russians west of the
Scha-ho.
But absolutely opposed
to this
was the
further arrangement of keeping strong forces ready
behind the riglit wing of the 2nd Army. The one prevented the other for the envelopment that
;
was planned, these

left
forces were needed behind the General Kodama, Chief of the General Staff at Japanese General Headquarters, after-' wards explained this by saying that it was hoped to pierce the Russian front at Pan-kiau-pu on the Mandarin Road that it was then intended, with the forces retained by the 2nd Army, either to act
wing.
against the
left
flank of the enemy's group, as-
sumed
right
on the INlandarin Road, or against the of the group at Fon-kia-pu. Two things were therefore in preparation namely, a wheel with envelopment, and penetration. We have to prove still, by the progress of the battle, that the Japanese Army could not execute a wheel in the battle It is true that, during the later days of the battle, the centre was in advance of the right wing, and the left wing in advance of But that was only the result of an the centre. advance in echelon, which took a different shape with the individual Armies, according to the amount of opposition offered by the enemy, and to the progress they themselves were making. If a right wheel had really been executed, the left wing of the 2nd Army must have ultimately crossed the
to be
flank
JNIandarin
Road
;
in a north-easterly direction south

it
of
but Mandarin Road.
Mukden
remained always west of the There were envelopments and
39(?
penetrations, but not in the sense of great operations deciding a battle.
The Russians were pushed back rather in a straight Hne on their starting-points. The means, therefore, the Japanese were trying
to
make
use of for increasing as
much
as possible
the defeat of the Russians did not assert themselves.
This
was
natural
consequence
of
the late resolve to attack, and of the Russian
numbers, but would have failed perhaps, even under more favourable circumstances, owing to the arrangements as they were made. It is always a delicate thing to pursue two objects
superior
concurrently in a battle.
of the Russian right wing
The
;
leading idea was
that of a wheel, with a simultaneous envelopment

this alone,
the
side
issue
of
penetrating,
ought
and not to have

A^'ith
decided the employment of the forces
the
2nd Army. In a manner similar to Oyama, Napoleon had tried, in the battle of Wagram on July 6, 1809, at one and the same time to envelop the right wing of the Austrians at JNIarkgrafneusiedl, and to penetrate their centre at Siissenbrunn he succeeded only in the envelopment. But on the Scha-ho it would have been impossible to execute the envelopment as well, even if the troops in reserve had been echeloned behind the left wing for the Russians were holding back
;
very
strong
forces
behind
their
right
wing.
the Japanese left wing itself was even now being threatened by an envelopment. That it did not come about in the course of the battle is not the merit of the Japanese, but a consequence of the want of
all reserves,
Denuded of
COMMENTS
activity
897
on the part of the Russians, who failed to recognise the advantage of their situation. The menace to both the Japanese wings clearly shows that they were fighting with a minority
remarkable that Oyama, on October 9, in the evening, demanded also of the extreme right wing, opposite which he assumed
against a majority.
It
is
two Russian Army Corps to be, to make a move He probably forward, though but a short one. had not been aware yet of the severe combats at Kuroki, commanding Pen-si-hu on October 9. the 1st Army, rectified the Commander-in-Chiefs order by imposing some restraint upon the 12th Division, which had meanwhile reinforced Umesawa's Detachment, by not permitting it to go beyond the position hitherto defended, until the enemy was beaten off. But for the rest he left this, the most threatened portion of the Japanese
battle-order, all to
itself.
his troops
by him in the firmness of was fully justified by General Ino-uye repelling on October 11 with his weak forces the furious assaults of far superior numbers of the
trust reposed
The
Russians.
The
heroes fighting almost to the last
man
and on tlie steep edges of tlie valley east of the town were for at no other the real victors of the battle point of the battlefield were the Russians so near victory as here. It was highly fortunate for the Japanese that their enemy did not use sufficient force on October 11 for completing the envelopment on the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. But ought we to allow Kuroki to count upon such
at the passes north of Pen-si-hu
;
398
good luck ? Or had he good reasons for hoping Prince Kan-in to be in time with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to ensure the safety of the extreme right wing? The Prince arrived only on October 12, and, even granted that the Japanese had no
occasion
for
estimating
fact
very
highly
the
per-
formances of the Russians in the attack, yet there
what was exacted from was too much to be comIno-uye's small force patible with the situation, the superior numbers of the Russians, and the want of reserves. But the extreme right wing was without doubt
remains
the
that
intentionally kept as
weak
as possible.
The
special
significance of General
fight lies in the fact
Baron Ino-uye's desperate that, with his Division and
General Umesawa's seven battalions, he riveted the attention of almost three Russian Army Corps. This alone permitted the Japanese to employ on
sufficient forces to feel
the other portions of their extensive battle-front on equal terms with the
Russians.
In this
way they were
able
on Octo-
ber 11 to carry out with some chance of success the
mass of the enemy Russian Eastern Detachment was assaulting the extreme right wing. At the end of the day it almost seemed as if the intended right wheel of the Army was really preparing. The 4th Army, in the centre, had actually effected a kind of right wheel towards Tan-hai-schi, as ordered for October 11 the 2nd Army had sufficiently far advanced northwards to cover the left wing of the 4th Army, overlapping, as it seemed, the extreme right wing
deliberate attack against the
standing fast in
its
positions, while the
COMMENTS
399
At that time the Japanese of the Russians. were probably not yet accurately informed about the presence of the 6th Siberian Army Corps and of Dembovski's Detachment. It is therefore
intelligible that
Oyama
should
idea of a right wheel
when
adhere to the arranging for the constill

;
tinuation of the attack on October 12
only the
extreme right wing, after the experiences of October 11, was directed to continue in its position. On October 12 the 2nd Army, on whose rapid advance all depended, certainly gained a splendid victory over the Russian Western Detachment, which was pushed into its last prepared positions on the Scha-ho but just that day proved the
;
impossibility
of
carrying
out the wheel.
envelopment, to which the affected only a portion of the Russian right wing, and did not prevent the Western Detachment from retiring in the direction from which it had come but at the same time the 6th Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachvictory,
;
The 2nd Army owed its
ment made their presence felt between the Hunho and the Scha-ho. The 2nd Army thus found itself opposite an overlapping Russian front which it was impossible either to envelop or to push from its line of communication. This obliged
also
the
4th
Army
to
continue
the
attack
frontally in a northerly direction
the wheel already initiated, as
it
and to give up would otherwise
have been endangering its left wing. Japanese General Headquarters did not hesitate to adapt themselves to the altered conditions. The
objective of attack assigned to the three
Armies

400
for

October
13,
Tai-kou
Tun-kia-fn to the 1st
Army,
4th,
Iû-sun-tun
and
Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy to the Scha-ho-pu Lin-schin-pu to the 2nd,
prove that the intention of pushing the enemy from JNlukden and Tie-hn had been given up. On the other hand, these objectives, by the additional
paragraph that the enemy was no longer to be attacked on the northern bank of the Scha-ho, should he be standing there in entrenched positions,
make
it
clear that
Oyama
did not intend to carry
the attack and pursuit beyond the Scha-ho.

reasons for
it
The
there
are intelligible.
Oyama saw
his
was, anyhow, no longer any chance of defeating
the
enemy decisively, and that who had been fighting already
own
troops,
since October 9,
would
be exhausting their strength in trying combats without achieving more than a retreat But it was likely that this retreat of the Russians. would come to an end at the latest on the Hun-ho, or perhaps already on the northern bank of the Scha-ho, where it was thought the Russians had In that case the some more troops in reserve. Japanese, immediately after the recent fights, would have to face another struggle for a strong It seemed imperative to let them first position. recover their breath and gather fresh strength for a
decisive battle afterwards.
Oyama
thought, as the
victor in the present struggle, he had it in his hand to make an end to the battle on the Scha-ho. It was surely no easy matter for Japanese
General Headquarters to arrive at this decision. It meant postponing once more the struggle for the It would be a mistake to look issue of the war.
COMMENTS
401
It is better to upon this as want of energy. abandon a hopeless operation, and to construct a new basis upon which to act afresh, than to waste
the strength of the fighting force in endeavouring Yet it to attain an object that cannot be reached.
cannot be done with disregard to the enemy of this the Japanese were to become aware as yet. But Oyama did not wish to let the Russians escape across the Scha-ho without inflicting on them With the 3rd Brigade of at least some damage.
;
the 2nd Division, which Kuroki, on October 12,
had moved from the left wing of the 1st Army to its right wing, he intended to separate and cut off" from the Centre those portions of the Russian Eastern Detachment which were still lying opposite General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment. They were actually separated already on the morning of October 13, the 4th Siberian Army Corps having, on October 12, retired more than Stackelberg's troops the 1st Guard Brigade, indeed, had already penetrated into tlie gap by occupying the Bai-ji-san. The operation, by itself, had therefore some chance of succeeding, but was made with too weak a force. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division met with superior Russian Infantry on the right wing of the Eastern Detachment, and was gaining no ground. Over and over again is seen the disadvantage of the inferior numbers of the
;
Japanese it deprived them also at another place of the chance of taking advantage of a situation particularly unfavourable for the Russian Centre.^
; When, where, and be ascertained.
how Oyama's General Reserve was used cannot
26
402

