Oxford Open Economics, 2024, 3, i4–i17

https://doi.org/10.1093/ooec/odad040
Dimensions of Inequality: The IFS Deaton Review
What is wrong with inequality?

What is wrong with inequality?

Debra Satz1, * and Stuart White2
1 Philosophy
and, by courtesy, Political Science, 450 Jane Stanford Way, Main Quad, Building 90, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
2 Politics
and International Relations, Jesus College Oxford, Oxford OX1 3DW, UK
*Correspondence address. E-mail: [email protected]

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ABSTRACT
This article lays out the reasons we have for objecting to certain differences between what individuals have and in how they relate to one
another. Our aim is to show that there is a plurality of reasons to be concerned with such differences and not simply with the absolute
amount that each individual has considered independently. Furthermore, we argue against a limited focus on income inequality. Other
forms of inequality can also matter.

Key words: inequality; political philosophy; ethics

1. Introduction argued that equality is at odds with the value of ‘meritocracy’

because people have different and unequal talents (Mankiw
We live at a time of very high inequality within many countries:
2013). Finally, some critics go even further and contend that a
these inequalities are found across the dimensions of income,
concern with equality ref lects a moral failing: it is rooted in envy
wealth, and the ownership of productive assets, educational
or resentment of the better-off (Nietzsche 1989 [1887]).
opportunity, life expectancy, health, and political inf luence.
We will argue that all of these objections are mistaken or can be
Across the developed world, many such inequalities have been
addressed. Inequality matters. At the same time, not all inequali-
growing since the 1970s, although at different rates in different
ties between people are objectionable or important. Some people
countries (Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015). At the same time, globally,
are taller than others; some are better at hand–eye coordination,
our world has seen a tremendous decline in poverty: over the past
whereas others are better cooks; some excel at music whereas
25 years, a billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty.
others are tone deaf; college professors are usually less fit than
Today, about 10% of the world lives in extreme poverty, defined
professional athletes. But these inequalities do not typically elicit
as less than $1.90 per day; in 1990 that number was 37%. This
moral concern. Any view about what is wrong with inequality
has meant that inequality between countries has also some what has to deal with the pervasive fact of human difference and to
declined at the same time that inequality within many individual distinguish those inequalities that matter from those that give no
countries has been increasing (Ravallion 2018). cause for concern.
This rising inequality, particularly with respect to in-country This article lays out the reasons we have for objecting to certain
economic inequality, is a growing concern of a number of contem- differences between what individuals have and in how they relate
porary social movements.1 The COVID-19 pandemic has under- to one another. Our aim is to show that there is a plurality of
scored this concern. In the UK, it has disproportionately affected reasons to be concerned with such differences and not simply
Black people, those from other minority ethnic groups and those with the absolute amount that each individual has considered
with disabilities (House of Commons Women and Equalities Com- independently (Scanlon 2018). Furthermore, we argue against a
mittee 2020; Oung and Elias 2020). Underlying economic inequali- limited focus on income inequality. Other forms of inequality can
ties have strongly shaped individuals’ opportunities to work from also matter.
home and to isolate when ill or at risk of spreading the virus. Section 2 introduces some of the key concepts in the philosoph-
However, some people argue that we should focus only on ical discussion of equality. Sections 3–5 then set out arguments
eliminating global and domestic poverty and not worry about for why inequality is objectionable and we should act to reduce
inequality. Some also argue that greater equality always comes it. Section 3 focuses on arguments that reducing inequalities
at a high cost: economist Arthur Okun claims that there is a can increase or maximize social welfare. Sections 4 and 5 focus
trade-off between equality and efficiency (Okun and Perry 1975); on arguments that inequalities are unfair. Section 4 focuses on
the philosopher Robert Nozick spoke for many critics when he arguments that inequality can be unfair by virtue of what causes
charged that achieving distributional equality requires constant it, whereas Section 5 focuses on arguments that it can be unfair
interference with people’s liberty (Nozick 1974). Others have by virtue of its consequences. In Section 6, we then consider, and
largely reject, some notable arguments against seeking to reduce
1 One example is the Occupy movement of 2011–12. See Kaldor and Sel- inequality. Section 7 concludes.
chow (2013).

Received: August 24, 2023. Accepted: August 31, 2023

© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which
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 Satz and White | i5

2. The landscape of equality: key concepts ciency is indifferent with respect to this matter). Sufficiency itself
Sufficiency is also unconcerned with how far above or below the sufficiency
level a person is. It differs from a concern for equality because
As already suggested, concern about inequality is distinct from
it is committed to improving the worst-off but not to worsening
a concern to ensure that everyone has enough to satisfy their
the position of the better-off in cases where the worst-off position
basic needs—‘sufficiency’. Philosopher Harry Frankfurt argues
cannot be improved.
that what matters is ‘not that everyone should have the same
To appreciate this latter distinction, consider the levelling-
but that each should have enough’. When everyone has enough,
down objection to equality. Imagine a situation where there is
he claims, it is of no moral consequence if some have more than
an inequality between people but where any attempt to reduce
others (Frankfurt 1987).
the inequality only makes some people worse off while making
Sufficiency matters enormously. To see why, note that equality
nobody any better off—a case of ‘levelling down’. If you care about
itself is not defined with respect to level. A society in which
equality for its own sake, then it seems like you must accept that
everyone was starving might be an equal society but it would
the more equal world is (in at least one respect) better than the
not provide its members with sufficiency; nor would it be desir-

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unequal one. But, in this case, it may seem implausible to prefer
able. However, a society which meets sufficiency might still con-
the more equal world because, as noted, by stipulation, nobody’s
tain very substantial inequalities in incomes, wealth, status, and
life is actually improved by equality whereas some people’s lives
power. For reasons we will elaborate below, these can still be unfair
are made worse. Proponents of the priority principle need not
and/or otherwise undesirable even if they do not have the specific
endorse moving to the more equal world in such a levelling-down
consequence of denying someone access to a decent threshold
case. Their concern is the quality of life of the worst-off and, if this
(see also Casal (2007)).
is not enhanced in the more equal world, there is no rationale for
In addition, even if one is only concerned with achieving suffi-
preferring it.
ciency, what is ‘sufficient’ in one area might be shaped by inequal-
In response, some egalitarians have argued that while it is usu-
ity in other areas and so demand action against inequality in these
ally undesirable to level down, all things considered, this does not
areas. Consider the example of achieving sufficient ‘capabilities’.
mean that the more equal world is not better in one respect—that
Amartya Sen argues that we should be concerned fundamentally
it is more equal—and so does not necessarily imply that equality
with ‘capabilities’: the power that individuals have to achieve var-
as such is not a value (Temkin 2000). However, many find it
ious valuable ‘functionings’ such as happiness, good health, and
implausible that there is always even a trivial value to equality in
full participation in society (Sen 1992). If we think of sufficiency
such cases—for example, in the equality of nobody being able to
in terms of a set of basic capabilities, then it can depend not only
access a scarce medical treatment as against a lucky few (chosen
on the income or wealth people have in absolute terms but on
at random) getting that treatment.
how much they have relative to others. One basic capability is
Nor do we need to argue this way to support a prioritarian
the power to participate fully in society without being exposed to
case for greater equality. If we ask which set of economic rules
shame or risks to one’s self-esteem. This capability, in turn, might
(including tax policies) will work to the advantage of the worst-
well depend on how much income one has comparatively. If one
off in the long run, then the answer will likely look different
has low income relative to others, then one might not be able to
from the ones that characterize many capitalist societies. In that
afford some of the goods necessary for such participation. (Adam
case, reducing inequality would not constitute a levelling down.3
Smith believed that in his day, the ability to appear ‘in public
Indeed, practically, one may wonder whether there are many
without shame’ involved having a linen shirt (Smith 1981 [1776]).)
genuine cases of levelling down, especially with respect to income
Greater equality in the space of income achieves—is needed to
and wealth. Consider that levelling down income and wealth may
achieve—sufficiency in the space of capabilities.2
yield improvements for those less well-off in terms of a range of
Thus, although the concept of sufficiency is analytically sepa-
outcomes such as fairer legal justice or more substantive equality
rate from the concept of equality, there are many circumstances
of opportunity.
where determining the level of sufficiency requires making com-
parisons between people (Satz 2007). In such cases, achieving
Equality of opportunity
sufficiency has an egalitarian dimension. What sets sufficiency
Commentators on both the left and the right often compare
apart from equality is (as mentioned above) that equality as a
equality of outcome unfavourably with equality of opportunity,
concept is indifferent as to level, whereas sufficiency is defined
with the latter being seen as the basis for a fair society that
with respect to some threshold.
rewards effort and talent—a ‘meritocracy’. By contrast, advocat-
Priority for the worst-off ing greater outcome equality, according to critics, unfairly treats
people who make unequal effort and have unequal talent alike.
Intuitively, it makes sense to think that giving an additional dollar
The concept of ‘equality of opportunity’ has, however, many
to a millionaire has less of an effect on her well-being than giving
different interpretations.
that dollar to someone who is destitute (Mirrlees 1971). Based on
According to the most minimal view, formal equality of oppor-
this intuition, one can argue that there is strong reason to give
tunity, equal opportunity obtains just so long as no person is
priority to the worst-off in arranging rules for distributions of
benefits (Parfit 2000).
This ‘priority principle’ is distinct from both sufficiency and 3 While the priority principle has many defenders, its general applicability
equality. It differs from sufficiency because priority will weigh the is open to question. On the one hand, the case for giving an extra dollar
claims of the least well-off more strongly than those of the better- to the destitute over giving it to the millionaire seems strong. On the other
hand, is it really evident that we should give priority to giving the marginal
off even when everyone is at or above sufficiency (whereas suffi- dollar to the millionaire over giving it to the billionaire (Crisp 2003)? Note,
however, that that Pigou–Dalton principle, which is widely used by economists
to justify income transfers that decrease inequality, is violated when we do
2 It also may be that the best way to achieve sufficiency is to direct not prioritize transfers to the millionaire over those to the billionaire. Thus,
resources from the top of the income and wealth distribution to those at the although ‘prioritarianism’ is compatible with the Pigou–Dalton principle, the
bottom of the income distribution. sufficiency principle is not.
i6 | Oxford Open Economics, 2024, Vol. 3, No. S1

subject to legal blocks in competing for jobs and offices. A some- which is due to choice is fair (Cohen 1989; Lippert-Rasmussen
what stronger view is that equality of opportunity also requires 2015; see also Dworkin (2000)). On this view, inequality in income
the state to prohibit employers and other institutions from dis- or wealth is unfair if it is due to factors that the individuals cannot
crimination (from, roughly, offering jobs and positions on a basis control, such as their ‘natural abilities’ or the families into which
unrelated to the individual’s aptitude). Let us call a society with they are born, but fair insofar as it ref lects different choices made
this second kind of equal opportunity a weak meritocracy (the against a background of equal options.
reason for ‘weak’ being clarified immediately below). How compelling is uncompromising equality of opportunity? It
Even in a context of robust non-discrimination, some will be is certainly true that people are more likely to respond negatively
at a significant disadvantage in competing for jobs and offices to the wealth held by those born with silver spoons than to that of
due to inequalities in social background that affect their personal those who made their way up the economic ladder by hard work.
development and economic opportunities. Sources of unequal Nevertheless, the ‘luck egalitarian’ view has serious problems.
opportunity, for example, might include unequal access to edu- Most fundamentally, there is reason to question whether luck
cation due to differences in parental wealth, parental education egalitarianism captures, or captures fully, what egalitarians ought

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levels, health, and nutrition. Merely providing formal equal oppor- in principle to be concerned about (Anderson 1999). On the one
tunity or weak meritocracy does not work for reasons pointed out hand, luck egalitarians often call for ‘compensation’ for those
by US President Lyndon Johnson in his 1965 speech supporting with ‘handicaps’ and low earnings potential. But the very notion of
‘affirmative action’ for African Americans: ‘It is not enough just ‘compensation’ in this context can seem patronizing and demean-
to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ing. On the other hand, luck egalitarianism is implausibly harsh
ability to walk through those gates’. in apparently suggesting that people should simply suffer any
This concern animates what we term, following John Rawls, fair disadvantage due to their choices. Should the ambulance pass
equality of opportunity. Fair equality of opportunity aspires to a by the drunk driver who has had an accident if it is the driver’s
society in which there are ‘equal life prospects for all sectors of own fault? In any humane society, the answer is no. In addition,
society for those similarly endowed and motivated’ (Rawls 1999 showing that one is entitled to community support because one’s
[1971], 265). It therefore seeks to redress disadvantages due to unemployment is bad brute luck may place on the unemployed
factors such as unequal educational opportunities and unequal a burden of ‘shameful revelation’ in that they have to show the
initial wealth endowments but allows for disadvantages due to state that they have continually tried to find work but have been
unequal effort and talent. Taken by itself, fair equality of opportu- continually rejected (Wolff 1998). Indeed, some forms of transfer
nity is compatible with a ‘strong’ meritocracy. Rawls’s own view, that reduce economic inequality might be objectionable because
however, is that we cannot take this principle by itself. For one even if cost-effective, they are not considered dignified in partic-
thing, it is not clear that it is desirable to allocate all of society’s ular settings. In such cases, a cash transfer paid to a redundant
goods and opportunities as rewards for effort and talent. Should steelworker will not adequately substitute for the dignity of a
we distribute political rights, life-saving medicines, or health care wage earned by hard work.
to people on the basis of their talents?4 Consider also that an equality of opportunity principle cannot,
Fully achieving equality of opportunity in Rawls’s sense is by itself, serve to justify our practices or institutions. A dictator-
extremely difficult, given the effects that families have on the ship can satisfy this principle just in case all individuals have
development of their children’s motivations and endowments.5 an equal opportunity (however understood) to be a dictator. The
However, even to the extent that we can achieve it, some argue ideal of equality of opportunity must itself attach to institutions
that even in this strong form, meritocracy does not satisfy the and practices that are justified on independent grounds (Scanlon
underlying demand for equal opportunity. In such a society, some 2018). Whether the prize structure of most current societies—the
will still have more limited market opportunities than others stakes attached to occupying different social positions—is justi-
because of the unequal distribution of ‘natural abilities’ that are fied is not something that can be answered by appeal to equality
not under their personal control. of opportunity.
These latter theorists have developed accounts of what we There are reasons, including those we discuss below, to care
might call uncompromising equality of opportunity: roughly, the about unequal outcomes even if they emerge from conditions
idea that people ought not to suffer disadvantage in access to the that satisfy the principle of equality of opportunity. For one thing,
good things of life by virtue of any factor beyond their personal equality of outcome directly affects equality of opportunity when
choice and control.6 we think about the next generation. Some inequalities of outcome
In its uncompromising form, equality of opportunity corre- for parents may simply constitute inequalities of opportunity for
sponds to a philosophical view known as ‘luck egalitarianism’. their children. This is especially the case where parents are willing
Something is a matter of ‘brute luck’ if it is not reasonably to spend significant resources on their own children’s education.
within the agent’s control. The luck egalitarian holds, roughly, that If we care about children’s unequal opportunity, then we have
relative disadvantage due to bad brute luck is unfair, whereas that reason to care about inequality of outcome for their parents.