the retreat of the Western Detachment to the
By
neighbourhood of Scha-ho-pu on October 12, the right of the Ist Army Coi'ps at Man-kia-fon had Between it become most seriously endangered. and the left of the 10th Army Corps at Tschientschan-lin-tsy there yawned a wide gap, open to the west, which the Russians were unable to close Had Oyama had sufficient troops in any strength. with the 4th Army to continue his advance against the front of the Western Detachment, as well as against the right flank and rear of the Centre, the fate of the 1st Army Corps and of the 4th Siberian Army Corps would have probably been sealed. But just then, on October 13, he sent the 5th Division from the 4th to the 1st Army,
with the object of supporting the Guard Division, wliich on that day was deprived again of the
advantages of
Siberian
Rifle
its
penetration at the Ba-ji-san by
Corps and the 5th East On October 14 the Centre and Eastern Detachment had retired approximately in line with the Western Detachment now there were no longer opportunities
the 4th Siberian
Division.
;
Army
for
cutting
ofl"
or
annihilating portions
of
the
Russian Army. It may have been a mistake of Oyama to call the 5th Division away from a spot where it could the danger threatening achieve a great success the Guard Division was, as a matter of fact, already removed when it was joined by the 5th Division. It is, of course, difficult to determine with certainty after the event what induced Oyama to act as he did^ In any case, he bad no more hopes
;
COMMENTS
now of reaping special
403
advantages, and was therefore
most anxious to end the battle at last. The 1st and 4th Armies were stopped by him on the southern bank of the Scha-ho on October 15, and the 2nd Army alone was to do the final work by capturing the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy, and the village of La-mu-tun, the pivots that were still in the hands of the enemy. Oyama's plan of breaking off
the battle synchronised with
Kuropatkin's
fresh
of leading the Western Detachment newly formed General Reserve forward to attack. The Japanese Commander-in-Chiefs wish was, therefore, not responded to by the
thoughts
and
his
intentions of the hostile
Commander.
a
right
Oyama had
certainly
to
suppose the
Russians to be equally fatigued as his
own
troops,
perhaps even more fatigued than the latter, owing to the effects of constant failure nevertheless, it
;
shown here again that the enemy can do as he likes so long as his will is not crushed by a decisive
is
victory.
Kuropatkin's eagerness to attack could,
of course, no longer be turned into any violent

action.
But the defeat
suffered
by the Japanese
Hills
at
the Putilov and Novgorod
during the
night of October 16-17 gave them clear proof that they had no right to look upon the battle as
finished at a
best.
moment when
it
suited their intentions
was not till October 19 that a tacit agreement was established between both parties for abstaining from further fighting. Now came the curious situation of both Armies standing, almost
It
inactive,
opposite each other for a long time at
close distances.
404

to face a difficult
The Japanese Commander had

task in the battle on the Scha-ho.
forced
The
battle
was
dis-
upon him by superior numbers.

riglit
He
cerned the
moment
for snatching the
advan-
tages of resolute action from the hesitating enemy.
But
all
attempts of giWng a decisive turn to

failed.
the extensive frontal attack
This
is
not
meant
as a reproach,
backwards,
may
though the critic, looking not approve of all the measures

;
adopted by the Commander it rather shows the determined efforts, indispensable for success, of
trying everything to gain something.
What was
an almost unbroken chain of successes in detail, but no complete victory defeat of an enemy pushed back, but not his
achieved was, after
all,
destruction.
The
rated.
situation, as it was, scarcely permitted to
achieve more, and the gains must not be under-
Not the
;
great
losses
of
the
Russians,
exceeding twice those of the Japanese, indicate the gain for the Russians were able to make good
their losses at
any time. The tremendous superiority
possessed by the Japanese since the days of Liao-
yan was once more established, and to a degree which deprived the Russians of all hope of ever giving the war a turn in their favour. They had been unable to hold out in the defence, and now their attack had failed likewise. They certainly
contributed themselves
to
the success of
their
enemy, and the fortune of war was on the side of the Japanese. But this fortune was well deserved by the constant manifestations of a firm will to beat the enemy, by the indefatigable energy
COMMENTS
troops.
405
of the attacks, and by the cheerful sacrifice of the
Commander-in-Chief defined the limits within which his subordinate commanders had complete freedom of action in This trust sohdng the tasks imposed on them. in the performance of commanders and commanded was transmitted down to the lowest private, producing that sureness and those methods which seemed almost natural and characterised everything the Japanese were taking in hand. Frictions and difficulties disappeared in the enormous working of the Japanese Army because every one, from the highest Commander down to the lowest coolie-soldier, was imbued with the feeling that he was responsible for the issue of
In clear and firm
lines the
the war.
The
falls
strategic result of the battle

results.
;
on the Scha-ho
Result of
^hebattle.
behind the moral
The Japanese had

but the Russians
certainly
made
a step forward
ultimately remained half a day's march south of the positions they had originally intended to
defend after the battle of Liao-yan.
The
situation,
however, created by the battle on the Scha-ho was of importance for this reason that it formed
the starting-point for the final great struggle for the issue of the war, and naturally influenced the
course of events in the battle of
Mukden.
WAR
CnMMAXDKH-ix-CHlKF: liENEH.U.
OKGAXIZ.VTION OF THE RUSSIAN A.KilY OF MAXCHUKIA DKIX(i TllK BATT

AlT)E-I)H-C'A.\ir KriiUI'ATKIX.
CiiiKK of the Staff:
1,1
OF INFAXTUY. (iKXEKAI.
Kl
TKXA.NT
I:m:i,'.\
I,
Western Dccachmeut or
of Staff:
Grcmp
liii'f
Kineral of Cavaliy Baron Bildfilin.u Major Oeneral Baron Tbiesciiba
n,
MNJnr
I)li>fr.
lîriitenanl (icneral
'liief
XVIIth Army Corps Wolkov
of Staff: Colonel DrajiOininiv
KIM
Ith Sib.
Iiil. li-l
Klh Inf. Div. Ll.Hen.Dobrshinslti

1
3ril Inf. Div.
Maj. (ien.
1
.lalisbnl
St
Drinade
st
Brigade
Sasht-sliulc
Maj. (ien. Glinski

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Maj. (ien.
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if
L'mh
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Kmiilii-i-
10 th
Kl.Sth liolcbov
All. HriKwIf
Sili.Arl.Alili-ilj;.
New
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lirijiaili'
llic
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TM'liriMhnl'
InilqiL'iiik'Mt
rwiciis. Ciiviiliv
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Miij. (Jfh.Pi'iiu-c Orbcliniii
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Dnôstanski
lloitsi-
SI
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l;..:i
ll.
MY
OF MA2JCHUKIA DRJNG THE BA.TTLE OX THE SCHA-HO

ipi- Till-:
ffi
OCTOBEE
1904.
CiiiKi-
Stakf:
UHITIONAXT
lilCNEKAI-
SACKATJOV.
Qiarterslvsteh-Gknkhal: LIElTTKNA.XTl
(iEXEKAL CH Alv'KllC\rrsil.
Ai
thr distinsal of
111,
IM Army Corps
ai
Liciileiiaiit (icnerul
'hill
l.i..-utuiaiil li
...n
l!iiiciik:,iii).l
IVlh Siberian
l.ient.
lii.-l
-\riiiy
Corp-
Vhli
liiiieial
liief
Sibeiiaii
\niiv
Corp-
Ivaii
tr. 7
1
ncral of Cavalry, Cencral Aiilf-df-Can
Ceneral Siiriibai.v
Muj, Cell, WebrI
of Slaff: Mnj. lien. Dra:
si
Inf. Uiv.
fr. ."i-lth
Inf.
Uiv.
Baron Meiondorf Chief of Stuf f Maj. (Jen. Laskievilsh

:
of liifaiilery .Sobiiliev
of Blaff:
of Slaff:
Colonel Poslov-ki
(i 111
ICast Sill.
(ii'ii.
Maj.
Kifk Uiv. Daiiilv

|
3 nl Kast Sib. liiflc Div Maj. (luii. Kai^htnlinHki
2s2ii,lTsheinoiars
L'UthMottshali
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2.s:;nl
(.Ten,
Inf. Div. Tshekinariov
22nd
1
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2ml
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Ist Brigade Maj, (ieii. Pliesliko
Ist
Dripiile
Biwulnia
1st Brigade
Ist
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Novikov
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2
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2 ml
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*
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All. I'.iigade
Colonel Schwerin
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1 Sotniius
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guns
7 th Sib. Coss. Hgt. Eipierry. Colonel Prinee 'rnibrlzkui
1).
Cobs.
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|- (S
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2 Mid. IVt.S,.is.
- 5 Sotns.
gum
VAE
CoMAM'i:ii-IN-<'iin:F:
OEGANIZATIOX OF THE JAPANESE FIELD ARMY DURIX(t