A bigger picture: relational equality

4 Rawls (1999 [1971]) denies that his theory endorses a meritocratic society,
in part because it includes the difference principle, which maximizes the level
The discussions above motivate a view of equality that is funda-
of the least well-off person irrespective of their level of talent. mentally relational. Relational egalitarians argue that we should
5 As Rawls notes, taken to its conclusion, this ambition might suggest the understand the ideal of ‘equality’ as fundamentally about the
need to abolish the family as a fundamental source of unequal opportunity.
However, Rawls’s notion of fair equality of opportunity assumes that we will not nature and quality of social relations between people rather than
take this step but nevertheless take serious action to limit background sources about the just distribution of goods. A society enjoys ‘equality’
of unequal opportunity—for example, through the design of the education
system, appropriate inheritance taxes, and the like. See Rawls (1999 [1971], 64, when its social relations are free of unaccountable power, stigma,
263–7, 447–8). or grovelling. Such a society stands in opposition to forms of
6 We abstract from some nuances here, but we have in mind here Ronald
Dworkin’s theory of ‘equality of resources’ and G. A. Cohen’s principle of
social organization based on caste or class hierarchies. Relational
‘equality of access to advantage’. See Dworkin (2000) and Cohen (1989). equality is closely related to one interpretation of the ideal of
 Satz and White | i7

democratic citizenship: democratic citizens may be unequal in Dimensions of equality: measurement

terms of wealth and income, just as long as such inequalities do Although our account of why inequality is objectionable will
not threaten their ability to relate to one another as social equals. highlight certain non-monetary aspects of inequality such as
Contemporary proponents such as Elizabeth Anderson argue opportunity for political inf luence and procedural fairness, these
that relational egalitarianism fully captures the ideal of equality are themselves often caused by, and in turn cause, economic
that progressive social movements have fought for throughout inequality. But how should we conceive of, and measure, economic
history, and that, by contrast, ‘luck egalitarianism’ captures inequality?
nothing of intrinsic concern (Anderson 1999).7 Arguably, relational ‘Economic inequality’ itself is usually understood in terms of
equality lies behind some of the policies enacted by social inequality in income or in ‘income and wealth’. Whereas ‘income’
democratic governments in the mid-20th century. Social insur- refers to the f low of pecuniary benefit derived from work or own-
ance, unemployment benefits, and national health care are all ership of an asset, ‘wealth’ refers to a stock of value. Concern with
measures that create a social safety net that prevents one person inequality in incomes has an established lineage in economics,
from becoming very dependent on another. We might also seek to with recent writings going back to an idea originated by Hugh

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prevent an accumulation of excessive political power by setting Dalton (Dalton 1920) and further developed by Anthony Atkinson
an upper limit on how much wealth any individual can hold—one (Atkinson 1970). According to this idea, income inequality is to
consideration behind the ‘limitarianism’ perspective recently be understood in terms of a loss of social welfare. One version
developed by Ingrid Robeyns (Robeyns 2017, 6–10). Plato had of this is the Utilitarian argument that income inequality can
earlier argued that no one should be more than four times richer diminish social welfare because of the marginal decreasing utility
than the poorest member of society (Plato 1960, 127). As these of income. James Mirrlees applied this idea to study the problem
examples show, the relational perspective has important and of optimizing the schedule of tax rates (Mirrlees 1971). Although
potentially even radical implications for the rules and institutions such declines in social welfare can be measured in multiple
that control how income and goods are distributed—even though dimensions, economists have tended to focus on income.
it does not see distributions of income and goods as what equality This defence of redistribution raises many questions and objec-
is fundamentally about. tions. If we reject the classical Utilitarian’s assumption of the
Below, we will canvass some specific reasons to be concerned marginal decreasing value of income, then Utilitarianism has
about economic inequality, several of which have to do with no predetermined distributive implications. It simply endorses
relations between the members of a society. When we focus on whatever distribution maximizes utility. A different way to defend
measures of economic inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, we greater equality of income would be to look at its consequences
should stop to consider how the significance of a given number for a variety of social and political values. (We do this in Section 5
will often depend on its relational implications. For example, it below.)
may depend on the extent to which a society can cordon off the We can also ask whether the best metric for measuring eco-
inf luence of money from the opportunity for political inf luence nomic inequality is income. Perhaps consumption is a better mea-
or procedural fairness. sure of what matters because it relates more directly to economic
Could the relational view of equality be combined with other
conceptions of well-being (see the third subsection of Section 3).
views of the importance of equality? Relational egalitarianism
Some family members may possess no income but they consume.
might be compatible with the sufficiency principle, and perhaps
At the same time, income tells us something about purchasing
some form of prioritarianism. It is clearly compatible with non-
power—surely related in a loose way to consumption—and fur-
discrimination and some forms of equality of opportunity. Some
thermore may have the advantage of being able to allow us to
argue that we can combine relational and luck egalitarian views
translate our metric more easily into other forms of power and
(White 2006; see also Elford (2017)). In attempting to combine
well-being. Credit and savings aside, someone who is consuming
these views, however, we need to be alert to the possibility of
without income is presumably consuming at the discretion of
tensions between them.
someone else who has income, and that points to a relationship of
Our exploration below of the causes and consequences that
unequal power of precisely the kind that relational equality tells
make certain inequalities unfair owes much to the relational
us to be attentive to. Focusing on consumption to the exclusion of
egalitarian view. In particular, we will call out values such as
income risks missing this kind of inequality.
reciprocity, respect, and equal standing, and the way that inequal-
What about using wealth as our economic metric? Both theory
ities endanger or violate these values. This way of understanding
the harms of inequality clearly has implications both for policy and evidence suggest that wealth is far more unequally dis-
interventions and for where we think research efforts should be tributed than income (Piketty 2014). If wealth is excluded, this
directed. Although most economists are not ‘luck egalitarians’ or may lead us to underestimate the actual degree of economic
‘relational egalitarians’, they have not usually attended to the dif- inequality in a society. Data on wealth are harder to come by
ferent aspects of inequality that lie behind measures such as Gini than data on income, and survey data have recognized problems
coefficients. That is unfortunate because, in our view, it can lead to with response rates and reporting from the super-rich. A focus on
an overlooking of other dimensions of inequality that matter. We wealth inequality might seem also to entail a somewhat narrow
discuss the relationships between monetary and non-monetary focus on the top 1%, given that in many societies most people
dimensions of inequality below and throughout Section 3. possess no or little wealth. But the distribution of wealth is
important for reasons that go beyond this narrow top group.
First, from the standpoint of the more substantive views of
equality of opportunity, surveyed above, inequalities in wealth
7 For a related argument, see also Iris Marion Young’s critique of the
matter because they affect the opportunities and choice sets
‘distributive paradigm’ and development of an alternative perspective based people have. Some people may have greater access to educational
on the ‘five faces of oppression’ (exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness,
or business opportunities than others because they have inherited
cultural imperialism, and violence) in Young (1990). Nancy Fraser’s conception
of justice as ‘participatory parity’ also has a relational focus (Fraser 2003). more wealth. For example, those without wealth are less able to
i8 | Oxford Open Economics, 2024, Vol. 3, No. S1

access credit to open up educational or business opportunities transcend the nation state. At a minimum, there are human
(Bowles and Gintis 1998; Hoff 1998). rights claims that have global application, and these include
Second, from the standpoint of relational equality, inequalities rights against torture and a right to some kind of due process;
in wealth also stand out as important, independent of income. and arguably, rights against severe deprivation (Shue 1980). Note
Imagine two people with the same income but in one case derived that this human rights minimum establishes an important set
from employment and in the other from capital. The second of obligations on the governments and citizens of nation states,
person is not currently in a job but could get one if they wanted. including obligations toward refugees and asylum seekers whose
The first person is dependent for their income on employment human rights are threatened in their country of origin (see Owen
whereas the latter is not. This likely gives the second person more (2020) for a wider discussion).
power to hold out for a job they like, and more power, crucially, to Do the claims of justice in the global context go further than
walk away from a job if they do not like the way they are being this human rights minimum, important as this is? Some philoso-
treated. This exit power makes the second person less vulnerable phers argue that the claims of justice, including one or more of
to abuse in the workplace (Hirschman 1970). This power might the claims of equality we have sketched above, apply globally