CHIEi-ni-THK Staff:
THF-:
B^
i
MA
i;sll
AL
lIAi;(;r]S ()Ya:\IA^
I.TErTKNAXT
IH-^XICKAI.
HAK'OX
K()l)A:\rA.
(Jf.nekai.
Hecond Ami:
fJeiieral
r|ii,.|
,,l
Baron
'^
n
r..l..iicl
S;;ilt;
Maj'ir
Imcral Ochi-ai.
I'.|mt.v Chii'f:
Yiirhi
;E KIKLD AKJIY DI'liLVr

NKKAI, MAKiiV KiiDAMA
IHK
BA'ITLK
(iX
THE SCHA-H(
OEXEKAL
IX OCTOBEK' 1904.
iIkvkiim, Staff: MA-l'iH
MIIIHI. MAJOIi (JKN'EUAL
FIKISHIMA. cnLdN'KI, M ATSIKAWA,

Fir-il
I
Arniy
Iviiroki
it'iierai
Haron
.\l;.|ur
ll.'iicml
r.vchara.
Dipuly
Clii.-f:
CiNim-l
-niliilii
luif nf Staff:
Major Cpiicral
Fujii,
Deputy Chief:
Cnloiifl
Malsiiishi
lOlli Divinion
IjriiliiianI (ii'jiCTal
Colorii-I
(luard Division
12 th
liivisioii
Boron Kawamiin Kurosawa

4Uth
Kith
Kolli
rigadc
Lieuteuaut (Jeneral Baron Nishijinia

Colonel Ishibashi
Lieutenant Tieneral Asada-i

Colonel Shigemi
Lieuleuant (icneral Baron Ino-nye
Colom-l .Mnji
-ilith
Colonel (^bara
Kith
l.'ith
L'lill.
Hrifja.li'
Klh
lirigadi-
Brigade
3 rd Brigade
2ud Brigade
Maj. ({on. Watanabe
Maj.tieu.Kimuralzaki-'')
23 rd Brigade
Maj. Gen. Kigoshi
2 th Brigade
Mai. Cell, Marui
Maj, (icu. Otal
Maj. (ien. Okasaki
Maj. Oen. JVIatsumaga
Maj. Oen. Shiinaniuri
nth
Kolli
iiriailc'
.Ma]
lirii.
Ilki
Lt. Colonel
Yoshida
21 th Colonel Hit:
olduc'l
Kainada
'1(1
oloiiel
nOth Kavasaki
2!lth
Colonel Shiiiiada
Kobi Brigadeî
Maj. Geu.
liMli
Okubo
isth
Cav.
Ktrl.
Maj,.r Vasu.la
;)4th
an
1
mil
n a
I!rif;a<le
l.-,th
,|,
I.t.
2n,l Cav. l;^t. Colonel Akivania
luard Cav.
ligt.
Lt. (,'olonel
Kasa
St
Field Art.
2nd
,|,
Field Art. Ki;t.
Cuard Field
,|,
Maj. flen. rohiyama

lilh
11 th
.j. .|i ij. .|i .[. .]. .|.
Colonel Tada
,|,
Art. Rgt. Colonel Kuniaiuoto

i|i .|i i|i i|. i|.
,|i
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[11(1,
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.|.
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lid
Pioneer
liatl.
(iuard riouei-r Ball.
Ihivr Knlii
llii..,aJ,-''i.
one
Fi.-I.l
Art,
\:n-.:,.W,
and
ll.-av
Arlill.-iv.
|)iviî...l
Ilia-
fii-sl
|,iii,,ii>.
al
I.iao.yau
on Oiloher
13.1
111-
Kuns,
s,,iia<ln
about
:M
guns, Heavy
Arlillc-ry
in additit
I'/,
Pioneer Battalit
APPENDIX
Mukden,
The following
:
III
Order No. 5 to the Troops of the Army of Manchuria

September 7, 1904, 9.30
p..-.
is
to be carried out
by the
Army
of Manchuria on Sketch
1.
September 8 1. The IQth Army Corps and the 2nd Siberian Army Corps will remain under the orders of Lieutenant-General Slutshevski, in the section assigned to them by General Order No. 4.' Advanced guards are to be pushed forward by the 10th Army Corps, in the direction on Pen-si-hu, to about the village of Fn-kia-pu by the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, to the railway bridge on a level with Lin-schiu-pu, with a
:
flank-guard at Kuan-lin-pu.
2.
The 17th
Army
Corps will remain in the section prescribed to

its
it
by General Orders,- pushing
advanced guard to Scha-ho-pu village. The advanced guard, until it is withdrawn behind the entrenched position on the left bank of the Hun-ho, is to be placed under the orders of the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps. 3. The advanced guards will keep in touch with each other. 4. The 3rd Siberian Army Corps ^ will cross to the right bank of the Hun-ho, and be stationed in the neighbourhood of Tschin-wan-fou
village.
5.
The
1st Siberian
and
the Ath Siberian
Army
4.*
Corps will remain iu
the sections indicated by General Order No.
' By General Order No. 4, of which there is no verbatim copy, the portion of the Mukden Position west of the railway was assigned to the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and that east of the railway to tlie 10th Army Corps. Headquarters of the 1 0th Army Corps went to Tia-ho, on the Hun-ho. * On the northern bank of the Hun-ho, on the Mandarin Road, south of Mukden. ' The 3rd Siberian Army Corps, on September 6, had occupied the left wing of the fortified position on the southern bank of the lûn-ho,
at Hun-ho-pu.
* North of the Hun-ho 1st Siberian Army Corps, east of the Mandarin Koad 4th Siberian Array Corps, at the railway.
:
407
408
6. The \st Army Corps will remain in the space opposite the north west corner of Mukden, between the roads indicated. 7. [Refers to the portions of the 5th Siberian Army Corps detailed
to other units.]
8. Major-General Kossagovski s Brigade will unite opposite Sin-mintuu to cover the extreme right of the Army. 9. General Liuhaviri.s Detaehnipnt will be stationed at the passes on the road Fu-schun Bian-yu-pu-sa, near Fan-schn village, as well as
at the Kau-tu-lin Pass, occupying- the passes for defence.

10. Lieutenant-Colonel Koshelevaki' s Detachment will march to Fanschn, joining Major-General Liubavin's command. 11. Major-General Peterov's Detachment will remain at the Da-lin
Pass.
12.
The detachment at Sin-tun-tin will remain in that place, covering
the extreme left of the Army. 13. The Orenburg Co.smrk Brigade will move forward 5 versts, continuing in the duties laid down in General Order No. 4. 14. Major-General Mishtshenko's- Detachment will advance as much as
Hun-pau-schan village, continuing in its duties in accordance with my directions given in General Order No. 4, but confining them towards the east, to the line Mukden Bian-yu-pu-sa. 15. The Siberian Cossack Division will concentrate on the line Mukden Bian-yu-pu-sa, in the neighbourhood of Fn-kia-pu, covering and reconnoitring in front of the Army, between the line Mukden Bian-yu-pu-sa and the line Mukden Fan-schn. Reconnaissance
possible, to about
towards the enemy in the section Fn-kia-pu Fan-schn. 16. The Terek-Kuban.yki Regiment will continue carrying out the task prescribed in General Order No. 4. 17. All units will establish communication with their Corps Headquarters by flying post, or, if possible, by telephone and telegraph ; Corps Headquarters, in their turn, with General Headquarters.
18.
General Headquarters will be at

(Signed)
Mukden Railway The Commander-in-Chief:

:
Station.
General Aide-<le-Camp KUROPATKIN. Chief of the Staff Lieutenant-General SACKARO V.
APPENDIX
IV
Okder No. 6 to the Troops of the Army of Manchuria

Mukden
It
Station, September S, 1904, 11 p.m.

tlie
being
I
my
intention to prepare for assuming

it
oiFensive with the
Army,
this
consider
necessary to oppose strong resistance to the
enemy
Wîth
in the position near

object, I
:
Mukden, should he advance on
that town.
order the units of the
Army
to adopt the following
measures
1.
Main
Position
remain in the position prescribed by General Order Xo. 5 the preparation for defence of
will
Likutenant-Gkneal Slutshevski
(a)
10th
Army
104
Corps
sotnias,
32 battls., guns,' 6 Sapper

:
battls.
Corps 12 32 guns, 24 mortars, 3rd E. Sib. Sapper Battl.

{b)
2ud
Sib.
Army
the entrenched position is to be continued. The ground in front is to be secured by the advanced
battls.,
sotnias,
(c)
Advanced
Corps.
Guard
of
17th
guards on the line of the villages Fon-kia-pu Lin-schin-pu Kuan-lin-pu. In case of a
Army
(rf)
hostile attack, the position will
2nd
Sib. Art. Abteilung.
be defended, the advanced guards at the same time being with-
drawn, when
of the 17th
tlie
advanced guard
will
Army Corps
rejoin its corps iu time.
' Tlie number of guns with the 10th Army Corps was only 88, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Batteries of the 31st Artillery Brigade being disbanded, and all other batteries organised at 8 guns each.
409
410

2,
Covering the Lefi Flank
Lieutknant-General Ivaxov
Army Corps 24 6 sotnias, 64 field guns, 24 mtn. guns, 4 Horse Artillery mtii. gunSj 2ud E. Sib. Sapper
()
3rd Sib.
battls.,
Battl.
(ft) Major-General Liubavin's Detachment

:
213th Infantry Regt. 26th Artillery Brig.
4 battls. 8 field gns.

1 battl. 1 battl.
1st Sib. Infantry Regt.
2nd Sib. Infantry Regt. Frontier Guard 2nd Brig. Trausbaikal

. . .
2 field gns.
12 sotnias. Cossack Division 4th H.A. Mtn. Batty. 4 mtn. gns.
Total
6 battls., 12 sotnias, 10 field
guns, 4 mtn. guns,
{c) Major-General Peterov's Detachment

:
214th Infantry Regt. 26th Artillery Brig. 2ud Dagestan Cossack

.
3 battls. 4 guns.
Regt.
.6 sotnias.
Total
3 battls., 6 sotnias, 4 guns.
APPENDIX
3.
IV
Flank
411
Close Protection
of
the Left
Lieutenant-General Baron StackELBERG

1st Sib.
Army
Corps
24 battls.,
and defend the right bank of the Hun-ho within the

will secure
10 squadrous or sotuias, 56 field Sapper and 1 Telegraph company from 1st E. Sib. Sapper
guns, 1
Battl.
section Fu-lin
Kiu-san, serving
Army
Corps,
to
as connecting-link
between the main body of the Army and the

3rd
Siberian
it
which
will
form the nearest

the section
support.
This force will move

inst. into
on the 10th
mentioned.
4.
Covering the
Lieutenant-General Dembovski
215th Infantry Regt.
.
412
6. Cavalry will remain in the sections apMajob-Genkral Grekov portioned to them by General Orenburg Cossk. Brig. 12 sotnias.
(a)
11th H.A. Batty

Total
(h)
:
6 guns.
Order No.
duties.
5,
continuing in their
12 sotnias, 6 guns.
Major-Gexeral Mishtshenko
.
Independ. Transbaikal Cossack Brig. 12 sotnias.

Transbaikal Cossack Batty. 6 guns. Ural Cossack Brig. 12 sotnias.
1st
. .
.
6th H.A. Batty. Frontier
Guard
:
4 guns.
Total
(c)
24 sotnias, 10 guns.
Major-Gknekai, Samsoxov
18 sotnias.
4th, 7th, and 8th Sib.
Cossack Regts. 20th H.A. Batty

Total
:
6 guns.
18 sotnias, 6 guns.
7.
General
17th
of
Nearest Suppoii, of the Cavalry Baron

will
Mahi
remain
5.
Position
in the section
BiLDERLiNG
Corps, less the units detailed as advanced guard in front
of the main position.
8.
(a)
appor-
Army
tioned to
it
by General Order
ô.
General Reserve
will concentrate
Northern portion jCiEyERAh AiDKde-Camp Baron JMeiendorf
1st
Army Corps and
.5th Sib.
Cos-
village
between Pu-ho and Hu-schi-tai Station,
sack Regt. (6 sotnias).

(6)
Southern portion, Lieutena.nt-
General Sarubaiev
4th Sib. Army Corps, less the brigade detached to Tie-lin ; 2nd Werchneudinsk Cossack Regt. (6
sotnias).
will concentrate
on September 9
between the
opposite the north-west corner
of
Mukden
city,
roads to Siu-min-tun and Sandia-sa.
9. All units will establish conxmunication witli their Corps Headquarters by flying post, or, if possible, by telephone and telegraph ; Corps Head-
quarters, in their turn, with General Headquarters.

10.
General Headquarters at Mukden Station. (Signed) General Aide-de-Camp KUROPATKIN. Lieuteuaut-Genercd SACKAROV.
APPENDIX V
Order No.
1
for the Troops Defending the Entrenched Position of Mukden

TiA-HO Village, September
9, 1904.
With the object of making the defence Commandant of Defence has ordered
:
as strong as possible, the Sketch 2.
1.
In addition to
(a)
tlie
Main
Fortline of Defence,
:
two more defensive

portion of Yen-
lines are to be prepared in its rear, viz.
From Tia-ho
village to Sa-kan-tsy
villages
;
centre
schu-tien-tsy
Lan-wa
the flanks of the line are to be
turned inward to the Hun-ho. {h) From the copse near the footbridge, by Ma-kiao-tun and Schu-lian-za, to the Hun-ho. 2. The sectional commanders will prepare the main line and the 2nd line the Commander of the General Reserve, the ord line. To be carried out
;
(a) Strengthening the
Main
Position
to within 1,000 metres at least,
clearing the field of fire : daoljan and high tsliumisa are to

;
be cut down in front of the position belts are to be left standing behind the position, for masking artillery and covering movements. {b) In the 2nd and Srd Positions preparing the villages for de:
fence, clearing the field of

(c)
fire, etc.,
as above.
Ranges are to be measured and marked, roads to be improved, bridges to be constructed, guide-posts to be erected. 3. A\'ith every unit must be officers who have made themselves thoroughly familiar with the country, to guide the troops by day and
by night.
4.
The detachments of scouts will thorouglily reconnoitre the ground
in front of the entrenchment, directing their attention to the suitable approaches to the position, as well as to
most
likely positions for
the enemy's batteries,

5.
etc.
The maps of
the entrenclied position are
to be verified during these reconnaissances.
Working hours, daily from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m., and from 2 to 6 p.m. (Signed) Chief of the Staff of the Defence Major-General ZUR! K0\'.
:
413
APPENDIX
Position of
VI
Order No. 3 for the Troops Defending the Entrenched
Mukden
TiA-HO ^'ILLAGE^ September 11, 1904.

lu compliance with the General Order of yesterday I order 1. From Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard, standing at Scha-ho-pu, are to be detailed three battalions, eight guns, and one
:
squadron, and to be dispatched at once to relieve the units of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps standing at Lin-schin-pu and Kuan-lin-pu ; the first-named of the two places will be occupied at the same time by two battalions, eight guns, and half a squadron, and the last-named by one battalion and half a squadron, lliese units form the right
advanced guard of the defending troops, and will remain under the direct orders of Major-General Jakubinski. 2. Lieutenant-Colonel Savitsh's advanced guard (121st Infantry Regiment, half a battery, and half a sotnia 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment) will remain in tlie neighbourhood of Fn-kia-pu, guarding in the
direction on Bian-yu-pu-sa.
3.
Aff advanced guard.'',
if
obliged by superior hostile forces, will
keeping in touch with each other, and continuing In that case, to guard in the directions they have done so hitherto. Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard will join tlie General Reserve of the Defence, and be stationed at Tia-ho village. LieutenantColonel Savitsh's advanced guard will join the local reserve in the left section of the position, and be at the disposal of Major-General
retire simultaneously,
Riabiukin.
4. The 2nd Siberian Army Corps having been charged with a new task, the entrenched position will be occupied in the following manner ' (a) The 9th Infantry Division, after detailing one regiment and half a battery to the General Reserve, will occupy the right section, from the Hun-ho to fort "III." inclusive, and half the interval between the latter aiul redoubt " G."
:
' the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, the section Till then had occupied west of the railway the 10th Army Corps, the portion east of the railway to fort "II." exclusively, with the 9th Infantry Division the portion from fort "II," to tbe left wing on the Hun-lio, with the 31st Infantry
:
;
P,ivisioi>,
4U
APPENDIX
(h)
VI
415
122nd Tambow
Tlie lst Infantry Division, after detailing the
Infantry Regiment, with half a battery, to the General Reserve at Tia-ho village, will occupy the left section from the centre of the interval between fort "III." and redoubt "G" to the Hun-ho.
5.
For
enfilading
the
approaches to the position
mentioned, the
right
commanders will select artillery positions on the of the Hun-ho, near the villages of Kin-tien-tun and occupying them each with a battery with escort.
sectional
6.
bank
San-kia-la,
From
the
5th
Mortar Regiment, two mortar batteries
will
be
attached to each of the 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions.
The General Reserve a combined Infantry Regiment of the 0th Infantry Division, 122nd Tambow Infantry Regiment, two half-batteries, two sotnias of Cossacks will be commanded by Major-General Kuswin.
7-
8. The sectional commanders and the Commander of the General Reserve will continue strengthening the fortified position, in compliance with Order No. 1. 9. Having regard to the great distance of the enemy, outposts are to be furnished only during the night, and these in small strength only,
to give less fatigue to the