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also underpin a heightened sense of self-respect and/or the status in a direct way (Caney 2005; Carens 2013). Others have argued
they are accorded by others in society. We thus see how issues that the scope of egalitarian justice is in principle more limited
surrounding wealth are not only about the 1%; they also apply than this. They argue that egalitarian justice applies only between
to those without wealth and point to the need for a country’s those who are bound by a common framework of coercive law
institutions to ensure some level of wealth (not only income) for (Blake 2001; Nagel 2005). Or they argue that egalitarian justice
its citizens. applies only between those who share participation in a shared
The relational significance of wealth inequality, and the related scheme of economic cooperation (Rawls 1999 [1971]). Those who
need to treat wealth distribution as a topic in its own right, is are mutually bound by shared laws, or who share participation in
emphasized in the report of the inf luential Meade Committee a scheme of economic cooperation, supposedly owe one another a
on the Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (Institute for special kind of justification for these laws or rules of cooperation,
Fiscal Studies 1978). Set up by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in one that uniquely triggers egalitarian considerations like those
its opening years, the committee argued strongly for the direct sketched above. However, even on these latter views, it can be
taxation of wealth and transfers of wealth. In explaining its case, argued that the scope of equality goes beyond the nation state.
the committee argued that treating wealth or wealth transfers In the contemporary global economy, citizens of all nations are
as significant only as ways of generating capital incomes, or plausibly part of the same scheme of economic cooperation. They
spending out of such incomes, is a mistake: ‘The holding of wealth are also subject to a degree of common coercion in the rules they
itself, whether it arises from inheritance or from the owner’s must follow in pursuing economic and other goals. Thus, as an
own effort and savings, can confer on the owner benefits of empirical matter, the conditions highlighted by these views as
security, independence, inf luence, and power, quite apart from relevant for egalitarian justice do apply across as well as within
any expenditure which the income from it may finance’ (Institute nations (Beitz 1999 [1979]; Cohen and Sabel 2006; see also Ypi
for Fiscal Studies 1978, 351). (2012), Ip (2016) and Laborde and Ronzoni (2016)).
In thinking about measurement, it is also important to think Pursuit of justice within a nation state must be consistent with
about whether we are interested only in measuring inequality our global justice obligations. Even if a policy—for example, trade
at one moment of time, or whether we are interested in mea- protectionism—reduces inequality within a state, it can violate
suring inequality over time—for example, as it plays out during a global justice obligation. This point will be especially impor-
a person’s lifetime. This issue is especially relevant for policy- tant in considering trade and immigration policies. Policymakers
makers thinking about inequities between the young and the inevitably confront such questions as to whether and if so, how
old. In many cases, we will have reasons to care about both the global and in-country inequality are related, and whether within-
synchronic and diachronic aspects of inequality.8 nation inequality should be the dominant moral concern.
Second, there is the question of equality between generations.
Further dimensions of economic equality: scope There is an obvious injustice if one generation uses up most of the
Another issue concerns what we call the scope of equality: what world’s available non-renewable resources and leaves future gen-
is the community of persons to which the demand for equality erations impoverished. The current generation clearly has some
applies? Much of the literature on equality and social justice we obligations toward future generations.9 Some philosophers have
have referenced takes the community to be the current popula- argued that morality requires that we treat future generations as
tion of something like a contemporary nation state. The policy being as important (or nearly so10 ) as our own generation (Broome
issue is then about how far the government of this nation state 1994), a perspective which was taken up in Stern (2006). There is
should act to limit inequality amongst those who are currently
members of this state. 9 Some argue against this claim on the basis of the so-called Non-Identity
Problem (Parfit 1984, 359). We are inclined to say that if we adopt environmen-
In this article, we assume that we are addressing policymakers
tally damaging policies now, this harms people who live in the future. But critics
who are also concerned with this specific, delimited question. say that the actual people in the future would not exist at all if the current
However, it is important to see how this is a limited question and generation had adopted different policies. So long as their existence in the
future is at least minimally decent, we therefore cannot be said to harm them by
to ref lect on at least two ways in which the claims of equality as adopting environmentally damaging policies now. However, even if we accept
a value arguably overrun the bounds of this delimited question. the argument, it still implies an obligation to ensure that future generations
have at least a minimally decent existence, which is by no means trivial. More
First, there is a question of equality in the global context, generally, the argument can be challenged by suggesting that we can do wrong
beyond the nation state. Political philosophers and much of the in an impersonal sense as well as by doing wrong to specific people; or by
suggesting that we can wrong the people who make up future generations
public accept that there are at least some claims of justice that even if we do not harm them (in the sense of making the specific future people
who exist worse off than they would otherwise be). For further discussion, see
Kumar (2009) and Finneron-Burns (2016).
8 For a treatment of justice between age groups, using a relational egalitar- 10 Taking into account the small possibility that the future generation may
ian approach, see Bidadanure (2021). not exist.
 Satz and White | i9

ongoing debate amongst philosophers as to the exact grounds and the Kaldor–Hicks criterion of efficiency. This says that one state of
content of these obligations. But they also shape the context in the world is preferable to another if at least one person is better off
which policies to address inequality within current generations in it and nobody is worse off, on the assumption that any ‘losers’
are pursued. Policies that reduce this inequality but violate our in moving from the first state of the world can be compensated
obligations to future generations should be avoided. by the ‘winners’. Arguments for reducing inequality in economics
This point is especially important in considering the interaction tend to appeal either to Utilitarianism or to the claim that doing
between the economy and the environment. Ongoing climate so is efficient.
change, which has serious consequences both for our current Some economists have claimed that we face a trade-off
generation and for the generations to come, makes it urgent to between greater equality and efficiency (Okun and Perry 1975).
address this (Caney 2020). Although there will be cases (hopefully Arthur Okun argues that if incomes and wealth are progressively
many) in which we can meet our obligations to future generations taxed then talented elites will change their behaviour in ways
without sacrificing anything of value for the present generation, that can reduce economic output. For decades, the prevailing
this will certainly not always be the case. Thinking about future view was that inequality is the necessary price of policies that