(a)
men
by the 9Â h\fardr]j LVu-ision, beginning at the Hun-ho, along the brook to Sia-ho-tun village, then farther along the railway branch line, to the point where tlie railway crosses the road ^V'anschi-tun
(ft)
Tia-ho.
:
by the ?>\st Infantrxj
10.
By
Division, from that crossing to tke Hun-ho. the \st Orenburg Cossack Regiment will be detailed
one sotnia each to Generals Gerschelmann and Riabinkin, the

latter
sotnia including the half-sotnia with the
121st Infantry
Regiment two sotnias to the General Reserve at Tia-ho village. 11. Of the bridges over the Hun-ho will be used by the 9th Infantry Division, the railway bridge and the bridge Lau-wa village
: ;
at
by the 31st Infantry Division, the bridge north of Tia-ho village, and the great Mandarin Roail Bridge. 12. The Divisional dressing-stations are to be established on the right bank of the Hun-ho, as directed by the Divisional Commanders. 13. The Ambulant parks are to be stationed as directed by the Divisional Commanders.
14. Reports are to be sent to
15.
Tia-ho village.
Deputies:
Major-Gkxkral GKnsrnEi-MAN.v.
MAJOR-GlCNKnAL KlSWIN. The Cominandant of the Defence Iîeuten^nt-GeneralSLLTSHEVSKJ,
:
(Signed)
APPENDIX
Position of
VII
Order No. 4 for the Troops Defexdixg the Entrenched
Mukden
TiA-Ho ViLLAGK, Septemhcr 13, 1904, 11 a.m.
Army Corps having heen detailed and being at my disposal when the action begins, I order, amending Order No. 3 1. The half-batteries of the 9th and f31st Infantry Divisions now with the General Reserve will be returned to their sectional commanders. 2. The Infantry regiments of the 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions now with tlie General Reserve are to be placed at the disposal of the sectional commanders Avhen the action begins, after Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard has been withdrawn into the entrenched
Infantry regiment from the 17th
:
One more
position.
3.
To the
General Reserve,
under the
orders of
Major-General
Kuswin,
will be detailed
strength (a) Major General Jakubinski's advanced guard one Infantry Brigade, one battery, and five squadrons Dragoons which, after its arrival in the entrenched position, will be stationed
:
at Tia-lio village.
(/>)
(_)ne
Infantry regiment of the 17th
Army
Corps on the
right
bank of the Hun-lio,
whicli, at tlie beginning of the action,
to Tia-ho village. Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard, after its arrival in the entrenched position, will be detailed, one to each of the sectional commanders, who will arrange for cover being prepared for these batteries now the selection of the position for these batteries is left to the sectional commanders. (Signed) ITie Commandant of the Defence Lieutenant-General SLUTSHEVSKI.
will likewise
4.
move
Batteries
from
416
APPENDIX
iNSTRUCTIOiJS FOR
VIII
THE DeFENCK OF THE MaIN POSITION OF
Mukden ^
1.
For the occupation of

(6)
the works, the garrison will be divided into
(a) the fighting portion, and
the inner reserve.
work concerned is to be formed of troops not belonging to the garrison. For the figliting portion are to be detailed three-quarters of the
outer reserve of the
The
garrison, and for the inner reserve one-quarter.
For the fighting portion must be allowed one man per pace of crest man for every two or three paces of gorge parapet of the work. 2. During the bombardment of the work by Artillery the garrison will be kept in the trenches on either side. When the enemy's Artillery fire ceases his Infantry having approached to within half a kilometre the garrison must rapidly mount the banquets \^' fighting portion "] or take post behind the parados [" inner reserve "] so as to be able to open fire at once. Cover must be prepai'ed for the outer reserve where there is no
of the faces and flanks, and for the inner reserve one
natural cover.
3.
Husbanding ammunition
in the defence, fire to be
opened only
on
visible objects
! 100 rounds
in addition to the regulation
number
to be held ready for every
man
in the
works
targets clearly to be
indicated
4.
tlie enemy rises fi-om the ditch to mount the parapet, the garrison of the work will rapidly go to meet him, pushing him
When
back with the bayonet.

5. In advance of the line of forts, at a distance of about half a kilometre, fire-trenches are to be constructed, or the villages lying
within that distance must be put into a state of defence on the side
facing the enemy.
line
nmst be constructed along the about half a kilometre behind it, cover for artilkry behind the intervals of the works. The Artillery here will fire over the heads of their own Infantry in the in the trenches about 1 verst in front of the Artillery second line of trenches intervals must be left through which tlie
line of fire-trenches
finally,
Then a second
of
forts,
and
Artillery can fire on the assailant.

'
Complete text not

417
available.
27
418
6.

[Refers to the mortar batteries; as
much
as possible centrally.]
is
Here
7.
to be kept in view that the effect of their fire
best at 1,600
to 2,500 metres' range.
Behind the
(a)
first line
of defence are to be established of
A A
second defensive line from Tia-ho village to Sa-kan-tsy
village
centre
portion
Yen-schu-tien-tsy
village
Lan-wa
village to the
{h)
Hun-ho.
to
line from the copse at the footbridge Ma-kiao-tun and Schu-lian-za villages.
third defensive
village
at
Tia-ho
Construction of fire-trenches, preparation of villages for defence,

etc.
Batteries are to be constructed in the second, but not in
the third, defensive line. In case of retreat on the third defensive line,
first
the Ax-tillery
must be gradually withdrawn
to the right
then, by degrees, the Infantry.
bank of the Hun-ho, and The Artillery will open fire at once
in front of the bridges
from the other bank. 8. Small bridge-heads are to be constructed

to ensure the crossing.
9.
guarding against surprise by night.] In order to give the garrison timely warning of a surprise by night, fires are to be
10. [Refers to
lit, apart from other measures, by advaned listening-posts, for which purpose they must keep handy dry material. At a distance of 800 paces in advance of the foremost trenches large fires must be prepared, which at the moment the enemy is approaching are to be ignited by electricity to illuminate the foreground. These fires are to be lit even by day, so as to impress the enemy. 11. The mines constructed in advance of the works are to be Wehere it ignited only by orders of the commandant of tlie work.
is
impossible to construct mines, red flags, marking, as
it
were, the
!i
position of mines,
must be placed
so as to confuse the
enemy
;
of roads within the position to connect the works and the reserves and river crossings behind erection of
12. [Refers to construction
guide-posts. ]
13.
I
firing-line of the line of forts, if
allow the troops of the foremost trench-lines to retire on the it is absolutely necessary ; but I do not
allow the latter line to be abandoned without a distinct order from a superior, for the fort-line is our main defensive line, in which we can, and must, offer the greatest possible resistance. The troops holding
the works must be deeply rooted in them, such that they can only be pulled out with the roots that is to say, tliey must die, but not surrender the works. (Signed) ITie General Commanding 10th Army Corps Lieutenant-General SLTSHEVSKI.
APPENDIX IX
Order No. 8 to the Troops of the Army of Manchuria
Mukden
Outposts of the
Station, September 28, 1904, 6 p.m.

line of villages Tschan-tan
'
enemy are holding the

'
:
Ta-tu-saii-pu
'
Sia-liu-ho-tsy Tschin-hsi-sai.*
on the
the left bank of
;
Sketch
1.
On
the
our wings have been ascertained

tlie
right, small bodies of
enemy on
Liao-ho, on the line of villages Ta-
wan Ma-my-kai
the Da-lin Pass.
ITie enemy's
on the
left,
about one Infantry brigade, opposite
main
forces are distributed as follows
About two Divisions echeloned on the line Sau-de-pu Hokun-pu * About four Divisions within the space Tschan-tai-tsy Sa-chu;
tun
Liao-yan
About two Divisions at the coal-pits of Yen-tai About two Divisions echeloned on the line Bian-yu-pu-sa
;
Pen-si-lxu.
The enemy
1.
is
entrenching positions
On
the line of villages Sclian-kan-tsy
Tschan-tai-tsyon
;
the heights south of Yin-tschezi-tsy village, on the line of villages
Tun-ta-lien-pu
2.
in
Tsien-tau on the heights east of Tsien-tau North of Bian-yu-pu-sa village, and south-west of that place the direction on Yin-tsien-pu.
first
In rear of the
position are being fortified the heights on the
Tai-tsy-ho between the villages of Mu-t^chan and Sy-kwan-tun, and
behind the second position another at Schan-pin-tai-tsy village. The Army of Manchuria under my command will advance and attack the enemy in the position he has occupied. Its first task will be to get possession of the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.
the Hun-ho, 4 kilometres north-west of San-de-pu. the Scha-ho, 13 kilometres south-east of San-de-pu. G kilometres south-oast of the San-kai-seki-sau. 6 kilometres east of Bian-yu-pu-sa. Wehere the Scha-ho joins the Tai-tsy-ho.
On On
419
420

1.
Western Detachment
will assemble at the Scha-
General of Cavalry Baron Bilderlinq

lOth
ho,
Army Corps
32 battls. , 6 sotnias, 88 guzis, 1 Sap.

battl.
with the object of advancing thence on both

sides of the
railway, be-
tween the Hun-ho and the
17th
Army Corps
32 battls., 12 sqns, 96 guns, 1 Sap.

battl.
Pai-tschi-tschai Lanfan-tun Pu-tsau-wa Tapu coal-pits of Yen-tai

in doing so, the last-named road is to be used only by detachments, protective
road Mukden
Ho-nii-kan
1 1th and 1 2th
Orenburg
.
Cossack Regts. Ural Cossack Brig.^ 11th H.A. Batty.
12 sotnias.
10 sotnias. 6 guns.
Total: 64 battls., 28 sotnias, 12 sqns., 190 guns, 2 Sapper battls.
the road being apportioned to the advance of the General Reserve.
On
the
first
day's
tions they are in now.
march the advanced guards will remain in the posiThe main bodies of the 10th and 17th Army
Corps will occupy the line Ta-su-kia-pu
Bhf.
Su-ya-tun
Sia-orr-tun
Pai-tschi-tschai.
Tschien-liu-tan-kou
the second day's march the advanced guards will occupy the line Hun-pau-schan Yin-schou-tun, proceeding to entrench the position. The main bodies will occupy the line Lin-schin-
On
pu
Scha-ho-pu Liian-fau-tun, entrenching this position.

2.
Lieutenant-General
Eastern Detachment Baron Stackelwill assemble
on the line
Ist Sib.
Army
Corps
24battls.,
16mach.
1
guns, 10 sotnias,
of villages Pa-kia-tsy*^ Tai - kia Hei - sun - pu
60 guns,
battl.
Sap.
miau-tsy, with the object of attacking the enemy's

position in front
2nd Sib.
Army Corps'
3rd Sib.
Army Corps*
17 battls., 8 mach, guns, 2 sotnias, 32 guns,l Sap. battl. 32 battls., 8 mach, guns, 7 sotnias, 66
guns,
1
and on
the
right
flank.
its
The
Sap. battl.
Sib.
Cossack Division 20th H.A. Batty
15 sotnias. 6 guns.
guns,
Total:
73
battls.,
32 mach,
34
advance ia limited by the roads FuYin Ta - yu echun Pa-kia8chou-pou-tsy Tschau-huan-tschai tsy San-kia-tsy, and Fu-lin Fn-kia Pu-lie-san-tsy pu Bian-yu-pu-sa Penspace for
sotnias, 164 guns, 3 Sap. battls.
si-hu, both roads inclusive.
' The Ural Cos.sack Brigade had to leave Mishtshenko's Division on the evening of the second day's march, and join the Western Detachment. * 3 kilometres north-east of the Kau-tu-lin Pass. [For notes 3 and 4, see next page.]
APPENDIX IX
On On
the
first
421
day march the main
bodies will reach the line of
villages Schi-hui-tschn
Yen-tau-tsy.
the second days march the main bodies will occupy the line of Hei-sun-pu Tai-kia-miau-tsy ; advanced guards are to be pushed forward to the line Wan-fu-lin Pass Hou-lou-tsygou Yin-pau Liu-tschen-ku-tun. The first task of the Eastern Detachment is to seize the enemy's
villages Pa-kia-tsy
position at Bian-yu-pu-sa.
3.
(a)
General Reserve
will assemble
Lieutenant-General Sarubaiev
on the
space
first
days
Corps 24 battls., 6 sotnias, 48 guns^ 1 Sapper battl. 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Sib. Artillery Abteiluiigs 36 old guns. 18 mortars. 5th Mortar Regt. 2nd E. Sib. Mortar 1st and
4th Sib.
:
Army
'
between Mukden and the Hun-ho, east of the Mandarin Road on the second days march, the bridges in the neighbourhood of Ho-mikan village are to be crossed.
in
march
the
Batteries
'
12 mortars.
Billeting within the space Liu-
kuan
Total: 24 battls., 5 sotnias, guns, 1 Sapper battl.
(6)
tun
114
Yin
tschen
tsy
Schi-kia-tsv.
Gexeral Aide-de-Camp Barox Meiendorf

1st
32 battls., 4 sotnias, 96 guns, 1 Sapper battl. 2nd and 3rd Transbaikal Cossack Batteries 12 guns.
:
:
Army
Corps
Total:
32
1
battls.,
4 sotnias, 108
battl.
assemble on the first days march between Mukden and the Hun-ho, west of the Mandarin Road on the second day tlie bridges of the Mandarin Road and at Tia-ho village are to be
will
;
guns,
(c)
Sapper
crossed.
Billeting within
the
area San-lin-tsy
Ma.tor-Gknkral
Mishtshhnko
will
Yin-pan.
A LA SLUTE OF H.M. Independent Transbaikal Cossack

Brig.
:
after the
assemble at Liian-fan-tun, advanced guards of the
sotnias, 6 guns.
6th
H. A. Batty,
:
of
Frontier
pied
\Yestern etachment have occuthe line Tschien-Iiu-tan-
Guard
Total
' :
2 guns.
11 sotnias, 8 guns.
kou
Hun
pau
schan
Yin
schou-tun.
battery. ITie 2iul East Siberian Mortar Battery was afterwards attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. In tlie \Vâr Organisation (Appendix 1.) it is therefore shown with the 3rd, and not with the 4th, Siberian Army Corps.
*
Only half a
[Notes continued from previous page.] * Attached to the 2nd Siberian Army Corps were 213th Infantry Regiment, 4 battalions 2nd Siberian Infantry Regiment, 1 battalion ; 26th Artillery Brigade, 8 guns. Attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps were 6th Siberian Infantry Regiment, 4 battalions 7th Siberian Infantry Regiment, 4 battalions ; 2ud Werchneudinsk Cossack Regiment, 1 sotnia.
:
422

4,
Covering the Flanks
(a)
LlEUTEXANTGeneral Dembovski
Right
Flank.
215th Infantry Re^. 216th Infantry Regt. 284th Infantry Regt. 28th Artillery' Brig. 4th Sib. Artillery Brig.
.
4 battls 4 battls 4 battls.
1st
Argunski C'ossack
.
Regt. Independ. Caucasian Cavalry Brig. 4th Transbaikal Cossack Batty. 5th E. Sib. Sap. Battl. East Sib. Bridg. Battl.
It, *"^
4.4.1
/-
APPENDIX IX
Colonel Madritov, of the General Staff
1st Sib. Infantry Regt.
1 battl.
423
will cover the
of the
Army
of
extreme left flank advance in the
Detachments
1st
of Mounted Scouts of
and loth E.
.
direction
Ta-pin-di-schan
Sai-ma-tsy, keeping in touch with
Sib.
Rennenkampfs Detachment.
1 sotnia.
Rifle Regt8.
Ussuri Cossack Regt. Caucasian Volunteers

Frontier Guard
.
1 sotnia.
2 guns.
Total
battl.,
2 sotnias, 2
de-
tachments, Scouts, 2 guns.
5.
Covering the Rear

will be echeloned
Corps: 32 battls.,^ 6 sotnias, 96 guns,^ 1 Sapper battl.

Rth Sib.
Army
between Muk-
den and
Tie-lin, in conformity
with a special Order.

Total strength of fighting troops 257| battalions, with 32 machine guns, 143 squadrons or sotnias, 760 field guns (among whicli 48 old
:
field
guns, 36 mortars, 16 quick-firing mountain guns, and 14 old mountain guns), 9 Sapper battalions, 1 Bridging battalion.' 6. A supplementary Order will be issued when the advance to begin. 7. 2nd fine transport will be half a day's march, and Zrd line transport one whole day's march behind the end of the columns marching on the roads assigned to them by the Commanders of the Detachments. 8. Reports will be sent to the head of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which is going to advance by the road Mukden Ho-mi-kan Pai-tschi-
tschai
rrr-tau-kou.
Deputies: Lieutenant-General Sackarov.
General Aide-de-Camp Baron Meiendorf. (Signed) The Commander-in-Chief of the Army

:
General Aide-de-Camp KUROPATKIX. Chief of the Staff Lieutenant-General SACKAROV.