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generations inevitably raises questions about possible trade-offs stimulate capital accumulation and thereby economic growth.
that make it harder to avoid filling out the content of our obli- We accept that there are likely to be points of tension between
gations to current and future people. Policies involving long- some policies that aim to reduce inequality and efficiency objec-
term projects or projects with long-term effects generally apply tives. At some point, higher marginal tax rates on incomes will dis-
a discount rate made up of two factors: a pure discount rate for courage production and growth. However, it is important to recog-
the factor of time (which philosophers have argued should be nize that this is only one side of the story. There can be important
near zero) and a factor that ref lects the expectation that future complementarities between some measures that reduce inequali-
generations will be better off. That latter expectation may not be ties and efficiency objectives. For example, where capital markets
warranted in all cases. Regardless of whether we do actually have are imperfect, inequality in wealth can lead to underinvestment
a theory of our obligations across time, many of our policies will in human and physical capital. Higher wealth on the part of the
in fact assume answers to such matters. asset-poor can unleash otherwise blocked investments (Hoff 1998;
Bardhan et al. 2000). A further argument is that production is facil-
itated by trust between individuals and that trust is improved by
3. Objections to inequality: efficiency, social economic equality (Bowles and Gintis 1998). Economists have also
stability, well-being considered how the distribution of income can affect aggregate
We have now laid out some of the key dimensions and con- demand and output, arguing that high inequality can sometimes
cepts relevant to a consideration of the call to reduce and limit dampen demand and output, suggesting, other things being equal,
inequality. We have also started to point to some of the arguments a potential boost to production from achieving a more equal
for caring about inequality that go beyond a concern to ensure distribution of income (Carvalho and Rezai 2016).
sufficiency or to prioritize the worst-off. In this and the following Rather than assuming that measures to reduce inequalities
two sections, we develop this case further. As indicated in the always entail a cost in terms of efficiency, therefore, we should
introduction, in this section, we look at reasons for focusing on adopt a much more nuanced perspective in which we consider
inequality reduction related to increasing or maximizing overall on a case-by-case basis the possible benefits, as well as possible
social welfare. Sections 4 and 5 then focus on arguments about the costs, to efficiency objectives of such measures.
unfairness of inequality. Section 4 draws out a set of arguments
that inequality is unfair by virtue of what causes it. Section 5 Social stability
draws out arguments that inequality is unfair because of its A second argument, connected to economic growth, focuses on
distributional or relational consequences. the relationship between economic inequality and social stability.
The intuition is that a more unequal society will also be a more
Efficiency divided and conf lictual society and, in this sense, less ‘stable’.
Utilitarianism holds that actions and institutions should be If lower inequality in some dimensions can help a society avoid
judged according to whether they maximize the aggregate or violent conf lict, in societies that are otherwise morally acceptable,
average level of welfare in society. To the extent that she accepts this is surely desirable. In addition to the benefit of avoiding
that there is declining marginal utility of income, then, holding conf lict for its own sake, other benefits might f low from this.
other things equal, a Utilitarian will advocate for greater equality One, already mooted, is greater trust, which can also have positive
of income. Above, we pointed out that without the assumption of economic effects. Another is that society will have to expend fewer
declining marginal utility, Utilitarianism, unlike prioritarianism, is resources on policing conf lict, and this will free up these resources
actually indifferent to distribution. For a Utilitarian, what matters for alternative productive uses (Bowles and Gintis 1998; Graeber
is maximizing well-being, and a concern with distribution is 2018).
subordinated to that end. Beyond its implications for productivity, it is possible that too
Utilitarians, historically, also implicitly held that utilities could much economic inequality in a society would lead to the ‘haves’
be compared across people and that, additionally, everyone’s util- undermining or gaming the system in their own favour. Many
ity curve was more or less the same. Some economists deny that
we can make such interpersonal welfare comparisons. Perhaps, utility functions of individuals; gathering that information is a very difficult
task, made even more complicated once we recognize that such curves can be
they argue, some people simply need more resources to make distorted by lack of information and a person’s becoming accustomed to having
them happy than others.11 However, these critics can make use of little. Gathering such information would also be costly and very likely invasive
to individual privacy interests. For this reason, it makes sense for governments
to begin from a default assumption that people are ‘alike’ with respect to the
basic goods and services that governments provide and countenance depar-
11 It might be argued that there is reason to hold onto the simplifying tures from that assumption only when given good and evident justifications.
assumptions of the Utilitarians and others about marginal declining utility and (For example, a person with a serious physical disability will have more trouble
interpersonal comparability. State policymakers have little access to the actual translating income into well-being than a person without such a disability.)
i10 | Oxford Open Economics, 2024, Vol. 3, No. S1

argue that such gaming is widespread today in many capitalist fact that in recent decades, most of the fruits of economic growth
countries. Too much inequality—if it persists—might also lead have been distributed upward, whereas the lives of those at the
the ‘have-nots’ to feel inferior and hopeless about their fate, or bottom have stagnated or declined. That decline comes along with
to withdraw from participation in collective decision-making. If changes that bear on a second aspect of well-being.
that is the case, then economic inequality can have implications Psychological well-being is, as Émile Durkheim pointed out,
for the stability of democratic institutions, an issue we will come affected by social connectedness (Durkheim 2002 [1951]). In the
back to in the second subsection of Section 5. USA, the last 50 years have witnessed not only increasing inequal-
ity, but a decline in social connectedness (Putnam and Garrett
Well-being 2020). Civic engagement, trade unions, marriage, religion, and
One of the main things that ultimately matter, it might be said, social trust have seen a downward trend. For white workers with-
is not how much output a society produces, or how stable its out a college degree in the USA, the coming apart of their social
institutions are, but how its members fare in life. and economic lives has brought about a crisis in pain and suicides
Human well-being is surely important. But there are thorny (Case and Deaton 2020). In the UK, the first Minister of Loneliness

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questions about how to interpret it, how to measure it, and how was appointed in 2018, after survey feedback of decreasing social
to compare well-being across different individuals. One popular connectedness, especially among the aged.
interpretation has it that well-being is best understood in terms Higher national income inequality has also been linked in some
of satisfying subjective preferences (Diener 2009). But many pref- studies to a higher prevalence of mental illness (Pickett et al. 2006)
erences are adaptations to information and environmental limi- and lower scores on other well-being measures (Alesina et al.
tations. People who have become accustomed to having very little 2004). Other studies have highlighted a relationship between well-
may feel content with their lot. However, this does not seem like a being and the feeling that one has some control and authority
good reason for them not to have more. On the other hand, if we over one’s life (Bandura 1977). Although the causal mechanisms
are tempted by more objective criteria of well-being, what justifies are not well understood, the most economically unequal OECD
these criteria once the tie to what people actually prefer is broken? countries tend to be associated with higher levels of psychological
Some have tried to repair this tie by arguing that well-being should disorder. They are also associated with a harsh individualistic
be understood in terms of what a person would have wanted if ethos, and with a decline in the institutions that connect people
they had full information and access to an acceptable range of to one another.
alternatives (Geuss 1981). Such views ‘launder’ preferences and
argue that only the agent’s suitably laundered preferences should 4. Objections to inequality: unfairness in
count. Others have argued that these problems should lead us to
the causes of inequality
reject welfare as capturing what ultimately matters. Rawls has
argued that we should measure inequality in all-purpose goods The above arguments focus on inequality’s complex connections
that citizens need such as freedoms, opportunities, powers, and to social welfare. A number of these arguments are empirically
self-respect, whereas, as we noted above, Sen has pressed the case controversial. So let us imagine that, in fact, the arguments are
that what ultimately matters is the level of ‘functionings’ a person f lawed and that there is no causal relationship running from
is able to achieve—their ‘capabilities’ (Sen 1980, 1992). economic inequality to reduced social welfare. Even then, we
Decades of psychological research have revealed a number of might still think inequality objectionable either by virtue of how it
important aspects about our subjective well-being relevant to emerged or by virtue of other consequences that it has. We discuss
issues about equality. The first aspect is that a person’s sense of the former consideration first.
well-being can have a relative dimension. Recall Adam Smith’s
invocation of the importance of being able to appear in public Historical injustice
without shame. In a society in which no one has a linen shirt, a First, it is important to recognize that before we even consider the
man lacking such a shirt can appear in public on an equal footing arguments about equality of opportunity or efficiency sketched
with others; that is not so in a second society where most men above, a major factor shaping inequality in our own societies is our
do have such a shirt and it has become the norm for their public history of injustices such as colonialism, unjust wars, and slavery.
attire. So even if there is no simple resource difference between The UK certainly has not emerged from this history with ‘clean
those without linen shirts in the two societies, it is easy to see hands’. There is a need to address this historical legacy of the
why in the second society the well-being of a man without a use of illegitimate force and violation of human rights, perhaps
linen shirt would be lower. Societies that are more unequal in through reparations. As Frantz Fanon sharply put the point with
income and wealth may also be more unequal in terms of the respect to Western colonialism: ‘Colonialism and imperialism
social status of their members. This may be especially true when have not paid their score when they withdraw their f lags and
those at the bottom lose forms of employment associated with their police forces from our territories’ (Fanon 2001 [1961], 79–
their self-respect—for example, manufacturing jobs that brought 80). Moreover, not all historical injustice lies outside the borders of
with them some opportunity for advancement and a better life. major colonial states. Land ownership in the UK is very unequal,
This ‘status inequality’ can give rise to a range of psychological and forcible and unjust appropriations have played a major role
effects: higher levels of anxiety and depression, an increase in in establishing the present distribution (Shrubsole 2019).
feelings of pain (Case and Deaton 2020), unproductive and stress- Many historical injustices are quite recent and continue to have
ful status competition (Frank 2011), and, to return to the theme major effects in shaping inequalities today (Mills 1997). For exam-
of the last subsection, the additional stresses of living in a society ple, one of the largest disparities in the USA between Black and
characterized by high rates of instability and lower levels of trust. White people concerns the amount of wealth they have. For most
In thinking about relative standing and inequality, it is impor- Americans, their wealth largely takes the form of owning a home.
tant to view this across time and not simply at a moment in time. But African Americans were denied the ability to purchase homes
When we look at today’s inequality in places like the USA, it is not well into the 20th century, and even where they could qualify
only the growing numerical gap that we should look at but also the for loans they were steered into less desirable neighbourhoods.
 Satz and White | i11

Black and Asian immigrants to the UK in the post-war period prevalence of negative attitudes toward disabled people (Equal-
experienced discrimination in the housing market (Hiro 1992, 28– ity and Human Rights Commission 2017, 134–7; see also Ryan
9). Measures addressing historical injustice, such as reparations, (2020)). Economic disadvantage may in part result from, and
can be expected to have an impact on today’s inequalities. work to reinforce, these attitudes, which indicate the less-than-
equal status of disabled people in UK society. And, again, these
Group-based inequalities, unequal opportunity, background inequalities are part of the context for understanding
and relational equality the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on the health and well-
These comments on racial inequalities underscore the signifi- being of disabled people (Oung and Elias 2020).
cance for inequality of group memberships. In addition to race, Social segregation, due to factors such as race and social
these apply along lines such as gender, social class, and disabil- class, is also consequential for equality in another way. When
ity. These group-based inequalities are typically objectionable in people’s lives are radically separated from one another, and they
terms of both their causes (our focus in this section) and their consequently lack understanding and empathy for the other’s
consequences (the focus of Section 5). In terms of their causes, circumstances, the idea that we are ‘all in it together’, that we are

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for example, they frequently ref lect discrimination and unjust a democratic ‘people’, becomes difficult to sustain. It is not just
exclusion (sometimes connected to the way historical injustices that the rich can afford luxuries. The rich are also unlikely to sit
have shaped our societies). In terms of consequences, they rein- in the same doctors’ waiting rooms, have their children attend the
force and deepen various inequalities in the status and power same schools, or travel in the same train compartments as those
of members of the relevant social groups, a prime concern for in the bottom quintile of society. The current levels of inequality
the relational egalitarian (and which of course can produce and in many countries mean that the rich and poor live in different
reproduce unequal opportunity). worlds. Yet, arguably, every democratic society requires certain
In the UK, racial inequalities in poverty, pay, employment, experiences and institutions where everyone is treated the same.
education, and assets are significant. Members of Black and the Otherwise, the rich lose touch with the rest of society. This rein-
main other non-White racial and ethnic groups are on average forces ignorance and exclusionary attitudes, and so undermines
disadvantaged in all these areas, although members of many equality of status.
of these groups have better educational attainment than White
people from similar social backgrounds (Platt and Zuccotti 2021). Market imperfections and unequal bargaining
Inequalities can be partly explained by differences in social class power
and in some cases by being relatively recent migrants to the Although the market transactions celebrated by economists
UK. But the differentials cannot be explained entirely in these involve free and knowledgeable adults transacting on their own
ways. There is clear evidence that discrimination in the labour behalf, many markets are not like that. For example, some
market, in education, and in housing plays a significant role in markets involve parties who have highly unequal or inadequate
generating these inequalities (Khan 2020). These inequalities have information. And some markets involve one party making
consequences, in turn, for the status and power of individuals in decisions on behalf of others, often without their consent (Satz
these groups, as well as for their well-being and health. In the USA, 2010). As an example of the first type, consider those in the USA
a recent study of Chicago neighbourhoods shows that poor Black who purchased subprime mortgage loans without understanding
children are overwhelmingly more likely to grow up in neighbour- the terms of those loans, which were usually buried in obscure
hoods with concentrated violence, high rates of incarceration, language. As an example of the second type, consider dictators
and lead exposure than their equally poor White counterparts. transacting on the international market in ways that saddle
This difference in exposure likely accounts for a large percent- their populations with debt, or trade away the country’s natural
age of disparities in intergenerational income mobility between resources (Wenar 2015).
Black and White people (Manduca and Sampson 2019). These There are also inequalities that arise on the basis of monop-
background inequalities give important context to the racialized olies. Some monopolies are ‘natural’ in that they emerge where
inequalities in sickness and death in the UK and USA during competition would do little to lower costs. It makes little sense
the COVID-19 pandemic (see House of Commons Women and to run two parallel pipelines to deliver water to a community, for
Equalities Committee (2020) on these inequalities in the UK). example. But some monopolies occur because laws erect barriers
Let us now consider gender. In the UK, there is clear evidence to the existence of new firms. And in other cases, large firms
that women are at an economic disadvantage to men in terms of can command an advantage that stif les the market forces that
pay, income, and wealth, despite the fact that women have had would usually generate competition. The late 20th and early
better educational attainment for some time (Hills 2010, 219–20; 21st centuries have seen the rise of enormous monopolies (e.g.
Costa Dias et al. 2016; Brett and Lawrence 2020). The gendered Facebook, Apple, Amazon) whose scope and depth are increased
division of labour around childcare is a major source of the by new technologies. Monopsonies—markets in which there is a
inequality, but discrimination is likely a factor too (and of course dominant buyer—can also arise. In labour markets, for example,
can be related to the gendered division of domestic labour in employers with monopsony power can push wages and employ-
that employers may select against women in hiring or promotion ment below competitive levels.
in expectation of them taking up a childcare role). Women who Where monopoly and monopsony power exist, trade unions
leave employment to provide childcare thereby become more can serve as a source of ‘worker power’ that enables workers
economically dependent on their husbands, creating an unequal to share in monopoly ‘rents’ and/or to limit monopsony ‘rents’
power relationship inside the family (Okin 1989). at workers’ expense. It has been argued that the weakening of
Let us also consider disability. A 2017 report of the Equality worker power in the USA since the 1970s, in part due to the way
and Human Rights Commission points to the substantial disad- policy has discouraged unionization, is the cause of a decline
vantages of disabled people in the UK in terms of educational in labour’s share of national income, and the rise in corporate
attainment, employment, pay, risk of poverty, adequate housing, profitability. These developments in turn contributed to higher
and many other respects. The report discusses the continued income inequality (Stansbury and Summers 2020).
i12 | Oxford Open Economics, 2024, Vol. 3, No. S1

Market imperfections and associated inequalities in bargaining 2020 has a net worth of over $1 million according to data from
power infect the justification of the inequalities in income and their financial disclosures.
wealth that a capitalist society produces. Obviously, if you have It is worth elaborating on the value of political equality at work
more than me simply because you unfairly skewed the rules in here. It is framed in terms of equal opportunities for effective
your favour, then the resulting inequality between us is unjusti- political inf luence, not equal political inf luence. Some inequali-
fied. ties of political inf luence are arguably acceptable—for example,
There is a further point that should be made about a market because some choose to devote more time and efforts to politics.
system. All markets depend on background rules and property But it is unfair if some citizens have greater opportunities for
rights. Typically, in policy discussions, the burden of justification such inf luence than others simply because they are wealthier. On
lies on those wishing to achieve a more equal distribution than a relational view of equality, economic inequalities are tolerable
that produced through the market. But why treat the ‘free market’ to the extent that the equal standing of citizens is assured. But
as a morally privileged baseline in this way (Rawls 1999 [1971]; how can such equal standing be assured when those with money
Murphy and Nagel 2002)? After all, this is just one possible set of can disproportionately shape the political agenda and policy out-

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economic rules from a wide range of possibilities that citizens in comes?
a democracy might choose. In addition, as democratic citizens, we One possible response to this question is to emphasize the
might well think that certain goods should not be provided by the importance of the associational context for democratic politics
market, or that aspects of goods provided by the market should (Cohen and Rogers 1995; Young 1995). Historically, for exam-
be partly decommodified. T. H. Marshall articulated the thought ple, labour unions and other popular associations have arguably
that there is a realm of equality that markets must operate within, offered some balance to the inf luence of the wealthy and of busi-
writing that ‘Social rights in their modern form imply an invasion ness corporations in democratic politics (Ahlquist 2017; O’Neill
of contract by status, the subordination of market price to social and White 2018). But as we indicated in Section 4, in our dis-
justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of cussion of unequal bargaining power, there has been a notable
rights’ (Marshall 1950). decline in unionization in nations such as the USA and the UK in
recent decades.