' In the War Organisation (Appendix I.), the 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division is not included, hence only 24 battalions there. * Two batteries of the 10th Artillery Brigade are not included in War Organisation (Appendix \.), hence only 80 guns there. * Including the troojis remaining behind in the positions of Tie-lin and Mukden. >\'ithout them results the total strength calculated in War Organisation (Appendix I.).
APPENDIX X
KuROPATKix''s Proclamation of October 2, 1904
More than seven months have
now passed
since
the
enemy
Since
treacherously surprised us wnthout preWous declaration of war.

that time, the Russian troops liave achieved
many
;
great deeds by land
sea, of which our fatherland may be proud but the enemy has not only been hitherto unconquered, he is also constantly striving to beat us completely. llie troops of tlie Manchurian Army were certainly strong in courage, but not strong enough in numbers for
and
driving away the Japanese Armies.
removing
all
obstacles,
and making the
Much time was required Army strong enough
for
for
the solution of the heavy but honourable and glorious task imposed on it. This was the reason why I did not think tlie time had arrived yet for assuming the offensive myself, but ordered a withdrawal on the occasions Avlien we successfully repelled the Japanese attacks at Ta-schi-t*;chao, Lian-dia-san, and in the positions of Liao-yan. You have abandoned the heroically defended positions, strewn with countless Japanese corpses, without being you have withdrawn to the prepared positions pressed by the enemj' ready to resume the combat after the fights lasting five days around Liao-yan, which cost the Japanese heavy loss. Tliough completely taking in hand, with
full confidence,
;
you have abandoned every position, retiring under most unfavourable conditions. Attacked by Kuroki's Army pushing against the flank, you have marched on Mukden, have waded through bottomless morasses, have fought day and night, and brought away guns and vehicles witli your own hands you did not leave a gun or a prisoner
successful,
taken along with you all wounded, in my heart, I have ordered you to retire, but also with the unshakable confidence that our retreat was absolutely necessary to gain a decisive victory over the enemy, when the time has come. By the supreme will of His Majesty the Emperor, new forces have been detailed, which shall ensure us
in the
hands of the enemy

lost
have
and not
a vehicle.
With sadness
victory.
AU
difficulties of
bringing up the fresh reinforcements the
424
APPENDIX X
425
long distance of 10,000 versts from home have been overcome in splendid manner by the persevering energy and ability of the authorities and persons who have dealt with this difficult transport, which
Several 100,000 men, many thousands of horses is without a parallel. and vehicles, million puds of material have been brought up into Manchuria by rail from European Russia and Siberia, without interruption, in the course of seven months, and this stream is still swelling. If the number of troops available do not appear sufficient, new regiments will arrive the firm will of His Majesty the Emperor, however, that we shall beat the enemy, must be carried out at all cost. Hitherto, our adversary, by making use of his superior numbers, and by disposing his Army to envelop us, has operated according to his
' ;
own free will, choosing his time for attacking us wlien it pleased him. But now the time the Army has been longing for has at last arrived, The moment has that we should go forward and meet the enemy. arrived for us to force our will upon the Japanese, for we are now
But you must not forget strong enough for assuming the offensive. that, to gain a victory over a powerful and brave enemy, it is necessary, in addition
to numerical superiority, for every one,
from the
it
oldest to the youngest, to be resolute to the last, whatever sacrifice
may
mind, every one of you, the importance of a remember, especially, how necessary it is for victory for Russia us to join hands with our brethren in Port Arthur, who for the last seven months have been heroically defending the fortress entrusted Our Army has in all wars achieved great deeds when to their care. protecting throne and fatherland, and has acquired the highest fame among every nation. Now bear in mind tliat, by the will of the Tsar, you are charged witli upholding Russia's position and her rights in the Far East tliink that, by the trust imposed in you b)' our Tsar, you are charged with preserving the honour of the Army of Russia. Our august Master and, witii liim, all Russia are praying for us and Invigorated by this prayer, and fully conscious of tlie imbless us
cost.
Hold
in
;
portance of the task entrusted to us, we will fearlessly advance, firmly resolved to stake our lives in fulfilling our duty to tlie last.
May
the will of the Almiglity guide us
all
Pud
40 Russian
lb.
33 English
lb.
(about)
APPENDIX XI
Order to the Troops of the Western Detachment
Mukden, September
Information about the
Distribution 30, 1904.
Enemy
\
V
Verbatim,
ae in
Intentions of the Commander-in-Chief
Sketch
1.
and Task of the Western De/cA??2en< J General Order. 1. 10th Army Corps (Lieutenant-Gkneral Slutshev.ski) 32 batsotnias, 88 guns, 1 Sapper battalion. For concentration at the talions, Scha-ho the road Tia-ho San-ho-kuan-tun La-mu-tun Pan-kiau-pu, and the roads east of it as far as the road Mukden Ho-mi-kan PaiLan-fan-tun Pu-tsau-wa Ta-pu coal-pits of Yen-tai, tschi-tschai are apportioned to the corps the latter road must only be used by protective detachments, it being proposed to use that road for the advance of the General Reserve. On the first day's march the advanced guard will remain in its position at Huan-schan a new advanced guard is to be sent forward by the main body, relieving on that same day the portion of the advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps standing at Scha-ho-pu. The main body will advance on a level with Sia-orr-tun village. On the second days march the advanced guards will reach the line Hun-pau-schan Yin-schou-tun, entrenching of villages Pan-kiau-pu
:
that line
the heights near Yin-schou-tun village are to be fortified The main body will reach the line of villages particularly strongly. Scha-ho-pu Lan-fan-tun, proceeding to entrench the position south
;
of that line
particular attention must he paid here to fortifying the height north of Hou-tai village. 2. nth Army Corps (Lieutexaxt-Ge.neral "VYolkov) 32 battalions, For concentration at 11 squadrons,' 96 guns, 1 Sapper battalion. the Scha-ho the roads along the railway embankment, and west of it
;
:
as far as the road Ma-kia-pu
Kuan-lin-pu Ta-tu-san pu Ko-tschenpau, are apportioned to the corps. On the first day's march the portion of the advanced guard of the
17th Army Corps standing at Scha-ho-pu will join the portion of the advanced guard .standing at Lin-schin-pu after it has been relieved by the advanced guard of the ] 0th Army Corps. The portion of the advanced guard standing at Kuan-lin-pu will remain in its
position on the
first
day's march.
'ITie
main body of the corps

Station (Bhf.).
will' reach
is
will
reach the line of villages Ta-su-kia-pu
Su-j'a-tun
On
'
the second day's march the advanced guards

of the 52nd Dragoon Regiment
the line
One squadron
charged with 9
special task in paragraph 4 of this Order.
426
APPENDIX XI
Liu-tan-kou
427
constructing
Tschien-liu-tan-kou Tsun-lun-yen-tun,
entrenchments here. The main body will reach the line of villages Lin-schin-pu La-mu-tun, proceeding to entrench the position south
of that line.
3.
Cavab'if
(a)
Ma.tor-General Grekov. Orenburg Cossack Division 12 sotnias, and 6 guns. Watching and reconnoitring in front between Protecting the the Scha-ho and Hun-ho is to be continued. right flank of the ^Vêstern Detachment during its advance. Touch is to be maintained with Dembovski's Detachment and with the
:
Ural Cossack Brigade. the second day's march the main body will concentrate at Wan-tschuan-tsy. Ural Cossack Brigade 10 sotnias. After (i) CoLoxKL Shabyko. the line of villages 'J'schien-liu-tan-kou Hun-pau-schan Yinschou-tun has been occupied by the advanced guards, the Ural Cossack Brigade will continue watching and reconnoitring in front between the Scha-ho and the road Mukden Fn-kia-pu Bian-
On
yu-pu-sa.
Touch is to be maintained with the Cavalry of the Eastern Detachments and with Grekov's Detachment. On the second day's march the main body of the brigade will concentrate at Hun-pau-schan village.
4.
Connnunication.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Mirbach, with a squadron
52nd Dragoon Regiment. \\'hen the advance begins, communication will be established between the staff of the Western Detachment under my command and the staifs of the Army Corps, Grekov's Detachment, and General Headquarters.
5.
Attention
is
called to tlie necessity of the columns keeping in touch
with each other.

6. 7.
Verbatim, as
I
in
paragraph 7 of the General Order.
request most energetic measures to be taken for keeping the
intended operations secret from the inhabitants of the country. When our operations begin. Chinamen nmst be prevented at all cost from passing our line in the direction of the enemy. 8. Reports are to be sent to the head of the main body of the 17th Army Corps, which is going to march by the road along the
railway embankment.
9. Deputies
10.
Lieutknant-General Smtshevski. Lieutenant-General Wolkov. supplementary Order will bo issued, stating the time when
:
the adx'ance
(Signed)
is to
begin.
of
tlie
The Commander
^\'estern
Detachment of
tlie
Army
General of Cavalry Baron BILDERLING. Chief of the Staff: Major-General Baron THIESENHAUSEN. The Ordkr is Dispatched October 1, 12 noon,
APPENDIX
THE Army
XII
Oeder to the Troops of the Western Detachment of
Han-tschen-pt-, October 13, 6 p.m.