Non-inclusive growth and the failure of

5. Objections to inequality: unfairness in reciprocity
the consequences of inequality Reciprocity, in general terms, requires that those who benefit
This last point means that when we, as democratic citizens, from the efforts of others should themselves provide benefits
choose our society’s property rules, we ought to consider broadly for these others, if they have capacity and opportunity to do so.
the consequences of the inequalities that some rules would pro- Reciprocity is an important element of social justice in its own
duce. We have already noted some unfair consequences above, right (White 2003). Experimental work in behavioural psychology
such as in our discussion of the impact of racial and gender suggests that people care deeply about reciprocity in this sense;
discrimination. These unfair consequences can also include the they are willing to pay a price to penalize those who ‘free-ride’ on
following. their contributions. Such third-party behaviour has the effect of
reinforcing reciprocity and, thereby, promoting mutually benefi-
cial cooperation over the long run (Bowles and Gintis 2002).
Unequal opportunity for political influence The idea of reciprocity failure—of people not reciprocating
Although democratic citizens are formally equal, having equal when they ought to—is perhaps most familiar in contemporary
rights under the law, and equal political rights, what use people public discussions of cash benefits. It is widely thought that
can make of their rights is largely a function of their resources. benefits should be linked to an obligation to look or prepare for
One area in which this unequal use can be of huge consequence is employment. This can be seen as ref lecting the idea that every
politics itself. Unequal resources can transfer over to inequality in person should ‘do their bit’ productively and not seek to live off
citizens’ opportunities for effective political inf luence. This is an the work of others.
unjust consequence of economic inequality—and of course, might However, the demand for reciprocity in this sense seems
itself in turn become an unjust source of economic inequality. reasonable only if it is understood as an obligation to do one’s
In the UK, the Democratic Audit project has pointed to some bit as part of a generally fair scheme of economic cooperation
of the channels by which resources can impact politics. The (White 2003, article 4; Shelby 2018, article 6). Where the wider
better-off and large businesses have more resources to put into economy lacks fairness in its structures of opportunity and
lobbying elected politicians (Dunleavy, Park and Taylor, 2018, 116). reward, the demand for work as reciprocity requires unfairly
Political parties rely heavily on donations to fund their expenses, disadvantaged workers to work even though other, more
including election campaigns, but these are by no means spread advantaged citizens have not made good on their obligations to
proportionately across parties—the Conservatives got 50% of all ensure fair opportunities and rewards. As a matter of fairness,
donations in 2013–17 (Dunleavy, Park and Taylor, 2018, 110). There we cannot impose one-sided obligations: there is a failure of
is a clear link between major donations and becoming a member reciprocity by the better-off as well. Consider, as an example,
of the House of Lords, the UK Parliament’s second legislative the effort to make cash benefits for disabled people more
chamber (Dunleavy, Park and Taylor, 2018, 110). Studies of the US conditional on work-related activity (Baumberg Geiger 2017).
political system have attempted to directly gauge the inf luence If the wider society is not making sufficient steps to address
that different income groups have on policymaking, with results the injustices that disabled people face in employment (see
that point to the lack of responsiveness of policymaking to those the second subsection of Section 4), or legislates conditionality
with low incomes and substantial responsiveness to the better-off requirements that are not sensitive to the capacities of individual
(Bartels 2008; Gilens and Page 2014). Although millionaires make disabled people, then we have a one-sided application of
up 3% of US households, more than 50% of the US Congress in reciprocity.
 Satz and White | i13

In thinking about reciprocity failure, therefore, we should give liberty side of the trade-off will require us to hold back on the
more consideration to the way reciprocity can fail due to inequal- extent of equality-promoting redistribution.
ities in the way the wider economy is structured. Inequalities in In responding to this objection, we need first to clarify what we
wealth and power can create a context in which social relation- mean by liberty. Liberty is an empty abstraction until it is given
ships fail to respect reciprocity as the powerful extract benefits actual functional definition. For example, your freedom to blow
from others without helping to create just opportunities or giving cigarette smoke wherever you like interferes with my freedom to
a proportionate return. be in situations where I am not subjected to smoke blown in my
Radical critics of capitalism, such as Karl Marx, argue that face. Constraining your liberty here means enlarging my liberty
exploitation of this kind is integral to capitalism as such (Marx and vice versa. This, as we shall show, is a crucial point. We have
1990 [1867]). But one does not have to endorse Marx’s economic reason to care about the distribution of liberty as well as the
theory to think that a worrying reciprocity failure arises when extent of liberty.
the benefits of economic growth are very unequally distributed. Taking the critic’s viewpoint, liberty seems to consist in: being
In the USA, the benefits of economic growth have been highly able to act as one wishes (or might wish to act) without being sub-

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concentrated at the top of the income distribution since the 1980s. ject to coercive interference by others, particularly by the state.
One recent study finds that although average income increased This corresponds to one understanding of what is sometimes
by 60% in 1980–2014, the post-tax income of those in the lowest called ‘negative liberty’ (Berlin 1969). However, even if we adopt
50% of the income distribution increased by only 21%, and that of this view of liberty, it does not in fact support the critic’s argument
those in the lowest 20% by only 4% over this entire period. At the against ‘redistribution’ to reduce inequality. To see why, imagine
same time, average post-tax income increased faster than average a free-market system with zero taxation and no redistribution of
at the top of the income distribution, especially for those at the income or wealth. Would this system place any restrictions on
very top, the top 1% (Piketty et al. 2018). Over this long period, individual liberty (in the negative sense)? Of course it would. If
people in low-income groups have continued to contribute to the a relatively poor person attempted to perform an action using
economy, but have not reaped much improvement in their living resources that are the property of others, they would be subject
standards from this, whereas better-off groups have done much to coercive interference by the state to stop them doing this.
better. This is growth without reciprocity. This is the enforcement of the private property rights people
There can also be a regional dimension to this. As Agrawal acquire in the free-market system. One person’s liberty stops at
and Phillips (2020) show, productivity and earnings are signifi- the door, as it were, of other people’s property (Waldron 1993). In a
cantly higher in London than elsewhere in the UK, and in recent world where all resources were owned privately and a particular
decades, house prices have increased much more in London individual owned nothing, they would not be able to perform any
and the South East than elsewhere, generating a rise in wealth action without being subject to coercive interference by others
inequality between regions.12 because every action they might wish to make would entail a
Where growth is non-reciprocal, this can in turn feed into some claim on property belonging to others. This is not necessarily to
of the other issues we have addressed around stability, health, and criticise the institution of private property. But it is to point out
well-being. For example, although the causes are complex, there that distributions of private property also shape the distribution of
is strong evidence to suggest that the exclusion of working people negative liberty. Imagine now that the state taxes wealth holdings
from the benefits of economic growth provides part of the context and passes the proceeds to those with least wealth. In doing
for growing health problems in the US, first affecting working- this, the state configures a different distribution of property and
class Black communities and more recently working-class White thereby also changes the distribution of liberty—the ability to act
people (Case and Deaton 2020). There is some evidence that as one wishes or might wish without being subject to coercive
similar problems are starting to affect the UK (Case and Deaton interference by others. And this is the key point: so-called redis-
2020, 282–3). tribution is not a matter of reducing liberty for the sake of greater
equality. It is (or can be) a way of achieving greater equality in the
distribution of liberty—‘negative liberty’—itself.
6. Objections to egalitarianism ‘The worst thing that can happen to one in relationships
between man and man’, wrote Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘is to find
We cannot necessarily conclude from Section 3 that we ought
oneself at the mercy of another’ (Rousseau 1984 [1755], 125).
to reduce inequalities because there might be outweighing moral
The focus on living ‘at the mercy of another’ lies at the centre
objections to doing so. Here, we consider—and reject—three moral
of the so-called ‘republican’ conception of liberty (Pettit 1997;
objections to inequality-reducing policy.
Skinner 1998) and resonates with the view of relational equality
Equality versus liberty? we discussed earlier. The paradigm case of republican unfreedom
is slavery, the slave being someone who is wholly at the mercy
A common argument against proposals to reduce inequality
of another. Freedom, the antithesis of slavery, is the status of
is that they curtail individual liberty. Consider ‘redistribution’
not being at another’s mercy, of not being subject to another’s
through the tax–benefit system. The critic argues that when we
power of arbitrary interference, the power to interfere as they
redistribute income, we use state coercion to force some people
wish, according to their whim. If we accept this view of freedom,
to transfer resources to others, thereby reducing the liberty of
then there is certainly always a danger that the state can be a
those subject to this coercion. Perhaps this does not invalidate
dominating presence, a risk that calls for careful structuring of
any and all redistribution, but the critic argues that it points at
the state in terms of checks and balances and individual rights
least to an equality–liberty trade-off; and that respect for the
to contest decisions. However, even in the absence of slavery,
there is also a serious danger of domination emerging within the
economy and civil society. As Rodbertus put it, ‘Hunger makes a
12 Although the high cost of housing means that median income after
housing costs in London is no higher than the UK average, and its after-housing-
good substitute for the whip’ (quoted in Böhm-Bawerk (1890, 334)).
cost income poverty rate is relatively high. Background rules about property and entitlements powerfully
i14 | Oxford Open Economics, 2024, Vol. 3, No. S1