1.
The Commanrler-in-Chief has placed under my orders
the Gth
Siberian
2.
Army
Corps and Devihov.skis Detachnimt.

is
The enemy
standing on the line Hun-lin-pu
Schu-lin-tsy
San-kia-tsy.
3. To-morrow the 10th and 17th Army Corpx will continue obstinately defending their positions on the Scha-ho. 4 The 6fh Siberian Army Corps will advance at daybreak to the line
Schau-kia-lin-tsy
6.
Ta-lian-tun.
Dembovskis Ddarhntent will remain on the right bank of the Hun-ho. The Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, with the two battalions attached to it, will go to-morrow with its main body to Yen-schulin-tsy, and with its advanced guard to Ho-lien-tai.
6.
Grekov's Cavalry liriyade will continue
its
reconnaissance in front
between the Scha-ho and Hun-ho, advancing with its main body in the direction on San-de-pu, covering the right flank of our Army Group, and endeavouring to drive the enemy out of San-de-pu. 7. The troops of our Army Group will be prepared to assume the
offensive.
(Signed)
BILDERLING.
428
APPENDIX
To THE Commander
of the
XIII
Western Detachment
October 14,
Received 11.45 a.m.

General Sarubaiev is withdrawing into a position in advance of Orr-tau-kou to align himself with the Army. The 1st Army Corps, which is still in action, will be conducted back San-kia-tsy. Mau's Brigade to the General Reserve at Lo-sien-tun
is
going to rejoin
its
corps.
thus secured by the disposition of the General you will have to adopt only measures for watching the interval between your position and that of the 4th Siberian Army
Your
left flank is
;
Reserve
Corps.
the left wing of the 10th Army Corps a position must be prepared which that corps, while refusing its left wing, can delay the enemy's attack long enough for me to bring into action the General Reserve, and neutralise the enemy's envelopment. Hold your position, giving more frequent information on the situation to enable me to dispose of the General Reserve accord-
On
in
ingly.
(Signed)
KROPATKIN.
429
APPENDIX XIV
Order to the Troops of the Western Detachment of the
Army
for October 16
1. The enemy is in occupation of the southern bank of the Schaho and of Lin-schin-pu village. 2. Our troops are on the line Fu-kia-tun-kou Kuan-tun Ta-lian-
tun
Schau-kia-lin-tsy.
The
3.
Army
is
going to attack
left.
tlie
General Reserve
is
advancing
to attack
4.
on our
The 10th
the \1th
Army
Corps will reach the line Nin-kuan-tun
Hun-pau-
schan, Liu-tan-kou, Corps: Tschien-liu-tan-kou, Dembovskis Detachment : Tsun-lun-yen-tun.

the Gth Siberian
Army
Corps: the line Pan-kiau-pu
Army
l)embov,ski' s
Siberian
kia-tun.
5. 6.
Army
Detachment is placed under the orders of the 6th Corps a flank guard will be left behind at Li;
Grekov's Cavalry Briyade will cover the riglit flank of the
Army.
Touch with Novikov's Detachment from the 1st Army C'orps will be maintained by two sotnias of the 1st Orenburg Cossack
Regiment. 7. The hour

order.
8.
for
beginning the attack will be issued in a supplementary

other of their position,
The
units will mutually inform each
so as to avoid flring into each other as they have done.
(Signed)
BILDERLING.
430
APPENDIX XV
The General Okder
The
series of the past
Issued on October 19
combats have confirmed what we assumed

is
to be the distribution of the Japanese forces.
Oku's Army, about 00 battalions and 30 squadrons strong,
on
the
left,
opposite Dembovski's Detacliment, the Gth Siberian, the 17th,
and part of the 10th Army Corps.

In the centre have been ascertained
:
the 5th and 10th Divisions or
Nodxus Army, about 32
battalions strong, opposite the 10th

(1st
Army
Corps and Gerngross's Detachment

Kuroki's
Army
:
Corps).
Farther east, in the direction of the Yen-tai mines and Orr-tau-kou, Army is operating strength three Divisions with reserve brigades ; of these, one or two Divisions, with one or two reserve
brigades, are opposite the 4th Siberian and 1st Siberian
Army Corps
'
;
farther east, at Bian-yu-pu-sa, about two reserve brigades are opposed

to
General llennenkami)f.
One
or two Divisions of Kuroki's

;
Army
are
stationed as General Reserve nortli of the Yen-tai coal-pits
this reserve
may
be used against our left flank as well as against our centre.

;
At Port Arthur have been ascertained the 1st, Dtli, and 11th Divisions. As regards the 7th and 8th Divisions, their station is not exactly known but probably one of these Divisions is at Liao-yan, if
;
not both.
Prisoners state that the Japanese have suffered heavy lo-sses in the recent combats, that their companies are far from being up to their full strength, and that the number of their sick is great. 'I'lie .Japanese
Army
is
suffering from
want of food and from the cold

10*
three
niglits.
In
regiments of the 5th and 10th Divisions were completely annihilated, tlie Japanese losing here 14 guns and 1 machine gun, and suffering enormous losses in dead and wounded. Judging by the moods of the prisoners, this bloody
the action of October
action has crushed the spirit of the Japanese completely.
That
is
to say,
somewhere near Ku-kia-pu.

431
Fight for Putilov Hill.
432

!
must wish the Japanese some more of these lessons are already somewhat superior in numbers we have greater experience in conducting an action. must take advantage of the defeat inflicted on them. The troops must be given to understand that fresh and energetic efforts are required for relieving Port Arthur, and that we must leave the enemy no time .for reinforcing himself and
We
We
We
making good
his losses.
(Signed)
KUROPATKIN.
PrinUd by BomII, Watton
Jt
Finty, Ld.,
London and Ayiabury.
Scha-ho.
Appendix XVIII.
Appendix XVI.
Appendix XVM.
Appendix XVIll.
River-crossing on the Schi-li-ho.
View
of Putilov-Hill
ti..,,,
ih,
\\y.
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

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CD

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

VOLUMES PREVIOUSLY ISSUED.

With nine Appendices and

^Vith ten Appendices and ten

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Digitized by the Internet Archive

2010 with funding from

THE BATTLE ON THE SCHA-HO

LATE LIEUT. 83rD (eaST PRUSSIAN) FUSILIER REGIMENT^ GERMAN ARMY

PRINTED BT HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LONDON AND AYLESBURY.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS USED ON THE SKETCHES

= (if au Artillery unit) 2-4 batteries (equivalent to

= Infantry Division. = Infantry Regiment.

= General Reserve. = Army Reserve, General

= Rearguard. Brigade = 2 Regiments of Artillery of 2-4 Abteilung

= Hill, Mountain. = Bahnhofe Railway bis = until. Brcke = Bridge.

A. = Eastern Detachment or Group.

= Colour or Standard Hill. Fels Hgel = Rock Hill.

= Western tachment or Group. =

= Centre. = Brickfield. zu = to, belonging to. zu (D.) = belonging to

along a road) from.

Zwei Kuppen Huge

NAMES SPELT IN THE TEXT DIFFERENTLY TO THOSE GIVEN ON THE MAPS

Kuropatkin's resolve to assume the offenIntelligence about

Strength of the Army, 16.

the enemy, 16.

Disposition after the battle of Liao-yan, 17.

to the East, 24.

BEGiXxVma of the Russian Movements

of the forces on the extreme right wing, 54.

Four Days of Battle

Division reinforces the right wing, 71.

posts of the 4th

and 2nd Armies withdraw,

attack to be continued during the night, 132.

inese 15th Brigade tries

Storming by night of the

San-kai-seki-san and of Sau-kuai-schi \-illage by the Japanese

The Japanese 6th

tures Orr-schi-kia-tsy, Siau-tun-tai, and Lan-tsy-tai, 201.

The Japanese 3rd

Division captures Nan-kuan-tsy, 204.

Counter-attacks of the 17th

Result of October 12, 221.

The Last Days

the Lo-to-san by the Japanese, 241.

from the Len-ge-san, 244.

Corps and Dembovski are placed under

The 6th Half-Division makes an

sult of October 13, 263.

Kuropatkin's order for a concentric attack

Oyama's order, 307.

patkin and the 10th

captures the height with the lonely tree, 331.

Kani's Detachment at the Wai-tau-schan

attack intended by Kuropatkin, 335.

Preparations for the attack

October 18 and the