inf luence the structure of coercion in a society. The fact that others. Paying attention only to an employment contract at a
someone makes a choice does not mean that the person was not given time leaves out all the social factors that put a person in
coerced. Robert Hale noted that even a slave makes a choice as the a particular bargaining position. It also leaves out the luck that
compulsion that drives him operates through his own willpower accompanies bargaining position—how scarce the person’s skills
(Hale 1943, 606). are at a given time. The same productive contributions will be in
In an important recent analysis, Elizabeth Anderson explores greater demand and command a higher price the scarcer they are.
the very considerable discretionary power that employers in the Third, the most compelling case for ‘desert’ involves the selection
USA frequently have over their employees not only within the of people for demanding, complex jobs that are socially valuable.
workplace but stretching to many aspects of life outside of the But it is possible to separate, at least partially, that process of
workplace (Anderson 2017). Against this, it might be said that, selection for such positions from the question of the size of the
unlike a slave, a wage worker always has the freedom to exit a job rewards that attach to these. Although incentives can be justified,
and thereby escape the dominating relationship. Indeed, this very the size of the incentives that are justified depends on many fac-
threat of exit may discourage the employer from exercising their tors including the number of qualified people, the intrinsic goods

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powers. However, if we stress the importance of exit power as a of the position, procedural fairness and, indeed, the prevailing
bulwark against domination in the workplace, then we begin to cultural attitudes about the justification of inequality. Fourth and
see one way in which a more equal distribution of wealth can help finally, from a relational perspective, we should be critical of a
to enhance individual liberty. For the power to exit is affected by meritocratic ethos that attaches itself so strongly to the idea that
how costly it is to leave a given job. Where a worker has no assets our compensation and standing in life are ‘deserved’. It is a short
to fall back on, the costs of exit might involve a risk of immediate step from that idea to the conclusion that those who do not fare
poverty that they cannot afford. If assets are distributed so that well ‘deserve’ their fates. This can lead those who win out in desert
all have some wealth, and thereby some income independent to smugly look down on those ‘losers’ who just cannot hack it.
of work, then everyone has a degree of exit power and protection Michael Young, who invented the term ‘meritocracy’, saw it as
against workplace domination.13 A similar argument can be made leading to social calamity (Young 1958).
in the family/household context where women need resources
to be free from domination by their husbands (Okin 1989, The politics of envy?
article 7). A third objection to the concern for equality is that it allegedly
ref lects the vice of envy. The poor resentfully wish for the benefits
The claims of meritocracy? enjoyed by the rich. They would be more virtuous if they focused
Above, we pointed out some of the shortfalls of meritocracy on getting on with the life open to them. The egalitarian, however,
and suggested reasons why strong meritocracy is not a com- panders to the poor’s resentment.
pelling ideal. Although meritocratic societies are improvements Given all that we have said above, however, it is clear that the
over aristocratic societies, they also tend to traffic in ideas about envy objection rests on a very narrow, inadequate characteriza-
unequal human worth (Sandel 2020). They too can harden into tion of what motivates egalitarianism. The ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’
self-reproducing elites. But suppose we acknowledge that meri- are not natural categories, but created politically through the laws
tocratic values have a place in justifying differential outcomes; and policies of states. To question the existing laws and policies
surely, I want to hire the competent plumber and not the incom- is not necessarily to express envy but to press for justification of
petent one. Equality-promoting action conf licts with meritocracy these laws and policies in terms of values such as justice.
that says it is fair that people be rewarded according to their Is the desire for ‘justice’ itself motivationally suspect? In his
efforts and abilities (Miller 1999). Economist Greg Mankiw has On the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche characterizes
further argued that promoting equality is wrong when it conf licts concerns for justice as expressing a ‘slave revolt in morality’, an
with the principle that people should be compensated in terms of attempt of the ‘weak’ to bring down the ‘strong’ and ‘noble’, born
what they deserve (Mankiw 2013). But for reasons that Friedrich from the ressentiment that the weak feel for the strong and noble
Hayek pointed out, ‘desert’ here cannot mean moral desert (Hayek (Nietzsche 1989 [1887]). At its core, the will to achieve ‘justice’
1960, article 6). Markets are not responsive to whether people are is seen as expressing an unattractive desire to deny others their
morally deserving: they reward the efficient racist and punish the opportunity to f lourish—and so is essentially life-denying.
altruistic bumbler who is poor at planning. So ‘desert’, especially The desire for justice, however, can surely have a more positive
in the economic context, must mean something like ‘productive impetus and meaning. Consider, in this connection, Frederick
contribution’. Douglass’s account of his experience as a slave in the early
Although it is true that some markets do track such contribu- 19th century US South and his escape from slavery (Douglass
tions, in the very specific sense of rewarding workers according 2009 [1845]). One thing that shines through is how, as a child
to the market-determined value of their marginal product, it is and a young man, Douglass acquired a strong sense of the rich
important to recognize the real-world limits of application. As we possibilities of life and of how these had been arbitrarily closed
have seen, many market ‘imperfections’ mean that many people to him on account of his race. His escape from slavery, and his
get rewards they do not ‘deserve’: the monopolist does not deserve subsequent political activism to abolish it, is clearly rooted in
his outsized profits while manufacturing shoddy goods. Second, this life-affirming spirit. Related to this, Douglass does not crave
in many cases a person’s productive contribution is difficult to what the slave-owners have as slave-owners. He is not envious.
untangle from the productive contributions of others with whom He expresses a mixture of anger and pity for them—constantly
she is cooperating. In a complex society, almost no one contributes embroiled as they must be in cruel efforts to retain control of
in isolation and almost all production involves cooperation with those they have enslaved.
To rebel against an inequality that puts one at a disadvantage
can thus be an expression of one’s own love of life and desire
13 A similar effect might be had by guaranteeing a universal income
independent of employment through the tax–benefit system. See Van Parijs
to make the most of it. To support such rebellion from a more
and Vanderborght (2017). privileged position, moreover, is not necessarily a symptom of
 Satz and White | i15

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